EDUCATION as a FOREIGN POLICY TOOL

Kenya Students' Airlift to Russia and Eastern Europe, 1954 – 1991

Paul K. Kurgat

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Foreword

Paul Kibiwott Kurgat in the present book has presented a wide range of critical reflections on one of the most important topical issues of our times - education as a foreign policy tool: Kenyan students' airlift to Russia and Eastern Europe, 1954 – 1991. This book, a product of Doctor of Philosophy research thesis focuses on Kenyan students' educational airlifts to Russia/Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It surveys Soviet and its satellite states of Eastern Europe's external relations with the developing world in general and Kenya in particular. It assesses the role of education in states foreign policies. The book reveals that even at the height of the cold war, when Kenya had little business to do with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states, students' continued admission to universities in these countries was almost the only steady engagement in the cold war period (1954-1991). The year 1954, marks Nikita Khrushev's policies of de-Stalinization and peaceful co-existence with other nations and 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and thawing of relations between East and West blocs in particular and the rest of the world in general. Students' Airlifts to Russia and its proxy satellite republics and Eastern European states, was a vision of African nationalists and the courage of hundreds of young Kenyans who dared venture forth to unknown destinations that were far from traditionally "acceptable" places for higher education, such as Makerere, Dar-es-Salaam, Fort Hare, Cairo, Addis-Ababa or
London. It also tells the story of a group of Kenyan nationalists, Russian and Eastern Europeans who understood the role of education in political socialization, creation of allies both internal and external, and subsequent spheres of influence.

The students' airlifts to Russia and Eastern Europe in 1954 are much earlier than the airlifts to America (1959-1960 and 1963) and continued much longer to the end of the cold war 1991.Governments in these countries allocated funds in their budgets on an annual basis to cater for air fares, tuition and accommodation. The students' airlifts to Russia and the Eastern bloc like those to America were aimed at supporting the anti-colonial movements around the world, creating various national cadres of human resource, future allies and spheres of influence. Today in Kenya some of those who were in these airlifts have played major roles in various sectors of

national development as engineers, doctors, politicians, educationists and in the public service and the private sector.

Dr. Kurgat's work, falls within the realm of diplomatic history. Overall, the book makes a very interesting reading. Given the massive chapters and the elaborate primary, secondary and oral sources used which constitute historical evidence for professional historians; and the book is adequate in both form and content. In terms of original contribution to knowledge, the book unquestionably does so in two respects. First, it is the first of its kind to focus on Kenyan students' airlifts to Russia and Eastern Europe. Second, the primary and secondary sources in the book have been aptly interpreted. Based on the above, the book is a reflection of a deep understanding of the subject matter. The author is a diplomatic historian who spent six years in the Soviet Union initially as a student of International relations and diplomacy at the Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, Kiev State University and later Kenya's ambassador to the Russian Federation, Republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era. These vantage positions, coupled with the fact that he is a Don at the Department of History, Political Science and Public Administration of Moi University, made him fully grasp the essence of diplomatic relations between Kenya-Russia/Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, based on cultural diplomacy. The book contributes to the understanding of how educational scholarships were influenced by both internal and external environments of the Cold war. It lays bare the fact that much of a country's foreign policy and national interests should be understood in the context of a country's relations with other states.

The chapters in this book offer an authoritative well researched academic summary and treatment of Kenya-Soviet and Eastern European relations and the rest of the world during the period of study, 1954 – 1991. This book is of an exciting scholarly historical research. I strongly recommend it for use at various institutions that include serving as a guide in policy formulation, a text of international relations, and diplomacy to be used by policy makers, researchers and students.

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Preface

The book sought to identify the genesis and historical development of student airlifts to the USSR and Eastern Europe, investigate the role of education as a foreign policy tool, and examine the impact of the cold war on students' scholarships to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Following the end of the World War II in 1945, the world order was dominated by the Cold War mindset. The USSR and USA started engaging in the de- colonization of colonial states in general and Africa states in particular. Both USSR and USA started supporting trade unions, political parties and strategized on to influence the Third World as education became a very useful tool. The politics and economies of de-colonization were engaged through and within the Cold War lenses and self-interest. The West rolled out the Marshall Plan of Action in Europe and extended the same to the Third World through foreign aid.

The book "Education as a Foreign Policy Tool: Kenyan Students' Airlift to Russia and Eastern Europe, 1954—1991 argues that much of a country's foreign policy and national interest can be understood in the context of the country's relations with other states. Traditionally, international relations are a matter of interchanges among states. States oversee and promote bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of peace and security, trade and other economic relations and cultural relations. Foreign policy begins when a state manages to transcend the dichotomy of internal and external pressures and develops multiple strategies of responding to world challenges. The book thus contributes to the understanding on how educational scholarships were impacted by both the internal and external environment of the Cold War.

The book focuses on Kenyan students' airlifts to the USSR and Eastern Europe from 1954 to 1991. The year 1954 marked Nikita Khrushchev's policies of de-Stalinization and peaceful co-existence with other nations.

Khrushchovskaya ottepel (Khrushchev's thaw), is a term coined after Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954 novel The Thaw. The policies initiated transformation of educational and cultural contacts, youth festivals, books by foreign authors and international sports competitions and other contacts. Khrushchev's policies helped liberate minds of the Soviets and endeared them to the outside world. In 1956, Khrushchev initiated a number of rehabilitations that restored reputations of innocent victims of Stalin's purge as well as introduction of freedom of speech. In July 1957 the World Youth Festival attracted 34 thousand youth and students from 130 countries. The thaw had huge impact in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia).

Some of the finest young Africans of Kenya were being transported abroad by the British and American benefactors to enter the universities of the United Kingdom and United States to acquire the education which would energize their final push toward independence. Other states that had little ties with Kenya also appeared on the educational scholarship scene. The book analyzes how the USSR was involved both inside and outside the USSR in helping to alleviate these needs. For the host country, international students' presence in colleges and universities is beneficial because these students contribute to the enrichment of higher education, to the strengthening of relations with countries in world trade and to the promotion of global understanding.

The contents of the book are analytical and descriptive in presentation in the form of text, tables, figures and photographs. In the text, descriptions of behaviour and the context in which they occur are given while the "voices" of the respondents are quoted. The cases are drawn from within the wider case and are reflected in the analytical framework of the study. Discussions are integrated into chapters. This book deals with the role of education as a foreign tool during the cold war (1954-1991) between Kenya, USSR and Eastern Europe. The mid-twentieth century saw young Africans go beyond borders to seek knowledge.

This book, therefore, explains more elaborately about Kenya- USSR and Eastern Europe's cultural diplomacy which is still an under-explored area. The book will benefit policy makers on how educational scholarships could be made a better foreign policy tool in diplomacy. This being a case study will contribute to the understanding of Kenya – Russia and Eastern European student airlifts and how it influenced the bilateral relations of

these countries. It will generate data and information that will be useful to students of international relations, scholars and policy makers as it will also recommend ways and means by which these states relations in particular and Kenya's foreign relations globally can be conducted. Furthermore, analyses of the airlifts demonstrate how foreign institutions can be utilized to acquire various skills needed for national development and how students and scholarships can be useful in enhancing bilateral relations.

Dedication

I dedicate this book to pioneer, present and future Kenyan Diplomats, Scholars and Students of International Relations and policy.

abbreviations

AASF	–	The African-American Students Foundation (formed to support Mboya's students' airlifts to USA)
AMU	–	Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia)
ASPAU	–	African Scholarship Plan for American Universities
BSB	–	Bursary Selection Board
CCK	–	Christian Council of Kenya
CECAF	–	Council for Educational Cooperation with Africa
CIA	–	Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	–	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
COTU	–	Central Organization of Trade Union
CPP	–	Convention People's Party (Ghana)
CPSU	–	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSB	–	Central Selection Board
CSC	–	Cambridge School Certificate
EAB	–	External Affairs Branch (Office of the Prime Minister)
ED	–	Education
FKSEE	–	Federation of Kenya Students in Eastern Europe
GDR	–	German Democratic Republic
GSE	–	General Certificate of Education
ICFTU	–	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IDA	–	International Development Agency
KADU	–	Kenya African Democratic Union

KAES	–	Kenya African Education Society (founded by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga)
KAMPU	–	Kenya African Moslem Political Union
KANU	–	Kenya African National Union
KAPE	–	Kenya African Preliminary Examination
KASSE	–	Kenya African Senior Secondary Examination
KAWC	–	Kenya African Workers' Congress
KLC	–	Kenya Legislative Council
KNA	–	Kenya National Archives
KOSAC	–	Kenya Overseas Scholarships Advisory Committee
KPP	–	Kenya Progressive Party
KPU	–	Kenya People's Union
KSP	–	Kenya Social Party
KT1, KT2, KT3	–	Kenya Teacher one, two, three
KUTV	–	The Communist University of the Toilers of the East
LGE	–	Little General Election (Kenya)
MFA	–	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OAU	–	Organization of African Unity
OSA	–	Open Society Archives
PD	–	Public Diplomacy
RASPH	–	Russian Archives of Social and Political History
RPFU	–	Russian Peoples Friendship University (Former Patrice Lumumba University) known in Russian Language as Rasiiskii Universitiet Druzhbi Narodov (RUDN)

RSKIDNI	–	Rossiiskiy Ttsentr Khranenie i Isuchenie Dokumentov Noveeishi Istorii (Russian Documentation Centre for the Study of Modern History).
SEOHE	–	Senior Education Officer Higher Education
TASS	–	(acronym of The Telegraph Agency of Soviet Union /Russia)
UDC	–	University Development Committee
UK	–	United Kingdom
UNECA	–	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	–	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	–	The United Nations Education and Scientific Cooperation
USA	–	United States of America
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	–	United States Information Agency
USSR	–	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (The Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Kirghizstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia and Turkmenistan)
VIPs	–	Very Important People
VOA	–	Voice of America
WFTU	–	World Federation of Trade Union

1

General Introduction

definition of terMs and ConCept

In this book there are key words and phrases that are frequently used and, therefore, needs some explanation on how they are operationalised. For the purposes of this book, the following terms and their given explanations were adopted.

Russia – In this book, the name of the country Russia and the Union of the Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union are used interchangeably, to refer to the Soviet Russia (currently the Russian Federation) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (see USSR membership in abbreviations). The Russian State and nationalism played a multifaceted role in the conduct of the international relations, firstly, beginning with imperial Russia (1682—1917), secondly, the Soviet Republic (1917—1922) and Soviet Union (1922—1940), thirdly, the Russian Federation since 1991. For details refer to L. A. Alekseiyeva, Istoria SSSR, Moscow, Vishaya Skola:
1985, pp. 67—69.

Eastern Bloc – This term is interchangeably used with Eastern Europe, Communist bloc and Soviet bloc to denote groupings of states in Eastern and central Europe that used aligned to the then USSR. These countries were: East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Albania

The Warsaw Pact – was a collective defence treaty of the Eastern bloc in existence during the cold war. It was the military complement to the Council for Mutual Assistance (COMEcon) formed as part of Soviet military reaction to the intergration of West Germany into NATO in 1955 and its desire to maintain control ober military forces in Central and Eastern Europe.

Foreign Policy Tool(s) – Are states' strategies that help in achieving International goals. Policy makers employ the following tools to conduct foreign policy: Diplomacy, Foreign Aid (which may include educational scholarships), Military force and can be pursued in three ways Unilaterally, Bilaterally and Multilaterally.

Foreign Policy – Foreign Policy consists of a set of actions taken by the varying sections of the government of a state. The actions are taken with reference to other bodies acting on the international stage, of which usually the most important are other states, but which include among other actors at the international stage, supranational, and transnational groups, and occasionally individuals. It is a term that refers to a state's international goals, its strategies and means to achieve those goals. According to Hill (2000:3), the policy is "foreign" because the world is still more separated into distinct communities than it is a single, homogenizing entity". The word "Foreign" derives from Latin "foris" meaning outside. The word "policy" like its adjective "politics", sometimes carries overtones of prudence or wisdom, and may imply something about the purpose for which actions are taken. A policy, therefore, is frequently taken to be not simply a range of actions, but also the principles influencing those actions or the purpose they are intended to serve. Foreign policy is "the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing." (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2012: 14).

National interest – The international actions or the purposes they are intended to serve are usually summed up in the concept "national interest"

(Reynolds, 1994). It is the defence of the community's ability to maintain its values internally and also their promotion externally.

A Diplom – (from Greek Diploma) is an academic degree in the German speaking countries – Germany, Austria, Switzerland and other European countries including Belarus, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Russia, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The term is also used in Brazil for engineers. It took usually four and six years depending on subject curriculum. Diplom was usually accepted as admission into doctorate programmes in German speaking countries, Scandinavian, some universities in Europe and Canada. With the implementation of the Bologna process the Diplom and Magister are increasingly being replaced by bachelors or Master's degrees

Diplomacy – The origin of the word diplomacy derives from the Greek verb *diplo* meaning *to fold* and referred to the folding metal plates used in Roman times as formal documents such as passports, passes etc. (Voskopoulos, 2011), while foreign relations of a state refer to the processes and consequences of its interactions with other states. The conduct of these relations is called diplomacy. Diplomacy, therefore, describes those activities taken by a government of a state to find accommodation in the state's relations with other countries (Orwa, 1990:218). It is the practice of states trying to influence the behaviour of other states by bargaining, negotiating, taking specific non coercive actions or refraining from such actions, or appealing to the public for support of a position.

Public diplomacy – It is a country's ability to promote its beliefs and ideals to citizens of other nations and societies in order to advance its national interest. For instance, the purpose of international information programs is to affect foreign audiences in ways that are favourable to the country's national interests. Public diplomacy can be a central component of national strategy.

Education – It is the process of imparting or acquiring of knowledge, mental or moral training; cultivation of the mind, feeling and manners. It is a means for the realization in the individuals of the ideals of the community as whole or acquiring information and inspirational suggestions which cause the individual to think and act along proper lines.

Education as a foreign policy tool – It is a process where higher education is identified by foreign policy/ political strategists as a priority area of engagement. It provides a powerful and innovative instrument for foreign

policy because of the particular articulation of the material, institutional and normative processes have forged. Higher education provides a means to match Kenyan and global economic and political interests (htt:www.allacademic.
com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation2/5/4/0/p.254106_inder.html?)

Airlifts – Refers to planes either chartered or commercial flights that flew dozens and hundreds of Kenyans from Nairobi, Cairo, Dar- es- Salam, Ethiopia, and London to Russia and Eastern European Bloc since 1954. The students were airlifted because of the distance and availability of air transport by that time.

Political socialization – Refers to political learning. It realizes that what goes on in politics is determined by people's behaviour – citizens, officials, revolutionaries, diplomats, newspaper editors, image makers, and others more than by institutional form. Its goals are directed to patriotism and nationalism. Political socialization is a lifelong process by which people form their ideas about politics and acquired political values. The family, educational system, peer groups, and the mass media all play a role. While family and school are important in early life, what our peers think and what we read in the newspapers and see on television have more influence on our political attitudes as adults. It is the process by which individuals (adults, adolescents and children) come to have certain core beliefs, political attitudes, behaviour and values (Glass, 1986)). It also refers to a learning process by which norms and behaviour acceptable to a well running political system are transmitted from one generation to another. It is through the performance of this function that individuals are inducted into the political culture and their orientations towards political objects are formed. Political socialization can be direct or indirect in form.

Direct Political Socialization – Refers to learning situations where the content of what is transmitted is specifically political. The attitude is attached to a political object from the beginning.

Indirect Political Socialization – Internalization of values that are not themselves political, but which subsequently influence the acquisition of analogous values which are political. The study, from which this book emanates, sought to interrogate how education was hoped would covertly influence the scholarship students in relation to the Soviet ideology.

Toilers masses of the East – The phrase "Toilers masses of the East" was commonly used by the *Bolsheviks* in reference to the non-western world,

which lumped Africa, Asia and the Middle East together without attention to regional, racial and religious distinctions (Matusevich, 2009:59).

The Cold War – It describes mainly the period 1945-1989, when the western bloc headed by the United States of America (U.S.A) and the Eastern bloc headed by the Union of Soviets Socialist Republics (USSR) Russia competed militarily, politically, economically and ideologically in an atmosphere characterized by tensions, proxy and full scale wars. These included competition for spheres of influence in the Third World and a major superpower-arms race. The cold war went through three phases i.e. 19451960s alternating relaxation, and confrontation, 1970s-1980s a cooperative and detente (thawing of relations) and since 1989 partnership and common approach to global issues (http://www.ibibli.org/exp/soviet.exhbit/coldwar.html).

Socialism – An economic and social system that relies on intensive government intervention or public ownership of the means of production in order to distribute wealth among the population more equitably; in Marxist theory, it refers to the stage between capitalism and communism.

Underdevelopment – Refers to a situation in which resources are being actively used, but used in a way which benefits dominant states and not the poorer states in which the resources are found.

İntroduCtion

Whereas contemporary societies place great importance on human interactions and mutual understanding as one way of avoiding conflict and the fact that human conflict is caused primarily by political, cultural and socioeconomic factors, there is no better place to inculcate the virtues of international peace and interstate cooperation than through international scholarship. Moreover, the pursuit of learning beyond national boundaries is an old phenomenon and the presence of foreign students in the host country's campuses provide an opportunity for many countries to promote cultural and international understanding as well as collaboration to tackle global problems. It is also possible to argue that despite differences in ideology, countries can still work together on educational exchanges.

Following the end of the World War II in 1945, the world order was dominated by the Cold War mindset. The USSR and USA started engaging in the de- colonization of colonial states in general and Africa states in particular. Both USSR and USA started supporting trade unions, political parties and strategized on to influence the Third World as education became

a very useful tool. The politics and economies of de-colonization were engaged through and within the Cold War lenses and self-interest. The West rolled out the Marshall Plan of Action in Europe and extended the same to the Third World through foreign aid. In this book, resulting from a doctoral degree research study, two airlifts programmes took place; one to the USA in 1958- 1960 and the other to USSR and Eastern Europe from 1954 to 1991. The focus of this book will be the later.

The book focuses on Kenyan students' airlifts to the USSR and Eastern Europe from 1954 to 1991. The year 1954 marked Nikita Khrushchev's policies of de-Stalinization and peaceful co-existence with other nations. Khrushchovskaya *ottepel* (Khrushchev's thaw), is a term coined after Ilya Ehrenburg's 1954 novel *The Thaw*. The policies initiated transformation of educational and cultural contacts, youth festivals, books by foreign authors and international sports competitions and other contacts. Khrushchev's policies helped liberate minds of the Soviets and endeared them to the outside world. In 1956, Khrushchev initiated a number of rehabilitations that restored reputations of innocent victims of Stalin's purge as well as introduction of freedom of speech. In July 1957 the World Youth Festival attracted 34 thousand youth and students from 130 countries. The thaw had huge impact in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and Yugoslavia).

Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader 1985- 1991 initiated *glasnost* (openness), *perestroika* (restructuring) and *demokratia* (democracy) and introduced market- oriented economic reforms. Gorbachev believed Warsaw Pact countries could find their own "way" of doings things. He withdrew in 1989 Soviet troops in Afghanistan who had been sent there in 1979 by Brezhnev as a Cold War strategy. By 1991, anti-reform groups in the military and party attempted a military coup. The coup collapsed and Boris Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev by the end of 1991 as the Russian Federation president while the other Soviet republics declared their independence.

The argument is that much of a country's foreign policy and national interest can be understood in the context of the country's relations with other states. Traditionally, international relations are a matter of interchanges among states. States oversee and promote bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of peace and security, trade and other economic relations and cultural relations (Baehr and Castermans- Holleman, 2004). There are studies that observe that, international aid, including the funding for higher education, has become an indispensable part of international relations and is closely related to national policy and generally used as an instrument of foreign policy and often used for the purpose of strengthening

diplomatic relations (Medica, 2010; Kapur and Crowley, 2008). Foreign policy begins when a state manages to transcend the dichotomy of internal and external pressures and develops multiple strategies of responding to world challenges (Snyder, 1989). This book thus sought to contribute to the understanding on how educational scholarships were impacted by both the internal and external environment of the Cold War.

Diplomacy is the implementing arm of foreign policy and its the conduct of relations amongst political entities, their principals and accredited agents. Sovereign states have never had a monopoly of diplomacy. Even in the nineteenth century Europe where practices were formalized and diplomatic practices were generally accepted and respected, governments had recourse to unofficial intermediaries and non-state institutions for the achievement of foreign policy objectives. The an unprecedented rise in the number of international actors whose role and influence extend beyond the traditional confines of the state (Hamilton and Langhorne, 2011). The author therefore attempted to investigate how education, an area that does not fall under the cluster of "high politics" was used at the height of the Cold War. Foreign policy decisions are often made under time and information constraints; involve value – trade-offs and sunk costs are influenced by perceptions and misperceptions, images and belief systems, emotions, and internal political and economic calculations, agenda, and interests (Mintz and DeRouen Jr., 2010).

Foreign policy choices range from dramatic to the mundane; leaders make decisions to go to war, make peace, form alliances, establish diplomatic relations or ratify global environmental agreements (Mintz and DeRouen Jr., 2010) to cultural relations. To gather public support for their foreign and security policies both at home and in the international arena, state leaders need to market their policies to the public, the opposition and adversaries and international actors.

eduCation and poLitiCaL SoCiaLization

Students in the higher learning institutions are politically active and get involved in the politics of any given state, but as a matter of fact, nation building and modernization are matters of citizen attitudes, political socialization that provides the citizenry with values (Prewitt, 1971). The nations educational curriculum is harnessed to the tasks of nation building and in Africa, independence meant nationalization of schools, restructuring curriculum and mobilization of the elites to national building. In this regard,

sociological analysis attributes two primary functions to the educational institutions of society; the integrative one of transmitting the cultural heritage through the socialization of the young, and the instrumental function of channelling its members into positions in the existing social structure (Eisenstadt, 1964; Gollin, 1967).

The school system would disseminate national building policies and plans by the political and civil servants. Education would also serve as an instrument of modernization and national development. Teacher directed political socialization and indoctrination are the characteristics of educational systems, as political and leadership consolidation takes place in institutions of higher learning (Prewitt, and Oculi, 1971). The higher national budget in education expenditure, creation of more national schools and shift from missionary based administrators to civilian administrators are indications of how governments are a reflection of national values and culture.

The sense of nationhood identity transcended ethnic or racial loyalties in most institutions of higher learning. For example, in boarding schools, students of different classes, ethnicity and race share common dining, dorm, play grounds, class-rooms, instructional languages and teachers. This integration leads to national integration; an equivalent of the "melting pot" hypothesis of America (ibid).

School is the most decisive socializing agent in the lives of those who are lucky to go through it. The reason why schools are so effective is that learners remain in school for so many hours, information is directed at them for long, the student is prepared to listen, motivation is very high in the understanding that all hope of upward social mobility depends on successful performance nationally (Koff and Der Muhll, 1971).

Education creates a strong motivation for the student to perform well because it practically guarantees the most motivated and achievement-oriented students a chance to contribute to society and receive its rewards. Education acts as a selection panel and equalizer by erasing advantages held by others. It enlarges the pool of talent and ability to be selected to a position of responsibility. According to Iliffe (1995:222) colonial conquest frequently stimulated young people to "marry the alphabet" at a mission station, seeking education as a way of escaping from agricultural labour into rewarding employment. Castle sketches the African mind about education as follows:

The educational tradition… was acceptance for its cash value and as a sure means of moving away from poverty and weakness to comparative affluence and power. For at least a few it was an escape route from toilsome

labour to the bright offices of the towns; for others it lead the way to the dimmer light of the mission schoolrooms. The path to this was desirable and was strewn with lit., British arithmetic and sometimes Latin. No one is to Blame. This was all the very hardworking expatriates' missionaries and teachers knew, and all the examiners prescribed (Castle, 1966 quoted in Prewitt, 1971:155-56).

Here two clear issues emerge. First, the British curriculum was being used to instil foreign values to the East African youth. Secondly, education was paged to securing elitists' employment and excellent prospects. This belief was shared then and now by many in the African continent. The few schools and limited vacancies caused courageous young people and nationalist leaders to seek for higher education in parts of the world that included America, Europe, Asia and different regions of the African continent.

Stanford (1967), on the school's and family's influence, observes that although courses in government can awaken the critical spirit, courses are regarded more as the subject of examination than as a challenge to the way one lives. In order to strengthen social responsibility one must worry not only about the curriculum but about the values it lives by, the examples it sets.

According to Bogonko (1992), traditionally, a university is accredited to transmit, create and classify knowledge through teaching, research and publication programmes. While these functions applied to universities in Kenya, emergent Africa could not allow the role of the University to remain at the abstract level. Thus, African political leaders and academicians have largely argued for universities to apply their energies directly to the practical solutions to social, economic and political problems of their nations. African universities had to actively participate in the idea-cultural regeneration, social transformation, economic modernization and training and in training and upgrading the most important means of production, human resource.

Africans opposed colonial education from the start. However, that opposition was not formalized and sustained until the formation of the African welfare cum-political associations in the early 1920s. Exposure to sufficient and proper education was necessary to understand and fight colonialism. In any case education was an aspect of politics, and the missionaries provided very little literary education. Hence all the African political association in one way or another took education as one of their major concerns.

The aftermath of the Second World War brought into being other factors which shaped African politics and education up to independence in 1960s.

Work by the African soldiers in Egypt, Abyssinia, the Middle East and South East Asia brought Kenyans into contact with different people who had similar colonial problems as their own. Kenyans came back with new ideas and consciousness of the world. Their mental horizons were widened. Besides acquiring the knowledge that no people should be ruled by another forever, African soldiers also learned the might of the educated intellect. Back home the soldiers craved for better, more and higher education for their children. This stand enhanced the emergent African nationalism and with it the campaign for expansion in education for Africans.

When Kenya attained independence, the struggle remained on decolonization, indigenization, enhancement and utilization of university education. Kenyan education had to address itself to the needs of Kenya. Consequently, government reports (Republic of Kenya, 1965; Republic of Kenya, 1988; Republic of Kenya, 1981) emphasized the role of the university in training of high level manpower for national development, promoting the intellectual and cultural growth of the country and carrying out research.

Jaramogi Oginga Odinga realized the need for higher specialized education and following his visit to India on a special invitation by the government of India, recorded his impressions and experiences and in particular education, science and technology in relations to national development. Odinga concluded that education is the key in acquiring new knowledge. According to Odinga, an institution of higher learning was supposed to first facilitate and empower a community to apply knowledge in what the world offers elsewhere in various fields; secondly, to facilitate better understanding among people of different nations, and thirdly , to harmonize cultures for greater peace in the world (Odinga, 1965). Sanford (1968) asserts that for students to have independence of thinking it means they must have knowledge to resist dogma; practice in criticism; the self-esteem and confidence that will permit them to stand in opposition to pressure of authority and of the immediate social group.

What foreign poLiCy entaiLs

The study of foreign policy is the study of a three-part procedure: process, decision and implementation. It concerns itself with the setting of objectives and policy, how certain decisions are arrived at and how they are put into practice. The 1970s saw scholars attempt to provide theoretical framework for the study of African or Third World foreign policies. They drew

attention to the following as factors that shaped African foreign policies such as the economic setting, internal pressures, colonial heritage, elite ideology, geographical and strategic location, national identity and security, personalised decision-making, lack of information, political stability and financial security, improvement of trade relations, food security and capabilities of the state (Aluko, 1970; Clapham, 1977; Calvert, 1986). The study was interested in whether the demand to fill the needs in regard to development opportunities through partnership with external actors, particularly in regard to development of human resource. According to Popov (2010), modern diplomatic contacts became more practiced from mid-Fifteenth century when states established relations not only with governments but also involved writers, artists and scholars. Direct diplomatic representation abroad by African countries did not in every instance have to await independence. Countries with important commercial connections with the United Kingdom, such as Uganda and Northern Rhodesia, had their own agents in London. As scholarship brought more students to the U.K, preliminary interviews for appointments began to be handled in London and Ministerial fund – seeking missions started up their frequent round – the – world travels and these offices took on increased representational responsibilities and their heads acquired the title of commissioner (Ingham, 1974). With the coming of independence, it was possible for African governments to look beyond the metropolis and limited horizon of previous diplomatic contacts has Cornford (1961:51) observes that "no individual is self-sufficient; we all have many needs…Having all these needs, we call in one another's help to satisfy our various requirements".

This book deals with the role of education as a foreign tool during the cold war (1954-1991) between Kenya, USSR and Eastern Europe. The midtwentieth century saw young Africans go beyond borders to seek knowledge. Ayandele (1982: 165) notes that in the belief that education is the *open sesame* to economic transformation and modernization, African governments adopted, with faith and hope, the credo: "seek ye the kingdom of knowledge and all other things shall be added unto you".

Some of the finest young Africans of Kenya were being airlifted abroad by the British and American benefactors to enter the universities of the United Kingdom and United States to acquire the education which would energize their final push toward independence (Smith, 1966). Other states that had little ties with Kenya also appeared on the educational scholarship scene. This book analyzes how the USSR was involved both inside and outside the USSR in helping to alleviate these needs. For the host country,

international students' presence in colleges and universities is beneficial because these students contribute to the enrichment of higher education, to the strengthening of relations with countries in world trade and to the promotion of global understanding (Chapdeleine, 2004; Marcketti, Mhango & Gregoire, 2006) and cordial relations.

theories

This book is premised on two complimentary theories: political socialization and social constructivism. In research theory helps strengthen analysis. According to Flockart (2012), we need theories as a form of organizing principle to make sense of a complex world. Without theories we would simply be overwhelmed by the mass of information that has to be processed in making and understanding of foreign policy. "Theories do organize data and also imply different policy options and they contain different assumptions about how the world works" (ibid: 79). By theorizing and conceptualizing we hope to hanger the research questions to research problem. For the purposes of the study, resulting into this book, we used eclectic approach thus the use of two theories; Social constructivism theory to understand the non-static Kenya – Russia and Eastern European relations and political socialization theory to understand how educational scholarships to the USSR and Europe was an instrument of foreign policy.

Political socialization is a concept concerning the study of the developmental processes by which children and adolescents acquire political cognition, attitudes and behaviour (Powell & Cowart, 2003). It refers to learning process by which norms and behaviour acceptable to a well running political system are transmitted from one generation to another. It is through the performance of this function that individuals are inducted into the political culture and their orientations towards political objects are formed (Varkey, 2008).

Political socialization is a process by which the individual acquires attitudes, beliefs, and values relating to the political system of which he is a member and to his own role as citizen within that political system. Plato's *Republic* (1992) for instance, can be seen largely as an effort to design a suitable civic education programme to insure the longevity of the ideals of the polis. According to Greenberg, "every political regime seeks to instil in young people values, beliefs, and behaviours consistent with the continuance of its own political order" (Greenberg, 1970:4). Indeed there is a thin line between "indoctrination" and "citizen training". In schools, children are introduced quite early to the flag, the founding fathers, patriotic myths, and affirmations of the rewards and virtues of the country's way of

life. Every society that wishes to maintain itself has one of its functions the socialization of the young so that they will carry on willingly the values, traditions, norms and duties of their society (Sigel, 1965: 1-3).

Both political philosophers and statesmen agree that political socialization of the young directly and significantly affects the survival potentials of communities, regimes, or governments, and the processes of political socialization are clear and can be transmitted with ease, although the processes are extremely complex. Support implies trust, affection, or confidence towards aspects of the political system. Socialization of citizens to supportive beliefs enables regimes to legitimize their policies. The world made of different political systems and governed by a number stresses are also productive of new ideas and questions that would help us answer the practices of political socialization and the phenomena of politics. Nielsen (1969) argues that the Communist powers consciously conducted their foreign policy on two planes; that of normal interstate diplomacy and that of revolutionary action working through party machinery and front organization, propaganda and subversion.

In this book, early socialization of Kenyan students and the Soviets socialisation is useful in understanding how far education was able to change their world views with regard to the various political systems while at the university. Further, the question that arises is whether the many instruments used by the Soviets and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were effective enough to make any impact in the future ideological thinking of the students on their return.

Jaros (1973) argues that, political behaviour is governed by values and norm and what people do in politics depends upon what they learn about it when they are growing. It might be through campaign propaganda, government communication, newspapers, public speeches, and television. The youthful learning processes in the prospects of finding the roots of patriotism, revolution, stability, instability, success or failure in the process of political development is termed as political socialization. Jaros further elaborates that:

> The idea of attaining or retaining political power by controlling the minds of people by transmitting political knowledge or information (cognitive socialization) or communicating political beliefs and values (affective socialization) has been tantalizing possibility for centuries . . . Educators observe that all countries have had programmes of civic training that transmit to populations knowledge about politics and at the same time expose them to norms that support the regime and glorify political heroes of hyzone regime (ibid: 9).

Architects of strategy make sure that future cadres are not left merely to chance and circumstance because regular behaviour patterns are not mystically transmitted but learned. All regimes invest heavily in formal or informal educational programmes and one output of educational programmes is social indoctrination. The formal school system is directed to advance the purposes of those in authority. The programme seeks to transmit both political commitment and information. The individuals' world view can be shaped within the desired ideological and political moulds by the school, but at the same time, the individual can accumulate objective knowledge for practical ends.

The research attempted to investigate how indoctrination of the youth was, for example, adopted by the communist regimes through an extensive programme of educating the masses. The programme that included the young and adults, made sure that school literature emphasized military exploits, heroism and prescribed match towards the construction of communist states at home and abroad. The Soviet State and its Eastern allies established youth leagues, recreational programmes and used entertainment as a vehicle for political socialization. These activities were not restricted to the host students alone but were desirable that foreign students also participated. Party youth organizations like the Young Pioneers and the Communist Youth Leagues in the USSR and the Youth for KANU in Kenya for instance were meant to instil loyalty to governments and train future party and political elites in the skills of leadership.

Political socialization is also found in countries in the form of civic education programmes. In non-communist countries like Kenya, education was meant to stop or warn the youth against the influence of communism. The Kenya society was not sympathetic to communist ideology and was sceptical towards scholarships to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it was never lost to those students that took up the scholarships what environment they came from and what environment they had to settle in during their study years.

There are two main objects of political socialization. According to Easton and Dennis (1969), they are community, the regime, or the government. Community refers to persons who share a division of political labour. Its characteristics are mass emotional commitment to the homeland being an important tool in the maintenance or construction of political systems.

