# Refugee Hosting and Conflict Resolution: Opportunities for Diplomatic Interventions and Buffeting Regional Hegemons

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Refugee Hosting and Conflict Resolution: Opportunities for Diplomatic Interventions and Buffeting Regional Hegemons

Dulo Nyaoro

1 Introduction

The Horn of Africa remains one of the most unstable and conflict-prone regions of the continent (Williams 2011). This is partly due to colonial legacies and partly cold war rivalries which were consummated in African soil. The countries constituting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are perpetually in some form of conflict or the other for the last 30 years. Since 1990 the region has experienced about 200 violent conflicts (Mengistu 2015). Somalia is slowly recovering from conflict since 1992, South Sudan has moved from liberation war into intra-state conflict since 2013, and there are long standing and low intensity conflicts in Ethiopia, which hardly reach international attention. Such intrastate conflicts frequently spill-over to neighboring countries (Milner 2011: 5). In relation to displacement, conflicts in neighboring countries have the potential to undermine conflict management in the country of origin. The two important players in the regional dynamics therefore remain host countries and refugees (IPI 2011). However, this is compounded by foreign interest, especially by former imperial powers and the USA.

The nexus between refugee hosting and conflict resolution efforts can be examined from different trajectories. The act of hosting and bringing regional leaders together in their countries confers recognition and legitimacy to the host states role in conflict resolution. The international community involvement through UN agencies and other international nongovernmental organizations creates the need for enhanced security and increases accessibility to refugee hosting areas as well as the involvement of international media. This helps elevate the role of host countries in regional politics and permits them to negotiate resources and logistics for refugee hosting with international communities, humanitarian organizations, and neighboring countries. In conflict resolution, leadership plays a crucial role. Refugees in

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protracted situations and some of their leaders may save and invest heavily in their host countries. Such investments may contribute to conflict resolutions or prolong conflicts. How host governments regulate and facilitate migrant investment impacts peace settlements. In addition refugee and asylum seekers develop lasting ties with their hosts all the way from ordinary members of the community to national leadership of host countries. These personal relationships create obligations and deference. The host nations and their nationals come to learn the possible economic opportunities in the countries of origin which they aggressively pursue. For example, Kenyan and Ugandan business people were the first to initiate trade and commerce in South Sudan. Finally regional hubs such as Nairobi, Addis Ababa, and Kampala assume great prominence in regional diplomacy and efforts that have a bearing on conflict resolution.

This contribution is divided into five sections. The first section discusses the background of forced displacement in the Horn of Africa and the magnitude of the problem. The argument is that the refugee hosting countries are often part of these conflicts. Their role in the peace processes is not entirely without merit and often necessary. Even though there have been attempts to reduce the role of Ethiopia and Kenya in the Somalia peace process or Uganda in South Sudan, this has not been possible.

The second section looks at the actual role of the host countries and their institution in the peace processes. It is argued that hosting large number of refugees confers legitimacy and authority to host states to participate in conflict resolution. This legitimacy draws from the principle of shared responsibilities and the assumptions that host countries stand to benefit most when peace is restored and refugees repatriate.

The third part examines the role of refugees and asylum seekers in the peace process. While there is not a plethora of literature in this area, it can be argued that refugees do have both positive and negative influence in peace processes.

The fourth section addresses the issues of durable solutions and how the host countries play an important role in shaping the search for durable solutions. The observation here is that refugee hosting policy most of the time determine the search for durable solutions. The fifth section examines the complementing and conflicting roles the different groups play during the post-conflict reconstruction.

2   Conflict and Displacement in the Horn of Africa

Conflict and displacement in the Horn of Africa paints a grim picture. By 2016, UNHCR estimated that there were approximately 8 million people of concern. Of these 6.6 million are internally displaced persons, and the remaining 2.3 million are refugees. Ethiopia hosted 736,100 refugees being the highest at that time, while Kenya came second with 553,912 refugees (UNHCR 2016). While Uganda had 477,187 in 2016, the number spiked to almost 1.4 million by end of 2017 (UNHCR 2017). South Sudan hosted 263,016 refugees, while Sudan had 309,639 (UNHCR 2016). More than 50% of

IDPs in this region are to be found in just three countries. Sudan has 3,735,966, people displaced, South Sudan 1,790,427, and Somalia 1,790,427.

