

**PATRON-CLIENT RELATION AS A DETERMINANT OF ELECTORAL  
PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY, KENYA**

**BY**

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## DECLARATION

### Declaration by the Candidate

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my wife Evaline Towett, my son Emmanuel Kipchirchir and my daughter Abigael Chebet for their endless moral support during the entire period of study. I also dedicate this work to my parents Mr./Mrs. David Langat and all members of *Kapkitolek* clan wherever they are within and outside the Republic of Kenya.

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## ABSTRACT

Electoral participation in liberal democracies is an unfringeable right guaranteed by the state Constitution and international law. Studies globally indicate that electoral participation is however influenced by party systems, political culture, and institutional and electoral management. While most studies in Kenya and especially Uasin Gishu County have focused on inter-ethnic and political conflicts, the core bulwark of these political dynamics has not adequately been inquired into. This study assessed patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County-Kenya. The objectives of the study included to; assess the clientelistic practices that influence electoral participation, assess the roles of primordial and purposive corporate social bonds in electoral participation, examine political dyadic networks influencing electoral participation, and to assess the implication of patron-client relation on democratic governance. The Theory of Reasoned Action and the Social Exchange theory guided the study and was based on pragmatist research philosophy. A mixed method research design was adopted and targeted 450,055 registered voters in the County. A sample size of 384 respondents selected through a simple random sampling technique participated in the study. Primary data was collected using questionnaires, Key Informant interview schedules and focused group discussion and corroborated with existing secondary data. Data analysis was done using convergent parallel mixed method for the purpose of presentation. The study established that the prevalent clientelistic practices influencing electoral participation included monetary incentives (73%), pork barreling (66%), provision of branded apparels (68%) and patronage appointments (52%). Purposive corporate social bonds attributed to voters' attachment to community association, the media, and political party as well as primordial social ties based on ethnicity, family history, gender, and social class shaped voters' choice of candidates during elections. The study also revealed entrenched political dyadic networks with actors such as ethnic political patrons, business associations, community groups, religious groups and individual voter, and with each dyad being established and sustained by use of clientelistic goods and services. Research findings also revealed that patron-client relation had affected attributes of democratic governance such as public participation (62%), transparency and accountability (60%), equity (59%), and responsiveness and efficiency in public service delivery (51%). The study concluded that patron-client relation is ingrained in County elective politics and involves mutual trade-offs between political candidates and voters. It affects voters' free will vote and weakens vertical accountability and thus pervasive to electoral democracy and democratic governance. To address clientelism, this study recommends amendment of Electoral Offence Act and the Election Campaign Financing Act to compel political candidates and parties to declare the sources and the amount of funds for use in campaigns while putting a cap on spending. Lastly, national and the county governments should establish pragmatic community empowerment programmes and projects to bolster citizens' socio-economic status and thus reduce reliance on clientelism. A National level analysis of patron-client relation and how it impact on efficiency of national government institutions is recommended for further research.

## TABLE OF CONTENT

DECLARATION .....	ii
DEDICATION .....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	iv
ABSTRACT.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENT .....	vi
LIST OF TABLES .....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xiii
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....	xiv
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS .....	xvi
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>1</b>
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Background of the Study .....	1
1.3 Statement of the Problem.....	6
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	8
1.4.1 Broad Objective.....	8
1.4.2 Specific Objectives.....	8
1.5 Research Questions .....	8
1.6 Significance of the Study .....	9
1.7 The Scope of the Study .....	10
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</b> .....	<b>11</b>
2.1 Introduction.....	11
2.2 Patron-Client Practices and Electoral Participation.....	11
2.2.1 Patronage and Clientelism and its Different Forms of Practice .....	11
2.2.2 Political Patron-Client Practices in Various Jurisdictions Excluding Kenya..	15
2.2.3 Political Patronage and Clientelistic Practices in Kenya Since 1963.....	21
2.2.4 Electoral Participation in Liberal Democracies .....	26
2.3 Primordial and Purposive Corporate Social Bonds and Electoral Participation....	30
2.3.1 The Nature of Primordial and Purposive Social Bonds .....	31
2.3.2 Primordial and Purposive Corporate Actors and Patron-Client Politics .....	31
2.3.2.1 Political Parties and Patron-Client Relations.....	31

2.3.2.2 Religious Groups and Patron-Client Politics.....	35
2.3.2.3 The Media and Electoral Participation .....	38
2.3.2.4 Ethnicity, Ethno-Regional Identity and Electoral Participation .....	41
2.3.2.5 Politicians and Voters in Patron-Client Relations .....	44
2.4 Dyadic Networks and Electoral Participation.....	46
2.4.1 The Nature of Dyadic (Patron-Client) Networks and Electoral Participation	46
2.4.2 Dyads in Patron-Client Networks and Electoral Participation.....	49
2.4.3 Elements of Patron-Client (Dyadic) Networks and Political Participation.....	52
2.5 Implication of Patron Client Relations on Democratic Governance .....	55
2.5.1 Democratic Accountability, Clientelism and Vote Choice .....	55
2.5.2 Patronage Networks and its Relations with Democratic Governance.....	57
2.5.3 Implications of Patron-Client Practices on Democratic Governance.....	63
2.6 Theoretical Framework.....	66
2.6.1 Social Exchange Theory.....	66
2.6.2 The Theory of Reasoned Action .....	68
2.7 Conceptual Framework.....	71
2.8 Chapter Summary and Research Gaps.....	73
<b>CHAPTER THREE</b> .....	<b>76</b>
<b>RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</b> .....	<b>76</b>
3.1 Introduction.....	76
3.2 Study Area .....	76
3.3 Research Philosophy.....	79
3.4 Research Design.....	80
3.5 Target Population.....	80
3.6 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure .....	82
3.6.1 Sample Size Determination.....	82
3.6.2 Sampling Procedure .....	83
3.7 Methods of Data Collection.....	84
3.7.1 Data Collection Techniques .....	85
3.7.1.1 Questionnaires .....	85
3.7.1.2 Interview Schedules.....	85
3.7.1.3 Focus Group Discussion.....	86
3.7.1.4 Secondary Sources of Data.....	87
3.8 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments.....	87

3.9 Methods of Data Analysis.....	88
3.10 Ethical Considerations .....	89
3.11 Limitations of the study .....	89
<b>CHAPTER FOUR.....</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>CLIENTELISTIC PRACTICES AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY.....</b>	<b>91</b>
4.1 Introduction.....	91
4.2 Response Rate.....	91
4.3 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents .....	92
4.4 Respondents’ Participation in 2013 and 2017 General Elections in Uasin Gishu County.....	96
4.5 Clientelistic Practices and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	97
4.5.1 Clientelistic Practices in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	98
4.5.2 Clientelistic Practices in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County ...	105
4.5.3 Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	113
4.5.4 Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	122
<b>CHAPTER FIVE .....</b>	<b>128</b>
<b>ROLES OF PRIMORDIAL AND PURPOSIVE CORPORATE SOCIAL BONDS IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY .....</b>	<b>128</b>
5.1 Introduction.....	128
5.2 Purposive Corporate Social Bonds and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County.....	128
5.2.1 Political Party/Coalition and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	129
5.2.2 The Media and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	135
5.2.3 Religious Affiliation and Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County.....	144
5.2.4 Voters’ Associations/Groups and Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County.....	146
5.3 Primordial Social Bonds and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County.....	151
5.3.1 The Influence of Candidates’ Ethnicity on Voters Choice of Candidates ....	151



5.3.2 The Influence of Candidates’ Family Ties/Clan on Voters Choice of Candidates.....	156
5.3.3 The Influence of Candidates’ Gender on Voters Choice of Candidates .....	161
5.3.4 The Influence of Candidates’ Race on Voters Choice of Candidates .....	163
5.3.5 The Influence of Candidates’ Socio-Class on Voters Choice of Candidates	165
5.3.6 The Influence of Candidates’ Religion on Voters Choice of Candidates .....	166
5.3.7 The Influence of Voters’ Family/and or Relatives on Choice of Candidates	168
<b>CHAPTER SIX</b> .....	172
<b>POLITICAL DYADIC NETWORKS AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY</b> .....	172
6.1 Introduction.....	172
6.2 Political Dyadic Networks Influencing Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County.....	172
6.3 Political Dyadic Networks in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	173
6.4 Political Dyadic Networks in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County ..	185
6.5 Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	194
6.6 Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	201
<b>CHAPTER SEVEN</b> .....	209
<b>IMPLICATIONS OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY</b> .....	209
7.1 Introduction.....	209
7.2 Patron-Client Relationship and Democratic Governance in Uasin Gishu County .....	209
7.2.1 Patron-Client Relation and Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	209
7.2.2 Patron-Client Relation and Transparency and Accountability in Uasin Gishu County.....	218
7.2.3 Patron-Client Relation and Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Public Service Delivery in Uasin Gishu County.....	229
7.2.4 Patron-Client Relations and Equity in Provision of County Public Services in Uasin Gishu County .....	241
7.2.5 Patron-Client Relations and Administration of Justice and the Rule of Law in Uasin Gishu County .....	244

<b>CHAPTER EIGHT</b> .....	248
<b>SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....	248
8.1 Introduction.....	248
8.2 Summary of Research Findings .....	248
8.3 Conclusions.....	263
8.4 Recommendations.....	265
8.4.1 Policy and Programmatic Recommendations .....	265
8.4.2 Recommendation for Further Research .....	267
<b>REFERENCES</b> .....	268
<b>APPENDICES</b> .....	278
Appendix I: Questionnaires.....	278
Appendix II: Key Informant Interview Schedule.....	296
Appendix III: Focus Group Discussion Interview Guide.....	299
Appendix IV: Sample Size Table.....	300
Appendix V: Extracts From Respondents.....	301
Appendix VI: Research Permit and Authorization .....	303
Appendix VII: Anti-Plagiarism Certificate .....	305

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Administrative Units and Area by Sub County .....	78
Table 3.2: Target Population.....	81
Table 3.3: Sample Size .....	84
Table 4.1: Questionnaires’ Response Rate per Sub County .....	91
Table 4.2: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents .....	93
Table 4.3: Respondents’ Participation in 2013 and 2017 General Elections.....	96
Table 4.4 Clientelistic Practices in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	98
Table 4.5: Clientelistic Practices in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	105
Table 4.6: Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	113
Table 4.7: Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County.....	122
Table 5.1: Influence of Political Party/Coalition on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in General Elections in Uasin Gishu County.....	129
Table 5.2: Influence of Coalition/Party Activities on Voters’ Choice of Political Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	130
Table 5.3: Influence of Radio on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	135
Table 5.4: Influence of Newspapers on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	138
Table 5.5: Influence of Television on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	139
Table 5.6: Influence of Internet on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	142
Table 5.7: Influence of Religious Leader(s) on Voters’ Choice of Political Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	145
Table 5.8: Associations/Groups Influence on Voters’ Choice in Elective Positions in Uasin Gishu County .....	149
Table 5.9 Influence of Candidates’ ethnicity on Voters’ Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	151

Table 5.10: Influence of Family Ties/Clan on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County.....	157
Table 5.11: Influence of Candidates' Gender on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	162
Table 5.12: Influence of Candidates' Race on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County.....	164
Table 5.13: Influence of Socio-class on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	165
Table 5.14: Influence of Candidates' Religion on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	167
Table 5.15: Influence of Voters' Family/and or Relatives on Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County .....	169
Table 6.1: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	174
Table 6.2: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County .....	186
Table 6.3: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Election of MNAs in Uasin Gishu County .....	195
Table 6.4: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County .....	202
Table 7.1: Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	213
Table 7.2: Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Transparency and Accountability .....	223
Table 7.3: Respondents' View on Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Provision of County Services in Uasin Gishu County .....	230
Table 7.4: Respondents' View on Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Provision of National Services in Uasin Gishu County .....	237
Table 7.5: Influence of Patron-Client Relations on Equity in Provision of County Public Services .....	241
Table 7.6: Patron-Client Relations and Administration of Justice .....	245

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Patron-Client Network/Linkages.....	51
Figure 2.2 Features of Good Governance .....	58
Figure 2.3: Theory of Reasoned Action.....	70
Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework .....	72
Figure 3.1: Map of the study area .....	79
Figure 5.1: Respondents' Affiliation to Formal Association in Uasin Gishu County .....	147
Figure 7.1: Frequency of Public Forum for Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County .....	211
Figure 7.2 Respondents Feedback on Access to Financial Audit Reports in Uasin Gishu County.....	219
Figure 7.3 Respondents' Sources of Audit Report in Uasin Gishu County .....	221

**ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ACC</b>	Assistant County Commissioner
<b>ACDEG</b>	African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance
<b>ANC</b>	African National Congress
<b>ADC</b>	Agricultural Development Corporation farms
<b>AGPO</b>	Access to Government Procurement Opportunities
<b>CCM</b>	Chama cha Mashinani
<b>CORD</b>	Coalition for Reform and Democracy
<b>COVID</b>	Corona Virus Disease
<b>CPDM</b>	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement Party
<b>CPSB</b>	County Public Service Board
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DCC</b>	Deputy County Commissioner
<b>DCI</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
<b>EACC</b>	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
<b>EMBs</b>	Electoral Management Bodies
<b>FGDs</b>	Focused Group Discussions
<b>GoK</b>	Government of Kenya
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>ICCJ</b>	International Criminal Court of Justice
<b>ICCPR</b>	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<b>IEBC</b>	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
<b>KANU</b>	Kenya Africa National Unity
<b>KADU</b>	Kenya Africa Democratic
<b>KI</b>	Key Informant

<b>KNBS</b>	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
<b>LPK</b>	Labour Party of Kenya
<b>MCA</b>	Member of County Assembly
<b>MNA</b>	Member of National Assembly
<b>NARC</b>	National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
<b>NASA</b>	National Super Alliance
<b>NEMA</b>	National Environmental Management Authority
<b>NG-CDF</b>	National Government-Constituency Development Fund
<b>NRM</b>	National Resistance Movement
<b>NCIC</b>	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
<b>NACOSTI</b>	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
<b>NGAOs</b>	National Government Administrative Officers
<b>ODM</b>	Orange Democratic Movement
<b>Pa</b>	Participant
<b>PLWDs</b>	People Living With Disabilities
<b>PNU</b>	Party of National Unity
<b>UDF</b>	United Democratic Front
<b>UN</b>	United Nation
<b>UDHR</b>	Universal Declaration on Human Rights
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
<b>SRC</b>	Salaries and Remuneration Commission
<b>TARs</b>	Traditional African Religions
<b>TNA</b>	The National Alliance
<b>TRA</b>	Theory of Reasoned Action

## **OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS**

### **County**

A geographical unit envisioned by the 2010 Constitution of Kenya as the second-level of political division in Kenya. Each county has an independent county assembly and county executive whose members are elected during every general election.

### **Ethnicity**

Used in this study in reference to all aspects associated with a socio-culturally constructed group identity based on language, culture, and ancestry and which constitute the main fulcrum around which national and local politics are organized.

### **Electoral Participation**

It refers to the involvement of individual citizens in identifying and choosing leaders who serve as their representatives at various levels of government within the country. In the context of this study, it examines voters turning out to choose the Members of County Assembly (MCA), Member of the National Assembly, the Governor, and the President during the general election.

### **General Elections**

In this study, it is the process of voters choosing members of elective political positions such as the position of the president, governor, member of national assembly as well as the member of the county assembly, often done after every five years as per the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.

### **Patron-Client Relation**

The selective and favourable treatment of individuals, groups or ethnic communities by political candidate(s) or party(ies) in exchange for votes during general elections.



**Determinant**

In the context of this study, it refers to a factor which decisively affects the nature and the outcome of electoral participation.

**Political Patronage**

It entails power relations emerging from politicians and/or political parties using personal resources or resources at their disposal in public agencies or other arenas, to compensate and reward groups or individuals who have played a significant role in towards winning in elections.

**Purposive Corporate Actors**

In this study, it refers to deliberate and consciously created social organizations such as formal community associations/groups, trade unions, business associations, political party, religious groups and media organizations for political mobilization.

**Public Participation**

A consultative process aimed at decision making and involving an individual, group(s) or organization.

**Primordial Social Bonds**

Used in this study to refers to attachments socially created by people or groups of people based on/or on a sense of common identity such family ties, ancestry clannism, religion, race, gender and ethnicity.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the background of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study and the scope of the research study. This study examined patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

#### **1.2 Background of the Study**

Globally, electoral participation forms the bedrock of representative democratic societies and refers to the involvement of individual citizens in choosing leaders to represent them in various levels of government (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). The United Nations through The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), emphasizes that a legitimate government must be founded on the will of the people expressed through periodic and genuine elections conducted under universal and equal suffrage and should be held by secret vote (UDHR, 1948 and ICCPR, 1976). This is an expression that the authority to govern must be based on regularly contested elections with a comprehensive equal right to vote and based on citizens' free will (Yamamoto, 2014). Electoral participation grants citizens the right to choose their desired leader(s) for public office, legitimizes the government's authority and institutions, articulates interests, and demands, and is a means through which public officials are held accountable in the management of public affairs and resources (Aspinall 2016).

While developed democracies such as USA, Britain, Germany, and Australia have met the threshold of free, fair and regular elections in accordance with UDHR and ICCPR, studies indicates that electoral participation and outcome is still affected by

the level of education, race, marital status, socio-economic status as well as citizens' occupation. In USA and France for instance, citizens' level of education, age and social-economic status, still affect the level of electoral participation (Culbert, et.al 2015). A research study by Pomirchy and Sonenshein (2015) established that in USA and Australia, better educated and higher social status groups tend to dominate the arenas of political participation and articulation of interests compared to the lower class. It was observed that education enhances citizens' sense of civic duty, responsibility, political competence as well as self-confidence (Dalton, 2008).

Developing democracies in Asia, Latin America and Africa, however, continue to encounter problems on the quality of their electoral processes especially on the level of citizens' free will to vote and elections being free and fair (Dubois and Blank, 2018). In Brazil, Malaysia, India and Indonesia, studies indicates that electoral participation is affected by religion, ethnicity, marital status, level of education as well as political patronage (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Roy (2014) established that in India and Malaysia, educated persons are more likely to discuss political issues with colleagues at workplaces, friends and neighbours at the residential areas but are less likely to participate in the voting or in attending political campaigns and rallies than the less educated because of their occupational commitment. A study by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) on Brazilian politics also noted that married people tend to be more active and participate in political activities than the unmarried. This was premised on the argument that marriage prevents mobility, provides a stable social existence and strongly bonds individuals with the community which helps the married persons to participate more in politics especially for better living conditions.

Studies indicate that in Africa, recent elections such as in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda have been affected by monetized politics, weak electoral and

judicial institutions and negative ethnicity (Chadwick, 2017 and Gherghina, 2014). In Zambia and South Africa, a research study showed that civic associations such as community and religious groups helps to enhance trust and cooperation and consequently motivate citizens to participate in political campaigns and elections. Research survey conducted on the impact of mass media on political participation noted that in Nigeria and Rwanda, newspapers remain to have less impact compared to radio and this has been attributed to low literacy rates and the high cost of purchasing newspapers. Additionally, most citizens with the help of their mobile phones and internet are able access varied information through various independent and international information platforms (Dubois and Blank, 2018). While various studies on electoral participation have focused much on determinants such as ethnicity, electoral and judicial institutions, as well as demographic characteristics such as level of education, age, marital status and occupation, there has been less focus on how patron-client relation shape electoral participation and thus the rationale for this study.

Patron-client relation is a political strategy adopted by individual politicians or political parties to gain electoral support by dispensing individual and/or collective goods or services to prospective loyal electorates (Hicken, 2011). Appropriation of resources through patronage is aimed at compensating and rewarding individuals and/or groups that have been instrumental towards winning in elections either by a politician, political party and/or a political party life or strategy (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). The selective incentives can also be offered on a large scale to help initiate and tie new supporters to the party or politician and can include development projects or land offers in exchange for electoral support or endorsement during election, or when influential and loyal party leader(s) are guaranteed of future support

especially to a higher political office (Boone and Kriger, 2010). The distinguishing characteristics of patron-client relationships are reciprocity, unequal exchange, proximity, and diffuseness. The combination of these elements is what makes the patron-client tie a specific type of exchange different from mere friendships (Stokes, et al. 2013).

As noted by Dubois and Blank (2018), political candidates who have successfully been elected based on patron-client exchange are expected to deliver on their promises and failure to do so may cost them the next general elections. Consequently, the struggle to hold the current political seat spills over from election period into post-election period (once elected) and thus may affect democratic governance. Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) posit that the elected representative must decide how to invest in securing and maintaining political support, leading to tradeoffs being made by politicians with citizens in preparation to secure next elections. Regardless of this, political investment in strategic voting groups now become more important and often takes precedence over the development agenda of the constituency (Hutchcroft, 2014). It is amidst this process that dyadic (patron-client) networks are developed as a reciprocal relationship between the elected official and the voters and as a means of maintaining ties between the actors involved.

A study by Banerjee, et.al (2014) on Indian local politics noted that primordial social bonds such as ethnic ties and caste system are key instruments of enhancing dyadic (patron-client) ties in general elections and thus create a social protection net for those who are voting to political candidates. In Africa, various states adopted elections as a means of choosing political leaders immediately after attaining their independence although the outcome of such elections have often been constrained by various factors such as ethnicity and weak electoral institutions (Kagwanja, 2005). Gherghina (2014)

argue that although the tendency of African political leaders to seek electoral victory is indicative of greater institutionalization of democracy, there is however, a widespread use of state resources in voter mobilization and other clientelist practices such as vote buying and government appointment to induce political support. In addition, patron-client (dyadic) networks are also increasingly evident as a means of enhancing political party and/or candidate support with voters, as witnessed in recent elections in South Africa, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Rwanda and Uganda where skewed development in certain regions of the country, vote buying, monetary incentives, and recruitment and promotions in the public service are used as key trade-offs (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016).

In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta's appointment of KADU leaders such as Ronald Ngala, Daniel Arap Moi and Masinde Muliro to cabinet positions when they agreed to dissolve KADU and join KANU in 1964 marked the beginning of patronage politics in Kenyan history (Klopp, 2012). As noted by Chelang'a, et.al (2009), the outstanding characteristic of the Kenyatta and Moi regimes was the adoption of selective methods of distribution of state resources such as public appointments to various State Corporations, ambassadorial positions, and land, where ethnic communities and regions in support of the regimes were greatly favoured while punishing dissent with dismissal. By 1969 when Kenya was a *de facto* one-party state, those Members of Parliament who exhibited loyalty to the Party Chairman (the president), and who demonstrated the ability to rally support for KANU by being consistently re-elected were rewarded with greater access to national resources (Kanyinga, 2009).

In 1992, Section 2A of the then constitution was repealed allowing multiparty politics in Kenya, and ending the one-party rule (Chelang'a, et.al 2009). When KANU under President Moi won the 1992 election in a profoundly unfree and unfair process, the

party faced a problem of numerical strength in parliament and the ruling party adopted use of patronage resources to keep a parliamentary majority on various critical votes. Opposition politicians found it hard to function as constituents demanded services and development projects, and KANU made it clear that opposition areas would be deprived of state funds unless they supported the government (Norris, 2012). The net result of these dynamics was an escalating demand for patronage resources and initiation of development projects for their constituents. Under Mwai Kibaki regime, a new constitution was promulgated in the year 2010 and provided for a robust institutional mechanism and framework for decentralized governance, peoples' representation, equitability in sharing of resources and equal universal suffrage.

Whereas the quality of electoral participation has been sustained in developed democracies, it has continued to diminish in the emerging democracies in the Latin America, south East Asia as well as Africa. This has been occasioned by malpractices that cause interethnic, social and political conflicts. However, the core bulwark of these political dynamic has not adequately been interrogated. It is against this background therefore, that this study assessed patron-client relation as a feasible explanation of the extant electoral behaviour in Uasin Gishu County.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

In both developed and developing countries, electoral participation is the hallmark of democracy and the major form of political participation that grants legitimacy to a regime and allows citizens to articulate their interests and demands to the government (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018; Askim, et.al, 2017; Kopecky, 2011; Chelang'a, et.al 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Oyugi, et.al 2003; Nyong'o, 1995). Elections are important in

bringing the desired socio-economic and political change in any country since it gives citizens an avenue to choose change-oriented leaders. It's expected that the entire electioneering process must, therefore, be transparent, fair and based on citizens' free will and in accordance with the established electoral laws, the constitution and legally accepted international electoral practices (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Banerjee, et.al 2014; Bogaards, 2013; GoK,2010; ICCPR and UDHR). Studies in countries such as USA, Australia, France, India, Ghana, South Africa however reveal that electoral participation is still influenced by factors such as age, level of education, occupation and race.

In Kenya, past studies have focused on state patronage by the national executive where land allocation and ethnic based government appointments have been used to rally ethnic and regional electoral support. The promulgation of a new Kenyan constitution in 2010 provided institutional mechanism and framework for equity in resource sharing, broader citizen participation and a more transparent executive in terms of its constitutional mandate. Additionally, the Constitution was envisaged to address past political malpractices related to electoral processes and voters' free will choice of candidates in elections. However, with scarce empirical studies, it cast aspersions on elections being based on voluntary participation as well as the efficacy of elections as a means of assuring democratic and responsive governance in Kenya. North Rift region especially Uasin Gishu County has been the focal point on studies related to electoral violence/conflict since the onset of multiparty politics as well as on human rights and land related studies. However, there is scanty research on how patron-client relation shape electoral participation in general elections. It is against this backdrop that this research study assessed patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County-Kenya. This was predicated on the



County being a peri-urban and cosmopolitan and thus able to provide the varying attributes of patron-client relation and practices from the different ethnic groups and from a cross urban and rural setting.

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The subsequent section highlights the broad and specific objectives of the study.

##### **1.4.1 Broad Objective**

The purpose of this study was to interrogate patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

##### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

The study was guided by the following specific research objectives.

- a) To assess the clientelistic practices that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.
- b) To interrogate the roles of primordial and purposive corporate social bonds in electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.
- c) To examine political dyadic networks that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.
- d) To assess the implications of patron-client relation on democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

#### **1.5 Research Questions**

The research study was guided by the following research questions;

- a) Which clientelistic practices influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya?
- b) How do primordial and purposive corporate social bonds influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya?

- c) How do political dyadic networks influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya?
- d) What are the implications of patron-client relation on democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya?

### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The purpose of this research was first premised on understanding how patron-client relation influence electoral participation through primary data and information sharing. The study thus provides an understanding on aspects of patron-client practices, the dyadic networks, the roles of purposive and primordial corporate actors, and the implications of patron-client relationship on democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. Secondly, this study sought to fill existing scholarly gap related to patron-client politics and electoral participation in Kenya. As noted, most conventional literature and studies are from the western democracies (like in USA, Britain and France) and focus much on the formal attributes for electoral participation which have tended to be universalized and adopted including in emerging democracies. This study therefore extends the discourse through an empirical study by integrating developing country phenomena that have implication for the practice of electoral participation and specifically from Kenya in the new 2010 Constitutional dispensation.

Thirdly, the research findings are of importance in policy making to both the County and national level of government. By understanding the dynamics of patron-client practices and networks, policy makers at both levels of government can develop strategies to address abuse of public offices and resources for political gain. Additionally, the electoral management body tends to be insulated from the reality of patron-client practices. This study will therefore inform electoral related policies and

actors such as Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC), and Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) by highlighting non-formal determinants that are crucial in realizing electoral participation as envisaged under the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Lastly, this research in its entirety will also form a basis for future research on election related issues in Kenya.

### **1.7 The Scope of the Study**

This study interrogated patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya and specifically focused on the clientelistic practices, the roles of purposive and primordial social bonds in electoral participation, the dyadic networks influencing electoral participation, and the implications of patron-client relation on democratic governance. The field research was conducted between the month of January 2021 and June 2021 and was confined to voters' electoral participation in the post 2010 general elections (2013 and 2017 elections) in the Presidential, Gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews literature related to objectives of the research. Key issues/themes reviewed include patron-client practices, the roles of different purposive and primordial actors in electoral participation, the dyadic (patron-client) networks, and the implication of patron-client relationship on democratic governance. Lastly, this chapter also highlights the theoretical and conceptual framework adopted in the study.

#### **2.2 Patron-Client Practices and Electoral Participation**

The subsequent section provides an understanding and practice of patronage and clientelism in different jurisdictions as well as electoral participation in liberal democracies.

##### **2.2.1 Patronage and Clientelism and its Different Forms of Practice**

Patronage and clientelism denote an approach used by political parties or politicians to gain political loyalty and support from the electorates. It is characterized by distribution of goods or services to prospective loyal individuals or groups (Hicken, 2011). As concepts used to analyze socio-political relations in different political systems, clientelism specifically refers to a dyadic relationship between two individuals or groups of unequal socio-economic status, while the concept patronage involves office holders using states resources to benefit their loyalists due to their unwavering political support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). According to Klopp (2012), clientelism implies a strategy to treat individual citizen primarily selectively and favourably in exchange for votes to the specific politician and/or political party dispensing the selective treatment.

According to Mbabazi and Pyeong (2015), patronage conventionally implies a dyadic relationship involving a political party and/or politician, and a voter or group(s) of supporters whereby political power is used by a political party and/or politicians to seal electoral loyalty and support within the larger community. Patronage politics is, therefore, characterized using own resources or resources at the disposal of a political party and/or a politician to reward and compensate individuals and/or groups for their important role in the life of a political party, and in party strategy towards electoral victory (Hicken, 2011). As noted by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016), patronage politics may include appointment of a favoured political supporter to any public agency which guarantees material benefits or monthly salary while sometimes the reward may include promotion at workplace, or new appointment such as to ambassadorial or judicial positions. This often occurs based on individual contribution to a party or candidate electoral victory, for instance, as key loyal supporters and strategists or as party fundraisers.

Boone and Kriger (2010) posit that selective incentives given on a large scale may include development projects and land offer aimed at winning new supporters to the party or to a political candidate, in exchange for electoral support, endorsement in an election, or for an assurance of future electoral support to a higher regional or national political office. In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual (the patron) may or may not be someone holding an official position, for instance as the political party leader or as a deputy party leader in parliament. As a result, the incentives to his clients may originate from the patron's personal influence, economic power and status, as opposed to his access and use of public resources (Klopp, 2012). It is, therefore, based on this understanding of patronage, that clientelistic practices are most closely associated. The patrons, who are the parties or politicians, have

clients, who are voters or potential supporters, with the link between the two being vertical and dyadic (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Chandra (2017) observed that both brokerage and patron-client networks between voters and politicians tend to be more pronounced and of significant importance in rural and less economically developed regions in developing democracies.

Historically, the concepts political patronage and clientelism are traced to the 1960s and 1970s and were used by anthropologists and political scientists in studies on political and social changes (Mbabazi and Pyeong, 2015). Empirical evidence indicates that early studies were based on ethnographic case studies as well as new analytical constructs and theoretical perspectives regarding the predominance of traditional patron-client relations in agrarian societies (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Chandra (2007) also opined that the first research studies on clientelistic networks examined the asymmetric and the dyadic nature of the ties between individuals of unequal status and power for instance between the peasants and the landlords in South-East Asia.

Other early studies sought to delineate the integration of the traditional patron-client ties based on personal relations between peasant clients and the locally influential notables, into the organizations of political parties owing to socio-economic and political changes (Kopecky, 2011; Stokes, 2007; Roniger, 2004 and Klopp, 2001). The dominant assumption of most early studies was premised on the argument that industrialization and economic development would undermine the prevalence of patron-client practices since it was mostly associated with pre-industrial communities (Roniger, 2004). It hypothesized that as states became more developed, the influence of cultural traditions which characterizes most traditional societies will gradually diminishes (Chandra, 2007). Additionally, the culturalist and developmentalist

approaches to patronage and clientelism also presumed that because of socio-economic and political changes, the class affiliations would replace the vertical dyad of patron-client networks as the primary bases of electoral choice and political preferences. Contemporary studies have however, established that patron-client practices continue to thrive even amongst the modern advanced democracies such as Britain, Australia, Japan, USA, and France (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018 and Hutchcroft, 2014).

Studies by Osayi (2015) and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) observed that the prevalent patron-client practices in most developing democracies may include; first, the direct gifts from the politicians such as clothes, electric appliances, food, liquor, building materials and many other material offers to the voters usually before, during and after the electioneering period (also Posner and Young, 2007). The second aspect is the preferential and selective access to material benefits in public social policy schemes where major social programs are subject to limited clientelistic manipulation due to the precisely and general operationalized rules of eligibility and contribution. This is often common in most democracies such as Norway, Netherland and Denmark which have large social programs such as health care insurance, old age pensions, income replacement, basic unemployment as well as other family benefits (Chandra, 2007).

Thirdly is the selective access to employment or appointment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector is mandated to provide social-cultural services such as nursing homes, counseling centers and hospitals (also Stokes, 2007). The fourth clientelistic practice is the selective access to government procurement opportunities or contracts to employers who consequently operates as enforcers of their staff electoral support or political campaign assistance for their partisan

benefactors (Pappas and Assimakopoulou, 2012). While this is a common practice mostly in state-owned or regulated enterprises, this form of practice also extends deep into the private capitalist business enterprises.

Lastly, Osayi (2015) posits that the manner of application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies also constitutes a clientelistic practice. Politicians and their administrative appointees in different regulatory agencies can interpret and apply regulatory code in favorable or unfavorable ways contingent upon the company's willingness to make its employees a dyad in patron-client electoral network (also Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018 and Hutchcroft, 2014). Spheres that may allow for regulatory discretion in relation to patron-client practices may include zoning laws, certification of companies and professions, construction and environmental codes, product safety laws and rules in finance and banking regulation such as on export and import licenses, or loan guarantees (Hutchcroft, 2014).

### **2.2.2 Political Patron-Client Practices in Various Jurisdictions Excluding Kenya**

Contemporary studies such as by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) noted that in Turkish politics, there are varieties of patron-client based behavior involving the role played by influential tribal or religious leaders, members of notable families and landlords as patrons in dispensing collective or individual benefits to electorates in exchange for political support in election. The 2008 elections in Turkey, for instance, was characterized by free distribution of household goods such as dishwashers and refrigerators by the local officials of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the residents of Tunceli in Eastern Turkey (Hutchcroft, 2014). It was established that while the residents of the region did not have access to electricity in their homes, they were receptive to the clientele goods and committed their political loyalty to the governing political party (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). The selective



provision of these clientele benefits to the electorate was a display of political patronage by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to gain political mileage and electoral support in a region perceived as opposition party stronghold in the previous elections.

A study by Parrado (2000) on political patron-client practice in Portugal observed that subsequent to elections of October 1995, approximately 6,000 political appointments were made by the incoming government of the Socialist Party at the top of various ministries and public agencies. This was not an exceptional situation since a similar practice (in large scale changes) had been witnessed when the Portuguese Social Democratic party in 1986-87 formed a majoritarian government. As opined by Parrado (2000), patronage politics in Portugal rewards individuals from within the political party based on the enormous support that the party gets from different party membership bases.

An assessment of the Greece's political system by Pappas and Assimakopoulou (2012) indicates that political patronage and clientelism has been a time-honored feature of Greek politics. An early study by John Campbell (1964) whose field-work focused on mountainous communities in Northern Greece showed that patronage was an intrinsic characteristic of social and political exchanges at local level politics. Progressively, studies indicated that in the post-authoritarian Greece, political party patronage became prominent and especially after the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) accession to power in the year 1981 (Pappas and Assimakopoulou, 2012). Under the PASOK regime, the public sector increased in size and most of its posts were filled with party appointees. When the New Democratic Party (ND) took over in 1990, there was pressure from the party and electorate for precious state jobs and other state-related benefits and despite effort towards state privatizations, party

patronage remained the order of the day (also Hicken, 2009). In 1993, when PASOK once again returned to power, it was apparent that patron-client practice had got out of hand and Kitschelt (2009) notes that the dominant political parties in Greece pursue patron-client practice in the form of public employment and by offering advantageous policy entitlements to targeted social categories.

In the Philippines, clientelism continues to shape the organization of party politics largely and since 1987, an average of 33.5 percent of all lower house representatives elected to Congress has switched parties in pursuit of resources allocated through clientelistic networks (Muno, 2010). It has been noted that majority of these party switchers usually join the party of the sitting president and thereby producing monolithic political behemoths (Kasuya, 2009). Fueled by presidential patronage, these monolithic parties have dominated Philippine politics under the past five administrations, notably the *Struggle of Democratic Filipinos* party in 1986 during the term of Corazon Aquino, followed by the *Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats* founded by Fidel Ramos, the *Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino Masses* party of Joseph Estrada, and the *Liberal Party* under Benigno Aquino III from 2010-2016 (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). As posited by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016), the regular split and merger of political parties into ad-hoc coalitions in Philippines have weakened party linkages with the citizens and thus replacing ‘democratic accountability’ with ‘clientelistic accountability’ characterized by direct monetary payments or continued access to employment, goods, and services in exchange of citizens’ vote during election.

An assessment of political patron-client practice and voting behavior in India by Banerjee, et.al (2014) noted that the practice leads to collective action such as social movement and social networking which in turn determines the behavior of masses to

vote for a particular candidate. The study established that the success of ethnic candidates is dependent on their ethnic ties with local people which create a social protection net for those who are voting. Providing patronage in Indian politics is therefore, the major factor to win political clientage when contesting election. Additionally, religious and caste factors (primordial social bonds) also create a direct linkage for both voters and political candidates, and thus providing and receiving patronage (Roy, 2014).

Banerjee, et.al (2014) further noted that out of fear of losing reputation in their constituency or voters escaping from their patronage, majority of political candidate use different means such as providing jobs, material gains, sanitation, and roads construction, to keep them under their patronage. There are, however, negative approaches adopted by political candidates to keep patronage such as theft of belongings, hijacking, character assassination of their families, murder attempts and even voter intimidation by use of local vigilante (Chaturvedi, 2005).

Studies in the Latin America such as in Brazil and Argentina established that patronage appointments are contested and controlled by various actors, and political patrons have different motivations for such appointments (Kristinsson, 2016). In Argentina for instance, patronage is controlled centrally by the ministers and the president in different strategic areas. For example, presidents mostly from the Peronist Party have historically monopolized allocation of national resources which they use to strengthen their political power with the state governors, the ruling party and the clientelistic regional political machines that gives important electoral support (Hilgers, 2012).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, political patron-client practices are increasingly evident because electoral contests have become the dominant means of political change (Pitcher, 2012). As noted by Arriola, et.al (2017), clientelism and patronage has permeated African societies from top to bottom and mostly involves the executive (presidency) exchanging patronage for support among their immediate lieutenants within the state as well as a chain of patron-client networks that spread out across the state. The increasing legitimacy of formal constitutional rules to political actors makes incumbency important to retaining power, given the advantages it confers such as controlling of economic and coercive resources, access to patronage networks, using record of performance and voter mobilization capacity to elections (Kopecky, 2011). A survey of most African states exhibits rampant patron-client practices for instance in South Africa, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Uganda among others (Nyang'oro and Sasaoka, 2013).

Since the 1992 return of multiparty elections in Cameroon, its cabinet size has continually increased and a study by Kopecky (2011) noted that President Paul Biya and his ruling Cameroon People's Democratic Movement party (CPDM) has used the power of incumbency to reward loyalty and manipulate the elections in his favor as opposed to increasing the cabinet to better manage the affairs of the country. Takeuchi (2013) posit that the regime used the monopoly over the national resources to manipulate ethnic groups, individuals, regions, including the opposition political parties to support the regime. The President for the purpose of staying in office systematically distributed resources including huge finances to opposition parties in exchange for their political support in power (Takeuchi, 2013).

After the Uganda's 1986 revolution that brought the incumbent Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) to power, promises regarding security,

individual freedoms and liberties, equality and sustainable development across the ethnic and political divide were made (Mbabazi and Pyeong, 2015). Nyang'oro and Sasaoka (2013) however note that after over three decades in power, these paramount promises are yet to be fulfilled and instead, vertical dyadic linkages of dependency and patronage have benefited particular companies, ethnic groups, family members and friends loyal to the regime. Johnson (2011) opined that the state-based clientelism in Uganda has become an impediment to democratic accountability especially when it favors certain groups over others, entrenched in the military, and has constituted the primary source of power. Nyang'oro and Sasaoka (2013) further observed that the NRM government since the year 2000 has significantly increased the number of districts to enhance its patronage networks and political base, use of intimidation and force to suppress dissent, and foreign funded development projects have been appropriated to NRM political bases as patronage.

Research study in Rwanda by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) noted that state patronage perpetrated by President Paul Kagame and the Rwanda Patriotic Front is one of the major post-genocide social exclusion problems. Takeuchi (2013) posit that since President Paul Kagame took over power after 1998 election, the Tutsi have had greater chances to education opportunities, the state public service and employment as a result of their patron-client network with political leaders. Additionally, the regime has also strengthened the presidency through constitutional change, use of intimidation and force against opposition leaders, state-capture through the arms control and money; the arms and weapons belong to the security services and the military and deployed selectively to suppress opposition while the money is used to reward loyalty and buy off potential and actual opponents into the patronage network (Nyang'oro and Sasaoka, 2013).

While studies from the Latin America, South East Asia and some Africa states indicate that patron-client politics are attributed to fragmented and weak political system, Kura, (2014) and Kopecky, (2011) analysis of South Africa and Ghana cases points to the contrary. Traditionally, a single political party system in a fragmented party system dominated either the legislative or the executive branch of government, or both. The reality in South Africa is that the governing African National Congress (ANC) has dominated the legislature and executive which is often a precursor for exploitation of state resource by state agents and political principals through corruption (Pitcher, 2012).

A study of South Africa and Ghana revealed that when there are competitive political party systems, it leads to less exploitation of state resources, political stability in the country and less patron-client politics (Holden, 2012). Well established and competitive political party systems in these countries impede exploitation of state resources by political leaders or from dispensing patronage through state jobs since party competition moderate the behaviour of agency officials and the governing political party or parties from voters' punishment in the subsequent or from strong opposition party or parties (Pitcher, 2012).

### **2.2.3 Political Patronage and Clientelistic Practices in Kenya Since 1963**

The aftermath of the dissolution of Kenya Africa Democratic Union (KADU) in 1964 paved way for the genesis of patronage politics and clientelistic practices almost immediately after independence in Kenyan (Klopp, 2012 and Oyugi et.al 2003). Jomo Kenyatta's government promises of assistant cabinet and cabinet appointments, and state development resources to leaders who would defect to KANU from KADU while denying access to state resources to the constituencies of those leaders who

remained in KADU marked the genesis of patron-client politics in the history of Kenyan (Oyugi, et.al., 2003). An example of patron-client appointment is that when KADU leaders such as Daniel Arap Moi, Ronald Ngala and Masinde Muliro crossed the floor and joined KANU, they were appointed into Kenyatta's cabinet and their party was dissolved.

Chelang'a, et. al, (2009) posit that an outstanding feature of the first two regimes (Kenyatta and Moi) was the entrenched selective approach of distribution of national resources where regions and ethnic communities in support of the regimes were greatly favoured. Ethnic and political leaders would pay homage to the president, outline their grievances, seek for state assistance, and fringe benefits and the president would issue a directive on establishing of infrastructural development in the region occupied by the visiting delegations (Cheeseman, 2008). Public appointments to State Corporation and ambassadorial positions were also used to reward loyalty and political support while punishing dissent with dismissal from government positions (Mulemi, 2011). Kagwanja (2005) noted that when Jaramogi Oginga Odinga in 1966 formed the Kenya People's Union party, all its members serving in statutory boards under KANU government were sacked and president Kenyatta and Moi flooded members of their respective ethnic groups in the public service.

As further noted by Chelang'a et al. (2009), Jomo Kenyatta in 1960s used biased farmland allocation as patronage in favor of his core constituencies of the ruling party KANU and specifically from his ethnic backyard. Kenyatta's regime facilitated the Kikuyu community in terms of logistics, financial support and in land buying process from the former white settlers residing in the Western Region, Rift Valley and the Coastal region of Kenya for settlement purposes for example the 636-acre Kamwaura

Farm in Molo, 500-acre Kiambaa Farm in Eldoret, 16,000 acres in Naivasha and 2,302 acres through Kipsitet Farmers Cooperative in Kericho.

By the year 1969, Kenya was already a *de facto* one-party state and electoral competitions were held both at the local and national level only amongst KANU candidates (Mulemi, 2011). This implied that those members of parliament (MPs) who demonstrated loyalty to the president (Party Chairman) and showed the capacity to mobilize support for KANU through consistent re-election were rewarded with greater access to national resources for patronage use (Kanyinga, 2009). In this way, MPs were least accountable to their constituents, and services provision was an important issue for rural voters in dire need of schools, roads and healthcare facilities. Most MPs consequently had to spend vast amounts of time lobbying the president and his cabinet ministers for funds and development projects which would be given through roadside declaration and as a signal to other regions and ethnic communities to be loyal to the ruling party (Klopp and Lumumba, 2016).

When Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978, the institutional mechanism allowed for the vice-president who was a presidential appointee to succeed as the head of state and government (president) (Mulemi, 2011). Former vice president Daniel Arap Moi assumed political power and retained Kenyatta's cabinet he inherited only for a short period of time while establishing Kalenjin hegemony in the public service by increasing the number of members of his ethnic constituents while reducing Kikuyu's numerical strength (Kagwanja, 2005). While the Jomo Kenyatta regime had left the KANU party weak and almost ineffective as it used the Provincial Administration as a political tool of control, Daniel Arap Moi fused KANU party to the Office of the President and used it in addressing factional conflicts at the local level even as he replaced Kenyatta clients with his own clientele (Oyugi, 1992).



As part of patron-client practice in the 1980s and 1990s, the Moi's government openly campaigned on a platform of displacing non-indigenous settlers out of the Rift Valley and resettling the indigenous communities, a move geared towards consolidating Kalenjin loyalty and political base (Kanyinga, 2006). In an effort to retain the Kikuyu political support in the Rift Valley and please the disgruntled Kalenjin, Agricultural Development Corporation farms (ADC) were grabbed and sub-divided by Moi loyalists, and further sold to members of their ethnic communities. Chelang'a et al, (2009) notes that among the names that benefitted from the illegal transactions included Katana Ngala, Kipkalya Kones, Abubakary Badawy, Jonathan Katana Nzai, and Ziporah Kitony. Public land and forest reserves were equally partitioned and allocated to ethnic party loyalists for instance part of Mau Forest to the Kalenjin as a means of advancing patronage by president Moi's regime (Mulemi, 2011).

When president Moi of KANU won the 1992 election by thirty-six percent of the popular vote, KANU party faced a new challenge of numerical strength in the national assembly (Kagwanja, 2005). With one hundred seats as opposed to eighty-eight seats for the opposition, the KANU leaders needed patronage resources to maintain a parliamentary majority on various critical votes and by mid-1995, nine defections were "bought" by the president and his close associates (Mulemi, 2011). Since every defector was by law required to re-run in his/her constituency through a by-election, the president provided every MP an assurance of a five-year salary as well as appointment to Boards of State Corporation should they lose in the by-election (Kanyinga, 2009).

Norris (2012) posits that the opposition politicians without independent bases of wealth and those who were locked out of access to state resources, found it hard to function even as constituents demanded services and development projects and

KANU openly declared that opposition areas would be deprived of state funds. Consequently, some opposition politicians such as Oginga Odinga and later, Raila Odinga from the National Development Party accepted to cooperate with KANU exchanging patronage resources for political support in the national assembly (also Kanyinga, 2009). As a result of these changing political dynamics, there was an escalating demand for patronage resources as well as establishment of development projects for their respective constituents.

While the proportion of ministers from the Kikuyu ethnic community stood at 30% in 1979, it reduced to 25% in 1982, to 20% in 1985 and to 4% in the year 2001 (Kagwanja, 2005). Conversely, only one minister from the Kalenjin community was in Kenyatta's last cabinet (1978) and when Moi took over power in 1979, he appointed three of his ethnic constituents into his cabinet bringing their proportion to 11% down from 4.8% and by the year 1998, 22% of the entire cabinet was drawn from his ethnic community (Norris, 2012). A statistical analysis by Kanyinga (2006) indicates that the ethnic extraction of Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi was a major tool of advancing patron-client practices such as appointments into influential and important public offices such as ministries and government agencies (also Boone et al. 2016).

Under Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta's regimes, an audit report by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission on ethnic diversity noted that in the year 2012 and 2015 respectively, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin representation in the civil service was still disproportionate to their population (Boone et.al 2016). The report noted that the two communities dominated all ministries and state departments followed by the Luhya, Luo and Kisii communities respectively. The Commission evaluation report in 2015 revealed that there was still over-representation of these five ethnic groups

(Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Kisii and Kamba) and which increased during 2014/2015 rather than decreasing (Boone et.al 2016).

It is apparent from the reviewed literature that political patronage and clientelism is a practice that characterizes both the developed and developing countries political landscape. In Kenya, land and government appointment along ethnic lines has been the dominant mode of patronage especially for the first three regimes. The new constitution of Kenya-2010 provides institutional mechanism and framework for equity in national resource sharing, broader citizen participation especially through devolution, and a more transparent executive in terms of its constitutional mandate. In addition, Chapter Seven of the Constitution was envisaged to address past political malpractices related to electoral processes and voters' free will choice of candidates in elections. However, doubt has been cast on the efficacy of the constitution in addressing patron-client practices in electoral participation and thus needed a study.