The role of the intellectuals is that they are not only agents of social change and continuity but also are sources of ideas and revolution, and role

models of leadership capabilities and potential for mass mobilization entice emulation.

Intellectuals are often considered to be the engines of transformation, continuity and change in any society (Mazrui, 1978; Amutabi, 2007). Intellectuals are therefore respected opinion leaders, paragons of social, economic and political engineering in society. According to Amutabi (2007:199) "an intellectual is a highly informed, opinionated individual in public life who is capable of generating ideas for society, shaping social change and development positively or negatively through public action, speeches, writings and dissemination". The socialization of elites, unlike that of the masses, focuses on leadership and policy decision making.

Political socialization can be influenced by generational change and maturation change. Generational change refers to the fact that changes in attitude, values, and behaviour occur overtime. On the other hand, maturation change simply means new conditions that people find themselves or the possession of new attributes and the end of adolescence, for example, leads to responsibility. It is expected that young people who have not encountered harsh experience, can be idealistic and allow themselves to be governed by their emotions. The study interrogated whether the Soviet's quest to socialise Kenyan students into the socialist ideology was successful or not, given the fact that they were raised more in the British system of education and in a country with a British colonial history and were adults by the time of taking up the scholarships.

It is commonly assumed or imagined that one of the great age-related changes of political attitudes is increasing conservatism. It is observed that older people are less likely to deviate from the political principles to which they have been socialized, regardless of whether these principles are liberal or conservative. Here maturational conservatism means that youth must be predominant carrier of political change. The young are more volatile and more impressionable, because they are strained by fewer expectations and they operate through youth behaviour change.

Scholars have devoted schools and institutions of higher learning as socialisers. As a matter of states' policy, formal education is subject to manipulation and more frequently, states impose a national curriculum such as history was a compulsory subject and a prerequisite to doing even such degree programmes like medicine, engineering, international relations and others in the USSR and East European countries. As such, learners and political leaders are also influenced by the manipulation in the learning institutions. More frequently, claims of the national curriculum failing to advance national agenda on development, peaceful co-existence, national

ideology or patriotism, are common phrases in day to day political parlance and remind us that learning institutions are socialization agents. Institutions of higher learning like schools, offer a great deal of instructions with specific political content while campus political activism is a common forum in many countries.

There are two ways in which higher institutions of learning are considered socializing agents in inculcating specific political values. One is that most teachings and course contents are offered to expand knowledge. However, sometimes learners' indoctrination is attempted. Nevertheless, institutions of higher learning teaches democratic participation by producing and encouraging enlightened, educated persons to become actively involved in governmental policy making. Thus, colleges are multi-faceted places where critical knowledge is acquired and conflict management techniques are learned.

In the USSR, the intelligentsia was divided into the "technical intelligentsia" and the "creative intelligentsia". The creative intelligentsia were those in the areas of literature and art and other realms of humanities. The Communist Party sought to retain a monopoly position in the realm of ideology where the "creative intelligentsia" were incorporated to its side (Khrushchev, 2006:546). This explains the change in attitudes and activities of intelligentsia over time (Ramer, 2010). The study sought to investigate whether educational scholarships efforts to create an international intelligentsia acting as carriers of communist ideology and bridges of inter-state relations was attempted in the U.S.S.R and Eastern Europe.

SoCiaL ConstruCtivisM

In society, both individuals and institutions are never static and according to the social constructivism theory, the environment impacts on our identity and how we assign identity to others. The verb "to construct" comes from the Latin "*con struere*" which means to arrange or give structure. Constructivism concerns itself with the role of ideas in shaping the international system. It refers to goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influences states and non-states actors within the international system. This study was concerned with whether perceptions and thus social norms shaped and changed the interacting countries foreign policy.

Social constructions, Bond and Gilliam (1994:5) argues, may reflect the interrelation and interpenetration of structures of thought and human agency

interacting within complex social fields. On the one hand, they reflect the ways in which "people are defined, apprehended and acted upon by others and, and on the other, how they define themselves". Constructivism provides both a means of encompassing a wide variety of social processes, and ideas which has much more than simply a technical meaning; for it refers to symbols, values, and ideologies which have popular currency (Hamilton, 1992).

Human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; hence, society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. Taken together these realities suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities (Kaplan, 1957, 1968; Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1983; Ashely, 1984; Wallerstein, 1977).

According to constructivism, relationships can be based on cooperation rather than rivalry, or enmity, and that identities and interests are fundamentally changed in the process. One of the central features of constructivism holds that people act towards objects (including other people) on the basis of the meanings the objectives (or persons) has for them. This means states act differently towards other states depending on whether they consider them enemy or friendly. Thus enemies are seen as threatening while friends are not (Wendt, 1992: 396). In this study, the question was whether socialization was an attempt to construct new identities at the individual and institutional level.

Onuf (1989) is one of the constructivists with the conviction that the world is of our making. Flockhart (2012) states that, the common proposition that reality which we take as given, is in fact a project under constant construction. Constructivists understand the world as coming into being rather than existing as a pre-given entity. The fact that constructivism is called social constructivism is indicative of the considerable role attached to the social process of interaction for the production of shared knowledge about the world. From this perspective, constructivists agree that although some aspects of reality clearly are "brute facts" who's concrete existence is not contested, their meaning is.

Apart from brute facts with different shared meanings, constructivists agree that there are portions of reality that are regarded as facts only through human agreement. According to Waltz (1979) and Hoffmann (1981) the international system consists of nation-states with different capabilities pursuing identical interests, and the relations between the different states is determined by their less or greater capacities for performing similar tasks

which are made observable only through practice. Kenya, though not falling under the "friendly states" countries that were sympathetic to the Socialist system, educational scholarships continued despite the ideological difference of the Cold War. If the world is socially constructed, it cannot therefore, be understood through reference only to material forces, such as, natural resources and military power, but that it consists of material factors, rules, symbols, and language, which all shape how we interpret the world and the actions of others.

Observations have been made that with the emergence of new African nations as sovereign entities, the communist powers, like the major non – Communist states in Europe and elsewhere, moved to adjust their policies and relationships accordingly. But whereas for the European countries this required the modification of a tightly woven and long established fabric of involvement in Africa, the Communist Powers had to build their first direct relationships virtually from bare ground. Communism in Africa Nielsen comment showed "much awkwardness of style because of inexperience, repeated shifts of course, fluctuating enthusiasms and disappointment, and a famine of triumphs" (Nielsen, 1969: 185).

Kenya and U.S.S.R foreign policies, like those of all governments, operated within the framework of an international system. A system determined by the number of actors and the hierarchical relationships between them which of course were constantly changing. Further, the international environment was constantly defining itself and being defined by states' interactions within it. Whatever its structure, however, the international system had certain enduring characteristics, that of necessity which conditioned the foreign policy of all nations. Primary among these was its decentralized character. Despite the Cold War, global politics lacked a central political authority like a world government. Ultimately, each nation was free in principle to determine the range of policies it will pursue for itself. This is the idea expressed by the principle of national sovereignty, a concept that rejects the right of an external political authority to control the policies of the state. It has been asserted that:

> national sovereignty in effect gives to international politics on anarchic character and most significant is the burden placed on each nation to look after its own security…The ultimate value for the nation-state is survival…unlike the individual within society, the state is unprotected by legal institutions, and thus must look to its own devices – diplomacy, armament, military alliances for self protection. The quest for survival is one of the hallmarks of international politics (Nogee & Donaldson, 1988:10-11).

Cooperation of states today does not prejudice conflict tomorrow, and vice versa. Hence inter-states relations are complexes of competing interests of which power is virtually at stake and others of which mutual convenience is the real issue (Snyder, 1987/ 1988). International relations therefore involve the use of many variables and the analysis of many interactions. This has more a times made it difficult to understand fully the dynamics of the international system.

The central category of the constructivist theory of international politics is identity. Before nations figure out how to best defend their interests with available material and diplomatic means, they first seek to understand what these interests in the international society are. By interacting with other members of the international society, nations develop affiliations, attachments and ultimately their own identities. Historically, some nations, or cultural communities emerge as more important than others, and it is through these significant "Others" that national Selves define their appropriate character and types of actions. The very existence of the self becomes difficult without recognition from the other.

Local conditions, such as the state of the groups, or the type of political regime, are just as important in shaping national perceptions. These and other conditions have long been part of foreign policy analysis, and the initially international system. Indeed, oriented constructivism is now moving toward incorporating domestic level variable (Tsyganikov, 2010; Kaarbo, 2002; Putman, 1988).

Constructivism does not view foreign policy as a product of a unitary state's advancing power, as in realism. Rather, the role of a coalition is to put forward a particular image of national identity that will speak to the existing local conditions and be recognized by the significant other. Identity coalitions are broader and more fundamental than interest coalitions, and they seek to achieve social recognition, rather than to maximize wealth and power.

International influences and local conditions are critical in understanding the processes of foreign policy formulation and change. International self evolves and then shapes foreign policy and because international society contains multiple norms and influences some of them may conflict in influencing the self.

In Kenya's case, U.S.S.R and the West in general played the role of the significant other and prominently figured in debates about national identity. It was the East and the West that created the meaningful environment in which Kenya's rulers defended their visions of national identity and national interest. National interest is about social adaption to the constantly changing

international and local conditions, and it is about recognition by the identified significant other.

Soviet's objectives in Africa were four-fold: to win local acceptance of a lasting Soviet political, economic, and even military presence in Africa; to gain a voice in the continent's affairs; to undermine the western position in Africa and to curtail Chinese influence (Albright, 2001). The USSR's strategy for achieving its objectives in Africa exhibited far less continuity across time than did the objectives themselves. Tsyganikov (2010: 16) aptly puts:

With distinct social conditions in place, nations have distinct concerns and therefore view the world in their own way. For instance, the perceptions of reality by rich nations will differ from those that are considered poor. Some local concerns are more historically stable and are formed across a relatively long time, while others are more immediate and emerge in response to short term developments. But in both cases, they serve as cultural lenses through which a nation views the outside world.

The objectives of the blocs to limit each other's influence in Kenya like in other parts of the world led to the use of proxy strategic alliances. In non-combat areas of competition, ideological mechanisms were applied and education was one avenue of deterrence. The international and national environments competed to influence the educational curricular thus shapping and directing a country's foreign policy formulation and diplomataic behaviour.



Figure: 1.1. The Influence of International and National Environments on Educational and Foreign Policy.

Nations rarely have once and for ever established visions of their fundamental external interests. More typically, national interests fluctuated with changes on the domestic and international political scene. Kenya, U.S.S.R and Eastern European relations were never static but were continually constructed to suit their national interests. Therefore, allowing for interstate relations through educational scholarships to the East in spite of the cold war ideologically divide where Kenya had traditional special relations with the capitalist West. Despite ideological competition fought through political socialization and educational scholarships serving as an instrument, students were rarely convinced by the communist system. The emergence of the U.S.S.R and the U.S.A as adversaries after the Second World War had the paradoxical effect of the two groups opening up educational opportunities to Kenyans.

2

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

an overview of Kenya's foreign policy and diplomacy

Foreign policy and diplomatic issues are basically oriented toward the national interest and states decide which interests are crucial and must be defended, and which can be sacrificed when a state interacts with other states or non-state actors. According to Handrieder (1967), foreign policy is a coordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision-makers in a country seek to manipulate the international environment in order to achieve certain national objectives. The study of foreign policy is, in fact the study of a three part procedure: process, decision and implementation. The process focuses on the general setting and objectives of policy, including the cultural influences and elite pressures, decisions, and analyses how specific decisions are taken within decision making machinery; and implementation which focuses upon how decisions are followed up and put into practice (Wright, 1992, 1999; Howell, 1968; Okumu, 1973; Rono, 1999; Kurgat 2000, 2011; Kurgat, 2006).

According to Kissinger (1966), in the traditional conception, international relations are conducted by political units treated almost as personalities. The domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends. Spencer (1966:6) notes that Kenya had maintained the British tradition of formal separation between the civil

service and politics, and had made no attempt to weave KANU directly into the administrative structure of the country.

It is paramount to note that a state's behaviour is influenced by and reacts to the policies of other states and the external conditions under which these policies take place. Economic instruments can also be used for rewarding or manipulating the behaviour of governments. Disbursements of foreign aid, in addition to the economic contribution they make, demonstrate degrees of sympathy between governments (Holsti, 1992). Economic diplomacy is used by states to enhance the bargaining power of selected groups of countries, and consequently, to determine a certain political outcome (Daddieh and Shaw, 1986).

When Kenya gained her political independence, she chose to be guided by the principle of non-alignment in international affairs. It was a principle by which the new state asserted her right to independence and sovereignty. Kenya postulated the principle of "positive independence" which expressed the country's determination to be an effective actor in world affairs and opposition to "imperialism, neo-colonialism, racialism and all other forms of foreign or national oppression" (The KANU Constitution, 1960). Internal and external relations produced the principle of a regional *status quo* from which emerged the policy of "good neighbourliness". To this was tied an economic ideology known as African socialism, which ostensibly rejected western capitalism and eastern socialist orientation (Republic of Kenya, 1965; KANU Manifesto, 1969; Gertzel, 1970; Orwa, 1986; Malhotra, 1990; Kurgat, 2011).

From the above principle and ideology emerged four levels of policy. The first level was concerned with global issues which came under the general policy of non-alignment. The second level focused on continental African affairs, while the third and final level of policy concentration is on the attainment and maintenance of regional stability. At the top of the entire objectives list is what Holsti (1977:132) calls "core interests" which comprise territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, national identity and security. Connected to these are the middle range objectives – economic, cultural and commercial relations, diplomatic representation and political influence.

Kenya's foreign policy in the tentative years toward self rule was captured in the KANU Constitution of 1960. The aims and objectives of an independent Kenya were to support the United Nations and regional organisations to promote the independence of countries and territories, fight against all forms of discrimination, cooperation with other states and

particularly closer ties with the African countries through strengthening the ideal of Pan-Africanism

(The KANU Constitution, 1960). The KANU Election Manifesto of 1961 laid down specific policies for the future independent Kenya. KANU forcibly rejected the presence of any foreign military base in Kenya, and proposed Africanization of the civil service with only a minimum amount of help from the most necessary expatriates:

Our approach to foreign affairs will be on the lines of positive independence and non-alignment with military or power blocs. The African personality must be the basis of our approach to peace and human welfare. Neutrality which would compromise truth is not our policy. We reserve the right to oppose or support all issues on their merits (The KANU Manifesto, 1960).

Formal non-alignment in economic matters was made explicit in the government's seminal document, *Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1965* section 23 which stated: the third conditioning factor is the need to avoid making development in Kenya dependent on a satellite relationship with any country or group of countries. Such a relationship is abhorrent and a violation of the political and economic independence so close to the hearts of the people. Kenya policy makers made it clear that economic non-alignment did not mean a policy of isolationism; but more related to political non-alignment which implied a refusal to participate in ideological blocs while engaging in world affairs. On the contrary it meant willingness and a desire: to borrow technological knowledge and proven economic commitment; to seek and accept technical and financial assistance from any source without strings attached; and to participate fully in world trade, without political domination (Republic of Kenya, 1965). KADU's support to keep the British military bases in Kenya after independence was seen as promoting a conservative foreign policy agenda, and as a result the support for the Pan African countries was accorded KANU in the 1963 General Elections.

Kenyatta's position on the direction that Kenya was to take is aptly put in his address and repeated remarks that, "those Africans who think that when we have achieved our freedom they can walk into a shop and say 'this is my property', or go onto a farm and say 'this is my farm' are very much mistaken, because this is not our aim" (Kenyatta, 1968:161). The same sentiments were echoed by Mboya in his speech to parliament when introducing a motion on Kenya Government *Sessional Paper no. 10 of 1963/65 of 4th May 1965, on "African socialism and its application to planning in Kenya"*. He told parliament that; "there is no society or country where social services are completely free. So far as the nation as a whole is

concerned, every service must be fully paid for. Services can be given free to some members of society only if other members pay for it" (Mboya, 1970:80). It suffice to note that African socialism was however, repeatedly denounced by Kremlin ideologists as deviating from approved course of "scientific" socialism.

Although Kenya's foreign policy sought to diversify sources of trade so as to reduce her dependence on one state or group of countries, in practice, diversification was mainly within the former capitalist market system, with limited participation in the planned economies has been maintained. Consequently, Nairobi became the hub for the penetration of international capital to Eastern Africa.

Kenya's relations with Eastern European countries and the People's Republic of China were quite cordial at the time of independence in 1963. Kenya's embassies in Moscow and Peking were among the first to be opened and there was little sign of any overt conservatism. The communist countries had hopes of friendly relations with Kenya because of its turbulent past and "Mau Mau" movement (Orwenyo, 1973). In November 1964, Kenya agreed to several Soviet aid projects, including a cotton mill, a radio station, a fish canning factory, fruit and vegetable processing factory projects that were cancelled following a shipment of Soviet arms (troop carriers and T34 tanks) to Mombasa and subsequent rejection of the cargo as obsolete (Stevens, 1976). In subsequent years little activity took place between Kenya and USSR and Eastern Europe.

the Conduct and determinants of russia's foreign policy and diplomacy during the Cold War

Russia's Cold War foreign policy and diplomacy can be explained through the following factors: Great Russian imperialism, bureaucratic tyranny, Byzantine traditions, national defence, Marxist political philosophy and Russian national character (Glaser, 1956; Hoffmann and Fredrick, 1980) and idiosyncrasies of particular decision makers i.e. their anxieties, their aspirations, and their perceptions (Zimmerman, 1980).

Russia's foreign policy in the post 1917 revolution was driven and determined by the revolutionary conquest of the world (Mackintosh, 1963).

Lenin's Decree on Peace that was adopted by the Second Congress of Soviets in November 1917 set the dual nature of Soviet foreign policy, of peaceful coexistence and practical opposition measures that ensured relatively peaceful relations with capitalist states. Both policies were

pursued simultaneously for peaceful coexistence but did not rule out determined opposition to the so called imperialist aggression and support for revolutionary gains in the struggle against foreign oppression (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_the_Soviet_Union).

Stalin's promotion of military, socio-economic, industrialization and collectivization of agriculture was meant to cushion foreign policy while watching carefully events in Europe and the Far East (Mackintosh, 1963). The study of the Russian foreign policy strategy and tactics from 1945-1953 allows us to make the following general conclusions. The communist ideology backed by military successes, fear of the western bloc, reinforced their desire to expand the territory of Russia and create friendly countries and spheres of influence. To the Soviet rulers the first years after World War II clearly appeared as years of revolutionary upsurge with no serious visible obstacle to bar the way of the Communist revolutionary tide (Ginsburg, 1960).

The history of international relations in the second half of the 20th century was dominated by the Cold War politics that intensified towards the end of the 1940s and 1960s. The Cold War captured economic, military and ideological spheres. According to Russian scholars, the Cold War was caused by USA and allies who decided not to inform them (USSR) of the manufacture of the atomic bomb, Churchill's decision to open the second front in the Baltic and not France, his Fulton speech appealing for an introduction of Iron Curtain against communist influence (Protopopov, Kozmenko and Elmenova, 2010). This period of ideological intransigence, and revolutionary movements defined the ideological battle lines and excluded non-aligned states dividing the world into two opposing camps: the socialist and capitalist camps (Ginsburg, 1960: 532). The USSR resolved to use Africa as a major arena in which to substantiate its claims to global power status, a strategy that continued up to Gorbachev's reforms (Saivets and Woodby, 1985).

The United States provided an external environment in which the Soviet Union was deterred from resorting to "the dangerous employment of strategic power for political ends" (Horelick & Rush, 1966: 218). The Cold War era provided an atmosphere that explained the extent to which Russia's foreign policy differed from other states. Marxism as refined by Leninist's and Stalinist's was projected onto international arena. The Russian assumptions about transformation of the international system were indeed reflective of doctrinal projects. According to the Russians, a global socialist revolution was inevitable thus contemporary international system would be

displaced by "international relations of a new type (Hoffman & Fleron, 1980; Zimmerman, 1969).

Russia's foreign policy towards Africa was shaped by the heritage of its colonial ties with the West, strong cultural and linguistic ties with the metropolis, the fear of Moscow's official atheist policy that went against African cultures, the persistent and consistent Chinese competition, the perception that Russia reaped from instability in the Third World, for example Angola and Ethiopia, and the view that Russia was a weak provider in terms of economic and political institutions thus driving elites back to the west (Judelson, Bratov, Sidlon, 1977).

Khrushchev's Russia acknowledged the principle of "many roads to socialism", the doctrinal basis for divergent approaches to potential socialist allies. Moscow agreed that under certain situations, socialism could ascend to power by means of general elections. Khrushchev drew attention to the role of the Third World countries and provided the rationale for Soviet involvement there. Soviet foreign policy moved toward mutual inter-state relations and considerable autonomy to national communist party in managing internal affairs so long as loyalty to Moscow was ensured (Petro and Rubeinstein, 1977).

In the early 1960's Russians focused on "*ravnovesie sil*" – equilibrium of power (Hoffman & Fredrick, 1980). While the Russians sustained the belief in the inevitability of revolution under atomic weapons, the dilemma posed by the constraints that atomic bomb does not observe the class principle, posed the questions – how could the triumph of socialism be secured without general war and how can there be a creation of an "international relations of a new type" (Korianov, 1963:13). With the dilemmas of unknown relations at hand, Russian leaders began to treat the contemporary international system more favourably.

In the post-Khrushchev era, the slogan, "workers of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your chains", and the clausewitzian dictum that, "war is the continuation of foreign policy by other means", was subjected to increased criticism in Russia as the doctrine of peaceful coexistence was abandoned in assertion that ultimate war victory on a world scale belonged to socialism and Khrushchev's plan to build communism was held high in the revolutionary advances of the 1960's and 1970's (Marinin, 1966:16).

Both the Russians and the Americans seemed to agree at this stage that domestic factors and political significance of technology were constraints imposed on the behaviour of states in the international system (Hoffman & Fredrick, 1980:27). The Soviet domestic and foreign policy successfully

used propaganda in order to publicize their interpretation of events with the opposing view to combat western information warfare.

The world had to be informed and convinced of the superiority of the socialist system in the market place of ideas as "disarmament for development" reinforced the deep-seated hope that arms control would help in the reallocation of resources into civilian economy, both in the East-West blocs. These two blocs expanded commitments, courted prospective clients and competed for local and regional advantages. Moscow moved from continental to global based strategy between the years 1954-1974. The strategies used included military and economic assistance to strategic Third Countries, and by 1970's, the superpowers had begun to be driven by longer-term considerations, potential gains and losses.

Central to Soviet foreign policy was the historical comparison of continuity and change with a general tendency of stressing the Soviet ability and ideology to act effectively in international arena. In these themes were assumptions that the Soviet foreign policy differed substantially from the foreign policy of tsarist regime, and that the major variable was the Russian political system as shaped by a particular leader with the assumption that Russia was impermeable to extra-national influences and insulated from the constraints of an open pluralist society whose decision-makers were obliged to take the opinions of domestic critics into account (Tusker, 1963).

Russia's political ideology revealed the assumption of the Soviet character and beliefs that embraced a critique of the existing order, the notions of a better future society, and policy prescriptions for transforming the real into the desired (Hoffmann & Fredrich, 1980). Soviet International relations lacked the salience of domestic affairs that to maintain the institutionalized revolutionary zeal integral to the nature of the Russian regime, foreign policy would become a surrogate of industrialization (Hoffmann & Fredrich, 1980).

The general foreign policy goals were a creation of favourable external conditions conducive to building communism in the Soviet union; elimination of the Cold War threat; disarmament; the strengthening of "world – socialist system", development of equal and friendly relations with "liberated' countries (Third World); peaceful co-existence with the capitalist countries"; and solidarity with Communist and revolutionary - democratic parties, the international workers movement, and national Liberation struggles (http:// en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Foreign_ relations_ of_ the_ soviet_ union).

Kennan (1987) and Wallander (1996) sought to explain Russian foreign policy in terms of regime type and political institutions. They argue that Russian foreign policy lacked internal sources of legitimacy as it made severe political and economic demands upon its citizens through repression. Leadership focused on the revolutionary Leninist ideology that would justify governments' hardship and legitimized policy focused on revolutionary mission hostile to capitalist international system that produced expansionist Russian foreign policies. The ultimate result was a foreign policy of caution, risk evasion and cautious opportunism that eventually produced offensive and over committed contradictory policies (Lenin, 1939; Dallin, 1981; Ross, 1984; Snyder, 1987, 1988).

The desire by Gorbachev in the mid 1980's to develop a new Russian foreign policy led to Russia's domestic political reforms. The subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and acceptance of change in Eastern Europe were as a result of successful political and institutional changes that directed Russia's foreign policy (Evangelista, 1991). One of the questions this chapter sought to answer was whether Russian leaders changed foreign policies because of lessons learned or simply because they had to change policies (Levy, 1994). Policy positions conformed to domestic agendas and foreign policy responsiveness to change in political priories entailed change in political power, coalitions and foreign policy (Anderson, Jr., 1993; Richter, 1994; Wallander, 1992; Mendelson, 1993). Scholars of international relations argue that domestic politics, power resources and the international system influences states interests and coalition formation.

Studies of the effects of the external security environment on Russian politics and foreign policy posit that security affects coalition building by affecting plausibility of alternative policy prescriptions. In the 1960s through the 1970s, export of Soviet resources; oil and gas was increased to pay for imports so as to create an environment that would sustain the limited cooperative foreign policy. Moreover, the impact of international economic environment, security constraints of competition with the USA, and the over stretched activities in the Third World finally contributed to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990's (Wallander, 1992).

africa–east european relations

Key drivers of Eastern European aid since the 1950s included an eclectic mix of foreign policy and Cold War rivalry. German Democratic Republic (GDR) African relations date back to the Soviet engagement in the continent. From 1955, Africa provided GDR with a platform to free itself

from international isolation since its inception in 1949, as it established a consulate in Tanzania and trade missions in Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Sudan (*Africa Report*, March-April 1969). However, GDR trade and commerce in the Third World was lower compared to the other East European countries and was at $304 million, in 1964 i.e. 4.5 per cent, Hungary 5.9 percent, and Czechoslovakia 10 percent (Radu, 1988).

By 1966, the East Germans had trained more than 2000 African students in East Germany universities (*Africa Report*, March-April 1969:59; Sandvoss, 1988), but despite this East European aid to Africa, Kenya continued to receive a large share of Western aid. According to the then Foreign Minister, Dr Munyua Waiyaki, East German aid was not denied Kenya but by choice Kenya kept away:

> I don't think Eastern aid has been denied us; we have just kept away from it. I do know, for example, in the case of the Soviet Union that there was a 40 million rouble facility that we did not use and which we are looking at it again. We have had from the time of independence or one year later, a $10 million facility from Yugoslavia which we did not use. We have had assistance from the Poles. We have polish doctors working in this country now, and there are Romanians working in the mines, which unfortunately, we had to close recently because they were not producing as well as we had hoped. We do get assistance (African report, March-April, 1977:39-40).

The close ties to Western bloc, and ideological differences among Kenya's political elites inside and outside parliament were to blame in the administration of Russia and East European aid. In reality, Kenya's principle of Non-Alignment underwent a serious test.

Positive non-alignment meant the maintenance of diplomatic, political and economic relations with both East and West political blocs. By the 1960s, non-alignment had become a serious focus of scholarly research (Burton, 1965; Crabb, Jr., 1965; Martin, 1962). The Non-alignment Movement was a reaction against cold-war alignments where, allies of each bloc insistently condemned each other on almost all major international issues. According to Okumu (1971:147), the "foreign relations of any African state are a function of its colonial history" because the major lines of these relations have, with a few exceptions, followed the lines of contact established by the former rulers as needed resources were denied on ideological grounds. It defined characteristics of Africa and other developing countries' response to the Cold War (McGowan, 1968; Kaplan, 1964).

African leaders saw non-alignment as a means of preserving the state's independence from the continued rivalry of power groupings as states desired to avoid commitment to former colonial masters as they exercised real influence in world affairs (Nkrumah, 1961; Crabb, 1965; Burton, 1965; Rothstein, 1968). Kenya's foreign policy was focussed on what the country believed is right and judging each case "on its merit" (KANU Manifesto, 1961:27, 28, 30).

Kenya hoped to effectively pursue her international interests through a collective strength from a moral force rather than military power and which believed in the policy of positive non-alignment (Mboya, 1970; Orwa, 1986, 1990). Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta declared that "our external policy is firmly based on non-alignment" (Kenyatta, 1968:279) and on the same note, Kenya's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Njoroge Mungai in the 1970's asserted that the first tenets of Kenya's Foreign policy were those of non-alignment noting:

> Even at the time of our independence, it was unequivocally stated that Kenya would adopt non-alignment as the basic policy in foreign affairs. We are not party to any arrangement of cold-war confrontation or of ideological warfare. We decided on the merits of each case objectively without any form of dictation or pressure from any external source. Our policy of non-alignment takes into account Kenya's national interest and the requirement of maintaining and furthering international peace, progress, justice and understanding in world politics (ACR, 1973-74 c 3538).

However, in 1968, Kenya lost Russia's and Chinese development opportunities when the then Minister for Economic Planning and Development, Tom Mboya played a hide and seek game on proposals to build Busia Textiles for 15 million dollars and Mumias Sugar Factory and the Russians, the Broderick (Webuye) Falls Pulp and Paper factory, Kakamega Technical college, a textile factory in Homa Bay and the development of Kano Irrigation Scheme and vegetable factories for Karatina and Sagana (Republic of Kenya, 1968).

As a way forward, Oginga Odinga proposed that planning the economy required diversification of development partners in the Kenyan regions and suggested that, the Chinese and Russians embark on the above projects, the Americans to develop water projects in Ukambani, Kitui and Machakos, the Germans to develop water projects in Turkana, the Canadians and the British to develop water projects in North Eastern province and irrigate the whole of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera. Mr. Odinga emphasized that Kenya should not have been interested in the East West ideologies but concentrate

on national development projects (ACR, 1973-74C.3538). Inside parliament, Martin Shikuku and Oginga Odinga blamed Tom Mboya for sabotaging Eastern bloc sponsored projects in Kenya:

> Having been in the thick of the negotiations of this particular agreement it is still very fresh in my mind as to what actually went on. We knew that we concluded an agreement with the Chinese ... they were particularly assigned to go to Busia, after we had learned that the Germans could put up the mills there... Some campaigns began against the Chinese by the Corner bar group in this country. This is what probably shows the attitude thing about the Chinese activities (Republic of Kenya, 1968: 4090).

A rumour had been peddled that because of Odinga's closeness with China, the textile Mill was installed in Kisumu instead of Busia, a claim he rejected by saying that the Kisumu mill was installed by the Indians and that the Busia Chinese project needed to be pursued, and that the Russians were ready to start work in Homa Bay but were blocked by Tom Mboya (Republic of Kenya, 1968). From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the principle of nonalignment in reality was not always practised and Kenya had a strong leaning to the West.

Kenya–Soviet union reLations Within the Soviet–afriCan Context

The USSR was a direct continuation of the Russian empire with a multiethnic formation dominated by a central ethnic group. There are two separate entities when describing what the Soviet Union was: the core of the empire with Russians as the dominant ethnic group, and the provinces with several non-Russian ethnic groups. The non-Russians such as the Slavic Republics (Ukraine and Belorussia), held a sort of intermediate position between the core and the provinces of the empire (Shlapentokh, 2001). The status of Ukrainians and Byelorussians were nearly equal to that of Russians with respect to the selection of bureaucrats. However, like the non-Slavic republics, Ukraine and Belorussia was subject to Moscow's absolute intolerance for any moves toward autonomy or separation.

Nogee and Donaldson (1988) argue that the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower was marked by its shift from a continental-based strategy to a global one. They note that development, a function as much of military capabilities as of diplomatic opportunity is most evident in the USSR's diplomatic penetration of the Third World. It is in the Third World,

made up of two-thirds of the world nations, that the Soviet Union engaged the United States in a low-cost, relatively low-risk, and highly intensive pattern of classical imperial competition. The Third World had taken up a special importance for Soviet strategists.

A combination of strategic, political, ideological, and marginally economic considerations ushered in Moscow's "forward policy" in the Third World. It was, however, Washington's deterrent policy during the pre-missile age when the U.S. nuclear superiority was paramount that facilitated the USSR's entry into and courtship with the Third World Countries. It has been argued that:

> The policy of the USSR towards the young independent states applies to many fields. It includes diplomatic support, economic assistance, and exchange of cultural values and, when necessary, military support, including the supply of arms to national independent fighters and, in certain circumstances, demonstration of our readiness to render direct military assistance (Tomachevsky, 1966:10).

The Bolsheviks were not members of some secret utopia sect but were part of a worldwide movement. In the twentieth century, the ideas of socialism, political, social and cultural life of nearly every country in the world was discussed and in some cases countries experimented on the ideas of socialism. Intellectuals from around the globe perceived socialist society, morally and culturally as superior to capitalist society.

Marcus Garvey and other African Americans considered Soviet Russia a "promised land" and an escape route from the Great Depression of the 1930's. Earlier in the 1920's several African foreigners were invited to attend special schools as part of Comentern's training programme, in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow (Draper, 1960; McClellan,
1993, 2006). Comprehensive information on the early Comintern students in Russia can be accessed from the Russian Archives of Social Political History and Russian Documentation Centre for the Study of Modern History (Rossiiskiy
Ttsentr Khranenie i Isuchenie Dokumentov Noveeishi Istorii (RSKIDNI), Collection no. 532). Starting in the late 1950's, an unparalleled level of interest in education led to a large influx of African students to institutions of higher learning (Blakely, 1986). Those in attendance included Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, E.F. Small from Gambia and I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson from Sierra Leone (Sontag, 1948 quoted in Blakely, 1986; Suchkov, 1993; Pegushev, 1997).

With the rapid decolonisation of Africa, a pattern quickly developed in which the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries sought to establish diplomatic relations with post-colonial African states. That effort was attempted through dispatch of delegations, of senior officials and sometimes even ministers, to physically attend Africa's Independence anniversaries.

Solodnikov noted that hundreds of Soviet Engineers, doctors, teachers, economists, lawyers, linguists, agronomists, geologists and other specialists were working in Africa together with their African brothers helping to eliminate the dire consequences of colonial rule, and at the same time hundreds of African students, up to 7200 by end of 1981, were studying in the Soviet Institutions of higher learning (Solodnikov, 1966; Nogee and Donaldson, 1988). The soviets considered Africa a strategic reserve a region in which the bipolar struggle with solid prospects of success could be realized (Nogee, and Donaldson, 1988).