Describing the region that is commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa is a complex affair because the geography and the politics are both similar and different all at once. Traditionally the Horn of Africa is understood to include Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea which by 2013 had 103 million people (Kolmannskog and Tamer 2014). However, the current usage (Greater Horn) tends to include Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya. Uganda, which is strictly not a part of it, cannot be excluded because of its role in hosting many refugees from the Horn. Invariable, Yemen, due to its proximity and the key role it plays in the migration and conflict nexus, is part of this configuration. It is this expanded usage which will be employed in this contribution (see Fig. 1). The region covers 5.2 million square kilometers with a population of almost 200 million. It is a confluence of regions, ethnicity, geomorphology, and climatic conditions, all of which can be sources and causes of conflicts. The Sudanese are mostly Muslim and of Arab descent. Ethiopia is largely Orthodox Christian and is home to many ethnic nations. Somalia is over 90% Muslim but is distinctively divided into a clan system. In Kenya, the Muslim population is about 11%, but there is a considerable tolerance between Christians and Muslims even though ethnicity remains the most divisive issue. Geographically, the Horn is dominated by desert and semidesert conditions, yet the river Nile passes through its very heart. In geopolitical terms, the Horn is of immense importance because it provides access to the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In much of the literature, Yemen, which is not part of Africa, is closely associated with mobility in the region (Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) 2013). The ports of Mombasa, Mogadishu, Djibouti, and Sudan remain attractive due to military and maritime trade considerations.

Conflicts in the Horn can be broadly categorized into three (Kidane 2011). The first category is interstate which is characterized by hostility between two or more different states. Such conflicts include the two wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, the first being in 1977–1978 and the second from 2006 to 2009 (Civins 2010). The first hostility between the two countries was the Ogaden War (1977/1978) over the disputed Ogaden region in Ethiopian territory with the majority of inhabitants being ethnic Somalis. It is claimed that without Russia switching sides to support Ethiopia, Somalia would have prevailed (Weiss 1980). In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia to prop up the newly installed Transitional Federal Government. The War of Independence between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which officially ended in 1993, remains a source of tension in the region, and, in 1998, the two countries experienced violent hostilities (Záhořík 2014). The second category, which is more common, is the intrastate conflict which includes civil conflicts in Sudan, especially the Darfur area, South Sudan (2014), Somalia (1991–2015), and Ethiopia. Djibouti experienced civil war in 1991 (Nyuotyoh 2003). The final category, which is also common, is the inter-communal conflict (Mkutu 2001). As a consequence, millions of people have been displaced in the Horn over the last 30 years (Mengistu 2015). Cumulative statistics show that over 30 million people have been displaced and millions more died (UNHCR 2016). Characteristically, over 70% of those displaced remain in their regions either as IDPs or as refugees and asylum seekers. Since conflict in the Horn can be aptly termed as protracted, repeated displacement is

Fig. 1 Map of the Horn of Africa. Based on UN Map No. 4188 Rev. 5. Department of Field Support, March 2012

common. The search for peaceful resolution to the violent conflicts has been long and drawn out. This contribution examines the different roles refugee hosting countries play in the conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa.

The Horn of Africa remains the most conflict-prone part of the continent (Kolmannskog and Tamer 2014). The countries constituting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) are in some form of conflict. For example, Somalia is currently taking tentative steps out of prolonged conflicts, and South Sudan has moved from the War of Liberation into intrastate conflicts, characteristic of most post-independent states in Africa. There are long-standing and low-intensity conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Intrastate conflicts frequently spill-over to neighboring countries (Milner 2011: 5). Currently Kenya and Uganda both have troops in Somalia under AMISOM, while Uganda also has troops in South Sudan due to the spill-over effects of conflicts in these countries.[1] Conflicts in neighboring countries have the potential to undermine conflict management in the country of origin. The two important players in the regional dynamics therefore remain host countries and refugee producers. The suppression of political dissent in both Ethiopia and Eritrea is producing significant numbers of asylum seekers and irregular migration (Healy 2011). Asylum seekers and irregular migrants further complicate regional diplomacy. The importance of neighboring countries in the situation of conflict has been documented in the Horn of Africa. For example, violent civil wars in Uganda and Ethiopia and Sudan and Somalia gave birth to IGADD, the predecessor of the current IGAD in 1986.