#### **2.2.4 Electoral Participation in Liberal Democracies**

One of the most remarkable developments in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries has been the global practice of competitive elections which is a major progress in democratic practice and reinforces both domestic and international peace (Norris, 2012). Electoral democracy is a civilian, constitutional system whereby the executive and the legislative positions are filled through competitive, regular, multiparty elections with universal suffrage (Bratton, 2004). The Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR) expresses that the foundation for any government should be the will of the people expressed through periodic and genuine elections carried out under universal and equal suffrage and held by secret ballot vote or by an equivalent free voting procedure (UDHR, 1948).

The degree of political development in any country is dependent on the level of credibility of leaders and electoral process that brought them to power and thus, regular election provides the electorates with the opportunity to choose political leaders to represent them at various levels of government (Culbert, et.al, 2015). As noted by Griffin and Newman (2005), elections help to enhance citizens' participation in local and national decision making on development, creates an avenue for citizens to express their will in the election of leaders of their choice, as well as providing an opportunity to replace leaders who have failed in their mandate. Dalton (2011) also opined that democratic elections must be characterized by transparency and accountability in government, clear channels of political communication, extensive party competition and clear avenues for citizens' participation. Norris (2012) however, argues that elections are perversions of democracy since it implies a popular participation as opposed to delegated power. In addition, while the mandate to govern is granted to the elected government officials by citizens through a credible election, in some cases such elected leaders often fail to govern in accordance to the will of the people who elected them but instead advance their own political interests (also Kimenyi, and Roxana, 2008).

According to European Union Commission (2007), the attainment of a democratic electoral process involves establishing a government system that promotes the rule of law, respect and protects human rights, and the development of democratic institutions (Yamamoto, 2014). This implies that for the sustainability of democracy in any country, political power should be premised on the consent and the will of the citizens through a fair, free and regular competitive election. While elections can be held even by political regimes that restrict democracy and manipulate electoral outcomes, they should closely be evaluated based on the manner in which legitimacy

is conferred on those who control government (Dasgupta, 2011). References to citizens' free will have therefore become central in granting legitimacy to govern in every election globally (Bourne, 2010).

According to Bogaards (2013), elections in liberal democracies serve four principal functions. First, the legitimacy of ruling elites is conferred through free and fair electoral processes free from intimidation, corruption, restricted choice of candidates and voter manipulation (also Dubois and Blank, 2018). Secondly, it is through electoral processes that political leaders are held accountable by the citizens in relation to promoting development and provision of public goods and services. Thirdly, Bogaards (2013) further noted that elections as a feature of any representative democracy provides a means of choosing representatives such as through the nomination of candidates and lists of political parties (also Smiddy and Young, 2009). Lastly, elections also serve as a means of aggregating interests and preferences of any social group. It helps in educating voters through setting of agendas, defining the issues affecting the public as well as in articulating policy alternatives and options (Rai, 2011).

Studies from western democracies such as Britain, USA, France, Australia and Germany reveal the triumph in democratic principles such as transparent, free and fair elections, as well as independent electoral related institutions and judiciary (Goodwill, 2006). According to Bormann, et. al, (2013), Australia provides a case study of an exemplary example of a professional electoral administration operating in a long-established and well-resourced democracy. The Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) both at the national and local levels have a well-established culture of a non-partisan, and professional work ethic such as in providing career opportunities for EMB staff, and in exemplary management in redistributions of boundaries, party

registration and in management of election (Pitkin, 2016). The Australian EMBs budgets are also quite substantial and correspond to public expectation of high performance from the electoral body (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2011).

In most African states, however, the persistent problem revolves around the quality of the electoral process as opposed to elections being rarely held or not being held at all (Luna, 2014). As opined by Jean-Paul (2011), most African states that attained independence in the 1950s and 1960s degenerated into autocracy and with more than 20 countries formally being recognized as one-party regimes except Mauritius, Botswana and Senegal that practiced electoral multiparty politics (Bennett, 2012). Despite the abolishing of one-party regimes during the late 1980s, and the wave of democratization process in early 1990s, challenges of conducting free and fair elections continued to persist in most African countries including Uganda, Burundi, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, and Kenya among others (Bormann, et.al, 2013). Bogaards (2013) further noted that while forty-four out of forty-eight Sub-Saharan African countries conducted elections between the year 1989 and 2003, over three quarters of such elections were discredited by independent observers as lacking transparency and not being free and fair because of flawed electoral process as well as entrenched clientelistic practices such as votes buying and intimidation of voters.

Askim, et al. (2017) posited that even when elections are regularly and routinely held in most African countries such as in Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe, the great majority of cases have been less to choose a government but to legitimize political choices which have already been predetermined through rigged election or through patron-client networks. Although problematic elections continue to exist at the continental level, Africa through the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the

African Union (AU) in 2000 is making renewed commitment towards democratic governance and promotion of democratic principles and institutions (Dubois and Blank, 2018). This milestone has also been strengthened by the ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in 2007, and the creation of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights in the year 2008 and which was renamed as the African Court of Justice, Human and Peoples' Rights in the year 2014 (Chadwick, 2017).

It is apparent from the examined literature that while there is a consensus on the centrality of elections in liberal democracies, the quality of electoral processes still varies across states depending on the level of institutional and financial resources to run election, the level of transparency of the exercise, and the capacity for the electorate to exercise their free will in choosing candidates of their choice. While liberal democracies such as Britain, Germany, USA, France and Australia have met this threshold, most developing democracies including Kenya are still faced with numerous challenges which affects the quality of elections. It is based on this background that this study focused on examining the influence patron-client relation on electoral participation.

### **2.3 Primordial and Purposive Corporate Social Bonds and Electoral Participation**

The subsequent section discusses the nature of primordial and purposive social bonds, the primordial and purposive corporate actors, and how they shape electoral participation in different jurisdictions.

### **2.3.1 The Nature of Primordial and Purposive Social Bonds**

Geertz (1973) and Steven Grosby (1994) are the proponents of the concept primordial social bond and argue that it stems from the ‘givens’ of the social existence of humans which creates immediate contiguity and kin connection. Grosby (1994) also noted that the social bond created by blood, language, ethnicity, race, and culture are perceived as inexpressible and at the same time overpowering *per se*. Hutchcroft (2014) opined that primordial social bonds are created when a community shares blood ties/clannism, the same race, territory, ethnicity, religion, language, customs, and traditions. A primordial membership of an individual to a community is hereditary and a person can only be a member of one primordial community.

An individual loyalty to a primordial community often accompanies a person throughout life and can psychologically be explained by primary socialization and the mechanism of social heritage (Banerjee, et.al. 2014). Primary socialization may be attributed to family, caste/class, race, religion to which a particular family belongs and thus creating the bond. Dasgupta (2011) noted that individuals may later in life develop a deliberate and consciously created attachment to formal organizations such as the state, political party, religion, formal and community associations, and the media and thus constituting a purposive corporate social bond.

### **2.3.2 Primordial and Purposive Corporate Actors and Patron-Client Politics**

The subsequent section discusses specific primordial and purposive corporate actors in relation to electoral participation in different jurisdictions.

#### **2.3.2.1 Political Parties and Patron-Client Relations**

As opined by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), political parties are rationally minded legal and formal group(s) of persons seeking to control the government apparatus by



gaining office through a constituted election. In democracies, political parties are defined by their ambition to occupy public office by running in elections and winning the support of a sufficient number of voters (Van Biezen, 2004). To succeed in the electoral contest, political parties rely on several strategies to build and maintain voter loyalties as well as a broad membership base and hence may bank on the charisma of their leaders, present an attractive package of public policy offerings (party manifesto), or offer participation opportunities, ideological rewards, or patronage (Chadwick, 2017).

Political parties consist of three sub-units namely, the party leader, the party organization (structure) and the office-seekers (candidates) which help articulate the overall party objectives (Chandra, 2004). Political parties as a means of enhancing party loyalty can offer their sub-units either collective or selective incentives. Political parties, just like business entities can appropriate private goods and benefits including social status, jobs, power, and business contracts (Chandra, 2004). The nature of incentives that can be appropriated within political parties is, therefore, a matter of great importance that depends on the configuration of intra-party dynamics and the strategies that each party sub-unit will utilize to achieve its primary objectives (Chaturvedi, 2005).

The political party leaders' objective is to preserve their position and maximize votes in order to win or retain political power in case of an incumbent leader. To achieve these objectives, political party leaders can rely either on the party organizational and programmatic strategy or the traditional patron-client relations to establish its clientele network (Carbone, 2007). Since both strategies can't be adopted and used concurrently, political party leaders must make their choices based on the option that

produces the desired payoffs (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar, 2010). The organizational strategy is primarily associated with the political party manifesto and ideology while the patron-client approach is associated with traditional parties where local political leaders enjoy massive electoral support autonomous from the party center (Chaturvedi, 2005). A party organization comprises of loyal believer activists devoted to the political party objectives, support its manifesto, and uphold its party ideology. Kasuya (2009) opined that since they are mainly motivated by collective incentives, party structure and party loyalists are expected to support party bureaucratization, collective decision-making as well as upholding party ideological purity.

Party office-seekers comprise of individuals either holding or seeking elective office and must convince most of the electorate to support them and win as opposed to their opponents (Dalton, 2008). In this effort, office-seekers can emphasize the public-goods side of the party manifesto and hope that their intra-party opponents do the same, or leverage on the private-goods side of their political parties and pursue individual patron-client strategies (Carbone, 2007). In developing democracies in Latin America, South East Asian countries and most African states, the logic followed by party patrons is that they never seek political office as a means of carrying out particular policies but to reap the rewards of holding that office and maintain it through use of patron-client networks and clientelistic practices to consolidate their support (Dubois and Blank, 2018).

Hutchcroft (2014) posit that patronage-based political parties have developed different adaptive mechanisms to cope with the enforcement problem created by the secret vote. These adaptive strategies are adopted in order to lessen the problems of information uncertainty surrounding the act of voting, better align the incentives of voters and party leaders, so that clientelistic exchange is less likely to fall apart due to

problems of opportunism. The first adaptive mechanism to cope with the enforcement problem created by the secret vote is the corruption of voting rules. Chadwick (2017) noted that the most fundamental problem for patronage parties is the secret vote and all the procedures that are adopted to protect it such as invalidation of all irregularly marked ballot papers to prevent vote buying. The study noted that the simplest method to cope with secret vote system is to corrupt the voting rules and find ways and means to observe the voting behaviour of individuals. In the USA, early studies on machine politics noted that the first different colour and size and later different texture of party-printed ballot papers allowed the party representatives at the ballot boxes to tell the voting behaviour of their clients (Gherghina, 2014). In Ireland, voters who want to demonstrate that they vote for the candidates to whom they have committed themselves frequently claim to be blind and on that ground are allowed to take a helper (or witness) into the voting booth.

Secondly, political parties also use proxies and Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) noted that when elections are secret, political parties may still be able to observe the behaviour of their clients by relying on proxies, or information shortcuts, frequently aggregate indicators that are not subject to laws of secrecy. Gherghina (2014) opines that the best indicator is the level of electoral participation, which can be observed by party representatives in the local polling stations. For instance, in machine-dominated election in U.S. cities as well as in such countries as Austria and Iceland, party tellers record the attendance of the believed supporters of their party and if presumed clients do not show up at the polling station, this will lead to last-minute mobilization efforts. At the end of the Election Day, the party will at least have a good sense of whether a client has failed to deliver on his or her part of the deal through abstention (Kristinsson, 2016). Another proxy exists where political party officials can control

necessary requirements of voting such as the ballot paper. Where no official ballot papers exist and party functionaries distribute party ballot papers just outside the polling station, they may have a useful guide to the faithfulness of those who are voting.

Lastly, political parties adopt voter bonding as an adaptive strategy aimed at achieving a better alignment of party and voter preferences so that voters will have a stronger incentive to fulfill their commitments even when they cannot be observed (Chadwick, 2017). If patronage consists of a stream of consecutive acts and/or the client delivers first, the fate of the client is tied to that of a party. The client, therefore, has all the incentives to keep the party in office so that it is able to continue delivering patronage. If the client has already received what he can reasonably expect from the party in his lifetime, his incentive to support that party will diminish. However, if a change in the party composition of the government would mean that the contracts of the adherents of the predecessor party would not be renewed, or that its clients would face various kinds of repercussions such as unpleasant job assignments and deprivation from decision-making powers, these clients will have strong incentives to do everything they can to keep their party in power.

### **2.3.2.2 Religious Groups and Patron-Client Politics**

Religion is a primordial and a purposive corporate social institution that exist in almost every society and World Values Survey (2016) noted that among the 175 states examined, 46 (26.2%) had official religions, another 71 (40.6%) favoured some religions more than others, three (1.7%) fairly supported all religions while 14 (8%) states were hostile to religion. No country lacks active religious institutions and clergy representing both majority and at least some minority religions including the extremely repressive communist states like North Korea and China (Banerjee, 2014).

Religion is therefore a significant element of society both at the individual and group levels, although this element is stronger in some states relative to others.

Various studies have noted that in both the developed and developing democracies, religious institutions and elites can influence electoral politics in a number of ways and to the extent that they are accepted by a population, their moral authority and prominence give their opinion weight (Mark, 2008). For instance, religious institutions, like many other government institutions, can provide the logistical basis for mass political mobilization in support of a particular political party or candidate(s). This is attributed to the presence of experienced religious leaders, a place to meet and organize, membership lists, contacts with the media, and often members with useful skills including in logistics and public relations (Banerjee, 2014).

A study by Kuru (2009) on *Secularism and State policies Toward Religion* noted the significant role of evangelical Christian leaders and institutions in influencing US foreign policy toward Iran. This group's support for Israel goes beyond lobbying the US government, and the Republican Party has always relied on their support for their political support in the USA politics. The study established that similar religious groups significantly influence national politics throughout Europe and North America as well as in Brazil, South Korea, South Africa, and Nigeria. Similarly, religious affiliated political parties in the Arab states such as *Fatah* and *Hamas* in Palestine, Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, and Democratic Jihad party in Egypt receives popular support from the Muslim fundamentalist groups as well as ordinary citizens and thus influence electoral participation and outcome in their respective countries (Elizabeth, 2007).

A study of Indian politics indicates that from the over one billion population, 85 percent are Hindus, 10 percent Muslims, and 2.5 percent Christians and the rest including Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists, and Parsees are minority sects (Kuru, 2009). Since India got independence, successive regimes have been dominated by members of the Hindu religion and the ruling parties have exploited patronage and clientelistic practices such as government appointment, conscription to the military, awards of development projects to regions dominated by members of Hindu religion as a means of sealing their party loyalty.

In patron-client politics, religion can also be the basis for political party identity. A study by Fox (2008) noted that political parties in developed and developing democracies such as in USA, Germany, Brazil, Italy, Egypt, Nigeria and India identifies themselves with a certain religion, their practices and well as religious development projects such as construction of worship centers and thus drawing loyalty and support from religious members. Owing to the shared religious ideology with a given political party, the religious faithful in return give their support by voting for the candidate(s) during elections as well as giving financial support to a political party (Banerjee, 2014).

As opined by Hutchcroft (2014), religion also grants legitimacy to justify nearly any policy or action including those that may otherwise be considered unjustifiable for instance continued reign or overthrow of governments. Some states may, therefore, mutually support a given religion in return to legitimize government activities. Based on patron-client relations, religious groups have justified and participated in the overthrow of governments or in the democratization process (Banerjee, 2014). For instance, the 1979 Iranian revolution depicts a consensus by the Iranian Muslims regarding overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Shah Mohammad Reza

Pahlavi, and the replacement of his government with an Islamic Republic under the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. As result, the subsequent regimes have given more rights and privileges to the Muslims who constitute 99.4 percent of the Iranian population, and this has equally been exhibited in the Turkish, Pakistani, and Gambian politics (Banerjee, 2014).

### **2.3.2.3 The Media and Electoral Participation**

The media constitute a fourth branch of government owing to the power they have and the role they play in providing oversight in democratic societies (Dubois and Blank, 2018). Modern-day democrats equally appreciate the role of the media as watchdog in democratization process in both advanced and emerging democracies (Heywood, 2017). The media is the guardian of the public interest and constantly warn citizens against any harm. An effective and a fearless media are thus necessary in developing societies where institutions are weak and susceptible to political pressure (Chadwick, 2017). In emerging democracies, the media is expected to help in building a tradition and a civic culture of debate and discussion which do not exist in authoritarian regimes (Izuogu and Umoren, 2017).

A study of Latin American states including Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela noted that continued investigative reporting on human rights violations and corruption has created a culture of transparency and accountability in government and thus strengthening democratization in the continent (Aririguzoh, 2014). In South-East Asia's states, continued reporting on malfeasance in public life has led to the removal of corrupt officials and boosted public awareness on the urgency for reforms (Chadwick, 2017). Dubois and Blank (2018) opined that investigative reporting on corruption and abuse of public office in the Philippines provided evidence used in the

impeachment charges against President Joseph Estrada in the year 2000. The media as an instrument for dissemination of information also aids the public in making informed choices on whom to vote for and the policies to be endorsed and those to be opposed (Moeller, et.al 2014).

As noted by Chadwick (2017), media outlets such as radio, newspapers and television helps to inform, educate and engage the public on important issues such as on human rights and electoral processes across states. Television for instance, has the capacity to inform, educate, entertain, and present images to audience in vivid colours, and consequently appeal and grab the attention of the audience (Antonoff, 2007). A survey of Television and radio networks in Philippines and Indonesia noted that these media outlets educate the voters on wise voting as well as the consequences of bad choices during elections (Aririguzoh, 2014). Additionally, political debates sponsored through media outlets such as television and radio stations have provided a platform to political candidates who can't afford to buy air time to articulate their views to target audience and majority of them have been elected on the basis of their development policies (Dubois and Blank, 2018).

Giglio (2015) noted that the use of radio as a means of reaching out during electioneering period is premised on the view that it is more accessible and less expensive to majority of citizens in developing countries. Localized FM radio stations helps to promote grassroots democracy since they provide a platform for citizens' political education. In 1996, Nepal became the first country in South Asia to license a Non-Governmental FM station and by the year 2018, there were over 25 FM stations all over the country. These FM radio stations have provided an alternative source of information because they are established at the grassroots, focuses on local issues, and reflect the ethnic and linguistic diversity in Nepal (Chadwick, 2017).



Contemporary research studies also reveal an increase in the use of digital media in electoral related activities such as political campaigns (Li and Chan, 2017 and Heywood, 2017). From a purely support role such as electoral database, direct mail printing, and graphical design, Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) also provides a platform for direct communication from and to political parties, candidates and voters (McLaughlin and Baker, 2012). In political communication process, the key online tools include podcasting, blogging, and political websites with means for online participation and feedback, online video sharing, and social networking (Heywood, 2017). For instance, elections in USA since 2004 have been characterized by use of political party websites where electorates can obtain all information about the party as well as engage the party leaders in political discourse on electoral related activities (Hawker, 2013). In the UK, social media companies such as *YouTube*, *Facebook*, *Google*, *Snapchat*, *Instagram* and *Twitter* are increasingly being used as platforms of communicating to voters (Dubois and Blank, 2018).

Bosch (2013) also noted that the spread of the Arab revolution in 2011 in Algeria, Libya and Egypt was attributed to the use of social media platforms such as *Facebook*, *Youtube* and *Twitter* in mass mobilization of street protests with over five hundred thousand protesters participating in Cairo alone. Research study by Heywood (2017) also established that political candidates in African countries such as Nigeria, Rwanda and South Africa have also used social media outlets such as *Facebook*, *twitter*, *WhatsApp* and *You-tube* extensively during their election campaigns.

Since the liberalization of broadcast media in Nigeria in 1992, the country boasts one of the most robust and diverse media environments in Africa (Daramola, 2017). Since then, the media industry has expanded and features nearly 300 radio stations and

numerous television stations, of which about 100 are state owned (Conroy-Krutz (2018). While privately owned radio has been a platform for political education and mobilization, the print outlets which are also private owned have been critical of government and influences political discourse (Dubois and Blank, 2018).

Traditional media such as use of radio in Kenya have powerful roles in political mobilization and participation (Kamau, 2018). According to Kimani (2017), Kenya has over 118 radio stations spread across the country broadcasting in different vernacular languages and enjoying popular support than the national broadcasting stations. Kenyan media play an important role in providing political information and setting the agenda for political discourse, although scholars question the objectivity and professionalism of media outlets, especially those owned by political elites (Heywood, 2017).

#### **2.3.2.4 Ethnicity, Ethno-Regional Identity and Electoral Participation**

According to Chelang'a, et.al (2009), an ethnic group is a community of people primordially bonded together because of common ancestry and with its members exhibiting distinctive characteristics such as common language, religion, or homeland origin. Kioli (2012) also noted that although the identity markers of ethnicity such as religion and physiognomy may be disputed, language and ancestral land is universally recognized as the most outstanding ethnicity markers. Primordialism present the quintessence of ethnicity as immediate contiguity, kindred spirits, kin connection of individuals, self-attribution of membership, common culture (language, religion, values, norms), common territory and common biological descent (common ancestors, race, tribe). Ethnicity as a primordial social bond, therefore, creates

individuals' deepest sense of identity and promotes unity and solidarity which often exceeds all social divisions within the community.

As further noted by Kioli (2012), ethnicity entails mobilization of social groups sharing a common culture, language and ancestry which is the basis around which both local and national politics revolve in most developing democracies. As opined by Ndegwa (2003), cultural rituals and practices such as circumcision have had a status value for example among the Kikuyu community in Kenya where presidential candidates would exploit the practice to mobilize their ethnic constituents against their Luo counterparts who traditionally did not practice circumcision. According to Ogot (2005), Kenya as a state has its identity in terms of its citizens, defined territories, and functional government. He noted that the process leading to the adoption of the 1963 Constitution of Kenya provided for the merging of the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD), Kenya colony, and the Kenya protectorate to form the modern state and the Republic of Kenya.

Similarly, Ogot (2005) argued that the communities within the Kenyan borders identify themselves with certain religion, culture, language, physiognomy, and region. For instance, the Mijikenda, Swahili etc at the Coast, Borana, Rendile, Gabbra at the Eastern region, Turkana, Samburu at the Northern Kenya, Gikuyu, Meru, Akamba at the Central region, the Kalenjin, Samburu, Maasai, Turkana at the Rift Valley, Luo, Kuria and Luhya in Nyanza, and the Luhya in Western region of Kenya. Kagwanja (2009) noted that ethnic groups in Kenya today have a strong attachment (ethno-regional identity) to their indigenous places of origin which they consider as ancestral land. For instance, the Kalenjin have ethno-regional identity and attachment to the Rift Valley as both an important economic and social factor and thus explain why

most land and ethnic conflicts against other communities have been experienced in the region (Chelang'a, et.al, 2009).

According to Miguel (2014), the Kenyan history is characterized by certain aspects of ethnicity that have been divisive in the past and with the capacity to disrupt the nation building process in future and includes the territoriality of ethnic groups. As part of the colonial strategy to enhance easy governance, administrative units such as provinces and districts were demarcated and established based on the dominant ethnic group in each territory (NCIC, 2012). Chelang'a, et.al (2009) also argued that owing to the need for smaller and manageable administrative units, the result of this process was that fewer than half of all the ethnic communities in Kenya could be accommodated territorially in an administrative unit. As a result, only ethnic communities with large constituents have been identified with some districts or regions and have continued to dominate those parts of the country. As a coping mechanism to this situation, the smaller communities countrywide have had to accept co-option into larger ethnic arrangements or get assimilated into the numerically dominant ethnic community in their respective neighbourhood (Ogot, 2005). Among such communities as noted by Miguel (2014) includes the Elmolo, Okiek, Sabaot, Elchumus, Segeju, Sengwer, Terek, Nubi, Boni, Sakuye, and Waata.

Generally, collective ethnic identities is not given, but communally created over time within the context of people's own well-defined, demarcated or loosely perceived territorial entities (Kioli, 2012). A sub-national territory, therefore, is a source of identity and self-sustaining resource, a 'homeland', a rightful possession of one's forefathers through generations and which must be protected for posterity (Ogot, 2005). What is embedded behind the framework of ethnic regions are spatial constructs with deep ideological significance that may correspond to political or

formal constructs (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Mann (2004) also opined that these ideologies are founded since territorial struggles that leads to regional alignments and understandings which consequently shape ideas, practices and a community overall orientation including the choice of leaders to represent them. Oyugi, et.al, (2003) argues that politicians vying for presidential seat in Kenya employ ethnicity and ethno-regional identity to derive a winning ethnic political formula depending on ethnic numerical strength. There are, however, scanty researches to demonstrate whether this aspect also shapes politics under the new 2010 Constitution in Kenya, and thus the need for study.

#### **2.3.2.5 Politicians and Voters in Patron-Client Relations**

James Scott (1972) described patron-client ties as a mutual relationship where a person of higher social and economic status (patron) appropriates his own resources, resources at his disposal or influence in order to give either protection, benefits or both, to a person of lower status (client) who, on the basis of reciprocity, offers unwavering political support and loyalty to the patron during election. Based on his description, the relationship is between the politicians as patrons, and the voters/electorate as the clients. More recently, political scientists like Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), Hicken (2011) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) have linked patron-client relations directly to elections and involving direct exchange relations between politicians and the voters. This exchange relation thus creates a purposive corporate social bond between the patrons and clients premised on mutual trust and reciprocity.

As noted by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), patron-client relations is rooted in both advanced and developing democracies where political candidates reward their loyal

supporters (voters) with private goods during the electioneering period and after being elected to office. Hicken (2011) argues that in political systems characterized by clientelistic practices, political candidates create clientele network with voters through monetary donations and selective development programs (pork barreling) among other free goods and services. Contrary to popular perception that the practice is limited to underdeveloped states, resilient clientelistic structures have been observed in well established party systems in advanced democracies such as Italy, Japan, Austria, and Belgium (Aspinall, 2016). Political candidates and Parties in clientelistic systems appropriate most material inducements in order to get the most competitive advantage over their rival parties and/or candidates.

In India, Banerjee, et.al (2014) noted that politicians use various goods and services as patronage such as jobs, material gains, sanitation, and roads construction before elections to consolidate voters' support. Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) opined that in the 2008 general election in Turkey, free household goods such as refrigerators and dishwashers would be distributed by politicians to individual voters in exchange for electoral support and loyalty. Equally, Hicken (2011) observed that some politicians can adopt negative approaches such as dropping of hate leaflets, character assassination of other candidates and their families, murder attempts, and targeted killing of innocent people to instill fear on voters if they don't honor their bargain in the exchange relations.

Early study by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) describe the patron-client relations as an informal contractual relationship between politicians and the voters based on principle of reciprocity; politicians and political parties provides incentives such as appointments and household goods, while the voter remains loyal and vote for the candidate giving the incentives. Aspinall and Berenscho (2018), Kura (2014) and

Scott (1972) observed that this politician-voter relationship creates vertical dyadic bond which constitutes a building block for political mobilization. It is thus evident that the success of patron-client practice is dependent on trust and the magnitude of exchange relationship between office seekers and the voters.

Studies by Kura (2014) also noted that a strong patron-client relation can also be attributed to primordial social bonds and political candidates in developing nations such as in India, Singapore, Ethiopia and Senegal exploit their economic status, family history, and race to enhance strong voter loyalty. Equally, the voters benefit from trades-offs such as development projects, employment, and government contracts. A strong patron-client relation is thus an outcome of economic exchange benefits as well as primordial social bonds between office seekers and the electorate. It is evident from the reviewed literature that the different primordial and purposive corporate actors influence processes such as public policy processes, political campaigns, enactment of legislations and shaping of public opinion. Gaps, however, exist on how such actors shapes political dynamics related to electoral participation and thus the need for study.

## **2.4 Dyadic Networks and Electoral Participation**

The subsequent sections provide reviewed literature related to the nature of dyadic (patron-client) networks, the dyads in patron-client networks and its elements, and electoral participation.

### **2.4.1 The Nature of Dyadic (Patron-Client) Networks and Electoral Participation**

Dyadic networks refer to the linkages established by political patrons and clients to maximize on their symbiotic relations; votes for goods and/or services (Kura, 2014). As noted by Gherghina (2014), early research studies on dyadic networks are traced to

anthropological studies and the concept implies a type of interpersonal exchange in small rural and/or tribal traditional communities. In modern political science studies however, the concept is used in relation to patterns of political organization within contemporary institutional frameworks such as structures of administration (bureaucracies) and political parties (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016).

Katz (2011) notes that in early anthropological studies, traditional patron-client networks referred to a primary part of land tenure system and agricultural production which characterized and existed in rural areas in the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Italy after the decrease of feudalism. Gherghina (2014) also argued that the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers encouraged patron-client system in their newly established plantations in Southeast Asia and Latin America since it proved useful as a means of keeping cheap and submissive labor force. The severity of patron-client networks as argued by Katz (2010) tend to increase in isolated rural communities that have rigid class structure based on land ownership such as in India, and which prevents any chance for upward social mobility for peasants.

As Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) noted that early studies of the patron-client networks is traced to the 1950s in small rural communities and tribal settings and thus used the term "patron-client networks" in reference to a type of interpersonal relationship that is institutionalized in form of contractual agreement between individuals of unequal socio-economic status, patron and the client respectively. Osayi (2015) describes patron-client networks as an informal and reciprocal relationship of people drawn from unequal socio-economic status and which imposes mutual obligations on the parties involved. In this case therefore, what are expected by clients (voters) is protection and favor while the patrons (politicians) expect support and loyalty, and their relationship is personal, face-to-face, and a continuous



exchange relationship (Katz, 2011). Kura (2014) further opined that patron-client networks are dyadic ties characterized by mutual friendship where an individual drawn from higher socio-economic status (patron) utilizes his influence and appropriate resources and protection to an individual of lower status (client) who, equally reciprocates by giving personal services, loyalty and support to the patron.

According to Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), the key features of patron client networks include reciprocity, proximity, unequal exchange, and diffuseness. Reciprocity is important in the formation and maintenance of the exchange relationship because it enhances sustainability of the relationship as long as the parties still needs each other. The dyadic relationship is premised on a reciprocal exchange of both political resources such as electoral support, vote loyalty and protections, as well as economic resources such as development projects, monetary donations, contracts and tenders, employments, among other (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). According to Kura (2014), reciprocity grants patron-client relationship its voluntary character which is entered into by the parties based on expected mutual benefits. In this case therefore, these exchange relations only function as long it meets the expectations of both patrons and the clients.

Osayi (2015) argues that if patron (politicians) and the client (voters) share common values and cognitive affiliations, the vertical dyadic relationship between them will be seen to be legitimate and with some degree of affection. Other than the element of inequality and reciprocity, the two other features of patron-client ties are their face-to-face character and their diffuseness. As noted by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984), the important aspect of mutual obligation is always strong in the patron-client relationship to enhance continuous exchange benefits between the parties. The establishment and sustainability of patron-client networks largely depend on face-to-face contact

between the patron(s) and the client(s) and the continued mutual obligation creates affection and trust (Kitschelt, 2000).

Patron-client dyads are also diffuse in their nature and involve a “whole person” relationship as opposed to “explicit, impersonal-contract bonds” (Sousa, 2008). As argued by Kura (2014), this element is critical in the survival of patron-client relationship during rapid social change; the dyadic networks tend to survive as long as both parties have something to offer one another during such times. Although Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) agree with Arriola, et.al, (2017) on the four features of patron-client relation (reciprocity, unequal exchange, proximity, and diffuseness) they also highlighted three other major features and nine other characteristics of patron-client relation. The three additional features of patron-client relations includes organization, regulation of exchange, and resource flow between the patron(s) and client(s).


#### **2.4.2 Dyads in Patron-Client Networks and Electoral Participation**

According to Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), patron-client network creates a structured dyadic system whereby the structural basic unit is the dyad. A dyadic relationship is a personal attachment characterized by interaction between two political actors (patrons and clients). Kura (2014) noted two variants of dyads namely, corporate dyads and the other is exchange dyads. In corporate dyads, the two individuals involved behave as one entity while in the exchange dyad, the actors/individuals maintain their separate identities. Among the features of these typologies of dyads as cited by Kura (2014) include first, that dyads are binding to people drawn from both the same and from different occupations or class backgrounds. Secondly, the dyadic exchange benefits are specific as opposed to being general gains. Lastly, dyadic exchanges involve some level of reciprocity between

actors but not exact reciprocity because full achievement of the latter means the termination of the dyad (Hicken, 2011).

Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) opined that every dyad is tied to other various dyads and all their respective dyadic ties within a society create a dyadic network. Furthermore, every unit of a structured dyadic system has an individual bond with other dyadic partners which are uniquely his own, and every individual set of dyadic relationships makes up his dyadic web. According to Kura (2014), an individual web can be categorized into horizontal and vertical structured web. In horizontal webs, the central person/actor together with his various partners have equal socio-economic status, resources or power and thus forming a "personal alliance systems" (Osayi, 2015). Conversely, vertical webs are characterized by the central actor/person being drawn from a higher status, resources or power compared to his dyadic partners who becomes his "personal following" and creating a patron-client network.

According to Osayi (2015), individuals and networks of individuals in a vertical dyad are key actors in a patron-client relationship as opposed to corporate groups and they undermine the horizontal group organization among clients and patrons themselves. Katz (2011) argued that the primary patron-client relation often transforms to a clientelistic social formation which often comprises of multiple patron-client dyads with multi-layered network of exchange relation, and a pyramid shaped figure. Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) and Scott (1972) observed that there are two typical representations of dyadic ties namely, the links where clients are directly tied to the patron forming a patron-client cluster and secondly, the dyad where vertical links of clients are tied to patron leading to the formation of a patron-client pyramid (see Figure 2.1).



**Figure 2.1: Patron-Client Network/Linkages**

**Source:** Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) and Scott (1972)

In a patron-client cluster, a patron is part of a two person exchange of a higher status than his/her clients, and dispense material and immaterial resources that he owns or under his control. In a patron-client pyramid, the intermediary (broker) serves a dual role as client and patron. The intermediary serves as a middleman to organize clientele exchange benefits between the two parties who are not in direct contact with each other. This usually occurs when the intermediary serves as an agent but does not have control over the benefits to appropriated. However, where the intermediary has control over the clientelistic benefits, then he will also serve as a patron or as a client if he also needs resources from another patron.

According to Osayi (2015), the distinctive features of a dyadically structured system of political patron-client relations includes the following; (i) the system is anchored on a single political leader with his constituents whom some are bound to the leader by primordial ties (ii) the system is leader-centred as opposed to being group-centered since it is the leader that form the group and establishes his clientele base (iii) the

bonds that tie the system together are vertical and dyadic. Whatever group spirit exists stems from the fact that various individuals have voluntarily chosen to follow the same person (iv) the uniting interest between the leader and his constituents are categorical. The objective of the relationship between the leader (patron) and his followers (clients) is the attainment of complementary private interests of both groups (v) there is a symbiotic relationship between the leader and his followers. The leader (patron) expects political loyalty and support while the constituents expect protection and their needs addressed (vi) the dyadic ties between the followers (clients) and the leader (patron) are based on reciprocity (vii) the exchange relations between the leader and the follower is based on voluntary choice. The relationship can end if one of the party's beliefs that the relationship is not bringing any benefit (h) these systems are dynamic and unstable and the patron's personal attributes and his resources are key determinants in relation to the size and the loyalty of his following.

#### **2.4.3 Elements of Patron-Client (Dyadic) Networks and Political Participation**

Patron-client networks have been in practice in different forms and have been a primary feature of rural settings of most developing countries, especially in Africa, Asia, Latin America including in advanced democracies (Aspinall, et al. 2017). In contemporary times, the concept patron-client has however, evolved into new forms depending on socio-economic and political environment. For instance, Osayi (2015) noted that an ecological understanding of these informal systems of government and how they impact on modern political situation in the developing world is important.

According to Arriola, et.al, (2017), there are five key features which serve as an umbrella from which political patron-client relations operate under in the developing democracies. First is the presence of a local strong individual in terms of his social, political and economic status to whom the clients align themselves to, in exchange for

protection and favors. Examples of such local strong individuals as cited by Caraway and Nugroho (2015) include the *Cacique* in Mexico, local boss/power brokers in the Philippines and the *Mafiosi* in Italy. In the case of the *Mafiosi* and Mexican *Cacique*, patronage was appropriated to clients (voters) in exchange for political support and loyalty during elections. The capacity for these local strongmen to leverage on support and protection from higher patrons, affirms Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) and Scott (1972) concept of patron-client pyramid. Based on this configuration, the local strongman can access and disperse the resources needed from the higher patron to their respective clients in exchange for electoral support and loyalty premised on reciprocity.

Land is the second essential element which also serves as a bargaining resource in the patron-client networks. Arriola, et.al, (2017) noted that peasants are the clients who need land for production while the patrons equally require the labor. In developing countries, this extends into the political sphere when the local patron ventures into politics and is to be aligned with another higher patron in the patron-client pyramid. In such a case, both a patron-client cluster and a patron-client pyramid are at play as illustrated by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) and Scotts (1972). Owing to dependency on land, political support from the clients is always guaranteed regardless of the manner it is undertaken. An example is in Brazil where political elites with huge tracks of land and who maintain close ties with upper patrons' uses access to land as patronage for political mileage (Volintiru, 2010).

Thirdly, Arriola, et.al (2017) noted that for patron-client relations to operate there must be a strong political party system where the party is the main patron, while the local strong man serves as the intermediary. This element (strong political party system) is almost similar to the local strong man; however, its distinctive attribute is

the access to the political party by locally influential man. A strong and a dominant political party is a precursor for the local strong man to access resources, favours and protection to be given to their clients (Volintiru, 2010). The political party is therefore the highest patron and with the local influential person being the lesser patron and as a result, the party requires support which is mobilized by the locally influential persons. As an intermediary between the political party and the clients, the local strong man channels resources and other clientele goods between the party and the clients while he pursues his private interest. Examples includes in Bangladesh and Senegal with the dominance of some political parties and locally influential person who mobilize the clients at the grassroots for their own interests (Arriola, et.al, 2017).

The fourth important element is the capacity for a religion through their influential leaders as intermediaries to develop a support base for a given political candidate or party (Arriola, et.al, 2017). In some countries such as Senegal, the local religious leaders serve as the local strong man and bargain for exchange benefits on behalf of their followers with those in power (Fatton, 1986). The Marabouts (an influential Islamic sect) in Senegal for instance have been able to commandeer considerable influence through their capacity to influence peanut production on behalf of respective members against the government (Kura, 2014). Since the government requires political support from the locals which can only be mobilized and offered by these local influential leaders, they have thus been accepted by the government within the patron-client pyramid structure.

The last element of patron-client linkage as noted by Arriola, et.al (2017) is control and use of state resources as patronage. The primary goal of clients (voters) in patron-client networks is to be able to access protection and economic resources provided by the ruling elites while giving them electoral support and loyalty premised on mutual

relation (Hickens, 2011). The existence of unequal socio-economic and political status between the patron and the clients provides the basis for the establishment and the sustainability of patron-clients networks (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Consequently, a clientelistic exchange relation based on reciprocity is developed where electoral support and loyalty are traded for economic resources, development projects, favours and protection.

## **2.5 Implication of Patron Client Relations on Democratic Governance**

The subsequent sections provide reviewed literature on democratic accountability, clientelism and vote choice, patronage networks in relation to democratic governance, and the implications of patron-client practices on democratic governance.

### **2.5.1 Democratic Accountability, Clientelism and Vote Choice**

Democracy as a system of government and as an institutional framework makes political leaders entirely reliant on citizens for political power and thus making vertical accountability of significant importance (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Through free and fair elections, citizens in representative democracies can choose leaders and subsequently hold them accountable in providing public goods and services to the citizens (Gherghina, 2014). It is therefore important to ensure that a political system is democratic as a means of expanding citizens' capacity to ensure that leaders are accountable both to society and to themselves. Existing literature demonstrates that patron-client practices can be used by political elite as instruments to undermine democratic accountability especially in developing democracies (Aspinall, 2016).

According to Stokes, et al. (2013), political candidates' contesting in election can dispense clientelistic goods as a strategy of voter mobilization as opposed to



persuasion, with an aim of winning the electoral support and loyalty. Research studies on voting behaviour in India, Nigeria and Brazil shows that when political candidates uses clientelistic goods to secure electoral victory, democratic principles such as accountability and transparency are undermined (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Furthermore, when the citizens because of poverty anticipate and get provided with the clientelistic goods, then it undermines electorate free will choice of political candidate during election (Askim, et.al, 2017). Consequently, it can be validly concluded that the prevalence of clientelistic goods during electioneering period is indicative of political corruption on the voters' free will choice of candidates.

Aspinall, et.al (2017) opined that most political patrons in developing democracies such as India, Malaysia, Brazil, Nigeria build on clientelistic networks with voters for political mileage and thus patronage as opposed to development policies are determinants of political choice and behaviour (Aspinall, 2016). Research studies by Osayi (2015) and Weghorst and Lindberg (2011) on voting behaviour have provided recent empirical findings regarding voting behaviour in African states such as in South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana. Evident from these studies is that voters are aware of the benefits that elections present to advance their own personal interest, like the political candidates from different political parties. For example, in executive or legislative elections, rational voters always assess how well an incumbent candidate has been responding to individual and local needs before they decide on whom to vote for (Osayi, 2015).

Given the fact that the electorates accord a high value on clientelistic goods and services, assessment of provision of immediate gains that are appropriated by new contestants and incumbents alike during campaign period is also a determinant on


vote choice of candidate (Mares and Young, 2016). It is thus necessary to clearly comprehend patron-client relations with an objective of having an insight on grounds under which electorate vote and how their respective attitudes and choice of candidates influence and propagate clientelism and the resultant effect on democratic governance.

### **2.5.2 Patronage Networks and its Relations with Democratic Governance**

As noted by Chadwick (2017), the relationship between patron-client linkages and democratic governance is of great significance. While patronage networks are often viewed as an exchange relationship of people of unequal socio-economic and political status (electoral patrons and clients), democratic governance is viewed as a decision making process and implementation aimed at a common public good (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018).

World Bank (2017) noted that governance comprises of mechanisms, institutions, and processes for determining and managing public affairs and entails a wide spectrum of issues including the resource extraction, control and distribution, electoral processes, public policy making, public participation and public affairs management (Caraway, Ford, and Nugroho, 2015). It can thus be deduced that good governance implies effectiveness in determining and management of public affairs, as well as responsive and effective public service delivery. Democratic accountability helps to enhance good democratic governance by holding government officers responsible for any action or inaction, as well as public policies that have an impact on citizens' lives (Hilgers, 2012). United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2016) report noted that the distinctive features of good governance includes responsiveness, citizens' participation, transparency and

accountability, consensus building, effectiveness and efficiency, the rule of law and equitability and inclusiveness.



**Figure 2.2 Features of Good Governance**

**Source:** UNESCAP (2016)

In conformity with the UNESCAP (2016) on good governance and democratic accountability, citizen participation must be strengthened among the different social groups in the society in relation to political activities such as referendum, elections and public policy making. As a constitutional right, the citizens make electoral choice of candidates based on free will voting. Research studies have however established that patron-client practices have the potential to undermine this important feature of good governance (Kristinsson, 2016). As noted by Dargent (2014), developing democracies such Malaysia, Brazil and Turkey are characterized by use of financial

inducement and vote buying by political patrons (parties and politicians) upon the clients (voters) and consequently shaping their choice of candidates during election.

As noted by Aspinall and Berenschot (2018), appropriation of clientelistic goods or services by political patron in a patron-client systems have the propensity to undermine free and fair elections and democratic accountability since the electorates loses the moral authority to subject government officers accountable over misappropriation of public resources and other malpractices in government. Research studies in Romania, Nigeria and Uganda also indicates that political deceit and unfulfilled campaign promises significantly contribute to voter apathy (Aspinall, 2016 and Gherghina, 2014).

Public consensus in decision making also constitutes a key feature of good governance and requires mediation of divergent interests and views on the different socio-economic and political issues affecting the society (UNESCAP, 2016). Building consensus therefore, helps to avert potential violent conflicts that may stem from varying interest and views between or amongst different social groups (Gherghina, 2014). This feature implies that there must be a direct engagement of the citizens or their elected representatives in decision making process at all levels of governance. As posited by Aspinall, et al. (2017), patron-client networks and practices undermine consensus in decision making since members of various social groups in the society upholds loyalty to the patron as opposed to consensus building on substantive issues affecting them.

During elections, social groups are likely to pledge loyalty and elect corrupt politicians because of clientele benefits received as opposed to electing leaders with pragmatic development agenda (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Wenibowei (2011)

also cited that most recent elections in Africa (between the year 2000-2017) such as in Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe were a formality to affirm political candidate already predetermined through patronage and clientelistic offers during electioneering period. Consequently, electorate loses voluntary consent to elect political candidates of their choice due to the reciprocal clientele exchange relations required of them.

According to UNESCAP (2016), transparency and accountability also constitute a third distinctive feature of good governance. Transparency implies that the decision made, and respective means of implementation must be done in tandem with the constitution as well as established rules and regulations. UNESCAP (2016) further notes that transparency is measured based on how free and accessible information to the public on substantive issues that affected them. Conversely, accountability implies responsibility by public officers to the citizens and that public interest shall always be a priority in government operations. Research studies in countries such as Brazil, Italy, Malaysia, Singapore and Nigeria show that as a result of patron-client practices, transparency and accountability on appropriation of public finances by government officials is significantly undermined (Aspinall, et. al. 2017). Once political leaders are in power, the discourse on vertical accountability on use of public resources becomes obsolete since political leaders makes assumption that the electorate are already rewarded for voting and they need to recover the money used in political campaigns, vote buying and clientele goods.

World Bank (2017) however noted that in India, there is a successful case of adoption of transparency legislation which has effectively helped in improving democratic accountability. The enactment and implementation of the Right to Information Act (RTI) of (2005) has provided leverage for grassroots campaigners to initiate collective action on effective application of a Public-food-Distribution System (PDS). The Right

to Information Act of 2005 has enabled social organization to access government records and verify transfer of food subsidies through the PDS scheme and consequently be able to sanction corrupt public officers and restore equitability in access to food (Banerjee, et.al 2014).

As a fourth feature of democratic governance, responsiveness examines the efficiency of processes and institutions created to timely provide citizens with public goods and services (UNESCAP, 2016). It implies that at every given time, government agencies must be attentive to the priority needs of the citizens and promptly respond to them. Mares and Young (2016) opined that elected representatives in democratic countries articulate the demands and interest of their constituents because of the delegated constitutional responsibility. In emerging democracies, however, concerns have been raised on the level of responsiveness of both the national and local government in relation to addressing citizens' priority needs. Gherghina (2014) noted that clientele exchange relations and practices create acrimony between political leaders and the electorate especially in regions in which voters never voted for the political party in power.

Efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery also constitute a key feature of good governance (UNESCAP, 2016). As a prerequisite for the achievement of expected results, there must be adequate human capital and well established local and national institutions and structures. Aspinall, Berenschot and Hendrawan (2017) observed that in emerging democracies, patron-client networks and practices have the propensity to bring about human capital that either lacks requisite leadership qualities or leaders who are unresponsive to citizens' needs having earned their positions through clientelistic arrangement.

The primary objective of the governing elite once elected to power is to recover the funds appropriated to provide clientelistic goods, and to reward individuals who played a key role towards political success through selective appointment regardless of work experience or merit (Hutchcroft, 2014 and Weghorst and Lindberg, 2011). As a result, the development projects outlined in the political party manifesto are shelved until the subsequent electioneering period. Aspinall (2014) further argues patron-client practices undermine efficiency and effectiveness of established bureaucratic institutions in executing their jurisdictional mandate and thus affecting the quality of governance.

Equity and inclusiveness also constitute an important feature of good governance (UNESCAP, 2016). As opined by Askim et.al, (2017), members of every society must have equal opportunity in managing issues affecting them and no one should be discriminated in the mainstream public policy making process. Democratic societies are largely pluralistic in nature in terms of social classes, religious affiliation, gender, race, and political affiliation and therefore, every social group must actively be engaged in the various political activities and processes as well as in the allocation of public resources (Banerjee, et.al, 2014). The entrenchment of patron-client practices creates a class structure based on demographic characteristics such as ethnicity and regionality and which forms the basis of discriminating some of the citizens from an inclusive public policy making process (Aspinall, 2014). On the contrary Osayi (2015) opined that elected leaders initiate development projects and policies which serve their interests for instance in getting tenders and employment opportunities to their close associates and friends.

Lastly, the rule of law is also an important feature of democratic governance and implies that the constitution and any other state laws are supreme over all the citizens

regardless of their socio-economic and political status (UNSCAP, 2016). Aspinall, et.al, (2017) noted that the rule of law demands impartial and indiscriminate enforcement of legal framework in relation to human rights and freedom, as well as existing rules and regulations by an independent judiciary. While advanced democracies such as Britain, USA, Australia and Germany have streamlined their judicial system and the rule of law, studies however indicates that emerging democracies in the Latin America, Asia and Africa continues to have the rule of law and constitutionalism greatly undermined by weak judicial system (Chadwick, 2017). Osayi (2015) for instance observed that in developing countries such as Malaysia, Nigeria and Uganda, the outcome of electoral disputes launched in courts are often influenced by the executive arm of government which wields much power over the judiciary including in the appointment of judicial officers which sometimes is done on the basis of patron-client relations.