In Russia, socialist ideas were not only popular among radical intellectuals but also with the entire intelligentsia. Socialism was the major force behind Soviet ideology throughout the history of the regime. Soviet national defence and high geographical status were the primary goals of the ideology. The ideology called for the almost total militarization of society and the mobilization of most state resources for foreign policy (Shlapentokh, 2001). Soviet writers have evidence of the USSR's active involvement in certain efforts to establish ties with Egypt and Ethiopia in 1920's and 1930's. They also cite Soviet efforts to educate African students at the Communist University for Toilers of the East as well as the development of fraternal relations with African communist parties that were established before the Second World War (Gorman, 1984).

Soviet objectives in the Third World have been a matter of some disagreement among academic and political observers; particularly with respect to whether Soviet policy was motivated more by Soviet national interest or by ideology. Those who believe that the objectives were driven by national interests argue that it was due to USSR quest for greater power status and promotion of traditional state interests, while those who emphasize the ideological bent see the spread of communism as more of a driving force. Nevertheless, elements of both were no doubt present in Soviet policy motivations and, whatever the genesis, gave rise to behaviour equally threatening to U.S interests (Hosmer and Wolfe, 1983).

It is noted that a set of related, long-standing objectives were evident in Soviet Third World policy since the mid-1950s. The first was to weaken Western control and influence in the former colonial areas of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Latin America emerged somewhat later as a

significant target of Soviet Third World Political interest. Another objective was to shape the socio- political and economic development of the newly independent countries and to bring the so-called nonaligned movement of the Third World into accord with Soviet goals and interests. Where feasible, the Soviets also sought to foster the establishment of pro-soviet Marxist governments and to sustain them in power against internal and external threats. This last goal seems to have moved up somewhat on the scale of Soviet Third World priorities, especially since the mid – 1970s, as Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan embraced the "non-capitalist path to development" and the rise of an avowedly Marxist regime in Mozambique.

The USSR tried to counter competition from Communist China, an aim that became increasingly evident from the 1960's. This was one of the motivating factors behind Soviet intervention in Angola in 1975 – 76. The failure of initial Soviet hopes for rapid transition of newly independent countries to Soviet style socialism saw a Soviet attempt to improve USSR's global power position and military reach by security access and basing arrangement in Third World areas as well an increase in USSR's political influence and force - projection capabilities in the Third World. These "basing" arrangements also supported the peacetime deployment and surveillance activities of Soviet naval and air forces and the broadening of Moscow's offensive options in the event of war. Furthermore, the USSR sought over a long period to improve Soviet bloc access to primary resources in the Third World and ultimately to control or deny the West access to such resources (Hosmer and Wolfe, 1983).

Ogunbadejo (1980) criticizes the assertion that Africa merely occupied a secondary place in Moscow's foreign policy and as a result, the Soviets always adopted a low profile policy on African issues. To stress his argument, he gives the example of notable works on Soviet Russian relations that already existed such as Cohen (1972) and Valkeniev (1973). According to

Ogunbadejo, the example of Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia attests to the importance of Soviet Africa policy. Soviet policies in Africa formed an integral part of a global strategy. Khrushev, for instance, was quite prepared to work hand-in hand with the nationalist leaders since they could, he thought, be used in a concerted effort to undermine the West's influence. Moscow argued that any nationalism that was genuinely based on patriotism must inevitably develop on the side of socialism (Kommunist, 1964). The creation of new independent states from the old European empires was seen as a loss for capitalism and therefore, a gain for socialism.

Soviet economic aid and political influence was to help the new African leaders to realize the superiority of socialism over capitalism.

Russia's relations with other states were particularly influenced by the development and behaviour of Western nations. What determined Moscow's foreign policy choices was whether or not the West's international actions were perceived by Russia as an equal and legitimate world power player. Russia's foreign policy displays a considerable account of historical continuity, due to challenges to its security as a borderland nation in a volatile external environment. These challenges included threats of external invasion; need to preserve internal state integrity and unrests in neighbouring territories (Tsygankov, 2010). The struggle to maintain the balance of political power among nation-states requires diplomatic initiatives and dialogue (Antoine, 2009).

Russia has never been part of Africa's colonial past, nor has Africa and its special needs and characteristics been part of the doctrinal or revolutionary history of contemporary communism. Traditionally, and until well after the Second World War, the World communist movement had little interest in Africa as such and almost no direct contact with it. Few, if any, Soviet scholars even travelled to the area. It was regarded as an appendage of Europe, and such communist organization existed in Africa as insignificant offshoots of the parent European parties (Nielsen, 1969). The Soviets on the other hand and in the quest for influence had to make some policy shifts over the years, what Ogunbadejo (1980) observes has been from strict ideological Puritanism, to a less doctrinaire posture, and finally, to an outright policy of pragmatism as and when it became necessary.

According to Kanet and Birgerson (1997), the major characteristics of the foreign policy of the former Soviet Union was the degree to which policymaking was insulated from domestic political pressure wielded by interest groups in the West. Soviet leaders had considerable autonomy when devising and pursuing foreign policy initiatives. However, this did not mean that Soviet foreign policy did not reflect domestic political trends. Indeed, "ambiguous and costly foreign policies influenced domestic policies and domestic conditions necessitated changes in foreign policy" (ibid: 335). Notable is the fact that foreign decisions in the USSR were basically made at the discretion of the General Secretary, with some input from other members of the Politburo. Public pressure was not a factor in foreign policy decisions, and interest pressure groups did not exist. Communist era leaders were not faced with organized efforts to influence foreign policy and were able, to a very substantial degree, to set and pursue their foreign policy goals

and objectives without concern for opposition from groups outside the party and state leadership.

The emergence of the principle of self-determination helped to provide a whole new rhetoric for African nationalism. Increasingly, the members of the new educated elites of African countries formulated their aspirations in terms of the rights of all people to determine their own destinies. The Soviet African approach at the era of independence was the establishment of positive relations while supporting the liberation struggles. At the beginning of 1956, Ethiopia was the only African country with diplomatic relations with USSR. By 1966 there were over twenty. The Soviet Union offered technical assistance in exchange for goodwill and alignment in world affairs. In the period between 1955 and 1978, an estimated ten thousand Africans mainly from Somalia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia were trained in the Russian military system. The main form of assistance to Africa by the USSR was education (*The National Observer*, 1962; Kanet, 1968; Bissel, 1981). This aspect of students' airlifts to the USSR deserves special attention for two reasons. First, it brought thousands of Africans to Russia for study programmes lasting six years and the establishment of African institutes in Russia to cater for foreign students and Russian researchers on Africa.

Kenya's relations with Russia (Soviet Union) 1958 – 1991 tended to highlight what has been referred to as the dilemmas of developing countries in dealing with developed countries divided along ideological lines (Wallace, 1979; Clements Jr., 1989; Gaddis, 2000). Kenya took non-alignment as the guiding principle for its external relations. However, it was largely not adhered to as Kenya, on balance, displayed a strong leaning towards the West and a lukewarm gesture towards the East.

War on CoMMunisM in Kenya and Kenya–Soviet reLations

The struggle between which bloc Kenya was to give attention was taken up in the House of Parliament. Some members of Parliament, in a joint statement, claimed that there were two groups in parliament; one inspired by the East and communism; the other believed that Kenya's future lay with neither the East nor the West but in the principles set forth in the constitution and the Sessional Paper on African Socialism (*Africa Report*, January, 1966).

On peace and security, KANU charged that KPU was promoting "communist" tendencies in its economic and foreign policies and a possible class conflict. KPU projected itself as the representative of the "have-nots" and advocated for a more "scientific" road to socialism than Kenya was following under KANU. KPU criticized the government actions on such

problems as unemployment, land redistribution, the cost of education, and pro-western foreign policy, and got the support of trade union leaders and former officers in the defunct left-wing Kenya African Workers Congress (KAWC), among them Denis Akumu, Ochola Mak'Anyengo, Vicky Wachira and John Akama (*Africa Report*, October, 1966).

The government consolidated power by co-opting and coercing government critics. For instance, Bildad Kaggia was arrested and remanded in 1968 on charges of holding a public meeting on the 17th February, 1968 in South Nyanza without official permission. At the same time, Oginga Odinga was prevented from departing from Nairobi for Boston University on 20th March, 1968. The presidential powers were consolidated by amending the Kenya Constitution in March 1968 to provide that: every candidate for parliament or presidency must belong to a registered political party; presidential candidates (one nominee per party) was required to win a constituency seat to legitimatize their candidacy, polling the most votes throughout the country to be declared president; the minimum age of the president was raised to 45 years from 35 years (this was calculated to lock Mboya out and who was going to be 38 years in the 1970 general elections); all parliamentary candidate members were to be nominated by members of their party; the 12 specially nominated MPs by the National Assembly were to be henceforth nominated by the president and in case the president died or resigned, the Vice-President was to automatically assume the presidency until the next general election. The government arrogated itself emergency powers by introducing preventive detention without any reference to parliament (*Africa Report*, May, 1968:25). The above was followed by the expulsion of Czech Jiri Forejt, Nairobi Correspondent for the Czechoslovakian news agency Ceteka on March 31, 1968. Forejts activities the government claimed had "jeopardized the security and interests of the state" (*Africa Report*, June 1968:26).

Forejt's predecessor, Zdenek Kubes had earlier been deported alongside with six other journalists and Eastern European diplomats in March, 1966 (*Africa Report*, April 1966). A month later, then Minister for Home Affairs, Daniel arap Moi, told parliament that a surprise search of KPU's party office found an illegal "Czech auto-pistol" and two loaded magazines which had been brought into the country illegally, a claim that Oginga Odinga rejected as a fabrication and unacceptable. Odinga was later prevented by immigration officials on 26th April, 1966 from flying out of Nairobi to Dar-es-Salaam for Tanzania's Union Day celebrations. Odinga attributed his predicaments to Western bloc powers who wanted to impose into positions

of leadership people who would allow peaceful exploitation of Kenyan resources (*Africa Report*, June 1968).

Oginga Odinga was convinced that KPU-KANU approach on foreign affairs, land, economic policy, corruption, tribalism and detention were the main causes of conflicts (*Africa Report*, November, 1968). To remedy these KPU advocated for the policy of nationalization, free primary education and reorganization of the university to ensure that graduates worked for national development (*Africa Report*, March-April, 1969). This position led to the refusal to grant permission to Oginga Odinga to address university students. The students' invitation, and refusal by minister for Education and University College of Nairobi Administration to allow Oginga Odinga give a public lecture, following a request by the Political Science Club in March 1968, caused further tensions between KPU and government (*Africa Report March*, April, 1969:10).

Meanwhile, KANU stood on its three ideological pillars: the 1963 Party Manifesto, the Republican Constitution of 1964 and Sessional Paper no.10 on African Socialism, issued in 1965. These documents had been shaped up by Tom Mboya in his various capacities as KANU Secretary General, Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs (1963-64), and Minister for Economic Planning and Development (*Africa Report*, October, 1966).

In contrast to the 1963 general election, which transferred power from whites to Africans, the Little General Elections (LGE) consolidated power in the President and in effect KANU. KANU was backed by most business, farm and labour government bodies. KPU registered the support of Somali President, the Soviet and Czech authorities (*Africa Report*, October 1966:60).

Preservation of Public Security Act was passed by Parliament, in June 2 1966 to strengthen and consolidate the president's powers. The President, inter-alia, had powers to detain persons, restrict movement, and censor communication (Ibid). This Act forced the Vice President Joseph Murumbi to tender a resignation letter on the grounds of poor health on 20th September, 1966, as he denied rumours that he was joining opposition. By end of July, 1966 KPU Nakuru officials joined KANU, while in Nyanza, the chairman of KPU Central Nyanza branch Oguok and sixty officials joined KANU. In the same month, 67 Kenyans sent to Bulgaria under KANU sponsorship for military training two years previously returned to Kenya but were ignored by the government (*Africa Report*, November 1967).

On 15th February, 1967 the National Assembly was merged with the House of Representatives (Africa Report, February 1967) and at the same time the government rejected Chinese Embassy's protest against the

breaking of a window in a display case outside the Embassy on January, 1967 (*Africa Report*, April, 1967).

Somali, USSR and Czech moral support during the Little General Election (LGE) and KPU's call for negotiations with leaders of Shifta rebels in North Eastern were later to be consolidated in the anti-communist campaign by the pro-western KANU wing. In a Republic Day message on December, 1967 the Minister for Defence Dr Njoroge Mungai charged that Somali Shifta activity had turned back the clock of progress in the North Eastern province by 60 years and let in the law of the jungle. He blamed the masterminds in Mogadishu whom he described as jealous of a prosperous, go-ahead, developed North Eastern province and their own wretched, poverty stricken country, further impoverished by having to support the cost of maintaining and employing £13,000,000.00 of armaments, thrust upon them so unwisely by the Russians (*Africa Report*, February, 1967).

The Minister for Home Affairs, Daniel arap Moi told the House of Representatives on November 1, 1967 that 1,600 Somali Shifta's had been killed, while on the Kenyan side, 30 police force members, 17 administrative officers and 21 soldiers were killed in a three year sporadic fighting in North Eastern province (*Africa Report*, January 1967). On 4th November, 1967 Minister for Defence Dr Njoroge Mungai rejected KPU's proposal to have the government negotiate with the leaders of the Shifta dissidents as he declared, "The only kinds of negotiations the Shifta are going to have are with a gun spitting fire… we are going to answer the Shifta by complete extermination." (*Africa Report*, January 1967: 32). He told the House that the Shifta had begun to use heavy mines received from Arab countries, and – the Soviet Union, China and Italy (ibid). Despite the strengthening Kenya-USA relation, Kenya had serious efforts towards the principle of good neighbourliness with Tanzania and Somali (African Report, November-December, 1985). The two Presidents of Kenya and Somalia met in Arusha, Tanzania on 28th October under the mediation of President Kaunda of Zambia, and agreed to:

> maintain peace on both sides of the border, prevent destruction of human life and property; refrain from hostile propaganda through mass media; suspend any emergency regulations imposed on either side of the border; reopen diplomatic missions; consider measures encouraging development of economic and trade relations, appoint a working committee and also examine ways and means bringing about a satisfactory solution between the two countries (Africa report, January 1967: 25).

While Kenya's foreign relations with the Western powers remained stable despite the 1964 Congo crisis in which Kenyatta mediated, during the 1976 independence celebrations, American planes were given the honour to fly past. This was a symbolic indication that the US was willing to defend Kenya's territorial integrity and independence (Attwood, 1967). Further, the USA wanted to portray Kenya as a friendly ally and dispatched Henry Kissinger to Nairobi in April 1976. For this friendship, Kenya and other Sub-Saharan countries received more than $340 million worth of military hardware, advisors and $165 million worth of military equipment since 1961 (Department of State, 2006; Nnoli, 1990; http :// www. state. gov/ r/ pa/ ho/ frus/ nixon/ eb/ c17634.html).

To keep the Soviet influence at bay, the British and the French feared political revolutions were soon to be witnessed in Africa through Ethiopia where the Russians had established a large diplomatic mission (Munene, 1995) and wanted to show-case Kenya as a success story in political and economic governance (Okoth, 2004). The Americans on their part to deter the communist threat impressed cultural instruments like education that were earlier not directly under the engagement of the government.

A study carried out by Smith (1966) on the East African airlifts to America immediately after Kenya's independence revealed that, the officials of the Government were involved to a little extent in the airlifts' programs. However, the degree of involvement apparently increased in each successive year and the programs begun to be seen as serving American foreign policy objectives.

The year 1959 was a turning point in overseas scholarship programs to Kenyans. On September 1959, a *Britania* Airliner operated by *Equatorial Travels Limited*, landed in Idlewild International Airport in New York and eight one Africans disembarked nearly all of them Kenyans, on their way to enrol in colleges and universities all over the United States. They had just completed a historic flight. Theirs was the first student air charter out of East Africa. An operation dubbed "Airlift Africa-1959" by its sponsors (ibid), and an educational- exchange episode that was to be emulated many years to come by other programmes and countries. A recommendation was placed that a larger government role in the placement of students' proceedings to the United States is undertaken and more government–sponsored scholars, who will be "the best ambassadors of their home countries and of the commonwealth" (Luke, 1960, quoted in Smith, 1966:1). By 1960, the U.S official perception of the airlifts had changed from disregard to active concern.

the iMpaCt of the CoLd War on Kenya–ussr and east european foreign reLation

The interests of the global powers brought Kenya into the fold of the Cold War and, as Schlesing, Jr. asserts, "the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression" and that American reaction to Soviet designs represented "the commitment of the United States to active responsibility for freedom and justice throughout the world" (Schlesing, 1969:106-7). This position on the role of America as a champion of freedom is supported by Lunderstad (1980, 1986).

According to Gould – Davies (1999:94) the causes of the Cold War were to be found in the dynamics of the interaction of the super powers. He notes that security dilemma sharpened by the zero-sum logic of bipolarity, generated action – reaction cycles that inevitably brought the two sides into confrontation. Williams (1962) asserts that the United States was a nation that wished to implement an economic, political and ideological agenda that would usher in American century; and therefore, the Russians had no real control. According to Williams, the Soviet Union therefore was not the only actor to be blamed for the Cold War tensions. The driving force of the Cold War was the role of the "winning weapon" the atomic bomb and the use of economic boom after World War II by the U.S.A against the backdrop of Europe and parts of Asia being in total ruin.

Leffler (1999), reviewing several works on the causes of the Cold War came up with the conclusion that new writings do not leave us with a clear and unambiguous view of the Cold War; He gives the example of John Gaddis (1997) *We Now Know* among others. Gaddis (1997:286-87) argues that "many people saw the Cold War as a contest of good versus evil". He acknowledges that recent books provide us with new information, fresh insights, and provocative argumentation. Sometimes they revive old controversies in fascinating and unexpected ways. But what is striking is the extent to which the new scholarship leaves itself open to diverse conclusions. Leffler (1999) and Mastpy (1996) blamed the Cold War on Stalin's personality, on authoritarian government, and on communist ideology. Leffler noted that Stalin supposedly conjured foreign policy threats in order to cement his rule at home and that the Cold War was fought on the periphery for no good reason whatsoever. The establishment and maintenance of military bases in the Indian Ocean by Britain and the U.S.A was attributed to containment of Communist influence in Africa (Mugomba, 1977).

Hosmer and Wolfe (1983) quoting Kennan (1947), observe that the notion that the USSR, impelled by reason of ideology, history and *realpolitik*, sought opportunistically to "fill every nook and cranny available to it in the world basin of power" was one of the premises underlying the post – world war II Western policy of containment of the U.S.S.R.

According to Kruglov (1962), Kenya was a strategic global place for big powers. The establishment of military bases in Kenya by the British and the Americans was one of the fronts to contain the spread of socialism. Kenya had been turned into "military and colonial strategic, and security base for the West in East Africa (Kruglov, 1962:2; Greig, 1977; Pochevskii, 1987).

Makinda (1982) observes that the Superpowers perception of their world's supervisory role to maintain the ideological status quo, contain communism and reassure security to the pro-Western states in the region, negotiated for military facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Egypt and Oman with a view to ensuring surveillance of the entire Persian Gulf region and the northern sections of the Indian Ocean. The Soviets later acquired military facilities in Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. After the launch of the Soviet Union's most spectacular space satellite, Soviet scientific achievement was portrayed acting as "redemption for the downtrodden Africans" (Krokodil, 1958: 8). It was argued that the Soviet Union being the first socialist state positioned themselves as the natural allies of those oppressed by international capitalist system (Richards, 1999; Matusevich, 2009).

In the wake of the American defeat in Vietnam, Soviet geopolitical adventurism around the world expanded into Africa and Latin America, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The USA administration sought to contrast Soviet military aggression with America's defence of human rights, though it suffered from "inability to clarify its basic operating assumptions" as an information or propaganda instruments". Africanist scholars argued that Africa's relations with the Soviet Union were quite part of Africa's relations with the Western world. Therefore contacts between African nationalists and Russia were often in response to disaffection with the western world (Rubin, 1966:10 and Mazrui, 1977).

Some scholars believed that Moscow's influence in the Third World rested entirely upon arms transfers to build the desired ties with "revolutionary" democratic states (Shearman, 1988) but to forge commercial links with the best economic performers in Africa, Moscow recognized that it had to rely essentially on economic instruments (Albright, 2000). The USA viewed Moscow's African interests in the light of access to raw materials and minerals (Albright, 2000) and Orwa (1985) explained Soviet

African relations through the Africa's Western European, economic and political ties. African institutions and organizations were based on Western models; official languages were European languages inherited from the former colonial powers and more importantly the compatibility of the Soviet Union Rouble currency was unable to penetrate Africa commercially.

In the Horn of Africa, the very fact that the USSR backed Addis Ababa curtailed Moscow's prospects for substantially improving relations with, Somalia, Sudan (Katz, 1988) and Kenya. A Russian scholar, Shubin, argues that the Soviets regarded pro Soviet states not as 'proxies' or "junior partners" in waging the cold war but rather as one of "the detachments" of the world struggle against imperialism (Shubin, 2004: 102).

Pan-Africanism as a Diaspora movement in the 1960's and 1970's had strong links with Marxism as a language of protest and the Third World benefited precisely from the tensions of the competition between the big powers consequently affecting inter-state relations (and at the same time Africa served as a centre for containment policies of East and Western blocs (Schroeder, 1991). Africa emerged as a battle field for proxy wars as both the US and the Soviet Union became involved in regional conflicts. The Soviets saw intimate links between war, subversion, trade, diplomacy, education, and propaganda.

The Americans have traditionally looked upon the continent policy as a special area of influence and assumed responsibility of the former colonial powers (Shroeder, 1991), a component that was best summarized in 1968 by George Ball, Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy Administration, who noted that the US recognized Africa as a "special European responsibility", just as European nations recognized "our particular responsibility in Latin America"
(Ball, 1968 quoted in Shroeder, 1991; 376). During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States vied for geographical dominance using almost identical strategies to expand influence wherever possible, by causing regime change (Mahoney, 1993; Shlapentokh, 2001). In the Cold War tensions, other scholars argued that the presence of nuclear weapons introduced an overriding factor of restraint into relations among the more advanced states and helped to preserve world peace (Brzezinski, 1970).

Moscow gave attention to vanguard parties in the Third World as instruments of Soviet foreign policy and contrary to Leninists doctrine that conditioned Soviet leadership in the breakup of the colonial system as the harbinger of a revolutionary tidal wave that would sweep over the Third World and leave Communist regimes in its wake, events in the Third World betrayed Moscow's belief that such a course of events would ensue

(Albright 1983, 1990). Kenya as a player in the International system had to navigate her national interests through the East-West blocs' rivalry and Russia formed part of Kenya's global foreign policy and diplomacy.

Many ideologists in Russia believed that Africa offered profitable, exploitable targets for USSR to pursue its ideologically ordained quest (Brayton, 1979). USSR and Eastern European countries, had both diplomatic and economic relations with most African states, and most were recipients of some type of aid; including those that considered themselves non-aligned countries. The Soviets sought to discourage African states from increasing economic cooperation with the United States which could weaken their ties to Moscow as they feared that African leaders could be persuaded to think Moscow had little to offer in economic development (Katz, 1988).

the end of Cold War and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

The end of 1980's witnessed the end of the cold war. The immediate result was the thawing of big power confrontational relations and a lessening of super power interests in Africa. The early 1990's saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialism in Russia and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev resigned and Yeltsin took over. The President of the USSR Michael Gorbachev did not intend to keep the Soviet Union in its existing state; nor did he want to let it break down. He believed in gradual transition to a voluntary union of republics. However, the radicals accused him of being too slow or dictatorial, while the conservatives encouraged him to use force in order to reinstate order (Smirnov, 2012). Eventually, at midnight on 31st December, 1991 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Russia's fourth empire ceased to exist.

The Russians created four empires, each of a difference kind and each of the four collapsed for different reasons. There was the Kiev on Rus, the Ivan the Terrible (Ivanov), the Romanov, and the Soviet Empire. It has been observed that the Soviet empire was more centralized and ideological than any of its predecessors and became the most extensive and powerful of all. It was also the most short-lived (Longworth, 2005).

The end of the Cold War seemed so distant during the late 1970s and early 1980s but the fact that several previously established patterns of Soviet American cooperation survived the "era of stagnation" in Moscow and the first Reagan administration in the United States, together with the rapid decline in cold war tensions meant that mutual suspicion was no longer the only force driving the superpower relationship (Axelrod, 1984; Oye, 1986). For the first time, there appeared to be both practical and a conceptual way

out of the "prisoner's dilemma" that had for so long confounded those seeking a model for how the cold war might end (Axelrod, 1984; Jevis, 1988; Forst and Lucianovic, 1977).

It has been noted that 1986 was an important year in Soviet's politics. A newly revised party programme was adopted; the Twenty Seventh Party Congress set out the priorities of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. According to President Gorbachev, foreign policy was to be determined by domestic priorities and economic contacts were to be tied up more closely with mutually advantageous economic relations (Shearman, 1988). This meant a reduction in Moscow's commitment to support poor Third World countries with large injection of economic and cultural aid.

In the immediate post-Soviet collapse, Russia's increased partnership with the west meant less of a relationship with the non- western regions (Tsygankov, 2010). Russia's immediate post-Soviet leaders were initially dismissive of the region's significance. Russia is thought to be concerned more with winning markets for its goods particularly arms and energy than developing strategicdiplomatic alliances or deep rooted cultural affinities.

However, Russo- Africa relations that were mainly based on ideological rivalry between U.S.A and U.S.S.R reached its lowest level in the late 1990s beginning the year 2000 as a result of the collapse and demise of the U.S.S.R. However, mineral rich Africa continued to attract Russia, the basis of renewed relations. Even though questions have been posed on whether these relations are worth considering, given Russia's economic problems, geographical distance, and low level understanding of the continent by Russian political, business and society. The renewed post- Soviet relations with Africa manifest the desire to do business with Africa. Visits by Inter-Parliamentary Committees, constant contacts with African ambassadors in Moscow, cultural, scientific research and exchanges have been intensified with Africa (Diplomaticheskaya, 2010; Klimov, 2010). Russia's influence in the international arena is gradually being felt after the post-Soviet slump (Dimbleby, 2009; Treisman, 2011).

The essence of Russian Foreign Policy is determined by the following longterm tasks: to revive Russia as a domestic, free, state, to provide favourable conditions for the formation of a modern efficient economy that will guarantee Russian citizens a worthy standard of living, and the country's financial and economic independence. To achieve an equal and natural incorporation of the Russian federation into the world community as a great power that boosts a country's long history, unique geopolitical situation, considerable military might, and significant technological, intellectual and ethical capacities (ibid). Russia's foreign policy from 1993

was to be guided not by ideological stances or parties' needs but by fundamental national parties' interests.

Education remained the main link in Kenya- Russian bilateral relations during and after the collapse of the USSR. By 1964, Kenyan students in the USSR, constituted the largest contingent of African students followed by Ghana and UAR (*Pravda,* 1964:3; *Uganda Argus*, 1965). With the Cold War warning and the soviet economy in shambles, by 1991, the country had lost much of its earlier clout and prominence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Matusevich, 2009). Nonetheless, education continues to play a role in Russo- African relations. About 700-800 African students are admitted to higher institutions of learning yearly and the total population currently stands at 5000 students, 50 % on Federal Government scholarship (Diplomaticheskaya, 2010). In the field of trade and economy, Russia and African countries are bound by many bilateral agreements, both inherited by the Russian Federation from the Soviet Union and new ones (Shubin, 2004; Deich, 2003). The Government education scholarships are, for instance, inherited from the Soviet Union.

eduCation and foreign poLiCy

Kenya-Russian early contacts started with Kenyatta's visit and short studies in Moscow in 1929; and 1932-33. In Kenya the Russian's had an influence on the Trade Unions like the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and found its ally in Makhan Sigh. According to Fred Kubai, the Central Organization of Trade Union (COTU) Secretary General, Makhan Singh was known as a "controversial...very dangerous man... a communist ..." (Singh, 1969:Foreword) by those opposed to his workers' rights activism work.

The USA-based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) found an ally in the name of Tom Mboya. Russians also sought contacts with Kenyans through Kiswahili Radio broadcasts in addition to those in English, beginning February, 1960. This was followed by pre-1963 students' airlifts to Russia and its satellite states of Eastern Europe (Orwenyo, 1973; Kurgat and Kurgat, 2012).

The Soviet academicians, through articles and radio commentaries, called for liberation of African countries; stating that African people had the right to self-determination against colonialism (*Tass*, 1960; Suchkov, 1993; Pegushev, 1997).

However, Tom Mboya cautioned Kenyans that totalitarianism and dictatorship were tied up with communism and Kenya's "future

development lay to the west" (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 1435-1436). The strong ProWestern forces in Kenya availed capitalist opportunities (*The Times*, 1972). American aid was explicitly a tool of foreign policy, a "political weapon" to assist projects such as the National Youth Service, to avoid them becoming communist indoctrination groups. The US also provided humanitarian support via USAID, and the Peace Corps, and used the Voice of America to build support for the its worldview, along with cultural exchanges, and scholarship programmes (Hornsby, 2012:145).

Western involvement in Kenya's political and economic activities played a role in determining the path that Kenya followed after independence. According to Hornsby (2002) the large foreign investment and number of citizens living in Kenya at independence acted as stabilizing forces, both good and ill. Although Western intervention became less overt, foreign advisers were put in influential positions, thousands of aid workers, teachers and other foreign professionals continued to work in Kenya.

Kenya experienced enduring tension between supporters of a more communal egalitarian or socialist path, and proponents of a more individualized, capitalist and unequal view of what was right for the country. The tension was most visible during the 1963-1965s. Hornsby notes that Kenya's African Socialism was never truly socialist, and its capitalism, was never of American free enterprise liberal type (Hornsby, 2002; Branch, 2011).

The struggle over development policy between Kenyatta and Odinga groups was an essential part of the dynamics of the independence process. According to Branch (2011:36), "between 1963 and 1969, Kenyan politics were played out on the global stage. The Cold War, in turn, left its mark on the country's politics". The Western countries struggled to keep Kenya from what Branch (2011: 144) termed the "lure of the East".

The Proletarians attached full and political independence to economic independence (Minayer and Fyodorov, 1965:65). In 1957 Arzumanyan leader of the Soviet delegation to the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity conference outlined his country's main principles in aiding the non-aligned developing countries as follows:

We can build for you an industrial plant or transport facilities, a research or educational establishment, a hospital or cultural institution, whichever you need. We can send our specialists to you or you may send yours to us to see our enterprises and research institutions. We can send our professors to your educational establishments or you may send your students to our educational institutions … state what you need and we can help you by

rendering assistance in the form of loans or technical aid, within our economic possibilities (Arzumanyan, 1958:185).

It was clear to the Soviets that educational and research exchanges played a major role in the development and integration of inter-state relations. Economic and technical aid would help to concretize the relations, as Arzumanyan continued to state:

We do not seek to get any advantages. We do not need profits, privileges, control interests, concessions or raw material sources. We do not ask you to participate in any blocs, reshuffle your governments or change your domestic or foreign policies. We are ready to help you as a brother helps his brother, without interests whatsoever, for we know from our experience how difficult it is to get rid of need. Our only condition is to aid without conditions at all (Arzumanyan, 1958:186).

Critics of this approach argued that Soviet African economic collaboration served to entrench Moscow's influence in the Third World and that the Soviets were self- appointed apostles against colonialism and imperialism (Vidyasor, 1972:59). Though the proletariat environment did not exist in the African continent, National-liberation movement registered Soviet support (Macintyre, 1993). Tomashevsky strongly expressed how other states had to reckon with USSR in her quest to liberate colonial countries. He stated:

The very existence of the Soviet Union objectively promotes the independence of emerging states and gives them additional strength for resisting imperialism even if they do not establish relations with the Soviet Union. When undertaking some measures against Asian, African and Latin American countries, the imperialist powers are forced to reckon with the Soviet Union and take into consideration the position it holds or might assume (Tomashevsky, 1966).

The 1950s witnessed heavy Soviet technical, economic and military assistance to liberation movements particularly in Africa. This was meant to win the "African Soul" and generate a match to Socialism (Federenko, 1964; Matusevich, 2009). At the UN, Nikita Khrushev supported the granting of independence to colonial countries (A/4501, 23 September, 1960; A/4502, 23 September 1960; A/PV, 925-939 and A/PV. 944-947). The Soviet proposal was adopted by the General Assembly under resolution 1654 (xvi), resolution 1810 (xvii) of 17 December 1962 and the special committee was enlarged from seventeen to twenty four to prepare for the declaration of independence.

According to Vassiliev (2003), Russia is a split society, with various social groups and class interests, which are manifested in its foreign policy. He, for instance, observes that researchers and scholars in higher institutions of learning played a supportive role in explaining Soviet foreign policy and served as centres of radical innovations. The press acted as a transmitter of party policy to the Soviets and the world. In some instances, the party acted as a tool of one party faction against the other in the process of consolidating power. It is therefore evident that Soviet diplomacy was characterized by secrecy and compartmentalization.

The cold war, military assistance, political support, and education were the prime instruments of expanding East-West spheres of influence (Lawson, 1988; Kanet and Ipatov, 1980; Federenko, 1964; CIA released documents created: 1/21/1965 and Pravda, 1965; Kovner, 1967). The Soviets provided military assistance to South Africa liberation movements, established wide spread contacts with most African states and supplemented it with economic, technical and educational scholarships (Nielsen, 1969; McGowan, 1968; Good, 1964). In the post-colonial states, the Soviets used the assistance they give to Third World to marshal their positions in the UN voting arrangements (Bach, 1965). The Soviet Union, worked very closely with their East European allies in the coordination of their networks in Africa. The type of aid and how it was channelled was a prototype of the Soviets. Such example of proxy states was the German Democratic Republic.

To mark independence celebrations on 12th December, 1963 Kenya invited friends from Eastern and Western blocs. The developments on the eve of Kenya's independence showed a considerable eagerness on the part of a segment of the Kenyan intelligentsia and leaders of the Soviet government to cooperate. The anxiety of the Soviets was summarized by Khrushchev's answer to a journalist's question thus:

> The sympathy of the Soviet people has always been with the courageous people of Kenya, who made many sacrifices in upholding their right to an independent existence and development. The proclamation of Kenya's independence spells a further extension of the family of independent African continent from colonial domination … the Soviet people, true to their international duty, have always sided with the peoples figuring for their freedom and independence, have always sided with those who, having gained independence, creating better living conditions for the working people (Soviet News, 1963:52).

