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Foreign Policies of East African States and Sub-Regional Cooperation

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Introduction

East Africa is potentially rich economically but has been marginalised by unfair international trade order, and inter-state conflict, fuelled by the colonial legacy, cold war politics and bad governance. From this reality, there is a considerable and ongoing interest in regional integration and co-operation as a solution to the region's problems. Traditionally, the focus has been on economic integration, trade preference schemes have been established and today as the East African Community II evolves, the limits of this approach are increasingly being recognised and a new form of regionalism is emerging. This new regionalism is, in pursuit of a long-term community building and more liberal in its economic orientation. The chapter examines the foreign policies of the East African states and regional co-operation since independence and explores some options for the revitalisation of such initiatives. These include the roles played by the respective East African states' regimes, parliaments, common market, language, regional security, common and foreign defence policies.

Theoretical Perspectives and Conceptual Framework

Foreign policy is the "legislative" aspect of the problem of inter-state relations. In this regard, foreign policy is the general course pursued by the state in conducting its relations with other states, with actions taken with reference to other bodies acting on the international stage, of which are international, supranational, and transnational groups, and occasionally individuals. On the other hand diplomacy is its executive aspect; the function of diplomacy is to peacefully defend the national rights and interests of the state abroad and through negotiations, ensure peaceful settlement of global problems and disputes. However, gunboat diplomacy or brute force is also an

instrument of diplomacy. In this regard, therefore, diplomacy is an integral organic part of foreign policy.

The word “policy” like its adjective “politic”, carries overtones of prudence or wisdom and implies the purposes for which actions are taken. A policy is a range of actions in combinations with the principles influencing those actions, or the purposes they are intended to serve. In all cases these purposes and actions are supposed to serve the national interests.

A policy may be well conceived in terms of goals, but ill-executed, so that frequently one hears excuses for bungling being proffered in the phrase, “He was acting in the national interest”. In this chapter we use policy to refer to actions designed to achieve goals. Reynolds defines foreign policy as: the range of actions taken by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, supposedly in order to advance the national interests.¹

Groups in all polities endeavour to identify with the national interest or the interests which the groups exist to serve. Such groups include economic, political, ethnic, military, religious and/or racial. In 1998, Kenyan wheat farmers demonstrating along Eldoret streets maintained with less success that the importation of agricultural products, i.e., maize, wheat, milk, and rice was not in line with the farmers’ interest.² National interests comprise the range of particular ends, usually of a relatively short-term in nature, which policy-makers, at a given time, try to achieve. In a revived East African Community, the objectives of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’s foreign policies include: among others, regional integration, peace and stability in the great lakes region, relief from starvation, easing of foreign debt burdens, and refugees. The executive and/or the ruling class have criteria for selecting or giving priority to some of these objectives.

In this regard, Foreign Policy decisions fall into the following three decision categories: pragmatic; tactical and crisis. Pragmatic decisions, are usually major decisions, and have long range consequences. These involve serious considerations, analysis and examination of alternative options. Tactical decisions are derivatives from the pragmatic level and are subject to re-evaluation, revision and reversal. Crisis decisions are usually unplanned and respond to unexpected or dangerous situations. States normally have three foreign policy choices that they can choose to pursue: status quo, expansionist, or prestige (demonstrative power).³ The first two categories correspond to Couloumbis and Wolfes pragmatic category,⁴ while pursuit of prestige according to Morgenthau, includes crisis and tactical decisions. Whatever the case, the following characteristics influence the formulation and implementation of foreign policy of any given state: environmental conditions such as territorial size, population, geographic location, resources and level of economic development; Societal structure, such as social classes, ethnic composition, cultural and psychological factors at work in the society; Contingency and situational factors which include political and economic crises, elections, strikes, civil war, and coups - factors that influence the intensity of social reactions and national ambitions; The governmental machinery of decision

making; and leadership, which refers to the way the executive formulates and implements its policies.⁵

Three major distinctions can be made from the variables above. Those which are in the nature of permanent and immutable physical realities which the policy makers cannot alter at all, or can alter at a great cost, i.e., natural material basics, societal structure and internal forces. Secondly, are those which are entirely amendable to manipulation by decision-makers; these include state institutions and state agencies which can be influenced by the executive or at their initiative. Thirdly, those which occur randomly and are capable of exerting decisive impacts on the course of events, i.e., situational factors and leadership.⁶ A good example was the 1971 military *coup detat* in Uganda which ushered in Idi Amin. The coup significantly affected the substance and direction of Uganda-Tanzania relations in particular and EAC relations in general.

The individual state's foreign policies in EAC thus, determine the extent and success of regional co-operation. East Africa's trend towards regionalism and regional co-operation has provided one of the most exciting developments in the history of international relations.