### **2.5.3 Implications of Patron-Client Practices on Democratic Governance**

Varying studies from liberal democracies shows that patron-client politics have both positive and negative impacts on governance (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). The first argument is premised on the social welfare and redistributive nature of clientelistic exchange and posits that the parameters for comparison should apply both to the programmatic and exploitative political systems. Gherghina and Soare (2013) opines that patron-client relations may not be ideal, however, if the alternative provides fewer gains to the poor citizens, then the practice becomes a means of achieving transactional benefits from those in power within the state. The second line of argument emphasizes the benefit of specialization and localism, and Ishkanian (2015) posits that clientelism can be a strategy for sharing national resources and dispensing them to the local constituents. Furthermore, owing to costs that may be



attributed to lost efficiencies and economies of scale as opined by Roniger (2004), clientele exchange relations can serve as a means through which local priority needs of the electorates such as development projects, money and foodstuff can be appropriated.

Studies by Ismailbekova (2014) and Lazar (2004) established that clientelistic practices can help in advancing the rights of disenfranchised citizens. From their studies, patron-client networks create an opportunity through which disenfranchised segment of population can take part in public policy making processes or in directing of national resources to needy citizens. In Bolivia for instance, Lazar (2004) noted that clientelistic network provided citizens with avenues through which local priority needs can be addressed. Additionally, a study by Ismailbekova (2014) in Kyrgyzstan also noted that patronage can't be seen to be incompatible with democracy. He opined that primordial social bonds have been used to rationalize clientelistic networks and consequently make them less hierarchical and intertwined with reciprocity and trust. Ismailbekova (2014) argued that on the basis of common primordial ties such as kinship and clannism, the electorates believe that they have authority over their political patron and must therefore abide by kinship norms and the community elders' resolutions in relations to people's needs.

The consensus in most literature, however, is that clientelism have the capacity to undermine how democracy functions and the ability for governance structures and institutions to develop responsive public policies and services (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). First, patron-client relations can reverse vertical accountability making it difficult for the electorate to hold public officials responsible for their actions while in leadership positions. The reciprocal clientele relations oblige the electorates to forfeit their constitutional political rights such as secret ballot and

voluntary choice of candidate in exchange for clientelistic goods and benefits and thus limiting citizens' capacity to hold leaders accountable (Ishkanian, 2015). In addition, the practice undermines progressive development of political institutions of governance by weakening systems of representation and accountability while consolidating incumbency advantage (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). The politicization of bureaucratic structures also constrains mechanisms of administrative control and oversight required to enhance public service delivery (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018).

Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2010) opined that in programmatic party systems, there is a higher freedom of access to information compared to patron-client systems, and this has consequently led to greater transparency and accountability in use of public resources, strengthened administrative structures, lower electoral volatility, and institutionalization of political party system. Furthermore, Stokes, et.al, (2013) noted that patron-client relations influence political behavior of the ruling political parties where clientelistic parties behave differently from the programmatic parties in the legislature. Patron-client based political parties in countries such as Brazil and Turkey are less cohesive and rarely rely on roll-call voting when they are in the opposition and thus making oversight of the ruling party to be difficult. Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) opined that patron-client relation is mostly intertwined with corruption and high levels of rent seeking which directly constrain national development in terms of quality of governance and economic performance.

Patronage based politics weakens initiatives towards better governance and studies by Gherghina and Soare (2013) and Katz (2011) noted that there is a significant correspondence between patron-client politics and the growing size of the public sector in terms jobs and size of wage bills. As observed by Askal, et.al, (2017),

political patron-client networks in Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana and Brazil have been linked to increasing wage bill and a bulging public sector which slows development projects due to high recurrent expenditure in terms of wages. Bormann, et.al (2013) also noted that diverting public funds in support of loyal political groups can contribute to inefficiencies in public service delivery. Patron-client relations oblige political leaders to prioritize his clientele base in terms of clientelistic benefits as opposed to addressing priority needs for all the citizens in their respective areas of representation.

Chadwick (2017) also opined that patron-client networks lead to politicization of the bureaucracy where under-qualified individuals are appointed into different administrative positions as opposed to merit. The practice also undermines organizational work ethics, weakens accountability where patrons engage in corrupt practices with the appointed officers covering up for their patrons, and lastly, it facilitate a systematic collaboration between the elected political leaders and the appointed public officials to engage in misappropriation of public resources in their respective offices (Ishkanian, 2015).

## **2.6 Theoretical Framework**

This study was guided by social exchange theory and the theory of reasoned action of electoral participation.

### **2.6.1 Social Exchange Theory**

The social exchange theory emerged in 1960s and the key proponents included Peter Blau (1964), George Homans (1961) and John Thibaut (1960). These scholars focused on the rational assessment of individual interest in human social relationships. The theory's primary principle is that human beings have the capacity to choose

behaviors that maximize achievement of self-interests in any social situations. The four basic tenets/principles of the theory that facilitate its application to reality include the following.

First, social exchange theory is based on the view that individuals are rational and can engage in a cost-benefit analysis in any social exchange relations. Thus, the theory assumes that human beings are rational actors who aspire to maximize relations for self-interest. Secondly, the theory is premised on the assumption that exchanges between or among individuals are efforts to achieve certain ambitions and interests of the parties involved in the relationship. Homans (1961) regarded the relations between or amongst the social groups as dyadic exchange relations. Thirdly, the theory holds that exchange processes that produce benefits/payoffs or gains lead to individual patterning of social interactions. These patterns of social interaction as opined by Homans (1961) serve both individuals' interest and constrain individuals on how they can achieve those needs. Every individual seeks social exchange relations that mutually promote their interest and needs and those of others involved in the relations.

Lastly, this theory is also anchored on the view that individuals in every competitive political system are always goal oriented. In contemporary democratic dispensation, every political system is highly competitive and basically fulfilling the Darwinian principle of survival of the fittest. As a result of its competitiveness, exchange processes often lead to differentiation of power and privilege in social groups to the extent that power in the exchange relations lies with those persons of upper socio-economic status and with resources giving them an advantage in the social exchange relations. As Blau (1964) opined, individuals with resources hold more power and are in a better positioned to gain from the exchange relation. Thus, the sustaining

principle of the social exchange theory in human relations is called reciprocity; an idea that when an individual or a group of people receives favour from others, a state of discomfort tends to set in because of feeling indebted to others. Wenibowei (2011) noted that the person(s) involved will feel obliged to reciprocate such an act in any manner within their capacity to restore equilibrium in the social exchange relation.


In the context of this study, patron-client relations constitute a chain of personal bonds between political candidates or parties (patrons) and voters/electorates (clients), premised on mutual benefits where the politicians distribute excludable resources such as money, jobs, and development projects to the voters in exchange for their political loyalty and electoral support. This theory was adopted to demonstrate how informal exchange relationship is established between the political candidates or parties (patrons) and the voters (clients), and the incentives that sustain the dyadic relations between them, and how the established network or relationship influences electoral participation. While the theory describes the exchange relations between or amongst different political actors from the cost-benefit analysis, it does not outline how pre-existing attitude, norms, self-efficacy and behavioural intentions of the actors may equally influence the exchange relations. It is against this background that the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) was adopted to complement this theory.

### **2.6.2 The Theory of Reasoned Action**

The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) was propounded by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen in 1967. The theory explains the interrelationship between individual attitudes and behaviors, and human action and thus helps to predict individual behaviour on the basis of their pre-existing attitudes and behavioral intentions. The theory holds that an individual's decision to engage in a particular behavior is premised on the anticipated outcomes/results of performing the behavior. The TRA primary purpose is to help

understand voluntary behavior of an individual by assessing the underlying basic motivation to perform the action. The theory states that an individual's intention is a precursor and a predictor as to whether they will actually perform that behavior.

According to the theory, an individual intention to perform a particular behavior is a function of favorableness or unfavorableness towards the behavior (attitudes), other people's perceptions regarding the behavior (normative pressure), and individual capacity to perform the intended behavior (self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control). According to TRA, attitudes are shaped by beliefs that performing the behavior will lead to specific consequences. The more an individual believes that a behavior will lead to positive outcomes or stop negative outcomes, the more favorable his attitude will be toward the behavior (behavioral intention). In relation to TRA, behavioral intention is important because such intentions are shaped by attitudes and subjective norms to the behavior. The theory therefore suggests that stronger intentions lead to increased effort to perform a given behavior and which consequently increases the probability that the behavior will be performed. In summary, attitude, norms and self-efficacy according to TRA shapes individual capacity to either perform or not perform an action.



**Figure 2.3: Theory of Reasoned Action**

**Source:** Bleakley and Hennessy (2012)


This theory was adopted to demonstrate how societal norms, values, and beliefs can shape individual capacity to participate in patron-client practices and networks and in elections. While Eagly and Chaiken (1993) recognized that TRA examines behaviors that people intentionally enact, the theory is however limited in terms of ability to predict behaviors that demand access to certain opportunities and/or resources. The theory was therefore adopted to complement the social exchange theory. While social exchange theory focused on material and immaterial incentives such as money, jobs and development project and protection, the Theory of Reasoned Action examined how attitude, norms, values, and primordial ties in a patron-client relations may influence individual engagement in clientelistic practices and subsequently, electoral

participation. The researcher holds that while there can be clientelistic offers such as vote buying, jobs, contracts among other, voters' moral values, beliefs, norms as well as other primordial attributes may equally shape voters' free will choice of political candidate in general elections.

## **2.7 Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework shown in Figure 2.4 was developed to illustrate how electoral participation is shaped by clientelistic practices, purposive and primordial social ties as well as the dyadic network. In addition, it also highlights the different intervening variable (internal and external factors) in relation to the study.





**Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework**

**Source:** Researcher (2019)

Figure 2.4 above shows that patron-client politics revolve around clientelistic practices, purposive and primordial corporate actors and their roles in patron-client relations, dyadic networks, and their implication on democratic governance. The

premise of this study was that these aspects of patron-client relations do influence electoral participation in Kenya; however, there exist inadequate data. In this study, clientelistic practices such as skewed appointment and employment, award of tenders and contracts, development projects, access to government funds and future political support, shapes voters' attitude and intention to either vote or not vote for certain candidates or political party. Patron-client relation involves actors such as the political parties, religious groups, voters, and business associations and performs certain roles towards electoral participation. To consolidate a broad support base, dyadic networks are established and can either be vertical or horizontal dyadic ties.

The study asserted that patron-client relations in electoral participation have implications on democratic governance such as on public participation, transparency and accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency, equity, and inclusiveness and on the rule of law. Electoral participation can be affected by other external factors such as influence by western countries, non-state actors, and international cyber-attack on electoral management system and internal factors such as insecurity, judicial independence, level of civic education, and the level of independence of electoral body. The proposition of this study is that the entrenchment of patron-client relations affects electoral participation in Kenya. If political patronage and clientelistic practices will not be addressed well and on time, then electoral participation in Kenya will be devoid of citizen free will and will continue to be a political event as opposed to a legitimate political process and thus leading to mediocre quality of governance.

## **2.8 Chapter Summary and Research Gaps**

Chapter two presented reviewed literature on the different thematic areas such as clientelistic practices, primordial and purposive corporate social ties, and dyadic

networks in relation to electoral participation. It also reviewed literature on the implications of patron-client relations on democratic governance. The chapter also discussed the theories that guided the study; social exchange theory and the Theory of Reasoned Action, as well as the conceptual framework developed to illustrate the relationship between the research variable under study.

From the reviewed literature, political patronage and clientelistic practices are aimed at consolidating loyalty to the regime with land and government appointment being key trade-offs especially for the first three regimes in Kenya (Klopp and Lumumba, 2016; Boone et.al 2016; Klopp, 2012; Mulemi, 2011; Chelang'a, et al. 2009; Kanyinga, 2009; Kanyinga, 2006; Kagwanja, 2005; Oyugi et.al, 2003; Oyugi, et.al. 2003; Nyangira, 1987). While the Kenyan Constitution 2010 provides institutional mechanism and framework for broader citizen participation, doubt has been cast on the efficacy of the existing legal framework in addressing patron-client practices in electoral participation and thus the need for study.

Electoral participation does not occur in a vacuum but involves different purposive and primordial corporate actors that may include political parties, political candidates, voters, religious organizations, and the media. Reviewed literature revealed that apart from their core roles in the society, these actors in different jurisdictions often influence public policy process and enactment of legislations as CSOs (Dubois and Blank, 2018; Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018; Chadwick, 2017; Heywood, 2017; Hutchcroft, 2014; Banerjee, 2014; Aririguzoh, 2014; Hawker, 2013; Kioli, 2012; Dasgupta, 2011; Chelang'a, et.al, 2009; Chandra, 2007; Elizabeth, 2007; Ogot, 2005; Oyugi, et.al, 2003; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984 and James Scott, 1972). Gaps however exist on how these actors shape electoral participation in Kenya and thus the need for interrogation.

Reviewed literature also indicated that political patrons can build dyadic bonds with clients with the objective of enhancing a wider linkage and assurance of political support and loyalty (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018; Arriola, et.al, 2017; Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Osayi, 2015; Gherghina, 2014; Kura, 2014; Katz, 2011; Hicken, 2011; Volintiru, 2010; Sousa, 2008; Kitschelt, 2000; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984 and Scott; 1972). Since direct clientelistic practices such as vote buying is illegal in Kenya, political candidates are likely to adopt informal recruitment networks to reach out to voters. This study sought to interrogate how dyadic networks are established, operated and sustained by political patron and clients and how they influence electoral participation.

Lastly, reviewed literature indicated that good governance is a prerequisite for sustainable development and is usually a derivative of a legitimate political process where citizens' free will in a free and fair electoral contest happens (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018; Bersch, et.al 2017; Askim, et.al 2017; World Bank, 2017; Aspinall, 2016; Mares and Young, 2016; Kristinsson, 2016; Ishkanian, 2015; Dargent, 2014; Gherghina, 2014; Gherghina and Soare, 2013; Hilgers, 2012 and Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In Kenya, scarce research exist to demonstrate the linkage between attributes of political patron-client relations and the level of democratic governance and thus the need for study.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the study area, research design, target population, sample size and sampling procedure, methods of data collection, validity and reliability of research instruments, data analysis, ethical consideration, and limitations of the study.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

Uasin Gishu County is one of the 47 counties in Kenya located in the former Rift Valley Province and with Eldoret town being the county's largest population center as well as its administrative and commercial center (GoK, 2010). Uasin Gishu County is situated in the mid-west of the Rift Valley covering an area of 3,345.2 square kilometers and lies between Longitude 34 degrees 50' East and 35 degrees 37' West and Latitude 0 degrees 03' South and 0 degrees 55' North (GoK, 2010). It borders six counties namely; Elgeyo Marakwet County to the East, Trans Nzoia to the North, Kericho to the South, Baringo to the South East, Nandi to the South West and Bungoma to the West, and according to the 2019 Population and Housing Census, the County had a total population of 1,163,186 (580,269 Male, 582, 889 women and 28 intersex) (GoK, 2019).

The County consists of six sub-counties (Soy, Turbo, Moiben, Ainabkoi, Kapseret and Kesses) 30 County Assembly units/Wards, and a total of 450,055 registered voters who were enlisted for 2017 general election (GoK, 2010 and IEBC, 2017). The focus of the researcher in Uasin Gishu County is that the county is largely peri-urban and cosmopolitan and thus able to provide the different attributes of patron-client relations in electoral participation from among the different ethnic groups and from

cross urban and rural setting. Although studies by Boone, et.al (2016) and Kanyinga (2009) noted that the County has occasionally experienced series of ethnic violence since the onset of multiparty politics in 1992, past research studies have focused much on land ownership among the different ethnic groups as well as electoral related conflicts but with less focus on the influence of patron-client relations on electoral participation and thus the need for study.


The county's name comes from the *Illwuas-in-kishu* Maasai clan which used the land as their grazing area during the pre-colonial period. They surrendered the land to the colonial government in the Anglo-Maasai agreement of 1911 and moved to Trans Mara (in Narok County) creating a more spacious land for the incoming white settlers in the new British Protectorate and thus forming the “White Highlands” (Boone, 2011). As the uprising for land rights emerged in the 1940s and 50s, most white farmers left and their land was occupied mostly by the Nandi and Keiyo communities even as the plateau that the Maasai community once occupied as their ancestral land was registered in its Anglicized version, Uasin Gishu.

Apart from the Kalenjin that predominantly occupy the county, other ethnic communities from Nyanza, Western and Central Kenya regions are currently permanent residents of the county engaging in different economic activities such as farming and trade (GoK, 2019). The County is one of Kenya’s breadbaskets due to its large-scale maize and wheat farms and thus the centrality of land as a means of production (Boone, et.al, 2016). Other economic activities include, milk and horticultural production, aquaculture and floriculture and the county capital, Eldoret, is home to a vibrant textile industry. Table 3.1 shows the administrative units per Sub County/Constituency while the Figure 3.1 indicates the Map of Uasin Gishu County.

**Table 3.1: Administrative Units and Area by Sub County**

<b>Sub County Name</b>	<b>Area In Km Sq.</b>	<b>Ward Code No</b>	<b>Ward</b>	<b>No. of Registered Voters</b>	<b>No. of Polling Stations</b>
1. Soy	682.4	0701	Moi's bridge	11,817	19
		0702	Kapkures	8,060	15
		0703	Ziwa	15,298	32
		0704	Segero/Barsombe	11,894	25
		0705	Kipsomba	8,702	19
		0706	Soy	9,933	19
		0707	Kuinet/kapsuswa	16,163	30
2. Turbo	365.6	0708	Ngenyilel	11,743	25
		0709	Tapsagoi	14,384	29
		0710	Kamagut	14,328	27
		0711	Kiplombe	24,573	42
		0712	Kapsaos	14,553	23
		0713	Huruma	31,270	47
3. Moiben	566.5	0714	Tembelio	13,126	31
		0715	Sergoit	8,864	20
		0716	Karuna/Meibeki	10,888	26
		0717	Moiben	12,266	28
		0718	Kimumu	23,678	40
4. Ainabkoi	591.8	0719	Kapsoya	21,103	34
		0720	Kaptagat	16,584	40
		0721	Ainabkoi/Olare	17,110	39
5. Kapseret	451.0	0722	Simat/Kapseret	12,343	25
		0723	Kipkenyo	13,851	22
		0724	Ngeria	9,374	19
		0725	Megun	6,958	15
		0726	Langas	24,056	38
6. Kesses	299	0727	Racecourse	17,396	28
		0728	Cheptiret/Kipchamo	14,098	31
		0729	Tulwet/Chuiyat	17,525	41
		0730	Tarakwa	18,117	39
<b>2,956.3</b>				<b>450,055</b>	<b>868</b>

**Source:** IEBC (2020) and GoK (2019)



**Figure 3.1: Map of the study area**

**Source:** GIS Lab-Moi University Department of Geography and Environmental Studies

### 3.3 Research Philosophy

A research philosophy is an orientation regarding how research data can be gathered, analyzed, and used. This study was premised on a pragmatic research philosophy. It entails a research approach that incorporates operational decisions premised on 'what will work best' in finding solutions to the research questions under study, and how such findings can find practical use in society (Kothari, 2007). In this study, the



researcher acknowledged that there cannot be a single approach in solving a research problem but a mix of approaches. Premised on this philosophy, a convergent parallel mixed method combining both qualitative and quantitative research techniques were used. The findings of this research revealed the realities of patron-client relations in shaping electoral participation, and thus forming the basis through which related challenges can be pragmatically addressed to secure voters' free will in general elections in Kenya.

### **3.4 Research Design**

A mixed method research design was adopted in this study where all registered voters who participated in the 2013 and 2017 general elections were targeted in Uasin Gishu County. As opined by Kothari (2007), a mixed method design allows simultaneous use of both quantitative and qualitative approaches to collect and analyze data, integrate findings and draw conclusions. This design helps in maximizing reliability and minimizing bias of the data collected and analyzed and thus provides for triangulation. In this study, the mixed methods design provided an opportunity to consider various aspects of the study problem and provided a room for generation of adequate qualitative and quantitative information. In addition, this type of research design allowed measuring instruments that were objective, reliable and valid. Therefore, this type of research design is efficient in collecting qualitative and quantitative data regarding the characteristics of the population, current behavior and changing trends in relations to patron-client relations and electoral participation.

### **3.5 Target Population**

According to Oso and Onen (2005), target population refers to the total number of subjects of interest to the researcher. The researcher targeted all 450,055 registered

voters in all the six sub-counties in Uasin Gishu County and it is from this figure that the researcher obtained the research sample for the study. Table 3.2 indicates the target population the researcher considered in the study from all the sub counties/constituencies in the study area.

**Table 3.2: Target Population**

<b>Sub County Name</b>	<b>Ward Code No</b>	<b>Ward Name</b>	<b>No. of Registered Voters per Ward</b>
1. Soy	0701	Moi's bridge	11,817
	0702	Kapkures	8,060
	0703	Ziwa	15,298
	0704	Segero/Barsombe	11,894
	0705	Kipsomba	8,702
	0706	Soy	9,933
	0707	Kuinet/kapsuswa	16,163
2. Turbo	0708	Ngenyilel	11,743
	0709	Tapsagoi	14,384
	0710	Kamagut	14,328
	0711	Kiplombe	24,573
	0712	Kapsaos	14,553
	0713	Huruma	31,270
3. Moiben	0714	Tembelio	13,126
	0715	Sergoit	8,864
	0716	Karuna/Meibeki	10,888
	0717	Moiben	12,266
	0718	Kimumu	23,678
4. Ainabkoi	0719	Kapsoya	21,103
	0720	Kaptagat	16,584
	0721	Ainabkoi/Olare	17,110
5. Kapseret	0722	Simat/Kapseret	12,343
	0723	Kipkenyo	13,851
	0724	Ngeria	9,374
	0725	Megun	6,958
	0726	Langas	24,056
6. Kesses	0727	Racecourse	17,396
	0728	Cheptiret/Kipchamo	14,098
	0729	Tulwet/Chuiyat	17,525
	0730	Tarakwa	18,117
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>450,055</b>

Source: IEBC (2020)

### 3.6 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Subsequent sections discuss on sample size determination and sampling procedure for the study.

#### 3.6.1 Sample Size Determination

In social science research, the general rule is to use the largest sample as possible because the main interest is to learn more about the population from which the sample is drawn (Kline, 1980). However, the sample size can be determined by the nature and characteristics of the target population. In this research, the study targeted 450,055 registered voters in Uasin Gishu County from which a sample size of 384 respondents was drawn as per Krenjie and Morgan (1970) and Kothari (2007) sample size determination formulae below (**Also see Appendix IV**).

$$\text{Sample size} = \frac{X^2NP(1-P)}{d^2(N-1) + X^2P(1-P)}$$

**Where**  $X^2$  = Table value of Chi-Square @ d.f =1 for desired Confidence level i.e.  
 0.10 = 2.7, 0.05 = 3.84, 0.01 = 6.64, 0.001 = 10.83

**N** = Target population size

**P** = Population proportion (considered/assumed to be 0.5 since this will provide the maximum sample size)

**d** = The degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion (0.05 or 5%)

For this study, the following values have been considered in determination of the sample size;

$X^2$  = 3.84 (For Confidence level of 0.05 or 5%)

**N** = 450,055 (Target population)

**d** = 0.05 (Degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion)

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Sample size} &= \frac{3.84 (450,055) (0.5) (1-0.5)}{(0.05)^2 (450,055-1) + 3.84 (0.5) (1-0.5)} \\ &= \frac{432,052.8}{1,126.095} \\ &= 383.67 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the sample size for this study was **384** respondents.

### 3.6.2 Sampling Procedure

The researcher purposively considered all the six sub-counties in Uasin Gishu County from which two Wards with the highest and the lowest registered voters in each Sub County was considered to avoid bias (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). Having the summation of all registered voters from every two selected Wards per Sub County ( $P=200,694$ ) expressed as a representation of the entire research sample size ( $n=384$ ), a proportionate sample from each selected ward was calculated and drawn as indicated in Table 3.3. For instance, a proportionate sample from Kuinet/Kapsuswa ward in Soy Sub County was calculated as follow.

$$\frac{P(n)}{\sum P}$$

Where;  $P$  = Total registered voters per a given ward e.g Kuinet = 16,163 voters  
 $n$  = The entire samples size (384) and  
 $\sum P$  = Total number of registered voters in all the sampled wards  
 (200,694)

The proportionate sample was calculated to be;

$$\begin{aligned} &= \frac{16,163 (384)}{200,694} \\ &= \frac{6,206, 592}{200,694} \\ &= 30.926 \end{aligned}$$

The proportionate sample from Kuinet ward was **31**.

Table 3.3 below indicates how the different proportionate samples from the selected wards per Sub County was drawn totaling to 384 respondents.

**Table 3.3: Sample Size**

<b>Sub County Name</b>	<b>Ward Code No.</b>	<b>Selected Wards for Study</b>	<b>No. of Registered Voters (p)</b>	<b>Sample Size</b>
1. Soy	0702	Kapkures	8,060	15
	0707	Kuinet/Kapsuswa	16,163	31
2. Turbo	0708	Ngenyilel	11,743	23
	0713	Huruma	31,270	60
3. Moiben	0716	Sergoit	8,864	17
	0718	Kimumu	23,678	45
4. Ainabkoi	0719	Kapsoya	21,103	40
	0720	Kaptagat	16,584	32
5. Kapseret	0725	Megun	6,958	13
	0726	Langas	24,056	46
6. Kesses	0728	Cheptiret/Kipchamo	14,098	27
	0730	Tarakwa	18,117	35
<b>Total</b>		<b>12</b>	<b>200,694</b>	<b>384</b>

**Source:** Researcher, 2020

A simple random sampling was then adopted in selecting individual respondents from each selected ward and served with questionnaires. Respondents were drawn from the different polling stations to avoid bias. Purposive sampling was adopted in identifying Key Informants to be interviewed and those to participate in the Focused Group Discussion (FGD).

### **3.7 Methods of Data Collection**

This study utilized primary and secondary data to establish the association between the variables; political patron-client relations and electoral participation in the study area. While in some cases the researcher adopted a single method of data collection, other cases adopted a combination of two or more techniques thus allowing triangulation approach. The researcher adopted the use of questionnaires, interview

schedules and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in soliciting primary data which was corroborated with existing secondary data.

### **3.7.1 Data Collection Techniques**

Data for this study were collected through the use of the following techniques.

#### **3.7.1.1 Questionnaires**

The questionnaire for this study was designed to seek information from the various electorates in the selected wards in Uasin Gishu County. Questionnaires were preferred because it allows collection of data from many respondents while saving time in the field. This instrument also helps to ensure consistency in the sequence and nature of the items given to the respondents and therefore, enhancing the reliability and validity of the study (Kothari, 2004). The questionnaires comprised of both open and closed ended items and thus used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data. The researcher through a simple random sampling approach distributed 384 questionnaires to respondents in the selected wards in the County and from which a total of 351 questionnaires were adequately filled and returned representing a response rate of 91.4 percent.

#### **3.7.1.2 Interview Schedules**

According to Kothari (2007), interview schedule is a written list of questions open or closed, prepared for use by an interviewer in a person to person interaction. It is a qualitative in-depth interview with people or a person who holds critical information regarding a given phenomenon under study. This research tool was used to solicit first-hand information in the study area on issues related to the objectives of the study. It involved face to face interview between the researcher and Key Informants using open ended interview questions.

The study involved use of interview schedules/guides to collect primary information from 30 Key Informants and included a former deputy governor aspirant, 2 elected Members of National Assembly, 1 representative of interest group (*Bunge la Wananchii*), 4 Members of the County Assembly, 3 Constituency Returning Officers, 3 Sub County Representatives of the Business Community, 3 Political Party Officials, 2 National Government Administrative Officers (1 Assistant County Commissioners, 1 Deputy County Commissioner), 2 Sub County Police Commandants, 3 Religious leaders, 2 representatives of trade unions, 2 county government officials and 2 local retired political veterans. Such Key Informants had in-depth understanding of the substantive issues under study because of their professional experience in their areas of jurisdiction, and involvement in electoral related activities in the County. Their respective inputs towards the substantive issues under study were documented and integrated with responses obtained from other sources of data.

### **3.7.1.3 Focus Group Discussion**

A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) involves gathering people from similar backgrounds or experiences together to discuss a specific topic of interest (Nachmias and Frankfort, 1996). It is a form of qualitative research where questions are asked about their perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, opinion, or ideas on a substantive issue of concern under research. In a Focus Group Discussion, participants are free to talk with other group members; unlike other research methods it encourages discussions with other participants.

In this study, FGDs were conducted using an interview guide in order to generate qualitative data unique to the target groups and involved seven focused group discussions of 5 to 7 members per group. The discussion session which lasted for at

least two hours for each group was held at a conference room that offered the best location for the purposes of recording and discussions. The discussion was audio-recorded to allow the researcher to review during data analysis. Moderators during FGDs played a significant role in the discussions by ensuring that all participants had an opportunity to contribute towards the topic and that a good rapport was maintained.

These categories of FGDs involved local administrative leaders (as FGD 1), religious leaders (FGD 2), the leaders of Uasin Gishu County Youth Forum (FGD 3), representatives of business associations (FGD 4), representatives of Uasin Gishu county workers (FGD 5), representatives of county professionals (FGD 6) and lastly political parties' representatives (FGD 7) from the study area. The responses received through FGDs were integrated towards understanding the substantive issues of research such as on clientelistic practices, the role of purposive and primordial actors, the patron-client dyadic networks and the implication of the practices on democratic governance in the County.

#### **3.7.1.4 Secondary Sources of Data**

The researcher incorporated secondary information obtained through a review of books, research reports and journals on patron-client relations and electoral participation. Secondary data provides a general framework through which a study can be operationalized, and such data is often used to supplement the primary data collected from the various respondents (Kothari, 2007).

### **3.8 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments**

Validity of research instruments is the accuracy and meaningfulness of the inferences based on the research results (the extent to which a test measures what it claims to measure) while reliability refers to the degree to which a research instruments yields



consistent results after repeated trials (Kothari, 2007 and Mugenda and Mugenda, 1999). Validity was determined using content validity whereby components of the questionnaires were checked to ensure clarity of words and accuracy of the statements in relations to the specific research question. In addition, the research instruments were given to the senior lecturers in the Department to evaluate the items and give their expert input regarding remodeling of the items. This is in tandem with Kothari (2003), that reliability of research instruments can be determined by using a panel of experts to appraise how well they meet the required standards and represent the variables under study (also Nachmias and Frankfort, 1996). The researcher used their suggestions to improve and modify the items in the research instruments.

To ensure reliability of research instruments, a pre-test of the questionnaires and interview schedules were conducted in Bomet County, in which 40 registered voters in at least 5 polling stations were served with the questionnaires, and local leaders such as the chiefs, area Members of County Assembly, leaders of professional associations (e.g. Kenya National Union of Teachers) and religious leaders were interviewed to allow a pre-test of the research instruments. This enabled the researcher to remodify the research instrument to adequately address every aspect required for every research objective.

### **3.9 Methods of Data Analysis**

Data analysis entails separation of data into consistent parts or element separately or in relation to the whole (Oso and Onen, 2005). This study adopted a convergent parallel mixed method combining both the qualitative and quantitative data analysis techniques. Qualitative data collected using open-ended questionnaires, focused group discussions and Key Informant interviews were analyzed qualitatively using thematic analysis and presented as verbatim. This approach was used in describing the

respondents' view on patron-client relations and electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County.

Quantitative data from closed ended questionnaires were organized and analyzed descriptively with the help of Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 24. The descriptive statistics derived from the analyzed quantitative data were presented using frequency tables, percentages, pie charts and graphs. In this study, the data gathered from the field was corroborated by available secondary data for the purpose of interpretation and presentation.

### **3.10 Ethical Considerations**

As outlined in the Belmont report, the researcher adhered to the research guiding code of ethics, beneficence, respect and justice. The researcher first sought a research permit from the National Commission of Science Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) and authorization from the County Education Office, County Commissioner's Office and from Uasin Gishu County government to conduct the research study. Secondly, respondents' informed consent and voluntary participation in the study was also sought. This involved the issuance of an introductory letter to every respondent explaining that the research was solely for academic purpose and not for any other use whatsoever. Additionally, all the respondents were assured of anonymity and confidentiality in all the information given since no respondent was required to sign his/her name, identification number or any other information that may reveal their identity on the questionnaire.

### **3.11 Limitations of the study**

While conducting this study, a number of limitations were experienced. First was the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic during the initial stage of data collection which

interrupted primary data collection from the respondents from the various Sub-counties in Uasin Gishu County. However, the lifting of travel restrictions and strict observance of the Covid-19 health protocol outlined by the Ministry of Health enabled the researcher to successfully collect all the primary data required for the study. Secondly, the respondents especially working for the County government were at first unwilling to reveal information regarding clientelistic practices and how it impacts on different attributes of democratic governance. However, the researcher's assurance of confidentiality and anonymity in terms of respondents' identity and information given created a breakthrough in obtaining required information for the research study.

**CHAPTER FOUR**

**CLIENTELISTIC PRACTICES AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN**

**UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides analysis and interpretation of findings of the first research objective on the clientelistic practices that determines electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. It begins with presentation of findings on the response rate and demographic characteristics of the respondents, and lastly on the clientelistic practices in presidential, gubernatorial, member of national assembly and member of the county assembly elections.

#### **4.2 Response Rate**

In order to collect primary data, 384 questionnaires were administered to the respondents and Table 4.1 shows the response rate per Sub County.

**Table 4.1: Questionnaires' Response Rate per Sub County**

<i>Sub County</i>	<b>Total Questionnaires Administered</b>		<b>Adequately Filled and Returned</b>		<b>Not Returned or Inadequately Filled</b>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent (%)</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent (%)</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent (%)</i>
Kesses	62	16.1	57	14.8	5	1.3
Ainabkoi	72	18.8	64	16.7	8	2.1
Soy	46	12	40	10.4	6	1.6
Turbo	83	21.6	76	19.8	7	1.8
Moiben	62	16.2	59	15.4	3	0.8
Kapseret	59	15.3	55	14.3	4	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>91.4</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>8.6</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

A total of 351 questionnaires were duly filled and returned representing a response rate of 91.4 percent while 33 questionnaires representing 8.6% percent were either not returned or inadequately filled and could not be used in the study. Krenjie and Morgan (1970) and Kothari (2007) posit that a response rate of 50 percent is considered adequate, 60 percent is good and above 70 percent is rated as very good. Given that the response rate for this study was 91.4 %, it was thus considered satisfactory and adequate for use in making generalization regarding the objectives of the study.

#### **4.3 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents**

This section discusses the findings on the demographic characteristics of the respondents and Table 4.2 provides a summary on sex, age, marital status, level of education, occupation, income levels, religion, and respondents' ethnic group.

**Table 4.2: Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Sex	Male	217	61.8
	Female	132	37.6
	Intersex	2	0.6
Age in Years	18-35	128	36.5
	36-53	167	47.6
	54-71	56	15.9
Marital Status	Single	49	14
	Married	284	80.9
	Widowed	12	3.4
	Separated/Divorced	6	1.7
Highest Level of Education Attained	Primary	18	5.1
	Secondary	78	22.2
	Certificate or Diploma	179	51
	Bachelor's Degree	64	18.3
	Post-Graduate Degree	12	3.4
Occupation	Casual worker	41	11.7
	Business	76	21.7
	Farming	142	40.4
	Employed on contract	54	15.4
	Permanently employed	38	10.8
	Level of Income in Ksh (Per Month)	Below 5,000	59
	5,001 - 15,000	168	47.9
	15,001 - 35,000	84	23.9
	35,001 - 55,000	32	9.2
	55,000 and Above	8	2.2
Religious Denomination	Catholics	112	31.9
	Protestant	183	52.1
	Islam	42	12
	Hindu	4	1.2
	Others	10	2.8
Ethnic Group	Kalenjin	178	50.7
	Kikuyu	58	16.5
	Akamba	8	2.3
	Luhya	48	13.7
	Luo	31	8.8
	Kisii	18	5.1
	Others	10	2.9

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings depicted in Table 4.2 indicate that 217(61.8%) respondents were male, 132(37.6%) were female while 2(0.6%) were intersex. Respondents aged 18-35 years were 128(36.5%), those aged 36-53 years were 167(47.6%) while respondents between 57-71 years were 56(15.9%). The age cohort distribution provided a good spread among the respondents (the youth, middle aged and the aging population) to facilitate meaningful inferences on the substantive issues under study. Regarding marital status, it was established that 49(14%) respondents were single, 284(80.9%) were married, 12(3.4%) were widowed while 6(1.7%) were separated/divorced. In view of the fact that over 80 percent of the respondents were or had been in marital unions, it enabled the study to clearly project how family relations as a primordial social tie shapes voting in general elections.

The findings also indicated that 18(5.1%) respondents had Primary school education, 78(22.2%) had Secondary school level of education, 179(51%) had either post-secondary certificate or Diploma, 64(18.3%) had undergraduate degree while 12(3.4%) had Post graduate degree. It is thus evident that a large proportion (72.6 %) of the respondents had adequate education to comprehend activities related to voting process in general elections. The study established that 41(11.7%) respondents worked as casual labourers (in construction sites, *Matatu* transport sector and saw milling), 76(21.7%) were engaged in business activities (such as hawking, *Jua-Kali* sector, shop keeping, second hand cloth dealer, Saloon services, woodwork, Cyber and food cafes), 142(40.5%) were involved in farming (such as growing and sale of coffee, potatoes, horticulture, maize, wheat, flowers and dairy keeping), 54(15.4%) were employed on contract (such as at the county headquarter offices, private hospitals, supermarkets, flower farms, learning institutions, banks and NGOs) while

38(10.8%) were permanently employed (such as in public hospitals, learning institutions, county and national government ministries and departments, and banks).

The study also established that 59(16.8%) respondents had their monthly income below Ksh. 5,000 while 168(47.9%) respondents had their monthly income between Ksh. 5,001-15,000. Furthermore, 84(23.9%) respondents had income between Ksh. 15,001-35,000, 32(9.2%) had income level of Ksh. 35,001-55,000, while 8(2.2%) respondents had their income above Ksh. 55,000. It was evident that 64.7 percent of the respondents had incomes not exceeding Ksh. 15,000 per month indicating that they could hardly support their households and thus perhaps explains why voters are willing to accept monetary incentives and clientele goods to vote for candidate(s) during election.

Regarding the religion of the respondents, 112(31.9%) were Catholics, 183(52.1%) were Protestants, 42(12%) were Muslims, 4(1.2%) were Hindu while 10(2.9%) subscribed to other religious faiths such as Traditional African Religions. This finding was consistent with the 2019 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics report which indicated the dominance of Christianity at 85 percent with Muslims at 11 percent of the population (KNBS, 2018). As a primordial and a purposive social bond, this finding was useful in interrogating how it shaped electoral participation in the 2013 and 2017 general elections. Regarding ethnic extraction of the respondents, 178(50.7%) were Kalenjin, 58(16.5%) were Kikuyu, 8(2.3%) were Kamba, 48(13.7%) were Luhya, 31(8.8%) were Luo, 18(5.1%) were Kisii while 10(2.9%) were from other ethnic communities such as Somali, Turkana and Borana. This finding depicts the cosmopolitan nature of the study area, and thus provided the basis



of understanding how ethnicity as a primordial social bond shapes voters' choice of candidates in general elections.

#### 4.4 Respondents' Participation in 2013 and 2017 General Elections in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to determine respondents' participation in the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County and the findings were as tabulated in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3: Respondents' Participation in 2013 and 2017 General Elections**

Responses on Participation	2013 General Election		2017 General Election	
	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Those who voted	339	96.6	343	97.7
Did not vote	12	3.4	8	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 4.3 show that 339(96.6%) respondents voted in the 2013 general election and 12(3.4%) did not, while in the 2017 general elections, 343(97.7%) respondents voted with only 8(2.3%) not voting. While respondents cited that it was their constitutional right to vote and bring leadership change in the different levels of governance, those who did not vote cited factors such as the demanding nature of their occupation (such as doctors, nurses, security officers), voter apathy, loss of the national identity card and sickness before election day.

The researcher sought to find out whether the respondents were willing to participate in future general elections and 342(97.4%) agreed that they will participate either as voters or as political candidates, while 9(2.6%) cited that they will not. Among the

reasons cited by respondents for future electoral participation included their constitutional right, that election provided an opportunity to choose leaders who were development conscious, election allowed social groups to aggregate their interests, while others cited that it provided an opportunity to obtain clientelistic goods from political candidates. Those who resented their future participation cited vote rigging that denies them their preferred political candidates, unfulfilled development promises by elected leaders, fear of electoral violence, while others cited predetermined candidates based on ethnicity and patron-client exchanges as opposed to a voluntary, free and fair election.

According to the Constitution of Kenya (2010), general elections are to be held every five years and shall involve the election of the president, county governor, woman representative to the national assembly, the senator, member of the national assembly and the member of the county assembly. This study however, focused on only four elective positions namely, the presidential, gubernatorial, member of national assembly and member of county assembly in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

#### **4.5 Clientelistic Practices and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

Provided for under Article 38 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya is the voluntary choice of electorate in electing their representatives in a free and fair elections held by secret ballot (GoK, 2010). Given the scanty research on the exactitude of these principles under the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Kenya, this section assessed the clientelistic practices that determine electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. This study adopted Klopp (2012) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) arguments that clientelism implies a selective and favourable treatment of individuals

or social groups by the state, political party, or political candidate(s) usually in exchange for votes and political loyalty in elections.

#### 4.5.1 Clientelistic Practices in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to assess the extent at which the listed factors influenced the choice of presidential candidate in the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County and the findings are as indicated in Table 4.4.

**Table 4.4 Clientelistic Practices in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Clientelistic Practices in Presidential Elections</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
a) It is my civic duty to vote	341 (97.2%)	8 (2.3%)	349 (99.5%)	2 (0.5%)
b) To get government employment/ appointment	112 (31.9%)	161 (45.9%)	273 (77.8%)	78 (22.2%)
c)To get government projects & funds	153 (43.6%)	116 (33%)	269 (76.6%)	82 (23.4%)
d) For future support of our ethnic leader	191 (54.4%)	128 (36.5%)	319 (90.9%)	32 (9.1%)
e)To access subsidized/free government goods such as fertilizers, seeds etc	178 (50.7%)	117 (33.3%)	295 (84%)	56 (16%)
f) I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party	162 (46.2%)	81 (23.1%)	243 (69.3%)	108 (30.7%)
g) To be awarded government tenders and contracts	12 (3.4%)	32 (9.1%)	44 (12.5%)	307 (87.5%)
h) To get government protection of our community assets	42 (12%)	89 (25.3%)	131 (37.3%)	220 (62.7%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Findings in Table 4.4 indicates that 349(99.5%) respondents noted that their electoral participation was premised on their civic duty to vote, 273(77.8%) attributed it to anticipation of government employment, 269(76.6%) based their electoral participation on anticipation for government projects and funds, while 319(90.9%)

respondents pegged their participation on future ethnic political reciprocity. Additionally, 295(84%) respondents based their electoral participation on access to subsidized/free government goods and services, 243(69.3%) cited receiving monetary incentive from the political candidates/party during political campaigns, 44(12.5%) premised their participation on anticipated government tenders and contracts while 131(37.3%) respondents attributed their electoral participation to the need to guarantee security to community assets.

As noted from the finding, respondents understood their democratic right to vote as provided for under Article 38(3b) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. A Key Informant noted that prior to general election, intensive civic education is done to educate electorates on their political rights as required by the Constitution. He noted that;

*The Commission (IEBC) under Article 88(4g) is constitutionally obligated to conduct countrywide civic education on the importance of elections, electoral process and the rights of voters. The objective is to enlighten voters on every aspect of election and enables them to freely exercise their democratic right to vote... (KI, No. 9)*

Response from the Key Informant agrees with Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) that voter education in developing democracies enables voters to make informed choices, avoid electoral malpractices such as vote selling, and foster voters' understanding of their political rights.

Article 1, 6, 175 and 176 of the 2010 Constitution provides for the establishment of national and county governments and their respective functions outlined in the Fourth Schedule (GoK, 2010). While Article 202 and 203 grants powers to the Commission of Revenue Allocation on national revenue sharing, over 84.5% of the total estimated national revenue remains with the national government while 15% is disbursed to the counties and with 0.5% provided as equalization funds to the counties (GoK, 2010).

In relation to this study, Key Informants interviewed and discussants from the FGDs noted that the huge financial resources remaining with the national government gave the office of the president the prerogative to appropriate such resources through ministries as patronage especially in specific regions that overwhelmingly supported the ruling party during elections. A discussant in FGD noted that;

*While various functions have been devolved to the Counties, over 80% of the national revenue remains with the national government and are used in initiating mega development projects under the supervision of the office of the president and sometimes based on regions that supported the party in power... (Pa 3, FGD 6)*

While the discussant response reflected a political practice and culture that characterized the 1963 constitutional dispensation where the president could make road-side declaration to initiate projects based on patronage and voters loyalty, it was evident that the practice was still ongoing even under the 2010 constitutional dispensation in Kenya. Respondents noted that the large amount of funds under the national government provided a basis for initiating targeted development projects (pork barreling) such as roads, electricity and dam construction, provision of subsidized public goods such as farm inputs as well as financial credit facility for youth and women, and which was noted to have had a significant influence on electoral choice in presidential elections in the study area.

Focused Group Discussion with Key Informants also noted that since the County was largely engaged in agriculture such as dairy farming, wheat and maize growing, there was always a demand for good infrastructure such as roads for easy transportation of farm produce to the market, as well as demand for free or subsidized farm inputs such as fertilizers and certified seeds. A discussant argued that:

*...The first tenure of Jubilee government brought goodies to us such as new roads construction and maintenance, subsidized fertilizers to farmers and improved prices of maize and wheat. At least the deputy*

*president (William Ruto) being in government was a sure bet on development in the region. Consequently, most voters elected Jubilee party presidential candidate again in 2017 elections with the hope of more favours... (Pa 5, FGD 2)*

Apparent from the discussant response was that skewed establishment of development projects such as roads, electricity, provision of subsidized farm inputs, and accessibility of funds for youth and women, influenced voters' electoral participation in presidential elections. This was also premised on the deputy president (also the deputy party leader of Jubilee party) being a resident of Uasin Gishu county and being able to articulate the community (ies) and regional interests in government. This finding agrees with Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) assertion that pork-barreling is a strong incentive that enhances a strong patron-client relation in developing nations and premised on targeted government spending on regions perceived as political strongholds.

The study also established that electoral participation in presidential elections was catalyzed by anticipated government employment as cited by 273(77.8%) respondents. Respondents' demographics indicated that 255(72.7%) respondents had post secondary education and above, and with only 92(26.2%) respondents engaged either in a contractual or a permanent job while over 70 percent of all the respondents were involved in informal jobs such as at construction sites and *Jua Kali* activities. It indicated that most of them were unemployed and would vote on the basis that formal jobs will be guaranteed by their preferred presidential candidate after winning in presidential election. Focused group discussion with various youth leaders noted that;

*...Most youths in the County have studied to the university level yet they work at mjengo, do hawking and other jua kali activities to earn a living. They are willing to campaign and vote for a political candidate as long as they will be assured of government jobs or appointments. Most youth in the region voted for Jubilee with these hopes in mind... (Pa 1, FGD 3)*

Evident from the discussant response was that most of the electorates and especially youth would vote for presidential candidates on the basis that formal jobs and government appointments were guaranteed. This was confirmed by Key Informants representing different political parties that as part of their party campaign strategy, their party manifestos cited job creation for youth to tackle unemployment as well as creation of youth funds for starting businesses. It's thus evident that as both a programmatic and a clientelistic practice, expectation for government jobs and appointment influenced voters' electoral participation in presidential candidate in the study area.

It was also found out that 319(90.9%) respondents cited future ethnic political reciprocity of their ethnic patron as a significant factor that shaped their choice of presidential candidate. As noted by Kanyinga (2009), political parties in Kenya since the year 1992 have been surrogates of ethnicity and serving as tools to advance ethnic interests, and often reflected in the party membership base. This was confirmed in the case of Jubilee Alliance/party in 2013 and 2017 respectively where URP lead by William Ruto of Kalenjin ethnic group entered into pre-election pact with TNA led by Uhuru Kenyatta of the Kikuyu ethnic group and based on the "tyranny of numbers", the Jubilee Alliance/party won in the two presidential elections. A Key Informant noted that:

*In the run up for the 2013 presidential elections, Uhuru Kenyatta from TNA and William Ruto from URP formed Jubilee Alliance and while at Afraha Stadium in Nakuru, the two promised to work together to ensure Kenyatta's presidential victory and upon completing his second tenure, he [..Kenyatta...] will then support Ruto for his tenure... (KI, No. 24)*

While the pre-election pact by the party leaders of TNA and URP was perceived as an effort to defeat indictment by the International Criminal Court of Justice following

accusation of bankrolling 2007/8 post-election violence, the study noted that the support for Jubilee Alliance presidential candidate was anchored on future ethnic political reciprocity. Key Informants noted that William Ruto from URP Party was able to successfully mobilize the Kalenjin community to vote for Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013 and 2017 with the hope that upon completion of his tenure, he will equally be endorsed as a presidential candidate having served as the deputy party leader and a Deputy President to Uhuru Kenyatta. This was a precursor for the massive ‘*Uhuruto*’ campaigns and subsequently a massive electoral support in the County as demonstrated by the over 85 percent voter turnout and voting for Jubilee presidential candidate in both the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections (IEBC, 2013 and 2017).