The USSR delegation composed of Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR and the First Deputy Minister for Higher and Secondary Education (Tass, November 22, 1963). The presence of the Education Minister, and the meeting with Jomo Kenyatta, was a clear indication of the role Education was going to play in the future bilateral engagements. Khrushchev emphasized the strengthening of political and economic cooperation (*East African Standard*, December 11, 1963; *Soviet News*, December 12, 1963; *Tass*, December 11, 1963; *Soviet News*, December 19, 1963). Kenya named Adala Otuko as Kenyan ambassador to Moscow, where he arrived on January 2, 1964 and presented his credentials two weeks later (*Tass*, January 8, 1964). Vladimir Lavrov was appointed the first Soviet Ambassador to Kenya on January 27, 1964 (*Tass*, January 2, 1964). Soviet Foreign Policy crucially affected the dynamics of international relations because its initiatives created realities which necessitated response by the other powers. To neutralize Kenya, the Soviet Union established Lumumba Institute in Nairobi that attracted the concerns of the western powers in a world polarized by the cold war (Schiebel, 1968; Orwenyo, 1973).

Following the establishment of Lumumba Institute in Nairobi, the prowestern Tom Mboya introduced a motion entitled, "Precautions against communism". In the debate and resolutions that followed, legislators committed themselves to maintain vigilance against communism:

That having regard to the increasing threat of communism in Africa and to Kenya's vulnerability and bearing in mind any political, economic and social frustrations which might provide a breeding ground for communistic propaganda and activity, this council requests government to maintain the outmost vigilance and all possible precautions against any development of communism in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 2656-57).

The legislators who included Masinde Muliro, Daniel arap Moi and Dr Gikonyo Kiano, compared communism to 'evil' and 'godless' ideology, and strongly condemned those who were trying to create the communist inroads in Kenya. According to Tom Mboya, the country was weary of communist threats and emphasized that:

> We should expose the communist lie by living the democratic faith. It is not going to be enough merely to tell the people that; communists are liars, that they give you false hopes, that they are this or that, if people should see an alternative that is better in real life than the practice of communism. That is the challenge that those of us who believe that communism must be defeated must ace in East Africa today (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 2661-62).

Moi and Kiano, who claimed to be Christian democrats, wanted to see communism defeated because they claimed it was full of violent doctrines unacceptable and evil (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 2687-88). The Minister for Internal Security and Defence during a Legislative Council Debates, J.W. Cussack, expressed colonial worries on the spread of communist in Africa in general and Kenya in particular:

The objective of communist support for the so-called national liberation movements in the colonies and elsewhere is not what a good number of people think it is. It is to deprive the metropolitan powers of supplies and raw materials, thereby creating unemployment in industrialized countries and the climate for a revolutionary situation where such a climate can only, in communist dogma exist. There is also a Russian imperialist background … the object of communism has nothing whatsoever to do with liberty and freedom for the colonies (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 2652).

The Minister further revealed that people identified with communism and communist literature, were to be restricted and culprits prosecuted (ibid). Taaitta Toweett, a member of Legco condemned the motion as a ploy by the colonial government to commit Kenya firmly to the western camp in the Cold War and by so doing divide the solidarity of African leadership and metaphorically proclaimed:

Now coming to the idea of what the mover of the motion had in mind, there is another thing which says "if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent him". It is the same with communism. It has been moved and it exists in our minds. I think it is very regrettable that this motion should have been brought to this house (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 2663-64, 1960).

Legislators in the Legislative Council, pledged to use all their powers to block communism and the Kenya government decided in 1966 to purge from the party and the government those politicians who advocated strengthening relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Kenyatta appreciated Soviet Scholarships to train Kenyans. He denied the rumour that people were confined and brain washed in the USSR and told his auto biographer:

> I was learning all the time. The first time I spent most of the time visiting different regions of the country as part of my education. I was not confined. I was my own master (Murray-Brown, 1972:268).

It is noted, however, later years, when Kenyatta returned to London and Kenya, he was anxious to appear moderate and eager to remove the "Bolshevik label attached to him" as the European settlers feared that African nationalism would redouble communist intensity in the country

(Suchkov 1993: 165). There were other legislators like J.N. Muimi who argued that educational scholarships will open inroads for communism:

> We in Kenya can stand on our own without any aid from any communist country and must prevent … young boys and girls being offered overseas bursaries by communist countries and going to be educated there … because they would return to Kenya with communist ideas and then convey "these ideas to Kenyans (Kenyan Legislative Council 1958: 2169).

In the West, educational scholarships were seen as a foreign policy tool to facilitate the spread of "dangerous" communist ideas, as advocated by the AfroAsian Solidarity Council (Republic of Kenya, 1958:2652). The pro-western Legislators discouraged Kenyans from taking educational opportunities in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As such plea was made by Shantry:

> The government of Kenya or for that matter all East African governments, should keep their eyes wide open for any signs of development of communism in East Africa. There can be no doubt that the eyes of the Kremlin are turned this way (Republic of Kenya 1958: 2655).

The Minister for Internal Security and Defence, G.J. Ellerton, contended that there had been an increase of Kenyan students to Russia and Eastern Europe and that the majority of them had been inspired and financed by Oginga Odinga, and that they would return as communist agents working "ruthlessly and remorselessly for the achievement of the Soviet interests" (Republic of Kenya, 1960:473-476).

Ellerton's statement contrasted with the nationalist point of view that believed that Kenya desperately needed specialists in all fields of knowledge: medicine, engineering, education, law, international relation, agriculture, technological transfer and were willing to have them trained anywhere (Republic of Kenya, 1960: 473-476).

In an effort to improve Kenya Russian relations, Dixon Makasembo, a spokesman for the Kenya Progressive Party (KPP), and John Keen, the Organising Secretary of KANU, visited Russia where they concluded that the Russian government desired something not short of good relations between the two countries (*East African Standard*, 1962). The two interviewed by Radio Moscow stated:

Kenya and other parts of Africa cannot always rely for all forms of aid on America, and Europe. There may come a time when that aid will stop, when it will be useful for us to be friendly with the people of other countries

so that we may continue to receive aid … if the United States showed signs of disinclination to continue aid, the Soviet Union aid will be available to come to our rescue (Moscow Radio, may 1, 1962).

John Keen was later to be criticized for his Soviet leanings and labelled as a communist, a perception he refuted strongly, claiming he defended what he thought was a genuine relationship developing between Kenya and USSR. These accusations, the two claimed, sneaked the Cold War to Kenya through false accusations (*East African Standard*, May, 1962:13). They recommended that more students be sent to Russia and Eastern Europe for scientific and technical training. This concurred with Oginga's view that Kenya should send about 500 Kenyans annually to train and specialize in areas the newly independent countries required (*Tass*, 1962).

From 1964 onwards, delegations to and from Kenya and USSR intensified. Oginga Odinga Minister for Home Affairs visited Moscow in April, 1964. Meanwhile K.K. Bakhalov, Head of the Legal and Treaty Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, visited Nairobi April 29, 1964 (Orwenyo, 1973: 175; *Tass,* April 18, 1964; *Soviet News*, April 20, 1964:64, *Pravda,* may 18, 1964:2). The Russians pledged to help construct a textile mill, a fish canary, a fruit processing factory, a sugar refinery, a radio station, paper mill, educational and health facilities, train personnel to work in the national hospital and provide medicine. On their part, the Soviets agreed to cover all expenses involved for the first two years of the college's operation (*Pravda,* May 18, 1964:2; Daily Nation, July, 1964:16).

At this point, the United states Agency for International Development, warned of communist dangers in Kenya. Oginga Odinga reiterated that Kenya would pursue a policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality by steering clear of all power blocs and judging each issue on its merits (Odinga, 1964). While in Moscow Odinga told the Soviet News Agency that:

> We shall not permit ourselves being labeled "the lackey of United States or "puppets of the Soviet Union" … we do not belong to either camp, we belong to Africa. Before gaining independence, we contrary to our will, were fettered to the west with chains of colonialism. Now we are free we shall establish new contacts. In some cases compensate for the lack of equilibrium that existed in the past and take steps to leave the western orbit (Tass, December 18, 1963).

In the 1970s Moscow tried to establish links with the political elites who sought to assert their independent linguistic, intellectual, and political thinking (Mazrui, 1977).

Conclusion

Education is an important foreign policy tool. Nevertheless, education literature on Kenya's foreign policy is still in its infancy. This chapter gives the background to Kenya, USSR and Eastern European Relations. The literature reviewed were those related to the topic, objectives and the research questions. The area of interest was literature on education, political socialization, the impact of the cold war in relation to Kenya, USSR and Eastern European foreign policies. From the review, it emerged that there is a huge gap on research on education and foreign policy, particularly on the Kenyan students' airlifts during the cold war era; thus, the thrust of this book.

3

Origins, Organization and Sponsors of Airlifts

In this chapter, an attempt is made to discuss what occasioned the need for studies abroad by Kenyans and why the countries that the scholarships were tenable were interested in offering them. The chapter analyses the origin, organization and sponsorship of the airlifts. It further interrogates the internal and external politics of the airlifts.

The need for overseas eduCation

Indigenization of human resources and mental emancipation were among the priorities, explicit and implicit, of the African political and intellectual elites striving for meaningful independence. Education, namely, training and research that was Afro-centric, was perceived as a means, if not sometimes as an end in itself to achieve these priorities. Concurrently, in order to facilitate national self assertion, African leaders advocated a context of supporting non-alignment abroad and struggling against neo-colonialism at home. Limited resources in Africa made it necessary to utilize foreign training facilities in order to attain a reasonably rapid indigenization, that is, the Africanization of human resources.

Plate 3.1: Among those at Nairobi Airport on Tuesday, August 20, 1963, to say good-bye to a group of Kenyan students leaving for further studies in Russia was the Minister for Information, Broadcasting and Tourism, Mr. R. Achieng Oneko. He is seen in the centre of a group of students.

Source: Kenya News Agency (KNA), Uchumi House, Nairobi, 20/8/1961. Ref 1333/278

To fill jobs created by development, economists pointed out that the Kenyan educational system must supply as much as 150 percent of highly skilled labour force in the 1960s within the next decade. There were still some 65,000 Europeans and Asians in the labour force, 50,000 of them expatriates. Thus non-citizens were needed in a number of occupations for some time to come if development targets were to be met (*Africa Report*, may 1968).

The Africanization Select Committee of the National Assembly released a report on February, 1968 urging the government to establish a crash programme to: train Africans for all top executive and managerial posts in private companies and carry out stricter government controls on Immigration. It proposed that the Kenyanization Bureau establish a phased programme with

a deadline for Africanization of each post and that government grant no work permits for those jobs after the deadline. Other recommendations included:

Africans "understudying" expatriates to take over within a year; International firms asked to send Kenyans to be trained overseas, and lastly that government direct firms to employ persons with the educational ability to take over top posts (*Africa Report*, May-June, 1968).

Lack of enough educational institutions meant high qualification criteria was set to enable few join the only East African institutions. Makerere University College of East Africa admitted students who were top 15 that were 20 percent secondary school finalists and two more preparatory finalists from the sixth form. Up to 1960, Makerere accepted only 170 new students from all over East Africa for degree courses. In Kenya, one-third joined teacher training, two-thirds various government training programmes, a fifth directly into government or commercial employment, and other commercial training programmes. Most of the airlift students to USA had Cambridge School Certificate of second or third division grade. This means they were not in the upper 12 to 20 percent and hence could not be admitted to Makerere University College (KNA/ED/3/2725, 1961).

Overseas universities played a dominant role up to the mid-1970s. Colonial education policy emphasized local technical institutions and regional universities before overseas universities. Enrolment in the local and regional universities gradually superseded facilities and overseas destination provided an avenue for higher education before and after independence and especially from 1950s – 1970s.

The Director of Education issued circulars no.60 of 1953, no.118 and 119 of 1954 and no.120 of 1955 outlining the guide lines which laid down procedure by which Kenya students would apply for places in educational institutions in the United Kingdom. It was stated that universities and other reputable colleges in the United Kingdom desired that colonial students be recommended to them by the Director of Colonial Scholarship at the Colonial Office. He in turn would base his recommendation on that of the Director of Education of the Colony concerned. Direct applications by students to colleges were not welcome. Application forms had to be supported by documents. Applications had to be forwarded in advance; for medical schools fifteen months and all others eleven months. The British Council would provide reception and accommodation service on behalf of the Colonial Office. Prospective medical students' candidates had to be holders of First Grade School Certificate (Curtis, 1955).

In the U.S. growing recognition of the vast educational need of Africa led to the involvement of U.S. private agencies, as well as government in

educational assistance programmes along a broad front including the promotion of increased U.S. education and training opportunities for African students, arrangements for short term visits by African leaders and specialists, and the recruitment of Americans to teach in Africa. The Council was also to seek and promote increased public support for educational programmes with Africa. Students applying for U.S. admissions were fully evaluated in respect to their academic, personal qualifications and adequacy in finalising the degree programmes (Sims, 1961).

From the foregoing, admission to institutions of higher learning in the United Kingdom and the U.S. required adequate financing from prospective candidates or sponsors. In both cases the needs of the country was a requirement for training and developing human resource. The presence of an increasingly large group of colonial students in Great Britain and USA caused considerable concern since it raised exceptional difficulties regarding their accommodation, supervision and welfare (KNA-ED/3/2737, 1955). These pressures made it urgently necessary for host countries to review the situation and to even consider limiting admissions.

From the analysis of background information on respondents in the study, it emerged that students sought these scholarships either because they did not attain the competitive cut off marks at home, the specialization in the area of interest were not available at home or due to financial difficulties. Others were eager to take the availed government to government scholarship that only fulfilled their need for education. For others, it made their dream to travel abroad come true and few among them were sympathetic towards the Soviet system and policies in regard to the Third world development and wanted to learn more about the system.

The attractions of Russian and Eastern European scholarships were multifaceted but the interviews and the archival material portrayed common trend overtime. According to a number of respondents, lack of enough facilities caused the local universities to be too competitive to join even for those who had attained good marks that could have allowed them enrol in a university (Mbakaya, oral interview, Eldoret,31 October 2009; Ondeng', Oral interview, Nandi Hills, 24 November 2009).

For early scholarship holders, they noted that apart from the high cut-off marks, university entrance was not only based on grade acquired but also on regional/ provincial balance (Luvere, oral interview, Ikhoka Murwe, 6 March 2009). There were those students, however, who had qualified to join Makerere University and later Kenyan local public universities but opted to

apply and take up the scholarships. According to Sule (oral interview, Nairobi, 1 October 2009), he had three principal passes in Kenya Advanced Level examination and was selected to join Kenyatta University to undertake a Bachelor of Education degree but opted to take up a scholarship to do a combined Bachelors and Masters' Degree in Economics. Mbakaya (oral interview, Eldoret, 31 October 2008) was also attracted by the Masters' Degree component in the Russian scholarship.

Public Administration, Arts, Social Sciences and Education were necessary for the development of a strong public service while Medicine and Engineering were needed for health and engineering sectors. A number of students travelled abroad to study specialized courses that they admired and their country urgently required. The most popular specializations taken in Eastern Europe were the technical sciences. Engineering was the dominant area followed by Medicine while a few went for the social sciences. A.N. Rindiri, writing from Czechoslovakia to the Ministry of Education Kenya stated that Kenyans who had been admitted to institutions in Uganda also competed for USSR scholarships. Another student applying from Bugema Missionary College, Namulonye, Uganda gave reasons why he should be allowed to switch from Uganda to USSR.

He stated:

> I as a Kenyan, Mkamba by tribe aged nineteen and a student at the above mentioned college in senior III would like to study in the USSR with a scholarship from their government. You very well know the inadequacy of schools that we have in East Africa and in my case most science subjects I would like to specialise in are not offered in my present school. I therefore submit my application to you... I would like to hear from you before 2nd of December, 1963 for after this date we shall have closed the school and your letter won't find me here after then. Yours faithfully Sadique K. Mullei (KNA, ED/3/1159, 31.10, 1963).

Others who wrote to the Ministry like Eyusa Buyiya and Eliud Wachira wanted to secure scholarship because they were not able to further their education for lack of school fees or were unable to raise finances to sit Cambridge School Certificate on time (KNA, Ed/3/3016, 1963) and could not raise fees for their studies elsewhere. The opportunity of a full scholarship with air travel to the country where the scholarship was tenable and back and a sustenance stipend was the most sought after.

The overseas educational scholarships also attracted working class people who wanted to go and further their education and specialization.

Bernard Evans Okotoha was a holder of diploma and trained clerk working with the East African Railway Administration, while Alfred G. Mwachira an alumni of Shimo la Tewa school and a holder of Cambridge School Certificate was a clerk at the East African Customs and Exercise, Mombasa, Kenya. Wycliffe Samson Machani, a holder of Cambridge School Certificate was a teacher in Kisii County and Sylvester Mwangi was an instructor at Magadi School (ibid). Several respondents gave similar reasons why they left their jobs to take up scholarship. The need to develop in their career paths meant most took courses related to their former work instance; Elkana Mbakaya Luvere was a mason in 1958 in Nairobi and applied for a scholarship to the Soviet Union. He graduated as a building construction engineer from Minsk University in Belorus (Luvere, oral interview, Ikhonga Murwe, Kakamega, 6 March 2009).

Earlier on, the Colonial Office in London considered and endorsed the concept of mass education through community effort and wanted it accepted as settled policy along with the development of local government and placed in the forefront of British development policy in Africa, and a central feature of His Majesty's Government. These included the whole range of development activities in the districts by Government or unofficial bodies in the fields of agriculture, livestock, health, water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity welfare, spread of literacy and adult education, improvement of schools and making use of co-operative movement (KNA, Ed/3/624, 1948).

Young Kenyan Africans had several reasons why they needed to advance their education abroad. These reasons included; acquiring education credentials which Europeans would respect; a university degree that would secure a wellpaid employment; to familiarize themselves with the culture and learning facilities abroad; that an African like other human beings given opportunity could compete in a fair competition. Through education, African students with ability, academic and personal quality had a special opportunity in the leadership of their country (Akello, oral interview, Mbale, 7 March 2009; Langat, oral interview, Kaptebeswet, 11 July 2009; Oburu, informal conversation, Nairobi, 13 August 2009, oral interview, Nairobi, 27 July 2010); Chidyausiku, oral interview, Moscow, 12 May 2011).

In Kenya before December 1963, parental consent was required for application for USSR scholarships and for British passports to be issued from candidates. In an acknowledgement letter, one parent writing from the Africa Court of Appeal wrote:

> I am writing in order to let you know that Lutta Ramadhan Wabucheri is my son... I have no objection of his leaving Kenya for further studies in Moscow (USSR). I would be glad if you issued him with a British passport... to enable him to take up his scholarship. It is my ambition that my son should have studies in Moscow in order to contribute for the goodness of Kenya as a whole. With best regards. Yours faithfully, Lubanga (KNA-ED/3/1569, 20/9/1963).

For both parents and students, scholarships availed an opportunity to further education and a chance to participate in the future development of the nation as a qualified specialist. In the study almost all the responses on why they chose to go to the USSR and Eastern Europe the answers were relatively homogeneous. They cited opportunities to grow academically and professionally as primary reasons for study in these countries.

It is, however, prudent to note that there were also students that not only went to USSR for degrees alone but were intrigued by what they had heard and read about the communist system and wanted to experience it and learn more about the system. According to Mosonik arap Korir (oral interview, Ngata farm, Nakuru, 27 May 2009), he choose to go to Russia because he was attracted by Marxism–Leninism and historical literature of the USSR in the struggle against imperialism and underdevelopment. The admiration was emphasized by the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa, colonial Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. His further world view on Marxism-Leninism as a system that needed more interrogation was aroused by what he called an impressive lecture given by a Soviet Africanist scholar while he was at the North Western University in the U.S.A for his Masters' degree. An offer by the African Institute to do a Doctorate Degree in Moscow and Kenya's government approval enabled him to fulfil his dream.

Genesis of EduCationaL AirLifts

As noted by Turner, the wealth of a country which the development of the state depends upon, consists in its natural resources; of which the most important are people. For people to be energetic industrious and effective in service delivery, they need good opportunity and good education of higher quality sometimes supplied beyond East Africa (Turner, 1945). This section focus on the aspects of development assistance programmes which aimed at providing, through the scholarships by the USSR and Eastern Europe to Kenya.

The challenges posed by the new nations in the pursuit for development turned the attention of nations' planners, aid planners and theorists to the

strategic role education in developing human resource. The need for scholarships has been noted as necessitated by a growth driven by enrolment pressures arising from greater demands to build human capital, rising primary and secondary education enrolments, a rise in demand alongside insufficient capacity, particularly in developing countries and high study mobility (Altbach, et. al., 2009; Medica, 2010). One way of meeting this need was through foreign study as one means of transferring technology and knowledge (Gollin, 1967).

According to Okello- Oculi (1967), African scholarships programmes were perhaps the most important contribution by the international community to African higher education. These scholarships were created at a time when the universities in Africa were not in a position to train adequate manpower. The colonial powers, he notes, left the colonies with hardly adequate qualified manpower to take over their operation effectively. In essence, the few universities they created and left behind were exclusively elitist institutions that did not out rightly meet the manpower needs of either public or private sector.

The colonial University colleges catered for a very small percentage of qualified students, leaving thousands of students unable to get a university education. Indeed, "the colonial powers, despite their elitist institutions, could not quench the Africans' thirst for knowledge" (ibid: 16). The trend continued after independence as a university education, indeed, became a passport to a good job and good life. Consequently, more and more students strove to obtain that passport for themselves (Chideya, 1981). According to Medica (2010), many of the international students who access scholarships are motivated by the potential to transform themselves and develop an international world view, as well as enrich their personal and professional experience.

The importance of developing human resource as a major component of aid by the Soviet Union and United States transcended ideological differences. Gollin aptly observes:

This consensus in the formulations of Soviet and United States analysts of one precondition for development was not based on commonly- held theoretical principles. It arose in large part, it may be suggested, from the experience gained in grappling with the practical problems and requirements of aid programmes undertaken during the period of intense East-West competition for the support or favours of the Third World, The need to provide technical assistance to accompany other forms of development aid

became increasingly apparent, and cast into sharper relief the human resource development problem, educational and training came to be seen as one proximate solution (Gollin, 1967: 360).

The Super Powers recognized the need to assist the African nations by providing facilities for the training of highly skilled human resources needed in the development of these nations. Both powers recognized the presence of the thirst for education and, like good Samaritans; they offered scholarships which were grabbed without hesitations. Ashby (1966:270) termed the 1950s and 1960s a period of the "scholarship invasion" of Africa, an expression that points to the serious competition between the Soviet Union and United States for influence in Africa.

One of the principal strategies used by the aid- giving nations to meet the human resources needs of developing countries has been to offer opportunities within their own borders for the education and training of foreign nationals. They have done so in a number of ways; by expanding or ear-making educational facilities for them (for example the Lumumba Institute in Moscow); by offering grants and fellowships; more indirectly by establishing immigration policies, or encouraging university admissions policies which do not unduly restrict the entry of self- sponsored students (Gass & Lyons, 1962; Gollin, 1967). The scholarship program was another delivery mechanism for exporting the donor countries' education, with the principle mode being the training of foreign students in their countries.

The Cold War in Kenya was fought on two fronts: those who supported Mboya mainly the USA and those who supported Odinga mostly the Soviets (Munene, 2000; Blundell, 1994). Both Odinga and Mboya were characterised by some scholars as agents of Sino-Soviet and Anglo-American interests, with Mboya having a strong backing from Kenyatta (Bennett and Rosberg, 1962; Ndegwa, 2006). For the USSR and the United States, in conducting their foreign policy, they developed foreign aid strategies which were geared towards realizing the goals and objectives of their foreign policy. One avenue was the establishment of links with elites in their targeted partner countries. In Kenya, Oginga Odinga became the point man of the eastern bloc's interest and Tom Mboya representing the United States.

According to Mazrui, Oginga Odinga led the way in post-colonial Kenya by daring to look beyond Western Europe and the United States for donors, potential trading partners and paradigms of development and in the "heat of the Cold War, he was the most daring of all Kenyans to explore what the

communist world had to offer to help Africa" (Mazrui 2005:7). Odinga's friendship with the communists began long before independence. In 1961, when Odinga's passport was seized by the British authority upon his return from a secret trip to Moscow and Peking, he openly admitted that he had sent more than thirty Kenyan students to study in communist countries, and stating that the money for their studies had come from Peking. He further revealed that he had at his disposal 2000 scholarships proffered by the Soviet Union. Bulgaria was willing to further Odinga's ambitions and was reported that Sofia was providing paramilitary training for one hundred Kenyans selected by the Vice President despite an agreement between Nairobi and London that the training of Kenyan Officers would be handled by Britain (http//files.OSa.ceu, hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/96-1-129.shtml).

While Odinga organised scholarships to the East, Mboya used his links to seek scholarships to the United States. American participation in the scholarship invasion began with the students airlifts' from Kenya organized in part at the urging of Mboya. The year 1959, was a turning point in overseas scholarship programs to Kenyans. In September 1959 a Britannia airliner operated by Equatorial travels, Limited, landed in Idlewild International Airport in New York and eight one Africans disembarked, nearly all of them Kenyans, on their way to enrol in colleges and universities all over the United States. They had just completed an historic flight. Theirs was the first student air charter out of East Africa. An operation dubbed "Airlift Africa-1959" by its sponsors, and an educational exchange episode that was to be emulated many years to come by other programmes and countries (Shachtman, 2009). Shachtman in a foreword to *Airlift to America* (2009:VIII) notes that the story of airlifts shows that "students had vision and courage and dared to venture forth to unknown destinations that were far from the heretofore acceptable places for higher education, such as London to such places like Moscow".

Organisation and sponsorship

The cost of education overseas was mostly met by public funds from government revenues and Native Administration. The greater part of government revenue came from peasant farmers and low wage earners both in East Africa and the United Kingdom. Other funds came from public trusts and benefactors such as Cecil Rhodes or Lord Nuffield. The students had to be carefully chosen for public good and scholarships given were to students who were ready to return and work in the Public Service. Independent

Kenya needed specialists in the field of teaching, medicine and administration.

The African quest for education overseas was delayed by a number of factors which were either local or international. According to Turner (1945), the Euro centrists argued that African education was a very recent growth and World Wars had delayed its rapid advance. In Europe, wars caused shortage of staff to engage in the national service and therefore admission of African students was minimal. However, British educational experts suggested that the colonial office needed to cooperate and coordinate with British universities in order to secure scholarships for foreign students and thus realise African needs. Turner notes that funding education posed a serious challenge because of the strong demand for primary, secondary and higher education and spreading expenditure fairly to all sections was a big challenge (ibid).

There were no official application forms but applicants were required to apply in their own handwriting to the Secretary, Kenya overseas Scholarships (Advisory Committee) stating their marital status, education, ethnicity, age, qualification, scholarship preference and country attainable. Other African students were able to travel abroad following favourable recommendations by the chiefs, Directors of Education, intelligence and security, the ability of parents to pay overseas expenses, and the reputation of the applicant. Writing to the Secretariat of the Chief Secretary about a young man seeking to travel overseas, H. Massie-Blomfield Director of Education stated:

> I have interviewed chief Njiru and Danson regarding the latter's application to proceed to Adams College, Natal. I explained to chief Njiru that there would be no question of a bursary, as Danson has yet passed his senior secondary. The chief said that he was quite prepared to pay all expenses himself. He is a rich man and can afford to do so. My information is Danson is a sensible lad with a good reputation… though his English is not very good and he is young… I see no reason why he should not be permitted to proceed to South Africa (KNA, D/3/27/21, 1949).

There was, however, reluctance on the part of the British government in the 1950s and early 1960s to facilitate study in the United States for African students. They would not necessarily deny the necessary clearance; but neither would they move them along unless urged. Insistence on the posting of bonds to guarantee return travel often proved a sufficient deterrent to Africans otherwise ready for study abroad.

British secondary school headmasters reflected official reluctance in their letters of recommendation, which often seemed to damn the students with faint praises. To a large extent, this policy reflected a genuine conviction that Kenyan students should pursue their higher education in East Africa or in the United Kingdom, following the "logical progression of the academic system in which they had been reared, and striving for recognized degrees which would confer immediate status and prestige in Kenya" (Smith, 1966:17).

Early educational migration was characterized by infrequent financial aid and more appeal for immediate Government support or repatriation coupled with no coordinate arrangements between the government, the students, the local individual linking groups or the destination countries. Students ignored local institutions, courses and without consultation left the territory incurring heavy liabilities. The Directors of Education accordingly recommended an appropriate circular be issued in each territory with the argument that the problem was in danger of becoming acute (KNA, ED/3/2721, 1937).

The Director of Education had authority under the Native Passes Ordinance approved by the Secretary of State to advise the police on the suitability or otherwise of one applying for a passport to proceed overseas. The conference of the Directors of Education of East Africa, held towards the end of 1942 recommended as follows:

> ... Where appropriate education facilities existed in East Africa, every effort should be made to persuade Africans to take advantage of these rather than seek entry into institutions of similar status in the Union of South Africa. The conference was of the opinion, however, that no obstacle should be placed in the way of students going to the union of South Africa for further education, provided that they had satisfied the requirements of the immigration and education authorities of the union (ibid).

The Kenya Government agreed with this recommendation and the Governors' Conference was informed to that effect. The Under Secretary of State in initiating the general agreement of the Secretary of State with this recommendation assured "that while African students would be encouraged to make full use of education facilities existing in East Africa, they would not be prevented from applying to proceed to the Union or elsewhere at their own expense for similar studies". It was also assumed that opportunities would not be withheld from Africans to proceed elsewhere for studies for which facilities were not at that time available in East Africa and which

could enhance the value of their services to the community on their return to East Africa (ibid).

Accordingly, applications from African natives for passports to proceed overseas for education were referred to the police and to the Director of Education for advice, in order to ensure that the applicants availed themselves of all local educational facilities and obtained proper advice regarding the courses of instruction in which one proposes to take. There was no intention that natives be prevented from obtaining education of a nature not available locally.

The then Minister of Education, Mathieson offered perspectives on the airlifts programmes as follows: that it was in no sense opposed to Kenya students proceeding for overseas studies in particular USA; that they were encouraged to maximize the benefits of such education and have the financial means to meet the cost of the whole course envisaged, and a special reference to its standing in Kenya for purpose of employment had to be made to the type of qualifications (KNA/ED/3/2725, 1961).

The government deemed the airlifts programmes as political rather than an educational enterprise, concluding that the students had no adequate financing, that there was no competitive selection resulting in high failure rate, that the receiving institutions selected students without proper guidance and that the airlifts depleted the supply of secondary school graduates to sixth form, university college, teachers colleges and technical schools (ibid). The government argued that the airlifts impaired plans for the orderly development of man power to meet the country's needs.

The supply of well qualified candidates was sharply limited. African students who had received a pass in the First Division in their examination were rarely in the market for overseas study, because the Government immediately channelled them into the Royal Technical College in Nairobi or the University College in Makerere Uganda (Nabwera, oral interview, Kiminini, Kitale, 2009; Nyon'go, oral interview, Moscow, 2011).

The national politics were reflected in the quest of scholarship ownership. Tom Mboya had been accused of seeking political mileage out of it. In defending himself from the accusation, Mboya noted:

That my efforts to help African students to study overseas …United States, e.t.c. ... is based on my conviction that our people need higher education and that as a leader it is my task and responsibility to help, however humble my contribution may be. This was one of my election pledges and I do not look for any credit. I will continue to do what I can for

our Youth in this field. I do not feel I should keep these activities secret because that would make it impossible for students from outside Nairobi to know about the scholarships or any help that may be available (quoted in Smith, 1966:56).

Mboya's argument was that self-help is something that brings out the best in any person and all should take pride in whatever contribution one can make to assist the boys and girls who will be men and women who will build the country. He further bridled against charges of nepotism. He protested his innocence of any tribal consideration in selecting candidates and his strong opposition to such influences. In retrospect it appears that he in fact controlled the dispensation of his scholarships rather closely, that the majority of the "Kenyans he sponsored were Luo, members of his own tribe" (Smith, 1966:57) and in particular from his home area and political supporters (Ochieng, Oral interview, Eldoret 23.2.2009; Oloo, Oral interview, Eldoret, 26.9.2009).

It is noted that in the 1960s, Tom Mboya succeeded in providing an American airlift to enable students to study in the United States. Oginga Odinga managed to balance that with scholarships for Kenyan students to study in the Eastern bloc among them his two sons; Raila Odinga who studied in the Germany Democratic Republic (GDR) and Oburu Odinga in the USSR.

Plate 3.2 Hon. Dr Oburu Oginga (right) graduate of Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow and former Assistant Minister of Finance, after an interview with Paul Kurgat (left) in his Nairobi Treasury office on 13/8/2009

Source: Researcher

Tom Mboya had cultural links between the trade unions of Kenya and those of the western world. It was the concerted efforts of Tom Mboya and other Kenyan Africans that had studied in the U.S. like Kariuki Njiiri and Gikonyo Kiano that lobbied institutions for vacancies and foundations and individuals for financial support that enabled Kenyans travel to the U.S for education. The State Department due to mounting pressures from the African nationalists, had given sixteen official scholarships between 1957 and 1958. A total of twenty four scholarships had been awarded since 1949 (Smith, 1966:19).

Other organizations included Committee on the Study and Training in the United States, which managed the Fulbright Scholarship. In 1946, an agreement was signed between the United Kingdom and the United States whereby funds derived from the sale of surplus USA war property in the UK were provided to finance the studies of the UK and colonial dependencies in American institutions of higher learning, and of American students in the UK and colonial institutions (KNA, BY/24/13/1952). The practical aspects of mass education were being set up.