A region in international relations is an area embracing territories of three or more states.⁷ These states are bound together by ties of common interests and not necessarily on the same geographical location. A clear example is the association of nations that form the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) which are spread from the Americas to Europe. However, East Africa provides a good example of a regional co-operation on the same geographical location. States' co-operation is, therefore, meant to pool regional resources together for technological, economic, political and/or security purposes. As Walter Lippmann stated, the true constituent members of the international order of the future are communities of states.⁸

Chapter VIII, Articles 52-4 of the United Nations Charter is entirely devoted to the importance of regional arrangements.⁹ So what is a regional arrangement, pact or co-operation? According to Van Klefens, a regional arrangement or pact is a voluntary association of sovereign states within a certain area or having common interests in that area for a joint purpose, which should not be of an offensive nature, in relation to that area.¹⁰ However, states in a regional arrangement will always guard themselves from hostile or unfriendly quarters by co-ordinating and co-operating on security matters. A co-operation is a collaborative venture between two or more partners, with a common interest on a given issue. It can be limited to a single issue, fields of activity, or a particular sector, as per the contractual nature of co-operative arrangements, they are time bound, and reversible.¹¹ Thus special circumstances give rise to these agreements to address particular problems. It does not necessarily have to be a relationship of equality among partners, because in such co-operation, well to do member states give assistance to the disadvantaged. It involves specific initiatives, for purposes of regional integration.

Regional integration refers to a voluntary pooling of resources for a common purpose by two or more sets of partners belonging to different states. The process aims at

reinforcing structural interdependencies of a technical and economic sort, with positive effects on economic welfare. This covers a full range of public sector activities to include among other things, the co-ordination of economic, foreign, and defence policies, human rights, health, research, regional security, technology, and resource management. Economic integration implies the integration of economic activities, and other related sectors, in the pursuit of economic advantage.¹² However, spatial proximity is not always fundamental. Economic integration may even prevent regional integration, if it takes place between regions that are geographically removed at the expense of neighbouring regions. In contrast, regional integration cannot be detached from its association with geographical and physical space. Regional affiliation becomes a determining factor around which are defined feelings of cultural and political cohesion and a shared vision of the future. Bourenane, summarises and distinguishes the concept of regional integration from associated concepts along the following three main lines: it is voluntary (unions may or may not be voluntary); it is collectively undertaken, bringing into play the concept of community-building (in contrast to the contractual and temporary nature of regional co-operation); and it is geographically defined (in contrast to the notion of economic integration).¹³

Theoretical foundations of conventional approaches to regional integration and/or regionalism. The earliest theoretical work on regional integration can be tracked to the theory of comparative advantage in international trade, and the interest of liberal economists in promoting the reduction of tariff and no-tariff barriers to trade. There was need to identify modalities for implementing such policies and effectiveness of regional integration as a mechanism of trade liberalisation. It is argued that regional economic integration reduces trade barriers between states to the extent of creating free trade zones. This in turn strengthens the efficiency in the allocation of resources, by a state enabling it to take part in the international trade. However, J. Viner, argues that regional economic integration could lead to either “trade creation or trade diversion”¹⁴ Trade diversion emerges if trade laws are either unfair or excludes individuals, firms or discriminates member states or the state(s) isolates itself from the regional market. In most cases, it results from the failure to harmonise customs laws. Indeed Viner’s argument holds water to-date. The 1999 trade war on the importation of bananas from the Americas to the European market serves as an example of a regional economic integration hindering the liberalisation of world trade.

However, A. Marchal, proposes an alternative approach that would take into account the historical dimension of economic and social phenomena. He argues that:

Economic integration can either be perceived as the historical product of evolving technical, economic, and social structures, or it can be the product of conscious efforts on the part of human societies, acting collectively to improve their economic condition as a matter of choice”.¹⁵

Marchal, believes that integration is the result of social transformation. It cannot occur just anywhere or under any conditions. He argues further that integration must be based on industrialisation as its driving force, and sustained by those social forces capable of supporting and organising the industrialisation process.¹⁶

However, Marxist-Leninists¹⁷ argue that, integration emerges as a reflection of the internationalisation of capital and is intrinsic to the evolution of the capitalist economy. The integration of the European and the East African communities would be viewed as the consequence, rather than precursor, of the transformation of production and trade in favour of multinationals. Marxist-Leninists called for the rationalisation of the available resources in accordance with the planned centralised socialist approach. The 1989 liberal changes in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and the eventual collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) renders Marxist-Leninist approach incompetent in the integration process.

Perroux, builds his model around the concepts of growth poles, strategic investments, and industrialization as a collective instrument of development based on import protection.¹⁸ However, extra-economic factors in decision-making, e.g. political instability, forced migration and cattle rustling would lead to re-defining the objectives and impact of the integration process in East Africa,¹⁹ Co-operation which has reverted into the East African Community (EAC).

Post-Colonial East Africa's Foreign Policy Formulation and Objectives

Prior to independence, the East African states' foreign policies were conducted by the British Imperial rulers. However, after achievement of flag independence in the early nineteen sixties, the African governments had to deal directly with other independent states and actors in world politics. The three East African states attempted and failed to establish a federal government, and therefore had to evolve their own foreign policies. These states had to take into account the nature of their economies, the social and political environments and the ideologies of the ruling classes. We then ask ourselves the following questions immediately. What were the foreign policy objectives of the East African states? How were their foreign policies formulated and implemented? To what extent did the intra-East African foreign policies converge or divert and why? How did the politics of integration match with their foreign policies? How did they respond to the Organisation of African Unity and pan-Africanism in general? What lessons have been learned from the past? To answer these questions, a sketch of the principle foreign policy objectives of the East African states follows.