Compounding the issue of conflicts are climatic conditions and livelihood strategies (Kolmannskog and Tamer 2014). Pastoralism remains the dominant form of economic activities with about 20 million people practicing it in the region (Mkutu 2001; Mengistu 2015). Pastoralism itself is a cause of intra-community conflicts but is also greatly affected by conflicts. A technical report prepared by Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement (Ginnetti and Franck 2014) has analyzed the close links between drought-related disasters and conflict in the Horn. People displaced by disasters end up seeking asylum simply because they cannot rebuild their lives.

The nature of armed conflicts has significantly changed over the last 30 years from interstate to intrastate wars (Nye 2007). The frequency of armed conflicts has increased, and the effects of violence have become more widespread and pervasive. It is estimated, for example, that from 1989 to 1992, there were 79 intrastate conflicts resulting in armed violence, while there were only 3 interstate conflicts in the same period. The intrastate conflicts have complex causes and pathways, resulting in millions of deaths and displacement. Before it ended formally in 2006, the conflict in Sudan alone killed over 1.5 million people. Estimates are difficult to verify because there are those killed directly by war and those killed by other causes associated to war such as starvation of preventable causes. In Somalia, over 300,000 died by 2000, while in Burundi 200,000 died since 1979. In Rwanda, the 1994 genocide pushed the death toll to over one million.

From available evidence, it is clear that intrastate conflicts displace more people than interstate wars. By the time the civil war ended in Uganda in 1986, about 750,000 people had died with hundreds of thousands having been displaced. Lasting peace does not only

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[1]Kenya recently withdrew her troops from South Sudan in a widely publicized disagreement with the UN.

happen with the cessation of violence; signing peace agreements heralds more difficult tasks of reconstruction, reintegration, and reconciliation. Often this involves returning refugees and IDPs. Involving refugee population and their hosts in the peace process might make such return orderly and more feasible. The tripartite agreements that the Kenyan government, for example, signed with SPLM and UNHCR in 2006 and the Somali government and UNHCR in 2013 should be seen in this way.

As mentioned in the introduction, the UNHCR (2016) estimated that of the 66 million refugees in the world, 26% are in sub-Saharan Africa alone. This translates to about 4.4 million refugees. According to the latest UNHCR statistics, the Horn of Africa hosts 2.3 million of these refugees. A further 10 million are IDPs, not to mention the 500,000 waiting as asylum seekers. Owing to recent conflicts in South Sudan and Eritrea, Uganda and Ethiopia have become the hosts of the largest refugee population. Ethiopia has over 736,000 refugees, while Uganda has over 600,000 (UNHCR 2016).

3   Neighbors and Domestic Conflicts

One of the reasons why the search for peace and political stability in the Horn must entail the involvement of refugee hosting countries is that they have been to a large extent part of the conflicts (Nyuotyoh 2003). Ethiopia for many years backed the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Sudan. Ethiopians' involvement in South Sudan has been attributed to its long-standing interest in the Gambella Region which though is populated by people originally considered Sudanese is under her control. Zahorik argues that supporting these conflicts is seen as a counterbalancing strategy by aspiring hegemons like Ethiopia (Záhořík 2014). Ethiopia also actively supported those who opposed the government of Siad Barre in Somalia. Indeed general, Aidid organized his attack from Ethiopian soil probably with the support of Ethiopian government (Nyuotyoh 2003). Barre's pan-Somalia agenda portrayed him in unfavorable light with neighboring countries given that the Somali nation was scattered in five different territories including Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Djibouti. Sudan and Somalia on the other hand backed the Oromo rebels in Ethiopia. Before 1986, when IGADD was founded, Ethiopia and Somalia had broken political and diplomatic ties.

The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have displaced more people and produced millions of refugees partly because they have been contesting the very essence of statehood. Eritrea sought independence from Ethiopia, while South Sudan sought for self-determination from the Arab-controlled Sudan (Záhořík 2014). The issue of self-determination in the Horn is quite complex given the overlapping identities. For example, when Eritrea gained independence, the two leaders, President Zenawi of Ethiopia and Afwerki of Eritrea, are of the same ethnic group. In Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland have declared autonomy (Kolmannskog and Tamer 2014). The potential of redrawing international boundaries remains very much alive in the Horn. For example, the case of Somaliland which is autonomous for all practical purposes has complicated diplomatic relations in the Horn. While many neighboring countries are conducting activities with Somaliland which tacitly acknowledge their independence,

no country has publicly acknowledged this, probably in deference to international norms regulating state formation (Nyuotyoh 2003).

