Abstract:
Sudan and Chad, despite having different referent objects of security in the transnational borderlands of eastern Chad
and Sudan’s Darfur, brought about similar insecurity outcomes in the borderlands. Sudan’s referent object of security
was the Arabo-Islamic identity, although in 2007-2016, it transited to regime security. Chad, on the other, pursued the
Chadian ruling regime security. Although both countries supported each other’s rebels, the other measures pursued by
each were different. Sudan mobilised ground soldiers to carry out reprisals on African indigenous communities; she
established and armed Arab Janjaweed militia group; and carried out aerial raids targeting civilians in the
borderlands. Chad, on the other hand, concentrated government troops in specific places to protect the Chadian
government; mobilised government friendly ethnic groups to carry out reprisals on civilians; and sometimes armed
“enemy” ethnic groups to provoke cataclysmic fights amongst the enemy ethnic groups. Additionally, Chad
subcontracted the security of citizens to rebel groups fighting the Sudanese government; and carried out aerial raids
on rebel positions inside Sudan.The security measures of the two countries were oriented to different referent objects,
but the measures did serve to mutually reinforce insecurity. The study concludes that the focus on a state’s referent
object of security can bring up hidden contrasts and comparisons that can influence the adoption of better state
security policy and practice in transnational borderlands.