Kenya's Foreign Policy Objectives

The first years of Kenya's independence witnessed significant disagreements over basic government policy. This came out most clearly, in the debates on land, nationalisation and Kenya's foreign policy.²⁰ Gertzel argues that idealism competed against realism.²¹ V.A. Pochevsk,²² summarises Kenya's foreign policy that the early independence period was characterised by attempts to reconcile internal and external factors, future determinants of Kenya's foreign policy stating. Priorities included: choosing political orientation, formulating Kenya's position and stand on international issues, place and roles in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and African conflicts, and the non-aligned movement. C. Gertzel and D. Rothchild state that the period between 1963 and

1966 was characterised by a search for a workable system of foreign policy management.²³ The late Tom Mboya,²⁴ one of the key players at that time, states Kenya's concern to define a system and identify policies that met the needs, solve its problems and further the ambitions of the country.

These observations complemented the situation during that period (1963–66). Members disagreed on policy and the position adopted by individual members towards the continued rivalry for state and party leadership. However, the principle objectives of Kenya's foreign policy as observed by Katete Orwa are traceable to the two election manifestos prepared by KANU in 1961²⁵ and 1963.²⁶ The 1961 election manifesto states that an independent Kenya would: (i) Vigilantly safeguard national interest, (ii) Maintain independence for the people of Kenya, (iii) Join other nationalist movements in Africa to eradicate colonialism, racism, and/or oppression; (iv) foster and promote African "Unity of action", and, work for international peace and peaceful settlement of international/regional disputes through the framework of the United Nations organisation.²⁷

The 1963 KANU manifesto realised these objectives and converted some for the national interests. The manifesto stated that an independent government of Kenya formed by KANU would undertake to: (i) protect the security of the people, (ii) preserve the national integrity of Kenya, (iii) maintain military forces capable of protecting the people and the state, (iv) foster East African common services organisation and the East African common market, (v) conclude defence arrangements with regional states, (vi) give support to liberation movements in the continent, (vii) be non-aligned in global politics and international economics and, (viii) articulate fully in international affairs.

The early documents of the ruling party KANU, whose elite have led independent Kenya since 1963, set the foreign policy debate between the radicals and the conservatives on whether Kenya needed to adopt radical or moderate policies domestically and abroad. These party objectives, governmental and presidential or the executive diplomacy faced with external challenges and opportunities, have been responded to by the state in a series of foreign policy actions or inaction. Mwangi and Kurgat have traced the evolution of the workings of Kenya's foreign policy and the regions diplomacy and explained how the objectives complement East African co-operation, OAU and pan-Africanist ideals, and global issues.

Tanzania's Foreign Policy Objective

Tanzania's regional foreign policy was influenced and affected by the development of international relations and shaped by its reaction to those relations. It is in this light, therefore, that Tanzania's foreign policy must be viewed in light of its reaction to the foreign policy of other countries.

On 14th December 1961, shortly after Tanganyika's independence, the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere outlined his country's basic foreign policy principles while addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York.²⁸ According to Nyerere, Tanzania

had to adopt four foreign policy principles of action so as to meet the following international obligations:

- (i) Commitment to human equality and human rights as stipulated in the United Nations Universal Declaration for Human Rights;
- (ii) The second principle, expressed Tanzanians support towards African liberation movements and even hosted the headquarters of OAU liberation committee in Dar-es-salaam, for many years;
- (iii) The third principle calls for African unity or pan-africanism. Adopting this strategy, Tanzania hoped to secure peace and political independence for the continent, which in turn would create a common front to fight against poverty and dependency; and
- (iv) The fourth principle emphasised Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. Anxious to keep out of the "East-West" tension, Tanzania was always vigilant not to be used to fight wars that were not of its immediate concern. Despite having a lot in common with most of the then Moscow-led pact countries, Tanzania maintained fairly cordial relations with majority of the countries world-wide.

Indeed, as Kiondo observes, the policies of socialism and self-reliance together with the forestated principles, constituted the determinants of Tanzania's foreign policy.²⁹ During the colonial period, Kenya was designed to develop as a settler economy, while Tanganyika and Uganda were to evolve peasant economies. Tanganyika could not, therefore, develop strong indigenous middle class or capitalist elements, which could forge an alliance with western finance capital. Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), as a political party was, therefore, a club of the petty-bourgeoisie, its social base being the poor peasants and unskilled workers. It was against this background that Tanzania's foreign policy was formulated and implemented up to the exit of the late Julius Nyerere from power in 1985. T.C. Niblock, concludes that, "Tanzania's foreign policy, like the country's many policies, was founded on populist rhetorics, rather than clearly focused strategies."³⁰ Here emanates the first limitation of Tanzania's foreign policies.