The study further found out that monetary incentive from the presidential candidates during political campaigns also shaped voters’ electoral participation as cited by 243(69.3%) respondents. Discussants in focused group discussion noted that through the use of party proxies such party officials at the grass root, monetary incentives were used to woo voters to turn out in large numbers during campaigns and on the day of election for a particular presidential candidate. This clientelistic practice targeted both individual voter and community organizations such as youth groups, women groups, people with disabilities and religious groups as a way of enticing them for electoral support. A Key Informant noted that:

*During campaign period, presidential candidates especially from the Jubilee party would donate millions of shillings to youth groups, women groups and churches and would promise more after elections. Most groups perceived this unique kind gesture and generosity as a persuasion to vote for their candidate and would equally pledge to support the party having received the donations... (KI, No. 11)*

Apparent from the Key Informant response was that targeted monetary donations to the different social groups and individual voters were a key incentive in enhancing high voter turnout and voter loyalty in presidential elections. While Elections Offence



Act (No.37 of 2016) prohibits voters' inducement to vote using money or any donated private or public goods or service by any political candidate(s) or party, it was found out that the practice continues unabated in the presidential elections and significantly shaped voters' choice of candidate.

As opined by Willis et.al. (2014), the disputed presidential elections in the 2007 general elections led to post election violence in Eldoret region in which ODM supporters drawn from Kalenjin, Luo and Luhya communities targeted PNU supporters from the Kikuyu and Kamba communities with their businesses being burnt down, targeted killing such as in Kiambaa church, and forceful eviction from residential homes. The study established that in the run up for the 2013 and 2017 general elections, 131(37.3%) respondents attributed their electoral participation in presidential election to have been influenced by the need to protect their assets such as land and businesses. A Key Informant cited that prior to 2013 general elections, several leaflets in Moiben, Munyaka, Langas and Turbo were circulated asking communities supporting CORD alliance to either vote for Jubilee party or vacate the County. He noted;

*Leaflets were circulating asking some communities who were supporting CORD in 2013 to leave the County, however measures were taken to enhance security and no violence was witnessed before and after the election... (KI, No. 25)*

Other clientelistic incentives provided to voters in presidential elections as cited by discussants in FGDs and interviews included branded apparels such as reflector jackets (mostly to *Boda Boda* operators and *mama mboga*), T-shirts, caps and food donations.

This study established that while the voters were aware of their civic duty to vote, pork-barreling in presidential elections was more prevalent than individual/private

clientele goods such as provision of branded apparels (caps, food donations, T-shirts, reflector jackets) and monetary incentives. Additionally, ethnic political reciprocity was also cited to be an immaterial incentive influencing voters' electoral participation. However, expectation of tender awards had little influence on voters' electoral participation in the presidential elections.

#### 4.5.2 Clientelistic Practices in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County

The findings as shown in Table 4.5 indicate how the listed factors influenced the choice of gubernatorial candidates in the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

**Table 4.5: Clientelistic Practices in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Clientelistic practices in Gubernatorial elections</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
a. It is my civic duty to vote	336(95.7%)	11(3.1%)	347(98.8%)	4(1.2%)
b. To get government employment/ appointment	132(37.6%)	112(31.9%)	244(69.5%)	107(30.5%)
c. To get government projects & funds	148(42.2%)	118(33.6%)	266(75.8%)	85(24.2%)
d. For future support of our ethnic leader	18(5.1%)	72(20.5%)	90(25.6%)	261(74.4%)
e. Access subsidized/free government goods such as fertilizers, seeds etc	154(43.9%)	102(29.1%)	256(73%)	95(27%)
f. I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party	102(29.1%)	137(39%)	239(68.1%)	112(31.9%)
g. To be awarded government tenders and contracts	23(6.6%)	45(12.8%)	68(19.4%)	283(80.6%)
h. To get government protection of our community assets	38(10.8%)	91(25.9%)	129(36.7%)	222(63.3%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 4.5 indicates that 347(98.8%) respondents cited civic duty to vote to have influenced their electoral participation in gubernatorial elections, 244(69.5%) cited access to county government employment, 266(75.8%) respondents pegged their participation on access to government projects while 90(25.6%) respondents cited future support of their ethnic patron. Additionally, 256(73%) respondents cited access to subsidized county government goods and services, 239(68.1%) cited monetary incentive from the political candidates, 68(19.4%) cited award of tenders and contracts, while 129(36.7%) cited security of community assets to have influenced their electoral participation in gubernatorial elections in Uasin Gishu county, Kenya.

The 2013 gubernatorial elections lacked an incumbent since it was the first time such election was being held under the new 2010 Constitution in Uasin Gishu County and Kenya at large. Like the presidential elections, it was established that respondents participated in gubernatorial elections as a fulfillment of their civil and political rights. This was equally attributed to frequent civic education conducted by IEBC officials prior to 2013 and 2017 general elections as cited by discussants in FGDs and Key Informants interviewed.

According to Kenya's new Constitution, devolved governments share functions with the national government in different fronts such as in agriculture, environment, infrastructural development, health care as well as trade (GoK, 2010). This study established that candidates campaigning on platform of giving county government employment under the County Public Service Board (CPSB) influenced voters' choice of candidate in gubernatorial elections. A discussant in focused group discussion noted that;

*Both Hon. Mandago from URP party and Hon. Kamar from ODM party in 2013 campaigned on a platform of creating equal job opportunities for the youth as well as absorbing them as employees of County government. Consequently, most electorate voted with the hope of getting employed... (Pa 2, FGD 6)*

The establishment of county governments under the Kenya's new Constitution created job opportunities to the residents especially in the different county departments. It was established that while some employees from the defunct Eldoret Municipal Council were absorbed directly to the new County government, other employees were employed to the new County public service as cited by 244(69.5%) respondents. Key Informants cited that patronage appointment largely characterized the appointment of Ward administrators, Sub County administrators, members of County Public Service Board and County Executive Committee members (CECs) by the office of the governor and approved by the County assembly. A Key Informant lamented

*When Hon Mandago won elections in 2013, he used his position to reward his loyalist to be CECs, administrators at the Ward and Sub County level as well as to the County Public Service. This almost cost him in 2017 elections because other communities accused him of sidelining them yet rewarding members of his ethnic community... (KI, No. 26)*

While it is the constitutional duty of the governor to make such appointments with the approval of the County assembly, Key Informants noted that it was the governor's discretion and often based on vote loyalty and contribution to political campaigns. It was established that to consolidate loyalty, skewed appointment to different County jobs and especially along ethnic lines had been a common practice and thus affirms the NCIC (2016) report on Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service which indicated that despite the County being multi-ethnic, 94.4% of county staff were drawn from the same community (the Kalenjin) contrary to Section 65 of the County Government Act.

In line with the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya, the establishment and maintenance of county development projects such as rural roads, water supply, sewerage system, construction of business/market stalls, and street lighting influenced voters' electoral participation in gubernatorial elections as cited by 266(75.8%) respondents. While some development projects were programmatic, focused group discussion and Key Informants noted that their establishment was based on pork-barreling approach (development projects benefiting areas that demonstrated voter loyalty during elections). A Key Informant alleged that;

*When the incumbent governor realized that most residents in Langas largely inhabited by Luo, Kikuyu and Kisii were supporting his opponent BUZEKI in 2017 elections, the County government disconnected water supply to the whole estate, and business stalls mainly owned by majority of the Kikuyu community were also demolished. When new stalls were later constructed, they were mostly given to Kalenjins, forcing the Kikuyu community to pledge loyalty to the incumbent... (KI, No.1)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was the alleged victimization of voters by the incumbent governor for supporting his opponent through demolition of business stalls and disconnecting of water supply to estates perceived to be opponent stronghold. Conversely, ethnic loyalty was rewarded through discriminate allocation of new business stalls, road construction and rehabilitation, connection of water supply, and street lighting. This finding agrees with Banerjee, et.al (2014) study in India who noted that while political candidates may use clientelistic incentives such as public and private goods and services to keep voters under their patronage, other candidates may also adopt negative approaches including demolition of businesses, and deprivation of public services and goods to force them into their patronage.

Access to subsidized government goods and services was also cited by 256(73%) respondents to have influenced their electoral participation in gubernatorial elections.

Provided for under Fourth Schedule of the new Kenya's Constitution, agriculture which constitute the backbone economy of the County is a devolved function and County governments are expected to take initiatives to enhance agricultural productivity (GoK, 2010). As cited by discussants, provision of extension training programmes, subsidized fertilizers and seeds, and leveraging farmers through market research and credit facility by the incumbent governor largely shaped voters' choice of candidate in gubernatorial elections. A discussant in focused group discussion noted that;

*As an agricultural County, gubernatorial aspirants often campaign on ways to leverage farmers on issues such as market for farm produce and products, subsidized farms inputs and extension training for farmers. The incumbent candidate has often been rated highly on these initiatives... (Pa 6, FGD 5)*

Apparent from the discussant response in FGDs was that as a County that largely depended on agricultural activities such as large-scale wheat and maize farming as well as dairy keeping, provision of agricultural incentives constituted instrumental clientele strategies that gubernatorial candidates could leverage on to shape voters' choice in their favour.

The study also found out that monetary incentive received from the gubernatorial candidates influenced electoral participation as cited by 239(68.1%) respondents. Discussants cited that it was almost impossible for any political candidate to win elections unless they had adequate funds for political campaign branding and to incentivize voters to turn out in large number and vote for them. A Key Informant noted that;

*In Kenyan politics, an aspirant must have money for campaign posters, caps and T-shirt printing, hire campaign vehicles and a good sound system, pay bloggers and campaign strategists and most importantly, good money to incentivize raiya (voters) to vote for you.*

*This was equally true with gubernatorial elections in Uasin Gishu County... (KI, No. 10)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was that while gubernatorial candidates required money to enhance their political campaigns such as printing of campaign posters, T-shirts and caps, campaign public address system as well as payment of campaign strategists and bloggers, political aspirants also budgeted huge sum of money to donate to voters as a clientelistic incentive. Further probing on where aspirants get funds for campaigns and to incentivize voters revealed that they are sourced from friends, personal savings, business associates, professional associations, kick backs from tenders and contracts, and in some cases bank(s) loans. Discussants in FGDs and Key Informants further noted that monetary incentives were given to voters especially during campaign rallies, in market-places, in some cases from estate to estate and from house to house with other clientele goods such as T-shirts, sugar and caps, and thus enhancing a strong aspirant-voter relation. It was however noted that while aspirants may provide monetary incentives and would expect voters to elect them during elections, it was difficult to monitor voters' compliance due to the principle of secret ballot during election.

It was also established that 68(19.4%) respondents cited award of County government tenders and contracts to have influenced their electoral participation in gubernatorial elections. Subsequent to the establishment of County governments, counties are expected to perform their devolved functions as outlined in the Fourth Schedule of the constitutions such as providing primary healthcare, rural roads construction and maintenance, environmental conservations etc (GoK, 2010). The study noted that when certain business associates, professional association and youth groups make financial contribution for campaigns and serve as grass root campaign strategists and

mobilizers for gubernatorial candidate, they are rewarded with various county contracts and tenders as trade-offs. A Key Informant noted that;

*Political aspirants may sometimes ask for financial support or those to volunteer as campaign strategists and to mobilize grass root support in exchange for contracts and tenders if he wins the elections. As members of associations, we always fulfill our side of the bargain... (KI, No. 14)*

Among the tenders and contracts cited to have been won by some business associates based on this clientele exchange relationship included supply and delivery of general stationery, delivery of computer consumables and accessories, supply and delivery of office furniture, and construction and maintenance of roads in the County.

Unlike in presidential elections in which over 90 percent of the respondents cited that future support of their ethnic patron influenced their choice of candidate, only 90(25.6%) respondents pegged their participation to this factor in gubernatorial elections. Discussants in FGDs opined that despite the County being cosmopolitan, the numerical strength of the Kalenjin voters was viewed as monopolistic in future gubernatorial elections and thus insignificantly influenced their choice of candidate in election. A discussant opined that;

*The Kalenjin dominance in terms of registered voters in the County is predictive that in the future gubernatorial elections, they will still dominate unless aspirants from other communities are seconded as a running mate... (Pa 4, FGD 1)*

The study affirms Scott (1972) argument that as homogeneity of voters in terms of primordial social bond such as ethnicity increases, then the lesser such a factor becomes a defining determinant of electoral behaviour and outcome.

As a cosmopolitan County in a region that have witnessed series of ethnic and post elections violence such as in 1992, 1997 and 2007/8 election, 129 (36.7%) respondents cited that security of their community assets such as land and businesses



influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate in election. In 2007/8 post elections violence for instance, communities perceived by majority ODM supporters to have supported PNU party had their residential houses and businesses burnt and with hundreds being killed (Willis. et.al. 2014). This study established that some of the community members perceived as CORD (in 2013 elections) and NASA (in 2017 elections) supporters had to openly declare their support for Jubilee gubernatorial candidates for fear of destruction of their businesses and potential forceful eviction. A discussant in FGD noted that;

*I was a supporter of ODM gubernatorial candidate prior to 2013 elections but when leaflets were dropped in our estates asking CORD supporters to leave the County, my family and I had to openly declare support for a Jubilee candidate for fear of attacks and destruction of our property... (Pa 3, FGD 6)*

Key Informants response indicated that the dynamics of presidential elections often have a trickle-down effect on the County politics especially on gubernatorial elections where despite all contestants being drawn from the Kalenjin community such as in 2013 elections, ODM candidate Margret Kamar would be associated with Raila Odinga and who was perceived to have collaborated with ICCJ in accusing Jubilee Alliance presidential candidate and running mate over 2007/8 post elections violence. As noted by discussants in FGD, the trickle-down effect was that any person supporting ODM party at the County elections (and CORD alliance at large) regardless of their ethnicity, were treated as traitors and enemies to peace and reconciliation effort attributed to William Ruto (of URP) and Uhuru Kenyatta (of TNA) coming together. While it is a constitutional right to vote for any candidate of choice, voters would shift loyalty and vote for the candidate supported by the dominant ethnic community in the county for the purpose of avoiding potential violence against them and against destruction of their assets.

Other clientelistic practices associated with gubernatorial elections as cited by discussants in FGDs and Key Informants interviewed included, favourable provision of county bursaries and scholarships to students from regions that overwhelmingly supported the incumbent, selective implementation of county legislations related to land rates payment, penalties over expired business permits, hawking and unpaid car parking fees in the Central Business District (of Eldoret town), promotion of county staff, and in allocation of county business stalls.

#### 4.5.3 Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County

The findings presented in Table 4.6 shows how the listed factors determined the election of MNA in the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

**Table 4.6: Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Clientelistic Practices in Election of MNAs</b>	<b>Much Influence (A) Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Some Influence (B) Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B) Number of Respondents</b>	<b>No Influence (C) Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> It is my civic duty to vote	338 (96.3%)	10 (2.8%)	348 (99.1%)	3 (0.9%)
<b>ii)</b> To get government employment/ appointment	42 (12%)	84 (23.9%)	126 (35.9%)	225 (64.1%)
<b>iii)</b> To get government projects & funds	98 (27.9%)	132 (37.6%)	230 (65.5%)	121 (34.5%)
<b>iv)</b> For future support of our ethnic leader	8 (2.3%)	36 (10.3%)	44 (12.6%)	307 (87.4%)
<b>v)</b> access subsidized/free government goods such as fertilizers, seeds etc	72 (20.5%)	138 (39.3%)	210 (59.8%)	141 (40.2%)
<b>vi)</b> I received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party	162 (46.2%)	107 (30.5%)	269 (76.7%)	82 (23.3%)
<b>vii)</b> To be awarded government tenders and contracts	4 (1.1%)	12 (3.4%)	16 (4.5%)	335 (95.4%)
<b>viii)</b> To get government protection of our community assets	32 (9.1%)	76 (21.7%)	108 (30.8%)	243 (69.2%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings presented in Table 4.6 indicates that 348(99.1%) respondents attributed their electoral participation in the election of Member of National Assembly (MNA) to their civic duty to vote, 126(35.9%) cited access to government employment, 230(65.5%) respondents based their electoral participation on government development projects while only 44(12.6%) respondents cited future support of their ethnic patron. Additionally, 210(59.8%) respondents pegged their electoral participation on accessibility to subsidized government goods and services, 269(76.7%) cited monetary incentives received from the political candidates, 16(4.5%) respondents based it on award of tenders and contracts, while 108(30.8%) respondents cited security of community assets.

Just like in the presidential and gubernatorial elections, the study also found out that up to 99 percent of respondents attributed their participation in election of MNAs to their civic duty to vote as provided for under Article 38(3b) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Discussants in FGDs and Key Informants interviewed expressed their awareness regarding the significant roles of MNAs in relation to their oversight role, legislation making and representation and thus the need to participate either by supporting the incumbent or electing a new leader to represent them in the National Assembly.

The Constitution of Kenya provides for representation of Sub County constituents at the national level by an elected member of national assembly (GoK, 2010). This study established that the new constitutional arrangement in Kenya provided elected MNAs with two fronts to lobby for employment of his/her constituents at both the national government and in their respective County government. As cited by 126(35.9%) respondents, the capacity for their preferred political candidate to serve as their lobby-

broker for employment at the County government as well as at the national government offices influenced their choice of candidate in the election of MNA. A discussant in FGD noted that;

*After campaigning for him in the 2013 elections, my area MP secured a job for me and my college-mate in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and we are forever grateful to him. To date, we often strategize on how he can win the next election... (Pa 4, FGD 6)*

Another discussant also noted that;

*I had no job for over five years after graduating from the University but after forming a youth group and campaigning for our area member of parliament, he secured me a job in the Ministry of Environment in the County Government... (Pa 2, FGD 3)*

Apparent from discussants' responses was that political candidate often reward individuals who had played a significant role in their electoral victory, and further probing revealed that such individuals are those who served as campaign organizers, campaign strategists, social media bloggers and grass root campaigners. Individuals who have been employed based on such exchange relations continued to play a role in planning for subsequent election victory of their respective political patron. This finding affirms Aspinall and Berenschot (2018) argument that clientelistic practices in a patron-client systems often establish a long-term relations especially when both parties continues to enjoy the benefits of such a relations.

It was however noted that most respondents (64.1percent) believed that while political candidates may seek election based on this clientelistic promise, majority of them only rewarded close friends, family members and relatives based on primordial social ties and thus leaving out most of the voters. Key Informant noted that;

*While a political candidate may make such promises of securing positions for them in either County or national government, sometimes it depends on how many opportunities are available... (KI, No. 3)*

Unlike the position of the president or the governor who have certain constitutional and jurisdictional powers on appointments, MNAs do not have such discretion and relies on lobbying for his/her loyal voters and campaigners on matters of employment and appointments on government jobs. It was noted that such a clientelistic promise could cost the incumbent the next election especially if he/she adopted it as the primary platform for campaign and subsequently election but fails to fulfill the promise once elected.

While appropriation of NG-CDF for projects is a programmatic approach to development at the Sub County level, it grants an opportunity to MNAs to establish such projects based on pork-barreling as cited by 230(65.5%) respondents in the study. Discussant in FGDs and Key Informants noted that MNAs tend to use these development projects to reward loyalty to regions that overwhelmingly voted for them. A Key Informant from Kapseret Sub County lamented that;

*In the run up for the 2017 general elections, the incumbent MNA suspended rehabilitation of roads and construction of schools in some parts of Langas ward when he found out that the residents were supporting his opponent. Consequently, he shifted to fast-track projects in places like Megun and Cheptiret wards where he had a strong political base... (KI, No. 2)*

Evident from Key Informant response was the use of pork-barreling approach while discriminating areas inhabited by voters supporting an opponent for instance by suspending ongoing projects like road rehabilitation and school construction. The study also noted that other than the use of NG-CDF to initiate development projects for constituents, MNAs could also lobby for development projects from the national government through ministries as well as the County government, and thus creating a broad clientele network to leverage on during election campaigns. It was however noted that 121(34.5%) respondents believed that while MNAs may use pork-

barreling, the County government provided an alternative means of getting similar development projects because they are devolved and thus was insignificant in influencing their electoral participation in MNAs election.

Owing to the strategic role of MNAs as the interface between the grassroots and national level of governance, they articulate the interests of their constituents on matters such as agriculture, environment, security, and education in the national assembly. As noted by 210(59.8%) respondents, the capacity of the MNA political candidates to articulate constituents needs such as subsidized fertilizers, certified seeds for farmers and market for their farm products and produce, significantly influenced the choice of political candidate in election of MNAs. This study for instance established that the capacity by the incumbent to articulate farmers' interests strengthened their chances of winning in elections. Discussant in focused group discussion noted that;

*Incumbent MNAs that have been vocal especially towards making legislations and lobbying the government for fair prices for maize and wheat as well as subsidized cost of fertilizers and seeds, have strong voters' support as they are viewed as farmers advocates at the national level. It is thus difficult to win in election of MNA without an aspirant outlining how he will help the farmers... (KI, No. 3)*

Apparent from the discussant response was that Sub-counties were largely dependent on agricultural activities such wheat and maize farming as well as dairy keeping. The study noted that MNA candidates campaigned on how they will advocate for free agricultural extension services, easy access to agricultural loans, provision of subsidized farm inputs as well as better prices for farm produce as clientelistic goods and services. It was however noted that while candidates for MNA would promise these clientelistic goods and services to farmers, their mandate largely revolved around influencing agricultural legislation making through lobbying but may not

guarantee substantial results to farmers, unlike for the case of elected governor or president.

The study noted that contrary to the Elections Offence Act (No.37 of 2016) that prohibits voters' inducement to vote using money by any political candidate or party, the practice was most prevalent in the election of MNA as cited by 269(76.7%) respondents. Key Informants argued that unlike gubernatorial position where successfully elected candidates had different clientelistic strategies to strengthen their relations with the voters, MNAs had few options with cash incentives being the most common practice. Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*Giving some cash to voters during campaign period and on Election Day is a very common political strategy to enhance turn out and voter loyalty. Political candidates across all parties get the opportunity to have a face-to-face interaction with the voter, and the strategy doesn't have so many obligations on the side of the candidate to the voter especially after elections... (KI, No. 2)*

It is evident from the Key Informant response that the use of cash incentive by MNA candidates reduced the obligation to provide other incentives after election and helps to enhance a personal relationship between the candidate and the voter. The study also noted that such monetary incentives are often offered during political rallies, along the roads during campaign trail, and from house to house together with other clientele goods such as branded apparels such as sugar, maize flour, soaps, caps and T-shirts having aspirant's name and party. It was however noted while aspirants in MNA election widely used this clientelistic practice, Key Informants noted that political candidates could not ascertain or monitor voters' compliance to vote for them due to secret balloting at the polling stations.

As a clientelistic practice, only 16(4.5%) respondents cited that award of tenders and contracts influenced their choice of candidate in the election of MNA and with

majority (over 90 percent) citing that it did not. Given the limited jurisdictional powers of MNA in terms of procurement, it was noted that it was difficult for any candidate to adopt it to enhance a clientele base during elections. A Key Informant noted that;

*Most activities of MNA do not require procurement and awarding contracts and tenders like at the County level. In few cases of award of contracts such as construction of roads etc, the elected MNA become interested parties and may influence award of contract to their proxy companies to make money for the next election, and recover what was used in campaigns... (KI, No. 3)*

The response from the interviewed Key Informant revealed that while MNA may have certain contracts such as in constructions of roads, dispensaries/health centres, schools and water projects, they often seek to influence the outcome by proposing their own proxy companies, or companies owned by friends in order to generate money for the next elections. Consequently, very few people get to benefit from such contracts and tenders except those within the candidate political circle.

The study noted the increasing tendency towards ethnic homogeneity of voters in all the sub-counties where the Kalenjin voters dominate as registered voters over other ethnic groups. Unlike in presidential elections in which future ethnic political reciprocity was cited to be a key determinant in electoral participation, only 44(12.6%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice of candidate for MNA. The extent at which future ethnic reciprocity influences electoral participation in the election of MNA diminishes as ethnic dominance and homogeneity increases. However, other communities such as the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and Kisii constituted a significant swing vote in the election of MNA in the cosmopolitan Sub-counties like Kapseret, Turbo, Kesses and Ainabkoi despite the numerical strength of the Kalenjin voters. Key Informant noted that;



*The Kalenjin dominates in all the Sub-counties but with significant non-Kalenjin communities such as the Luhya, Kikuyu, Luo and Kisii in Ainabkoi, Kesses, Turbo and Kapseret Sub-counties and whose contribution to voting can never be ignored... (KI, No. 10)*

Key Informant response indicated that while the Kalenjin numerical vote strength was viewed to dominate the election of MNA, it was noted that election in Sub County was greatly influenced by expectation of future ethnic reciprocity. Discussant noted that during the party primaries in the run up for 2017 general elections, a Jubilee candidate from the Luhya community won the party primaries despite the Kalenjin dominance in the Sub County and the Luhya voters expected the Kalenjin to reciprocate by electing an MNA candidate from their community. As a clientelistic strategy, most of the respondents (87 percent) however, noted that ethnic political reciprocity had no influence in their choice of MNA candidate in elections.

The cosmopolitan nature of Sub-counties such as Turbo, Kapseret, Kesses and Ainabkoi were cited by Key Informants to have witnessed post elections violence after 2007/8 general election. In this study, 108(30.8%) respondents noted that their choice of MNA candidate was based to the candidate's assurance of protection of businesses and other assets of the non-indigenous communities. Key Informants cited Ainabkoi Sub County in the 2017 MNA election where non-indigenous communities rallied overwhelming support to an Independent candidate Hon. William Chepkut as opposed to the incumbent Samwel Chepkong'a vying under the Jubilee Party ticket. Similarly, Jubilee party candidate for Kesses Sub County Hon. Swarup Mishra in the 2017 general elections was cited by discussants in FGDs and by Key Informants to have been supported by most non-indigenous communities based on his assurance of protecting the interests of every ethnic community. It was however noted that majority of the respondents (70 percent) noted that regardless of the candidate elected

as MNA, security of the non-indigenous communities was mostly dependent on the nature of presidential election outcome. A Key Informant noted that;

*Communities have always been peaceful but historically, problems of targeted ethnic violence against non-indigenous communities often start when there is contestation over presidential elections for example as witnessed in the 2007/8 general elections... (KI, No. 3)*

From the Key Informant response, it was established that violence against non-indigenous communities are often spontaneous and dependent on the outcome of presidential election as opposed to MNA election. This finding affirms the Kriglers's commission report of 2008 on the spontaneous nature of the 2007/8 post election violence in the region as opposed to premeditated violence. As a clientelistic strategy, therefore, the study noted that it was insignificant clientelistic strategy in creating patron-client relation during elections of MNA.

Other clientelistic practices associated with MNA election as cited by discussants and Key Informants included provision of scholarships and bursaries to students in perceived incumbent political bases, donation of branded furniture and buses to secondary schools, provision of free medical care and consultation to constituents, offsetting of outstanding medical bills in regions perceived as strongholds and construction of business structures/housing for *Jua Kali* artisans, *Boda Boda* operators and widows. As cited by Klopp (2012) and Kopecky (2011), these clientelistic approaches adopted by political candidates are geared towards consolidating a strong political base and voter loyalty and consequently shaping voters' choice of candidate in electoral politics.

#### 4.5.4 Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County

Presented in Table 4.7 are the findings on how the listed factors influenced election of Members of County Assembly (MCA) in the 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

**Table 4.7: Clientelistic Practices in Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Clientelistic Practices in Election of MCAs</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> It is my civic duty to vote	339(96.6%)	9(2.6%)	348(99.1%)	3(0.08%)
<b>ii)</b> To get government employment/ appointment	12(3.4%)	72(20.5%)	84(23.9%)	267(76.1%)
<b>iii)</b> To get government projects & funds	54(15.4%)	108(30.8%)	162(46.2%)	189(53.8%)
<b>iv)</b> For future support of our ethnic leader	6(1.7%)	26(7.4%)	32(9.1)	319(90.9%)
<b>v)</b> access subsidized/free government goods such as fertilizers, seeds etc	6(1.7%)	18(5.1%)	24 (6.8%)	327(93.2%)
<b>vi)</b> I received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party	162(46.2%)	113(32.2%)	275(78.4%)	76(21.6%)
<b>vii)</b> To be awarded government tenders and contracts	2(0.6%)	7(2%)	9(2.6%)	342(97.4%)
<b>viii)</b> To get government protection of our community assets	18(5.1%)	54(15.4%)	72(20.5%)	279(79.5%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 4.7 indicates that 348(99.1%) respondents attributed their electoral participation to their civic duty to vote, 84(23.9%) cited access to

government employment, 162(46.2%) respondents based their participation on government development projects while only 32(9.1%) respondents cited future ethnic political reciprocity. Furthermore, 24(6.8%) respondents pegged their electoral participation on accessibility to subsidized government goods and services, 275(78.4%) cited monetary incentive received from the political candidates, 9(2.6%) respondents cited award of county government tenders and contracts, while only 72(20.5%) respondents cited security of their community assets to have influenced their electoral participation in election of MCA.

Similar to other elective positions, the study noted that over 99 percent of respondents attributed their participation to their civic duty to vote as provided for under the Kenya's new Constitution. Respondents expressed their awareness of the roles of MCAs in representation of their Wards in the County Assembly, and thus the need to elect a Ward representative to articulate their developmental issues at the county level.

According to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, MCAs provides oversight to the County executive and primarily enact County legislation in relation to the different devolved functions (GoK, 2010). In relation to election of MCA, only 84(23.9%) respondents cited that election of their preferred candidate was based on promise of employment opportunities at the County government. A male discussant in FGD noted that;

*In the run up for the 2013 elections, aspirants would campaign with promises of employing or lobbying for appointments of constituents by the county government. With much expectation, some youth would elect a candidate based on this platform.... (Pa 2, FGD 1)*

From the discussant response, political candidates who were elected would reward his/her campaigners by lobbying for employment by the County government for

instance as Ward administrators or under the County public service. However, the majority of the respondents (76.1%) noted that despite some MCA candidates adopting this strategy, only few close friends to the elected candidate could benefit. Unlike the position of the president or the governor that have certain constitutional and jurisdictional powers on appointments, the MCAs do not have such powers and have to rely on lobbying for their loyal voters and campaigners on matters of employment and appointments in County government jobs. Consequently, the adoption of the strategy does not benefit most of the voters and is ineffective in consolidating a large political base by any political candidate.

As a clientelistic practice, the use of Ward development projects was cited by 162(46.2%) respondents while majority (53.8 percent) however noted that MCAs did not have the jurisdictional powers to initiate projects of their own in their Ward but could only works with the community in identifying priority projects and lobby the County executive to allocate funds and initiate them. Further probing with Key Informants established that unlike the governor and MNAs who have access and can authorize appropriation of funds for projects, MCAs do not and can only provide oversight on the implementations of County development projects. Consequently, Key Informants noted that it was an insignificant clientelistic strategy in shaping voters' choice of candidate in MCAs election.

The adoption and use of monetary incentive as a clientelistic strategy was cited by 275(78.4%) respondents, contrary to the Elections Offence Act of 2016. Key Informants noted that since MCAs have a limited scope of clientele resources for pork-barreling and award of contracts and tenders, monetary incentives to voters was

the most common clientelistic strategy to strengthen their relations with the voters and enhance electoral support. A Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*Unlike the Governors who have County funds and MNAs having CDF to initiate projects for their constituents, MCAs do not have any, and are thus left with limited options such as giving some monetary incentives to voters during campaign period and on Election Day... (KI, No. 5)*

Further probing with discussants in FGDs revealed that monetary incentives by MCA candidates were given out during political rallies, by the roadside, and from house to house. It was however noted that the strategy was short term and difficult to monitor voters' compliance in voting for a specific candidate dispensing the incentive due to secret ballot.

The use of subsidized public goods and services and award of tenders and contracts as a clientelistic strategy was noted to be insignificant in influencing voter choice of candidate for MCA as cited by over 90 percent of the respondents. Key Informants noted that appropriation of subsidized public goods was largely within the domain of the national and county executive. While the MCAs may lobby the County government to provide certain subsidized public services such as veterinary services for farmers in their Wards, it remained the prerogative of the County executive to either approve it or not. Similarly, award of tenders and contracts at the County level is the prerogative of the County executive and thus could not be leveraged on by MCAs as a clientelistic strategy to enhance voters support in election.

At the Ward level, the study noted the increasing homogeneity in terms of ethnic composition of voters where Wards in the rural areas across Sub-counties were dominated by the Kalenjin community while Wards within and around Eldoret town were dominated by voters from non-Kalenjin communities. Key Informants cited that electoral Wards such as Huruma, Langas, Kimumu and Kapsoya were largely

inhabited by communities such as the Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii, Luhya, Kamba and Somali with small number of the Kalenjin. Discussants in FGDs argued that similar to ethnic coalitions that characterized the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections in Kenya, MCA candidates in these urban Wards largely relied on inter-ethnic coalition to secure electoral victory. A Key Informant noted that;

*In 2013 and 2017 elections, the Kalenjin voters in Wards like Huruma and Langas overwhelmingly supported MCA candidate from the Kikuyu community and successfully won the seats. Similarly, the Kikuyu voters in rural Wards voted for Kalenjin Jubilee aspirants and equally won... (KI, No. 7)*

Key Informant response indicated that ethnic political reciprocity is a key feature of urban Wards politics in the study area. As a clientelistic approach, the success of a political candidate was based on how to establish ethnic political networks with readiness to reciprocate in subsequent elections. The majority of the respondents however noted that this clientelistic strategy did not affect their choice of MCAs since they were drawn from the less cosmopolitan rural Wards in the study area.

The study also noted that in cosmopolitan urban Wards, campaigning on platform of assuring security to community assets had no influence on election of MCA candidate as cited by 79.5 percent of respondents and discussants attributed it to enhanced security against voter intimidation during electioneering period. Further probing with the discussants in FGDs and Key Informants interviewed indicated that other clientelistic practices associated with election of MCA included selective award of scholarships and bursaries, donation of branded apparels such as T-shirts, caps and reflector Jackets, and offsetting of outstanding medical bills for voters in perceived strongholds.

In summary, this chapter presented the clientelistic practices that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County. The prevalent clientelistic practices included

future ethnic political reciprocity, government employment, pork-barreling, monetary incentives, subsidized public goods, branded apparels, offers of tenders and contracts, and bursaries and scholarships. The severity of use however, varied from one elective position to the other. This finding affirms the tenets of social exchange theory that individuals are rational and choose behaviors that maximize achievement of self-interests in any social relations. Voters maintain their loyalty to a political candidate if there is continuity in provision of clientelistic goods and services.



## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **ROLES OF PRIMORDIAL AND PURPOSIVE CORPORATE SOCIAL BONDS IN ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides analysis and interpretation of findings of the second research objective on the role of primordial and purposive corporate social bonds on electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. As opined by Hutchcroft (2014), purposive corporate social bonds are created based on a person's conscious choice of attachment to entities such as political parties, the media, religion and formal associations such as youth and women groups, professional associations, labour unions among others. Conversely, primordial social bonds stem from the 'givens' of the social existence of humans which creates immediate contiguity and kin connection based on blood or family ties/ancestry, language, ethnicity, race, territory and culture. The first section of this chapter examines purposive corporate social bonds and the second section focuses on primordial social bonds in relation to electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County.

#### **5.2 Purposive Corporate Social Bonds and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

This section examines the roles of specific corporate actors such as political party/coalition, the media, religion, and formal associations in relation to electoral participation and the findings are as presented in the subsequent sub-sections.

### 5.2.1 Political Party/Coalition and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County

The study sought to interrogate the extent at which political parties/coalition influences voters' choice of candidates for the different elective positions under study and the findings presented in Table 5.1

**Table 5.1: Influence of Political Party/Coalition on Voters' Choice of Candidates in General Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	302	86	295	84.1	282	80.3	292	83.2
Some Influence	29	8.3	31	8.8	48	13.7	37	10.5
No Influence	20	5.7	25	7.1	21	6	22	6.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 5.1 show that 331(94.3%) respondents agreed that political party/coalition influenced their choice of presidential candidate while 20(5.7%) cited that it did not. In gubernatorial elections, 326(92.9%) respondents also cited that political party/coalition influenced their choice of candidate while 25(7.1%) dissented. In addition, 330(94.0%) respondents agreed it significantly influenced their choice of MNA candidate and with 21(6%) dissenting that it did not. Lastly, 329(93.7%) respondents also agreed that their choice of MCA candidate was influenced by party/coalition while 22(6.3%) cited that it did not.

Evident from the finding was that political parties/coalitions influenced voters' choice of candidates in all the four elective positions; presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA as cited by over 90 percent of the respondents in each case. Luna (2014) opines that political parties serve as agents of social and political relations and interactions and thus have the capacity to shape individual political behaviour. Through its ideology and manifesto, political parties have the capacity to create a purposive corporate social network of 'believers' across different geographical areas, religions, age, gender, class, and ethnic groups and which consequently constitute the political party membership base. The specific party/coalition activities that shaped their electoral participation were as indicated in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2: Influence of Coalition/Party Activities on Voters' Choice of Political Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Influence of Coalition/Party Activities on Choice of Candidates</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
a) The Party gave us money during political campaigns	43(12.3%)	163(46.4%)	206(58.7%)	145(41.3%)
b) The Party articulated our ethnic interest	291(82.9%)	42(12%)	333(94.9%)	18(5.1%)
c) Party advocated for development projects for our community	189(53.9%)	49(13.9%)	238(67.8%)	113(32.2%)
d) The party advocated for national cohesion	81(23.1%)	109(31.6%)	190(54.7%)	161(45.8%)
e) The party mobilized us to turn out and vote	252(71.8%)	63(17.9%)	315(89.7%)	36(10.3%)
f) The party provided political education and communication to voters	217(61.8%)	73(20.8%)	290(82.6%)	61(17.4%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Findings in Table 5.2 shows 206(58.7%) respondents cited that their choice of political candidates was based on political party use of monetary incentives during the campaign period, 333(94.9%) cited the party/coalition articulation of their ethnic interest and 238(67.8%) respondents cited the coalition/party advocacy for development projects. In addition, 190(54.7%) respondents cited party advocacy for national cohesion, 315(89.7%) noted party/coalition mobilization of voters to vote, while 290(82.6%) respondents based their electoral participation on coalition/party capacity to provide political education and communication during electioneering period.

As noted by Katz (2011), political parties in democratic societies play a number of institutional roles such as political socialization, political education, political mobilization, recruitment of political leaders as well as articulation of societal interests through representation. This study affirmed these significant political party roles, for instance in terms of mobilization of voters to vote as cited by 89.7% of the respondents. Discussants in FGDs noted that political parties were engaged in mass transportation of supporters to political rallies and polling stations on Election Day, working with local vernacular radio stations, door to door canvassing and use of random phone messages as strategies to mobilize voters to turn out and vote.

Political education and communication as cited by 82.6% of the respondents was also a significant party/coalition activity that influenced voters' choice of political candidates. Discussants and Key Informants interviewed noted that political parties adopted various means such as use of party websites, radio, Television, party bloggers, party banners and posters, as well as social media outlets to reach out to

voters and educate them on the rights to vote, electoral offences and the tenets of their respective party manifestos. A Key Informant noted that;

*During the campaign period, parties used various media outlets to reach out to voters in relation to voters' right to vote, party manifestos, electoral offences as well as the importance of national cohesion. Jubilee Alliance was well known for using their Twitter account to reach out voters on their development agenda such as the Big Four Agenda... (KI, No. 26)*

While different political parties/coalition campaigned for representation of constituents, it was also noted that they served as a means of enhancing national cohesion as cited by 54.7 percent of the respondents. Key Informants noted that the 2013 and 2017 general elections were characterized by parties/coalition emphasizing on national unity/cohesion as opposed to ethnic balkanization.

Other than political campaigns, political parties served as tools for national and regional peace and cohesion as cited by 190(54.7%) respondents. Key Informants and discussants for instance noted that the pre-election pact to form Jubilee Alliance between URP (led by William Ruto) and TNA (led by Uhuru Kenyatta) prior to 2013 general election was anchored on fostering inter-ethnic peace and reconciliation following the 2007/8 post-election violence. While Willis, et.al (2014) perceived the pact as an effort to defeat the indictment of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta by the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICCJ) for bearing criminal responsibility of the 2007/8 post-election violence, the pact that formed Jubilee Alliance demonstrated the role political parties can play in enhancing peace in the run up for 2013 and 2017 general elections.

The study also noted that as a programmatic approach, political parties outlined the development projects in their party manifestos and significantly influenced voters' choice of political candidates for elective positions as cited by 67.8 percent of the

respondents. As opined by Roy (2014), party manifesto serves as a contract between the electorates and the party candidates, and incumbents are assessed on their achievements based on their past manifesto. As a political party/coalition activity, campaigns based on the need to initiate development projects to the citizens significantly influenced voters' choice of political candidates in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

Contrary to Elections Offence Act of 2016 that prohibits voters' inducement to vote, the study noted that 58.7 percent of the respondents acknowledged to have been induced by political parties to participate in the election through use of monetary incentives. Further probing with Key Informants interviewed noted that the use of this clientelistic practice by political parties was aimed at consolidating the party support base and maximize their chances of winning in the elective positions. However, 41.3 percent of the respondents resented that the use of monetary incentives by the party had no influence in their choice of candidates. A Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*Political parties do not directly use money to induce voters in compliance with Election Offence Act. However, political party candidates tend to use the approach for their own self gain and with full knowledge of the legal implications... (KI, No. 24)*

It was apparent from Key Informant response that while political parties as legal and formal entities sought to comply with electoral related legislations, political party candidates would make their own deliberate choice to use monetary incentive to expand their electoral support base.

Lastly, the study established that political parties/coalition's ability to articulate ethnic interests was a single most influential factor that shaped voters' choice of candidates in the 2013 and 2017 general elections as cited by over 90 percent of the respondents.

As noted by Kagwanja (2005), political parties in Kenya are surrogates of ethnicity with their respective political bases being specific ethnic communities. Examples cited by Key Informants in the 2013 and 2017 general elections included TNA which enjoyed popular support from the Kikuyu community, URP largely supported by the Kalenjin, ODM by the Luo, FORD and ANC by the Luhya, WIPER party by the Kamba and with their respective ethnic patrons such as Uhuru Kenyatta (TNA), William Ruto (URP), Raila Odinga (ODM), Musalia Mudavadi (ANC) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Wiper Party) respectively being the party leaders.

Political mobilization premised on ethnic interests has been apparent in the way the leading political candidates from the vote-rich communities such as the Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Kikuyu, Kisii and Luo move from one political party to another without losing their primordial following during general elections. Key Informants and discussants in FGDs noted for instance that political leaders like William Ruto, Raila Odinga, Musalia Mudavadi, Uhuru Kenyatta, and Kalonzo Musyoka have changed their political parties over time but without losing their ethnic political support during election.

It was further established that while such leaders advocated for perceived community interests such as development projects at the national level and sometimes vying for presidency or presidential running mate, political candidates vying for gubernatorial, MNA and MCA often realign their candidature in line with the party supported by their ethnic patron due to their strong ethnic support base. Based on this view, such political candidates strive to win in the party primaries as it is viewed as a direct victory during the election, and thus party primaries become even more important than the main election. Where a contestant feels aggrieved due to unfair party

primaries (for instance vote rigging or issuance of direct party ticket to an opponent), such candidate would contest for the same elective position as an independent candidate.

### 5.2.2 The Media and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County

As envisaged under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 34 and 35 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the media wields much power in providing oversight function, keeping governments considering transparency and accountability to the public, as well in providing political education and mobilization in electoral related activities (UDHR, 1948 and GoK, 2010). This study examined how the different media platforms such as the radio, newspaper, television, and internet shaped voters' choice of Presidential, Gubernatorial, Members of National Assembly and the Members of County Assembly candidates in Uasin Gishu County Kenya. First, it sought to assess the influence of radio on voters' choice of political candidates and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.3.

**Table 5.3: Influence of Radio on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	236	67.2	134	38.2	115	32.8	39	11.1
Some Influence	81	23.1	156	44.4	152	43.3	140	39.9
No Influence	34	9.7	61	17.4	84	23.9	172	49.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)



Analysis of findings in Table 5.3 indicates that 317(90.3%) respondents acknowledged that the use of radio as a source of political information significantly influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 290(82.6%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 267(76.1%) agreed that it influenced their choice of MNA while only 179(51.0%) respondents agreed that it influenced their choice of MCA in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

Apparent from this finding was that the use of radio had a significant influence on voters' choice of candidates in all the four elective positions, and with the level of influence increasing as the elective position becomes national i.e. increases from election of MCA to presidential elections. Key Informants and discussants noted that Wards in the study area were generally small in geographical sizes and thus allowing contestants to easily transverse with ease as they campaigned, and such individuals were well known to voters. Consequently, contestants vying for MCA finds it effective to use door to door campaigns unlike MNAs, Gubernatorial and presidential candidates whose electoral units are vast and making the use of radio as an effective means of reaching out to voters.

In relation to this study, the national radio stations (Kiswahili and English radio) cited by Key Informants and discussants as the major sources of political information during the 2013 and 2017 electioneering period included *Citizen FM*, *Radio Taifa*, *Radio Jambo*, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) and *Classic FM*. Further probing however, revealed that while these stations were platforms for obtaining general information on national politics during prime-time news, vernacular radio station were widely listened to in relation to ethnic community interests across all elective positions. It was cited that vernacular radio stations had open talk shows that allowed local and national political leaders to share their views with listeners on

political issues such as on preferred political party for the community, party manifesto and individual candidate's political agenda. It was noted that through such talk shows, voters were able to assess the candidates who were in support of their national ethnic leader as well as candidates having the potential to articulate community interests at various levels of representations.

Among vernacular radio stations cited by Key Informants and discussants in FGDs to have been used by candidates in the 2013 and 2017 election campaign included *Kass Fm* (Kalenjin) and *Changei Fm* (Kalenjin), *Ramogi Fm* (Dholuo), *Kameme Fm* and *Inooro Fm* (Kikuyu), and *Mulembe Fm* (Luhya). As noted by Giglio (2015), the rapid penetration of radio as a source of information in developing countries is premised on the view that it's less expensive to purchase, more accessible to most citizens in remote areas, and allows the illiterate segment of the population to have access to political education. While this study established that the use of radio significantly influenced voters' choice of candidates in the different elective positions, Key Informants noted that caution was necessary to censure vernacular radio stations on their content to avoid abuse to incite violence as witnessed in 2007/8 general election in the study area.

The study also sought to assess the extent to which newspapers as source of political information influenced voters' choice of candidates in the different elective positions and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.4.

**Table 5.4: Influence of Newspapers on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much	27	7.7	21	6.0	20	5.7	2	0.6
Some	116	33.0	92	26.2	78	22.2	10	2.8
No	208	59.3	238	67.8	253	72.1	339	96.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 5.4 shows that 143(40.7%) respondents agreed that the use of newspaper as a source of political information influenced their choice of presidential candidates, 113(32.2%) respondents acknowledged that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidates, 98(27.9%) agreed that it influenced their choice of MNAs while only 12(3.4%) respondents agreed that it influenced their choice of MCAs in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

The finding indicates that newspapers as source of political information had insignificant influence on the choice of political candidates across all the four elective positions under study as cited by over two-thirds of the respondents. Key Informants and discussants in FGDs noted that newspapers are largely expensive, inaccessible to people in the rural areas, illiteracy among a section of the community members and unreliability of its information during the electioneering period. This finding was in tandem with Chadwick (2017) argument that newspapers penetration in developing countries is constrained by high illiteracy level among citizens, partiality in reportage,

prohibitive cost of newspaper, and lack of access to communities in the rural areas. Further probing with Key Informants noted that most newspaper outlets tend to concentrate in presidential elections with less focus on the county politics and thus reducing the extent at which it can influence choice of candidates at the County level politics. The major newspapers in circulation in the study area included *The Star*, *Daily Nation*, *The Standard* and *Taifa Leo* which according to the Communication Authority of Kenya report (2019) only reaches 30 percent of the Kenyan population and especially the urban population.

This study also sought to determine the extent at which television as a media platform influence voters' choice of candidate in different elective positions in Uasin Gishu County and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.5.