Students airlift to Russia and Eastern Europe in the Post-Colonial era marked the second wave of the Kenya government policy on overseas scholarships: first to train were government personnel whose selection was made by the Ministries concerned. Second, training members of the public and the selection was done by Kenya Overseas Scholarships Advisory Committee (KOSAC – a body under the Ministry of Education). KOSAC advertised all scholarships referred to it by the government in the public press clearly showing the country, subjects to be studied, and the qualification required. Applications were thereafter received, processed and finally a selection made and the lists sent to the donor government as a form of recommendation from the Kenyan government and if approved, the applicants became the scholarship holders (KNA, ED/3/1963). KOSAC co-ordinated offers of educational assistance from overseas in the form of scholarships, financial support from governments, private organizations or individuals to the best advantage of Kenya as a developing country and a growing nation (KNA, ED/3/2963, 1963).

Organisation and ownership of scholarships raised several questions in parliament particularly on which country was offering, who was in-charge of processing and the region or ethnic belonging of the candidates. The Minister of Education, Mr. Joseph Otiende answering Mr. Kerich's question no.203 of 9th June, 1964 on the reasons and number of Kenyan students studying in the communist countries contended that numerous people sent their own candidates to the world without consulting the Ministry of Education and their complete number, ethnicity and names were unknown but a rough guess put them at between 1200 and 1500 (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1964). The Minister then noted that it was difficult to establish their ethnicities because some went privately, others through trade unions or other organizations (ibid). By the late early 1970s the estimated number of students in Russia and the U.S.A were 686 in USA and 360 in USSR (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1970).

In what seemed like parliamentarian concerns over regional awards of national scholarships, there were fears that some areas were marginalized in educational matters. For instance, five years into independence Moyale, Marsabit and Isiolo had just been awarded three scholarships according to Parliamentary Debates (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1967). Regions like Bungoma and Coast raised the same questions and even wanted to know how they compared with other regions. The total number given was 189 in 1967 – 1974 and 96 for Coast Province for 1968-69, but on how it compared with other region the speaker turned down the request for an answer.

In the 1970s, Scholarship Selection Committee was formed and made of: Dean of Faculty of Arts, University College, Nairobi, chair; Permanent Secretary to the Treasury or nominee; chairman of the Public Service Commission or nominee; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education or nominee; Chief of Education Officer; Chief Inspector of Schools; one representative from the eight provinces of Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley, Central, Nyanza, Western and Nairobi and five other members from interested groups (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1970). Parliament was notified that between 1963/64, there were 5000 Kenyan students abroad but as at June 1968, the number came down to 2850. The house was informed that before 1963, there were no proper records kept by the colonial government and that it had improved with the attainment of independence in 1964.

Parliamentarians continued to voice their concerns on the criteria, regions and ethnic balance in the distribution of government scholarships. However, the government insisted that scholarships were awarded on merit and not

regional basis. Some Members proposed that a quota system be operated to enable each province receive at least a certain number of scholarships per year (ibid).

It was government policy not to send pupils of KPE level abroad as was done before and that only those going for specialized courses would be allowed and the rest would undertake their studies in East Africa and on notification of scholarship to would-be candidates, County Education Officers were to notify them of available scholarships well in advance. The Ministry of Education advertised through the local press every Friday and in the official gazette notices, circulars displayed in public and that they keep stocks of application forms for scholarships (KNA, official report, Vol. XVI (part 1) 2nd Sept, 1968 to 4th Oct. 1968., KNA Vol. XII). However, it was noted that there were incidences when friendly foreign donors gave short notices and was lamentable that such notices disadvantaged candidates who were far from Nairobi and did not access newspapers or did not regularly visit District Commissioner's offices (ibid).

When Kenya attained independence, the number of scholarships in the form of bilateral agreements increased and was treated as part of foreign aid. Most applicants for these scholarships got the information from the daily newspapers as did Eyusa, W. Buyiya, Eliud W. Erastus, Bernard E. Okahoh, Alfred G. Mwacharia, G.T.Gathua, Wycliffe S. Machani, Francis P. Waruingi, John M. Nderi, C. T. S. Mbaathi and Benjamin E. Ogutu according to archival materials (KNA, Ed/3/3016, 1963) and information given by those interviewed



Map 1: **Routes used by early Kenya contacts and students to Russia and Eastern Europe during the Colonial and Cold War periods 1954 – 1962**

Source: Researcher

in the course of this study. According to the respondents, early scholarships were personal efforts by individuals of groups that sourced for the scholarships. The majority of them were arrangements made by Oginga Odinga and CMG
Arwings Khodek. These scholarships were available to Russia, China, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Odinga sought the support of Egypt and Eastern European countries in the organization of the scholarships (Oloo, oral interview, Eldoret, 26 September 2009; Ochieng, oral interview, Eldoret, 23 June 2009; Odhok, oral interview, Yimbo East Lower Nyakach, 6 July 2010; Okello, oral interview, Nairobi, 15 July 2010). Oloo and Ochieng, for instance, were students that went to USSR and Czechoslovakia respectively while Odhok and Okello were Odinga's coordinating persons. They were in charge of the various route offices and the most active was the Uganda, Sudan (Khartoum office) and Egypt (Cairo office) and to some Da- re salaam before dispersal to the various destinations in Eastern Europe.

Some of the students used road from Nairobi to Uganda, trekked from Uganda to Sudan then used steam ship to Cairo before being airlifted to USSR and from there to other Eastern European countries. Below is a sample of such a travel deduced from information from Martin Yaya Ochieng, one of the researcher's key informants.



Map 2 **Routes used by Key Informant – Martin Yaya Ochieng to Russia enroute to Czechoslovakia, 1960 – 1963**

Source: Researcher

Travel documents were processed in Cairo while for others they had to apply for them at the British embassy in the respective countries they were taken. Ochieng, for instance, kept the original personal sketch map of his travel, travel documents and photos so well and the author appreciated his and the other respondents' willingness to give their documents and photographs to be used in the study resulting into this book.



Map 3 **Sketch map drawn by Martin Yaya Ochieng describing his journey to Egypt in 1960**

Source: Martin Yaya Ochieng's personal documents.



Figure 3.1 Martin Yaya Ochieng identification documents in Egypt

Source: Martin Yaya Ochieng's personal documents

According to Odhok and Okello, they had each two passports; ordinary and diplomatic. They not only coordinated the travels, helped source for funds and scholarships for students but also looked for funding for Odinga's cause. Plate 3.3 was taken during the interview and Plate 3.4 shows Odhok during one of his missions as Odinga's ambassador at large.

Plate 3.3 ***Seated*: James Onyango Arigi (Kenya army Trainee officer in Cairo 1959/60) helped establish contacts and routes for Kenyans travelling to Russia and the East.**

Standing from left: George Owuor Talian, did computer science in Yugoslavia 1965-66 and left for West Germany; in the middle Ochieng Panya Ogola who left for Sweden and Eng. Martin Yaya Ochieng Msc Engineering graduated from Czechoslovakia in 1974

Source: Martin Yaya Ochieng's photo album

Plate 3.3 **Mr. Were Olonde Odhok gives an interview to the researcher at his home in Nyakach on 6/7/2010**

Source: Researcher

Plate 4.4 Mr. Were Olonde Odhok above addresses pupils in Vietnam in 1964. He was KPU's Ambassador at large on Liberation and Overseas scholarship issues.

Source: Were Odhok's photo album

Later scholarships were government to government or from the United Nations Agencies. Such scholarships were advertised through the Ministry of Education and applications were made and shortlisted candidates invited for interviews. They were scholarships that were given to KANU, *Maendeleo Ya Wanawake* and others directly to the Ministry of Education. In 1964, for instances, Kenyatta gave five scholarships to KADU's hardliners Jean Marie Seroney, William Murgor and Masinde Muliro and others from other regions to welcome them to KANU. According to one beneficiary of the scholarships, five scholarships were given to each of the leaders and he got a slot for having been an active KADU youth winger in his location (Mutai, oral interview, Kapkagaon, Nandi, 26 July 2009). He benefited from Serenoy's share. In his group was Bethwel Kiprono Lagat. From this interview, the author was able to locate Lagat who in his village went under the name of "Bulgaria". Lagat left Bulgaria in 1965 before completing his studies. Since he came back without a degree, he had problems getting a job in Kenya. He later got a teaching job. Few knew why

he was unemployed and attributed this to having a useless communist degree. The situation was not helped by the perception that those who studied in Eastern Europe were "*watu wa changaa*" (this comment was made by a neighbour when the researcher was asking where "Bulgaria" could be found). In an interview with him, it emerged that the respondent was not happy with being recommended to go back to high school in Bulgaria, a situation that forced him to come back home (Lagat, oral interview, Ziwa, 13 June 2009).The problem of qualification was not limited to Bulgaria alone. According to Ochieng (oral interview, Eldoret, 23 June, 2009) he had to undergo a pre university course and it took him twelve years to complete his studies instead of the six years in Czechoslovakia.

In July 1964, parliament was informed that for the year 1963/64 and 1964/65, Kenya was offered 800 scholarships. It was estimated 300 was for technical studies and 500 for pure academic studies. The countries offering were USA, West Germany, France, Israel, Ethiopia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, USSR etc. Attention was brought to the floor of Parliament that when government accepted scholarships, the Central Selection Board selected suitable candidates, recommended them to the donor countries which made them to the final selection and in some instances all offers were taken up or some vacancies declined. Out of the 800 scholarships the minister told parliament that ten of UNESCO scholarships tenable in Poland had not been filled because of the high qualifications required (NAHROR, Vol. III (part 1) 9th June, 3rd July 1964: 783-84).

Some countries like Czechoslovakia took the responsibility of what it termed as scientific and technical assistance to developing countries (KNA/ ED/3/400, 1964).

However, the problem of qualification always marred the tenability of the scholarships. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, despite students requests to be elevated to the university status, some had very unsuccessful academic progression at the vocational training (secondary) level. It is possible that the problem emerged from lower qualifications of selected candidates or language adoption issues. A letter from the Embassy of Czechoslovakia indicated that of three students requesting to be elevated for university admission, one qualified and was considered due to her satisfactory performance while the other two had unsatisfactory performance (KNA-XJ/ 12/26, 1967).

There were scholarships that were given to *Maendeleo Ya Wanawake*. These scholarships were given to young female students to go and study in the USSR. In an interview, Elkana Mbakaya Luvere was asked about his experiences and what he thought about studying in the USSR. His response was that despite the challenges of distance from home, the education he received was excellent and that is why he supported his daughter Agatha Achitsa Mbakaya to go for studies in the USSR.

According to him, Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organization was looking for bright girls from Idakho and Isukha and a school principal, a Sister Rita had been tasked to enlist scholarship candidates from the area. Agatha Mbakaya was among those who were picked and later joined Kiev University in the Ukraine, one of the former Soviet Republics. According to Mbakaya (Mbakaya, oral interview, Eldoret, 31 October 2009) she and other five girls from Western Province took up scholarships offered by the Soviet Communist Party. There were students that made private arrangements through friends. Francis Maina Kagara, for instance, met a Romanian Commercial Attaché through a relative who gave him scholarships forms to Romania to fill. His application was accepted and he left for Bucharest through Moscow and was admitted to Jossy Polytechnic, University of Ion Cuza to pursue a degree in chemical engineering (Kagara, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009).

Contributing to the debate on the students' airlifts to Bulgaria on 13th November 1963, Members of Parliament concluded that immigration officers issued papers as passports and police did not intervene, government students were stranded and the KANU-Education Office corresponded with Bulgaria independently and had been sending people overseas for some time.

Radio Sofia of Bulgaria was also involved in securing scholarships for Kenyans. The radio carried their air show competition on, "What do you know about Bulgaria?" As a result, one Francis Kariari Wangondu, a student at a Nyeri college won the competition and the price was a sponsored visit to Bulgaria. Wangondu holder of passport № 14868 left Nairobi on 26th of September, 1965 for Bulgaria. On arrival, he applied for a scholarship in a technical school through Bulgarian ministry of people's Education and in turn, the ministry wrote for a green light from the ministry of Education, Kenya as it advised the Ministry of External Affairs also be notified (ibid; letter 29th October, 1965).

In another incident connected to Radio Sofia, the family of Stoyko Dinev and Lily Dineva, both employees of the radio having had contact with the family of Josphat Wangondu Gachogi of Nyeri offered to sponsor their son Gerald Karogo to undergo studies in Bulgaria. They made a direct appeal to the Bulgaria Ambassador in Nairobi to intervene for Gerald to be included on the list of the East African students that was expected to fly to Bulgaria 1965 (ibid; letter 22nd September, 1965).

Responding on behalf of the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education, Mwirichia, wrote to an F.F. Indine of Ministry of External Affairs seeking guidelines on matters of policy over two applications (ibid, letter 4/11/1965). Bulgarian scholarships were also secured directly through Inter-ministerial requests for the government or even constituency level. Writing to the Minister for Education in Sofia, Bulgaria, in February 1965 the then Minister for Lands, J.H. Angaine stated:

Dear Sir, you will no doubt remember that during my recent visit to Bulgaria when I had the pleasure of meeting you, I asked whether the Bulgarian government would be kind enough to grant some scholarships to Kenya government for the benefit of some students in my constituency of Meru district. You very kindly agreed that I should send four students … to arrive in Bulgaria this month to take up different courses, indicating veterinary and agriculture; the Bulgarian government being responsible for the payment of their transportation … I have now selected the four students and shall be glad if you will let me have the necessary application forms for completion, in order that arrangements may be made at this end for their arrival in Bulgaria as soon as possible (ibid; letter 1st February, 1965).

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNECA) offered scholarships for Kenyan students to study in Bulgaria in agriculture, medicine, pedagogy, science and technology including engineering (KNA, Education/3/370, 1967). Each scholarship award covered free tuition, monthly allowance for board and incidental expenses, free hostel accommodation, books, free medical facilities and cost of international travel between host country and Bulgaria. No dependency allowance or winter clothing allowance was given (KNA, Education/3/330, 1967).

It also emerged that many students to Russia and Eastern Europe travelled without proper documents. A number of former graduates confirmed to the author that they got documents either in Cairo or London (Ochieng, oral interview, Eldoret, 23 June 2009; Oburu Oginga, oral interview, Nairobi, 27 June 2010).



Figure 3.2 Martin Yaya Ochieng's travel documents given to him in Egypt (left) and a Czechoslovakian visa (right)

Source: Martin Yaya Ochieng's documents.

The long journeys made by young Kenyans to Cairo, Russia and Eastern Europe were not without problems as demonstrated by experiences of some students like Peter Anderson Muthondu, Stephen Kariithi and Abdulaziz Hussein. Muthondu wrote to the Ministry of Education from Czechoslovakia as follows:

I left Kenya on 11th September, 1961 after paying 300/= to Olwande then the man who was responsible for sending students to Socialist countries. After arriving at Cairo I was taken over by the Kenyan office in Cairo acting as Mission of External Affairs of KANU…on 29th November 1962 six students Kariithi, Kinyanjui, Bakuly, Musa, Oduor, Obonyo and I were transported to Czechoslovakia. Our studies were to last one year with KANU or government recommendation. On March 1963 Njiiru Educational secretary of KANU visiting from Bulgaria and recommended us for studies … but his recommendation were turned down by Cairo office, instead in August, 1963 they sent Othieno Othigo from London who recommended Oduor, Obonyo, Bakuly and Musa for university studies. Kariithi, Kinyanjui and I were not. November, 1963 Mwai Kibaki head of visiting Kenya Trade delegation recommended us for further studies… End of November we were informed that Kenyan government wanted us for national building and since CSSR government was answerable to Cairo office, they gave us tickets back home and on 10th December, 1963, we left for Kenya (KNA/ED/3/2962, 1964).

It is clear from the above narration that only students who were able to raise some money had the chance to travel to Cairo; KANU Office acted with equal breath with the government. It is also notable there was no coordination by Kenyan politicians as to who to nominate or recommend for further studies and thus, an element of ethnicity is noted on how students were considered from either side on ethnic grounds. The Department of External Affairs in the Prime Minister's Office also noted incidences where families were tormented due to the disappearances of their loved ones in Russia and Eastern Europe.

Notifying KOSAC of the disappearance of Abdulaziz Hussein, W. W. Njaga wrote that Ali Hussein who claimed to be a brother of Abdulaziz Hussein wanted to find out where he was since he left Kenya in 1962. He informed the Department of External Affairs that Kenya African Moslem Political Union had helped him through Cairo Office to Czechoslovakia where he was "pushed" to a factory although he was a holder of KAPE, certificate and one year secondary school, had intended to study medicine (ibid). The conclusion likely to be arrived at is that at times, the candidates selected had low education and were mainly KAPE certificate holders therefore, while in Europe without proper qualifications, prospective students were subjected to all sorts of treatment including forced industrial labour.

The Department of External Affairs, made frantic efforts through British Embassies in Europe to try and trace its nationals and writing to the British Embassy in Rome, with copies to Ministry of Education and KOSAC in Nairobi, the government wanted to know the where about of one Elias Nkamani a student designate in one of Czechoslovakia universities but left for Rome where he was stranded and distressed (ibid).

It is also evident from the above examples that the coordination between the various stakeholders/ organizers and the students was at times missing causing conflicts over policy matters. Organizational conflicts demanded the streamlining of responsibilities and in January 1964, the government, through the External Affairs Branch, Office of the Prime Minister directed that with the official closure of the Kenya Cairo Office all Kenyan students in Russia and Eastern Europe were to channel all their correspondence through the Ministry of Education, and in consultation with the Treasury and the Directorate of Personnel was to make a decision as to whether any financial assistance could be made available to the distressed Kenyan students. However, all matters on bilateral relations were to be dealt with by

the External Affairs Branch including the security of Kenyan nationals abroad. The implementation of the directive was complicated since Czechoslovakia was represented in Kenya by its Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam (ibid) which made communication between contact persons very difficult (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1969).

It was difficult to establish the exact number of students in Russia and Eastern Europe because students moved from country to country i.e. those who went to the USSR may have left for West Germany or elsewhere (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1969). The Embassies and a set Board were tasked to detail students' whereabouts and what they were doing. The Board claimed unqualified students left on foot to Cairo while some students while abroad decided to change their original degree programmes, university or even country. In the USSR students could be sent for Russian language preparatory course to a university not necessarily the one that he or she would study in later. Furthermore, after the language learning year, some students out of influence from friends or personal desire applied for change of specialization course. This was however allowed if one was changing from one science course to another or from a social science course to another. For instance, one could change from library science to journalism or from international relations to international economic relations or international law and vice verse.

The change of degree program could affect the university, town or the republic that the student would be posted to. Therefore, keeping track of what the students were doing or which programmes they were enrolled in or how to help them when they had a problem was difficult. To do these, students sought the help of the nearest Kenyan Embassy, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education or even support of their Members of Parliament. An example of the many letters that were exchanged is one from Kariuki K. Njiru Member of Parliament of Kigumo, writing to J.G. Kiano Minister for Education stating:

I have received a letter from two students who are studying in East Germany. They are requesting me to help them to transfer from East Germany to West Germany ... I feel, sir, it is only through your Education Attaché in USSR that could speed up this important request ... As you very well know these are some of my students that I sent when I was the Party's Publicity and Educational Secretary (ibid).

In reply J.N. Muini for Permanent Secretary for Education noted that Kenya did not have diplomatic link with East Germany and correspondence

was very difficult, but nonetheless Kenya's Educational Attaché in Bonn was tasked to contact the students and try to find out their problems (ibid).

Yugoslavia was one of the Eastern European countries that offered Kenya educational scholarships as foreign aid. The scholarships covered various fields: motor mechanics; marine technology; electrical engineering and economics (*East African Standard*, 1964). Educational background required was secondary school certificate (8 years of primary and 4 years of secondary school), pass course and age limit was 45 years old. Most Kenyan students to Yugoslavia were holders of Cambridge School Certificate (ibid).

However, with all the difficulties, the Senior Education officer Higher Education (S.E.O.H.E.) briefing to the Minister for Education on the 28th January, 1966 noted that, prior to independence, there were fifty Kenyan students in Yugoslavia studying various degree programmes and in 1964 Kenya sent 72 students, 1965 sent 80 students mostly to study in the field of agricultural machinery. The Yugoslavia scholarships were divided into Cultural Relations awards for direct university training and Technical Assistance awards which catered for courses below university degrees (KNA, ED/3/2707, 1965).

Kenya's problem up to 1965 stemmed from a misunderstanding of basic academic requirements for entrance into various institutions. This was later solved by Yugoslav authorities who allowed school certificate holders a chance to join the university thus the number of students returning prematurely or changing courses on arrival were largely solved. Yugoslavia earlier gave fully maintained scholarship including passages but stopped paying passages from 1965 and Kenya had to reduce the number of places offered by half so that their scholarships could be used for paying passages for the other half (ibid).

Kenya was happy that Yugoslavia gave first class training at all levels and emphasized the bid of university studies, in fields of economic planning, engineering, medicine, dentistry and other fields that were not available locally (ibid). Kenya increasingly requested more places in the universities for studies in: medical sciences (laboratory technology, pharmacy and dentistry; engineering sciences; agricultural sciences; planning statistics; banking and allied fields which were not available in East Africa and by 1966 Yugoslav government had awarded 150 scholarships to Kenyans to study in Yugoslavia (ibid).

In the Kenya–Yugoslav scholarships, political parties played a role. Yugoslav party scholarships were availed to KANU candidates. There was

communication between KANU National Publicity and Education Secretary and Secretary Commission for International Relations, Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia. In the 1963/64 Yugoslavia offered twelve scholarships. That is five scholarships for the university students and seven for technical training. These scholarships covered transport, tuition and accommodation. The offers were channelled through Yugoslav Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam.

However, reacting to these scholarships, Ohanga, secretary KOSAC noted that the committee was very concerned with the high proportion of one ethnic group on the list of beneficiaries and that the public press had voiced its criticism on the selection of people benefiting from overseas scholarships as foreign aid (KNA-ED/3/2712, 1963; KANU letter 4/9/63 and list, KOSAC letter 1/10/196). Hungarian People's Republic was also not left out in postcolonial Kenya's human resource development. Hungarian government offered scholarships in the field of Forestry, Civil Engineering, Veterinary medicine etc (KNA-ED/3/2702, 1965).

Other bursaries were offered by City Council of Nairobi up to £100 per annum for two years. The support was given mostly to students who would return to work for the City Council and candidates were preferably holder of school certificate (KNA-ED/3/2728, 1954).

The applicants for the USSR scholarships were mainly from the major cities of Kenya either students or public servants. It is evident that these applicants accessed information from the daily press or had linkages with people in towns that could access information on scholarships.

Since scholarship allocation was mainly based on provincial quota prospective candidates were keen to declare their ethnicity and level of education for eligibility. Applications were directly forwarded to institutions of higher learning in USSR through USSR Embassy in Tanganyika, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Education in Nairobi, the party (KANU Education Office) or Provincial Education Offices. On the eve of independence the average age 20 years with secondary Education. Applying directly to the KOSAC secretariat, one applicant wrote:

I would like to apply for the vacancy of doing the Test-if at all there will be test. I am in the above mentioned school (City Hall School) in form III, and I am Muluhya from Western region. I am sixteen years old. I ask gently to remain, yours, lewis mulongo Khafweli (KNA-ED/3/1569, 1963).

Some candidates were already teachers and obtained scholarships from KANU Education Office and simply notified their employer of their

intention to resign and travel and take up their scholarships, as demonstrated by a letter excerpt below:.

I am writing to inform you the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, Moscow, has offered me a scholarship through Kenya African National union... In this case I declare my resignation from your management as from the end of next month, August 1963 (KNA-ED/3/1561, 1963).

A study of Kenyan applications for overseas scholarship indicates that United Nations Organization (UNO) scholarships were also availed through Russian and Eastern European Universities. An applicant wrote:

I have sent my particulars to Patrice Lumumba University, Moscow as required under the United Nations Organization Scholarship programme... I sent everything for admission and scholarship as follows: Allocation of scholarships, Autobiography, 2 photographs, Medical Certificate and Certificate of Education... I sent through the Embassy of USSR in Tanganyika P.O. box 1905, Dar-es-Salaam... Yours in the struggle for Education help. S. Michael Chegge (KNA/3/1569, 1963).

Russian and Eastern European scholarships were sometimes secured through intensive personal tours of politicians. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga toured and established contacts with Russia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. Oginga Odinga secured an offer for Bulgarian aircraft of Kenyan students from Cairo and Nairobi to Sofia and other Eastern European countries. KOSAC made recommendations for those students to be issued with visas as an agreement was reached by the government and Christian Council of Kenya (CCK) and the Catholic Church that:

In view of the exceptional circumstances connected with scholarships proposed for Russia, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, particularly, apparent impossibility of following criteria applied in other scholarships be approved this year (1962) because of the urgency but with the proviso that in future years the donors will be requested to provide the particulars required for all scholarships (KNA, ED/3/2958, 1962).

There were students who took personal risks and left the country in search of education. In 1962, for instance, claims and counter accusations were made on individuals who were thought to have made connections and later abandoned students in foreign lands. Oginga Odinga informed the committee that the students who were reported stranded abroad were not sent by him but had made their own arrangements without prior reference to him. They went on their own accord then started applying for vacancies

while abroad to Kenya office in Cairo. He informed the public in the press release that all the students sent to Communist countries were provided for both in tuition, maintenance, medical care and other facilities even through their holidays (ibid).

However, Daniel arap Moi who had just arrived from Cairo and met in his hotel up to fifty stranded students, blamed Oginga Odinga for the plight of 25 of them and that money that was to be given by the Egyptian government through Ministry of African Affairs was not given out and their passports were being held by the Cairo Office illegally (*Daily Nation,* 1962).

But in a quick rejoinder Koduol, secretary to Oginga Odinga, issued a statement claiming that Moi was simply slandering Odinga and the Cairo office because according to letters received in Odinga's Nairobi office, students in Cairo were well looked after. The accusation he argued was tantamount to abuse of humanitarian work of his colleagues in Cairo. Koduol alleged that those students who were stranded went there on their own or through other agencies and offered Moi to check with Odinga's office letters from students stranded in Leopoldville, Khartoum, Somalia and elsewhere explaining how they went on their own and were applying afresh for scholarship to Odinga or Kenya Cairo office. He alleged that most of them had no passports and, therefore, Moi's allegations regarding passports were surprising (*Daily Nation,* 1962; KNA, ED/3/3958, 1962). With respect to funds, Koduol stated that it was a lie and worthless political fabrication claiming all meagre funds were fully utilised to alleviate students' hardships. He noted that Kenya Cairo Office and Odinga were responsible for granting nearly 500 Kenya scholarships to Russia and Eastern Europe despite the emergency situation. Koduol noted that the students walked all the way to Cairo without British passports in search of education. He doubted if Moi would offer to listen or help considering the fact that his political party KADU hated assistance from Communist States (ibid).

The origins of Russian and Eastern European Scholarships can be traced to USSR-USA competition for sphere of influence in the continent of Africa. According to interviewees Kenyan Independence was nearing and politicians wanted to train young people to support them in post-colonial nation building. While Tom Mboya sought USA sponsorship, Jaramogi sought Russian, Eastern European and Chinese support. Mboya travelled personally to the USA to solicit funding and vacancies in educational institutions. On trips and appeals, he used his ambassadors at large, for example, Olonde Odhok and William Okello.

According to Annual Kenya Embassy Moscow Reports, the number of Kenyan students to Russia and Eastern Europe drastically increased by 1977 from 257 in January to 300 students in December, 1977. However, the number of students increased significantly in USSR and Poland, while the figures remained the same in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic (KNA-XJ/6/3, 1977).

> The first wave of Kenyans to travel to Russia and Eastern Europe through Uganda, Sudan and finally Cairo included among others Martin Yaya Ochieng (Ochieng, Oral interview, Eldoret 23.2.2009; Oloo, Oral interview, Eldoret, 26.9.2009). However, following what the Government of Kenya described as a coordinated overseas scholarship, the Ministry of Education centralized scholarships, interviews and awards from end of 1965. Kenya government further opened up direct contact with the Eastern European countries and students to these countries could fly directly without necessarily passing through Moscow, a position that was common before independence. Map 4.4 is a sketch of the routes followed after independence.

Map 4 Air Routes used by students to Russia and Eastern Europe during the Post – Colonial period to the End of the Cold War, 1963 – 1991

Source: Researcher

The second wave of Kenyan students to Russia and Eastern Europe got scholarships through Ministries of Education, Cooperative, Culture and Maendeleo ya Wanawake, political parties like KANU, and UNESCO, but

all had to be channeled, advertised, applicants interviewed and awarded scholarships by the Ministry of Education. This trend of events was confirmed by majority of the interviewees (Tubula, oral interview, Nairobi, 5.6.2009; Imbaya, oral interview, Eldoret, 12.7.2009; Sarmat, oral interview, Eldoret, 19.7.2009; Misoi, oral interview, Nairobi, 25.7.2009; Odhiambo, oral interview, Eldoret, 21.6.2009).

The other organizations that sourced scholarships included *Maendeleo ya Wanawake* (Kenya National Women Organization). Some of the beneficiaries included Agatha Mbakaya (oral interview, 31October 2008) and Uneah Ataya (oral interview, Kisii, 2 April 2009).

The Ministry of Cooperatives, Kenya also played a major role in securing scholarships to Russia and Eastern Europe and in particular short courses (Kebenei, oral interview, Kamagut, 4.5.2009; Rotich, oral interview, Eldoret,
6 May 2009; Kemei, oral interview, Kapyemit, 11 June 2009). The United Nations Education and Scientific Cooperation (UNESCO) in assisting developing nations funded Kenyans to study in Russia and Eastern Europe (Githiora, oral interview, Eldoret, 1 July 2009). Other Kenyan candidates made direct personal contacts or through agencies of the host countries in Kenya or got information through friends about educational opportunities overseas
(Tenai, oral interview, Eldoret, 11 April 2009; Kagara, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009).

Table 3.1 Select Sample of Seventeen Interviewees graduates of Russian and Eastern European Universities

Candidate's Name	**Scholarship Information**	**Academic Background**	**Country where Scholarship was Tenable**	**Specialization**	**Job Placement in Kenya**
Moses Opiyo	Adverts in Local Press	"A" level	Russia	Industrial Engineer	University lecturer
Uneah Ataya	MOE adverts in the Local Press	"A" level	Russia	Librarian	University lecturer
Mosonik arap Korir	Applied directly to Russian institute for African	Masters of Arts – USA	Russia	Historian	University lecturer

	Studies				
Elkana Mbakaya Luvere	MOE adverts in the Local Press	Instructor Machakos Technical School	Belarus	Civil engineer	Local Government (Retired)
Samuel Njue Munyi	MOE adverts in the Local Press	"A" level	Belarus	Journalist	Ministry of Home Affairs
Oloo Jackton Herbert	Through a friend Railway Station Master	"A" level	Ukraine	Lawyer	Private Engagement with a law firm
Irene Ondeng	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"A" level	Ukraine	International Relations expert	Provincial Administratio n
Kifalu S. Baraka	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"A" level	Ukraine	Aviation Engineer	University lecturer
Nehemiah Kuruna	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"A" level	Poland	Pharmacist	Ministry of Medical Services
Thomas Odhiambo	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"A" level	Poland	Chemical Engineer	University lecturer, Pharmacist
Samuel Sarmat	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"A" level	Poland	Chemical Engineer	University lecturer
Bethwel Lagat	KANU – KADU youth scholarships	"O" level	Bulgaria	Mechanical Engineering (Re-called midway)	Farmer
Willie, Kibiy	KANU – KADU youth scholarships	"O" level	Bulgaria	Electrical Engineer	Ministry of Information (KBC), Retired
Kiprop	Constituenc	"O" level	East Germany	Agro-Market	Ministry of

Kebenei	y Member of Parliament				Agriculture
Joseph Misoi	MOE adverts in the Local Newspaper	"O" level	Hungary	Veterinary	Politician, Retired veterinary
Francis Maina Kagara	Through a friend who had contact with a Romanian diplomat	"A" level	Romania	Chemical Engineer	University lecturer
Martin Yaya Ochieng	KANU – Cairo office contact person	"O" level	Czechoslovakia	Textile Engineer	University lecturer

Source: Researcher

internaL and externaL poLitiCs of the airLifts

During the colonial and post colonial period, overseas scholarships were a matter of concern to Members of Parliament who always decried that their ethnic groups or regions were not benefiting from government or private overseas scholarship. They alleged that the Ministry of Education failed to advertise scholarship but government insisted that scholarships were always advertised in the daily newspapers while the government had no power over private scholarships. However, the Minister for Education gave assurance that in future, all scholarships would be controlled or monitored by government (Republic of Kenya, The National Assembly – House of Representatives, Official Report, 1963:1563; 1792-2112).

The organization of students airlift to Bulgaria caused an incident on 6th of November, 1963 at Embakasi Airport that had to be discussed in parliament.

The Ministry of Education, Kenya Overseas Scholarships Advisory Committ (KOSAC) invited, selected and awarded 46 students to study technical subjects in Bulgaria. When it came to the date of departure, another group from KANU office took over their places as their luggage was thrown out

according to the then Minister for Education J.D. Otiende Akello (Akello, Oral interview, Mbale, 7 March 2009) . In November 1963, KOSAC selected students were replaced by KANU students for the Bulgarian scholarship an incident that portrayed challenges to the Russian and Eastern Europe airlift. The Minister for Home Affairs, Jaramogi Odinga pushed for his students' choice to the disappointment of the Ministry of Education (KNA, ED/3/370, 1964). The 46 students had received donations from relatives, friends, societies and firms in their course to go to Bulgaria. The students claimed that those selected had very low qualification according to a letter by 46 stranded students for Bulgaria dated 29/11/1963 (ibid). The government accepted only responsibility to fund their transport home and find possible scholarship for further studies abroad but remained non committed (ibid).

There were other scholarships offered by the Bulgarian government directly to individuals and then asking Kenya government to give the green light as some students had reached Bulgaria by some obscure route, though the government did not object to private donors helping individual students (KNA, ED/3/370, 1965). This problem was highlighted in a letter from the Permanent Secretary MOE to Permanent Secretary MExA, on 4th November 1965 (ibid).

The Bulgarian incidents indicated how the government and the ruling party KANU were sharply divided on government policies and the perception that overseas scholarships went a long way into building the political careers of individuals. The incidents also showed the partiality of scholarship selecting bodies which selected many students from their own homes. It also revealed that academic qualification was preferred only after ethnicity. Out of the fifty five who went, forty four had only KAPE and only eleven had school certificates. Even though the proponents of KANU side argued that many regions like Turkana had no school certificate graduates from those regions were not considered for selection at KAPE level.