The roots of the second limitation can be traced to the economic situation at independence. It is said 85 percent of her development revenue came from British loans and grants with the rest coming from the Federal Republic of Germany. The third limitation was that indigenous citizens held only a quarter of the senior and middle grade posts in the civil service.³¹

It is, therefore, not surprising that Tanzania's foreign policy between 1961-1965 encountered serious challenges. The early years of foreign policy formulation and articulation were coerced by the Hallstein policy.³² Accordingly, Tanzania was advised not to allow East Germany to open a consulate in Dar-es-salaam³³ Tanzania remained faithful to its principle of non-alignment and allowed the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to establish a consulate. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) responded by withdrawing military assistance and threatening to withdraw its economic assistance.

Tanzania quickly reacted to these threats by calling off all FRG financed projects.³⁴ And in another show down with the developed world, In January 1965, Tanzania expelled two American diplomats suspected of engaging in subversive activities against the Zanzibar government. In 1965 Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with Britain over its failure to act upon Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Rhodesia.³⁵ Under these circumstances, Tanzania lost the technical, economic, and educational assistance it urgently needed from the donor community. Frustrated with the non-availability of funds and foreign investments prospects, and determined to drive the economy to meet the needs of the masses, the government embarked on the policy of nationalisation. These were the ideals and expressions of socialism in an attempt to be self-reliant that culminated in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) also coerced Dar-es-salaam into withdrawing their financial assistance.

Uganda's Foreign Policy Objectives

Uganda, like its neighbours, also sought independence, security, national identity and pan-Africanism as key foreign policy objectives. Uganda's domestic needs, argues P.G. Okoth³⁶ had to evolve for its own foreign policy. At the domestic level Uganda's foreign policy had to take into account the nature of the economy, the social and political environment and the ideology of the ruling class³⁷. There were two major obstacles in the formulation and implementation of Uganda's foreign policy objectives. First, Ugandan diplomats and policy-makers had no experience in diplomacy and foreign policy making. Secondly, internal political instability had forced the Ugandan leadership to concentrate more on peace and national reconciliation.

Located at the source of River Nile, Uganda is a land-locked country. Its first foreign policy objective, therefore, was good neighbourliness with the Nile basin countries in general and Kenya in particular. Uganda was dependent on Kenya's external trade; Kenya provides this outlet at the port of Mombasa. The second foreign policy objective was to guard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. This again meant adopting the policy of good neighbourliness. Until the 1978/79 Uganda-Tanzania war, it was considered taboo for the East African states to engage in war, on any issues involving their national interests.³⁸

The third foreign policy objective emphasised fostering East African co-operation by building on the foundations of a common market and the services that had been established under British colonialism.

However, the idea of an East African Federation challenged Uganda's foreign policy objective of forging closer co-operation. The Obote administration wanted the federation to succeed, but when it was finally initiated following Kenya's political independence, the neo-federalists in Uganda posed serious obstacles to the federation debate. The government, therefore, opted to consolidate state power and national unity.

The fourth foreign policy objective emphasises the principle of non-alignment. This principle was clearly articulated in the 1960's by Dr. Milton Obote who declared:

We in Uganda are against any political blocs in Africa or in the world. We do not believe in a divided Africa ... we believe in the non-alignment.³⁹

This declaration was mainly for purposes of internal consumption. Much as Uganda would have liked to be neutral, the declaration was directed at Buganda's separatism and feudalism that had been constitutionally protected. Okoth notes that this was to become a bone of contention between the King of Buganda – Edward Mutesa II and premier Obote.⁴⁰ Shortly after Obote's victory against the Kabaka, and the declaration of the common man's charter, Uganda entered into a crisis in its domestic and foreign relations lasting up to date.

A comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the three states clearly draws some similarities. First, independent East African governments sought to safeguard their national interests. Kenya's North Eastern frontier district attempted to secede followed by the shifta war. Separatist tendencies from the Ugandan Kingdoms of Buganda, Toro, Ankole and Bunyoro and Tanzania's troubled island of Zanzibar are pointers to this direction. Secondly, the three states supported the eradication of all forms of colonialism, racism and oppression. Thirdly, they fostered East African co-operation and African unity. Fourthly, they supported peace through the framework of the United Nations Organisation. However, their ideological differences worked against their common stand in most foras.

Inspired by one of their major foreign policy principles – the spirit of Pan-Africanism, and the establishment of common market and services, the leaders pledged in the Nairobi Summit of June 5, 1963 to steer the states into a political federation. In a joint communique they declared:

... Our meeting today is motivated by the spirit of Pan-Africanism, and not by mere selfish regional interest. We are nationalists, and reject tribalism, racialism or inward-looking policies. We believe that the day of decision has come and to our people we say: There is no more room for slogans and words. This is our day of action in the cause of the ideals that we believe in and the unity and freedom for which we have suffered and sacrificed so much.⁴¹

With this declaration, the East African states, guided by their foreign policy principles of fostering East African Co-operation, hoped to take practical steps to achieve their common goals. Their common history, culture and customs acted as a catalyst to their common destinies, and only needed a legal framework urgently. In the post colonial era, the East African governments needed a regional organisation that would serve in areas including economic planning, human resource development and utilisation, a central bank, common defence programme, and diplomatic representation abroad. Such an approach would assist the governments to achieve greater co-ordination and savings in scarce capital, facilities for training and manpower. The susceptible population then at 25 million (today approximately at 90 million), would provide a formidable labour market to influence economic development at home, attracting a greater investment, enhancing the East African prestige and influence abroad. An East African federation meant drawing a constitution to accommodate relevant territorial interests. However,

the question then was how individual country objectives and interests could be harmonised?