In the Horn of Africa where all member states are also member of IGAD, the right and obligation to participate in regional conflict resolution is given intentions by IGAD Constitutive Act Art.7 which requires member states to take effective collective measures to eliminate conflicts and promote stability. After trying to remain neutral in the Somalia conflict due to the presence of a big Somali ethnic population, Kenya was drawn into the peace process through IGAD in 2002. Kenya's involvement was meant to neutralize both the Ethiopia and Djibouti peace initiatives which were supporting different functions. The Somalia National Reconciliation Conference begun in Eldoret, Kenya, in 2002 and became an important milestone in the Somalia peace process.

The role of Kenya in both Sudan and Somalia peace processes has been significant. Four reasons can be gleaned for Kenya's heightened role in the two peace processes. First, Kenya has had considerable success in maintaining neutrality in both Sudan and Somalia; this had eluded Ethiopia in Sudan and Somalia and Uganda in Sudan. Second, Kenya by far had the largest number of both Sudanese and Somali refugees; the country therefore benefited from both sympathy for the strain of hosting hundreds of thousands of nationals and longer concern for the fate of refugees. Third, Kenya has enjoyed long periods of political stability only bettered by Tanzania among the neighboring countries. Fourth, Kenya has the infrastructure and resources to support and sustain long meetings and peace conferences.

4 International Interests and Conflicts in the Horn

Since the establishment of the Suez Canal in 1869 which opened the Red Sea for maritime commerce and the colonization of Africa, the Horn has maintained a strategic geopolitical and military importance to Europe and North America. Besides the fragmentations occasioned by the colonial experience, the cold war had three important impacts in the Horn; first the numerous armed conflicts flooded the region with small arms and light weapons (Kellerman 2011). From the first Sudanese civil war in 1959 to date, the issue of proliferation of small arms and light weapons remains a vexed problem in the Horn. Each cycle of armed conflict reveals the duplicity of international arms industry and their governments. For example, the capitulation of President Amin of Uganda in 1979 enabled the discovery of stockpile of Russian weapons by citizens from both Uganda and Kenya. The citizens proceeded to arm themselves while exchanging the rest for livestock and food (Mkutu 2001). This also happened in the Ogaden War of 1978 between Ethiopia and Somalia. Second the cold war encouraged authoritarian leadership in the region. The rule of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia and Siad Barre in Somalia was only made possible because of Russian and American support. Their despotic rule planted the seeds of internal strife. The Arab countries especially Yemen and Saudi Arabia have also had strong influence in the Horn. In the post-cold war period, the Horn has remained of great interest. The collapse of the Somali State in 1992 and the

widespread violence sucked in many international players (Raffaelli 2007: 125). For example, the USA efforts to end violence turned into a national tragedy when 14 US marines were brutally murdered and paraded in public. While withdrawing the forces, the USA ensured that it retained a strong military base in Djibouti to guard her interest in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The breakdown of government in Somalia also led to the growth of radical Islam whose core message was anti-Western Europe and North America and *modus operandi* is terrorism (CMH 2006). Of international concern was the sea piracy along the Somalia coastline. Since the piracy did not discriminate, it threatened the life of many countries that depended on the Indian Ocean for their imports and export with losses being estimated at $12 billion by 2010 (Kellerman 2011). This called for a united effort which brought many countries including Canada, Britain, and even Australia forces to join. The breakdown in law and order was also seen to fuel trade in illegal drugs and wildlife products. All these efforts could only work with the help of regional countries including Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan.

4.1 Conflict Resolution in the Horn: Multi-track Diplomacy Approach

Multi-track diplomacy is the strategy of operating on several tracks simultaneously both in terms of groups and also issues of conflicts including official and unofficial conflict resolution efforts, citizen and scientific exchanges, international business negotiations, international cultural and athletic activities, and other cooperative efforts (Wehrenfennig 2008). These efforts could be led by governments, professional organizations, businesses, churches, media, private citizens, training and educational institutes, activists, and funder. Given the intractability of conflicts in the Horn tract 1 and 11, two types of diplomacy have not been entirely successful. For example, during the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the issue was very clear, yet involving a few elites did not work until the Eritrean diaspora who immensely supported the separation was involved. The regional and group fragmentation that followed the collapse of Somali government made it almost impossible to negotiate with one or two groups. This made conflict resolution in the Horn a protracted affair.