**Table 5.5: Influence of Television on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	168	47.9	98	27.9	56	16.0	7	2.0
Some Influence	98	27.9	113	32.2	142	40.5	57	16.2
No Influence	85	24.2	140	39.9	153	43.5	287	81.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 5.5 shows 266(75.8%) respondents acknowledged that Television use as a source of political information influenced their choice of presidential candidates, 211(60.1%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice

of gubernatorial candidates, 198(56.5%) agreed that it influenced their choice of MNAs while 64(18.2%) respondents agreed that it influenced their choice of MCAs in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

Evident from the finding was that the influence of television on voters' choice of candidates for elective positions increases as the elective position become national from the Ward level. Key Informants noted that presidential candidates often prefer television to other media platforms owing to the centrality of their national development agenda and thus the need to reach out to the largest number of voters within a short time. A Key Informant noted that;

*In the 2013 and 2017 presidential campaigns, several presidential debates were organized involving various contestants. These events captured live through prime-time television networks were watched all over the country as every candidate demonstrated their priority issues if elected to power... (KI, No. 17)*

Discussants in FGDs also noted that owing to the key role of the County government in relation to development and service provision to the citizens, voters gained much interest on the performance of the incumbent and where such County developments were aired through the television, voters would be influenced on the choice of candidate. A Key Informant noted that;

*Repeated coverage on agricultural activities and the county government interventions played a key role in gubernatorial election campaigns in the run up for 2017 elections. The incumbent governor and BUZEKI were constantly on TV, each trying to reach out to electorates to have them voted with the view of enhancing maize, wheat and milk production and sourcing market... (KI, No. 1)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was the persistent use of television in the coverage of County and national development projects, and in conducting political campaigns thus influencing voters' choice of presidential and gubernatorial candidates. Key Informants also noted that MNAs candidates would use the television

to reach out to voters in their constituencies. The majority of such candidates would debate over the development projects either already accomplished (by the incumbents) or those set as priority for the purpose of implementation and thus providing a platform through which voters could assess potential candidates for the elective position. The insignificant influence of television in the election of MCAs was attributed to the capacity by the different candidates to easily reach out to voters through alternative means such as door to door and roadside visits due to relatively small geographical sizes of their respective Wards.

Discussants in FGDs and Key Informants interviewed noted that television stations such as *Citizen TV*, *KTN*, *KTN News*, *KASS TV* and *NTV* were widely viewed in presidential, gubernatorial and MNA political campaigns and debates. This finding rhymes with the Communication Authority of Kenya Report (2019) that such stations were the leading countrywide in terms of viewership but only reaching 40 percent of the Kenyan population, majority of whom are in urban areas. Aririguzoh (2014) opine that Television provides political candidates with an opportunity to by-pass their political parties and appeal to the voters directly, and candidates who frequently appear on the television are perceived by voters as serious contestants.

This study also sought to examine how the use of the internet influenced voters' choice of a candidate and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.6.

**Table 5.6: Influence of Internet on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much	43	12.3	26	7.4	21	6.0	14	4.0
Some	58	16.5	68	19.4	66	18.8	53	15.1
No	250	71.2	257	73.2	264	75.2	284	80.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings depicted in Table 5.6 shows 101(28.8%) respondents acknowledged that internet use influenced their choice of presidential candidates, 94(26.8%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidates, 87(24.1%) cited that it influenced their choice of MNAs while 67(19.1%) respondents acknowledged that it influenced their choice of MCAs in the 2013 and 2017 general elections.

Assessment of the influence of internet on voters' choice of candidates in the four elective positions indicated that over 70 percent of the respondents were never influenced in their choice of candidates. While Chandwick (2017) posited that internet connectivity and uptake in developing countries is significantly increasing and transforming different sectors of the economy, Key Informants and discussants in FGDs in this study noted that most parts of rural areas were still constrained by inaccessibility to internet connectivity especially cyber cafes. Key Informant noted that;

*Most cyber cafes are largely located in the urban areas where most of the people from the rural areas cannot access. Despite some people having phones fitted with internet, the cost of buying internet bundles is also extremely high. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain internet information due to propaganda during electioneering period... (KI, No. 10)*

From the Key Informant response, the inability to adopt the use of internet by most of the respondents was attributed to lack of connectivity especially in rural areas where most of the voters live. Additionally, respondents also cited the high cost of internet bundles among those using mobile phones, as well as unreliability of information circulated through the internet during electioneering period. This finding rhymes with the Communication Authority of Kenya (2021) report that with Kenya having an estimated population of 54.38 million in January 2021 with 28.2% in urban centers and 71.8% in rural areas, only 40% of the entire population can access and use internet with majority of the users being in the urban areas.

Respondents who acknowledged that internet influenced their choice of political candidates cited the use of digital social media platforms such as *Face-book*, *Twitter* and *Instagram*. This social media platform provided a means through which political candidates could communicate their development agenda to the voters and mobilize them to turn out and vote. A Key Informants cited that Jubilee Alliance presidential candidate and Running mate (Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto respectively) in 2013 general election branded themselves as ‘Digital Team’ owing to their use of digital platform such as *Twitter* and *Instagram* accounts to campaign even as they promised to digitalize service provision if elected.



### 5.2.3 Religious Affiliation and Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County

Religious organizations constitute a key agent of socialization and have been responsible for meeting spiritual needs of its members, assisting members of society conform to social values and norms, as well as providing a sense of social identity and solidarity (Elizabeth, 2007). According to the GoK (2019) on Kenya Population and Housing Census Results, 85.5 percent of the 47.5 million Kenyans subscribed to Christianity, 10.9 percent were Muslims, 1.8 percent was from other religions such as the Hindu, Buddhism, and Traditional African Religions, while 1.6 percent noted that they never subscribed to any religion.

This study sought to examine whether respondents' religious denominations allowed them to vote in the 2013 and 2017 general election and it was noted that indeed they were all (100 per-cent) allowed to vote. Respondents cited that it was their constitutional right to vote having registered as voters in different polling stations. This was in tandem with Article 32(2) and 38(3a, b) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, that while every citizen has the freedom to practice his/her religion as an individual or as a community, they are equally entitled without any unreasonable restriction the right to register as a voter and to vote by secret ballot in any election. A Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*We allow our members to register and vote as their constitutional right and as a member of the clergy, I believe that bad leaders are chosen by good people who don't vote. As religious leaders in our faith, we always educate members on the importance of election in relation to the different levels of representation... (KI, No. 20)*

It was evident from the Key Informant response that other than the core mandate of providing spiritual guidance, members of the clergy also undertook civic education to

their congregations on the importance of election and thus the need for them to participate.

The study also established that different religious groups and their members provided different forms of support to a political party/coalition or candidate of their choice during electioneering period. These support as cited by respondents included providing political candidates with time to campaign during religious meetings, members were allowed to personally campaign for their preferred candidate or party/coalition, and giving of special prayers to preferred political party and/or candidate. Additionally, members of different religious groups were also allowed to provide logistical support including mobilization of voters at the grass root level.

The study also sought to assess the influence of religious leader(s) on voters' choice of political candidate in the different elective positions and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.7.

**Table 5.7: Influence of Religious Leader(s) on Voters' Choice of Political Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	90	25.6	74	21.1	67	19.1	55	15.7
Some Influence	126	35.9	130	37.0	123	35.0	127	36.2
No Influence	135	38.5	147	41.9	161	45.9	169	48.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 5.7 shows that 214(61.5%) respondents acknowledged that religious leaders influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 204(58.1%)


cited that they influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 190(54.1%) noted that they influenced their choice in the MNAs election, while 182(51.9%) acknowledged that religious leaders influenced their choice of MCAs. Comparatively, over 50 percent of all the respondents acknowledged that their religious leaders influenced their choice of political candidate in all the elective positions.

It was established that the strength of influence of religious leaders on voters' choice of candidates in the different elective positions decreased as elections became local; from presidential to election of MCAs. Discussants in FGD and Key Informants interviewed argued that there was a tendency towards religious homogeneity at the lower level of representation and especially in the rural areas and thus reducing the effects of religion as a cleavage factor in electoral politics. It was further noted that to appeal to the religious leaders of different faiths and seek their electoral support, candidates used strategies such as offering of monetary donation, identifying themselves with multiple religious groups, as well as attending their religious meetings. Discussants in FGDs cited '*UhuRuto*' campaign in 2013 and 2017 in the County, where they attended different churches giving monetary donation while adorned in religious regalia to appeal to the masses or invited religious leaders across the Country for prayers.

#### **5.2.4 Voters' Associations/Groups and Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Bleakley and Hennessy (2012) opined that formal associations can serve as agents of socialization since it unites people of common and formal interests together for instance in business, profession and government. Such formal associations often create a strong corporate social bond and networks through which members can advance their interests, share information, views, and opinions and consequently

shaping their group behaviour. This study sought to assess respondents' affiliation to any formal association(s) and the findings were as indicated in Figure 5.1.



**Figure 5.1: Respondents' Affiliation to Formal Association in Uasin Gishu County**

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Figure 5.1 indicate that 54(15.4%) respondents were members of business groups, 32(9.1%) were members of professional associations, 87(24.8%) were members of youth groups, 70(19.9%) were subscribed to women groups, 82(23.4%) did not subscribe to any association while 26(7.4%) cited other associations such as sports associations.

Evident from this finding was that most respondents (over 73 percent) subscribed to a formal association which according to Etzioni (1975) often have their rules and regulations, common objectives to achieve, established structure of operation and leadership, as well as a centralized communication structure. Business groups in this study included members of the *Jua Kali* sector, clothes and food vendors, cybercafé operators, *Matatu* associations, *Boda Boda* Association; professional associations

included experts of different technical skills like the teachers, lecturers, lawyers, architects, medical practitioners, while youth and women groups were involved in different activities such as on environmental conservation, farming and hand craft. Other associations included members of sporting clubs and associations.

This study established that the different formal associations fully allowed their respective members to participate in electoral activities in conformity with Article 36(1) and 38(3a and b) of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Respondents who identified themselves with various Associations/Groups cited different forms of support they gave to either Political Party/Coalition or Political Candidates of their choice to include giving aspirants time to campaign during their meetings, members allowed to campaign for their preferred political candidate or party, and serving as volunteers at the grass-root as political strategists and campaigners for a preferred political candidate or party. Furthermore, members of the Association/Group could also provide logistical support including voter mobilization and information gathering for preferred political candidates.

When the study sought to assess the extent at which Associations/Groups influenced respondents' choice of political candidates in the different elective positions, the findings were as indicated in Table 5.8.

**Table 5.8: Associations/Groups Influence on Voters' Choice in Elective Positions in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	67	24.9	61	22.7	48	17.8	40	14.9
Some Influence	130	48.3	118	43.9	116	43.1	112	41.6
No Influence	72	26.8	90	33.4	105	39.1	117	43.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 5.8 indicates that from the 269 respondents who were members of various Associations/Groups, 197(73.2%) acknowledged that their Associations/Groups shaped their choice of presidential candidate, 179(66.6%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 164(60.9%) noted to have influenced choice of MNAs while 152(56.5%) respondents acknowledged that their choice of MCAs was influenced by their respective Associations/Groups.

As noted by Robbins and Coulter (2007), formal associations are driven by the desire to achieve common objectives such as accomplishing their development projects, success in business or in any socio-economic welfare activity of their members. In this study, the respondents' choice of political candidates in the different elective positions was shaped by their Associations and the strength of influence, increased as elective positions became national from the Ward level. Article 132(3b) and 176 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya grants jurisdictional powers to the office of the

president and the governor compared to MNA and MCA to establish a development blueprint towards achievement of their respective functions such as addressing issues affecting the youth, professionals, women, PLWDs and the elderly. As depicted in this study, members of different Associations such as the Youth, women, professionals, and business groups noted that voting for presidential and gubernatorial candidates was shaped by their capacity to articulate respective group interests. A Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*Youth and women groups often prefer to vote for presidential and gubernatorial candidates who are able articulate their needs at the national and county level of governance because they have the resource and the capacity to shape public policies in their favour...*  
(KI, No. 16)

It was noted from the Key Informant response that the two executive positions; presidential and gubernatorial had huge resource capacity that could be used to address the varying needs of these Associations. As cited by respondents, this included monetary donation and support of Groups/Associations' projects, registration and certification of the Associations/Groups, facilitation of capacity enhancement training for members, extension services in relation to ongoing projects, market survey for their products as well as access to tenders and contracts under Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO).

As noted by discussants in FGDs, anticipation of fulfillment of such interests significantly shaped the choice of political candidates especially in the gubernatorial and presidential election compared to MNAs and MCAs elections. On the other hand, the decreasing influence of Associations/Groups on the election of MNAs and MCAs as cited by Key Informants was attributed to their limited capacity to dispense certain clientele goods or services such as funds needed for projects, as well as

Associations/Groups' perception that the two elective positions mainly legislate policies and with less powers to directly allocate substantive resources to them.

### 5.3 Primordial Social Bonds and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County

The subsequent sections examine the influence of primordial social bonds such as ethnicity, family ties and clannism, gender, race, social class, and religion in relation to presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections in general elections in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

#### 5.3.1 The Influence of Candidates' Ethnicity on Voters Choice of Candidates

As a primordial social bond, the study examined the influence of candidates' ethnicity on voters' choice of presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs candidates and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.9.

**Table 5.9 Influence of Candidates' ethnicity on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	191	54.4	197	56.1	194	55.3	201	57.3
Some Influence	118	33.6	102	29.1	93	26.5	76	21.6
No Influence	42	12.0	52	14.8	64	18.2	74	21.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 5.9 indicates that 309(88%) respondents cited ethnicity of the candidates to have influenced their choice of presidential candidates, 299(85.2%) acknowledged to have influenced their choice on gubernatorial candidates,



287(81.8%) responded to have influence their choice of MNA candidates while 277(78.9%) respondents cited to have influenced the choice of MCA candidates in the 2013 and 2017 general elections. This study established that ethnicity of candidates was the single most determining factor in voters' choice of candidates in all the elective positions. In presidential election, Key Informants and discussants in FGDs opined that ethnic communities rallied behind their ethnic patrons and parties that enjoyed ethnic support base. A Key Informant noted that;

*Voting pattern in presidential elections still reflects the traditional practice where voters vote for a candidate based on ethnicity. Almost every ethnic community is represented by an ethnic patron with a registered party for bargaining with others on their ethnic interest...* (KI, No. 25)

A discussant in FGD also noted that;

*Why shouldn't we vote for our kin to protect our ethnic interest? In our community, there is a saying that blood is thicker than water and would prefer to vote for our own. Our community leader through his party must bargain with others on our behalf...* (Pa 1, FGD 7)

Evident from the responses was the historical practice of ethnic based voting which continued to shape voters' choice of presidential candidate. Further probing with discussants noted that the acceptance to vote for Uhuru Kenyatta by the Kalenjin in 2013 and 2017 was driven by the pre-election pact between URP party led by William Ruto (Kalenjin *defacto* leader) and TNA party mainly supported by the Kikuyu and led by Uhuru Kenyatta and perceived by their respective ethnic communities to represent their ethnic interests. Similarly, other communities such as the Luhya led by Moses Wetangula and Musalia Mudavadi, Luo led by Raila Odinga and Kamba led by Kalonzo Musyoka rallied their support to Raila Odinga and Kalonzo Musyoka as presidential candidate and running mate respectively in the 2013 and 2017 presidential election on the same platform of ethnic coalition and interests. A Key Informant noted that the severity of ethnic based voting and political support in

presidential election was demonstrated when the NASA presidential candidate Raila Odinga called for their support base to boycott the repeated presidential election on 26<sup>th</sup> October 2018 which was largely heeded to by supporters from Nyanza, Western, Eastern, North Eastern region and Coastal part of Kenya. This was after Supreme Court rendered the 8/8/2017 presidential election null and void following serious electoral irregularities in the presidential election.

Given the cosmopolitan nature of the County in terms of ethnic composition, this study also noted that ethnicity of the gubernatorial candidates was a key consideration in voters choice of candidates in election. A Key Informant noted that;

*The county government should be led by a governor indigenous to the county. The governor should be a son of the soil to take care of the interests of the constituents and not outsiders... (KI, No. 1)*

A discussant also quipped that;

*When the counties were established, the local communities were given the opportunity to govern themselves and therefore cannot vote someone who is not from the Kalenjin community... this is a practice happening in other counties... (Pa 1, FGD 1)*

It was evident from the discussant and Key Informant responses that the establishment of counties had equally entrenched negative ethnicity since election of a governor was based on his/her ethnic identity. Further probing of the 2013 gubernatorial elections with Key Informants projected that while the contesting candidates were from the same ethnic community, there were intra-ethnic and inter-party supremacy battle between URP party that fronted Jackson Mandago and ODM party that fronted Margret Kamar. Key Informants cited that URP Party associated with William Ruto managed to rally the support of the Kalenjin and Kikuyu to vote for URP aspirant Jackson Mandago and Daniel Chemno as governor and deputy governor, respectively. Conversely, ODM gubernatorial party candidate Magret Kamar and Stephen Chelogoi (gubernatorial candidate and running mate respectively) were supported by the Luo,

Luhya and Kamba voters in the county. Key Informant opined that the ODM candidate became associated with Raila Odinga whom majority of the Kalenjin voters had accused of betraying William Ruto in relation to ICCJ criminal case associated with the 2007/8 post-election violence despite the support that the community had given to ODM party and its leadership between the year 2005 and 2007.

Similarly, in a bid to derive a winning ethnic coalition formula in the 2017 gubernatorial elections, Bundotich Zedekiah Kiprop alias *BUZEKI* (from Keiyo sub-tribe) vied as an independent candidate and rallied the support of voters from Keiyo (sub-tribe of Kalenjin), Kikuyu, Luo, Kisii and the Luhya communities. However, the incumbent governor vying under Jubilee Party Hon. Jackson Mandago (from Nandi sub-tribe) retained his running mate Daniel Chemno (from Keiyo sub-tribe) and rallied the support of the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen and a section of the Keiyo voters courtesy of his running mate and thus securing electoral victory due to their numerical strength. This finding demonstrated the existing intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic political dynamics that shapes voters' choice of gubernatorial candidate in Uasin Gishu County.

Similar to presidential and gubernatorial election, ethnicity of the MNA candidate was a significant factor that structured voters' choice of MNAs in the study area. This was premised on the perception that their own 'son or daughter of the soil' (tribes-mate) will prioritize their ethnic interests in every decision-making process. One discussant cited that;

*We should entrust our own with the responsibility to lead us as a community in every aspect.... Even in Turbo Sub County, we [Kalenjin] preferred to vote for a female independent candidate of our own despite having a Jubilee candidate from the Luhya community... (Pa 5, FGD 7)*

The severity of ethnicity as the basis of election of MNAs was demonstrated when for instance a Jubilee party candidate from the Luhya community (*Kevin Okwara*) won the party primaries in Turbo Sub County, but the local Kalenjin community unanimously agreed to front an Independent candidate (Janet Jepkemboi Sitienei) and voted her to victory in the 2017 MNA elections. Key Informants interviewed noted that the Jubilee deputy party leader William Ruto who is a resident and a voter within the Sub County could not convince members of his ethnic community to vote for the Jubilee party candidate (Kevin Okwara) even as the Kalenjin voters rallied behind Janet Jepkemboi Sitienei. An assessment of elected MNAs in all the Sub-counties for the 2013 and 2017 elections, indicated that they were all from the dominant Kalenjin community with the exception of Kesses Sub County in 2017 election which was won by a Jubilee party candidate Hon. Rajan Swarup Mishra (alias *Kiprop Arap Chelule*) of Indian origin but ‘ethnically assimilated’ as a Kalenjin and ‘adopted’ to *Kap Chepkendi* clan.

Assessment of Wards under study indicated that wards in the rural areas such as Sergoit, Kapkures, Cheptiret, Tarakwa, Kaptagat and Megun Wards mainly occupied by the Kalenjin community elected MCAs from their own ethnic community. Similarly, Wards in the urban areas such as Huruma and Langas predominantly occupied by the Kikuyu and Luo voters and with small proportion of the Kisii, Akamba, Luhya, Somali and Turkana rallied support to MCAs especially from the Kikuyu and the Luo community. A review of IEBC (2017) Election data revealed that in Huruma Ward in which 9 candidates vied for MCA position, 7 of them were from the Kikuyu community and with one candidate from the Luo and Kalenjin communities respectively, and with the seat being won by Jubilee candidate Peter Chomba Kiiru.

Similarly, in Langas Ward mainly occupied by the Kikuyu and Luo communities with relatively smaller number of the Kalenjin, Luhya, Kisii and Kamba voters, 9 candidates contested for MCA of which 6 candidates were drawn from the Kikuyu community and with Francis Muya Mwangi winning by 9,429 votes against his close competitor Charles Okumu from the Luo community who garnered 6,970 votes (IEBC, 2017). MCA election in these two urban Wards (Huruma and Langas) demonstrates ethnic politics among the heterogeneous urban population with contestants mainly relying on votes from their ethnic communities. Exceptional cases raised by Key Informants and discussants in FGDs were Kapsoya and Kimumu Wards where despite a significant population being drawn from the Luhya, Kisii, Kikuyu, Turkana and the Kamba communities, there were allegation of mass voters transfer from adjacent rural Wards mainly dominated by the Kalenjin to enhance Kalenjin voters' numerical strength in MCA election. As a primordial bond, ethnicity was noted to be heightened during election period and explains the repeated post-election violence witnessed in the study area as ethnic groups shifts their voting loyalty depending on their ethnic interests and occasioned by change of political parties by their ethnic patrons.

### **5.3.2 The Influence of Candidates' Family Ties/Clan on Voters Choice of Candidates**

The study examined the influence of candidates' family tie/clan as a primordial bond on voters' choice of candidates in the presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.10.

**Table 5.10: Influence of Family Ties/Clan on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	84	23.9	64	18.2	66	18.8	78	22.2
Some Influence	103	29.3	134	38.2	140	39.9	137	39.0
No Influence	164	46.7	153	43.6	145	41.3	136	38.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Table 5.10 shows that 187(53.2%) respondents acknowledged that the family ties/clan of candidates influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 198(56.4%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 206(58.7%) opined that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 215(61.2%) responded that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates. As noted by Kagwanja (2005), the Kenya's struggle for independence is traceable to the roles of personalities and families such Tom Mboya, Bildad Kagia, Jomo Kenyatta, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Dedan Kimathi, Daniel Arap Moi among others at the national level. Similarly, post independent struggle for democratization in Kenya is attributed to personalities such as Mwai Kibaki, Kenneth Matiba, Musalia Mudavadi, Martin Shikuku, Kijana Wamalwa and Raila Odinga. This study noted that in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, family history and ties to these national heroes (*Mashujaa*) shaped voters' choice of candidate with the top contenders in the two presidential elections; Raila

Odinga and Uhuru Kenyatta having family ties to the founding fathers of the republic of Kenya. A discussant in FGD noted that;

*Presidential politics is deep rooted on family dynasties which always connote the Kenya's struggle for independence and democratization reforms. Before 2010, we had Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi who fought for independence, then Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in 2007 who were reformists, then Uhuru Kenyatta in 2013 and 2017....*  
(Pa 2, FGD 1)

Apparent from the discussant response was that voters were more likely to vote for presidential candidates from certain families or lineages having deep rooted Kenya's historical event(s) such as the struggle for independence or the struggle for democratization than candidates making first attempts in vying for the presidential seat. Key Informants noted that the existence of certain family ties by a presidential candidate provided social visibility since the family name (like Kenyatta's, Moi's, Odinga's, Wamalwa's, among others) is symbolic to the voters and often arouse nostalgic memories of past achievements and thus shapes voters' choice of candidate. Discussants in FGD however noted that as a new generation of voters oblivious of past Kenyan history emerges, future presidential elections will be a contest between the 'dynasties' versus 'freshers'; those candidates with past family ties of leadership and new candidates making fresh entry into presidential election arena.

While gubernatorial election is a new phenomenon associated with the new 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the study established that family ties and/or clan of the candidates shaped voters' choice in gubernatorial elections. Key Informants noted that as peri-urban county, gubernatorial elections in Uasin Gishu County was structured by conglomerate of family ties, clannism, and the age-set of candidates especially by majority of voters in the rural areas. A Key Informant argued;

*Traditionally, Kalenjin community leadership was based on particular clans like the Kabooch, Talai or Kapkitolek. In addition, a*

*particular age set was also entrusted with community leadership at a given time. Mandago leveraged on these two cleavages because he comes from the Kabooch clan and from Kaplelach age set... (KI, No. 29)*

Evident from the response was that the traditional and cultural aspects of the dominant Kalenjin community in the County, constituted a significant consideration in gubernatorial election. As noted by Mutai (2012), the Kalenjin community is organized based on clannism and age set where for instance, the Nandi have clans such as *Kap Chepkendi, Kap Meliilo, Kap Taalam, Kabooch, Kaptumoiis, Koilegei, Kabianga, Kapsile, Kapno, Cheptol, Tibingot, Talai and Murkaptuk*. Key Informant in this study noted that elders of the *Kabooch* and *Talai* clans served as political and spiritual leaders (*motirenik*) and prophets (*orkoik*) respectively and performing functions such as endorsement and blessing of community leaders because of their supernatural endowment. As further noted by the Key Informant, male Kalenjin initiates are grouped into rotational age-sets such as *Maina, Chumo, Sawe, Kipkoimet, Korongoro, Kaplelach, Kipnyigei, and Nyongi* with each age-set lasting for 13 years and a full circle taking up-to 105 years.

Discussants in FGDs noted that close family ties to the *Talai* and *Kabooch* clans as well as candidates' membership to the *Kaplelach* ageset provided a cleavage upon which the incumbent governor could leverage on in the 2013 and 2017 gubernatorial elections. Key Informant noted that;

*Jackson Mandago was just a teacher before he joined politics in 2013 for the gubernatorial seat. Being a member of Kaplelach age set and coming from Kabooch clan provided him with a cleavage to leverage on, against his competitor Magret Kamar in 2013 and BUZEKI in 2017... (KI, No. 30)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was the centrality of family ties, clannism, and age-set especially among the dominant Kalenjin community in structuring voters' choice of gubernatorial candidate.



Similar to gubernatorial election, Key Informants noted that family ties, age set and clannism shaped voters' choice in MNAs elections even as the constituents became increasingly homogenous in terms of ethnicity and related cultural attributes at the Sub County level. A Key Informant noted that;

*Most candidates at the grass root are first known based on their ethnicity, family history/lineage, their age-set and clan. Candidates branding themselves using these social ties especially from the Kalenjin easily get audience and acceptance. Currently, Kaplelach age-set has the mantle of community leadership, and members of Kabooch, Talai and Kapkitolek clans are revered in political leadership... (KI, No. 30)*

It was apparent from the Key Informant response that MNA candidates identified themselves to the electorate based on their community social bonds such as ethnicity, family ties, age-set and clannism to get audience and community acceptance and thus creating cleavages for exclusion especially for non-indigenous communities vying for the MNA political seat. The study established that structuring of electoral participation on the basis of age-set and clannism greatly disadvantaged women even as Key Informant noted that, “*matinyei ibin korgo*” (women do not have age-set) and that, “*cheptaab oreet age ne wendi oreet age*” (women have no clan because they adopt the clan of the family they are married to). This finding equally explains the small number of successful women political leaders in MNA election due to the entrenchment of family ties, clannism, and age-set as key determinants in election.

This study also noted that the election of MCAs was significantly influenced by candidates' family ties and/or clan. Key Informant noted that as election became localized from the national level to the Ward level, the extent at which family ties, clannism and age-set influenced voters' choice of candidates significantly increased and this was attributed to increasing homogeneity in terms of socio-cultural belief system and practices. This was however noted with Wards that were largely in the

rural areas as opposed to Wards in the urban areas. A discussant in FGD observed that;

*Unlike in rural areas where communities are largely homogenous with a similar belief system in terms of age-set structure, clannism or family ties, urban area are cosmopolitan with varying ethnic composition, culture, race, religion and thus difficult to entirely base leadership on primordialism... (Pa 3, FGD 1)*

It was noted from the discussant response that MCA candidates especially in the rural Wards such as Sergoit, Kapkures, Tarakwa, Kaptagat and Megun mostly had to identify themselves to the voters in terms of their family history, age-set, and clan as leverage against their competitors from non-indigenous communities. However, the heterogeneous nature of the urban-voter population in Wards such as Kikumu, Langas, Huruma and Kapsoya was premised on broader social bond such as ethnicity as opposed to family ties. This finding demonstrated that where family ties or clannism as primordial bond do not apply due to the heterogeneity of the voter population, voters would base their choice of candidate on other primordial linkages such as ethnicity.

### **5.3.3 The Influence of Candidates' Gender on Voters Choice of Candidates**

Candidates' gender as a primordial attribute was also assessed in relation to its influence on voters' choice of candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections and the findings were as presented in Table 5.11.

**Table 5.11: Influence of Candidates' Gender on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	121	34.5	127	36.2	129	36.7	68	19.3
Some Influence	166	47.3	154	43.9	148	42.2	135	38.5
No Influence	64	18.2	70	19.9	74	21.1	148	42.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Table 5.11 indicates that 287(81.8%) respondents acknowledged that the gender of candidates influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 281(80.1%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 277(78.9%) posited that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 203(57.8%) responded that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates.

Comparatively, the candidates' gender influenced voters' choice in all elective position under study. A review of IEBC, 2013 and 2017 Election Data on presidential elections indicated that only Martha Karua in 2013 contested for the presidential seat as the only female aspirant and with no female candidate contesting in the 2017 presidential elections. Similarly, only one female gubernatorial candidate-Magret Kamar under ODM party ticket contested in 2013 elections without securing victory. This study also noted that in the 2013 and 2017 MNA elections, only male MNAs were elected with the exception of Turbo Sub County in the 2017 election, while in MCA elections in the 12 Wards under study, only two Female MCAs were elected in 2013 election (from Cheptiret and Kuinet Wards) while only one female candidate (from Kimumu Ward) was elected in 2017 elections. A discussant noted that;

*Kenya is a conservative country and from a socio-cultural and religious perspective, leadership position should be held by a male as a reflection of the family unit headed by a man. In our culture, women are taught to be submissive, respect authority and take care of the children at home. Even with education, she is still a woman and must obey... (Pa 2, FGD 2)*

Evident from the discussant response in FGDs was that the preference of a male candidate to a female aspirant was attributable to negative socio-cultural socialization and gender-constructed roles at the family level which exalted male patriarchy while suppressing women involvement in electoral politics and in leadership. Further propping with discussants revealed that in exceptional cases where a community interest is threatened, women could however be endorsed by community elders to participate in elective politics as witnessed in the case of Turbo Sub County where Janet Jepkosgei (an independent candidate) was supported by the dominant Kalenjin community as opposed to Kevin Okwara (from the Luhya community) despite winning the Jubilee party primaries in the year 2017. While negative cultural socialization was to blame for the small number of elected women in the study area, it was noted that the problem was more perverse in the rural areas than in the urban areas.

#### **5.3.4 The Influence of Candidates' Race on Voters Choice of Candidates**

The study also assessed the influence of candidates' race on voters' choice of presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA candidates and the findings were as depicted in Table 5.12.

**Table 5.12: Influence of Candidates' Race on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	14	4.0	12	3.4	14	4.0	7	2.0
Some Influence	79	22.5	77	21.9	63	17.9	53	15.1
No Influence	258	73.5	262	74.7	274	78.1	291	82.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 5.12 shows that 93(26.5%) respondents cited that the race of candidates influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 89(25.3%) acknowledged that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 77(21.9%) posited that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 60(17.1%) responded that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates.

Comparatively, there was insignificant influence of candidates' race on voters' choice of candidates in all the elective positions under study. Unlike in foreign countries such as the USA, France, Britain, Australia and South Africa that have citizens of different racial groups and with a significant percentage participating in elections, Kenya's population consists of over 90 percent Black African of different ethnicity and with a small percentage of the Asians, Caucasians and Arabs (KNBS, 2019). Discussants noted that owing to the increasing racial homogeneity, race difference among candidates in the different elective position could not constitute a political cleavage that could structure voters' choice in election. This finding was in tandem with

Banerjee, et.al (2014) that in developing democratic societies characterized by homogeneous racial group, race can't constitute a cleavage for exploitation by candidates to enhance competitive advantage over their political opponents.

### 5.3.5 The Influence of Candidates' Socio-Class on Voters Choice of Candidates

Socio-class as a primordial social bond was also assessed in relation to its influence on voters' choice of presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA candidates and the findings were as shown in Table 5.13.

**Table 5.13: Influence of Socio-class on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	162	46.1	98	27.9	64	18.2	52	14.8
Some Influence	88	25.1	113	32.2	119	33.9	125	35.6
No Influence	101	28.8	140	39.9	168	47.9	174	49.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Table 5.13 indicates that 250(71.2%) respondents acknowledged that candidates' socio-class influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 211(60.1%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 183(52.1%) responded that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 177(50.4%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates. As argued by Karl Marx, capitalist societies like Kenya are characterized by class structure on the basis of socio-economic endowment and which influence different aspects of human life (Ishkanian,

2015). This study affirmed that socio-class of candidates in all the elective positions under study influenced voters' choice of candidates. Due to the widespread use of clientelistic goods and services to strengthen patron-client relations in elective politics, this study established that respondents preferred candidates perceived as wealthy and generous. Discussants in FGD noted that;

*During political campaigns, some political candidates are willing to give financial support for youth and women groups, give monetary incentives to voters. You can't vote for candidates who can't give you anything yet they want your votes... (Pa 4, FGD 7)*

Evident from the discussant response was that political candidate stood a better chance of winning in the elections based on the socio-economic status due to public perception of generosity in providing clientele goods. This was the case with the Jubilee Alliance candidate in 2013 and Jubilee party in 2017 presidential elections where Key Informants cited fleet of branded choppers being used in the campaigns and with majority of the households in the study area being given clientele goods such as branded apparels and monetary donations to youth groups, women groups and religious organizations. This was equally observed in gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections where the candidates' capacity to dispense clientele goods and services to voters such water tanks, construction of houses for the aged, waiving of medical bills for poor constituents, full academic scholarships to youth, and provision of heifer for the aged contributed to enhancing a competitive edge in the elections.

### **5.3.6 The Influence of Candidates' Religion on Voters Choice of Candidates**

Candidates' religion as a primordial social bond was assessed on its influence on voters' choice of candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections and the findings were as presented in Table 5.14.

**Table 5.14: Influence of Candidates' Religion on Voters' Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much Influence	74	21.1	67	19.1	43	12.2	21	6.0
Some Influence	109	31.0	97	27.6	112	31.9	127	36.2
No Influence	168	47.9	187	53.3	196	55.9	203	57.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Findings presented in Table 5.14 shows that 183(52.1%) respondents cited that candidates' religion influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 164(46.7%) cited that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 155(44.1%) responded that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 148(42.2%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates. As noted in the 2019 Kenya Census Report, over 95 percent of the 47.5 million Kenyans subscribed to a religion; 85.5% Christians, 10.9% Muslims, and 1.8% from other religions. This study established that voters' choice of presidential candidates was shaped by candidates' religion. A Key Informants noted that as a religious conservative nation, liberal presidential candidates whose development agenda may include advocacy for same sex marriage, abortion or euthanasia will likely lose supporters because most members of different religions and registered as voters do not support or approve such practices. Key Informant opined;

*Most Kenyans subscribes to Christianity and will prefer to vote for someone who believes in the ideals, values and principles of the faith as president as opposed to a liberal candidate. At the county, there is*



*largely homogeneity in faith and people don't pay keen interest to candidates' religion in election... (KI, No. 21)*

While candidates' religion significantly influences voters' choice of presidential candidate, it was established that the severity at which it influenced gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections significantly decreased as election became localized from the national level. Basing on the 2019 Kenya Census Report, Uasin Gishu County statistics indicated that from 1.16 million populations, 95.1% were Christians, 1.6% were Muslims, 0.14% were Hindu, and 0.1% subscribed to Traditional African Religions. In relation to this study, the tendency towards homogeneity in religion at the county level reduces cleavage that could trigger voters' choice of candidate on grounds of religion. It was however observed that in urban and cosmopolitan wards such as Huruma, Langas, and Kapsoya having voters of different religions, political candidates adopted different mechanism to appeal to adherents such as monetary donation, support of religious projects, attending sermons, prayers, publicly reciting scriptural texts, singing, and wearing ecclesiastical regalia.

### **5.3.7 The Influence of Voters' Family/and or Relatives on Choice of Candidates**

The study also examined the influence of voters' family and/or relatives on choice of presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA candidates in the 2013 and 2017 general elections and the findings were as indicated in Table 5.15.

**Table 5.15: Influence of Voters' Family/and or Relatives on Choice of Candidates in Uasin Gishu County**

Degree of Influence	President		Governor		Member of National Assembly		Member of County Assembly	
	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%	No. of Respondents	%
Much	83	23.6	88	25.1	31	8.8	8	2.3
Some	152	43.3	162	46.2	151	43.0	155	44.1
No	116	33.1	101	28.7	169	48.1	188	53.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>351</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings presented in Table 5.15 indicates that 235(66.9%) respondents acknowledged that voters' family and/or relatives influenced their choice of presidential candidate, 250(71.3%) opined that it influenced their choice of gubernatorial candidate, 182(51.9%) responded that it influenced their choice of MNA candidate while 163(46.4%) respondents cited that it influenced their choice of MCA candidates. Comparatively, the voters' family and/or relatives influenced the choice of presidential, gubernatorial and MNA candidates with exception of MCA candidates, and the severity of influence decreases as the elective position become localized from the national level.

As noted by Cainzos and Voces (2010), the family constitutes an important agent of socialization which shapes individual world view regarding different socio-economic and political phenomena. Key Informants and discussants in FGDs opined that the first political discourses often start at the family level or with close relatives, and thus

becoming a precursor for future political debates with peers. A discussant quipped that;

*I first heard of Kenyan heroes like Dedan Kimathi, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Jomo Kenyatta, Koitalel Arap Samoei among others from my grandparents who narrated how they struggled against the White people. I also heard my parents discussing with my elder siblings about election of Daniel Moi and Mwai Kibaki ... (Pa 4, FGD 3)*

Apparent from the discussant was that national history, the role of different national personalities and election related activities are first discussed at the family level and thus have the capacity to shape family members' choice of candidate in presidential elections. Similarly, the establishment of county governments had contributed to discourses about service delivery as well as the use of NG-CDF at the Sub County level. Further probing with discussants and Key Informants revealed that while incumbent presidential candidates are assessed and evaluated at the family level based on their capacity to protect ethnic interests, favourable distribution of development projects and employment opportunities to ethnic constituents, new presidential candidates are evaluated based on their ethnicity, past political history, their capacity to protect community interests and reciprocate any political support given, their religion, family history and their development agenda.

Similarly, gubernatorial and MNA candidates at the family level were also assessed based on their ethnicity, family history, loyalty to the ethnic political patron, incumbent use of public funds, clannism and age-set, equitability in distribution of development projects, allocation of bursaries and scholarships, as well as their capacity to appropriate clientelistic goods or services. In the MCA elections however, voters' family and relatives did not have much influence on voters' choice of candidate as cited by only 163(46.4%) respondents. A Key Informant opined;

*Most MCA aspirants are well known to the people at the grassroots because they are indigenous to their wards and are known by their clan, age-set and family history may be with exception of wards in urban areas... (KI, No. 8)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was that as elections became localized and especially in rural Wards, the voters' knowledge regarding the particulars of every MCA candidate significantly increased and thus voters can make independent decision on whom to vote. However, it was further noted that Wards in the urban areas often have large number of new candidates in every election cycle and voters in their respective families often assess such candidates based on their ethnicity, their development plan, loyalty to ethnic patron, as well as their disposition to appropriate clientelistic goods or services just like in other elective positions.

In conclusion purposive and primordial social bonds created a leverage upon which voters are recruited and mobilized to vote for a political candidate. It was established that purposive corporate social bonds attributed to voters' attachment to religion, community association, the media, political party, and professional associations/trade unions influenced the choice of candidates and with varying severity across the different elective positions. Similarly, primordial social ties attributed to ethnicity, family history, gender, social class, religion of candidates, and voter's family and/or relatives equally influenced voters' choice of candidates in the different elective positions under study. Clientelistic benefits based on mutual reciprocity were the major trade-offs between political candidates and voters from the different purposive corporate entities and thus affirming the tenets of social exchange theory that individuals are rational and chooses behaviors that maximize achievement of self-interests in any social relations. Similarly, primordial attributes such as family ties, ethnicity, religious beliefs and family can influence voters' choice of candidates and thus affirms the premises of TRA adopted in the study.

**CHAPTER SIX**  
**POLITICAL DYADIC NETWORKS AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION**  
**IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

**6.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents analysis and interpretation of findings of the third research objective which examined the dyadic networks that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The research focused on political candidate-voter (patron-client) dyadic relationship in the different elective positions, and how these relationships are established and sustained to enhance a competitive advantage by political candidates. This chapter focuses on patron-client dyadic networks influencing presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA election in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya.

**6.2 Political Dyadic Networks Influencing Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

The study assessed the respondents' views regarding whether political dyadic networks was of any importance towards in elections and the findings established that all the 351(100%) respondents acknowledged its centrality towards electoral victory of any political candidate. Among the reasons cited by respondents included the view that political dyadic networks enabled incumbent political candidates to strengthen their popularity at their respective political bases. While giving opportunity to candidates to entrench themselves and establish new support base, respondents further noted that such dyadic networks also served as candidates' grass-root 'ears' through which competitors strategies could be identified and counteracted to have a competitive advantage. A Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*Your networks with wananchi on the ground enable you to know what your opponents are saying about you or what they are planning to do and thus be able to organize yourself appropriately. Wananchi can be very hostile on the ground because of your competitors' propaganda but when you have your ears on the ground, you will never bother because you are able to get all the information... (KI, No. 29)*

It was further established through discussants that political network served as means of monitoring compliance and loyalty in voters' participation in elections. Owing to the secret nature of balloting as provided for under Article 38(3b), political candidates can use their grass-root agents to monitor voters turn out and thus mobilize those who have not voted for instance by providing means of transport or monetary incentives to vote. Such groups as cited by discussants included PLWDs and the aged within the clientele network who may not be able to reach the polling station but are loyal voters.

Discussants in FGD noted that dyadic network provided a means through which political candidates' development agenda could be relayed to the voters at the grass-root level. It was established that recruited agents (brokers) serving on behalf of their patron are able to popularize their candidate's political agenda even in his/her absence. Further probing with Key Informants revealed that political dyadic networks also provided an avenue through which clientelistic goods and services could be appropriated to voters. In addition, Key Informants noted that the dyadic networks incorporated close ties with religious organizations, associational groups such as business groups, youth and women groups and professional association, the media as well as individual voters in the different electoral units.

### **6.3 Political Dyadic Networks in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

The study sought to interrogate the influence of the listed activities and actors in enhancing presidential candidates' dyadic networks with voters in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections and the findings were as indicated in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Presidential Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Activities and Actors in Political Dyadic Networks</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Associating with religious groups and their activities.	74(21.1%)	154(43.9%)	228(65.0%)	123(35.0%)
<b>ii)</b> Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron	276(78.6%)	46(13.1%)	322(91.7%)	29(8.3%)
<b>iii)</b> Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups, PLWDs etc	218(62.1%)	70(19.9%)	288(82%)	63(18.0%)
<b>iv)</b> Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc	63(17.9%)	165(47.0%)	228(64.9%)	123(35.0%)
<b>vi)</b> The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties	77(21.9%)	183(52.1%)	260(74%)	91(26.0%)
<b>vii)</b> Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc	84(23.9%)	154(43.9%)	238(67.8%)	113(32.2%)
<b>vii)</b> Working and associating with business associations/ Groups	69(19.7%)	163(46.4%)	232(66.1%)	119(33.9%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings as indicated in Table 6.1 shows that in order for presidential candidates to enhance political dyadic network with the voters, 228(65%) respondents cited the need to associate with religious groups and their activities, 322(91.7%) respondents noted the centrality of collaborating and working closely with ethnic political patrons, 288(82%) cited working with Community Associations, while 228(64.9%) respondents acknowledged the need to associate with professionals and their respective trade unions. In addition, 260 (74%) respondents cited the nature of political party/coalition, 238(67.8%) emphasized on the role of the media in political

networking with the voters while 232(66.1%) respondents acknowledged the need to work and associate with business associations/groups to enhance dyadic network with the voters.

The Kenya Census Report indicated that 95.1% of the 1.16 million populations in Uasin Gishu County subscribed to Christianity, 1.6% being Muslims, 0.14% Hindu, 0.1% from the Traditional African Religions (TARs), while 1.2% did not subscribe to any religion (KNBS, 2019). In relation to the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, 228(65%) respondents noted that presidential candidates enhanced a strong dyadic bond with voters from different religious groups by associating with their respective religious activities and practices. Key Informants and discussants noted that activities that strengthened presidential candidates-religious group dyadic relations included provision of monetary donations in support of projects such as office(s), Church, Temple or Mosque construction, donation of car(s) to members of the clergy, as well as regular visits and worshipping with the congregants. In return, members of the clergy would give time to candidates to campaign during their meetings, and members of different religions would campaign for their preferred political candidates, give special prayers, and could provide logistical support such as voter mobilization at the grassroots. Key Informant noted that;

*Presidential candidates are free to ask for political support from the congregants in our meetings and we welcome them to religious meetings as well. We also appreciate their kind gesture in supporting projects as it demonstrates their recognition of the role of religion in the society ... (KI, No. 22)*

Further probing established that the propensity by presidential candidates to associate and provide support to religious groups and their activities, always prompt good relationship with the members of the clergy who equally rally their respective congregations to vote for such candidates based on reciprocity. While religious



organizations serve as agent of socialization and inculcate religious beliefs and values to members, this finding demonstrated that such organizations are equally key actors in electoral activities and can shape voters choice of candidate in presidential elections.

According to Oyugi.et.al (2003), Kenya is one of the African countries with a deeply ingrained practice of ethnic politics where political elites have traditionally used ethnic identity and numerical strength to pursue partisan ends. As noted in this study, 322(91.7%) respondents cited that dyadic network in presidential elections involves candidates collaborating and working closely with ethnic political patrons. Discussants and Key Informants observed that the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections involved conglomerate of ethnic political patrons representing their respective ethnic communities' interests under ethnic based political parties and coalitions. A Key Informant posited that;

*...the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections involved conglomerate of Political parties led by ethnic patrons on behalf of their communities to form pre-election pact and increase their chances of winning elections... (KI, No.30).*

According to Article 138 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, a presidential candidate can only be declared to have won election if he/she has garnered more than half of all the votes cast in the election (50%+1), and at least twenty-five percent of the votes cast in more than half of the 47 counties (GoK, 2010). Evident from the Key Informant response was that the requirement prompted pre-election pact by different political parties represented by ethnic patrons to maximize on their chances of winning in election. For instance, the Jubilee Alliance in 2013 presidential elections comprised of TNA party by Uhuru Kenyatta and URP party led by William Ruto and serving as the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic patrons respectively.

Similarly, CORD alliance consisted of Wiper Party by Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba), FORD party by Moses Wetangula (Luhya), ODM by Raila Odinga (Luo), among others. In the 2017 presidential elections, Jubilee party was formed after merging of all Jubilee Alliance affiliate parties with William Ruto (Kalenjin) and Uhuru Kenya (Kikuyu) being the key protagonists and incumbent presidential candidate. Similarly, the NASA Coalition was formed and involved ODM by Raila Odinga (Luo), Wiper Democratic Movement by Kalonzo Musyoka and NARC by Charity Ngilu (both as Kamba patrons), FORD-Kenya by Moses Wetangula (Luhya), ANC by Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya), and *Chama Cha Mashinani* (CCM) by Isaac Ruto (Kalenjin).

This finding demonstrates that a presidential candidate's success is largely dependent on the extent of collaboration with other ethnic political patrons representing their respective ethnic communities. Ethnic political patrons who in most cases are party leaders as witnessed in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections are viewed by their respective ethnic supporters as embodiment of ethnic interests and thus fanatical political support. The pre-election coalition that ethnic patrons decide to enjoin determines the possible number of voters that the coalition can get depending on the ethnic numerical strength and thus electoral victory is a derivative of ethnic patrons' collaboration accompanied by their respective ethnic numerical strength and bloc voting.

As purposive corporate social actors, community associations such as youth groups, women groups, and groups for PLWDs draws their membership based on shared objectives and members are thus socialized into common interests, values and principles. Youth and women groups for instance come together to pull their resources together in doing different development projects such as farming, table

banking, environmental conservation as well as their group members' social welfare activities. This study established that 288(82%) respondents cited that dyadic networks in presidential elections are strongly enhanced by candidates working closely with these community associations. As noted by Scott (1972), political dyads form the basis through which voters are recruited and mobilized towards supporting a party or a political candidate in election.

Key Informants and discussants noted that presidential candidates prior to 2013 and 2017 elections adopted different strategies to enhance dyadic networks with community associations and included provision of monetary donations, promise of award of tenders and contracts through AGPOs, as well as promise to establish revolving funds to promote Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) among the youth, women and PLWDs. A Key Informant noted that;

*Presidential candidates are aware that majority of the voters are youth and women and in the last two presidential elections, candidates have campaigned on grounds to facilitate registration of youth, women and PLWDs and provide them with revolving credit facility to promote income generating activities. After election of Jubilee government in 2013, Uwezo Fund was operationalized in 2014... (KI, No.13).*

While most of the programmes targeting youth, women and PLWDs are programmatic, presidential candidates tend to use them as clientele campaign strategies to enhance dyadic relations with these groups. Based on the principle of reciprocity, Key Informants and discussants in FGDs cited that community association members often mobilize themselves, members of their families, friends and relatives to turn out and vote. It was on this basis that Jubilee government was voted for in 2013 and 2017 presidential elections and thus demonstrated that close collaboration and provision of support to the activities and programmes of community

associations helps to enhance a strong dyadic relationship based on clientelistic exchange relations.