The Minister of Education stated that the government in an effort to correct and avoid a repeat of the mistake released a policy decision. The government acknowledged the benefit from human resource development opportunities and facilities for education and training available in East Africa and overseas. Scholars were to be selected by an executive Central Selection Board (CBS) which included representatives of administrative regions and government ministries that included Minister for Education (chair), the Minister for Finance, the Minister for Home Affairs, the Minister

for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Minister for Health and Housing, the Minister for
Information and Broadcasting, the Minister for Labour and Social Services and the Minister in charge for Africanization and Training in the Prime Minister's office. The CSB gave a covering approval to self sponsored students, those who obtained loans from the Higher Education Loans Board and those who were selected by Director of Personnel for training courses for government services. Students were to be their countries Ambassadors as the students were warned of the attractions that developed country can surmount (KNA, ED/3/388, 1965).

The government was for the idea that students be encouraged to study at the colleges and institutions in East Africa. However, it also recognized that there were many courses that would have to be secured overseas (KNA, ED/3/388, 1965). Scholarships provided by both East and West triggered competition in the field of university education and Kenya benefited from generous organizations to train young men and women so as to participate in the future development programmes.

For the Kenyan students, Eastern or Western European or American scholarships meant a new life. For politicians they meant votes and for the host countries and sponsors they meant future allies in the developing world. These issues very much determined the complexion of candidates' qualifications taking up overseas scholarships (KNA, ED/3/2725, 1961). The colonial government feared that education abroad was being manipulated by African leaders as a last contest with the colonial authority in the East and Western blocs. After independence, although all stakeholders agreed on the need for training beyond borders, political competition at home, the cold and post cold war environment impacted on foreign policy and greatly influenced educational airlifts.

SuMMary

Independence brought with itself challenges and opportunities. The newly independent state of Kenya needed skilled human resource to take over from the outgoing colonial personnel. Education was a central focus to ensure a stable and prosperous Kenya. Limited resources in Kenya made it necessary to utilize foreign training facilities in order to attain a reasonably rapid Africanization of the labour force. Lack of enough educational institutions meant seeking education at overseas universities. The chance to earn a university education with the help of a scholarship was the gateway to opportunity. Enrolment in the local and regional universities gradually

superseded facilities and overseas destination provided an avenue for higher education before and after independence. Education scholarships meant to fill a training void became entangled in the cold war rivalry and became a political instrument for individual political elites and groups in the country and at the international level, attempts to socialization towards a particular ideological group. Despite the politicization of the airlifts, taking up scholarships abroad continued to be an avenue to access educational opportunities for Kenyans. The next chapter will attempt to discuss how political socialization through education was used in an attempt to influence states' policies.

4

Education and Political Socialization

The chapter assess the centrality of education in national development. It discusses how political socialization in institutions of learning shape the students worldview and the national and international character of a state.

the development of education and political socialization in Kenya

Education is a complex concept that cannot be restricted to one single characteristic; it does not refer to a single idea and does not have a singular meaning. Instead, it points to a whole 'family of meaning' including growing up, instructions, training, and others. Education is a public form of experience and is judged to be a social or public affair as the learner is initiated into social life through education (Peters, 1966). Education is an asset to both the individual and the state and the two are intertwined in political socialization process because education and politics are inseparable since educational policies are made by politicians through legislation (Manduku, oral interview, Kisii, 2 April 2009; Nyong'o, oral interview, Moscow, 29 April 2011).

Socialization is a process whereby someone becomes social, that is a member of society. From a psychological perspective, socialization is a process whereby a child is trained to control his/her basic needs, actions and expectations and thus learns to adapt self to the adult environment. Sociologically speaking, socialization is a process whereby an individual learns to accept the norms, values and ways of behaviour characteristic of the society to which he or she belongs. Socialization is, therefore, a process of learning, more particularly a process of training in the course of which the individual is conditioned or moulded into a respectable member of society.

The process of socialization can be either formal, when it occurs by means of well-established practices and rituals, or informal, when it takes place in the course of day to day social contact. Furthermore, it is a process in which the adult members of society play an important role, as agents of socialization. Thus parents, grandparents, relatives, neighbours, elders, and teachers all help to facilitate the process of socialization, both individually and collectively. In this case they are assisted by other agents of socialization, such as the church, the school, the state and the media. Socialization is therefore a very common process that occurs in *all* societies, both traditional and modern, and both large and small (Njoroge and Bennaars, 1986).

Education is a purposeful activity. It implies aims, goals, and ideals. In other words, people engaged in education; be they educators or those being educated, set themselves certain standards. Education is seen here as an instrument, a tool, through which one is able to cope with his life in a satisfactory manner. Dewey (1963) influenced by philosophers like Rousseau, Froebel and by educational psychologists, viewed education as a process of growth whereby the individual child learns through experience to adjust himself to his environment, be it physical, social or cultural. Modern philosophy refers to education as being a process of growth, a developmental process, while modern philosophers call it a process of becoming. Education is thus a process of awareness.

One of the primary aims of education from the psychologists' perspective is to develop the learner's personality so that the individual can adjust to the environment in his or her own manner. By defining education as initiation, Peters and Hirst (1970) wanted to draw attention to the important point that education involves an introduction into the *public* forms or *modes of experience.* The 'public modes of experience' are basically forms of knowledge.

One way in which the schools relate to the political system is through the political socialization of children and youth. Furthermore, education is very much a socialiser because peoples' views are shaped and influenced by the teachers and professors they meet while they receive new frontiers of knowledge (Massialas, 1969; Nyon'go, oral interview, 29 April 2011). The schools, the curriculum, the textbooks, the instructional methods, the school clubs, the classroom milieu, the students, the teachers, the administrative structure, and other school associations may implicitly or explicitly engage in the transmission of basic political orientations toward the environment (Massialas, 1969). According to Fukuyama (2006), middle class societies arise as a result of universal education. The link between education and liberal democracy has been frequently noted, and would seem to be an all - important one. Societies require large numbers of highly skilled and educated workers, managers, technicians and intellectuals: hence even the most dictatorial state cannot avoid the need for both mass and open access to higher and specialized education if it wants to be economically advanced. Societies cannot exist, without a large and established educational establishment. Further noting that social status is defined by one's level of educational achievements. The class differences that exist in most societies are due primarily to the differences in education.

The effect of education on political attitudes is complicated. The professed aim of modern education is to 'liberate" people from prejudices and traditional forms of authority blindly, but rather learn to think for themselves. Even if this doesn't happen on a mass basis, people can be taught to see their own self- interest more clearly and over a longer time horizon. Education also makes people demand more of themselves and for themselves in other words, they acquire a certain sense of dignity which they want to have respected by their fellow citizens and by the state (Fukuyama, 2006).

deveLopMent of eduCation in Kenya

Societies from time immemorial, have utilized education to exploit the environment for survival. In pre- colonial Africa indigenous education enabled ethnic groups to pass down the social, political and economic systems to the younger generations. According to Bokongo (1992:1) this education was "moral, progressive, gradual and practical". The advent of external interaction through the Arab traders and European missionaries exposed the continent to formal non-indigenous education. This in essence

meant that Africans had their system of education contrary to the European missionary thought that Africans were primitive and had no education and was upon them to civilize Africans through religion and formal education.

Bokongo notes that formal non-indigenous education in Kenya and the whole of East Africa began with the coming of Arabs and Persians by 700A.D. Their settlement necessitated the building and establishment of mosques and Koranic schools to care for their spiritual and moral welfare. They became the first group to establish a formal school system in Kenya. Western education was the second non-indigenous system of education to be introduced to Kenya in the middle of the 19th century by the Christian missionaries. The western education took root with the arrival of John Kraft and Johan Rebman of the Church Missionary in 1844 and 1846 (Bokongo, 1992; Sheffield, 1973; Anderson, 1970).

In Kenya, missionaries took up the role of agents of mass education. In the promotion of mass education specialists and professionals concentration on the development of local leadership was stressed. Those trained were supposed to return to their villages to discuss over with their neighbours what needed to be immediately addressed in the community in terms of development projects.

The aftermath of the First World War witnessed a number of government measures with regard to education given to Africans. It was to that end that the East Africa Protectorate Education Commission of 1919 was appointed (Bokongo, 1992). Its report, which was heavily influenced by the white settlers, recommended the preparation of Europeans for leadership roles in the colony. While compulsory education was recommended for all other races, Africans were excluded from such plan. In 1918, the East African Protectorate Education Commission and the Phelps-Stoke of 1912-1925 Commission came up with recommendations on the structure of education to be adapted.

The 1924 and 1931 Ordinances saw the establishment of schools directly ran by the government. This shift in education policy impacted on the involvement of Africans. Earlier on, there was no definite education policy regarding the nature of education for the Africans to the 1920s (ibid). The white settler community did not want Africans to be educated outside technical training and the missionaries only wanted to convert them to Christianity. One other factor was the rivalry for political power between the Europeans and the Asians. This conflict resulted in the demand by Europeans for an African artisan class to replace the Asians artisans. On the other hand, Africans regarded missionary education inadequate and

inappropriate and demanded literary or intellectual education instead. All these made it difficult to come up with a clear policy on African education.

The more missionaries and government persisted in the specified propriety of education for Africans, the more the latter became restive and, therefore, arrogant towards religious and technical education. Africans valued the utility importance of literary. A good job such as clerical work which carried with it good wages, supplemented by the specious glamour of town life and spurious respectability, required literary education.

Africans wanted their children to be efficient in business and contracting as the Indian traders, competent in office work and accounting and in due course be capable of making their influence felt in cultural, social, political and economic affairs of their country. This base could not be provided by a mere industrial and religious education. It was only secular schools which could provide courses that could make the aforesaid a reality. This very fact propelled Africans to oppose education provided almost purely on technical and religious lines. Education then, like now, is a champion no future can depress, no crime can destroy, no enemy can alienate and no nepotism can enslave (unknown author, htt://children.foreignpolicy blogs.com/category/ notable-quotes-about-children).

On university education, the Colonial Office approved the De La Warr Report that Makerere be modelled in 1938 as an independent higher college with its own governing body consisting of representatives from all four territories of East Africa. The government of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika quickly set up an endowment fund to enable Makerere to exercise its autonomy under its own governing council.

The appointment of Sir Cyril Asquith Commission of 1943 came up with a report in 1945. Governed by the belief that university colleges were crucial to colonial social, economic and political progress, Asquith recommended the elevation of existing colleges to university college status and the establishment of new ones where they did not exist. Makerere was renamed the University College of East Africa in 1949. A college council was set up with representatives from Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar.

At independence, Kenya was in desperate need of a better educated African work force. Kenyatta had committed himself to fight against "poverty, ignorance and disease" and improving African access to education was a critical tool in achieving all these (Hornsby, 2012:139). In 1964, a special Education Commission was established, to review how the education system could be used to build national identity, encourage racial and ethnic intermixing and support development.

In Kenya, education reform and development have been long standing objectives of the Government since its independence in 1963. The Kenya government has continued to invest heavily in education. The recognition of the noble role of education in society has led for several years to the struggle for formal education. This struggle has led to numerous conflicting interests among various "actors" in education in both colonial and post-colonial period.

The educational struggle in Kenya is the need for pedagogy, more specifically, an African pedagogy that is responsible to the African condition today (Bennaars, 1998). It is a pedagogy that is expected to be liberating, empowering and responsible to societal needs (Ojiambo, 2009; Gore, 1992). As Ojiambo (2009) observes, no society anywhere in the world educates its people without having good reasons for doing so and that no society or government will spend so much time, energy and money on an enterprise such as education, if it does not serve any purpose.

The Beecher commission was, for instance, mandated to examine the scope, content, methods, administration and financing of African education (Otiende *et al*, 1992). However it was criticized by the Africans for Europeanization of education rather than Africanization of education. According to Bogonko (1992:79), in 1952, Africans who constituted 96 percent of the total population of Kenya, held an annual average 11.3 percent of overseas government scholarships and bursaries while the alien races, who formed a mere 4 percent of the population, were allocated a massive 88.3 percent of the government studying opportunities abroad.

The 1960s was a turning point not only in the political landscape of the East African countries but was the beginning of a journey in the quest of institutional and intellectual self governance. The University of East Africa was born in 1963 and had Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Makerere University Colleges as its constituents. However, by 1970, each University college had developed its own courses and the University Development Committee (UDC) mandated to oversee all the three colleges had little power. In 1968, a Working Party on Higher Education recommended the promotion of each college of the federal university to full university status in 1970. Accordingly Makerere, Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were set up by acts of parliament.

Although the government might have wanted to restrict the expansion of higher education to meet manpower needs while postponing broader expansion until the economy permitted, it was pressured by public demand to provide more university spaces. Despite the impressive expansion, access

to university education in Kenya still remained elusive to a huge number of qualified students.

From the 1970s the unsurpassable expansion in secondary education, meant Kenya was hit by the unavailability of university places locally. The ever increasing number of young people seeking university education became increasingly critical. The Kenya government viewed study abroad opportunities in any part of the world by her citizens as vehicles to build academic, scientific, and technological capacities.

Table 4.1 Kenyan Students on Higher Education, 1967—1974

SN№	Subject of Study	University of East Africa				Overseas	Grand Total	Year
		Nairobi	Makerere	Dar-esSalaam	Total			
1	Public and Business Administration	-	-	-	-	78	78	1967/ 68
		-	-	-	-	2	2	1968/ 69
		-	-	-	-	-	-	1969/ 70
		-	-	-	-	-	-	1970/ 71
		-	-	-	-	148	148	1971/ 72
		-	-	-	-	123	123	1972/ 73
		-	-	-	-	119	119	1973/ 74
		-	-	-	-	470	470	
2	Arts and Social Sciences	281	35	55	371	613	984	1967/ 68
		391	56	47	422	297	719	1968/ 69
		387	104	92	583	315	898	1969/ 70
		593	146	97	836	63	924	1970/ 71
		791	87	132	1010	283	1293	1971/ 72
		854	94	71	1019	291	1310	1972/ 73
		845	172	49	1066	293	1359	1973/ 74
		4070	694	543	5307	215521	7487	
3	Education (Adm., T.T., Tech., Dom. Science, etc)	53	72	-	125	116	241	1967/ 68
		63	96	21	180	54	234	1968/ 69
		26	108	26	160	104	264	1969/ 70
		44	74	44	162	36	198	1970/ 71
		16	44	60	120	107	227	1971/ 72
		412	116	78	606	113	548	1972/ 73
		1289	-	82	1371	107	1478	1973/ 74
					2562	63719	2979	
4	Medicine (Health, Nurses, Ph., Sur., etc)	19	117	-	136	513	649	1967/ 68
		62	119	-	181	478	659	1968/ 69
		115	112	-	227	416	643	1969/ 70
		184	81	-	265	353	618	1970/ 71

		276	63	-	339	448	787	1971/ 72
		352	-	-	352	433	785	1972/ 73
		427	6	-	433	398	831	1973/ 74
		1435		-	1933	3039	4972	
5	Engineering (Civil, Mechanical, Electrical)	118	-	-	118	495	613	1967/ 68
		133	-	-	133	391	524	1968/ 69
		124	-	-	124	343	467	1969/ 70
		171	-	-	171	143	314	1970/ 71
		220	-	-	220	258	478	1971/ 72
		266	-	-	287	261	548	1972/ 73
		389	-	-	389	272	661	1973/ 74
		1421	-	-	1442	2163	3606	

Source: Summary of Tables 157-184 of the Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstracts, 1968-1974 Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Training of administrators was the preserve of overseas universities especially in the U.K. Courses were offered that were capable of influencing policy and management of political transition immediately and after independence in an era of cold war politics. Specializations like public administration, arts and social sciences, education, medicine and engineering were offered by overseas universities. Table 4.1 analyses of *Kenya Statistical Abstracts* 1967 to 1974 illustrates how in the early years of independence, the country was not ready to accommodate students and train them to fill the dire need in human resource development.

Table 4.2 Students Enrolments at Kenya Polytechnic, 1964 – 1974

S. №	Subject of Study	Number of Students Registered	Year
1.	Preliminary Technical	100	1964
		133	1965
		369	1966
		375	1967
		225	1968
		180	1969
		160	1970
		124	1971
		86	1972
		80	1973

		84	1974
		1916	
2,	Mechanical, Electrical, Automobile Engineering	354	1964
		425	1965
		551	1966
		708	1967
		854	1968
		913	1969
		1206	1970
		1070	1971
		1072	1972
		921	1973
		960	1974
		7964	
3.	Secretarial, Commercial and Professional courses	144	1964
		215	1965
		206	1966
		213	1967
		187	1968
		166	1969
		342	1970
		344	1971
		478	1972
		661	1973
		572	1974
		3528	
4.	Institutional Management section, Catering, Hotel Management etc	18	1964
		17	1965
		32	1966
		44	1967
		38	1968
		64	1969
		229	1970

133	1971
161	1972
185	1973
196	1974
1117	

Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1968-1974, Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Planning. Summary of Tables (158-184)

The need to have a knowledgeable indigenous manpower to take over from the departing British colonial power necessitated young Kenyans to travel overseas to seek education. According to the Statistical Abstracts between 1967 and 1974, training in public administration and business was done overseas. In the social sciences, the total number trained in all the East African universities was way below the total number trained in overseas universities. The same trend applied to all the other specializations.

Analysis of Table 4.2 sheds light on how the country was trying locally to cater for skilled human resource. A number of students enrolled into the existing polytechnic. Upward increment yearly attests to this demand that catered for technical and professional jobs. Enrolment moved from 100 students in 1964 to 1117 in 1974. Later years witnessed organizations of airlifts to various destinations in search of education.

the University and poLitiCaL soCiaLization

Political philosophers and statesmen agree that political socialization of the young directly and significantly affects the survival potentials of communities, regimes, or governments, and the processes of political socialization are clear and can be transmitted with ease although the processes are extremely complex.

Parsons (1978) in his interpretation of the role and significance of higher education in society- *inter alia* include not only the teaching of what has been called “higher learning”, but also various functions and above all what has come to be called the “research function” or the advancement of knowledge and the development of professional groups. The acquisition of professional training giving the practitioner a “professional complex” and the university become the mother of institutional complex. The university can therefore be argued to reflect the general development, growth and structure of higher education in any society.

Institutions of higher learning like schools, offer a great deal of instructions with specific political content. There is a relationship between curricular content and childhood political values. To enable the learners cope with increasingly complex political life instructional programmes that emphasize multi participation i.e. civic education, personal rights, gathering and evaluating information are introduced. However, although curriculums are important, their impact may depend on how skilfully they are communicated to the learners.

The success of a curriculum depends on investment on learning materials and the role the tutors play. Political socialization will, therefore, be gauged through pupil change in information and attitude. Instructors are agents of political values and learners may acquire values by a process of identification with their instructors. Students apparently learn by reward or punishment process of classical theory and by observation and reproduction of actions of other individuals, more often role models. Instructions therefore serve as models of some behaviours and attitudes that might be political to some learners. Learning institutions therefore are agents of socialization at least in some instances. Courses or curriculums coupled with teacher's competence and educational quality produces forces in the direction of political socialization. If institutions of higher learning are important agents of socialization, their changing nature should be reflected in the political socialization of the learners.

Campus political activism is a common forum in many countries. There are two ways in which higher institutions of learning are considered socializing agents in inculcating specific political values. Colleges are spaces where multifaceted, critical knowledge is acquired and conflict management techniques are learned. Teachings and course contents expand knowledge in a given field but at times indoctrination of learners is attempted. Institutions of higher learning teach democratic participation by producing and encouraging enlightened, educated persons to become actively involved in governmental policy making. Elites hold different political values than their less educated counterparts.

A university is an institution that teaches and examines students in many branches of advanced learning awarding degrees and providing facilities for academic research. The terms training, education, research and excellence are interwoven in all discussions on what a university stands for. A university is not a monolithic monument entity with its functions and roles taken as given but captures the dynamism inherent within the university. Just like any other community the university constructs itself symbolically.

Within the university unity and diversity are integrated and emphasis given to connection rather than separation.

eduCation and the deveLopMent of nationaL CharaCter

In Africa the intellectuals were viewed as the "other" endowed with knowledge and skills to articulate and implement societal needs. In most societies, the intellectuals have been the vanguards behind change. In Africa, for instance, the conception, birth and maturation of Africa's newly independent states was in large part the work of modern African intellectuals. Among them Jomo Kenyatta, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, King Hassan and Milton Obote. Many of them received their education outside their countries using this opportunity to study while championing the independence struggle. Given this historical role intellectuals in Africa are seen as people with valuable skills, special responsibilities and a lot to answer to society's many questions.

According to Bogonko (1992), traditionally, a university is accredited to transmit, create and classify knowledge through teaching, research and publication programmes. While these functions applied to universities in Kenya and Africa in general the emergent nations could not allow the role of the university to remain at the abstract level. Thus, African political leaders and academicians have largely argued for universities to apply their energies directly to the practical solutions to social, economic and political problems of their nations. African universities had to actively participate in the ideacultural regeneration, social transformation, economic modernization and training and in training and upgrading the most important means of production, human resource.

Africans opposed colonial education from the start. However, that opposition was not formalized and sustained until the formation of the African welfare cum-political associations in the early 1920s. Political associations were formed to protest against the harsh conditions Africans were subjected to during and after the First World War. In this endeavour, they made education one of the rallying points against colonialism. Exposure to sufficient and proper education was necessary to understand and fight colonialism. In any case education was an aspect of politics, and the missionaries provided very little literary education. Hence all the African political association in one way or another took education as one of their major concerns.

The aftermath of the Second World War also brought into being other factors which shaped African politics and education up to independence in 1963. Work by the African soldiers in Egypt, Abyssinia, the Middle East and South East Asia brought Kenyans into contact with different people who had similar colonial problems as their own. Kenyans came back with new ideas and consciousness of the world. Their mental horizons were widened. Besides acquiring the knowledge that no people should be ruled by another forever, African soldiers also learned the might of the educated intellect. Back at home, the soldiers craved for better, more and higher education for their children. This stand enhanced the emergent African nationalism and with it the campaign for expansion in education for Africans. It was not surprising that the political associations that struggled for independence were led by 'mission boys'. The new political engineering devolved on them.

eduCation and the struggLe to ConstruCt a SoCiaList soCiety in the ussr, eastern europe and abroad

In 1919, consistent with basic socialist ideology, Lenin ordered the schools to serve as training grounds for workers to reorganize their positions in a socialist state. To achieve this objective, he demanded that socialist literature be used in all schools. Lenin has been credited with the saying "give us the child for eight years and it will be a Bolshevik forever" (Macintyre, 1993:5). In his speech at the Third All Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League he had noted that:

> ... radically remoulding the teaching, organization and training of the youth shall be able to ensure that the results of the efforts of the younger generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e. ; a Communist society" (Lenin, 1947:661).

According to the Leninist ideology, schools were to serve as training ground for workers to reorganize their position in a socialist state (Mungazi, 1993). Lenin considered both teaching and learning crucial to building a socialist state. Lenin is noted to have argued that "Teaching is important part of education and thus: "Without teaching there is no knowledge, without knowledge there is no socialism, without socialism society degenerates into a capitalistic decay" (Kuzin & Kondokov, 1977:8).

Literature courses were more susceptible to political socialization. For much of the time, all literature courses, even those in non-Russian republics, addressed only Russian writers. Pre-revolution writers and anti-revolutionary writers were removed from the syllabus and replaced with

"politically correct literature" (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1989:165). There were subjects meant to arm pupils with the knowledge and skills necessary for active participation in the communist construction, and to contribute to the formation of a dialectical materialist world- view and atheistic convictions (Muckle, 1987).

Education plays a big role in shaping an individual and in the long run the society in totality. The Soviet Union in the struggle to construct a socialist state and meet the needs of a new socialist world order, a socialist man had first to be created who was in turn to be the custodian of the system. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev once argued:

The soviet man is a man who, having won his freedom, has been able to defend it in the most trying battles. He is a man who has been building the future unsparing of his energy and making every sacrifice. He is a man, who having gone through all trials, has himself changed beyond recognition, combining ideological connections and tremendous vital energy, culture, knowledge, and ability to ease them. This is the man who, while an ardent patriot, has been and will always remain a constant internationalist (Brezhnev, 1976:6).

The Bolsheviks wanted to instil a sense of social, economic and political curriculum that would give students skills they needed to function in a new socio-economic and political order. What students were expected to learn was a must in order to play their appropriate role in shaping the socialist ideology and political character that was destined to exert decisive influence on the social character of the world. Education is critical to national development and therefore must be consistent with national purpose to shape the national character. When Gorbachev assumed office in 1984, he regarded the development of the curriculum as a central component of *glasnost* and *perestroika.*

Russian schools traditionally have been more than places to learn reading, writing and arithmetic; they have also been tasked with moral education and character building what Russians call *vospitanie* (upbringing/teaching). Schools were to teach children how to behave and relate to others in society, a Russian version of civic education. *Vospitanie* in schools was manipulated to encourage conformity and serve the needs of the state.

Indoctrination of political and social values began in kindergarten and continued through the school years in an effort to form a new "soviet person" better able to contribute to the building of socialism. In the Soviet Union, History of the USSR was compulsory. The argument was that human

developments and efforts to structure the future to serve human needs are a result of lessons from the past. For future sympathizers of socialist system for them to construct socialism meant having knowledge of the past to understanding the present and plan the future. The importance of history is that it is not easy for any specialist to understand the present and plan the future without an effective knowledge of the past. Every sector of specialization gets its knowledge or understanding from a historical perspective. In the first year of study in the USSR, history as a course was compulsory regardless of area of specialization (Focus Group Discussions, Eldoret, 10 March, 2010).

Education and political socialization were seen as the keys to transforming the peasantry into socialist citizens. The author's findings concurred with other research findings on socialization in Russia and Eastern Europe that there were two major instruments of political socialization, the school and the family although the state would have liked to have been the sole instrument of child rearing (*vospitanie)* in the country, it was physically incapable throughout the entire communist regime (Clawson, 1973; Yazov, 1987; Macintyre, 1993).

Atheism, for instance, was covered with Darwinism in biology, and love for the socialist motherland was developed by emphasizing Soviet scientists with international accomplishments and reputations. Students were taught the role of the Soviet Union in the decolonization process of Third World Countries under the History of the USSR, the History of the Communist Party of the USSR and the History of Developing Countries and the cutting edge of Soviet technology with such outstanding scientists like Gagarin, Tereshkova and Mendeleev among others (Luvere, oral interview, Ikhonga Murwe, 6 March 2009; Tubula, oral interview, Nairobi 5 June 2009; Ataya, oral interview, Kisii, 2 April 2009; Makumi, oral interview, Eldoret, 21 April 2009).

Macintyre (1993) argues that since political socialization was so important to the Soviet system, it was not very surprising that a tremendous effort was dedicated to *Vospitanie* (upbringing/ rearing) in the education system right from the start. In a communist setting the communist "hidden curriculum" was more than an educational output. The ideological "duty" of education was paralleled by deeply rooted social habits that sharply contrasted it. Teachers, parents and students who were particularly pragmatic in coping with the real situation, in reality were characterized by paradoxical and counterproductive effects. The latent curriculum was the

outcome of excessive educational centralization. In fact, the myth of a classless society was related to "democratic centralization".

The long established centralization of East European educational systems was once again strengthened by means of political ideology. This had the great effect of producing tremendously rigid configurations. However, proclaiming educational uniformity did not mean that the education actually received was the same everywhere. Where the central curriculum was dominant, there it inevitably appeared a latent curriculum. Literature, for instance, to preparatory language classes for foreign students and in their first year at the university was influenced by which republic one was studying. National writers commonly referred could either be Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks or any other of the former republics. In the Ukraine, for instance such renowned national writers like Taras Shevchenko was widely taught and classical pre- revolutionary writers and poets like Alexander Pushkin (Mbakaya, oral interview, Eldoret, 31 October 2009; Ongoro, oral interview, Nairobi, 1 October 2009; Ondeng, oral interview, Eldoret, 24 November 2009: Oduol, oral interview, Nairobi, 5 April 2010).

In the Eastern bloc, the dysfunction of communist collectivism as a form of cooperative teaching was shaped by the specificity of social and educational contexts. Regimes produced an elitist – individualist counter culture that opposed truly collectivist – cooperative values. It was evident in society that the citizens never truly embraced collectivism at an individual level but was more an adherence to the rigid and strict demands of the regime. Citizenship education had its contradictions. The sharp divergence between the communist theory of social change and its political effects resulted in an artificial conception of citizenship that lost most of its original persuasiveness. The educational strategies to promote the new citizen were based on traditional pedagogy: the citizenship profile was that of a disciplined hard working subject, able to exhibit accepted public behaviour in a 'civil' rather than 'civic' sense (Mincu, 2009).

Evidently, most foregn students did not register or attend elective courses such as atheism, scientific communism or Marxism- Leninism, while those who did attend showed less enthusiasm and only did them because they were either compulsory subjects or were curious to know what it was all about. Those who felt they were unfairly compeled to do the examination made sure they were performing poorly. The assumption was that they were meant for ideological brain washing and getting an excellent mark onto your examination transcript might be misinterpreted on your return home to mean you liked these subjects and therefore you were a communist sympathizer.

Students came to realise that in reality, collectivist ideology, the classless society and socialist democratization the great communist aspiration of social cohesion, was a political ideal that mostly remained a Chimera. The national question though proclaimed both in the media and through school programmes to have been solved remained a sensitive issue in society. The Soviets each remained in their national identity. The socialist appeal for a classless society and state ownership of property existed along side with a quest for ownership of property. The citizens looked upon foreign visitors and students for what was found outside the bloc in terms of material goods and world views "a sense of disillusionment on the role of the socialist regime in providing for society perverted the bloc" (Opiyo, oral interview, Eldoret, 1May 2009; Kifalu, oral interview, 5 May 2009; Namango, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009). Furthermore, the existence of special shops (*kommission*) selling foreign luxurious items mocked the essence of a classless society that was propagated in schools and lecture halls.

The special shops were for the communist party leaders and sold imported goods. One had to have a special card to buy from such shops. Host students and the surrounding community always looked forward to the time when foreign students would travel outside the USSR so that they could buy what they would bring back. Such items like clothes particularly jeans and electronic goods found ready market and even Western magazines were valued presents. The people were always eager to read something or anything from outside to get abreast with what was going on beyond the borders.

Social stratification was also evident in the education sector itself. According to Mincu (2009), the emergence during the 1970s of a *sui generis* social class, the so called *nomenklatura*, was another sign of reinvigorating the process of stratification. The polytechnic principle" revealed itself from the outset as typical Soviet rhetoric, which informed all the Soviet educational reforms from 1921 to 1984. While it was supposed to represent a genuine search for an educational solution to the classic distinction between intellectual and manual work, its obscured and shifting meaning testified to a mostly ideological function. The communist ideology had a differentiated influence on the educational systems of socialist countries. The communist ideology became a mere ritualistic duty.

However, it also created educational and social paradoxes that contrasted starkly with official ideology. In the USSR while the state's socialization mechanisms stressed positive support for the regime, informal socialization

often stressed ways for individuals to protect themselves from the regime or to exploit the system for personal advantage (Ledevena, 1998; Shlapentokh, 2001).

Zubok (2009:331) gives the example of Vysotsky's songs arguing that they "expressed the anger of the changed generation of intellectuals and the fatigue of Russian society lashed for decades by the forces of history". In society there were the intelligentsia that openly challenged the policies of the system like Sakharov and were sent to exile in Gorky (closed town to foreigners) for protesting against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

Others lived a double life, criticizing the system in private and remaining party communists in public. The elites joined and worked for the party not out of commitment but as an avenue to access what belonged to the privileged party leaders. The intellectuals out of fear for repression or personal gratification became voices of the party. The privilege to travel outside the Soviet Union for instance was treasured. When perestroika and glasnost set in from the 1980s it is noted that the intelligentsia were among the first to back Gorbachev's reforms (Matveyev, informal conversation, Voronezh, 20 October 2011; Semenov, informal conversation, Voronezh, 20 October 2011).

The Eastern bloc educational landscape in essence was teeming with rhetorical catchwords, ideological slogans and political and educational myths that did not account for the real situation. Thus, socialist citizenship is best described as the "paradox of social cohesion" (Saunders, 1993). The billboard outside Patrice Lumumba University hostels with images of Africans, Asians, Latinos, Arabs Arbs, and Eurpeans was in a clear demonstration of the belief that what repeated slogans could sociolize the entire world.

Plate 4.1: Moscow befriended us: Graduates of Russia's Peoples Friendship University – World Elites (and RPFU has students from 145 counries. Reads a billboard on one of the hostels walls)

Source: Researcher

İnternationaL sChoLarships and poLitiCaL soCiaLization

Scholarships can be used as an instrument for international political socialization. International political socialization has two general meanings. First, the term refers to the process of transmitting knowledge about and attitudes toward the international community of men and second, it refers to the process of transmission of political orientations in different national settings. The justification given is that when socio-political issues are discussed in the classroom in a true spirit of inquiry, the level of political efficacy of the participants may be raised (Massialas, 1969). The avenues for socialization may range from courses taken to extra curricula activities.

It is commonly assumed or imagined that one of the great age-related changes of political attitudes is increasing conservatism. It is observed that older people are less likely to deviate from the political principles to which they have been socialized, regardless of whether these principles are liberal

or conservative. An analysis of the background of students that travelled to the USSR showed that the majority were above twenty two years. Some were already working before they left. They were in an age bracket that could make informed choices and not easy to manipulate. The interviews revealed that most students wanted an education that would benefit them and their country and took advantage of the good education while not getting entangled in ideological propaganda (Mbakaya, oral interview, Eldoret, 31October 2009; Sitati, oral interview, Eldoret, 13 March 2009; Tenai, oral interview, Eldoret 13 April 2009; Kurgat, Oral interview, Nairobi, 5 April 2010). They were less volatile, less impressionable and less affected by youth behaviour change.

In the Soviet Union, ministerial curriculum made sure that courses include history of the USSR, political economy, scientific socialism, atheism, ethics, philosophy and Russian language, literature, history and geography were compulsory subjects during the language preparatory year and first year at the university. All those interviewed regardless of whether they studied in USSR or in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe had a similar response.

Learners and political leaders are influenced by the manipulation in the learning institutions. More frequently claims of national curriculum failing to advance national agenda on development, peaceful co-existence, national ideology or patriotism are common phrases in day to day political issues and remind us that learning institutions are socialization agents. The shared assumptions are that learning institutions exert tremendous political influence on learners and these influenced processes are subject to some kind of deliberate control. It is an established fact that the more education a person receives, the more distinctive his orientations and values.