4.2 Peacekeeping Missions in the Horn

The international community has made several attempts at bringing peace and stability in Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan. Much of these efforts is framed around issues of displacement and need for humanitarian assistance. In Somalia, the first peacekeeping mission was UNOSOM in 1992, which was a UN Ceasefire Observer Force operation which did not have any impact during the civil war (Nyuotyoh 2003). The second was the US-led UNITAF in 1992, which temporarily

secured main relief centers in areas badly hit by starvation. The third was UNOSOM II in 1993, which resulted in the graphic deaths of 18 US soldiers, prompting the withdrawal of US forces in 1994 (Poole 2005). After these failures there seems to be a general appreciation that regional countries through regional organizations are best placed to deal with such conflicts. The invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops to support the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia was therefore tacitly supported by the USA.

Currently the African Union with the help of the UN Security Council has three peacekeeping missions in the Horn: AMISON in Somalia, the hybrid United Nations/African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Missions in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). As opposed to the traditional peacekeeping missions which were purely military in character, these peace operations in the Horn can be described as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations employ a mix of military, police, and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement. They support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance and rule of law. They also support the state's ability to provide security, with full respect for human rights.

In deploying these peace keeping troops, there is a tacit agreement that safe zones for civilians and returnees should be created and secured. The collapse of the state and the prolonged decay of institutions of governance and supporting structure in Somalia, for example, mean that reestablishment of the state is absolutely necessary if the peace agreement is to be protected, promoted, and sustained. In 1994, the Kenya government with help of the US government tried to create safe zones for Somali refugees in the Lower Juba region, and it failed simply because there was no police or any form of security to protect the transit camps (Hyndman 2000).

5   Conflict Resolution and Buffeting Hegemonies

While donor countries and related humanitarian agencies give almost 70% of financial and material support to meet the basic needs of refugees, they implicitly evade the more pervasive and long-lasting consequences of refugee hosting. Although the role and the legitimacy of the host countries in the search for peace and even durable solution are readily recognized, it is strengthened by the need to maintain political stability and the apparent desire by many industrialized countries of keeping refugees in their region (Milner 2011; Chimni 2002).

This legitimacy is also strengthened by the role of the international community. The UNHCR has long adopted what it calls "humanitarian diplomacy" by which they mean the strategies that seek to protect, assist, and find solutions for refugees, stateless persons, and people of concern without antagonizing host governments (Clements 2016). Humanitarian diplomacy recognizes the central role politics play in the production, hosting, and the search for solutions for refugees, yet the UNHCR is supposed to remain neutral in prevailing political circumstances. So this form of

diplomacy is meant to persuade both sovereign states and non-state actors to keep routes and borders open to access, protect, and assist refugees and also work toward durable solutions.

The host countries not only host humanitarian organizations, but they also host a large number of expatriates, diplomats, and security personnel. There is, therefore, a need for host governments to play important role in regional diplomacy. Nairobi, for example, hosts the majority of high commissioners, consulates, and embassies whose mandate also cover the neighboring countries in the regions. Besides its economic and regional importance, Nairobi is also the diplomatic hub of the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa on the other hand is the headquarter of the African Union and other supporting organizations. All regional bodies affiliated to the union routinely organize their meetings in Addis Ababa. For this reason, Kenya and Ethiopia can be considered to be the regional hegemons in the Horn.

In protected refugee situations like what obtains in the Horn of Africa, refugees constitute an important segment of economic activities. It has been noted how the exclusion of large number of Palestine refugees from the peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine has affected return, restitution, and responsibility (Rempel 2012: 6). The Palestine refugees, through their own platforms, have taken the position that they have a right to return to their homes without the political baggage characteristics of peace negotiations. The argument which has some merit is that refugees' situation is normally used by politicians and elites for political bargains which ultimately never benefit the refugees themselves. Refugees argued that they have not given anybody the power of authority to represent them so it is procedural for anybody to claim such responsibilities (Ibid.).