Article 41 and 38 of the 2010 Constitution provides for the right to fair labour practices, and workers right to form, join or participate in the activities of trade union, as well as the right to participate in electoral related activities (GoK, 2010). In this study, Key Informants and discussants noted that among the registered trade unions in the study areas included unions representing professionals such as the teachers, lawyers, accountants, nurses as well as university academic and administrative staff and which constantly advocated for better terms of services for their members. As noted by 228(64.9%) respondents, presidential candidates associating and working with professionals and their respective trade unions helps to create political dyadic network that enhances electoral support. Despite devolution, registration of the different trade unions is done at the national level and with national commissions such as Salaries and Remuneration Commission (SRC) overseeing setting and regularly reviewing remuneration and benefits of all public officers. This consequently places the president elect at the best position to intervene in addressing matters affecting workers across the country owing to the large jurisdictional mandate.

Key Informants and discussants noted that with the different Unions having thousands of registered members across the County and represented by elected officials at both the County and national level, presidential candidates often strive to appeal to members of these Unions both directly and through their representatives to vote for them with the promise to improve their terms of service. Further probing established that presidential aspirants often create linkages with most of the union's leadership to appeal to their respective members for electoral support and thus creating a political dyad with them. Key Informant noted that;

*...Presidential aspirants often seek to engage workers unions to appeal to their members for electoral support. This is often based on the promise that they will address workers welfare once elected to office. Union members however, have the right to make their own decision of whom to vote for... KI, No.27).*

Evident from the Key Informant response was that various union leaders often play an intermediary role in the negotiation of members' interests. However, union members have the right to freely decide on their own preferred presidential candidate as a political right and thus not bound by their union political views. This finding was in tandem with Berenschot (2018) that trade unions and membership not only scrutinizes the behaviour of political candidates but also assess the programmatic gains that their respective members will achieve before providing electoral support to political candidates in elections.

As noted by Chadwick (2017), political parties or coalitions are formal registered associations through which a group interests are articulated in elections. In relation to presidential election in Kenya, Article 138 of the 2010 Constitution outlines the minimum requirements for one to be declared as a president elect such as at least 50%+1 of all votes cast and 25 percent of the votes cast in more than half of the 47 counties. Consequently, political parties are prompted to sign pre-election pact in order to increase their chances of winning as was observed in the formation of Jubilee Alliance, CORD, Amani National Coalition and Alliance for Real change in 2013, and NASA and Jubilee Party in 2017 presidential elections.

Key Informants and discussants observed that affiliate parties to the different coalitions derived their support base from specific ethnic groups. For instance, in 2013 presidential election, TNA had huge support of the Kikuyu with Uhuru Kenyatta as the ethnic patron while URP had support from the Kalenjin with William Ruto as the ethnic kingpin. Similarly, the CORD affiliate parties such as ODM had support

from Luo with Raila Odinga as the patron, Wiper party supported by the Kamba with Kalonzo Musyoka as the patron while FORD Kenya had support from the Luhya with Moses Wetangula as the patron, and so was the case with the different coalitions in the 2017 presidential elections. A discussant quipped that;

*Political parties can be identified with specific ethnic patron and ethnic community in terms of their support base and are often used to articulate ethnic interests in general elections. In 2013, Kalenjin had URP, Kikuyu had TNA, Luo had ODM, Kamba had Wiper party... As a matter of fact, the parties are just bargaining tools and patrons can change a party without losing ethnic following... (KI, No. 26)*

Apparent from the Key Informant response was that since no single ethnic patron (with ethnic based party) can have an outright win in presidential elections under the 2010 constitution, ethnic based dyadic networks to guarantee the constitutional threshold was therefore unavoidable. This was also cited by 260(74%) respondents who observed that the nature of political party or coalition was a key determinant in establishing the support of the electorates.

A review of the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections indicated that the different coalitions were represented by ethnic-based affiliate political parties and patrons who constituted important intermediaries between the presidential candidates and the voters, and thus creating a triad of Candidate-Ethnic patron-Voters chain. For instance, the success of Jubilee Alliance in 2013 was because of William Ruto's (from URP) intermediary role in rallying the Kalenjin voters and Uhuru Kenyatta rallying the Kikuyu support under TNA party. This finding demonstrated that those ethnic kingpins who are also political party patrons' plays an intermediary role in reaching out to their ethnic constituents to support a given presidential candidate as witnessed in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.

The media is the guardian of public interest and provides the platform through which civic culture and a tradition of discussion and debate on substantive development issues are made to have an enlightened public (Dubois and Blank, 2018). In Kenya, this responsibility is provided for under Article 34 and 35 of the 2010 Constitution (GoK, 2010). In this study, 238(67.8%) respondents acknowledged the significant role the media play in enhancing political dyadic network with the voters in presidential elections. A Key Informant cited that;

*Ethnic communities often tune to their vernacular radio and Televisions stations for political direction from their ethnic patrons who are also leaders of political parties. Owing to community interests, ethnic patron consolidates regional and ethnic base using these media to reach out to constituents... (KI, No.15).*

A discussant in FGD also noted that;

*As youth, we often have social media platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp groups comprising of hundreds and thousands of members through which we strategies on how to consolidate our votes and campaign for our preferred candidates at the various levels of representations. The administrators of the groups are also campaign strategists based on our interests, for instance the Uasin Gishu County Forum ... (Pa 1, FGD 3)*

From the Key Informant and discussant responses, ethnic political patrons who are also leaders of ethnic based political parties' rallies their ethnic support to a preferred presidential candidate using vernacular radio stations and television as opposed to mainstream media outlets using either Kiswahili or English.

Discussants established for instance that prior to 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, URP Party leader William Ruto rallied the Kalenjin ethnic community to support TNA party leader Uhuru Kenyatta using Kalenjin vernacular stations such as *Kass Fm*, *Chamgei Fm* and *Kass Tv*. Similarly, Uhuru Kenyatta rallied the Kikuyu voters using *Kameme Fm* and *Inooro Fm*, and *Inooro TV*. Other political leaders equally adopted the same strategy for instance use of *Ramogi Fm* by Raila Odinga, *Mulembe*

*Fm* by Musalia Mudavadi and Moses Wetangula, and *Musyi Fm* by Kalonzo Musyoka. The adoption of these vernacular radio and Television stations was attributed to the need to ventilate ethnic interests that can only be discussed using the local dialect, the need to reach both the literate and the illiterate in the community, as well as the vast coverage and accessibility to these means of communication to consolidate ethnic support base. Social media outlets such as closed *Facebook* and *WhatsApp* groups were also platforms for debating, articulating, and mobilizing ethnic and regional youth support to a preferred presidential candidate. It is apparent from the study that the media constitute a key agent of political networking in presidential election, where ethnic patron rallies their ethnic constituents to support a preferred candidate using vernacular media outlets.

According to KNBS (2020) Report, up to 82.7% of Kenyans are involved in the informal sectors of the economy owing to the failure by the formal sector to generate sufficient employment opportunities and especially to the youth and women. As earlier established (chapter five), most of the business associations are involved in the *Jua Kali* sector, *Matatu* and *Boda Boda* business, small scale agro-business enterprises, food and cloth vending, open market business, retail and wholesale businesses and cyber café services. As cited by 232(66.1%) respondents, presidential candidates' collaboration with the different business associations was a key strategy of enhancing a dyadic network for political loyalty and support. Through FGDs and Key Informants, it was noted that most of these business operators are often constrained by capital accessibility for expanding their businesses, market for their products, work related equipment as well as the lack of security for their businesses. A discussant in FGD also noted that;



*Presidential candidates often try to develop programs aimed at boosting activities SMEs and informal sector and include giving monetary incentives, promise to create formal jobs, provide Uwezo funds, providing government contracts as well as other clientele goods and services....(Pa 2, FGD 4)*

Responses from the Key Informants and discussants in FGD revealed that presidential candidates often seek to establish and sustain dyadic network with these groups through programmatic approaches such as promise to create more government jobs, provide government revolving funds for business, as well as providing government tenders and contracts through AGPOs. Provision of clientelistic goods such as monetary incentives, and branded apparels like aprons, T-shirts and Reflector Jackets were also used to strengthen dyadic relations. The finding demonstrates that based on mutual reciprocity, the political dyadic network created between presidential candidates and the voters are expected to enhance voters' loyalty and a broad support base to a candidate.

In summary, presidential candidates establishes political dyadic networks with different actors through the use of activities anchored on mutual reciprocity and social exchange relations. Presidential candidates establish political dyads with ethnic patron using their respective political parties in order to win the electoral support of their ethnic constituents. Political dyadic network with business associations such as the *Jua Kali* sector, *Boda Boda* operators, *matatu* associations, clothing and food vendors are also used by presidential candidates to expand clientele network. Furthermore, candidates also establish dyadic networks with community associations such as the youth and women groups as well as groups for PLWDs. Dyadic networks with electorates are also established by candidates using media platforms such as the radio, television and social media. Furthermore, candidates also establish dyadic political

network not only with religious groups but also with professionals and their respective trade unions.

In the dyadic exchange relations, clientelistic goods and services becomes key trade-offs in the establishment and sustainability of political dyad and includes giving of monetary donations to community associations, support of their respective projects, award of tender and contracts through AGPO, pledge of government employment opportunities, pork barreling, provision of subsidized goods, monetary incentives, and supply of branded apparels such as T-shirts, reflector jackets and caps.

#### **6.4 Political Dyadic Networks in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

Research findings on the influence of the listed activities and actors in enhancing political dyadic network in gubernatorial elections were as indicated in Table 6.2

**Table 6.2: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Gubernatorial Elections in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Activities and Actors in Political Dyadic Networks</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Associating with religious groups and their activities.	57(16.2%)	162(46.2%)	219(62.4%)	132(37.6%)
<b>ii)</b> Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron	266(75.8%)	49(14.0%)	315(89.8%)	36(10.2%)
<b>iii)</b> Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups, PLWDs etc	216(61.6%)	78(22.2%)	294(83.8%)	57(16.2%)
<b>iv)</b> Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g. teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc	26(7.4%)	172(49.0%)	198(56.4%)	153(43.6%)
<b>vi)</b> The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties	105(29.9%)	162(46.2%)	267(76.1%)	84(23.9%)
<b>vii)</b> Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc	64(18.2%)	168(47.9%)	232(66.1%)	119(33.9%)
<b>vii)</b> Working and associating with business associations/ Groups	63(17.9%)	165(47.0%)	228(64.9%)	123(35.1%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 6.2 indicates that 219(62.4%) respondents acknowledged the importance of associating and working with religious groups and their activities, 315(89.8%) cited the need to collaborate and work closely with ethnic political patron, 294(83.8%) cited working with Community Associations, while 198(56.4%) respondents noted the need to associate with professionals and their respective Unions to enhance dyadic network. Furthermore, 267(76.1%) respondents acknowledged the centrality of the nature of political party/coalition in enhancing dyadic network,

232(66.1%) cited the role of the media while 228(64.9%) respondents acknowledged the importance of working and associating with business associations/Groups to enhance dyadic network.

From the findings, gubernatorial candidates in the 2013 and 2017 elections enhanced a strong dyadic bond with voters from different religious organizations by working and associating with their respective activities and practices as cited by over 60 percent of the respondents. Discussants in FGD noted that gubernatorial candidates adopted different strategies such as provision of monetary support to the different religious groups, as well as visiting and worshipping with their congregations to earn the loyalty and electoral support. Consequently, members of the clergy would give time to candidates to campaign, give special “prayer of successes”, and allow their respective members to campaign for a candidate of choice. In reciprocity, candidates would commit to support religious projects such as construction of church offices, provide water and electricity connection, give scholarship and bursary to support youth, as well as giving monetary gifts to the clergy for miscellaneous use. Similar to presidential elections, this study established that the gubernatorial candidates’ capacity to frequently associate and provide support to religious faiths and denominations awakens mutual cordial relationship with the clergy who in return rally their congregations to vote for such candidates.

As a means of establishing a strong political dyadic bond with the voters, gubernatorial candidates would closely collaborate and work with ethnic political patron as cited by 315(89.8%) respondents. While ethnic patrons were largely involved in national and presidential related activities, they significantly played a role as a king maker in gubernatorial election owing to the immense support they enjoy

from the electorates as they are perceived as an embodiment of ethnic interests. It is therefore imperative that for any aspiring gubernatorial candidates to have electoral support, they must have unquestionable loyalty and support to the ethnic patron who would then rally the constituents to support such a candidate. A Key Informant quipped that;

*Just like in other parts of the country, you cannot win gubernatorial election unless you first pledge your unwavering loyalty and support to ethnic political patron [William Ruto] as the incumbent governor did in 2013 and 2017 elections... (KI, No.1).*

Evident from the Key Informants response was that prior to the 2013 gubernatorial election, the incumbent governor Jackson Mandago drawn from the URP Party had the endorsement of the URP Party leader and the Kalenjin de-facto ethnic patron-William Rutto and consequently contributing to his overwhelming victory over Margret Kamar from ODM party. Similarly, the 2017 gubernatorial elections involved two candidates Jackson Mandago (Jubilee party) and Zedekiah Bundotich (Independent candidate) pledging their support to the Deputy Jubilee party leader (William Ruto) as a strategy of winning votes from the dominant Kalenjin electorates. However, the endorsement of the incumbent governor by the Deputy party leader contributed to his electoral victory for the second successive period as the County governor. While Wanyande (2009) emphasizes on ingrained practice of ethnic politics by the political elites at the national level politics, this finding depicted intra-ethnic political dynamics where loyalty to the ethnic political patrons is a significant determinant of electoral outcome in County level politics.

According to Gherghina (2014), dyadic networks constitute a mechanism through which voters can be recruited and mobilized to vote for a political candidates or party in democratic societies. As noted in this study, political dyadic networks in

gubernatorial elections could be enhanced by aspirants working closely with community associations such as youth groups, women groups, and groups for PLWDs as cited by 294(83.8%) respondents to broaden electoral support base. Based on Article 176 and the Fourth Schedule of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the County government under the leadership of the governor is mandated to address the welfare of youth, women, PLWDs and set funds for their respective activities. Key Informants and discussants cited that in the run up for the 2013 and 2017 elections, gubernatorial candidates used clientelistic strategies such as financial support to group projects, payment of groups outstanding bank loans, organizing free business and farming training and seminars, donation of farm tools and equipment, promise of award of county tenders and contracts as well as promise for special financial kitty for PLWDs.

A Key Informant noted that;

*Gubernatorial candidates are expected to outline how they intend to address the issues affecting majority of the voters who are largely the youth and women. In the 2013 and 2017 elections, aspirants could promise to create jobs for youth and women. Aspirants could also give monetary donation to youth groups, promise tenders and contracts, paid registration fee for aspiring groups as well as facilitating youth and women empowerment training ... (KI, No. 15)*

While most of the programmes targeting social groups were programmatic and provided for under the Constitution as well as political party's manifestos, aspiring gubernatorial candidates tend to use them as a means of enhancing their dyadic network with potential voters. Further probing with discussants and Key Informants noted that members of community groups often reciprocate to aspirants' incentives by mobilizing themselves, their families, and friends to vote for a particular candidate depending on their propensity to dispense clientelistic goods or services to their group members.

Article 235 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides for staffing of the County government by the County Public Service Board (CPSB) to execute devolved functions. While several appointments such as members of the County Executive Committee, Ward and Sub County administrators are largely governor's appointees with the approval of the County Assembly, professionals such as accountants, doctors and nurses are employed under the CPSB. This study as cited by 198(56.4%) respondents established that political dyadic networks are enhanced when gubernatorial aspirants associate and work with these professionals and their respective trade unions. Discussants and Key Informants interviewed noted that in the run up for 2013 and 2017 gubernatorial elections, aspirants sought to rally members of different professions such as doctors and nurses into their dyadic network on the basis that their issues such as wages, terms of service, scholarship for further studies, and housing will be addressed if elected.

Further probing with Key Informants however, established that the elected governors have limited jurisdictional powers to address every issue affecting county employees since they are bound by national policies and legislation on matters of labour relations for instance on regulation of salaries. Additionally, Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) on union members' welfare are done by the national union leaders at the national level and thus did not guarantee any aspiring candidates of workers' reciprocity in terms of electoral support. There were also several employees and unions working under the national government such as teachers and universities' staff whose issues are directly addressed by the national government and thus making it impossible for aspiring gubernatorial candidates to enlist them in their dyadic networks despite being voters at the county level.

Article 180(4) of the Constitution of Kenya provides for the election of the governor based on simple majority vote (GoK, 2010). Kanyinga (2009) opines that political parties in Kenya are surrogates of ethnicity and this was affirmed in the study where 267(76.1%) respondents cited that the nature of political party or coalition in gubernatorial elections constituted a significant determinant in enhancing political dyadic network with the voters. Key Informants noted that the ethnic patrons who are also party leaders are considered by the voters as community spokesperson and thus influences the choice of community leaders including in gubernatorial elections. A Key Informant noted that;

*In 2013 and 2017 elections, Uasin Gishu County was the epicenter of URP Party and Jubilee Party and led by William Ruto. Owing to the Kalenjin support for Ruto, loyalty to the Party including in the nomination and election of the governor was central and this contributed to the election of Jackson Mandago... (KI, No. 25)*

Evident from the response was that loyalty to the political party led by ethnic patron was a significant determinant in enhancing a political dyadic network between any gubernatorial candidate and the voters. While the 2013 gubernatorial election in the study area attracted contestants from URP (Jackson Mandago) and ODM (Margret Kamar), it was noted that electoral victory of the URP party candidate was attributed to the political party (URP) having Uasin Gishu county as its political support base and the endorsement by the party leader. In addition, the political coalition between the URP and TNA at the national level had a trickle-down effect in rallying the dominant Kalenjin community largely supporting URP and the Kikuyu supporting TNA to vote for Jackson Mandago as the preferred gubernatorial candidate.

As noted by Heywood (2017), the media in democratic societies plays a significant role in political education and mobilization and Article 34 and 35 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides for the freedom of both print and electronic media. In



this study, 232(66.1%) respondents noted that the media plays an important role in enhancing political dyadic network with the voters in gubernatorial elections. Key Informants noted that local vernacular radio and Television station were widely used by gubernatorial candidates to reach out to voters owing to their capacity to reach out to large number of voters in their local dialect. A Key Informant for instance noted that;

*In the last two gubernatorial elections-2013 and 2017, gubernatorial candidates preferred using local vernacular radio and Television network such as Kass FM and TV and Chamgei FM to reach out to voters from the dominant Kalenjin community, and sometimes use Kiswahili radio or Television networks to reach out to non-Kalenjin voters... (KI, No. 24)*

The study noted that all contestants in the 2013 and 2017 gubernatorial elections were drawn from the dominant Kalenjin community in the County and these aspirants as cited by Key Informant widely used vernacular radio and Television station to reach out and consolidate the Kalenjin voters. Discussants from FGDs also cited social media outlets such as *Facebook, Twitter* and *WhatsApp* groups to create a unique dyad of supporters for every gubernatorial candidate. A discussant in FGD quipped;

*...BUZEKI in 2017 campaigns used Twitter to rally youth towards voting for him. He also had both open and a closed group Facebook accounts which he frequently used to reach out to his campaign agents, strategists and voters in the County. Mandago also used the same approach in the 2013 and 2017 gubernatorial campaigns and elections... (Pa 7, FGD 3)*

Evident from the discussant response was that the use of media in gubernatorial campaigns and elections enhanced a strong candidates-voters dyadic network aimed at winning in election. The use of vernacular radio and Television network helps to create and consolidate a strong political dyad based on ethnicity as primordial social bond.

According to KNBS (2019), 43.9 percent of the population in Uasin Gishu County are largely urban dwellers and engages in small and medium enterprises. Conversely, the 56.1 percent of the population who are rural dwellers are mostly involved in agro-business enterprises as well as both small and large-scale crops and animal husbandry. Based on this study, 228(64.9%) respondents acknowledged that gubernatorial candidates often work and closely associate with the different business associations/Groups as a means of establishing a political dyad aimed at consolidating support base and consequently increasing chances of winning in election.

Discussants and Key Informants from the business associations noted that their primary goal was to have a favourable business environment that allows them to transact their businesses and will always support gubernatorial candidates having such programmatic measures. A discussant noted that;

*....every business operator such as the Jua Kali artisans, 'watu wa mitumba', Matatu and Boda boda operators needs a favourable working environment such as business stalls, maintained roads, timely processing of business permit as well as solid waste disposal around their business premises. The incumbent governor has been able to address this and thus winning votes from most of the business operators in the county... (KI, No. 12)*

The jurisdictional mandate of the office of the governor in addressing the interest of different business associations provided gubernatorial candidates with a cleavage to leverage on, in relation to their political campaigns and election. As noted from the discussant response, gubernatorial candidates often use clientelistic goods to establish dyadic networks with business groups/associations such as monetary donations. It can be observed from this finding that gubernatorial candidates' working and associating with business association based on mutual reciprocity helps to establish political dyadic network geared towards broadening political support base and voter loyalty.

In summary, gubernatorial candidates establishes political dyadic networks with voters through specific activities and actors premised on reciprocity and social exchange relations. Similar to presidential candidates, gubernatorial aspirants must establish dyadic network with ethnic patron and vie using his political party in order to gain electoral support of ethnic constituents. Gubernatorial candidates also establish dyadic bond with business groups/associations in order to broaden electoral support base.

Political dyadic bonds with community associations such as youth and women groups and groups for PLWDs was also very important just like dyadic bonding with the media outlets such as vernacular radio and Television networks, and the social media. To broaden political base and electoral support, gubernatorial candidates also establish dyadic network with religious groups as well as with professionals and their respective trade unions. On the basis of mutual gain, reciprocity and social exchange relations, gubernatorial candidates' appropriates clientelistic goods and services as trade-offs to sustain the political dyad with voters from these groups and thus affirming the tenets of the social exchange theory adopted in the study.

### **6.5 Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of National Assembly in Uasin Gishu County**

This research study also assessed the influence of listed activities and actors in enhancing political dyadic network in the election of MNAs and the findings were as presented in Table 6.3.

**Table 6.3: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in Election of MNAs in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Activities and Actors in Political Dyadic Networks</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Associating with religious groups and their activities.	12(3.4%)	186(53.0%)	198(56.4%)	153(43.6%)
<b>ii)</b> Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron	231(65.8%)	77(21.9%)	308(87.7%)	43(12.3%)
<b>iii)</b> Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups, PLWDs etc	192(54.7%)	95(27.1%)	287(81.8%)	64(18.2%)
<b>iv)</b> Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc	4(1.2%)	178(50.7%)	182(51.9%)	169(48.1%)
<b>vi)</b> The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties	98(27.9%)	165(47.0%)	263(74.9%)	88(25.1%)
<b>vii)</b> Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc	52(14.8%)	151(43.0%)	203(57.8%)	148(42.2%)
<b>viii)</b> Working and associating with business associations/Groups	31(8.8%)	165(47.0%)	196(55.8%)	155(44.2%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 6.3 indicates that 198(56.4%) respondents acknowledged that MNA candidates' associating with religious groups and their religious activities enhances dyadic networks with electorates, 308(87.7%) respondents cited collaboration and working closely with ethnic political patron, 287(81.8%) emphasized on working with Community Associations, and 182(51.9%) respondents acknowledged on associating with professionals and their respective Unions. In addition, 263(74.9%) respondents noted that the nature of political

party/coalition enhances political dyadic network with the voters, 203(57.8%) acknowledged the role of the media while 196(55.8%) respondents cited the centrality of close collaboration with business associations/groups.

Uasin Gishu County comprises of six Sub-Counties; Soy, Turbo, Moiben, Ainabkoi, Kapseret and Kesses each represented by an elected Member of National Assembly as per Article 97 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Like presidential and gubernatorial elections, this study established that MNA candidates could enhance political dyadic network with voters by associating with religious groups, their activities and practices as cited by 198(56.4%) respondents. Key Informants and discussants noted that while there was a tendency towards religious homogeneity (Christianity) at the Sub County level, MNA candidates adopted the use of clientelistic goods such as monetary donation in order to enlist and maintain religious groups in their political clientele network. MNA aspirants also adopted strategies such as financial support of religious projects and attending and participating in religious meetings to strengthen dyadic bond with religious faithful.

Political dyadic networking could also be enhanced in MNA elections by candidates closely collaborating with ethnic political patron as cited by 308(87.7%) respondents. Ethnic patron as noted in the presidential and gubernatorial elections enjoys massive ethnic political support and largely serves as a kingmaker in elective politics. Key Informants interviewed noted that election of MNAs in 2013 and 2017 general elections was mostly dependent on aspirants' level of loyalty and support to the ethnic patron. A Key Informant quipped that;

*...any MNA candidate must first declare his/her loyalty and support to our ethnic patron. You cannot be an enemy to our ethnic patron and brand yourself as an angel to the voters. It will never work... (Pa 5, FGD 3)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was that in all MNA elections held in 2013 and 2017 in the six sub-counties under study, the main criteria by voters was loyalty to the regional Kalenjin ethnic kingpin. The Kalenjin dominance in terms of registered voters in these cosmopolitan Sub-Counties had been overriding and thus leading to elections of all MNAs perceived to be loyal to the ethnic patron. This finding demonstrated the centrality of ethnic loyalty and collaborating with ethnic patron as a means through which MNA candidates can enlist voters in their political dyadic network in elections.

As opined by Gherghina (2014), membership into community associations is premised on shared objectives and interest of members such as undertaking business investment, environmental activities, members' social welfare and farming activities. As cited by 287(81.8%) respondents, MNA candidates associated and worked closely with community associations such as youth groups, women groups, sporting associations and groups for PLWDs to enlist them in their political dyadic network and consequently broadening their electoral support base. Provided for under Article 24 and 25 of the National Government-Constituency Development Fund Act of 2015, funds appropriated by the national government as NG-CDF avails financial resources which elected MNAs can use to support activities and projects of these groups as a means of sustaining political dyad with them. Discussants in FGD noted that;

*...as a youth group of Kapseret Sub County, we are beneficiaries of CDF support in our agro-business enterprise and poultry projects, and which have really improved our income. As a youth group we are greatly indebted to him [Oscar Sudi] and will always give him our votes if he is interested with the parliamentary seat... (Pa 2, FGD 3)*

Apparent from the discussant response was that while incumbent MNAs could use NG-CDF to expand their political dyadic network by enlisting more community associations, it was also established that new contestants used other strategies such as

personal financial donations to these groups, construction of business stalls, and facilitation of registration of new groups to enlist them in their dyad. On the basis of reciprocity, members of these community associations often rally support of their friends and family members to vote for such candidates during the election.

Article 95 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya provides that MNAs shall represent the people of their constituencies and special interests, as well as deliberate on and resolve issues of concern to the people through legislation making and oversight of state organs (GoK,2010). As a means of establishing a political dyadic network, 182(51.9%) respondents cited that MNA candidates could also collaborate with professionals and their respective trade unions through interest articulation in the national assembly. Key Informants interviewed noted that while members of professional association and unions constituted a significant target in MNAs clientele network in the 2013 and 2017 elections, their numbers at the Sub County level was significantly small compared to the County and National level, and with their issues being addressed by the national government and with teachers, doctors and nurses being the major target.

Election of MNAs from the 290 Sub-Counties is provided for under Article 97 and 101 of the Constitution of Kenya and shall be elected from a registered political party or as Independent Candidate (GoK, 2010). In this study, 263(74.9%) respondents cited that the nature of political party or coalition constituted a significant factor in enhancing political dyadic bond between MNA candidates and the electorates during elections just like in the presidential and gubernatorial elections. Key Informants interviewed acknowledged that the party or coalition supported by ethnic patron often enjoys unwavering support from community members since such a party or coalition is perceived to embody ethnic interests. MNA aspirants rigorously compete during

nomination and even seek direct party ticket from the ethnic patron since winning the party ticket during party nominations is an assurance of winning in the general election. Similar to gubernatorial elections, it was established that loyalty to ethnic patron's political party or coalition by MNA candidates was key in enhancing dyadic network with the electorates from the political party nominations to the general elections. A Key Informant noted that;

*...this County was a URP zone in 2013 owing to William Ruto being the URP party leader. In solidarity with him as the community ethnic patron, electorates elected all MNAs from the URP party in all the six Sub-Counties. This was repeated in 2017 election under Jubilee party, except in Soy and Ainabkoi sub-counties where independent candidates were elected ... (KI, No. 25)*

Key Informant response demonstrated that MNA candidates' loyalty to the political party lead by ethnic patron was an important strategy of enhancing a dyadic network with the voters. Further probing with Key Informants corroborated with IEBC (2013) data revealed that while affiliate parties of CORD, Eagle alliance and Amani National Coalition fronted candidates in 2013 MNA elections, the parliamentary seats in all the six Sub-Counties were won by URP candidates. Similarly, the 2017 MNA election in all the six sub-counties followed the same pattern as the 2013 elections where despite KANU, PNU and NASA affiliate parties such as ODM, ANC, MCCP rallying candidates for the parliamentary seats, Jubilee party successfully contested and won in four Sub-Counties (Soy, Moiben, Kapseret and Kesses) while Independent candidates secured electoral victory in Turbo and Ainabkio Sub-Counties. This finding indicated that the nature of the party or coalition is a significant determinant in enhancing political dyadic network between MNA candidates and the voters in general elections.

As noted by 203(57.8%) respondents, the media as a means of enhancing dyadic network with voters in MNA election was significantly important though not as



effective as in the gubernatorial or presidential elections. Similar to gubernatorial elections, Key Informants and discussants cited that local vernacular media outlets were frequently used by MNA candidates as means of enlisting the dominant Kalenjin voters into their political dyad. Key Informants further noted that the use of either Kiswahili or English radio and Television stations was common among incumbent MNA candidates airing out their development achievements compared to new aspirants in parliamentary politics. The use of social media outlets also played a crucial role in recruitment and mobilization of voters to broaden political support base. The media thus play a significant role in MNA dyadic network with the voters in general elections.

While KNBS (2019) observed that 35 percent of the entire population across the six sub-counties live in the urban area and with 65 percent being rural dwellers, this study noted that *Boda Boda* transport business, retail businesses and agro-business, and large scale commercial farming (maize and wheat) were common among rural dwellers while *Jua Kali* artisanship, *Matatu* and *Boda Boda* transport services, food and cloth vending, open market activities, retail and wholesale businesses were done in urban areas. As acknowledged by 196(55.8%) respondents, MNA candidates constantly sought to work and associate with these business groups as a means of enhancing political dyadic network with voters. Discussants in FGD acknowledged that the ultimate objective of business groups/associations revolved around having a business environment that will promote growth and profit maximization. A discussant noted that;

*...elected MNAs are expected to help in creating business opportunities for youth and women, and also support them financially in terms of capital sourcing and finding market for produced products such as maize, wheat, horticulture and milk...*  
(KI, No. 14)

Evident from the response was the need to have programmatic approaches to create and sustain business opportunities and which largely constituted the jurisdictional mandate of the County and National executive, even as the MNAs makes requisite legislation. Owing to the limited powers of MNAs compared to presidential and gubernatorial position, Key Informants noted the widespread use of clientelistic goods as a means of creating and sustaining political dyadic networks with the voters.

In summary, MNA political candidates can establish dyadic network with voters by first making open declaration of loyalty and support to ethnic patron's political party in order to get the support of the constituents. MNA candidates can also have business and community associations, the media, and religious groups as part of their political dyads. The establishment and sustenance of every political dyad with the different actors was premised on clientelistic exchange relations where monetary contribution to community and business associations, lobbying for employment opportunities, pork barreling, award of bursaries, as well as supply of private goods such as monetary incentives and branded apparels were key trade-offs in exchange for electoral support and loyalty.

#### **6.6 Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County**

The respondents were asked to give their responses on the influence of listed activities and actors in enhancing political dyadic network in the election of MCA, and the findings were as indicated in Table 6.4.

**Table 6.4: Activities and Actors in Enhancing Political Dyadic Networks in the Election of Member of County Assembly in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Activities and Actors in Political Dyadic Networks</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Associating with religious groups and their activities.	7(2.0%)	175(49.9%)	181(51.9%)	169(48.1%)
<b>ii)</b> Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron	196(55.8%)	102(29.1%)	298(84.9%)	53(15.1%)
<b>iii)</b> Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups, PLWDs etc	98(27.9%)	109(31.1%)	207(59%)	144(41.0%)
<b>iv)</b> Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc	2(0.6%)	41(11.7%)	43(12.3%)	308(87.7%)
<b>vi)</b> The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties	72(20.5%)	187(53.3%)	259(73.8%)	92(26.2%)
<b>vii)</b> Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc	3(0.9%)	129(36.7%)	132(37.6%)	219(62.4%)
<b>viii)</b> Working and associating with business associations/ Groups	9(2.6%)	151(43%)	160(45.6%)	191(54.4%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 6.4 indicate that 181(51.9%) of the respondents stated that associating with religious groups and their activities was key in enhancing dyadic networks in MCA election, 298(84.9%) noted the need for MCA candidates to collaborate and work closely with ethnic political patron, 207(59%) respondents acknowledged on the need for MCA aspirants to work with Community Associations, while 43(12.3%) cited MCA candidates' need to associate with professionals and their respective unions as a means of enhancing dyadic network in elections. Furthermore,

259(73.8%) respondents acknowledged that the nature of political party/coalition was important in establishing dyadic network with the voters, 132(37.6%) respondents noted on the role of the media, while 160(45.6%) acknowledged that working and associating with business associations/groups help in enhancing dyadic network between MCA candidates and the voters.

As earlier demonstrated in this study, the Wards under study had respondents who subscribed to Christian faith (Catholics-31.9% and Protestants-52.1%), Islam as 12%, Hindu 1.2% and those of other faiths constituted 1.2% of all the respondents. This study established that dyadic networks in MCA elections could also be established and enhanced by candidates' associating with the different religious faiths, religious activities and practices as cited by 181(51.9%) respondents. Like other elective positions under study, Key Informants and discussants interviewed noted that the significant use of clientelistic goods in creating and sustaining a political dyad between MCA candidates and members of different faiths.

Ethnic political patrons as observed in the preceding elective positions enjoys massive ethnic political support at the grass-root level and often serves as the embodiment of ethnic interests and a kingmaker in elective politics. Working or collaborating with ethnic political patron in MCA election is also central in establishing a dyadic network between MCA aspirants and voters as cited by 298(84.9%) respondents. In the 2013 MCA elections, discussants and Key Informants noted that in 11 out of the 12 Wards under study, MCA candidates supporting William Ruto and URP party were all elected while Huruma Ward dominated by the Kikuyu community elected an MCA from the TNA party associated with Uhuru Kenyatta as the *defacto* Kikuyu ethnic leader. A Key Informant noted;

*...only MCA candidates supporting our community leader were elected and who were drawn from the URP party. Wards away from Eldoret town and dominated by the Kalenjin elected MCAs from their community while the Kikuyu community in the cosmopolitan urban Wards like Huruma elected MCA from their community ...*  
(KI, No. 6)

Evident from the response was that while MCA candidates campaigned for their election, they equally had to openly declare loyalty and support for their ethnic patrons who were largely leaders of political parties for instance William Ruto (URP party leader), and Uhuru Kenya (TNA party leader). Further probing with Key Informants also noted that other communities such as the Luo and Luhya also supported their ethnic patrons who were party leaders of CORD alliance affiliate parties such as ODM, ANC and Wiper party. However, the Kalenjin and Kikuyu ethnic bloc voting characterized by their numerical strength compared to other resident communities guaranteed success even as they voted for Kalenjin MCAs in the rural Wards while supporting MCAs from the Kikuyu community in urban Wards such as Huruma and Langas. Similarly, loyalty to ethnic patrons was also witnessed in the 2017 MCA elections as candidates leveraged on it to establish political dyads with their ethnic constituents to earn support and loyalty.

The legislative power and oversight authority of MCAs is provided for under Article 177 and 185 of the Constitution of Kenya and relates to the devolved functions of the County governments (GoK, 2010). The legislative powers to address concerns of different community associations such as youth groups, women groups and people living with disabilities provides an opportunity that can be leveraged on by MCA candidates to enhance a political dyadic network with voters as acknowledged by 207(59%) respondents. The capacity to enact County legislations beneficial to these community organizations and oversee implementation of development programs

through County Assembly Committees can be leveraged on by MCAs to expand their clientele network and broaden their political support base. Other strategies cited by Key Informants aimed at enhancing dyadic network included personal financial donations to community associations, construction of business stalls, facilitation of youth and women groups business training, as well as facilitation of registration of new groups. Based on social exchange relations, community associations would be enlisted in a candidate's political dyad.

Unlike the MNA that represent their constituent at the national level and provide oversight to the national executive, MCA have extremely limited jurisdictional powers confined only to the County devolved functions. Working closely with professionals and their respective trade unions as a means of enhancing dyadic networks was insignificant in establishing a political dyad with voters as cited by 43(12.3%) respondents. The limited jurisdictional powers of MCAs on unions' welfare activities at the County level limits aspiring candidates and incumbents from leveraging on it to establish political dyadic networks with government employees during elections.

Article 193(1c) of the Constitution of Kenya provides for election of MCAs and that such individuals can be a nominee of a political party or an Independent candidate supported by over 500 registered voters from his/her Ward (GoK, 2010). Like gubernatorial and MNA elections, the nature of political party or coalition constituted a significant factor in establishing a political dyadic network in MCA elections as acknowledged by 259(73.8%) respondents. Key Informant noted that;

*...the party and ethnic patron factor always have a trickle-down effect where, ethnic communities vote for MCA from the party supported by their ethnic patron. In 2013 and 2017, the County was largely in support of UhuRuto partnership and ended up electing*

*either Kalenjin or Kikuyu MCAs and from URP or TNA... (KI, No. 8)*

Key Informant response demonstrated that the party or coalition supported by ethnic patrons often enjoys unwavering support from community members at the Ward level and thus the need for any MCA aspirant to align their aspirations to the party. Election of MCAs at the Ward level in the 2013 and 2017 general election was largely shaped by party and ethnic coalitions at the national level. It was found out for instance that in 2013 MCAs election, all the Wards under study were won by Jubilee Alliance affiliate parties; 11 Wards by URP party candidates and one Ward by TNA party candidate. Similarly, all the Wards under study were also won by Jubilee Party candidates in the 2017 general election where 10 Wards were won by Jubilee party candidates from the Kalenjin community and 2 Wards won by candidates from the Kikuyu community. Further probing noted that while candidates from other parties such as ODM, Wiper, ANC, and FORD-Kenya contested in the election, only those candidates drawn from either URP or TNA in 2013 or Jubilee party in 2017 won the election. It is thus evident that the nature of political party or coalition is a significant factor in enhancing dyadic network in MCA election.

Establishment of political dyadic network using the media in MCA elections was insignificant as cited by over 60 percent of the respondents. As noted by Key Informants, Wards in the study area are generally small in geographical sizes unlike other electoral units and thus allowing MCA aspirants to easily transverse and physically reach out to the voters as opposed to using mainstream media outlets. A Key Informant argued;

*...our electoral Wards are generally smaller and thus allow aspiring MCA candidates to easily move around and personally interact with the voters because they are people known to the locals unlike in other electoral position. It is not necessary to use television or radio*

*to target people of a small locality when you can meet them face to face... (KI, No. 7)*

Unlike in MNA, gubernatorial or presidential election in which the media such as radio and television are effective means of networking with the voters, face to face interaction such as through door-to-door meeting with the voters was noted to be the most effective means of enhancing political dyadic network in MCAs election. Discussants in FGD however, noted that there were the use social media platforms such as *WhatsApp*, *Facebook* accounts and *Twitter* by MCA candidates to recruit and mobilize mostly the youth voters to turn out to vote and to debate on the strategies of broadening political support base.

While this study affirmed existence of business associations and groups, only 160(45.6%) respondents acknowledged that MCA candidates can enhance dyadic network by working closely with these businesses' entities. Unlike the MNAs and the gubernatorial candidates who based on reciprocity would pledge to address the needs of these business entities owing to funds domiciled to their positions if elected, MCAs entirely relies on the County executive initiatives targeting these business entities since it is a devolved function. A discussant in FGD noted quipped that;

*MCAs position is purely legislative and unlike MNAs and governor, they do not have funds allocated to them to appropriate in addressing the needs of the business community. However, they can lobby the county executive or use their own personal initiatives to enhance support to these business groups... (Pa 4, FGD 4)*

Despite the limited jurisdictional power and resources associated with MCA position, discussant response indicated that MCA candidates would use clientelistic approaches to recruit business groups into their dyadic network. This would involve construction of business stalls, monetary donation to table banking groups, donation of branded apparels, and roadside monetary award to hawkers. In summary, political dyadic networks in MCA election involves close collaboration between MCA candidates and



ethnic patron, business and community associations as well as religious groups. Clientelistic trade-offs helps to establish and sustain the political dyad between the MCA aspirants and the voters drawn from all these social groups.

In summary, this chapter presented on the dyadic networks that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The study revealed entrenched vertical political dyads in the different elective positions (presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA) which included political candidate' vertical dyads with ethnic political patrons, business associations, community groups, religious groups and directly with the voters with each dyad being established and sustained by clientelistic goods and services. Political dyadic networks created a web of loyal voters from the different socio-economic cleavages depending on a candidate's propensity to appropriate clientele goods and services. The findings affirm the premises of the social exchange theory adopted in the study that individuals are able to assess and maximize on the gains in any social relations, and the sustainability of the relations is based on mutual and continued reciprocal trade-offs. It was also found out that as trade-offs diminishes, the strength of a political dyad and the level political loyalty also weakens.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **IMPLICATION OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the findings of the fourth research objective on the implication of patron-client relations on democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. As opined by UNESCAP (2016), good governance is a panacea for socio-economic and political development and entails practices such as citizen participation, equity, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency in public service provision. In Kenya, this is provided for under Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya as well as other domestic legislations (GoK, 2010).

#### **7.2 Patron-Client Relationship and Democratic Governance in Uasin Gishu County**

This research study sought to interrogate the influence of patron-client relation on democratic governance with specific focus on attributes such as citizens/public participation, accountability, and transparency in use of public funds, responsiveness and efficiency in service provision, equitability in public service delivery, and the rule of law and administration of justice. The first aspect assessed was citizen/public participation in decision making and the findings were as presented in section 7.2.1.

##### **7.2.1 Patron-Client Relation and Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

Public participation is a significant feature of democratic governance and allows citizens to freely express their will in relation to decision making pertaining to developmental issues in their locality (Aspinal and Berenshot, 2018). In Kenya, this is guaranteed for under Article 69, 118, 196, 201 of the Constitution, as well as *County*

*Public Participation Guideline (2015)* emphasizing the centrality of public participation on political, environmental, financial, and legislative matters in both the national and County governance. Regarding citizens involvement in decision making on County and national development issues, this study established that 133(37.9%) respondents agreed that there was adequate involvement while 218(62.1%) respondents disagreed. It was further established that only 74(21.1%) respondents had participated in either County or national government development forums with 277(78.9%) having never participated.

Discussants in FGD cited that they were not obligated to participate since elected leaders had the prerogative to make favourable decisions on their behalf based on reciprocity of patron-client relation. Additionally, they also cited inadequate access to information regarding invitation for public forums for the purpose of giving their views. Key Informant interviewed acknowledged that due to the social exchange relations with elected leaders, they hardly wanted to scrutinize every activity for instance in terms of priority development projects, budgeting process or legislative process to avoid mistrust with their political patron. Key Informant stated;


*Most of the voters rarely want to involve themselves in scrutiny activities since they know it will affect the clientele relationship with their patrons and that such patrons will always act in their best interest... (KI, No. 11)*

Response from the Key Informants indicated that non-involvement in public participation in different county and national development decision making processes was attributable to the clientelistic arrangement between the elected leaders and the voters. Other respondents however, attributed their public participation to their constitutional duty despite clientelistic exchange agreements and practices with their political patrons. Further probing indicated that the major avenues of participation

included community forums, county hall meetings, public *barazas* and *Bunge Mashinani* and with prior communication being done through county public notice boards, County website and through Sub County and Ward Administrators. Key Informant noted that;

*As a county government, we have avenues such as community forums, Bunge Mashinani, public Baraza, Town hall meetings and we also allow written submissions or petitions from the public on development and legislative activities. We communicate on such substantive issues through our county government website, county notice boards and through Sub County and Ward administrators...*  
(KI, No. 4)

On the other hand, public forums/*Barazas* on national development issues were communicated to the public through National Government Administrative Officers (NGAOs) under the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government. The study sought to assess the frequency of public forums organized to allow citizens to participate in decision making and the findings were as indicated in Figure 7.1.



**Figure 7.1: Frequency of Public Forum for Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

Source: Field Survey (2021)

From the findings, 228(64.9%) respondents cited that there was no defined time for holding public forums for public participation, 17(4.8%) respondents stated that such forums were being held monthly, 36(10.3%) responded being done every 3 months, 27(7.7%) cited every six months while 43(12.3%) noted that public forums were held annually.

According to Aspinall (2016), public participation as an attribute of good democratic governance demands regular involvement of citizen in every government decision making process. However, it was apparent from the finding as indicated in Figure 7.1 that over 60 percent of the respondents noted that while there were avenues to participate, there was no defined time for public participation. The lack of a defined time for public participation implies a reactionary approach to developmental issues as opposed to a programmatic approach. Consequently, this increases chances of government making developmental policies or legislations that are not only unconstitutional based on the error of procedure of formulation and implementation, but also unresponsive in addressing priority needs of the citizens.

The study also sought to examine how patron-client relations have negatively influenced public participation in relation to the listed activities at the County level and the findings were as indicated in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1: Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Public Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Public Participation</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
i) Development project plans	67(19.1%)	186(53%)	253(72.1%)	98(27.9%)
ii) The quality of government service delivery	34(9.7%)	169(48.1%)	203(57.8%)	148(42.2%)
iii) Government legislation/ policy making process	15(4.3%)	203(57.8%)	218(62.1%)	133(37.9%)
iv) Security issues/matters	8(2.3%)	84(23.9%)	92(26.1%)	259(73.8%)
v) Appropriation/use of public funds/management	78(22.2%)	161(45.9%)	239(68.1%)	112(31.9%)
vi) The choice of candidates in election	112(31.9%)	190(54.1%)	302(86.0%)	49(14.0%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The findings in Table 7.1 indicates that 253(72.1%) respondents agreed that patron-client relations negatively affected decision making on development plans, 203(57.8%) acknowledged that it influenced the quality-of-service delivery, and 218(62.1%) cited that it affected government legislation and policy making process. In addition, 92(26.1%) respondents cited that it influenced security matters, 239(68.1%) responded that it negatively affected public participation on management of public funds while 302(86.0%) cited that it influenced the choice of candidates in general election.

The promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) entrenched a citizen-centered decision-making process on developmental issues both at the County and at National level of government (GoK, 2010). However, this study revealed that priority

development projects have been affected by patron client relation as cited by over 70 percent of the respondents. A discussant in FGD noted that;

*...our elected leaders based on exchange relations with voters usually promise to initiate development projects as a reward. Citizens are thus made to believe that it's the leaders who know everything to be done and should not be reminded for such amount to lack of trust... (Pa 5, FGD 1)*

The response from the discussant demonstrated that pork barreling and other clientelistic exchanges had affected public participation as envisaged in the Constitution of Kenya. The study revealed that citizens expected that even without public participation to identify priority needs in the different electoral units, development projects would still be established by elected leaders based on pork barreling.

Article 174 of the Constitution of Kenya, the County Government Act (2012) and Intergovernmental Relation Act (2012) empowers the citizens to petition both levels of government as a form of public participation on matters of services expected of them by the Constitution (GoK, 2010). As noted in this study, patron-client relation has constrained citizens' capacity to demand quality services from the government. A Key Informant noted that;

*...elected leaders usually guarantee employment opportunities to key campaign strategists and close cronies for instance in the County or CDF offices. It thus become difficult to complain on the quality of services since the elected leaders need them in the next election and thus cannot be reprimanded over poor service delivery in their dockets... (KI, No. 11)*

The appointment of close political cronies, campaigners, strategist or family members to serve in offices such as at the NG-CDF office or County offices based of patron-client arrangement was affecting the quality of service delivery. Key Informant noted that it was difficult to apprehend office holders who had failed in their mandate due to the key role they play in patrons' political life. As argued by Robbins and Coulter

(2007), efficiency in public service delivery can only be achieved through meritocracy, accountability to authority, strict adherence to operational rules and regulation, and which this study established to have been lacking in the County due to patronage-based employment and appointment.

The legislative powers of the National Assembly and County Assembly are provided for under Article 95 and 185 of the Constitution of Kenya and with Article 119, 174, 196 giving citizens the powers to participate in shaping legislations or policy making process (GoK, 2010). While public participation is deeply entrenched in the Constitution, this study established that patron-client practices had negatively affected citizen's participation in legislation and policy making processes. A discussant noted that;

*...some elected MNAs have never spoken in the National Assembly despite their constituents having numerous development problems. Similarly, Ward representative rarely engage the citizens on county legislative process and whenever they do, their input is never reflected in the final policy or legislation and example is the Uasin Gishu County Market and Trade Bill 2021 among others... (Pa 1, FGD 6)*

Discussant' response in FGDs revealed that clientelistic exchanges between the elected political leaders and the voters prior and after election weakened voters' capacity to hold such leaders accountable for their failure to engage them on legislative and policy making processes.