A working party was commissioned to prepare a framework for the draft of a constitution for the Federation of East Africa. The party consulted with the governments and, with their consent, co-opted constitutional and other experts in their work. By August 1963, a conference was expected to consider their proposals. Membership was left open to Zanzibar and any other neighbouring states to join the federation in future. President Nyerere, Prime Minister Obote and President Kenyatta, after lengthy consultation, appended their signatures to the proposals. The proposals opened lengthy federation debates from the public official circles, regional governments, the private sector and parliamentarians from the three states. The roles played by the legislatures and governments in the federation attempt, are analysed in the next section of the chapter.

The Roles of Parliaments and Governments in Regional Co-Operation and Integration

The debate on the creation of an East African Federation was received with a lot of enthusiasm. Tanzanian newspapers termed the idea a step towards a prosperous economic future for it made sense economically and politically that such a solid foundation could gradually lead to a wider amalgamation of African states.⁴²

In parliament Tanzanian front and backbenchers vigorously supported the project and saw it as an attempt to boost the socio-economic level of development to the maximum. The emergence of a political federation served Tanganyika's national interests. A.Z.N. Sivai, a member of parliament while addressing the house stated:

... Sir, it would appear desirable that a long term federal planning policy should aim at removing disparities between the levels of development of the component parts of the federation ... These regional plans should enable the poorer people to enjoy the full benefits of this new step towards African unity. The work at present in progress within the Ministry of Development Planning will be a valuable contribution to the overall economic and social plan of the new Federation of Eastern Africa within the context of Pan-African Unity.⁴³

The parliamentarians expected the federation to usher in new types of development. A parliamentary member was applauded when he remarked that the large, brotherly, new community which was emerging in East Africa should not tolerate the fact that all its members do not enjoy a comparable standard of living.⁴⁴

In Kenya, the opposition party KADU and the ruling party KANU welcomed the idea. Ronald Ngala of KADU expressed his sentiments in parliament in 1963:

... This House would welcome a federation of East Africa this year (1963), and urges the Government of Kenya to negotiate on the basis of creating one East African nation embracing, amongst other fundamental aspects, one flag and one Prime Minister⁴⁵

KANU supported the idea through the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Tom Mboya. Re-affirming the 1963 KANU manifesto's objectives to foster East African Co-operation by building on the foundations of the East African Common Services Organisation and Common Market, the Minister stated that: "... It was KANU's intention to surrender the sovereignty of Kenya to a bigger East African Federation". The party believed, that was the reason why KANU was elected with an overwhelming majority throughout the country. The August House, was informed that the government, in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, had dispatched on the day the government was sworn in, on 1st June 1963, three ministers to Tanzania to confirm Kenya's readiness in the formation of an East African Federation.⁴⁶

While acknowledging the government's efforts to negotiate a political federation, Ngala urged the House, to speed up the process. He advocated for a co-operation that would be of meaning to the *Mwananchi* (ordinary person). However, he cited Kenya's Majimbo system, Uganda's Kingdoms and the three states' constitutions as possible obstacles to the process. He stressed that it was the right of the people to determine their own internal constitution. As if that would have any negative implications on the federation process, Ngala said: "Local matters, that really matter to the people and are close to their hearts, are placed nearer to them so as to effect practical democracy".⁴⁷

A federation, Ngala said, would solve the problems of boundaries, strengthen regional security against aggressors, create wealth, services and jobs. The motion was seconded by Masinde Muliro, after which, the Ministers of Justice and constitutional affairs (Mr. Mboya), Commerce and Industry (Dr. Kiano), and Deputy Speaker (Mr. De Souza) engaged the opposition side – especially Ngala and Martin Shikuku who were disturbed and according to them were misunderstood, said Shikuku:

... We are not talking of one East African bed in which you are going to sleep. We are talking of various territories trying to agree on a type of constitution which will cater for the East African Federation, and not one bed or one wife for all ...⁴⁸

After a lengthy discussion, the government and the opposition sides were able to shape and direct Kenya's foreign policy towards regional integration. Unanimously after amendment, the Kenyan parliament resolved:

... This House would welcome an East Africa Federation this year and urges the Government of Kenya to negotiate on the basis of creating one East African Nation embracing, amongst other fundamental aspects, one flag and one Head of State and that personal ambitions, tribalism or territorial constitutions must not be allowed to stand in the way of this vital step towards the unity of East Africa.⁴⁹

Things so far were moving well in Kenya and Tanzania on the federation issue. However, there was serious hesitation from some quarters in Uganda. The Ugandan Kings and hereditary rulers feared that the East African federation would sweep away their powers enshrined in the constitution. Some opposition leaders were angered by the fact that the Prime Minister, had attended the Nairobi meeting to declare the East African Federation without consulting the people of Uganda.⁵⁰

An opposition leader, Basil Bataringaya, while endorsing the declaration by the Heads of the East African Governments to form a political federation, warned that this was to come with sacrifices, including giving away sovereign powers.⁵¹ Bataringaya positively recognised that East Africa is a geographical region, with a common inland lake, Lake Victoria – a communication link. Kenya and Uganda have a common railway line – a lifeline of Uganda and a market route for Kenya. However, the opposition member especially from the Ugandan Kingdoms – Buganda, Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro were disappointed that the Prime Minister did not consult with them, though they represented quite a large section of Ugandans.