Refugee property and investment form a critical part of conflict reconstruction. For example, in the region matters concerning refugees' property remain unclear. Repatriation remains difficult owing to the complexities surrounding issues of custody, benefits, and restitution of properties and investments. Smit (2012) has discussed housing and property rights and the principles therein. All these considerations depend on the host countries' laws and policies. If, for example, repatriation of such property ensures that rightful owners do not lose their properties, then peace negotiations can benefit from such understanding. While documentation is scarce, it is claimed that Somali refugees using their clan networks have invested heavily in Kenya especially in Nairobi and other urban area. The Sudanese refugees have also invested in Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Their leaders have invested more (Zeitvogel 2016). Unsubstantiated claims have been made that Ethiopia and Kenya have often used the threat of freezing accounts and properties of Sudanese leaders to make them honor agreements.

Although Ethiopia and Kenya have not attained absolute hegemonic influence that Nigeria has in the ECOWAS region or South Africa in the SADC (Mesfin 2012), there is clear evidence that the two countries are moving toward this direction. Several reasons can be advanced to support this view. Firstly the entire humanitarian infrastructure and logistics of supporting refugees and displaced persons are coordinated from Nairobi, Kenya, or Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This is also true of conflict management and resolution efforts.

Secondly in military terms, the two countries have managed, with little opposition, to breach what would be considered accepted practice in conflict resolution. Both these states have sent their armies into Somalia although neighboring states are prohibited to do so.

Thirdly, the failure of the USA and European countries to directly contain violent extremism on their own means that they heavily rely on Kenya and Ethiopia to help manage the menace. These two countries have on this background been accorded considerable leverage. Besides playing host to many diplomatic dignitaries, these countries are currently receiving substantial military and intelligence support which enhances their standing of neighboring countries. Finally Addis Ababa hosts the headquarters of the African Union, while Nairobi hosts IGAD headquarters which are important focal points in regional negotiations. Being regional hubs for air travel as well as bases for many international NGOs and multilateral offices, their diplomatic influence is readily visible. Kenya and Ethiopia are both competitors and collaborators in their influence in regional policies and diplomacy.

6 Refugee Participation in Conflict Resolution

One of the enduring questions is whether refugees as victims of conflicts or persecutions in their home countries can be part of the conflict resolution and peace process. Rempel (2012) makes a case for refugee participation in peace negotiations and search for durable solutions from the basis that these forms are part of public affairs. The right to take part in peace negotiation and durable solutions has become a cornerstone of democratic norms and even international law. Most treaties which codify political participation are a fundamental to democratic gains. Human right affirms the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs directly or through representations. Human rights laws secure the rights of citizen to participate in public affairs, such laws are silent whether, and citizens can take part when they are displaced and residing outside of their country.

The role of refugees and diaspora community in conflict resolution has been demonstrated in the Horn of Africa by the case of Eritrea which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and Somalia peace process and supported the referendum in 1993. Refugees and the general term diaspora participated in reconstruction through regular payments and investment. They maintained political linkages with the homeland, and the current president was hosted by President Moi in Kenya (Al-Ali et al. 2001).

The justification of including host countries and refugees in conflict resolution and peace building has been enumerated by Milner (2011). Firstly, incorporating refugees in peace-building processes will further the cause and strategy and searching for durable solutions. Secondly, incorporating refugees in peace building will lessen the security concern and burden of refugee hosting countries. Thirdly, unresolved refugee situation can undermine peace building in neighboring countries.

This has been amply demonstrated by the case of Somalia in the Horn of Africa. Young and Prestholdt in their study in Ghana found an overwhelming desire by refugees to participate in the peace processes and other decisions which have a direct bearing in their lives (Young and Prestholdt 2010).

This is true both for IDPs and asylum seekers in neighboring countries. While this concern has not been adequately addressed, there have been several attempts at involving refugees in peace negations. The case of Somalia peace conferences in Kenya is illustrative. The many conferences held in Kenya and Ethiopia allowed many refugees to take part both as individuals and representative of different interest groups. This has also happened during the Sudan peace process. Although the Eldoret Peace Conference among the different Somalia groups was not conducive, it included many refugees as participants. However, controversies over the authenticities of delegates, especially refugees who may not be well-known to leaders, cause tension. Refugees are perceived to have legitimate rights and obligations to participate in the peace process.