As a national government mandate, Article 238, 242, 243 of the Constitution of Kenya grant powers to the National Intelligence Service and the National Police Service over internal security affairs and operate under the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (GoK, 2010). As cited only by 92(26.1%) respondents, patron-client relation had insignificant influence on public participation on internal security matters. Key Informant noted that;



*As security sector, we have a strong chain of command and remain non-partisan on political matters of the state. Whenever we have security issues to address, our local administrators and field officers uses public barazas to engage the public and directly deal with such security threat ... (KI, No. 18)*

Key Informant response indicated that a strong bureaucratic structure, completely separate from political involvement, delinks the national security agencies from the patron-client practices that compromises on public participation on security matters. As cited by Key Informant, the National Government Administrative Officers and police officers working under the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government enjoys permanence of tenure, employment of officers based on merit, strong chain of command, and devoid of politics unlike the elective positions which according to this study are secured based on patron-client arrangement with the voters. Consequently, public involvement on security related issues is largely objective for instance by public administrators such as the County Commissioner, Assistant County Commissioners, Chiefs and Sub-Chiefs as opposed to patron-client arrangements that characterized elective political positions.

Patron-client relations also negatively influenced public participation on matters of appropriation of public funds as cited by 239(68.1%) respondents. Article 35, 201, 221 of the Constitution of Kenya together with the County Government Act (2012), Public Finance Management Act (2012) and NG-CDF (2015) outlines the way the members of the public must be engaged in relation to appropriation of public funds. Key Informants noted that members of the public were rarely involved in identifying priority projects for funding, developing budget estimates, project implementation process and in the use of allocated funds both in County initiated projects as well as those established by the national government under NG-CDF. Key Informant noted that;

*During campaign period, political candidates often pledge to use funds to initiate development projects such as roads, water, and electricity if elected. Electorates having been beneficiaries of clientelistic practices such as monetary donations do not feel obliged to scrutinize use of funds as long as the promised development projects are established sometimes based on pork barreling... (KI, No. 4)*

Evident from Key Informant response was that the anticipation of development projects based on pork barrel approach, and electorates being beneficiaries of other clientelistic practices such as vote buying and monetary donation weakened citizens' capacity to subject political leaders under financial scrutiny on use of public funds under their docket.

Article 38 of the Constitution of Kenya grant political rights to every citizen registered as a voter to elect a political candidate of any political party based on their free will choice to an elective office (GoK, 2010). Electoral participation therefore accords members of the public the freedom to elect desired leader(s) for public office, to legitimize the government's authority and institutions, and a means to hold elected officials accountable to the public. However, this study as cited by 302(86.0%) respondents established that patron-client relations had negatively affected citizens' participation in relation to the choice of candidates in elections. A discussant in FGD noted;

*...electoral victory of any political candidate depends on their capacity to appropriate clientele goods to the citizen both before and after elections. Citizens rarely elect leaders based on their programmatic agenda but based on what they are given during campaigns or promises to be give after election and thus compromising on the voters' free will choice of candidate... (Pa 3, FGD 1)*

A Key Informant also opined;


*... you cannot run for any political seat without having good money to incentivize the electorates. In fact, you can have good manifesto but if you don't give them anything during campaign, you will obviously lose in the election... (KI, No. 3)*

Evident from the discussant and Key Informant responses was that while the choice of candidate is constitutionally premised on voters' free will choice, it was noted that patron-client relation had negatively affected electoral participation. It was established that citizens' capacity to turn out and vote for candidates in elective positions was largely motivated by patron-client practices contrary to Article 38(2) of the Constitution of Kenya. From the foregoing discussions, it is apparent that patron-client practices has weakened public participation in relation to legislative and policy making process, development project plans, provision of quality public services, appropriation of public funds as well as in the choice of candidates during election.

### **7.2.2 Patron-Client Relation and Transparency and Accountability in Uasin Gishu County**

Transparency and accountability imply openness in the conduct of government business, and the capacity for public officials to be held responsible for every action or inaction in relation to their jurisdictional mandate (Aspinall, et al. 2017). In Kenya, Article 10, 225, 226, 232 and 244 of the Constitution, the Public Finance and Management Act of 2012 and Public Officers Ethics Act of 2009 provides for transparency and accountability from any government office and public officers (GoK, 2010; GoK, 2012). These legal provisions emphasize on transparency in government decisions, activities, access to information, public participation, and that every public officer must be answerable in the stewardship of public funds, compliance to set procedures of operation and in the performance of their jurisdictional mandate. This section examines the respondents' view on access to the financial audit reports, sources of financial audit reports and lastly, the influence of patron-client relation on transparency and accountability.

In Kenya, Section 35 of the Public Audit Act (2015) and Article 229(4) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that an annual audit regarding previous financial year expenditure must be done by the office of the Auditor General within 6 months of every new financial year on all government entities. The audit reports should then be submitted to Parliament or the relevant County assembly, County or national government, or any other entity that legislation requires the Auditor-General to audit (GoK, 2015). Within seven days of receiving the report, the concerned entity audited is then required to publicize the report on their official website and other public spaces for public consumption. Additionally, the Auditor-General shall publicize the report on its official website and other public spaces within fourteen days after submitting the report to the concerned government entity to which the report was made. When this study sought to find out respondents' view on access to financial audit report, the findings were as indicated in Figure 7.2




**Figure 7.2 Respondents Feedback on Access to Financial Audit Reports in Uasin Gishu County**

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Figure 7.2 indicates that 134(38.2%) respondents agreed that they had accessed financial audit reports while 217(61.8%) respondents had not. The substantive issues audited often include use of funds under the accounts of the national and county governments, the accounts of all funds and authorities of the national and county governments, and the accounts of the National and the County assemblies, and with appropriate action being taken in cases of misappropriation of funds. Based on the finding of this study, it can be deduced that most of the citizens were unable to know how funds for instance under NG-CDF and the County government are appropriated. A discussant in FGD posited that;

*...while our leaders such as the governor and Member of Parliament have funds under their domain, we have never seen any audit report on how such funds were used. There is no transparency on how these funds are used because very few people get to see the reports indicating all the monies appropriated in relation to projects... (Pa 3, FGD 6)*

It is apparent from the discussant response that most of the citizens rarely got access to financial audit reports and thus could not scrutinize financial expenditure in relation to funds received from the national Treasury. Discussants cited that inability to access report was attributed to lack of internet access to most rural constituents, ignorance on where to get such reports, illiteracy, and citizens' laxity to scrutinize spending by their elected patrons to avoid mistrust. From the respondents who had accessed financial audit reports, the researcher sought to determine how they were able to get the audit reports and the findings were as indicated in Figure 7.3.



**Figure 7.3 Respondents' Sources of Audit Report in Uasin Gishu County**

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

The study showed that from the respondents who agreed being in access to financial audit reports, 37(27.6%) cited that they got the information through the media, 12(9%) obtained it through the County and Sub County public forums while 24(17.9%) respondents noted that they obtained it through the County website. Additionally, 49(36.5%) respondents acknowledged that they accessed financial audit information through the Auditor General website, and 12(9%) respondents obtained it through the Sub County and County Information Office.

As noted by World Bank (2017), easy access to financial audit reports by the citizens is a prerequisite towards enhancing transparency as well as holding office holders accountable in the use of public funds. Assessment of the different sources of audit reports shows that most citizens especially in the rural areas were unable to access financial audit reports due to poor or complete lack of internet connectivity, as well as

ignorance on the website domains having such information. While the media such as the radio, television and newspapers superficially informed the public on financial audit issues, Key Informants and discussants cited that much attention was given to political discourses and citizens are rarely given prior access to the financial reports being discussed for any constructive scrutiny and criticism.

While County and Sub County public forums would provide an avenue for most citizens to be informed on the financial audit reports, there was always small turn-out during such forums, lack of defined time to have such forums, as well as limited information being released whenever such public forums were held as audit reports would be treated as confidential and meant for office files only. Other sources of financial audit reports cited to have been accessed by the respondents included the Kenya's parliament website and Transparency International-Kenya website.

The study also sought to examine the extent at which patron-client relation had influenced transparency and accountability in the County and the findings were as presented in Table 7.2

**Table 7.2: Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Transparency and Accountability**

<b>Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Transparency and Accountability</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Adherence to rules and regulation e.g. public procurement	18(5.1%)	143(40.7%)	161(45.8%)	190(54.2%)
<b>ii)</b> Involvement of the public in selection of priority development project	99(28.2%)	139(39.6%)	238(67.8%)	113(32.2%)
<b>iii)</b> Access to information on use of public funds	77(21.9%)	174(49.6%)	251(71.5%)	100(28.5%)
<b>iv)</b> Stakeholders involvement in budgeting and expenditure process	63(17.9%)	154(43.9%)	217(61.8%)	134(38.2%)
<b>v)</b> Prosecution of any accused in relation to public finance mismanagement	13(3.7%)	149(42.5%)	162(46.2%)	189(53.8%)
<b>vi)</b> Employment of public officers	53(15.1%)	171(48.7%)	224(63.8%)	127(36.2%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 7.2 indicates that 161(45.8%) respondents acknowledged that patron-client relation had influenced adherence to rules and regulations such as on public procurement, 238(67.8%) cited that it had influenced involvement of the public in selection of priority projects while 251(71.5%) respondents cited that it had influenced public access to information on use of public funds. Furthermore, the study also established that 217(61.8%) respondents cited that it influenced stakeholders' involvement in budgeting and expenditure process, 162(46.2%) acknowledged that it influenced prosecution of the accused in relation to public finance mismanagement, and 224(63.8%) respondents noted that patron-client relations influenced employment of County public officers.



The jurisdictional mandate of the County government is provided for by the constitution and Acts of Parliament such as the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, 2016. The Public Procurement Act of 2016 for instance is meant to streamline the public procurement processes in the public service, to secure a judicious, economic, and efficient use of public resources and to ensure that procurement and disposal of public assets are conducted in a fair, transparent and accountable manner (GoK, 2016). While majority of the respondents (over 50 percent) noted that patron-client relation had least affected adherence to rules and regulation for instance regarding public procurement, Key Informants interviewed noted that there were instances of skewed award of tenders and contract to preferred groups as patronage. A Key Informant noted;

*...county tendering for supply of goods and services is done every financial year with tenders being open to any bidde, while others target PLWD, youth, special groups and women but often based on 'As and when required' basis. However, some senior County officials have proxy companies and there are cases of award of tenders to companies owned by close cronies as kick back due to financial support during election campaigns... (KI, No. 4)*

While the tendering process gave equal opportunities to different companies including those registered by youth, PLWDs, special groups and women, it was established that the award of such tenders based on 'As and When required basis' created loopholes where senior County officials could award tenders to their proxy owned companies or to close kin, and friends. In addition, Key Informant further noted instances where certain registered business companies owned by youth and women were allegedly awarded tenders due to their political loyalty to the governor as well as MNAs as a post-election kickback and with the hope of future political reciprocity contrary to Public Officers Ethics Act (2009) and the Public Procurement and Disposal Act (2016).

Citizens' participation in identification of priority projects constitute the 'soul' of the Kenyan constitution as provided for under Article 174, and other legislations such as County Government Act (2012) and Uasin Gishu County Equitable Development Act of 2019 (GoK, 2010). While these legal provisions are geared towards enhancing equitable, fair and people-oriented development projects, this study however noted that patron-client relations had significantly influenced the involvement of the public in selection of priority development project as cited by 238(67.8%) respondents. A discussant in FGD lamented;

*...we thought by having devolution, it will be possible for the local constituents to decide on the list of priority projects, but this has not been the case. While county officials sometimes visit to have public forums on development projects, their suggestions are rarely incorporated in the final county priority projects and most residents currently ignores any calls for such public meetings whenever invited... (Pa 2, FGD 1)*

A Key Informant also noted;

*...existing legislations grant powers to the governor to appoint members of the County Executive Committee who are crucial in county planning and in the development of County Integrated Development Plan. Owing to patronage appointment as CECs, decisions on development projects often takes political angle as priority is given to areas in support of the appointing authority as opposed to priority needs on the ground... (KI, No. 17)*

Contrary to Section 115, 116 and 117 of the County Government Act (2012) and Section 7 of Uasin Gishu County Equitable Development Act (2019) which stipulate the manner in which the public are to be engaged in identification and delivery of priority projects, discussants and Key Informants interviewed lamented on the failure by the County Planning Committee to integrate the input of the public, and instead resorting to pork barreling in allocation of development projects. Discussants in FGD noted that the pattern of established County development projects approved by the County Assembly usually reflect reward of loyalty to regions that overwhelmingly supported the Governor elect.

The right to access to information including from public entities is provided for under Article 35 of Kenya's Constitution and Section 96 of the County Government Act (2012). The County Government Act (2012) for instance outlines different County communication frameworks such as county website, community radio, Television, public forums and ICT centers in relation to access to county information. However, as cited by 251(71.5%) respondents, access to information on appropriation of public funds such as audit reports was affected by patron-client relations. Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*...financial reports are rarely found in the county website or during public forums. When you try to obtain this information including from the Information office, you are told that they are classified documents and therefore members of the public remains in the dark regarding details on appropriation of funds... (KI, No. 28)*

While financial audit reports on appropriation of NG-CDF funds by Sub-counties and on use of county funds are annually produced by the office of the Auditor General, responses from discussants and Key Informants indicated that such documents were not easily accessible to members of the public. Further probing with discussants established that some citizens did not have interest to scrutinize spending by their elected patrons due to believe that such leaders had to recover the money spent during the campaign period of which they were beneficiaries through vote buying and monetary donations. It can thus be deduced that clientelistic practices during the electioneering period consequently weakens vertical accountability of leaders in the use of public funds once elected.

Article 220, 221 and 222 of the Constitution of Kenya together with the Public Finance Management Act (2012) spells out the legal framework of stakeholders' engagement in budgeting and expenditure process (GoK, 2010). This study however established that patron-client relations had influenced stakeholders' involvement in

budgeting and expenditure process as cited by 217(61.8%) respondents in the study. A

Key Informant argued that;

*...As interested parties representing members of the public under the umbrella of Bunge la Wenye Nchi, we petitioned the County Assembly of Uasin Gishu over failure to adhere to public participation and to adhere to the entire process at the formulation stage of the budget estimates as required by section of 128 of the Public Finance Management Act 2012. Members of the public and especially people living with disability, youth and women were never made aware of the budget proposals or whether the budget tabled at the assembly on May 5, 2015, had any target program for these group due to a ineffective consultation process... (KI, No. 23)*

Apparent from the response was the failure by the Budget Preparation Committee to engage stakeholders such as PLWDs, youth, and who according to this study were the frequent targets in the political dyadic network. Further probing with Key Informant revealed that having been beneficiaries of clientelistic practices such as vote buying and monetary donation during election campaigns, these groups were overlooked in the budgeting process with the assumption that on the basis of reciprocity, they would rely on the decision made by County leaders. This finding revealed that while elected leaders may believe that voters in their clientele network doesn't need to actively participate in budgeting and expenditure process, voters are aware of their democratic right to be involved and can petition for their involvement especially if the anticipated clientele exchange benefits cannot be guaranteed by the elected leaders.

As provided for under the Public Finance Management Act (2012), the Public Officers Ethics Act, (2003) and Article 75 of the Constitution of Kenya, every public officers must diligently and professionally perform assigned duties and with dire consequences of breach of code of conduct. The implication of such legal provisions is that there must be utmost responsibility, transparency and accountability on public officers for every action or inaction in their jurisdictional mandate. This study

established that over 50 percent of the respondents noted that patron-client relations had not influenced prosecution of any accused person in relation to public finance mismanagement at the County level. Key Informant interviewed noted that;

*...if there are audit queries on use of funds, the county finance officer takes responsibility similar to accounting officers in the use of NG-CDF. There are independent agencies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and Directorate of Criminal Investigation that can independently investigate and prosecute over such cases... (KI, No. 4)*

The existence of independent agencies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) weakened the influence of patron-client relation in holding accused officers accountable in the use of public funds. The non-political partisanship of these agencies allowed objective investigation and prosecution of state officers accused of financial mismanagement under their dockets.

The Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya outlines the devolved functions of County governments, and Article 235 of the Constitution and the County Government Act (2012) grants jurisdictional power to the Counties on staffing to enhance capacity in service delivery (GoK, 2010). Vacant positions are filled either based on appointment by the Governor with the approval of the County Assembly, or by the County Public Service Board (CPSB) through a competitive recruitment process. This study however, established that patron-client relations had significantly influenced employment of county public officers as cited by 224(63.8%) respondents. A discussant in FGD lamented that;

*....there have been advertisements since 2013 but most people given the jobs were from the Kalenjin community. I was asked by a county official why I didn't apply for the same job in Kisumu County which is my ancestral home. Elected leaders lobby for their ethnic constituents and appear to be reinforced by the County Public Service Board dominated by members of the Kalenjin community... (Pa 5, FGD 1)*

A Key Informant also opined;

*...devolution was meant to help the local communities in service delivery and jobs. No County can give out jobs to non-indigenous communities when they have their own people who are qualified. Every community has their home county where they can apply for any vacant job ... (KI, No. 17)*

Apparent from discussant and Key Informant responses was the patronage appointments based on ethnicity and which constituted a significant determinant of electoral participation in the study area. Further probing indicated that most beneficiaries of patronage appointment included Ward administrators, Sub County administrators, County Executive Committee members and the members of County Public Service Board most of whom were alleged to have been the financiers, chief campaigners or strategists of governor-elect during electioneering period. Consequently, these appointees served as agents of perpetuating the governor-elect agenda of pork barreling, recruitment and promotion, and also serves as the “eyes and ears” of their patron in relation to political activities in the County.

Based on the foregoing discussions, it can thus be deduced that patron-client relation has affected transparency and accountability as a tenet of democratic governance. It has weakened the capacity to involve the public in selection of priority projects, public access to information on the use of public funds, stakeholders’ engagement in budgeting and expenditure process, as well as in employment of county public officers.

### **7.2.3 Patron-Client Relation and Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Public Service Delivery in Uasin Gishu County**

Article 176(1) of the Constitution of Kenya provides for the establishment of a County governments anchored on the premise that the decentralized structure of government will enhance responsive and efficient public service delivery (GoK,

2010). In the provision of devolved services outlined under the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya, Section 117(3) of the County Government Act (2012) emphasizes the need for regular review of service delivery with an objective of making improvements and ensuring efficient and timely delivery of public services. The study sought to interrogate respondents' view regarding responsiveness and effectiveness of Uasin Gishu County in provision of the listed county services and the findings were as indicated in Table 7.3.

**Table 7.3: Respondents' View on Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Provision of County Services in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Respondents' View on Provision of County Services</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Cleanliness of the towns/streets & waste disposal	98(27.9%)	119(33.9%)	217(61.8%)	134(38.2%)
<b>ii)</b> Provision of accessible and safe drinking water	22(6.3%)	125(35.6%)	147(41.9%)	204(58.1%)
<b>iii)</b> Provision of basic primary healthcare services	53(15.1%)	161(45.9%)	214(61%)	137(39.0%)
<b>iv)</b> Construction and maintenance of county roads	41(11.7%)	152(43.3%)	193(55%)	158(45.0%)
<b>v)</b> Traffic management and street lighting	11(3.1%)	144(41.0%)	155(44.1%)	196(55.9%)
<b>vi)</b> Environmental conservation & management	43(12.2%)	147(41.9%)	190(54.1%)	161(45.9%)
<b>vii)</b> Construction and maintenance of sewerage lines	8(2.3%)	136(38.7%)	144(41%)	207(59.0%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

As depicted in Table 7.3, a total of 217(61.8%) respondents acknowledged that Uasin Gishu County Government was responsive and efficient in the cleaning of towns/streets and waste disposal, 147(41.9%) cited responsiveness and efficiency in

provision of accessible and safe drinking water, and 214(61%) responded that there was responsiveness and efficiency in provision of basic primary healthcare services. The study further established that 193(55%) respondents cited that there was responsiveness and efficiency in the construction and maintenance of County roads, 155(44.1%) cited responsiveness in traffic management and street lighting, 190(54.1%) acknowledged efficiency and responsiveness in environmental conservation and management, while 144(41%) respondents noted that there was efficiency and responsiveness in the construction and maintenance of sewerage lines.

As a devolved function, every County government has the jurisdictional mandate over matters of cleanliness and disposal of solid waste (GoK, 2010). This study established that there was responsiveness and efficiency in the cleaning of towns/streets and in waste disposal within Uasin Gishu County as cited by 217(61.8%) respondents. Key Informant interviewed attributed it to additional acquisition of several side loaders, skip loader lorries, over 100 three-bin systems, and skip containers as well as over 6 acres of land for temporary transfer of cabbage and 20 acres of land to serve as dumpsite by the County Government of Uasin Gishu. The Key Informant opined that;

*...as a County government, we have been able to purchase additional equipment on solid waste management and town cleaning such as 3 side loaders, 3 skip loader lorries, over 100 three-bin systems, 110 skip containers, over 6 acres of land for temporal storage and transfer of waste, and a 20 acre piece of land as dumpsite. This has enabled us to effectively clean, collect, transport and dispose wastes across towns in the County... (KI, No. 17)*

Despite the success in urban cleanliness and solid waste disposal, discussants in FGDs however noted that there was inadequate landfill and a lack of recycling plant which still required the attention of the County government to address. This had been exuberated by the poor and inadequately constructed and maintained sewerage lines that often allow overflow of wastes during rainy season in Eldoret town Central



Business District and in neighbouring estates such as Huruma, Langas, Mwanzo, Kipkorgot, Kurunga and Munyaka, and consequently posing a major sanitation challenge.

As noted by up to 60 percent of respondents, there was inefficiency and unresponsiveness in provision of adequate, accessible, and safe drinking water across the six Sub-counties. Discussants in FGD noted that the major sources of water to most rural households in the County included rivers, boreholes, shallow wells, springs and dams. Despite existence of these water sources, discussants cast doubt on the human safety given the frequent surface run-offs from agro-chemical dependent farming in the County especially during rainy seasons. While a Key Informant noted that accessibility of water in urban areas of the County ranged from 0-500 Metres, cases of water rationing were common and with Eldoret town and its environs alone having access only to 43,000 M<sup>3</sup> of water per day against a demand of 62,000 M<sup>3</sup> of water. A Key Informant noted;

*People in rural areas mostly rely on rain water, rivers, dams, wells and springs. Our urban areas and their environs in the county are connected with treated piped water although we still need to increase water connectivity. Our current daily requirement in Eldoret town alone is 60,000 cubic Metres of water but only able to supply up to 43,000 cubic Metres... (KI, No. 17)*

Further probing with discussants in FGD cited deliberate instances where supply of water to estates such as Pioneer and Langas in the 2017 gubernatorial elections was allegedly disconnected citing failure by most communities in these estates to support the incumbent governor. Nevertheless, the study established that the inadequate and poor access to clean and safe drinking water was also attributable to inadequate financial allocation.

The study established that there was responsiveness and efficiency in provision of basic primary healthcare services in all the six Sub-counties under study as noted by 61 percent of the respondents. Respondents acknowledged the establishment and upgrade of Sub County hospitals such as Ziwa, Kesses, Moiben, Kapteldon, Turbo and Burnt Forest into level 4 hospitals and serving residents with different health services. It was further established from Key Informant that there were over 30 new health facilities and over 127 refurbished health centres across the different Wards in the county providing basic healthcare services. Key Informant noted;

*The County has 6 level 4 hospitals, over 30 new healthcare facilities and over 130 refurbished facilities serving the county residents. There are also over 15 County ambulances to strengthen emergence responses and referrals. Notably has been the increasing size of healthcare providers such as the nurses, community health workers, doctors who continue to provide services. Delayed capitation from the treasury has however been a challenge in enhancing continuous supply of drugs as well as increasing the human resource capacity to provide health services... (KI, No. 17)*

Evident from the Key Informant response was the existence of ambulance services aimed at enhancing responsiveness to emergencies and referrals for specialized treatment. While responsiveness and efficiency in healthcare provision had been witnessed, Key Informant however cited some facilities having inadequate drugs and few medical personnel and which was attributed to delayed disbursement of funds by the national treasury and thus affecting procurement of drugs and hiring of more medical staff.

The study also established that the County government was responsive and efficient in the construction and maintenance of County roads as cited by 55 percent of the respondents. A Key Informant noted that despite much of the county funds between 2012-2017 financial years being used to set up County structures and recruitment of staff and with low uptake in development expenditure, the County government was

able to tarmac 16 kilometers of new road, 4,680 kilometers of road was graded, 1,127 kilometers of roads was graveled, and a total of 4,600 metres of culverts were installed across the Six sub-counties. Additionally, over 60 road construction equipment and machinery had been purchased to enhance road maintenance and construction and included several Motor Graders, Tipper Lorries, Rollers, Concrete Mixers, high Mast Flood Lights, Bulldozers, Excavators, Backhoe Loaders, Water Bowsers, Canters, and Wheel Loaders. Key Informant noted:

*During the first term of the incumbent governor alone, 16 kilometers of road was tarmacked, 4,680km graded 1,127km gravelled and 4,600 metres of culverts installed. In collaboration with development partners, the government constructed 32km of non-motorized transport foot paths and procured roads equipment and machinery including 12 Motor Graders, 9 Tipper Lorries, 6 Rollers, 6 Concrete Mixers, 6 high Mast Flood Lights, 4 Bulldozers, 3 Excavators, 3 Backhoe Loaders, 3 Water Bowsers, 2 Canters, and 1 Wheel Loader. By end of 2022, we will have tarmacked additional 83 km, graded 8,100 km, graveled 2,600 km and installed 5,300 metres of culverts. This will open up rural areas, help farmers in transporting farm produce and business operators across the county... (KI, No. 4)*

The discussants in FGD cited examples of the roads that had been constructed, graveled and/or graded such as Lamaiywet-Matunda road (in Kapkures Ward), Ngelo and Marura SDA road (in Kuinet Ward), Chepsaita-Mlimani road (in Ngenyilel Ward), Kingongo-Kamanda street (in Huruma Ward), Karo-Tugen Estate road (in Sergoit Ward), Kambi Nairobi road (Kimumu Ward), and Kapsoya estate feeder roads (in Kapsoya Ward). Additionally, roads cited to have been upgraded to bitumen level included Bandaptai-Barngetuny-Kitmatt-Family care road (in Kimumu Ward) and Langas - Kona Mbaya – Kahuroko - Kisumu Ndogo Road (in Langas Ward). It was however noted that heavy rains, inadequately maintained roads, blocked or inaccessible road corridors as well as encroachment of road reserves remained a challenge in road infrastructure sustainability in the county.

It was also established that the County Government of Uasin Gishu had also been responsive and effective in relation to environmental conservation and management as cited by 54 percent of the respondents. Respondents and discussants in FGD cited that there were initiatives geared towards environmental conservation and management such as bamboo promotion in high altitude areas such as in Kaptagat Ward, school greening program targeting public primary and secondary schools, as well as promotion of agro-forestry programs among farmers for instance in Kaptagat, Soy and Burnt Forest areas. A Key Informant further noted;

*The County government has developed partnership with the Kenya Forest Service and the community in afforestation efforts in Kaptagat forest to increase forest cover. Additionally, the County government has also worked with NEMA towards eradication of illicit plastic bags... (KI, No. 17)*

Apparent from the Key Informant response was the deliberate effort by the County government to establish partnership networks with the Kenya Forest Service and the community towards afforestation, as well as partnership with National Environmental and Management Authority (NEMA) in curbing possession and use of plastic bags. As cited by Key Informants, successful 'greening' program aimed at enhancing aesthetic value of the County headquarters (Eldoret town) included rehabilitation of Nairobi road-round about, Kisumu Road round-about, Fims round-about, Oginga Odinga round-about, Nandi Park, Nandi road, Iten road, and Kenyatta street round-about among others.

As noted by over 55 percent of the respondents, responsiveness and efficiency in traffic management and street lighting in the County remained a developmental challenge that needed to be addressed. Respondents cited that while rural areas were devoid of traffic congestion, Eldoret town constantly experienced unprecedented road traffic jam attributed to inadequate road inlets and outlets and lack of functional

traffic signal and management system. Additionally, the Kenya-Uganda road passes through the centre of Eldoret Central Business District and characterized by heavy trucks and trailer transporting goods to the East Africa Community members and passing through the town causing heavy traffic congestion. Key Informant added that the situation had been made worse by the narrow gauge of the road network in and around town and the human encroachment of road reserve by private developers to construct residential houses and business stalls especially along the highway. Key Informant noted;

*Our rural areas are free from traffic congestion but we have had a perennial problem in our county headquarter because all heavy trailers transporting goods to our EAC members through the heart of Eldoret town. The narrow road into and out of town has contributed to traffic jams and this has been worsen by lack of space for expansion as the road reserve has been grabbed by private developers to set up residential and business buildings... (KI, No. 4)*

Further probing with the Key Informant however noted that there were several efforts underway aimed at decongesting Eldoret town which included construction of several inlets and outlets roads such as Nairobi road as well as Cheplaskei-Kapseret-Maili Tisa by-passes road in conjunction with the national government.

Unlike poor traffic management especially in the urban areas in the County, discussants in FGD noted that there was a significant improvement in terms of street lighting and in the establishment of floodlights in residential estates, markets, and bus parks and stages and thus boosting security for instance in Kamukunji, Munyaka, Langas, Huruma, Annex, Hill School, Maili Nne, Hawaii, West Indies and Kambi Nairobi informal settlement in the outskirts of Eldoret town. Other urban areas cited by respondents to have had street lighting and consequently enhancing security and business growth included; Outspan, Chebarus, SachFour and Kipsamo Trading Centres (in Kesses Sub County), Illula, Kipkorgot and Naiberi trading centres (in

Ainabkoi Sub County), Langas Kona Mbaya and Kisumu Ndogo (in Kapseret Sub County), Munyaka centre and Jerusalem in Moiben Sub County among many other centers.

The study also assessed the responsiveness and effectiveness of the national government in provision of the listed national services and the findings were as indicated in Table 7.4. The provision of these national services had constituted major political campaign promises amongst the presidential aspirants and especially the Jubilee Alliance/Party that won in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections.

**Table 7.4: Respondents' View on Responsiveness and Effectiveness in Provision of National Services in Uasin Gishu County**

<b>Respondents' View on Provision of National Services</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>i)</b> Connection to electricity grid/ Access to electricity	97(27.6%)	141(40.2%)	238(67.8%)	113(32.2%)
<b>ii)</b> Construction and maintenance of roads and Highway	32(9.1%)	165(47.0%)	197(56.1%)	154(43.9%)
<b>iii)</b> Provision of accessible and affordable housing	3(0.9%)	39(11.1%)	42(12%)	309(88.0%)
<b>iv)</b> Creation of employment/job opportunities	12(3.4%)	51(14.5%)	63(17.9%)	288(82.1%)
<b>v)</b> Provision of agricultural subsidies e.g fertilizer, seeds	23(6.6%)	61(17.4%)	84(24%)	267(76.0%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 7.4 indicates that 238(67.8%) respondents acknowledged that there was responsiveness and effectiveness by the national

government in connection to national electricity grid, 197(56.1%) respondents cited responsiveness in construction and maintenance of roads and highway while 42(12%) cited responsiveness and effectiveness in provision of accessible and affordable housing. Additionally, 63(17.9%) respondents also acknowledged responsiveness and effectiveness in creation of employment opportunities while 84(24%) respondents cited responsiveness and efficiency in provision of agricultural subsidies.

The Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya grants jurisdictional powers to the national government on matters of national public works, housing, energy, agriculture as well as on national economic planning (GoK, 2010). This study established that the national government had been responsive in enhancing access to electricity in the study area as acknowledged by 238(67.8%) respondents. A Key Informant noted that the Last Mile Connectivity Programme initiated by the national government through Kenya Power and Lighting Company (KPLC) in partnership with African Development Bank and World Bank had contributed to connection of electricity to almost every household which initially did not have any electricity access. He noted that;

*Since 2016, UhuRuto government has been connecting every household with electricity and even now connection is still ongoing. The program targets all the 47 counties and intended to connect every household with electricity before the year 2030... (KI, No. 3)*

Apparent from the Key Informant response was an ambitious flagship project by the national government towards enhancing universal access to electricity across the country by the year 2030 and which discussants and Key Informants ascertained to have been rolled out in all the Wards under study. Further probing with discussants noted that while some households had not been connected to electricity, they had been registered for connection and awaiting their Scheme to be initiated for connection.

Effectiveness and responsiveness in construction and maintenance of roads and highways by the national government was also cited by 197(56.1%) respondents. As argued by discussants in FGD, Jubilee Alliance and Party in 2013 and 2017 respectively campaigned on platform of infrastructural development as a precursor for national development. Discussants and Key Informants cited roads upgraded from murrum to bitumen level such as Kapsoya-Illula-Iten road, Eldoret-Moiben road, Cheptiret – Kesses-Lessos Road, and Naiberi-Iten junction Road. A Key Informant opined that;

*As an agricultural county, the national government has made efforts to improve road infrastructure in order to open up new agricultural productive areas and to enable farmers to access market for their products... (KI, No. 2)*

Evident from the responses was that the established roads had significantly opened new agricultural areas and enabled farmers to easily transport their farm produce to market. Further probing of Key Informants also cited highway expansion and maintenance, as well as by-pass construction in the County geared towards decongesting traffic in Eldoret town such as rehabilitation of 73 Km Timboroa-Eldoret road, 31.2 Km Maili Tisa - Ngeria road and Cheplaskei-Kapseret-Maili Tisa by-pass road.

Despite the County being the grain basket of Kenya producing million metric tonnes of maize and wheat among other agricultural produce annually, the study established that the national government had been unresponsive and ineffective in providing agricultural subsidies such as fertilizers and certified seeds to farmers as acknowledged by 267(76%) respondents. While the need to enhance food security constituted the main campaign agenda in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, it was noted that the national government had abdicated its responsibility in providing farmers with incentives geared towards increasing production as well as in regulating



pricing of produce. Consequently, respondents argued that residents had opted for high income and new promotional crops such as macadamia, avocado, coffee, passion fruits and tree tomatoes as opposed to maize and wheat for instance in Ainabkoi, Turbo and Kapseret Sub-counties. Similarly, over 80 percent of the respondents cited that the national government had been unresponsive in providing accessible and affordable housing despite being a Jubilee Party campaign promise in the 2013 and 2017 presidential election.

Creation of over one million job opportunities annually was a campaign promise by Jubilee Alliance and Party in the 2013 and 2017 presidential election, however, over 82 percent of the respondents cited that this had never been achieved. While some respondents cited that rural electrification through the Last Mile Connectivity project had opened up opportunities such as setting up of welding workshops, carpentry shops, and barber and saloon shops especially in rural areas, majority of the respondents noted that the national government had failed to create formal employment opportunities to thousands of graduates in the County. A discussant lamented;

*We have thousands of graduates from universities and colleges who remain jobless despite Jubilee government making a pledge of one million jobs annually. The situation has been aggravated by the outbreak of COVID-19 that has seen thousands of employed people retrenched. Again, one must be connected to senior people in government to be guaranteed of a job especially in the national public service.... (Pa 4, FGD 3)*

Evident from discussant response was that unemployment had been aggravated by the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic which had seen thousands of employed people retrenched and with few employment opportunities being based on patronage as opposed to meritocracy.

### 7.2.4 Patron-Client Relation and Equity in Provision of County Public Services in Uasin Gishu County

The Constitution of Kenya as well as the County Government Act (2012) explicitly emphasizes the centrality of equity in delivery of County public services (GoK, 2010; GoK, 2012). For instance, Section 34(h) of the County Government Act (2012) grants jurisdictional powers to the County Executive Committee to ensure equitable sharing of resources throughout the County. This study interrogated the influence of patron-client relations on equity in provision of County public services and the findings were as presented in Table 7.5

**Table 7.5: Influence of Patron-Client Relation on Equity in Provision of County Public Services**

<b>Respondents' View on Equity in Provision of County Services</b>	<b>Much Influence (A)</b>	<b>Some Influence (B)</b>	<b>Sub-Totals for (A+B)</b>	<b>No Influence (C)</b>
<b>Listed County Services</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
<b>a)</b> Development projects e.g. roads, health centers etc	38(10.8%)	169(48.1%)	207(58.9%)	144(41.1%)
<b>b)</b> Employment opportunities at the county	93(26.5%)	142(40.5%)	235(67%)	116(33.0%)
<b>c)</b> Award of county contracts and tenders	23(6.6%)	157(44.7%)	180(51.3%)	171(48.7%)
<b>d)</b> Award of bursaries and scholarships to students	39(11.1%)	179(51.0%)	218(62.1%)	133(37.9%)
<b>e)</b> Water connection, sewerage services, health services etc	31(8.8%)	161(45.9%)	192(54.7%)	159(45.3%)

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings as indicated in Table 7.5 shows that 207(58.9%) respondents acknowledged that patron-client relation influenced equitability in the distribution of

County development projects, 235(67%) cited that it influenced equitability in access to employment opportunities, while 180(51.3%) respondents responded that it influenced award of tenders and contracts. Additionally, the study established that patron-client relation had influenced equity in the award of bursaries and scholarships as cited by 218(62.1%) respondents while 192(54.7%) respondents noted that it influenced equity in relation water connection and sewerage services.

As a jurisdictional mandate under Section 34(h) of the County Government Act (2012), the County Executive Committee members have the executive authority towards ensuring equity in the establishment of County development projects. The study however noted that patron-client relations had influenced equitability in the establishment of development projects as cited by 207(58.9%) respondents. While some projects were programmatic in nature, discussants noted that their establishment was based on pork-barreling to areas that demonstrated political loyalty to the incumbent governor during elections. A discussant noted that;

*The incumbent governor after 2017 election has focused on completion of projects such as roads, health centres and water connection in his perceived stronghold while overlooking at areas that supported his opponent BUZEKI such as Burnt Forest region, Langas, Huruma. While attributing it to inadequate funds, it's sad that projects in other parts of the county are going on... (Pa 6, FGD 5)*

Evident from the discussant response was the alleged incumbent executive sidelining either establishment or completion of projects in areas perceived as opponent support base such as in Huruma, Langas and Burnt Forest predominantly occupied by non-Kalenjin communities. Conversely, vote loyalty was rewarded in incumbent governors' support base through completion of development projects such as water connections, road construction and street lighting. The establishment of water

connection and sewerage services was also cited to have adopted the same pork barreling approach as cited by over 54 percent of the respondents.

The establishment of Counties under the Constitution of Kenya (2010) and the resultant County government structures for service delivery created employment opportunities to the residents. This study established that patron-client relations had significantly affected equity in access to employment opportunities in the County as cited by 235(67%) respondents. While several County staff were directly absorbed from the defunct Eldoret Municipal Council to the new County government structure, the study noted that a significant number of new County employees were employed based on patronage for instance as ward administrators, Sub County administrators, members of County Public Service Board and the County Executive Committee members. A Key Informant quipped;

*After election of the incumbent governor in 2013, he rewarded members of his campaign as CECs, Ward and Sub County administrators as well as to the County Public Service. The County Public service Board has since then served the interest of the governor in employing members of his ethnic community while overlooking non-Kalenjin residents... (KI, No. 17)*

Evident from the response is the alleged patronage appointment to senior county jobs along ethnic lines, as well as the use of the County Public Service Board to favorably consider members of the Kalenjin in other County employment opportunities. This finding affirms NCIC (2016) report on Ethnic and Diversity Audit of the County Public Service indicating disproportionate representation of the Kalenjin (at 94.4%) despite the County being multi-ethnic, and in contravention of Section 65 of the County Government Act of 2012.

In a bid to provide services such as primary healthcare, rural roads construction and maintenance, environmental conservations among others, the County government

must award tenders and contracts to business entities or consultancy agencies in line with Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2016. Equity in the award of tenders and contracts to provide these services was however found to have been influenced by patron-client relations as cited by 180(51.3%) respondents. Key Informant argued that business and youth groups that had made financial contribution for campaigns would favorably be rewarded with County contracts and tenders as patronage. A Key Informant noted that;

*The gubernatorial campaign requires huge finances which can be sourced from friendly business and professional groups in exchange of contracts and tenders. Similarly, Youth groups engaged in campaigns can also be given some tenders and contracts or financial returns as trade-offs... (KI, No.4)*

The clientele exchange relations involving favourable award of contracts and tenders to business associates, professionals and youth groups for vote loyalty not only violate the Public Finance Management Act of 2012, but also creates a cartel of agents in County public procurement based on vote-loyalty and financial support to the governor elect as a precondition for awards of tenders. Similarly, award of bursaries and scholarships was also cited to be based patron-client relations where the incumbent governor perceived political support base would allegedly receive favourable support compared to opponents' perceived strongholds.

### **7.2.5 Patron-Client Relation and Administration of Justice and the Rule of Law in Uasin Gishu County**

Article 159 of the Constitution of Kenya grants jurisdictional powers to the Courts on matters of administration of justice and protection of human rights and freedom (GoK, 2010). The study sought to assess the implication of patron-client relations on the administration of justice as a component of democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County and the findings were as indicated in Table 7.6.

**Table 7.6: Patron-Client Relation and Administration of Justice**

Influence of Patron-Client Relations on Administration of Justice at the County level	Responses			
	YES		NO	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
a) The deliberation of court cases are always delayed	39	11.1	312	88.9
b) Outcome of court cases are influenced by ethnic affiliation of the accused and judicial officials	53	15.1	298	84.9
c) There is professionalism in deliberating court cases in the county	294	83.8	57	16.2
d) The outcome of cases are based on corruption	77	21.9	274	78.1
e) There is fairness in administration of justice in the county	267	76.1	84	24
f) One must be politically connected to win in a court case in the county	63	17.9	288	82.1

**Source:** Field Survey (2021)

Analysis of findings in Table 7.6 indicates that 39(11.1%) respondents cited that because of patron client relations, deliberation of court cases was always delayed, 53(15.1%) noted that the outcome of court cases was influenced by ethnic affiliation of the accused and judicial officials, and 294(83.8%) responded that there was professionalism in deliberating court cases in the County. Additionally, 77(21.9%) respondents cited that the outcome of cases was based on corruption, 267(76.1%) noted that there was fairness in administration of justice, while 63(17.9%) respondents cited that a person must be politically connected to win in a court case in the County.

The establishment and the jurisdictional mandate of the Courts under the Constitution of Kenya are distinct and independent from other arms of government and mainly address matters of administration of justice (GoK, 2010). In relation to administration of justice, the study established that only 11 percent of the respondents held that a delay in deliberation of court cases was attributable to patron-client relation, with 89 percent of respondents cited that it did not. A Key Informant argued that;

*...deliberation of cases is a function of effective investigation as well as adequate staffing of judicial officers especially judges to the Courts. This has not been the case in the County and the whole country at large since there are several cases already launched in court, and the Office of DPP has never submitted their investigation reports, and with few judges to deliberate on those cases... (KI, No. 19)*

Response from the Key Informants indicated that occasional delays in deliberation of cases was because of few judicial officers against the numerous cases in court, as well as delays in conducting investigations by the office of Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) as opposed to political patron-client relation. Similarly, over 84 percent of the respondents noted that the outcome of Court cases in the County was never influenced by ethnic affiliation of the accused and judicial officials but purely based on the merit of the cases. While patron-client relation formed the basis of the social exchange relation in the elective positions under study, over 83 percent of the respondents as well as the Key Informants cited the existence of professionalism in deliberating court cases. It was however cited by discussants as well as 77(21.9%) respondents that there were incidences of corruption especially by the police department conducting investigation, where money would exchange hands between the accused and the investigating officers in an attempt to cover up the case.

The study further established that there was fairness in administration of justice in the County as cited by 267(76.1%) respondents. Unlike other services offered by the

County based on patronage, the Courts within Uasin Gishu County performed their constitutional mandate fairly and without any social exchange relations and practices. Similar to responses from discussants in FGD, over two-third of the respondents noted that a person didn't need to be politically connected in order to have their court cases addressed. While patron-client relation characterized provision of development projects and devolved County services in Uasin Gishu County, it was established that there was the independence of the Courts in administration of justice even as respondents cited existence of professionalism and fairness, and that litigants didn't need to be politically connected to win a case nor have any ethnic affiliation with the judicial officers.

In summary, this chapter presented the influence of patron-client relation on democratic governance in Uasin Gishu County. Due to patron-client practices, attributes of public participation such as identification and establishment of priority development projects, involvement in legislation and policy making process, and in development of budget estimates had been affected. Additionally, it had also weakened project implementation process, scrutiny on use of public funds as well as citizens' free will choice of candidates during elections. In relation to transparency and accountability, clientelistic exchanges had affected involvement of the public in selection of priority projects, affected public access to information on the use of public funds, influenced stakeholders' involvement in budgeting and expenditure process, as well as employment of county public officers. Patron-client practices had also affected equitability on development projects, equity in access to employment opportunities, award of tenders and contracts, award of bursaries and scholarships, water connection and sewerage services. The rule of law and administration of justice by the courts was however, found to have been less affected by patron-client relation.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents summary of findings of research objectives, conclusion, and suggested recommendations. The study assessed patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya and was guided by objectives such as to assess the clientelistic practices that determine electoral participation, to determine the roles of primordial and purposive corporate social bonds on electoral participation, to interrogate the dyadic networks influencing electoral participation, and to assess the implications of patron-client relation on democratic governance. The study focused on the 2013 and 2017 presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCA elections with a descriptive survey research design being adopted and a sample size of 384 respondents participating in the study. Primary data was collected through the use of questionnaires, interview schedules and focus group discussion and the collected data analyzed using convergent parallel mixed method for the purpose of presentation. A total of 351 out of 384 respondents fully participated in the study representing a response rate of 91.4 percent.

#### 8.2 Summary of Research Findings

The first research objective assessed the clientelistic practices that determine electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County. While the findings indicates that respondents were aware of their civic constitutional duty to vote in the 2013 and 2017 general elections, different clientelistic practices with varying severity dominated the different elective positions under study. The establishment of the national and county levels of governance provides a platform that could be leveraged on by presidential and

gubernatorial candidates to make appointment and provide employment opportunities as patronage. The severity on use of this clientelistic practice was however relatively lower in MNA and MCA elections since candidates largely relied on lobbying for their respective constituents at the national and county governments respectively.

Access to subsidized government goods and services such as fertilizers and seeds were also promised as clientelistic goods by presidential and gubernatorial candidates compared to MNA and MCA candidates. As a County that relied on agriculture, agricultural incentives also served as instrumental clientelistic strategies. Unlike elected MNAs and MCAs, incumbent gubernatorial candidate would allegedly use victimization of voters supporting his opponent through demolition of business stalls and disconnection of water supply, while rewarding ethnic loyalty through allocation of business stalls, road construction and rehabilitation, and connection of water supply.

The use of monetary incentive on voters as a clientelistic practice significantly shaped voters' choice of candidate in all elective positions under study. The study revealed that it's a prerequisite for any candidate to incentivize voters through monetary donation in order to reinforce voter turnout during election and for such voters to remain loyal and vote. Money was also needed during political campaigns to facilitate provision of branded apparels and pay campaign strategists and bloggers. These funds were sourced from aspirants' friends, candidates' savings, business associates, contribution from some religious groups and bank loans. While monetary incentives were given to voters during campaign rallies, in market places, estates and from house to house with other clientele goods, it was however noted that it was difficult to monitor voters' compliance due secret ballot at the polling stations.

Comparatively, award of tenders and contracts was cited as an insignificant clientelistic approach in all the elective positions under study. It was however noted that close Business associates, professionals, youth and women groups making support to campaigns and serving as grass root strategists and mobilizers could be rewarded with contracts and tenders either directly or through proxies as patronage especially in gubernatorial and MNA elections. In the exchange relation, tenders and contracts such as supply and delivery of general stationery, delivery of computer consumables and accessories, supply and delivery of office furniture, and construction and maintenance of feeder roads became clientelistic practices to seal political loyalty. The low uptake in the use of government tenders and contracts as a clientelistic practice in MNA and MCA election was attributed to their limited jurisdictional powers on matters of procurement, making it difficult to adopt it as a key strategy of enhancing patron-client relation during elections.

Pork barreling in the establishment of development projects was a prevalent clientelistic practice in presidential, gubernatorial and MNA election elections. Appropriation of national and county funds for development projects provided a cleavage that could be exploited by presidential, gubernatorial and MNA candidates to influence the voters' choice of candidates but insignificantly low in MCA election. While establishment of government development projects should be programmatic, the study noted that political candidates establish them to reward loyalty to regions that gave political support in gubernatorial and MNAs candidates while sidelining regions perceived as opponents' strongholds. The limited jurisdiction and the lack of funds under the domain of MCAs to initiate development projects limited the extent at which aspiring candidates could leverage on pork barreling as a clientelistic strategy.

Inter-ethnic political reciprocity as a clientelistic strategy was noted to influence presidential elections but insignificant in gubernatorial, MNA and MCA election. This was attributable to the fact that at the county level, there was a tendency towards Kalenjin dominance as registered voters over other ethnic communities. Consequently, future inter-ethnic political reciprocity as a clientele strategy could not be leveraged on in gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections compared to presidential elections. Increasing ethnic homogeneity at the county level politics limits the extent at which candidates can leverage on inter-ethnic political reciprocity as a clientelistic strategy to win in an election.