While urging the Kings to give up their Kingdoms, for the greater good of Mother Africa, the opposition was quite worried about the conduct of external relations. They related sovereignty to external relations, i.e., diplomatic representation abroad and their seat at the United Nations. They expressed concern that Africa would lose its four seats in the United Nations – through the federations of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar and called for serious re-considerations. This position brought Uganda's opposition in a closer league with the hesitant Ugandan Kings. Other leading anti-federation elements included veteran politician, Paul Muwanga, who disputed the idea that the East African federation would act as a nucleus of African Unity. He dismissed it as unworkable citing the Monrovia and Casablanca groups, which were dissolved by the OAU charter. Muwanga further identified failed regional co-operations like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali and the French Cameroon. He singled out Kenya and Tanganyika for being dishonest partners in the spirit of the East African Common Services Organisation (EASCO). Muwanga cautioned that the British and the Americans were not sincere partners, and were never interested in the unity of a single state, let alone an East African Federation. He preferred a wider African unity and blamed Kenya's failure to balance its budget without external subsidy, as an obstacle to the federation. Muwanga finally concluded that:

I admit that the links between these three territories must be maintained, but it is high time we thought of the greater field ... These regional groupings had their own time and that time is gone. They have been tried in various spheres and they have failed. An East African Federation, as compared with African unity is going to fail.⁵²

Such an uncompromising stand was to be adopted by many Ugandan personalities both in the regions, government and/or opposition parties. In fact, Uganda's Minister of Information, Broadcasting and Tourism (Mr. A.A. Nekyon), was forced to concede that; the three East African leaders had committed themselves to forming a federation without co-ordinating with their parliaments, who were the people's constitutional custodians. In an attempt to absolve the government he said: "... as the prime minister said in his foreign policy speech recently, before East African Federation becomes a reality, the National Assembly and indeed the other legislatures will be fully consulted and given a chance to submit their views."⁵³

The opposition was quick to note the shift in the government's foreign policy, judging from the Prime Minister's tone; he was quoted as having said the declaration was

merely an intention. However, Obote gave his people assurance by saying that: "The East African Federation is important. We shall continue to talk about it, and I hope we shall find a solution to a structure that would accommodate the needs of the federating countries"⁵⁴. However, he angrily protested against sentiments by Kenya's Minister of State, Joseph Murumbi's statement that Kenya and Tanganyika may go ahead and form a federation on their own, leaving Uganda, to come in later.⁵⁵ Even though wary of the Kenya and Tanganyika possibilities of restricting port facilities to Ugandan goods, he argued that investors were more concerned with the stability of a country than about its size. "The profit may be small but, steady and continuous,"⁵⁶ How said Dr. Obote. He singled out foreign policy as an area of concern that had not been agreed upon though Tanganyika and Uganda were independent and their foreign policies well known. It was, therefore, difficult, according to Obote to decide "the Federation's common foreign policy. However, Kenyatta and his government, stood firmly by the June 1963 resolution on East African Federation, and disassociated his government from the statement made by the Minister of State in-charge of External Affairs, Joseph Murumbi.⁵⁷ Meanwhile Uganda's President, Sir Edward Mutesa, congratulated Kenya on the successful outcome of the Kenya constitutional talks concluded in London and expressed optimism about the anticipated closer association and advanced economic-co-operation in East Africa.

However, in a rejoinder by the opposition, legislator Bataringaya said, "The Nairobi declaration Mr. Speaker has been punctured. The big declaration has missed the bus. We have to start afresh ..."⁵⁸ He accused the government for having not come out with a frank public policy on the East African Federation. He wondered if the federation was a Kenya-Tanganyika-Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC) or Kenya-Tanganyika-Uganda federation. Dr. Obote had just made a joint communiqué on the federation of East Africa in Nairobi with his Kenyan and Tanganyikan counter parts, but under pressure pulled aside on the issue. However, he believed that foreign policy, focused on the federation, could better serve Uganda's economic and political interests.

The legislative assemblies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam gave enormous support to the debate on the establishment and development of a federation. However, the support prompted Ugandans to conclude that it was political sympathy that linked Kenya and Tanganyika. A KANU parliamentary group meeting (April 9, 1964) appealed to the three East African leaders to adopt the noble objectives contained in their joint communiqué of June 5, 1963. They termed the federation's objective as a pre-requisite to the advancement of Pan-African Unity.⁵⁹

The Nairobi legislators' conference of May 7th, 1964 representing the TANU and KANU groups, supported and endorsed the historic declaration signed by the East African leaders on June 5, 1963, in Nairobi. They said that such a federation was in keeping with the spirit of the Charter signed by the African Heads of State at Addis Ababa, May 1963 for promoting Pan-African unity. The legislators' conference called for: the immediate federation of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar; heads of state summit within 15 days of the date thereof to sign the interim articles of federation; adoption of an open door policy to any African country wishing to

join such federation; and a strong federal constitution to provide for a strong East African federal government.