History of patriotism and valour during the great patriotic war, with tales of exceptional heroism of the Soviet people was taught to inspire the students not only to appreciate the big sacrifice of the people but the might of the communist system. Some nations are called a fatherland, others motherland. The Soviet Union was clearly a motherland (*Rodina*). During the Soviet Union era women were strong, hardworking, nurturing, long-suffering, and true heroes of the Union. They worked in factories and on farms and fought in the Second World War. The people fought *belikoiya otchechstvnaya faina* (the Great Fatherland war) and Soviets were always reminded to be ready to protect the motherland (*za rodiny*) whenever a threat appeared. During the Soviet era, the national homeland was the socialist motherland. To the foreign students it sent a feeling of a war that

had just ended and of a society that seemed always at a state of preparedness in case of conflict. In Poland for instance, apart from course of specialization they were taught Polish language, pedagogic, design, political economy, history and literature of Poland and what was referred to as patriotic teachings, however only Polish students undertook military training (Kuruna, oral interview, Eldoret, 22 April 2009; Chemjor, oral interview, Eldoret, 19 June 2009; Misoi, oral interview, 25 July 2009).

eXtra–CurriCuLar aCtivities

The communist youth groups played a crucial role in the socialization process ranging from the little Octobrists in elementary school, young pioneers to the Komsomols (Communist Youth Association). Youth groups for years were the only source of extra curricula activities. This was a powerful motivator for many, who joined simply to take part in summer camps and sports (Prosin, oral interview, Moscow, 15 April 2012; Stepankina, oral interview, Moscow, 24 July 2012). Apart from academic activities, Russian universities liked organizing what they refer to as "cultural programs". These included for instance, outings to the theatre, ballet, circus, Russian bathhouses and trips to the countryside, especially during the summer season.

Such arrangements were open to foreign students, however very few foreign students participated in these activities. Foreign students took this gesture to be one way for the regime to get a forum to indoctrinate them. Being associated with the Komsomol among the Kenyan students might have ostracized one from the *zemlyachestva* (compatriots Union).

Other such organised extracurricular activities were visiting museums and excursions. Many took part in their preparatory years for there were organised as class trips with the class language teachers being in change. Later invitations to join organised university trips were not taken up. Such trips were one way of helping the students to settle in but stereotypes that they were used to turn students into communist youths tainted the noble idea.

Plate 4.2: Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, Kiev State University, Russian language class, 1987

Source: Alice Kurgat's personal album

In the preparatory year to learn Russian language students were divided into small tutorial groups of eight to nine students. Three Russian language teachers were assigned to a group. In Plate 4.2 above are three Russian language teachers and eight students from six different countries. They are from Gabon, Guinea Conakry, Sudan, Kenya, three from Yemen and one from Jordan.

Among other components of *Vospitanie* was the military patriotism education, an exposure that began quite early in life. Pre-school children

learned patriotic and military stories and played with military toys. Children's books glorified military life at all ages. Television had war films filling half of the programming (Herman and Dohrs, 1982; Macintyre, 1993). At some of the universities, foreign students were allowed to practice how to shoot for sports purposes during physical education hours. They could practice with toy guns (Odido, oral interview, Eldoret, 13 April 2009; Handule, oral interview, Moscow, 30 July 2012). It was not for military purposes. However, Russian students and students from some friendly socialists' countries were exposed to real military drills. In Kenya many who heard about these training took it to mean all those trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe underwent military training and the reason was to prepare them for subversive missions back at home.

Kenyan students never understood why there were an inordinate number of holidays celebrating the armed forces, all of which were given much attention in the schools and even institutions of higher learning. These included Navy Day, Army Day, Rocket Forces Day, Air force Day, Tank Day, Militia Day, Recruits Day, and Victory Day, in addition to local memorials of special events. In schools, children sang songs about Lenin and the Red Army. The Russian character is largely moulded by time and space. History and geography have left their mark on it. History explains and justifies many things. For example centuries of permanent military threat have determined a special patriotism of Russians.

In Russia, 9 May is Victory Day. A day set aside to honour those who died to save the Soviet Union in the Great Patriot War (Second World War). A documentary image on TV were relayed on the war days to the date and on the particular day live transmission of the parade was beamed to the rest of the republics. The parades not only celebrated the heroic deeds of the past soldiers but reminded the young Russians on the need to heed the call to defend *Rodina Mat* (The Motherland) whenever the situation demanded.

It was mandatory for all Soviet Students to enrol and undergo military training for some time. The 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, schools were required to provide 140 hours of Basic Military Training (NVP), plus an additional 30 hours during summer camp. The military training was designed to supplement and reinforce the socialization towards patriotism, and respect for the armed forces (Scott and Scott, 1984; Scott, 1992; Jones, 1985; Nelson & Schweizer, 1987; Macintyre, 1993). The military training programme was referred to as *voyenno – patrioticheskoe vospitanie uchashchikhsya na zanyatiyakh po nachalnoi voyenno podgotovke.* Military knowledge (*Voyenniye Znanii)* was given special

attention during the Soviet regime. The history curriculum in the Soviet Union has been described as "teaching view focusing on defence of the country ... against foreign aggression from the middle ages to the Great Patriotic War, and emphasizing the heroism of the soviet people and the army" (Kuebart, 1989:105) and teachers were "reproached for putting too much emphasis on love of peace as the main characteristic of the soviet foreign policy and neglecting aspects of national security and the need to strengthen its defence position and spirit" (Kuebart, 1984:109). The staggering losses and lingering pain of the Second World War seemed so fresh in the minds of the Soviets. What Zubok referred to as "bleeding memories" of the Great Patriotic War. Victory day celebrated on 9 May is one of the major national celebration days in the calendar and the memories of the Second World War seem always so fresh.

As already discussed, foreign students were not incorporated into military training unless there was a government to government agreement on it. It is, however, noted that in the 1960s those who went to Bulgaria were given military training as part of the course units. They were students that were undertaking their degree programmes in telecommunication engineering (Mutai, oral interview, Kabyemit, 26 June 2009; Lagat, oral interview, Ziwa, 13 June, 2009). The students were given military training for six months and after graduating from the army were admitted for a cadet course for the rank of a lieutenant.

A desired part of the Soviet extra – curriculum exhorted that children be taught the significance of their participation in the society. Pupils and students in colleges and universities participated in communal working day/ hours called "*subotnik*". The *subotnik* were special days in a month where students voluntarily went out to do communal cleaning. Although all students were called upon to participate, very few foreign students actually participated. The same attitude was taken by Kenyan students in the USSR till the collapse of the political system. The students associated manual work with the "workers power or role" in society a position trumpeted by the system for propaganda purposes.

African students saw in the Soviet Union less of a promised land and of racial equality and more of an educational opportunity of choice. Few of these students were committed Marxists. In fact, even those of them who arrived with the backing of foreign communist parties or their front organizations often lacked the approximate ideological credentials or at least failed to put them to good use once in the USSR. This attest to why foreign students were not known to join communist youth groups like the

Communist Students Organisation (The *Komsomol*). Foreign students also showed no interest in courses on scientific socialism despite the fact that they were compulsory subjects. The attempt at socialisation yielded very little; not only in creating a Soviet person, but arousing sympathy from the students who were meant to be future ambassadors of the system when they returned to their countries.

However, it suffice to note that the availed opportunity to, not only interact with the host students and community, but a diverse group of foreign students from different parts of the world and cultures armed the educational beneficiaries with multiple international experiences, a sense of belonging to a global community and the ability to adapt to different environments positively.

In the Soviet Union, students from different countries shared the same rooms, lectures and seminar groups (tutorials). For instance, for six years, the author shared a room with students from USSR, Uganda, Rwanda, and Ghana, among others, while his immediate room neighbours were from India, Morocco, Mali and Vietnam. Students changed rooms almost every academic year and one acquired new roommates and neighbours. The academic environment was more diverse, with students coming from different regions and cultural backgrounds.

Plate 4.3. The Researcher with his Ukranian campus roommate in Kiev, in 1986

Source: Researcher's Photo Album

This agrees with other findings that, students' identity is shaped by mobility transition and formal learning and how this influences their own culture and emergent global culture enables cultural hybridity (Keohane, 2005; Doherty and Sigh, 2005; Appadurai and Breckenbridge, 1988; Giroux & Robbins, 2006; Rizvi, 2005, Medica, 2010) and inter-culturalism. International students gain from the transformative space whereby they learn to work cross-culturally and gain from personal experience and understanding of multiple cultures (Kim, 2008; Butcher, *et. al.*, 2003). This makes students good agents of public diplomacy.

Students' Political Socialization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The fear of importation of communist ideology through those trained in the communist bloc raised issues on political socialization of the students while abroad. According to political socialization research, learning begins early in life with the majority of individuals having acquired their basic orientations by the end of adolescence (Mishler and Rose, 2007; Easton and Dennis, 1969). Most students who went for studies in the USSR and Eastern Europe were old enough to distinguish whatever they had earlier been socialized to belief and what the Socialist environment was propagating.

However, as it is argued, political socialization is not always identical for all groups. Differences in gender, ethnicity, or family position can produce important variations in socialization (Mishler and Rose, 2007; Dalton, 1977, 1994; Finifter and Mickiewiz, 1992). Generational differences are considered especially important both because different generations come to political consciousness during different historical periods and because economic development typically ensures that different generations are socialized under different social economic conditions (Abrahamson and Inglehart, 1992; Jeanings and Niemi, 1974).

Institutional theories emphasize adult political experiences or political "relearning" based on individuals' rational assessments of "the net present value" of contemporary institutions and circumstances (Mishler and Rose, 2007; March 1988; Noan, 1990). Institutional theories hold that attitude and behaviours are malleable and adaptable. Thus, later life experiences are expected to play a greater role in initial political attitudes should diminish

overtime as they are overwhelmed by the common lessons of contemporary experience (Demartini, 1985).

Political socialization and political experiences denote that political lessons of childhood are variously reinforced, revised, or replaced overtime by later life experiences. Mishler and Rose (2007) observes that a lifetime learning perspective, the debate between cultural and institutional explanations reduces to an empirical question about the relative importance and durability of early life socialization and later the experiences on political attitudes and behaviour.

All generations in society may be socialized broadly into a common political culture, but different aspects of that culture may be emphasized depending upon the particular historical environment (war, depression etc.) within which different cohorts were socialized. In Kenya the pre- and post-independent generations were socialized in different environments.

Social and economic change provides a second reason that generations can matter. According to cultural theories life socialization trumps later life experience in shaping adult attitudes and behaviours (e.g. lessons learned early are the lessons learned best) while structural theories argue that attitudes learned early in life interpret and shape later life learning in a classic path dependent process reinforcing early life socialization.

In the USSR, while the state's socialization mechanisms stressed positive support for the regime, informal socialization often stressed ways for individuals to protect themselves from the regime or to exploit the system for personal advantage (Ledevena, 1998; Shlapentokh, 2001). It is true that the communist ideology was paper thin, and most Russians jettisoned it easily. But they did not lose certain ways of thinking that predated the communist era and lie deep in the Russian psyche. It was common, and still is, to hear Russians regret the loss of "togetherness "they felt under communism. The "collective" was not Soviet invention, but had roots in Russian history (Roxburgh, 2012:14).

Kenyan students, like most from Africa, went for their studies when they were old enough to interpret and analyse the environment they were living in. They struggled against any form of indoctrination, a position taken to mean that they had an anti-communist agenda by the Soviet state. As early as May 1965, the Soviet authorities tacitly linked the African student community in the country with the idea of political subversion when they expelled a black American diplomat, Norris D. Gamett, for "conducting anti-Soviet work among students from African countries" (*The New York Times,* 1965).

Back in Kenya identification and symbols of Communism in Kenya caused serious political consequences. In 1965 the government took over Lumumba Institute in Nairobi that had been built to train KANU party cadres. The Parliament passed a motion for government to take over and place it in the hands of the Minister for Education like any other public education institute. The Board of Governors was also dissolved as the Minister for Education was given the mandate to appoint a new board consisting of persons who had no political commitments (Republic of Kenya, 1965).

Lumumba Institute had been partly built by Odinga's finances and partly by the Bank of Baroda and the bank was demanding Ksh.403, 914.00 from Odinga or threatened to auction the land. In the face of bankruptcy, the Minister for Lands and Settlement Jackson Angaine allowed Odinga to sell the property on September 10, 1975, albeit with confusions that any public or KANU funds which may be involved in the purchase or maintenance of the property, be recovered and Odinga to retain the balance (*The Standard,* 2004).

While western resources subsidized western style organizations in Kenya, Oginga Odinga negotiated different forms of foreign assistance from different socialist countries. Cinema vans were received from Czechoslovakia; lecturers came from the Soviet Union, books and blankets from Yugoslavia, financial support from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and from the Peoples' Republic of China. Odinga, after coming back from a tour of Europe which took him to Yugoslavia, proposed freedom for Kenyan students to study in any country; which included those nations behind the Iron Curtain (Kenya Legislative Council, 1960). Odinga insisted that he was a socialist and not a communist. Just because he had friendly relations with communist countries did not make him a communist, noting:

Take the example of former US president Richard Nixon. Nixon was the first US president to visit Mao Tse Tung's China; that was in the early 1970's. Nixon broke through the ideological iron curtain between communist China and the USA … they ate together with Mao Tsetung and Chou en Lai … did president Nixon and Henry Kissinger become communists? … What I did by visiting China and the Soviet Union was no more than Nixon did (Mazrui, 2005:7).

Western investors saw in Soviet educated and trained Kenyans, the 'force' that would rout western predominance in Kenya, as earlier advocated by Odinga. Kenyan legislators claimed that students suffered from

ideological indoctrination, learning subversion tactics and were victims of racial discrimination (Glagolev, 1963; Beliaev, 1963). However, the scramble for those scholarships was very high and ugly (*East African Standard*, 1963; *Daily Nation*, 1963).

For most students, cultural identity change is apparent on entry to a foreign cultural environment (Searle and Ward, 1990; Sussman, 2002) and is most salient at the time of return to the home country (Sussman, 2002; Cox, 2006; Medica, 2010). Settling in by students was sometimes hard and painful as demonstrated by the students strike in Baku University orchestrated by the murder of a Ghanaian student purportedly by an Iraq roommate but erroneously attributed to the Russians. Such cases were utilized by those against the Soviets scholarships to discredit the Soviet Union as an education destination for those seeking education abroad. The 1965 incident saw the recall of scholarship students from Baku University in the Georgian Republic of the former USSR (*East African Standard*, 1965:1; *Reporter*, 1965:30: *Daily Nation* 1965: 6; *The New Times Magazine*, 1965:64).

The returning students blamed lack of security, racism, indoctrination, brainwashing- claims denied by Kenya students' leaders in Moscow and termed as fabrication. The Soviets condemned the students as reactionaries as the USA intervened and offered them scholarships in the USA (Republic of Kenya, 1965:1491; Tass, 1965; *Uganda Argus*, 1965:1; *Daily Nation*, 1965:2). The Baku strike incident seemed to have affected the 1965 scholarships, where out of two hundred and thirty scholarships offered, only one hundred and twenty candidates were selected (*Reporter*, 1965).

The presence of Kenyan Ambassador and, students in the USSR and the USSR ambassador in Nairobi was a promise of the growth of good relations between the two countries (Moscow News, 1965). However, some legislators in Kenya were unhappy and called for quick rounding up of all those students who had studied in Russia and Eastern Europe because as claimed by the Deputy Speaker, John Kebaso were "capable of overthrowing Kenya government" (Republic of Kenya, 1966:1001).

Following this suggestion, the student leaders of the University College of Nairobi and Kenya Peoples Union were the most watched by the secret police and especially those that frequently invited Ambassadors from Eastern Countries for public lecturers or to address their meetings (*Reporter*, 1966:25). University students and the radical political intelligentsia were perceived as socialist agents. Commenting on the roles of overseas

scholarships and its impact on political socialization, the government, through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, stated as follows:

> The majority of Kenya's university lecturers obtained their degrees at overseas seats of learning. Having been away from their homeland for years, they have returned to find a completely new order established, an African government revolutionalizing the life of the people in a manner beyond anyone's dreams before independence and a rate of progress and achievement that is a record. Graduates returning from countries like Russia, the United States of America and Britain where circumstances have made them sceptical of their country found themselves bewildered and lost. They appear to be completely out of step with the realities of the present day trends in Africa generally and Kenya in particular. In dealing with the problem of economic development and social evolution, they appear lamentably obsessed with theories learned overseas, which while they may be useful in cold war politics and international "isms" are irrelevant in a country like Kenya (Inside Kenya Today, 1969:3).

Here, the government was determined to deal with foreign ideologies and suppress those who might have been politically socialized in their studies either in the West or Eastern blocs emphasizing that Kenya desired to take a middle path of non-alignment. To complement overseas scholarships in Russia and Eastern Europe, foreign Institutions started to appear in Kenya fully equipped with facilities, manpower and financial support. The Patrice Lumumba Institute was one such institution in Kenya.

In the spring of 1964, Oginga Odinga made arrangements for the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to finance the Lumumba Institute through the "Lumumba Trust Fund". Lumumba, the former Congolese leader and pro eastern personality, had come to symbolize Africa's liberation struggle. Lumumba Institute by acting as the party school of KANU was to define, teach and popularize African socialism, and to instil the spirit of harambee, nationalism and patriotism. On the other hand Odinga maintained that the institute was meant to "build a classless society" while Mboya maintained that the institute would not advocate nationalisation of means of production nor the dispossession of people of their private property, nor did it mean that everybody must be on the same level of poverty and did not mean lowering down of standards (*Moscow News*, 1962: 7; Republic of Kenya, 1964:17). Following differences that ensued later between Kenyatta and Odinga, the government closed down the

Institute and dissolved the board of governors (Republic of Kenya, 1965:77).

Chideya (1981) argues that scholarships were initiated precisely because they entailed not only the transfer of skills and knowledge to the nationals from the new African countries, but, they also meant an exposure to the values, norms, and practices of the donor nations. It was not only an exercise in the provision of substantive skills; it also included an inculcation of attitudes and values. As Baer (1979) observes, African students were viewed as the proto- elites of their emerging nations, to be trained and then to assume positions of authority within their newly independent countries. Thus indeed, these programmes were bound to influence the future leaders of Africa.

the Cold War and political socialization of Kenya students in eastern europe

The cold war politics between the West and East as well as the divisive bipolar politics back in Kenya trickled into students' organization in Eastern Europe. Kenyan students in Russia and Eastern Europe, in order to handle or discuss issues of common interests, had formed the federation of Kenya students in Eastern Europe (FKSEE) in 1962 (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1967). The FKSEE had grown in significance following the tripling of Kenya students, self-desire of FKSEE to harmonize students' political thinking in Europe, and the need to draw a constitution and management procedures. The second FKSEE was held in August 1963 in Moscow and the third FKSEE was held in Czechoslovakia. Apart from the students needs, political, economical, educational and social developments in Kenya were to be discussed (ibid).

The organization and recruitment of students in Kenya and the East Africa region seemed to have divided students along party ideology and ethnic lines. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, one Joreme A. Tindi, President, Kenya Students Union in Prague wrote:

It has been discovered that letters to the Kenya Students Union are being interposed by a Luo Union of students posing as a Kenya Students Union in CSSR. We have also discovered that the group is in fact corresponding with the Kenyan Government. This is quit contrary to the spirit of the Kenya Students here… We are for the last time, calling on the government to evaluate the students' political activities (ibid).

The federation of Kenya students in Russia and Eastern Europe had contacts with Kenyan students in Scandinavia, Western Europe and in

particular U.K., West Germany and Italy. Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to quell an anti- communist uprising, many Kenyan students fled to the United Kingdom and sought admission in the London School of Economics. The office of the President of Kenya; following consultations with the Kenya High Commission at Portland Palace directed the Ministry of Education to assist students who had joined the London School of Economics (KNAXJ/12/26, 1969). The fund according to the office of the President was to help some of Kenyan Czechoslovakian students in London to pursue their studies. However, students' politics continued to dominate their unions and seemed to be following political situation at home and in particular students' politics in the public university, the University College of Nairobi. Commenting on the students' demonstration in Nairobi, James Gikandi the President of the Students Union in Prague, Czechoslovakia wrote:

> We have come to learn that some of the Kenyan students in Czechoslovakia wrote condemning the Kenya Government on its action on the students of the university college of Nairobi at their last demonstration. If this is true we would like to make it clear that this did not include all the Kenyan students in this country (Czechoslovakia). The Kenya students here are not represented by a single union for political reasons... in other words there are two unions of which the Moscow Embassy is aware" (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1969).

The Student Union President condemned "the other group" and gave a condition that if the Permanent Secretary was interested in knowing, then a request be made to that effect but not before acknowledging receipt of present letter (ibid). The Permanent Secretary F.G. Ng'ang'a acknowledged receipt of the letter, but expressed dismay at the division among Kenyan students in Russia and Eastern Europe. The Ministry of Education on behalf of government encouraged students to work together in a well organized society so as to portray the best picture of Kenya which gave them identity. Students were cautioned that they could not evaluate the political situation adequately from outside Kenya. He encouraged students to protect Kenya's best image which in the final analysis gave them dignity they merit and respect of the people they live with. The Ministry requested detailed activities of the alleged two unions causing the discomfort in the students' welfare (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1969).

The study findings have shown that political socialization was not identical for all groups and concurs with other works that differences in gender, ethnicity, or family position can produce important variations in

socialization (Mishler and Rose, 2007; Dalton, 1977, 1994; Finifter and Mickiewiz, 1992). Generational differences are considered especially important both because different generations come to political consciousness during different historical periods and because economic development typically ensures that different generations are socialized under different social economic conditions (Abrahamson and Inglehart, 1992; Jeanings and Niemi, 1974). The findings on Kenyan students show that the older students that went to Eastern Europe before independence and the sixties were more politically active than later students that were apolitical. Institutional theories emphasize that adult political experiences or political "relearning" are based on individuals' rational assessments of "the net present value" of contemporary institutions and circumstances (Mishler and Rose, 2007; March 1988). Institutional theories hold that attitude and behaviours are malleable and adaptable. Thus, later life experiences are expected to play a greater role than initial political attitudes that diminish overtime as they are overwhelmed by the common lessons of contemporary experience (Demartini, 1985). The early post colonial revolutionary ideal had worn off and most students took up the scholarships for pure academic development.

the ChaLLenges to poLitiCaL soCiaLization in the u.s.s.r and eastern europe

The goals of socialist upbringing included: social and political awareness (to make citizens politically active and literate), morality and ethics, patriotism and internationalism (to encourage love of the socialist motherland and worldwide proletarian solidarity, military patriotic education (to develop the desire to defend the motherland).

Other goals included; labour education and professional orientation, mental development and the rising of general culture, atheism, knowledge of the law and obligation of citizens, economic education, and aesthetic education and physical education. However, the successes of these strategies were questionable. Obviously, they did not develop Soviet patriotism and a desire to defend the socialist motherland in all young people. The eruption of independence seeking nations throughout the ex – Soviet republics indicates that the goals of the ideal Soviet upbringing did not achieve internationalism.

The communist socio-political and educational experiments in Central and Eastern Europe displayed common traits as well as differences. The communist ideology denied the alternative discourse on social development which meant that the official discourse based on collectivism, democratic

centralism, polytechnic/vocational education, and citizenship had a mere ritualistic political function. In reality it produced contradictory outcomes and paradoxical realities particularly in the 1970 and 1980's (Mincu, 2009).

In Eastern Europe, students were socialized less on rights and privileges but more on duties and obligation. Foreign students were always seen to lack discipline, whenever they complained to their institutions, for instance, over accommodation conditions. Soviet students during the Soviet regime never held any open demonstrations. However, foreign students were more frequent and open to complain about anything they were not happy about. Generations remain, influenced by what they live under their impressionable years. Adults are exposed to different unanticipated political and economic experiences during their life. Some of these experiences require an equilibrium between values learnt in the past, and others demand the adoption and acceptance of new ones (Siegel, 1989; Rose and Mishler, 2007; Marinin, 2009). Studies have shown that the education system plays a significant role in shaping the political attitudes and orientation of citizens towards the political system (http://www. amazon.co.uk/education-Democratization-kenya-socializatio-undergraduate/....7/12/2011).

In the USSR, the intelligentsia were never unanimous on their world view of socialism. Nonetheless, the idea of entrenchment of communism on every Soviet mind was the perception of the outside world. In Kenya, the mention of anything and everyone associated to the Soviet society was communist. In the 1960, Parliamentary debates ranged on how many Kenyan students were studying in the communist bloc, their ethnicity and what they might have been studying. The then Minister of Education Honourable Otiende concurred with other parliamentarians like Honourable Kerich that it was common knowledge that the students were indoctrinated (Republic of Kenya, 1964).

The general perceptions of intellectuals who read anything written by Russians or studied in the USSR or Eastern Europe was a communist (Shikuku, oral interview, Nairobi, 14 August 2008; Mungai, Kikuyu, 10 October 2009). This perception was given credit by the cold war propaganda given by students who had left the Soviet Union and were admitted to West European or American universities (Nyangira, 1965). According to Lynch (oral interview, Eldoret, 16 July 2009), the generalization made on those who studied in the USSR stemmed from how that society has been socialised. Giving the example of Britain, she stated that she was socialised into a conclusion that Russian education was formulated by cold war ideological intent and a course such as engineering was meant to develop

heavy industrialization a base for military industrial complex. British perceptions of Russia and Eastern Europe were fairly negative because their foreign policy is constructed along ideological lines and, therefore, xenophobic. However, her personal opinion was that those who studied in the USSR and work in Britain are competent in their areas of specialization.

Glasnost had a significant effect as well. As society became more open about life in general, and about abuses in the communist party in particular, the propaganda had increasingly less effect. With *glasnost* the Soviet public was less and less dependent on government news sources and added the possibility of the widespread exchange of information among the Soviets without the effect of government censorship. Zubok (2009:324) rightly observed that *perestroika* created an "oases of relatively unhindered intellectual and cultural life". The more this happened, the more people began to blame the communist system for breeding corruption, in addition to the corrupt officials with whom they had to deal with. After years of tolerating small lies, people were openly disillusioned with their government and the communist Party.

Macintyre (1993) observes that despite the vast resources dedicated to *Vospitanie* (upbringing) and basic military training for youth, these socialization efforts were remarkably unsuccessful in producing the new Soviet man. The Soviet society was always curious and yearning to learn more about the outside world, especially the popular and material culture of the west. The lack of success in political socialization was clearly demonstrated by numerous factors among them the many youth resisting the draft prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, the speed of that break up, the emerging ties to the capitalist west and the lack of faith in the economy. Furthermore the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, COMECON and disintegration of some the states and the unification of GDR and FRG sealed the fate of socialism construction in Europe, however, it does not mean that seventy years of life in a communist society did not socialize the youth to some extent. Kenyan students in the USSR coming from a capitalist country and then living in a communist state had the feel of the two systems. They had the privilege to appreciate the good from either sides and reject what was outright propaganda. It is evident that the communist regimes never even managed to create an "ideal Socialist person" out of the citizens and therefore it was even more difficult to mould one from their "education scholarship guests".

SuMMary

From the discussions on the development of education in Kenya, it emerged that education was one of the major pillars to the country's attainment of independence and future development. It was noted that education all over is central to individual development and constructs the national character. Through human resource development, countries can turn the natural resources into national wealth and provide an opportunity to improve the welfare of its citizens. Through the education system the citizens are socialized to respect or question the socio- political systems prevailing in their environment. Education can, therefore, be used to achieve a particular agenda which can be at a national or international level. During the cold war period, education became important as a socializing agent to the East and West blocs and their allies. Analysis of the Kenya students' scholarship holders to the East showed that despite the concerted efforts from their host countries, the students took advantage of the educational opportunities and became passive observers in

regard to the communist party propaganda. It suffices to note also that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist regimes at the global level was attributed to the failure to socialize the citizens and create soviet and socialist citizens abroad. The subsequent chapter will discuss findings on how Kenyans perceived the Soviet society and the socialist ideology on one hand and on the other what Soviets and East Europeans thought of Kenya and how these perceptions influenced their world views and bilateral relations

5

Kenya Students' Experiences

In this chapter, students' experiences are examined to expand knowledge on the perception of Kenyans about the Soviet society and communist system on the one hand, and what the Soviets thought about Africa and Kenya in particular on the other hand. Students' experiences shed light on the instruments that were used by the states' to enhance their foreign policy. Cases such as settling in by the students, everyday encounters, attempts at political socialization by the Soviet system and its challenges and the students return after their studies are discussed to explain bilateral relations and international environment of the cold war.

the sChoLarship students

The population interviewed went to the Soviet Union and the proxy states of Eastern Europe to undertake a six year to seven year Masters Degree program. The sample comprised students who studied in different institutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe taking a diverse range of specializations. The study's finding concluded that although these students returned after graduation, the years lived in their host countries were sufficient for them

not only to experience many acculturation challenges but also to become diplomatic bridges to the collaborating countries. International students are evidence of internationalism.

The Moscow Youth Festival of August 1957 exposed the Soviets to the lifestyles, mannerisms, aesthetics, cultural expressions, and political debates existing beyond their borders. The conference provided an opening through which western ideas and art forms began to seep into Soviet society (*The New York Times*, 1957). Africans, so visible during the festival, would soon begin to arrive in the country in large numbers. They came to study but, "in an ironic reversal of roles, they ended up educating the Soviets; they introduced the population steeped in parochialism to modern aesthetics, new art forms, and the liberation political discourse" (Matusevich, 2009:21). The students came to seek knowledge breed within a particular culture. They were, therefore, covertly influenced in certain ways. Namango's view summarized the views of most students noting that:

Russia simply enlightened me and widened my world view. Despite the fact that I was going to do Chemical Engineering, I was taught Philosophy, Russian Language, Russian Literature, international relations... I became more exposed to what was going on in the world (Namango, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009).

SettLing in

Kenyan and other foreign students in Russia and Eastern Europe were exposed to two or more cultures and values. Students' knowledge of these countries before their departure was nil. From the interviews, it emerged that rarely did the students know which university, town or even republic in the case of the USSR, they would be staying in while undertaking their studies. There were those that had heard about the USSR only through the media and the closest was when they went for briefing at the Russian embassy after receiving the scholarship. The students knew very little about their host countries and this posed a lot of challenges on arrival. That sense of being far in a foreign country strikes one immediately on arrival. As one respondent puts it:

My plane to Moscow arrived at the Sheremetyevo Airport on an autumn morning. It was not a warm welcome. It was windy and cold and the tree leaves were turning yellow and falling. The wait at the immigration was long and tedious as the customs immigration officers took their turns to

peruse through our documents to allow us enter Russia (Ondeng', oral interview, Nandi Hills, 24 November 2009).

Settling in did not come once, it was actually quite a gradual process. One could not absorb so much in a week of orientation. When one first arrived, there was so much on one's mind. One would be thinking of one's room, one's roommate(s), one's classes, the language, the food, and maybe even missing home already. Indeed, the reality of being a "foreigner" made living hard in a strange land when one had to make a number of personal, social and environmental changes upon arrival.

The most common problem faced from the very minute they landed was communication problem. All Eastern European countries do not use English in their day to day communication or in their educational institutions and a high proposition of those interviewed reported having language difficulties, particularly in their first year of arrival.

Moscow was the entry and exit point for all those who studied in the USSR and on arrival, students were taken to the "University Restaurant" in Moscow. The word restaurant in Russian language was always read in English as "pectopah". Once they knew how to read after the language year, it left many remembering their first touch of Russia.

The majority of the students arrived in the Soviet capital in mid autumn. They observed that everything seemed grey and concrete. Amid the greyness were frequent art works of life size drawings of workers, factories, school going children (pioneers), military officers and the soviet flag forming the background. The workers were depicted holding their tools of trade, the axe and the sickle and the soldiers either inside/beside the tanks or holding Kalashnikovs (AK 47). The same portraits were common across the Soviet Union. In the language lecture halls, corridors and eating places (students' canteens and buffets) were drawings that brought to the halls omnipresent Soviet power and doctrine. Pictures of renowned Soviet leaders and heroes graced the walls. Most common were those of Lenin, rockets launched (Vostok and sputnik), picture excerpts from the Second World War and workers picking apples in collective Soviet farms. These images gave mixed reactions on what to expect in the Soviet Society. On one hand a feeling of Soviet System demonstration of power and on the other the propaganda behind the success of the collective farms.

Foreign students in Russia and Eastern Europe were expected to study in national languages of their host countries. For instance in Czechoslovakia, it was Czech or Slovak, Russian in USSR, German in East Germany and thus foreign students had to spend one year in a preparatory faculty to be proficient in language. For instance, the most popular degree courses in

Russia and Eastern Europe were Engineering, Medicine, Aviation and Transport. Students needed to embark on Russian language before joining various universities (*East African Standard*, 1964:17; *Daily Nation*, 1964:4; *Daily Nation,* 1964:1). Students were also expected in due course to adopt the host country's cultures and traditions, including political socialization.

In all the specializations, Russian history, literature, political economy and philosophy were compulsory. In history, apart from stressing the October revolution, the Second World War and Soviet post October 1917 achievement of the Soviet Union and its virtues that were said to uphold equal rights regardless of race, class or nationality. The point was that since the national question had been solved in the USSR, the rest of the world should embrace the Soviet Union's model to build peaceful ethnic coexistence and racial equality in their countries. The official ideology on "Sovietisation" of the national identity was the slogan in all forums.

New students were sent for ten months to preparatory faculties (*Podkul*) all over the Soviet Union, which specialized in Russian instruction and adaptation lessons for specific student populations. While students were at their *podfaky*, decisions were made on where to send them for their higher education. The Ministry of Culture then informed the various institutions which foreign students they would be hosting.

In the different cities all over the USSR where the students were dispersed for their studies, local organizations played an important role in their reception, organizing cultural tours, parties, camping exploitations, and trips. Foreign students in Kiev State University Faculty of Law, International Economic Relations and International Relations were invited to take extended boat cruises along the Dnieper, visits to historical sites (for example the Statue of Motherland in Badol district in Kiev), the black sea, to collective farms and summer vacation resorts (*dom otdykha*), circus, cinema halls and other various recreational activities. It is, however, noted that actually very few students took advantage of this hospitality (Focus Group Discussion, Eldoret, 10 March 2010). Amongst the student community was an inter-generational story of how the Soviets would use these opportunities to socialize students to be communists. Thus, the students always were not willing to take up the offer. The most probable reason was that those who took it up were labelled soviet informers within the foreign student community.