6.1 Equipping Refugees and Host Communities in Conflict Resolution

Although when discussing conflicts, it is often that conflicts can occur or do occur between refugees and their host communities. Oliver Walton (2012a) has pointed out that tension between host communities and refugees can be addressed through integrated development program, conflict resolution program, and environment management programs. Some experiences in host countries may have long-term impact when refugees return in their home countries. Conflict resolution programmes run by UNHCR, UNDP and Care International in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia re-orient refugees from violence as the only means of addressing conflict (Walton 2012b) such experiences can be transferred to home countries.

Given that the average refugee situation exceeds 17 years, it is likely that refugees themselves have cultural investments in their host countries. To Milner it is important to integrate refugee issues into the responses to "long-standing conflict" (2011: 2). Peace-building processes which only view refugees as passive onlookers awaiting opportunity to return may yield only partial solutions. Yet among refugee population, there may be segments that are opposed to peace process in their own countries. This can either be through maintenance of political links or provision of material resources through remittance.

Milner notes that refugees can enhance peace-building process in their countries of origin if they are exposed to skills training that improve self-reliance while in exile. Training in service provision especially in health and education can make refugee contribution more visible on return and avoid conflict. Furthermore, peace education in exile could improve prospects for reconciliation and conflict resolution upon return (Milner 2011: 4).

The inclusion of refugees in peace negotiations, election, and peace building enhances the legitimacy that makes initiatives more representative (Milner 2011). Indeed this has been apt demonstrated in the case of South Sudan, Eritrea, and Somaliland (Torres 2005).

6.2   Post-conflict Reconstruction

As mentioned in the introduction, post-conflict situation brings with it challenges which are directly linked with displacement. The majority of peace accords fail because they fail to anticipate post-conflict problems. Furthermore peace agreements remain fragile for long periods of time as in the cases of Burundi and Cote d'Ivoire. Analysts have consistently pointed out that termination of violence and signing of peace agreements is hardly the end of conflicts.

Citizens and organizations of host communities are often the fast economic beneficiaries in post-conflict reconstruction in the Horn. Given that conflicts greatly undermine the asset base of citizens and institutions of countries of origin as well as the neighboring states, there is need to rebuild many public utilities, provide services, and prop capacity. Upon cessation of civil conflicts, Kenyan business and organizations ventured into Uganda, and many of them are still there today. This has been witnessed in South Sudan as well as in Somalia.

Evidence suggests that 70% of refugees and asylum seekers remain in their regions. For example, according to Fig. 1, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda host a total of 66% of refugees in the region with majority coming from neighboring Somalia and South Sudan. This means that these countries shoulder the greatest responsibilities of hosting refugees and asylum seekers. But this may also mean that they stand the chance to benefit most if peace and stability is restored in the region. This implies involving parties to the conflict but also host countries. Indeed, most of these activities in the home of Africa are done either in Nairobi, Addis Ababa of Nairobi.

7   Conclusion

This contribution analyzed conflict resolutions and peace processes from the position of refugee hosting countries. While the argument is not entirely conclusive, evidence directs us to further examine how hosting countries actively invoke the presence of large number of forced migrants in their territories to participate in conflict resolution. The Horn of Africa provides an apt region from which to analyze regional conflict resolution. First all the three common types of conflict tend to occur simultaneously. The presence of hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia on the one hand and Ethiopia and Eritrea illustrates the case of interstate conflicts. All the states within the region except Djibouti are experiencing intrastate conflicts which are

responsible for the large number of displaced people in the region. Inter-communal conflicts are equally present.

While Ethiopia has arguably behaved as a regional hegemon even without such massive displacement, its position has been greatly strengthened by the support it gets from the international community in stabilizing Somalia. To enhance its position, Ethiopia has even changed its refugee hosting practice and now has self-settlement areas where refugees can freely mingle with host population and experiment with alternative livelihood strategies.

Kenya's central role in IGAD and especially in the peace processes in both Somalia and South Sudan has elevated its position within the region. Indeed the incursion into Somalia and subsequent incorporation into AMISOM have made Kenya a serious contender of a regional power. However Kenya's influence is more evident in the post-conflict and reconstruction phase where many Kenyan businesses and institutions have vigorously sought to take advantage of the government's role in peace process.

Finally the post-conflict reconstructions efforts in the Horn will of necessity involve organizations and institutions from the neighboring countries. There is need for capacity building in security, governance, institutional support, and stabilization mechanisms required in both Somalia and South Sudan which can only be provided for effectively by regional states.

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