In their rejoinder, the three heads of state endorsed the legislators' commitments but with serious reservations. Nyerere for instance, cast serious doubts on the ability of a federal government to solve all the difficulties facing the East African states. He voiced the need for careful interrogation of the documents that had been drawn up. He stressed the importance of commitment by saying:

... nations should only enter into a federation when they can do so with a whole-hearted and unqualified commitment to it. There is nothing wrong in not being ready to make that commitment, but to enter discussion, or a new political unit, without the commitment would be to do enormous damage to the whole future of Africa.⁶⁰

However, Nyerere cautioned that if Africa waited until all interstate or all the internal problems were solved, then the chances of any federation or any form of unity would not be there at all. Dr. Obote expressed the same sentiment noting many aspects of federation had still to be settled, i.e., the respective powers of the federal and state governments. "It is not good to set up a federation and then have differences",⁶¹ concluded Obote. Nyerere and Obote made it clear that without an invitation or initiative from either head of state, they would not attend any meeting under pressure – thus ignoring the legislators' proposals.

In his rejoinder, Kenyatta rejected the legislators' resolutions of May 11th, 1964. Spelling out Kenya's regional foreign policy, Kenyatta stressed the importance of letting the working party on East African Federation to pursue the objective of forming the federation and to examine certain trade relationships pertaining to the common market. "The parliamentary (Kanu-Tanu) conference resolutions calling for Kenya-Tanganyika federation without Uganda is most unfortunate", said Kenyatta.⁶² He firmly stated that the enthusiasm of the East African people for a federation meant closer collaboration with all regional governments.

However, at this point, the working party identified three main problematic areas namely: distribution of powers within the federation e.g. foreign affairs; the federal capital; and the powers of the Senate.

We now look at individual states position on common foreign policy. Kenya preferred the exercise and control over foreign policy and foreign relations to be under the federation. However, Kenya's worry, as expressed by Tom Mboya, was a situation where separate East African, representatives at the United Nations could take different stands on the same international issue. Nevertheless, Kenya advocated for an effective share in determining the foreign policy of the federal government, for example having a committee similar to the USA (the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate), which would be entrusted with the appointments to diplomatic posts and formulate common foreign policies. Concurring with Kenya's sentiments, Oscar Kambona (Minister of External Affairs) of the Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, reiterated that control of foreign affairs, citizenship and to some extent external borrowing, were essential

attributes of a federal government.⁶³ It was the conviction of Tanzania, like Kenya, that foreign affairs controlled by individual states rather than by the federal government, would render it difficult to identify the international personality of the federation.

However, Ugandan expressed a different view on the issue of common foreign policy. Adoko Nekyon, categorically emphasised that foreign affairs must be a state subject. He expressed fears that if foreign affairs were controlled by the federal government, it would be impossible to identify the international personality of the federation. Nekyon queried:

... What powers would Uganda surrender to the continental government of Africa, if and when established, if Uganda now surrenders foreign affairs to the federal government in East Africa ... if powers in relation to foreign affairs were given to the federation, then it would amount to Uganda asking her federal states to go into the federation as independent units rather than a central government of Uganda going into federation .⁶⁴

The Ugandan government had difficulty going into a federation, in which foreign affairs are surrendered to the federal government. In the light of the above, it was clear that the leaders of Kenya and Tanganyika intended foreign affairs to be a federal subject, unlike the hesitating Uganda partner. However, this did not deter a move to closer co-operation.

The heads of the three East African states committed themselves to a federation in June 1963, via the Nairobi declaration, and by 1965, the public was being prepared for a substantial introduction in the area of the functional co-operation, already established prior to 1963. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda became the founding members of the East African Community in 1967.⁶⁵

However, despite the many notable differences, East Africa had so much in common. These include: strong historical and cultural links, i.e. common history; common market; common services, free personal movement; common currency; common economic and political interests – these were necessary tools in the integration process. Their differences arose only from the three state/ideological divide – Tanzania's socialist orientation, Uganda's sympathy to the left and Buganda's long-standing hostility towards East African Union, and Kenya's capitalist orientation. These were some of the problems in the operations of the common market.⁶⁶

However, the foreign policies of the three East African states from 1961–1967 were concentrated on issues of political federation and economic cooperation. Unfortunately, lack of a common ground on political federation finally made the leaders, sign the EAC treaty mainly inclined on the region's economic cooperation.

East African Foreign Policies: An Experiment in Integration

Foreign policy plays a very prominent part in development strategy. Economic matters, therefore are central in the foreign policies of developing countries, as they are in the developed world. In this section, we analyse the part played by the foreign policies of EAC States towards economic integration.