Other clientelistic practices associated with gubernatorial and MNA elections cited in the study included favourable provision of bursaries and scholarships, selective application of county legislations, donation of buses to schools and institutes, donation of branded furniture to schools, provision of free medical care and consultation to constituents, offsetting of outstanding medical bills in regions perceived as political strongholds, donation of heifers to the aged and PLWDs, donation of farm tools and equipment, as well as construction of business structures/housing for *Jua Kali* artisans and *Boda Boda* operators. It was established that the broader and the more varied the clientelistic goods and services appropriated by political candidates, the higher the likelihood of influencing voters' choice of candidate in the elective politics.

The second objective of the study examined the influence of primordial and purposive corporate social bonds on electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The purposive corporate social actors examined in relation to their roles in shaping voters' electoral participation included political party/coalition, media, religion, and formal

associations. It was established that political parties/coalitions influenced voters' choice of candidates in all the four elective positions: presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA. The coalitions/party activities that influenced voters' choice of the candidate included mobilization of voters to turn out and vote, working with local vernacular radio stations to encourage huge voter turnout, door to door canvassing, and use of random phone messages and phone calls as strategies aimed at voter mobilization to vote for a preferred candidate and party.

Political education and communication was also a significant party/coalition activity that influenced voters' choice of political candidates and involved the use of party websites, radio, Television, party bloggers, party banners and posters, as well as social media outlets to reach out to as many voters as possible. This was aimed at educating voters on their rights to vote, electoral related offences as well as the tenets of their respective party manifestos. The political parties/coalition advocacy for national cohesion as well as the programmatic development agenda in the party's manifesto also shaped voters' choice of candidates in all elective position under study. The study also established that political party's propensity to give monetary incentives to voters influenced electoral participation, and party candidates made their own deliberate choice to using monetary incentive to expand their clientele network. Lastly, political party ability to articulate ethnic interests was noted to be a single most influential factor that influenced electoral participation.

Regarding the media, the study established that the use of radio had a significant influence on voters' choice of candidates in all the four elective positions. While contestants vying for MCA found it more effective to use door to door meetings due to small electoral unit, MNAs, gubernatorial and presidential candidates whose electoral units are vast preferred to use radio to reach out to voters spread across the

County. The use of newspapers however, had less influence in the choice of political candidates across all the four elective positions: presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs. Newspapers were cited to be expensive to most people, inaccessible to people in the rural areas, illiteracy among majority of community members, and unreliability of information relayed through such media during the electioneering period.

Regarding the use of television, it was established that its influence on voters' choice of candidates for elective positions increased as election became national from the Ward level. Presidential candidates preferred television to other media platforms owing to its capacity to reach out to many voters within a short time while showing real time images to the audience. The gubernatorial and MNA candidates would use television especially to debate over development projects either already accomplished or those set as priority for implementation and thus providing a platform through which voters could assess potential candidates. The insignificant influence of television in the election of MCAs was attributed to the capacity by the candidates to easily reach out to voters through alternative means such as door to door visits. Use of Internet platforms such as *Face-book*, *Twitter* and *Instagram* in the four elective positions was insignificant in shaping voters' choice of candidates. The rural areas were still constrained by lack of internet connectivity, high cost of internet bundles among those using mobile phones as well as unsubstantiated information circulated through the internet during electioneering period.

The study established that religious denominations subscribed to by the respondents allowed their congregants to participate in the general election in line with the Constitution of Kenya. Other than providing spiritual guidance, members of the

clergy also undertook civic education on the importance of elections, provided support such as prayers to preferred candidates and parties, offered platform for political campaign during religious meeting, while their members campaigned or provided logistical support to preferred political candidates or party. Regarding religious leader(s) influence on voters' choice of political candidate in the various elective positions, it was established that the strength of influence decreased as elections became local; from presidential to the election of MCAs. The tendency towards religious homogeneity at the lower level of representation and especially in the rural areas reduced religious cleavages that could be leveraged on by candidates in election.

In order to appeal to the religious leaders of different faiths and their congregations for political support, candidates adopted strategies such as offering of monetary donation to religious groups, reciting scriptural texts/verses, and attending religious meetings. Because of social exchange relations, the political candidate supported were expected to reciprocate upon successful election by supporting religious activities such as purchase of plot or land for construction of offices or precinct, acquisition of musical instruments, connection of electricity and water to the precinct as well as monetary donation for any miscellaneous operations.

As purposive corporate actor, formal associations that respondents affiliated themselves with included business groups, professional associations, youth groups, women groups and sporting associations. The different formal associations fully allowed their respective members to participate in electoral activities in conformity with the Constitution of Kenya. Additionally, these formal associations would also provide political support such as campaigning for preferred party or candidate,

providing a platform through which candidates could campaign as well as logistical support. The study established that voters' choice of political candidates in the elective positions was shaped by their respective Associations and the strength of influence increased as elective positions became national from the Ward level.

Members of associations such as the Youth, women, professionals, and business groups cited that voting for presidential and gubernatorial candidates was influenced by their capacity to articulate their respective group interests such as support of projects, facilitation of capacity building training for members, extension services on ongoing projects, market survey for their products as well as monetary donation. The decreasing influence of Associations on voters' choice of MNAs and MCAs candidates was attributed to their limited capacity to dispense clientelistic goods or services since they mainly make legislations and provide oversight as opposed to direct allocation of substantive resources.

The study also examined the influence of primordial social bonds such as ethnicity, clannism and family ties, gender, race, social class, as well as voters' family and relatives in relation to 2013 and 2017 general elections in Uasin Gishu County. It was established that ethnic identity of candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections influenced voters' choice of candidate. Political parties still retained the traditional feature of ethnic support base and led by an ethnic patron. Ethnic communities shifted loyalty to the coalition that articulated their ethnic interests and thus voting for candidates from their ethnic community in the different elective positions. As a primordial social bond, ethnicity was heightened during election period and used as a tool for political mobilization by political candidates.



Family ties/history of candidates influenced voters' choice of candidates in presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA election. In presidential election, candidates whose family history and ties could be traced to the struggle for independence and democratization process in Kenya would leverage on it during their campaigns and thus shaping voters' choice in elections. Clannism and age-set of the candidates especially in gubernatorial, MNA and MCA election also shaped voters' choice of candidates, and with aspirants drawn from certain clans and age-set having a competitive advantage over their opponents. Similarly, the gender of candidates influenced voters' choice in all the elective positions and with decreasing rate of influence as election became local from the national level. It was established that the preference of a male to a female aspirant in election was attributable to negative cultural socialization and gender-constructed roles which exalted male patriarchy.

As a primordial social bond, racial identity of candidates was found to be insignificant in shaping voters' choice of candidates in all elective positions. It was established that the increasing tendency towards racial homogeneity reduced cleavage that can be leveraged on by any political aspirant in elective politics. This study also established that the social class of candidates significantly influenced voters' choice of candidate in the presidential, gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections. Respondents preferred candidates who were perceived as wealthy and generous owing to their propensity to appropriate clientelistic goods and services.

Voters' family and/or relatives was also found to influence the choice of presidential, gubernatorial and MNA candidates, but relatively less on election of MCAs. As agent of socialization, the family provided the first orientation to political discourses and thus becoming a precursor for future political debates in relation to national and

county politics. Incumbent candidates were assessed and evaluated based on their capacity to protect community interests such as land and other private properties, favourable distribution of development projects and employment opportunities. New candidates were also evaluated based on their ethnicity, family history, past work history, capacity to provide clientelistic goods and services, and their capacity to protect community interests.

The third research objective examined the dyadic networks that influence electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. The study established the centrality of dyadic networks towards winning an election by enabling candidates to strengthen their popularity at their respective political support base and a means of monitoring vote compliance and loyalty. Additionally, it also served as a means through which candidates' development agenda is relayed to the voters and an avenue through which clientelistic goods and services could be appropriated to voters. Political dyadic networks involved candidates maintaining close vertical linkages with religious organizations, associational groups such as business groups, youth and women groups, the media as well as individual voters.

The study established that a strong vertical dyadic bond could be enhanced through close candidates' association and partnership with religious groups and their respective religious activities and practices in all the elective positions. Key activities that strengthened candidates-religious group vertical dyad included giving monetary donations in support of religious projects, donation of a car(s) to members of the clergy, as well as regular visits and worshipping with the congregants. In return, religious leaders and adherents would give time to such candidates to campaign during their meetings, members would campaign for preferred political candidates, give special prayers and members would also provide logistical support such as on

voter mobilization at the grassroots and thus building a strong dyadic bond on the basis of mutual reciprocity.

Close collaboration and partnership with ethnic political patron enhanced candidates' dyadic networks with the voters in presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections. It was noted that the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections involved conglomerate of ethnic political patrons representing their respective ethnic communities under an ethnic based political party in order to meet the requirements of Article 138 of the Constitution of Kenya. Presidential electoral victory is a derivative of ethnic numerical strength marshaled through collaboration with respective ethnic patrons. In the gubernatorial, MNA and MCA elections, ethnic patron played a role of a king maker. It was established that any aspiring gubernatorial, MNA and MCA aspirant must first pledge unquestionable loyalty and support to the ethnic patron and support his political party in order to have the support of the voters. Ethnic patron in presidential election serves as a broker, while in county politics he serves as a kingmaker and an embodiment of ethnic interests.

Strong vertical dyadic network between political candidates and voters could also be enhanced through close association and collaboration with community associations such as youth and women groups, PLWDs and business association in presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections. Political candidates used clientelistic strategies such as monetary donations, promise of award of tenders and contracts, payment of group outstanding bank loans, and donation of farming tools and equipment in exchange for electoral support and loyalty. Similarly, close collaboration with professionals and their respective trade unions by candidates contributed in creating vertical dyadic bond in presidential, gubernatorial and MNA

elections, but not with MCAs candidates. Presidential and gubernatorial candidates strived to appeal to union members to vote for them with the promise to improve on their terms of service. MNAs leveraged on their legislative and oversight responsibility to articulate workers interest in exchange for political loyalty. The limited jurisdictional powers of MCAs on trade unions welfare limited aspiring candidates from leveraging on it to establish dyadic networks with trade unions.

The nature of the political party/coalition also played a significant role in creating a strong dyad in presidential, gubernatorial, MNAs and MCAs elections. In a bid to meet the requirements of Article 138 of the constitution of Kenya in presidential elections, pre-election coalition were formed from the largely 'ethnic based' political parties and thus creating a strong presidential candidate-voters dyad. While election of gubernatorial, MNA and MCA requires a simple majority vote, the nature of political party or coalition also constituted a significant determinant in establishing patron-client dyad. The party or coalition supported by respective ethnic patron enjoys unwavering support from community members as such a party or coalition is perceived to embody ethnic interests. Consequently, voters tend to rally behind any candidate contesting for an elective position using their ethnic patron's political party. The study established that ethnic patron determines the party or coalition that aggregates ethnic interests, and such a party consequently shapes voters choice of candidates in the various elective positions.

The media also played an important role in enhancing political dyadic networks in presidential, gubernatorial and MNAs elections but moderately low in MCA election. The study revealed the decreasing propensity to rely on the media in enhancing dyadic network with the voters as elections became localized from the national level. In order to reach out and mobilize voters to turn out and vote, presidential,

gubernatorial and MNA candidates used vernacular, Kiswahili and English radio and Television outlets. The use of vernacular radio was found to be the most effective in reaching out to a large segment of the population and provided opportunity for candidates' interaction with voters in local dialect on political issue. As electoral unit became smaller, reliance on the mainstream media to enhance dyadic networks significantly reduced as observed in the case of MCA election where face to face interaction enhanced dyadic bond with the voters.

Working and associating with business associations/groups during electioneering was also a key strategy of enhancing vertical dyadic network and support in presidential, gubernatorial and MNA election, but insignificant in MCA election. Political candidates adopted programmatic approaches such as promises to create more government jobs, provision of government revolving funds for business, provision of government tenders and contracts as well as clientelistic trade-offs such as giving monetary incentives, branded apparels, and construction of business sheds to *Jua Kali* artisans. Unlike the MNAs, gubernatorial and presidential candidates who on the basis of reciprocity would pledge to directly address the needs of these business entities owing to funds domiciled to their positions if elected, MCAs did not have funds directly allocated to them by law to run programmatic and clientelistic activities but rely on the County executive or personal initiatives to target these business groups.

The last research objective assessed the influence of patron-client relation on democratic governance and with specific parameters being citizens/public participation, accountability and transparency, responsiveness and efficiency in service provision, equitability as well as the rule of law and administration of justice in Uasin Gishu County. This study established that there was inadequate engagement of the public in decision making process occasioned by lack of defined time for

conducting public forums. This had contributed to the county government making developmental decisions based on county officials' perception as opposed to citizen-oriented decision. Patron-client practice such as pork-barreling had negatively affected public participation in identification of priority development projects since citizens expected that even without their involvement, projects would still be established on the basis of reciprocity for their political loyalty and support to elected leaders.

The study indicated that clientelistic exchange relation had constrained citizens' capacity to demand quality services from the county government. Patronage appointment of close political cronies, campaigners, strategist, and family members of political leaders to serve in county, Sub County and ward offices had affected efficiency in public service delivery. Additionally, patron-client relation and practices had affected public participation in legislation and policy making process. The blatant failure to engage the public on the substantive legislative/policy issues was attributed to clientelistic exchanges between the elected political leaders and the voters which weakened citizens' capacity to hold such leaders accountable.

Patron-client relation had also negatively affected public participation on matters of appropriation of public funds. Members of the public were rarely involved in identifying priority projects for funding, in development of budget estimates, project implementation process, and in the use of public funds both in County and national government-initiated projects. Pork barreling approach, vote buying, monetary donation, and skewed employment had weakened citizens' capacity to subject political leaders under scrutiny in relation use of public funds. While electoral participation also gave voters the freedom to elect their desired leader(s) for public

office and to hold them accountable, patron-client relation had negatively affected voters' free will choice of candidate for elective positions.

In relation to transparency and accountability, most respondents had never accessed financial audit reports on use of public funds citing ignorance on where to get such reports as well as denied access of the information by Sub County and County information offices. However, the few who had accessed the audit reports obtained it through county and Sub County public forums and the Auditor General's website. The media superficially informed the public on financial audit issues, while county and Sub County public forums lacked a defined time and the information released during such forums were always limited. Patron-client relation had affected involvement of the public in selection of priority projects, affected public access to information on the use of public funds, had influenced stakeholders' involvement in budgeting and expenditure process, as well as employment of county public officers.

Regarding responsiveness and effectiveness in public service delivery, the study indicated that the County government performed well in the cleaning of towns/streets and waste disposal, in provision of basic primary healthcare services, in the construction and maintenance of county roads and in environmental management and conservation. However, there were challenges in provision of accessible and safe drinking water, in traffic management, as well as in construction and maintenance of sewerage lines. Efficiency and responsiveness in provision of county public services was attributed to devolution entrenched in the Kenya's new Constitution despite the prevalence of patron-client practices. National government was also noted to be responsive and effective in electricity connection and in construction and maintenance of roads and highway but with unresponsiveness on matters of accessible and

affordable housing, in creation of employment opportunities as well as in provision of agricultural subsidies.

In relation to equitability in provision of County public services, it was established that patron-client relation had affected development projects such as roads due to pork-barreling. It had also affected equity in access to employment opportunities due to patronage appointments. Patron-client relation had also affected equity in the award of tenders and contracts where particular business associates and community associations that provided massive electoral support would favorably be rewarded as patronage. Similarly, the award of bursaries and scholarships, as well as water connection and sewerage services were also in favour of incumbent governor's perceived political support base.

Regarding the rule of law and administration of justice, it was insignificantly affected by patron-client relation and with respondents citing professionalism in deliberating court cases and fairness in administration of justice. Litigants did not have to be politically connected to win a court case nor have ethnic affiliation with judicial officers. While there were delays in deliberation of court cases, it was attributed to poor human resource capacity against the numerous cases in court and delays in conducting investigations.

### **8.3 Conclusions**

Based on the research findings, it can be concluded that patron-client practices are deeply ingrained in elective politics and involves social exchange relations between political candidates and voters. The use of clientelistic practices has the capacity to shape voters' choice of candidate in favour of individuals having a higher propensity to dispense such clientele goods or services. The free will vote enshrined under



Article 38 of the Constitution of Kenya is subsequently subjugated and thus negating the essence of elections and the growth of liberal democracy. Purposive corporate social actors play a central role in shaping voters' choice of candidates in elective politics and serve as means of recruiting and mobilizing voters into political candidate's clientele network. Similarly, primordial social bonds based on ethnicity, family ties, gender, and social class continues to serve as significant determinants of electoral participation, with ethnicity in cosmopolitan regions being the single most important predictor of electoral participation and outcome. However, as homogeneity increases in terms of these primordial social ties, the severity at which they shape electoral participation decreases as candidates cannot leverage on them to enhance a competitive advantage over their political opponents.

Success in elective politics is dependent on candidates' dyadic networks as means of reaching out to many loyal voters into their political dyad. The expansion of these dyads in terms of membership from the different socio-economic cleavages is dependent on the candidate's propensity to appropriate clientele goods and services. Such dyads must include maintaining mutual reciprocal linkages with actors such as religious organizations, associational groups, youth and women groups, professional associations, and individual voters in every electoral unit. The entrenchment of patron-client relation even in decentralized governments have pervasive effects on important attributes of democratic governance such as citizens' participation, transparency and accountability, and equity and efficiency in provision of public service. However, the existence of independent judiciary anchored on professionalism, meritocracy, and security of tenure among judicial officers helps to enhance the rule of law and administration of justice despite existence of patron-client relation in other arms of government. The study concluded that while Kenya has a

progressive constitution that enshrines free will vote and an opportunity for peoples' representation at different levels of governance, the existence of patron-client relation and practices continues to be pervasive to both electoral democracy as well as democratic governance in Kenya.

#### **8.4 Recommendations**

This study assessed patron-client relation as a determinant of electoral participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya. Based on the findings, the following recommendations were made.

##### **8.4.1 Policy and Programmatic Recommendations**

The following policy and programmatic recommendations are made;

First, Electoral Offence Act (2016) and Political Parties Act 2011) should be amended by parliament to incorporate the different clientelistic practices as electoral offences and restricting political party spending during campaigns respectively. Political parties and candidates in contravention should be barred from politics, imposed punitive fines and/or imprisonment since such clientelistic practices subvert citizens' free will choice of candidates and violates Article 38 of the Kenyan constitution. This remedy should be accompanied by extensive civic education of voters and political candidates by IEBC on the sanctity and the benefits of free will vote as opposed to clientelistic exchange relations, as well as the implications of patron-client relation on the growth of electoral democracy in Kenya.

Secondly, to address the pervasiveness of primordial social ties/bonds in electoral politics in Kenya, Constitutional commissions such as the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, Kenya National Human Rights Commission and the National Cohesion and Integration Commission should develop civic education

training programmes geared towards civic awakening, cohesion and national unity despite the diverse socio-cultural and political orientation of the citizens. This should also incorporate the training of purposive corporate actors and having them as agents to reach out to their respective members as well as the public.

Thirdly, given the pervasive nature of patron-client relation on electoral and democratic governance, institutional capacity of government agencies such as EACC, IEBC, and DCI to investigate and prosecute any political actor from using clientelistic practices should be strengthened. This should be corroborated with lifestyle audit of every political candidate to ascertain their exact source of wealth and consequently limit use of clientelistic practices during electioneering period.

Lastly, patron-client relation and practices thrive in societies with wide socio-economic inequalities which allow political elites to appropriate clientelistic exchange benefits to voters in return for electoral support. As noted in this study, appropriation of such clientelistic goods and services compromises voters' free will choice of candidates contrary to Article 38 of the Constitution of Kenya and the Elections Act, 2011. The national and the county governments should therefore establish pragmatic community empowerment programmes and development projects to bolster socio-economic status of community members and thus reduce reliance on clientele goods and services especially during the electioneering period. This also implies the need to adequately fund the county governments and closely monitor the use of such funds by the office of the Auditor General as means of enhancing county capacity to fulfill its mandates under the constitution.

#### **8.4.2 Recommendation for Further Research**

Based on the preceding research findings, further research is recommended on the following areas: a national level analysis of patron-client relation and how it impact on efficiency of national government institutions, Ministries, Commissions and Parastatals in public service delivery. Lastly, comparative, and cross-national studies on patron-client politics is also recommended in order to enrich existing literature and clearly bring afore its implication on the growth of African liberal democracy.

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## APPENDICES

## Appendix I: Questionnaires

**KIPKIRUI** Geoffrey Towett,  
Moi University,  
P.O. Box 3900,  
Eldoret.

**8<sup>th</sup> January, 2021**

**To Research Respondents**

Dear Sir/Madam,

---

**REF: FILLING OF RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE**


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The above subject refers

I am a Doctorate Student of Moi University carrying out a research study on ***“Patron-Client Relation as a Determinant of Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County, Kenya”***. This research is purely academic and your contribution is highly appreciated. I kindly request you to answer all the questions provided to the best of your knowledge and be assured that information given will be treated confidential and used for research purpose only. *(Please circle or tick the appropriate answer where applicable)*.

Thank you in advance for your willingness to participate in this survey. (Use a (√) on the spaces given)

<b>I Agree to Participate</b>	[    ]	<b>I Don't want to Participate</b>	[    ]
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***Mr. Geoffrey Kipkirui Towett***

**PhD Student-Dept of History, Political Science & Public Admin,  
Moi University**

**Contact:** 072.....45

**Email:** [taita.towett@gmail.com](mailto:taita.towett@gmail.com)

**SECTION A: Demographic Characteristics**

1. Sub County/Constituency .....

2. Electoral Ward .....

3. Please indicate your Gender Male  Female  Unisex 4. Indicate your age bracket? 18-35 yrs  36-53 yrs  54-71 yrs  Above 72yrs 5. Your marital status; Single  Married  Widow/ Widower   
Separated/Divorced 6. Highest level of education completed; Primary  Secondary  Diploma   
Bachelor's Degree  Post Graduate Degree  None 

7. Your occupation;

A.	Casual worker (paid per day)	Specify;
B.	Farmer	Specify;
C.	Business	Specify;
D.	Employed on contract	Specify;
E.	Permanently employed	Specify;
F.	Other occupation	Specify;

8. Level of income **Per Month** in Kenya shillings;

[A] Below 5000

[B] 5,001 - 15,000

[C] 15,001 - 35,000

[D] 35,001 - 55,000

[E] 55,001 and Above

9. What is your religious denomination? Catholic  Protestant  Islam   
Hindu  Sikh Others (**Specify**).....10. What is your ethnic extraction? Kalenjin  Kikuyu  Luo  Kamba   
Kisii  Luhya Other (**Specify**).....



**SECTION B: Clientelistic Practices and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

11. a) Indicate whether you participated in General Elections as indicated;

2013 General Elections      YES [ ]                      NO [ ]  
 2017 General elections      YES [ ]                      NO [ ]

b) What do you think could have made some voters not to participate in the 2013 and/or in 2017 elections?

.....  
 .....  
 .....

c) Do you intend to participate in General Elections in future?    YES     NO

d) What are the reasons for your answer in (c) above?

.....  
 .....  
 .....

12 a) To what extent did the listed factors influenced your choice of **Presidential Candidate**? (Use a (√) on the spaces given)

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
It is my civic duty to vote					
To get government employment or appointment					
To get government projects & funds such as roads, water, electricity, youth funds etc					
For future support of our ethnic leader (future ethnic political reciprocity)					
To access subsidized/free government goods and services such as fertilizers, seeds etc					
I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party during campaigns					
To be awarded government tenders and contracts					
To get government protection of our community assets such as land, businesses etc					

Any other reason (**Specify**)

.....

.....

.....

**b) To what extent did the listed factors influenced your choice of **Gubernatorial Candidate (Governor)**? (Use a (√) on the spaces given)**

	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
It is my civic duty to vote					
To get government employment or appointment					
To get government projects & funds such as roads, water, electricity, youth funds etc					
For future support of our ethnic leader (future ethnic political reciprocity)					
To access subsidized/free government goods and services such as fertilizers, seeds etc					
I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party during campaigns					
To be awarded government tenders and contracts					
To get government protection of our community assets such as land, businesses etc					

Any other reason (**Specify**)

.....

.....

.....

.....

c) To what extent did the listed factors influenced your choice of **Member of National Assembly (MP)**? (Use a (√) on the spaces given)

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
It is my civic duty to vote					
To get government employment or appointment					
To get government projects & funds such as roads, water, electricity, youth funds					
For future support of our ethnic leader (future ethnic political reciprocity)					
To access subsidized/free government goods and services such as fertilizers, seeds					
I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party during campaigns					
To be awarded government tenders and contracts					
To get government protection of our community assets such as land, businesses					

Any other reason (**specify**).....

.....

d) To what extent did the listed factors influenced your choice of **Member of County Assembly (MCA)**? (Use a (√) on the spaces given)

	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
It is my civic duty to vote					
To get government employment or appointment					
To get government projects & funds such as roads, water, electricity, youth funds etc					
For future support of our ethnic leader (future ethnic political reciprocity)					
To access subsidized/free government goods and services such as fertilizers, seeds etc					
I had received monetary incentive from the political candidate/party during campaigns					
To be awarded government tenders and contracts					
To get government protection of our community assets such as land, businesses					

Any other reason (**Specify**)

.....  
 .....

**SECTION C: Purposive and Primordial Social Bonds and Electoral Participation in Uasin Gishu County**

**13 a)** To what extent did the nature of **Political Party/Coalition** influenced your choice of candidate for the following political positions? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Positions</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly (MP)					
iv) Member of County Assembly (MCA)					

**b)** To what extent did the listed **Coalition/Party Activities** influenced your choice of political candidates during general elections? (Use a (√) on the spaces given)

<b>Party Activities in Electoral Participation</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
The Party gave us money during electioneering period					
The Party articulated our ethnic interest					
Party advocated for development projects for us					
The party advocated for national cohesion					
The party mobilized us to turn out and vote through media					
The party provided civic education and communication to voters on election matters					

**c)** What have been your personal expectations if the political party/Coalition you voted for wins in an election?

.....  
 .....

**14 a)** To what extent did the use of **Radio** influenced your choice of candidates for the listed political positions in general elections? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

**b)** To what extent did the use of **Newspaper** influenced your choice of candidate for the listed political positions in general elections? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

**c)** To what extent did the use of **Television** influenced your choice of candidate for the listed political positions in general elections? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

**d)** To what extent did the use of **Internet (Mobile and/or Cyber Cafe)** influenced your choice of candidate for the listed political positions in general elections? (Use a [√])

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

e) What were the factors that motivated you to use the preferred media (in **a, b, c** and **d** above) in relation to choice of political candidates?

.....

.....

.....

.....

**15 a)** Did your religious denomination allowed its members to vote in General Elections?

YES  NO

**b)** Give reason(s) for your answer in **15(a)** above

.....

.....

.....

.....

**c)** If **YES** in **(15a)**, how did members gave their political support to either Political Party/Coalition or Political Candidate(s) during the election?

.....

.....

.....

**d)** What have been the expectations of members of your religious group when a political candidate or party/coalition that they supported wins an election?

.....

.....

.....

**e)** To what extent did your **Religious Leader(s)** influenced your choice of political candidate listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly (MP)					
iv) Member of County Assembly (MCA)					

**16 a)** Indicate your affiliation to any **ONE** of the following **Associations/Groups** (If any) Youth Groups  Women Group  Business Association  Professional  None  Other  **Specify**).....

**b)** Does your Association/Group in **(16a)** allow members to participate in electoral activities? YES  NO

**c)** If **YES** in **(b)**, how did members of your Association/Group provided support to either Political Party/Coalition or Political Candidates of his/her choice?

.....  
 .....

**d)** What have been the expectations of members of your Association/Group when a political candidate or party that you supported wins in an election?

.....  
 .....

**e)** To what extent did your **Association/Group** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly (MP)					
iv) Member of County Assembly (MCA)					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in **(16 e)** above?

.....  
 .....

**17 (a)** To what extent did **Ethnic Affiliation/Tribe of the candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in **(17a)** above?

.....

(b) To what extent did **Family Ties/Clan of the candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17b) above?

.....  
 .....

(c) To what extent did **Gender of candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17c) above?

.....  
 .....

(d) To what extent did **Race of the candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Political Position</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17d) above?

.....  
 .....



(e) To what extent did **Economic Class of the candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

Political Position	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17e) above?

.....  
 .....

(f) To what extent did **Religion of the candidate** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

Political Position	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17f) above?

.....  
 .....

(g) To what extent did **Family and/or relatives** influenced your choice of political candidates listed below? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

Political Position	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
i) President					
ii) Governor					
iii) Member of National Assembly					
iv) Member of County Assembly					

What are your general remarks regarding your responses in (17g) above?

.....  
 .....

**SECTION D: Dyadic (Patron-Client) Networks Influencing Electoral Participation.**

18. Based on your assessment, do you think political candidates needs political networks/ connections with voters to win in elections? YES  NO

**Support your answer:**.....

19. To what extent do the following activities and actors enhance political networks/connections with voters towards electoral victory of a **Presidential candidate**? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Actors and means of Enhancing Political Networks</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Associating with religious groups and their activities such as donations, attending services etc					
ii) Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron					
iii) Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups etc					
iv) Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc					
v) The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties					
vi) Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc					
vii) Working with business associations/groups					

**Any other reason (specify)**.....

20. To what extent do the following activities and actors enhance political networks/ connections with voters towards electoral victory of a **gubernatorial candidate**?

(Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Actors and means of Enhancing Political Networks</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Associating with religious groups and their activities such as donations, attending services					
ii) Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron					
iii) Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups etc					
iv) Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc					

v) The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties					
vi) Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc					
vii) Working with business associations/groups					

**Any other reason (specify).....**

**21.** To what extent do the following activities and actors enhance political networks/connections with voters towards electoral victory of a **Member of National Assembly (MP) candidate?** (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Actors and means of Enhancing Political Networks</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Associating with religious groups and their activities such as donations, attending services					
ii) Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron					
iii) Working with Community Associations such as youth groups, women groups etc					
iv) Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc					
v) The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties					
vi) Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc					
vii) Working with business associations/groups					

**Any other reason (specify).....**

**22.** To what extent do the following activities and actors enhance political networks/connections with voters towards electoral victory of a **Member of County Assembly (MCA) Candidate?** (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Actors and means of Enhancing Political Networks</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Associating with religious groups and their activities such as donations, attending services					
ii) Collaborating and working closely with Ethnic political patron					
iii) Associating with Community					

Associations such as youth groups, women groups etc					
iv) Associating with professionals and their Unions, e.g teachers, nurses, lecturers, doctors etc					
v) Incumbency of the political candidates					
vi) The nature of political party/coalition e.g. in terms of ethnic composition of affiliate parties					
vii) Use of the media such as Radio, Television etc					
viii) Working with business associations/groups					

**Any other reason (specify).....**

### **SECTION E: The Implications of Patron-Client Relationship on Democratic Governance in Uasin Gishu County**

**23 a)** (i) Based on your assessment, do you think citizens are actively involved in decision making on county and national development issues? YES  NO

(ii) Have you ever participated in any county or national government development forum(s)? YES  NO

If **YES**, how did you get invitation for the public forum/*baraza*?

.....  
 .....  
 .....

**b)** How often are county public forums organized to allow citizens to participate in decision making?

<b>Frequency of Government Forms</b>	<b>Response</b>
i. More than once a month	YES [ ] NO [ ]
ii. Once a month	YES [ ] NO [ ]
iii. Once every three months	YES [ ] NO [ ]
iv. Once every six months	YES [ ] NO [ ]
v. Once a year	YES [ ] NO [ ]
vi. No defined time	YES [ ] NO [ ]

c) To what extent has patron-client (politician-voter relations) relation **negatively** influenced **public participation** on the listed activities at the county level? (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

Issues of Discussion in Public Forums	Very Much	Much	A Little	Very Little	Never
i) Development project plans					
ii) The quality of government service delivery					
iii) Government legislation/policy proposals					
iv) Internal security issues/matters					
v) Use of public funds/management					
vi) The choice of candidates in election					

d) In your assessment, what are the reasons for your answer in (c) above?

.....  
 .....

**24 a (i)** Have you ever been in access to the county or Sub County financial audit report since 2012? YES  NO

**(ii)** Give reason for your answer in **24 a (i)** above.

.....  
 .....

**iii)** If **YES**, in **24 a(i)** above, how did you get financial audit report regarding the use of public funds?

Sources of Information on Financial Audit Report	Response
i. Media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)	YES [ ] NO [ ]
ii. Ward/Sub County/County public forums	YES [ ] NO [ ]
iii. From the county government website	YES [ ] NO [ ]
iv. Office of Auditor General website	YES [ ] NO [ ]
v. County/Sub County Information Office	YES [ ] NO [ ]

**Other sources (Specify)**.....

.....

b) To what extent has patron-client (politician-voter) relation influenced **transparency and accountability** in relation to the listed activities in the County?

(Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Selected County &amp; Sub County activities</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Adherence to rules and regulation e.g. public procurement					
ii) Involvement of the public in selection of priority development project					
iii) Access to information on use of public funds					
iv) Stakeholders involvement in budgeting and expenditure process					
v) Prosecution of any accused in relation to public finance mismanagement					
vi) Employment of county public officers					

c) Based on your assessment, what are the reasons for your answers in (b) above?

.....  
 .....

**25 (a)** Rate the County government (of Uasin Gishu) **responsiveness and effectiveness** in provision of the following selected services (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>County Services</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Overall cleanliness of the towns/streets (refuse removal)					
ii) Provision of accessible and safe drinking water					
iii) Provision of basic primary healthcare services					
iv) Construction and maintenance of county roads					
v) Overall traffic management and street lighting					
vi) Environmental conservation and management					
vi) Construction and maintenance of sewerage lines					

**Others (specify)**.....

What is your general assessment in provision of services listed in (a) above?

.....  
 .....

**b) Rate the national government responsiveness and effectiveness** in provision of the following services in Uasin Gishu County. (Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>National Services</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) Provision of accessible electricity					
ii) Construction and maintenance of roads and Highway					
iii) Provision of accessible and affordable housing					
iv) Creation of employment/job opportunities					
v) Provision of agricultural subsidies e.g. seeds, fertilizers					

**Others (specify)**.....

What is your general observation in provision of services listed in (a) above?

.....  
 .....

**26** To what extent has patron-client relation influenced **Equitability** in provision of the following county public services? Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>County Services</b>	<b>Very Much</b>	<b>Much</b>	<b>A Little</b>	<b>Very Little</b>	<b>Never</b>
i) County development projects (roads, health centre					
ii) Employment opportunities at the county					
iii) Award of county contracts and tenders					
iv) Award of bursaries and scholarships to students					
v) Water connection, sewerage services, health services etc					
vi) Award of business units/space and permits					

What is your general observation on equitability in provision of services in the County?

.....

27 Give your view in relation to the influence of patron-client relation on **rule of law & administration of justice** by Courts at the county level. Use a [√] on the spaces given)

<b>Administration of Justice at the County Level</b>	<b>Response</b>
i) The deliberation of court cases are always delayed	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>
ii) Outcome of court cases are influenced by ethnic affiliation of the accused and judicial officials	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>
iii) There is professionalism in deliberating court cases in the county	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>
iv) The outcome of cases are sometimes based on corruption	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>
v) There is fairness in administration of justice in the county	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>
vi) You must be politically connected to win in a court case in the county	<b>YES [ ] NO [ ]</b>

What is your general observation on administration of justice in the County?

.....  
 .....



## **Appendix II: Key Informant Interview Schedule**

### **A: For Political Leaders**

1. Year of birth .....Sex ..... Ward .....Sub County.....
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. How many years have you been in politics and which party did you use to vies for elective position in 2013 and 2017 elections?
4. What are your experiences about elections in the county and what motivates voters to cast their ballot for a given candidate?
5. From your experience, how do you consolidate your support base to strengthen voters' loyalty?
6. Which are the core groups that help you in campaigns and how do they do so?
7. How do you finance your political campaigns and related activities?
8. Which are your various means of reaching out to the voters to keep them posted of your political agenda?
9. How do you enhance networks/connection with the voters in your electoral unit?
10. Which are your target mechanisms/strategies used to ensure voters vote for you?
11. What are the monitoring instruments of ensuring that there is compliance by voters in voting for you?
12. How do you keep a strong bond with the various groups that assisted you to win election and why do these groups agree to partner with you?
13. What is your view in relation to the quality of governance in the county?

### **B: Political Party Officials/Representatives**

1. Year of birth .....Sex .....
2. What is your highest level of education?
3. Which party do you represent and how many years have you worked for the party?
4. How do you fund your political party activities?
5. How do you consolidate you political party base and what incentives do the party give or promise to the voters to remain loyal to the party?
6. To ensure the party win in elections, which other actors/groups do you engage and what roles do they play?
7. How do you enhance your political networks with the various groups?

8. In your assessment, how has the current clientelistic practices during electioneering period affected the quality of governance?

**C: Associations/Groups (Youth, Women, PLWDs & Professional)**

1. What is the name of your association (optional) and how many years have you been in operation?
2. What is the nature of your activity (ies) and how many are registered members in the county?
3. What are the various strategies that political candidates use in order to win your votes during campaigns and in election?
4. What are the demands you make from political candidates to earn your political support?
5. How do you maintain your political networks/connections with political leaders?
6. What are your expectations from a political candidate that win based on your electoral support?
7. In your assessment, how has the current clientelistic practices affected the quality of governance?

**D: County/Sub County Election Officials from IEBC**

1. Sub County/county..... Sex .....
2. How many years have served as an electoral official in the Sub County/county?
3. During electoral campaigns, what has been the trend in terms voter mobilization?
4. Which are the common electoral malpractices committed by political candidates and voters during the electioneering period?
5. What has the electoral commission done to those voters or political candidates who have committed electoral offences?
6. To what extent is the entrenchment of clientelistic practices in this electoral unit?
7. What mechanisms are put in place by the electoral commission to safeguard the sanctity of secret vote based on electorate free will?
8. What are the emerging challenges that may constrain voters' free will choice of candidate?
9. How has the current clientelistic practices during electioneering period affected the quality of governance?

**E: Local Administration (Chiefs, ACC, DCC & Police Commandant)**

1. Area of jurisdiction..... Sex..... Age .....
2. How long have you worked as an administrator?
3. Based on your experience, what factors have always motivated voters to turn out to vote?
4. What means do political candidates use to influence the outcome of election?
5. From your experience, how do the incumbents seek to use local administration to their advantage during electioneering period?
6. What political network/connections have most political candidates established to enhanced voter support?
7. How has electoral malpractices affected the quality of governance?

**F: Religious Leaders**

1. Which religious group do you lead..... Sex.....
2. For how long have you served as a member of the clergy?
3. What is the socio-demographic composition of your congregation in terms of ethnicity, age, occupation, class?
4. What is your general practice in terms of role of political leaders in your religious group and activities?
5. To what extent and in which areas do you allow political candidates to be involved in denominational projects/activities/programs?
6. In what ways and under what circumstances do you and members give political support to political candidates?
7. What are your expectations when a political candidate you supported wins in an election?
8. As a religious leader, what is your assessment in terms of quality of governance in the county?

### **Appendix III: Focus Group Discussion Interview Guide**

1. How many of you have participated in elections?
2. In what capacity did you participate? Voter, candidate, campaigner or IEBC official?
3. As a voter, what factors influenced your voting for the President, Governor, Member of National Assembly (MP), and Member of County Assembly (MCA)?
4. How has the candidate(s) you voted for sought to maintain political network with you and how have you responded?
5. How did the following factors influenced your choice of political candidates during election?
  - a. Your religious organization
  - b. Political party
  - c. The media
  - d. Ethnicity
  - e. Family ties/clannism/peers/relatives
6. What are your view regarding citizens' participation, transparency and accountability, public service provision and the rule of law after successive elections in the county?
7. In relation to clientelistic practices during electioneering period, how has it affected the quality of governance?

## Appendix IV: Sample Size Table

Required Sample Size <sup>†</sup>								
Population Size	Confidence = 95%				Confidence = 99%			
	Margin of Error				Margin of Error			
	5.0%	3.5%	2.5%	1.0%	5.0%	3.5%	2.5%	1.0%
10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
20	19	20	20	20	19	20	20	20
30	28	29	29	30	29	29	30	30
50	44	47	48	50	47	48	49	50
75	63	69	72	74	67	71	73	75
100	80	89	94	99	87	93	96	99
150	108	126	137	148	122	135	142	149
200	132	160	177	196	154	174	186	198
250	152	190	215	244	182	211	229	246
300	169	217	251	291	207	246	270	295
400	196	265	318	384	250	309	348	391
500	217	306	377	475	285	365	421	485
600	234	340	432	565	315	416	490	579
700	248	370	481	653	341	462	554	672
800	260	396	526	739	363	503	615	763
1,000	278	440	606	906	399	575	727	943
1,200	291	474	674	1067	427	636	827	1119
1,500	306	515	759	1297	460	712	959	1376
2,000	322	563	869	1655	498	808	1141	1785
2,500	333	597	952	1984	524	879	1288	2173
3,500	346	641	1068	2565	558	977	1510	2890
5,000	357	678	1176	3288	586	1066	1734	3842
7,500	365	710	1275	4211	610	1147	1960	5165
10,000	370	727	1332	4899	622	1193	2098	6239
25,000	378	760	1448	6939	646	1285	2399	9972
50,000	381	772	1491	8056	655	1318	2520	12455
75,000	382	776	1506	8514	658	1330	2563	13583
100,000	383	778	1513	8762	659	1336	2585	14227
250,000	384	782	1527	9248	662	1347	2626	15555
500,000	384	783	1532	9423	663	1350	2640	16055
1,000,000	384	783	1534	9512	663	1352	2647	16317
2,500,000	384	784	1536	9567	663	1353	2651	16478
10,000,000	384	784	1536	9594	663	1354	2653	16560
100,000,000	384	784	1537	9603	663	1354	2654	16584
300,000,000	384	784	1537	9603	663	1354	2654	16586

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Source: Krenjcie and Morgan, (1970:23)

### Appendix V: Extracts From Respondents


1. KI, No.1-A Male participant, Aged 58 years (former deputy governor aspirant)
2. KI, No.2- Male participant, aged 58 years (an MNA)
3. KI, No.3- Male participant, 56 years (an MNA)
4. KI, No.4- Female Participant, 52 years (County government Official)
5. KI, No.5- Male participant, 50 years (an MCA)
6. KI, No.6- Female participant, 48 years (an MCA)
7. KI, No.7- Male participant 44 years (an MCA)
8. KI, No.8- Male participant, 52 years (an MCA)
9. KI, No. 9-Male Participant, 48 years (Sub County Returning Officer-IEBC)
10. KI, No.10 Male participant 52 years (Sub County Returning Officer-IEBC)
11. KI, No.11-Male participant, 49 years IEBC (Sub County Returning Officer-IEBC)
12. KI, No.12- Male participant, 52 years (Business community representative)
13. KI, No.13- Male participant, 50 years (Business community representative)
14. KI, No.14- Male participant, 56years (Business community representative)
15. KI, No.15- Male participant, 47 years (ACC)
16. KI, No.16- Male participant, 51 years (DCC)
17. KI, No.17- Female participant, 48 years (County government Official)
18. KI, No.18- Male participant, 50 years (Sub County police commandant)
19. KI, No.19- Male participant, 45 years (Sub County police commandant)
20. KI, No.20- Female participant, 48 years (Religious leader)
21. KI, No.21- Male participant, 52 years (Religious leader)
22. KI, No.22- Female participant, 51 years (Religious leader)
23. KI, No.23- Male participant, 52 years (Representative of *Bunge la Wananchii*)
24. KI, No 24-Male participant, 56years (Political party official)
25. KI, No. 25- Male participant, 52years (Political party official)
26. KI, No.26- Male participant 52 years (Political party official)
27. KI, No.27- Male participant, 52 years (Representative of Trade union)
28. KI, No.28- Female participant, 48 years (Representative of Trade union)
29. KI, No.29- Male participant 72 years (Retired political veteran and an elder)
30. KI, No.30- Male Participants 68 years (Retired political veteran and an elder)
31. Pa 3, FGD 7: A Male, aged 48 yrs, (Representative of political party)
32. Pa 4, FGD 2: A Male participant, 52 years (Religious leader)

33. Pa 1, FGD 3: Female participant, 34 years (Youth representative)
34. Pa 2, FGD 6: Female participant, 48 years (Representative of county professionals)
35. Pa 6, FGD 5: Male participant, 58 years (Representative of county workers)
36. Pa 4, FGD 5: Male participant, 56 years (Representative of county workers)
37. Pa 3, FGD 6: Male participant, 56years (Representative of county professionals)
38. Pa 4, FGD 6: Male participant, 44 years (Representative of county professionals)
39. Pa 5, FGD 2: Male participant, 46 years (Religious leader)
40. Pa 2, FGD 1: Male participant, 48 years (Member of local administration-NGAO)
41. Pa 1, FGD 7: Male Participant, 56 years (Representative of political party)
42. Pa 1, FGD 1: Male participant, 62 years (Member of local administration-NGAO)
43. Pa 5, FGD 7: Male participant, 58 years (Representative of political party)
44. Pa 5, FGD 2: Male participant, 34 years (Religious leader)
45. Pa 2, FGD 1: Male participant, 48 years (Member of local administration-NGAO)
46. Pa 3, FGD 1: Male participant, 56 years (Member of local administration-NGAO)
47. Pa 2, FGD 2: Male participant, 58 years (Religious leader)
48. Pa 4, FGD 7: Male participant, 48 years (Representative of political party)
49. Pa 4, FGD 3: Male participant, 35 years (Youth representative)
50. Pa 2, FGD 4: Male Participant, 35 years (Representative of business community)
51. Pa 7, FGD 3: Male participant 33 years (Youth representative)
52. Pa 5, FGD 3: Male participant 33 years (Youth representative)
53. Pa 2, FGD 3: Male Participant, 34 years (Youth representative)
54. Pa 4, FGD 4: Male Participant, 56 years (Representative of business community)
55. Pa 5, FGD 1: Male Participant 53 years (Representative of county workers)
56. Pa 1, FGD 6: Female Participant, 47 years (Representative of county professionals)
57. Pa 3, FGD 1: Male Participant, 58 years (Member of local administration-NGAO)
58. Pa 3, FGD 6: Male Participant, 54 years (Representative of county professionals)

### Appendix VI: Research Permit and Authorization



**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**




**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

Date of Issue: **24/November/2020**

Ref No: **864796**

### RESEARCH LICENSE



**This is to Certify that Mr.. GEOFREY TOWETT of Moi University, has been licensed to conduct research in Uasin-Gishu on the topic: PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND OUTCOME IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY, KENYA for the period ending : 24/November/2021.**

License No: **NACOSTI/P/20/7576**

Applicant Identification Number: **864796**


*Approved*  
*26/11/2020*

**COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

**Director General**

**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR  
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &  
INNOVATION**

Verification QR Code



**NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.**

*Proceed*

*26/11/2020*

**FOR: COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION  
UASIN GISHU COUNTY**

**26 NOV 2020**

P.O. Box 9843 - 30100, ELDORET  
TEL: 053-2083342 / 0719127212



REPUBLIC OF KENYA  
COUNTY GOVERNMENT OF UASIN GISHU



Tel. NOs:direct line:053-2016215  
053-2016000  
053-2016125

Fax: +254-053-2062884  
Website:www.uasingishu.go.ke  
Email:info@uasingishu.go.ke

When Replying, Please Address  
to:

County Secretary  
Uasin-Gishu County  
P.O. Box 40 – 30100  
Eldoret, Kenya.

REF: UGC/ADM.1/31/GEN/2021/VOL.II/

6 January, 2021

Mr. Geoffrey Kipkirui Towett,  
P.O. Box 40,  
**LONGISA.**

**APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY  
OUT RESEARCH WITHIN THE COUNTY GOVERNMENT**

Your letter of 6 January, 2021 in which you made the above request is relevant.

Authority is hereby granted to you to carry out your research within Uasin Gishu County Government, for your academic use and we request you to share your findings with the Office of the undersigned. Your findings may be useful in addressing Public Relations issues in the County.

By copy of this letter, the Chief Officer, Environment, Water, Natural Resources, Tourism & Wildlife Management is requested to assist you accordingly.

**Edwin Bett**  
**COUNTY SECRETARY/**  
**HEAD OF COUNTY PUBLIC SERVICE**

c.c. Chief Officer, Public Service Management,

## Appendix VII: Anti-Plagiarism Certificate

*SR244*



*ISO 9001:2019 Certified Institution*

**EDU 999 THESIS WRITING COURSE**

*PLAGIARISM AWARENESS CERTIFICATE*

This certificate is awarded to

**GEORGEY KIPKIRUI TOWETT**

**SASS/DPHIL/POL/06/2018**

In recognition for passing the University's plagiarism  
Awareness test for thesis: **PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS AS A DETERMINANT OF ELECTORAL  
PARTICIPATION IN UASIN GISHU COUNTY, KENYA** with a similarity index of 4% and striving to  
maintain academic integrity.

Awarded by:



Prof. Anne Syomwene Kisilu  
CERM-ESA Project Leader    Date: 14/08/2023