After the failure to chart out an East African political federation, through shuttle diplomacy, the three leaders turned their attention to the economic form of integration. The negotiations led to the signing of the Treaty of East African Co-operation in 1967, which mainly emphasised economic activities in the region. Other fields of co-operation were mentioned casually.⁶⁷

The main objective of the East African states' regional foreign policies manifested in the treaty was to create, strengthen, and regulate the industrial, commercial, and other relations of the partner states. It was designed to achieve an acceptable distribution of the benefits of co-operation between the states, and to place within one framework, the common services and the common market.⁶⁸ The treaty enabled the common market to acquire a legal foundation, which was non-existent in the EACSO, and conferred a legal personality on the organisation.

The treaty also established a transfer tax system, designed to protect some industries in Tanzania and Uganda against similar ones in Kenya. This encouraged duplication rather than protected Tanzania and Uganda from Kenya's competitive industries. The treaty established the East African Development Bank which was commissioned to initiate investments within East Africa.⁶⁹ The treaty also relocated the headquarters of the common services. Kenya became the headquarters of East African Railways and East African Airways. The harbours corporation and the headquarters of the East African Community were located in Arusha, Tanzania. The East African Development Bank and the East African Post and Telecommunications were located in Kampala, Uganda.⁷⁰

The control of the Community was bestowed on the Authority (the highest policy-body making) comprising the three heads of state. This situation limited the capacity of other sectors/organs of the community to initiate or implement policies of the community. The authority protected national interests and in turn led to centralisation of power within the executive. The success of the system depended on the harmonious relationships among the presidents. This was the problematic nerve in the operations of the Community. Any political differences or conflict, therefore, affected economic integration.

The East African states also needed rationalised economic basis. One such basis, the East African Common Market, was institutionalised. However, it was never so articulate, or rationalised in its philosophical undertakings. Indeed this was the root cause of the EAC I break up. Despite the energy and time accorded to regional building, nobody bothered to overhaul the colonial economic set-up. Tanzania and Uganda were recipients of multinational goods from Europe, through Kenya. All the important industries (British) were based in Kenya.

The East African Industries controlled the East African market, manufactured all cooking oils, detergents and many processed foodstuffs. Long after its formation, the East African Common Market was not common at all. It remained almost wholly Kenyan or, more correctly, British. The primary cause of the collapse of the community can thus be traced to London and, ultimately, to a conspiracy of British Industrialists. These industrialists prevailed on certain high-powered politicians and civil servants in the Kenyatta regime to reject the legitimate demands by Tanzania and Uganda that the market be rationalised. Samwel Makinda stresses that:

Indeed, from the beginning, Kenya's foreign policy was shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, maintain commercial links with neighbouring states, ensure the security of its borders and consolidate the domestic power base.⁷¹

This policy entrenched dependence on 'foreign investment' which, in turn called for the perpetuation of Kenya's dependence on the East African market and foreign investment which was to facilitate and maintain Kenya's regional dominance.⁷² As evidenced by statistics, trade in the EAC was basically confined to two bilateral flows as indicated in Table 1. These were trade flows between Kenya and Uganda on the one hand, and Kenya and Tanzania on the other. On average, between 1969 and 1978, trade between Kenya and Uganda totalled US\$83.4 million and that between Kenya and Tanzania totalled US\$60.8 million in the same period.⁷³ This implies that, for every US\$1 representing trade between Tanzania and Uganda in the EAC, there were US\$23 representing Kenya's trade with Uganda, and US\$16 representing Kenya's trade with Tanzania.⁷⁴

Uganda and Tanzania remained net importers because 81 percent of Uganda's total intra-EAC trade between 1969 and 1978 comprised imports from Kenya alone. Kenya controlled 76.6 percent of the total intra-EAC exports. For every US\$4 worth of exports, Kenya imported only US\$1 worth of goods from the EAC, Uganda US\$5 for every US\$1 and Tanzania for every US\$1 imported goods worth US\$2.⁷⁵

Table 10.1 indicates that a substantial part of intra-EAC imports went to both Uganda and Tanzania.

Governance and Development in East Africa

In this Book, several authors, drawn from Kenyan universities, address the perpetual burning question of : why is there persistent and unequal development with many of the initiatives taken only registering minimal success?

While the promise of development has been a rallying call by most east African leaders, especially in the struggle for political independence, the high expectations of the citizens for a change in livelihoods and wealth creation has not been matched by altruistic interests amongst the leadership. Indeed, insurmountable problems continue to bedevil the citizens including poor health, hunger and malnutrition, dilapidated physical and social infrastructure amongst others.

The broad purpose of the Book is to gather evidence that could qualify or disqualify the linkage between the form of governance adopted in east Africa and its development. While the book does not survey the entire continent, it rather follows a case study of east Africa, in an interdisciplinary perspective. The issues covered in the area of governance include, leadership, parliamentarism, NGOs and empowerment, ideologies, feminist perspectives of governance, democratization, challenges of reproductive health, east African integration, and foreign policy making.

This Book may serve as a resource material for university students, researchers and practitioners of governance and development. It may also appeal to general readers.

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