There were also emotional adjustments that students had to make before they could successfully manage their studies. As foreign students, they faced a multiplicity of difficulties stemming from the absence of familial ties, the pressure of limited finances, the need to adapt to very different

educational and social systems, and the stereotyping by their host community due to colour of their skin, nationality and religion.

There were those that were faced with problems associated with requirements to join a university. For instance, students who secured scholarships to study in the University of Prague (named after 17th November), Faculty of Social Sciences were grouped into two at the language centre. Those who had school certificates were prepared for university studies and those who had Kenya African Preliminary Examinations (KAPE) or lower were prepared for Secondary studies (vocational studies). One letter that expressed the dissatisfaction with the criteria for acceptance read:

Our two friends, Singh and Irungu, since they were recommended by Kenya Government are going to be grouped in the university section, we are also claiming for the same right but they are denying us saying that we have no school certificate (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1967).

The Ministry of Education expressed concern on the treatment given to Kenyan students and in particular in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The Ministry noted that it had always demanded that the students be told in advance what to expect on arrival and completion of their courses. The Ministry alleged that among the complaining students: Constanziana N. Thumbi had gone to study textile, Mohamed Kiprono, electrical technology and Duncan K. Bomu, mechanical engineering at university level (ibid). On an inquiry by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education was informed that although these courses were not to be given at the university but rather in technical institutes, they would be of university level (KNA, XJ/12/26, 1967). The main complaints that the Kenyan students preoccupied themselves with was the issue of institutes issuing degrees. The students also questioned why they were going to be awarded "diplom" upon graduation. Bachelors and Masters degree programmes were lumped together and took a duration of seven years, except for medicine which took eight years, Russian language included. For one to qualify for the title "doctor" one undertook three years as "kandidat Nauk" candidate of Science equivalent of doctor of philosophy in Kenya and another additional three years to qualify for "doctor Nauk" i.e doctor of Science a total of six years.

the afriCan and afriCa in Soviet popuLar CuLture

Folk tales are particularly significant for revealing the national character. The initial ideas about the world, good and evil and how moral values are shaped by them. Generally, in Russia the heroes of folk tales are big, strong,

handsome supermen preferably with something magical for instance a sword, and a horse endowing them with superpowers (Pavlovskaya, 2013).

According to the Soviet people, all black students belonged to a country called Africa. The word black was never used positively on the African continent or people of colour but it was known from American history that black slaves were forcefully taken from Africa to America. Black people and blacks in the Soviet Union were called as was then in America as Negroes. Some ended up in the Russian Courts like the great poet Alexander Pushkin's grandfather and others in the Caucasus among the Tajik and the Azeri.

At age four to six, the Soviets came to know about Africa through children's short stories written by Karnechei Ivanovich Chukovsky in his book *Doctor Aibolit* (an exclamation of pain – ooih painful!). *Doctor Aibolit* a Russian children cartoon in humour depicts Africa as an exotic and dangerous place. Chukovsky portrays Africa as a fairy tale with good national parks. In the parks are tigers, elephants and lions; while in the rivers are hippopotamus, crocodiles and sharks. An impression is created that Bananas grow wildly and are easily available and the state boundaries are non-existent as one can cross from Zanzibar, Mt. Kilimanjaro, and Limpopo to Kalahari Desert.

The story portrays Africa as being a distant continent with no proper means of communication and Chukovsky's main character Dr. Aibolit started his journey over the snow with the help of wolves, sea sharks then flew by air with the help of an eagle. The journey was without food or drinking water, but the Doctor carried with him enough drugs to cure malaria, dental diseases, diahorea and many other diseases (Chukovsky, 2010). Dr. Aibolit's stories made the Soviet child curious to know much more about the African person. Children asked questions on how people survived in Africa since they had no basic needs and much more living with wild animals, reptiles and birds. The African student was, therefore, seen as an extension of the exotic wild. Thus, there were common questions on whether there were houses in Africa, how the students managed to travel to their country, and how they were coping with snow since Africa is always very hot.

Some young children, depending on the regions and exposure could either request to be allowed to touch the African hair and were amused how a black person could speak their language. On the other hand, children reacted negatively by moving away from an African student while telling those around that he is "*abysian*" or she is "*abysianka*" meaning monkey.

In reality, Africans, on many occasions found themselves objects of ridicule while walking down the streets or riding a subway. The exotic looking guests were often referred to as chocolate, black, Negro, *abysian* (monkey) or *negriitianskii tovarich* (Negro comrade) depending on the place of encounter. The findings concurred with Oleinikov (2007) argument that many at times were clearly fascinated with their exotic guests and their foreignness and Matusevich (2009) observation that the lofty anti-colonial rhetoric of the Soviet Union were often confused by the mind boggling mixture of state sponsored propaganda, the reality of everyday racism and the selfless generosity of warmth students encountered in many Soviet people.

The African conditions were portrayed as the same and permanent; common African language, territory, no organized state and no need for clothes because of the heat. These Soviet era stereotypes formed part of childhood and adulthood experiences about Africa in the Soviet Union. There is every indication that there was lack of information about the continent we "live on Zanzibar Island, in Kalahari and Sahara, on the mountains Fernando Po, where hippopotamus walk across wide Limpopo". In brief, the author says do not let children go to Africa because of sea sharks, crocodiles, malaria, diarrhoea, dental diseases and heat which is over 50°C (ibid). This Soviet era story book was so popular that even in post-Soviet Russia, children still read and even recite it (Focus Group Discussion, Moscow, 10 August 2012).

The children stories stereotype Africa as a distant world without proper communication, medical facilities, drinking water, food and housing, an hostile environment of animals and infectious diseases, and on the other side it tries to justify Soviet help to Africa as a reliable partner in medicine, emergency situations, humanitarian help and plenty in national resources in the main character that Dr Aibolit who is the hero in the story that goes to save Africa. Indeed, "there was an exaggerated perception of poverty and disease in Africa" (Osenya, oral interview, Kisii, 2 April, 2009).

In film, Africa is typically presented in the image of "a black child, cute and vulnerable and in dire need of protection" (Matusevich, 2009:67). A film *Little Vera* directed by Vassily Pichul gives a glimpse of popular Soviet imagery of Africa and alerts the viewer to Africa's presence in late Soviet public and cultural domains. In *little Vera,* the little boy in the move did not just materialize out of thin air amidst the clutter of Soviet domestic life. His mother is white; hence the father had to be of African descent. His precise identity is left to the imagination of the viewer. He might have been a

foreign sailor, an African student, a romantic guerrilla type on training in the USSR, or maybe even a visiting black American Musician.

While over the years the Soviet state and its ideologies exerted considerable effort in "bringing Africa into the fold", the reality of African presence in the USSR was far more multi-layered and complex. As a propaganda weapon, Africa often jammed and even backfired, and as the Soviet collapse loomed, closer the idea of Africa was playing at least partially a subversive role to the Soviet status quo. This is captured in the late Soviet Perestroika countercultural film production such as *little Vera* and *ASSA* directed by Sergey Soloviev (1988) and produced by Mosfilm.

Matusevich (2009) thus observes that it was probably not a coincidence that a cult classic like ASSA utilized an idea of Africa and Africanness in its treatment of the contemporary Soviet condition. Such contrasting imagery fleshed out the essentials of Soviet experience, its profound isolationism, the drabness of the mundane, the lack of colour, and even the notoriously forbidding Russian climate. Africa and Africans occupied a highly ambiguous place in the Soviet everyday thus:

For many a Soviet citizen, Africa encapsulated the world outside the Soviet ritual, differing from it in almost every respect. At the same time, the African presence in Russia if it was often overlooked or ignored was nevertheless real. From the genealogy of Russia's greatest poet (A.S. Pushkin) to Russia's late nineteenth century fascination with the Orthodox brethren in Ethiopia, to the prominence of black activists in the comintern, to genuine widespread enthusiasm for anti-racist and liberation struggles on the African continent and the continuing existence of a small but culturally significant African Diaspora in the country, Africa has occupied its unique, if not immediately defined, place in Russia's culture, history and popular imagination (Matusevich, 2009:75).

Indeed, people of African origin in the Soviet Union experienced a condescending paternalism reflected also in their cinematic portrayal and popular literature and folklore part of the rhetoric of internationalism. The presence of communities of young Africans in Soviet cities created a new dynamism in the relationship between the Soviet citizenry and their "exotic guests". Being an African in the Soviet Union meant performing "foreignness" on a day-to-day basis. African students brought with them new lifestyles and aesthetics and generally raised the Soviet's awareness of the outside world. For decades, isolated from the rest of humanity, Soviet citizens now had an opportunity to see and have foreigners live on their streets, while African students became natural conduits of conveying knowledge about Russia and the Soviet Union deep into Africa.

In college, most of the foreign students were male, single, and older than their host colleagues. Students from Africa, the vast majority of who were male, were popular with Russian women. In fact, women married African students or had children by them outside wedlock. Hostility towards African students always flared up when there was contact between African men and Soviet women. Hundreds more dated Africans in spite of the immediate institutional suspicion aroused by close contact with any foreigner. Kriilov (1996) observes that in the 1990s, approximately six thousand Soviet born women married to Africans lived in Africa. More than one thousand are married to African students in Russia. Soviet women had to undergo societal stigma and prejudice once they showed interest or married Africans. They suffered problems of racial acceptance despite the Soviet propaganda and ideology taught in school. The ideals of internationalism found no meaning when confronted by racism (Kriilov, 1996:44). In Kenya, it is estimated that from 1987 – 1988 there were 47; between 1991 -1992 were 57 Soviet/Russian women in Kenya. In the post-Soviet Russia, cases of mixed marriages have become common and African female students are getting married to Russian men- cases that were never there during the Soviet era.

Students' experienCes during the earLy years

The students in Russia and Eastern Europe voiced their challenging experiences through an umbrella union called the Federation of Kenya Students Union whose Permanent Secretariat was in Prague, Czechoslovakia (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1969). The student population was placed at one thousand in 1963.

During an annual meeting held in August 1963, students discussed and passed resolutions on a number of issues affecting their studies. The students felt that the government should take over from Kenya Cairo Office and KANU office in Nairobi, and be accorded equal privileges and recognition like those studying in USA and Western Europe. Other issues included low stipend meant to cover food, accommodation, books and transport.

Many a times, applicants were elderly and even up to the age of 35 years and those who did not produce evidence of having completed secondary school education were referred to high schools for a period of one to three years. Persons who were physically challenged or of poor health were not accepted for admission. Foreign students like their counterparts in the host

countries had tuition, medical and holiday resort waivers. Students also enjoyed 50% waiver on road and rail transport. There were special allowances for those who performed exceptionally well academically (ibid).

The Students Union also experienced difficulties in bringing together Kenya students and especially those who went overseas before independence. Others were accused of refusing to allow the playing of the national anthem or made derogatory remarks about Kenya and its leaders (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1967).

Lack of reading materials in English also posed a serious challenge to students in the Eastern bloc. Some students requested medical books in English through a possible Ministry of Education supplementary grant but to no avail (KNA, XJ/12/26, 1966). The Permanent Secretary Ministry of Education, in a reply to the letters sent by the students maintained that no government could afford to buy books for students overseas, and that the scholarship offered by the host country was intended to cover book allowance as well and to buy books for Kenyan students overseas was a difficult task if not an impossible one (ibid).

What both the students and the Ministry of Education officials did not understand or chose to ignore was that foreign students were to be socialized culturally, academically and politically in the whole process of awarding scholarships. To realize these ideals, one had to be made proficient in the host country's language and therefore the desire for English books was a tall order.

In a country like the former Czechoslovakia, students experiencing academic difficulties because of language or from low academic backgrounds were automatically denied stipend, expelled and the home government required to repatriate them without delay. Of four Kenyan students expelled from Czechoslovakia in May, 1966, one failed university exams and offered to enrol for a cooperative course instead of coming back. Three had to be facilitated by Kenyan government to travel back to Kenya (ibid).

The host country and Kenyan students experienced problems of change of courses after a year of studies. Yugoslav's authorities sought the Kenyan government's guarantee that any future students would not wish to change course of study. Kenya's position was that once the students left home, their change of mind or attitude could not be controlled by the Ministry of Education.

Other cases included students from Eastern Europe going to Western Europe even after spending many years in the East. A case at hand was that of Kemiti who without informing anybody left for Western Europe and back

to Kenya, seeking help to bring home his Yugoslav girlfriend. At one point Kemiti wanted to go back again claiming his girlfriend would help him secure a scholarship something Yugoslav Embassy officials dismissed and declared that he was very unwelcome in Yugoslavia. One Macharia Samson switched from West Germany to Yugoslavia, and the government was ready to give a scholarship only on condition that Kenya government was to include him in the list of the 10 scholarships offered to Kenya in 1965.

In USSR and Eastern Europe according to our interviewees students' complaints ranged from academic courses offered (in particular units on socialist and communist political systems, incidences of racial discrimination, severe climate, restriction on movements from one city to the other to the academic qualifications of some students). The soviet officials tried to give serious attention to these problems as well as devote greater attention to the selection of better qualified students for the available scholarships. This might also have been aggrevated by the fact that before and early years of independence some "political students" were selected, instead of emphasizing on academic qualifications.

The problem of academic certificate equation was very prominent. In Czechoslovakia, "maturity" examination taken before university admission was equated to High School Certificate (G.S.E.) or 'A' level and not School Certificate which most of the scholarship students held (ibid). The equation of school certificate was never discussed in advance between sending and receiving countries and always caused untold suffering to students. In mos of these countries, there was no diplomatic representation by an Education Attaché which made it difficult for students to solve emerging problems are even coordinate national holidays that included Independence days (ibid).

Students in Yugoslavia faced the same problem in regard to proper equation of school certificate. Some Kenyans holding Cambridge School Certificate and under Cultural Relations scholarships were allowed to proceed to the university, while others with the same qualifications but under Technical Aid were admitted to High Schools. This move was strongly resisted by Kenyan students who demanded to be transferred to other countries for further studies. Some students requested to change courses claiming that they were selected to compete with those who had just completed elementary education of standard eight to ten, blaming the Ministry of Education for their predicament (ibid).

Students experienced numerous problems from ill health to language comphrehension that led to poor academic performance in some instances. In June 1965, Paul Mate and Henry Njeru were shipped to the port of Mombasa for ill health and family problems respectively. Ruingi and

Asoloma were sent back home because they declined to do university entrance test, while Matina asked for voluntary repatriation because of her ill mother in Kenya, while Otanga asked to be repatriated because he did not wish to study in high School (KNA-ED/3/2707, 1965). What emerges from the various letters was that most students were ill informed of the expectations in the host countries, some were family people and the long period was intolerable while others did not have the right qualifications to enable them to be admitted to universities. Scholarships communication was another difficult area handled between host country, Ministry of Education and prospective candidates.

In the case of 1965/66 scholarship offers, the Embassy informed the Ministry of External Affairs in a letter dated 10th March, 1965 that the closing date was 30th April, 1965 and the Ministry of Education received the communication 16th April, 1965. The processing difficulties made it practically impossible and at times selected candidates were informed in a hurry to pack and go. Others failed to take up the scholarships because they could not raise air tickets, process passports or undergo medical tests on time (KNA, ED/3/2707, 1965).

Conflicts at times arose between the students and their hosts. In Yugoslavia for instance, the International Technical Co-operation on its part experienced difficulties from students who were unwilling to study, often drunk, created disturbances in public places, uttering abusive and insulting remarks about the leadership of their host countries and fellow students and the painful final decision of expelling them after having spent tax payers money without tangible results (ibid).

the Kenya Student's Union

Kenya students overseas experienced difficulties emanating from Kenya's domestic politics. The alleged ethnic selection of scholarship benefactors and the Constitutional Lancaster Conference of 1960-61 threw the students union off balance because ethnic inclination superseded patriotism (KNA, Letter, 18/11/1964). The organization and recruitment of students in Kenya and the East Africa region seemed to have divided students along party ideology and ethnic lines. In Czechoslovakia, one Joreme A. Tindi, President, Kenya Students Union in Prague wrote:

It has been discovered that letters to the Kenya Students Union are being interposed by a Luo Union of students posing as a Kenya Students Union in CSSR. We have also discovered that the group is in fact corresponding with

the Kenyan Government. This is quite contrary to the spirit of the Kenya Students here… We are for the last time, calling on the government to evaluate the students' political activities (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1967).

The federation of Kenya students in Russia and Eastern Europe had contacts with Kenyan students in Scandinavia, Western Europe and in particular U.K., West Germany and Italy. Following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, many Kenyan students fled to the United Kingdom and sought admission in the London School of Economics. The Office of the President of Kenya following consultations with Kenya High Commission at Portland place directed the Ministry of Education to assist students who had joined the London School of Economics (KNA, XJ/12/26, 1969).The fund, according to the Office of the President, was to help some of Kenyan Czechoslovakian students in London to pursue their studies. However, students' politics continued to dominate their unions and seemed to be following political situation at home and in particular students' politics in the public universities particularly the University College of Nairobi. Commenting on the students' demonstration in Nairobi, James Gikandi President of the students union in Prague, Czechoslovakia wrote:

> We have come to learn that some of the Kenyan students in Czechoslovakia wrote condemning the Kenya Government on its action on the students of the university college of Nairobi at their last demonstration. If this is true we would like to make it clear that this did not include all the Kenyan students in this country (Czechoslovakia). The Kenya students here are not represented by a single union for political reasons. In other words there are two unions of which the Moscow Embassy is aware (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1969).

The President condemned "the other group" and gave a condition that if the Permanent Secretary was interested in knowing, then a request be made to that effect but not before acknowledging receipt of the present letter (ibid). The Ministry acknowledged receipt of the letter, but expressed dismay at the division among Kenyan students in Russia and Eastern Europe and encouraged students to work together in a well organized society so as to portray the best picture of Kenya which gave them identity. Students were cautioned that they could not evaluate the political situation adequately from outside Kenya.

The students were encouraged to protect Kenya's best image which in the final analysis gave them dignity they merit and respect of the people they live with. The Ministry further requested detailed activities of the

alleged two unions causing the discomfort in the students' welfare (KNA-XJ/12/26, 1969).

Later student unions were less political and were restricted to each country. In the USSR there were chapters in each town and the overall Kenya Students Union in the USSR. Their functions were more about students' welfare and each year a town was voted for where the meeting could take place. The Annual General Meetings doubled as elections conference for the student Union leaders. Plate 5.1 below shows photography of one of the meetings held in Kiev in 1988. The Student Union was the main uniting organ that brought the students together and represented them when it came to negotiating with the Kenya government or the Soviet authorities on behalf of the students whenever need arose. The annual general meetings were like family reunions where exchange of experiences from the different towns and republics were shared, coping strategies discussed and new members welcomed. The host members took charge of accommodation of those from other towns.

Plate 5.1: Kenyan Students' Association (USSR)Annual General Meeting in Kiev, Ukraine, 1988

Source: Researcher's Photo Album

In the Soviet era existed a strong sense of bonding among Kenyan students that new students were received and guided around by old students

and their settling in was like joining one's family despite the feeling of foreignness one felt throughout the stay. Those who studied in Moscow always tried to receive the new students on arrival before they were sent to other towns or taken to their host institutions within Moscow. Any Kenyan whether on a visit or transit in another town would never check himself or herself into a hotel since fellow Kenyans would provide accommodation.

Inside the Soviet SoCiety: Students' enCounters

According to the research findings, the university is a place for students to interact themselves with others both in academics and outside the classroom for there is no other time in life that one will encounter others with much time and intensity unrestrained by other requirements of job and family. Life for Kenyan students was full of expectations, challenges and learning. Kenyan students in the 1980s in the Soviet Union had a social network despite the expansive territorial distance; they tried to keep in touch among themselves in the different towns. Students that lived in the same town made attempts to come together over the weekends when their academic programs were not too busy or during the winter and summer holidays. Plate. 5.2 is a photo of some of the Kenyan students in Kiev during an excursion to an exhibition complex (*viestavka*) in Kiev.

Plate 5: 2 Kenyan Students studying in Ukrain Universities pose for a photo in Kiev city (Ukraine), 1987.

Source: Researchers Photo Album

Living among the Soviets on campus and out of campus enabled the students to learn much more beyond the demands of their academic specialization. They had the advantage of interrogating what the Soviet system was able to provide and how practical was its sustainability. The biggest question was whether the construction of a classless society based on the workers owning the means of production was a success or cold war propaganda. The students knowingly or unknowingly started questioning the Soviet ideal of *uravnilovka* (leveling) where all were supposed to be equal in society. In a question to one of the respondents on whether his studentship in Russia influenced his worldview he had the following to say; "the perception at home was that we were sympathizers, but we were not... I understood factors at play in world politics" (Manduku, oral interview, Kisii, 2 April 2009).

During the communist era were the *nomenklatura*, the life long, tenured positions filled by Communist Party appointees on the basis of political reliability. An elite that had their own lifestyle; better housing, access to special "closed stores" and upscale vacation resorts, superior medical care, and the highest award for loyalty and foreign travel. With a foreign eye, students were able to appreciate the Soviet society particularly the people and their culture and discern state propaganda.

When the students arrived, the educational system they encountered was different from what they were used to back at home. In the Soviet Union, there were several categories of schooling. For instance, for the gifted and talented, there were schools specializing in maths, science and the arts. Other schools specialized in foreign languages, producing graduates who were nearly bilingual.

Applicants to institutions of higher learning took oral and written examinations at the end of the ninth and eleventh years as well as entrance examinations given by higher education institutions. Some were enrolled in colleges and universities and included many that were enrolled in the evening or extension courses.

In the Soviet Union, there existed special towns and cities referred to as the "*akademgorodok*" that housed the largest concentration of scientific minds, for example Moscow, Leningrad, Dubna and Novosibirsk which had the highest concentrations of scientists. Foreign students were in such towns as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Odessa and other bigger towns that were not classified as "*Zakrityie goroda*" (closed towns). The closed cities were specifically for the Soviet scientists and closed out to

foreigners. These towns mainly housed technology institutions or institutions that were of national strategic nature.

Kenya students understood why some compatriots had complained about them going to be turned into atheist. Samwel Namongo's father, a bishop, was disappointed when he knew his son had applied for a Russian scholarship claiming that Russians do not fear God. However, his neighbours were excited because they had not heard of people going to the East (Namango, oral interview, Eldoret, 19 December 2009). Students wondered why there were so many church buildings in Russia but never heard people proclaiming to be Christians nor was there any Christmas celebrations. Later they came to learn that religion was not publicly acknowledged in the USSR and the many churches had been turned to other uses. What was more striking was that it was not unusual for examinations to fall on Christmas day.

The crusade against religion began with Lenin's philosophy that religion was an obstacle to the construction of a communist society, and was later carried out with zeal by Khrushchev. Khrushchev had launched a campaign of militant atheism, with the goal of eroding any form of organized religion. The majority of young urban professional, intellectuals, and artists after the war grew up as atheists, and not many of them lost sleep over the state persecution of religion.

Apart from lack of freedom to worship, the Soviet organized collective life was overbearing for foreign students. The system had coerced the citizen into a state where they very little participated in decision-making. The party organ and officials were in control of what went on in the cities and the provinces. In villages, people had no right to move wherever they chose. The "*propiska*" and "*prikglashynie*" that is residential registration and invitation from relatives was required.

Nowhere was this more visible than in the villages and collective farms. "Collecting the harvest" can be argued, symbolized the state's Soviet organized collective life. For instance, there was a ban on private ownership of cows and pigs by those who lived in provincial cities and towns and were not members of collective farms. In Nikita Khrushchev's Memoirs, he romanticized the "virgin lands" thus:

The virgin lands program was one vast epic. It always makes me happy to remember it. When I would arrive in the Virgin lands, I would travel all around Kazakhstan, the Orenburg and Altai Steppe lands, and the farms in Krasnoyarsk territory. The Virgin lands of Kazakhstan made a powerful impression. Mountains of which were there, and it must be said it was good wheat (Khrushchev, 2006:316).

The praise of collective farmers became almost mystical given the state strong endorsement. The great achievements through the media and film portrayed a total success. According to the respondents, the expectations of how the Soviet land looked like was that of green fields bursting with ripe apples like the one shown in a documentary film at the USSR embassy as part of the briefing after the scholarship was secured. Other things that Kenyan students found difficult to understand were the many breaks (*peririv*) in the course of a work day even in a bank and the sanitation day in public offices. Making profit was not the driving force and thus the apathy towards work. Sanitation day was a day on which a Soviet institution was closed to the public so that the premises could be cleaned. Kenyan students were always quick to point out the lack of self thrift and ambition in the Soviets.

Private life was felt to lack due to the many police officers (*militsia*) in the streets and the *dyezhrnaya* (person on duty) in buildings. The *dyezhrnii* were personnel in Soviet hotels, hostels, and other institutions who kept keys and controlled rooms. They were often old women. Guests to hostels were supposed to register with the *dyzhrnaya* at the entrance stating whose guest he or she was and the room number. His passport was entered into the visitor's record and at times detained to be collected on one's way out.

Russia and Siberia are very cold much of the year. Autumn is brief followed by a long and cold winter. Summers are short and hot. Winter begins in October and continues through March. Winter session seems to engulf people with a sense of gloominess. Those who spent time in Russia have argued that:

Russia can be a cold and impersonal place, where a visitor's requests all often meet with an automatic *nyet* (no). But Russians respond to human approach, and they can be warm and helpful once a good interpersonal relationship has been established. When that point is reached, their word is good, *nyet* becomes *da* (yes), and deals can be done. That is the key to understanding Russians (Richmond, 2003:3).

Russians are impressed with size and numbers, and much that they do is on grandiose scale. These may range from huge apartments and buildings, many statuses and museums to big celebrations and many parties. The Russian winter can bring down the people's spirit; however the Slavic tradition of hospitality can make a big difference. Once Russians accept one as a friend, one is taken almost like family. It may start with the toast in a party to invitation to go for joint excursions and dinner invitation in their homes.

Visitors should be prepared to frequently raise their glasses in a toast. Toasting in Russia is a serious business and even an art. Vodka is taken straight, ice cold in small glasses in one "bottom-up" gulp. It is served with the *zakuski*, tasty Russian cold meats, fish, fresh and pickled vegetables, and cavier when affordable. People toast for health, opportunities, friendship and many other wishes.

One other common means of showing friendship, affection, appreciation, goodwill and even remorsefulness is the giving of gifts. Gift giving is an old Eastern European custom. In Slavic lands, visitors have been traditionally welcomed with gifts of bread and salt, the staple of life. Among friends, colleagues and family, ladies are given flowers and men liquor as gifts. Russians welcome inquiries about family and children and will be interested in learning about visitors' family. Such interests are genuine and should not be seen as merely making small talk. Business and even official inter government agreements can really be boosted if those engaging in it understand the Russian culture. Personal touch and presence are important in winning trust.

ChaLLenges to the spirit of internationaLisM

Young Africans were encouraged to study in Russia and Eastern Europe where they received mixed reactions and, on account of occasional conflict with the authorities and Soviet cultural norms, became symbols of dissent against official soviet culture. According to Suarret and Vijner (2009), a large perceived cultural distance is always associated with less psychological adjustments and more interactions with host nations. There were conflicts between Africans and their host universities and Soviet authorities. The Africans differed from their Russian/Soviet peers in their readiness to express grievances and to put forward demands to the university and party officials. Accounts by African students in the late Soviet Union are replete with complaints about drab lifestyle, everyday regimentation, sub-standard dormitory accommodation, spying (real or imagined) by Soviet students and so on. Among the issues were restrictions on travel within the USSR; restrictions on dating Russian women; and for early scholarships holders', restrictions on forming national and ethnic student organizations.

In November 1975, approximately 800 African students went on a weeklong strike in Kiev, in protest against the expulsion of a 23-year old Czechoslovakian woman for marrying a Nigerian fellow student. While in the same year, a Nigerian student sleeping in his hostel room in the city of

Lvov (L'viv) was attacked by a drunken Russian with a Chisel. The attacker was reportedly incensed by the Nigerian's successes with Russian and Ukrainian girls. The incident quickly turned into a major fight involving other Nigerian students who had come to the rescue of their compatriot, and as a result, three of them were expelled for attacking and beating up a Soviet citizen (Matusevich, 2009; *The Christian Science Monitor*, 1975).

Male students' relationship with the host female students was always the major cause of conflicts between the students themselves and with the host community. Experiences from USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe bore a common outlook. In Romania for instance, hostility towards those in mixed racial relationships was often overt. Romanian women were discouraged and even scolded for dating African men (Kagara, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009). In the USSR, Soviet female students were always ridiculed for having black boyfriends and in case of marriages, they were accepted with a lot of reservation if the two insisted on going ahead with the marriage. Majority of those who were in mixed marriages gave almost similar experiences (Kifalu, oral interview, Eldoret, 5 June 2009; Mosonik, oral interview, Ngata Farm, Nakuru, 27 June 2009; Ongoro, oral interview, Nairobi, 1 October 2009; Chivole, oral interview, Eldoret, 17 December 2009; Makumi, oral interview, Eldoret, 21 April 2009).

It was not that every African student in the USSR embarked on a collision course with the Soviet system. Yet being an African in the Soviet Union also meant that one performed "foreignness" on a day-to-day basis. Matusevich aptly puts:

African students in the USSR routinely collided with the state and challenged by word and deed its values. They had demarcated for themselves a separate cultural and ideological space within the Soviet domain, an impressive achievement of free will, beyond the wildest dreams of most Soviet citizens. For many a Soviet citizen then Africa encapsulated the world outside Soviet ritual differing from it in almost every respect. And for this very reason Africa and Africans became early targets for the xenophobic propaganda campaigns of the late Soviet period (2009:28).

During the last seventy years the Soviets had staked its international reputation on a vociferous campaign against racism. Although students occasionally came across racial discrimination, it was checked by the fear of repercussions from the government (Focus Group Discussion, Eldoret, 10 March 2010). However, neither the Russian government nor the general public seem not to be prepared to so much as acknowledge the unfolding crisis of race relations in a country that in not so distant a past used to pride itself of having managed racial and national discrimination.

Matusevich observes that after decades of anti-racist and anti-imperialist propaganda during the Soviet rule, post-socialist former Soviet Union and its citizens exhibit little taste for internationalist and egalitarian causes. He further notes that ideas of race and racial difference entertained by many modern day Russians formed to a large extent through their encounters with official and popular representations of Africans residing in the Soviet Union, most of them young men who, from 1957 onwards travelled to the USSR to pursue affordable higher education.

The image of Africans as that of helpless people in need of salvation from the capitalist west was used to convince the eastern bloc working classes that it was their international duty to liberate these people. According to interviews with Russian elites, it emerged that anti foreigners feelings in the post Soviet Russia was not only limited to African students but to all those that were perceived to have been supported by the former communist regime at the expense of the Russian citizens. Thus, the use of the word *jorin* is applied to all with dark skin ranging from those of Caucasian origin of the former Soviet republics to the African students (Prosin, oral interview, Moscow, 15 April 2012; Stepankina, oral interview, Moscow 24 July 2012).

It is noted that prior to *Perestroika,* African students had been in a privileged class of their own. Their stipends were high, their lodgings were free, and what is more important, they were allowed to travel twice to Western Europe, a privilege denied to their Soviet peers. According to responses from the interviews, an African student bringing three pairs of jeans, a stereo and a few t-shirts to the USSR from European vacation could easily fetch sufficient Roubles (reference for Russian money) for a comfortable living for a semester. This was notwithstanding the fact that during the Soviet era, making profit referred to as *spekulatsiya* (speculation) was punishable by the system. The neat arrangement was ended by a combination of skyrocketing inflation and new regulations that imposed heavy financial burdens on foreign students in the Soviet Union, but not before it had produced a widely spread envy, resentment and racism and let loose the virtual anti black hysteria.

The post-Soviet reaction was the opposite of early Soviet "racial discrimination in reverse" toward the foreign student community. In the *perestroika* period, Africans became a scapegoat for popular discontent amidst a worsening climate of racism and were blamed for medical, economic and political disasters (Quist-Adade, 1991, 1993, 2006; Matusevich, 2008, 2009; Mazov, 1999; Mutsotso, oral interview, Moscow, 24 June 2012). According to Matusevich and Quist- Adade, African

students' presence, a symbolism of former Soviet officialdom was referred by the common street people as those who brought SPID (AIDS). SPID became translated as *Socialnoe Polsledstvie Internationalnoi Druzby* (Social Consequences of International Friendship) or *Spetsialny Podarok Internationalyn Druzby* (Special Gift from Foreign Friends). The Soviet vospitanie that condemned those termed as *Nyekulturno* (uncultured, bad mannered, or vulgar) meant little to the post Soviet generation. Society changed both in form and character and *tovarich* (comrade) became *gospotin* (Mr or Sir) a former distasted capitalist address in the Soviet era.

Return and Job pLaCeMents

The importance of the experiences of Kenyans majority who spent minimum of the six years in the USSR and Eastern Europe as the privileged guests of their host countries can not be overemphasised. The curriculum course of bachelors and masters degree programmes was alien for most respondents, who came from British Curriculum background and aggrevated by culture shock, and adaptation to the foreign culture and then the almost equally difficult transition upon return home

There was a deeply ingrained perception that students trained in the USSR and Eastern Europe were indoctrinated in these Communist countries that even in the National Assembly, Members proposed that those who went through private organizations after 12th December 1963 should not be considered for employment as they claimed that there were other alterior motives behind their airlifts (KNA, The Kenya National Assembly, 1964). This general perception that students who studied in the Communist countries were indoctrinated paved way for too many hurdles in the employment of graduates from Russia and Eastern Europe

The concern about attitude of Kenyans towards persons educated and qualified in USSR and Eastern Europe was raised during a meeting of KenyaRussian Technical Team on 24th December, 1970. The case of one Hanah Chepkoit in Kisumu who had been kept in a junior position for long and a Russian medic lady married to a Kenyan medical assistant who could not be employed was discussed. Dr. Gikonyo refuted any negative perceptions on Russian trained medical personnel emphasizing that citizens were treated according to their qualifications and individual merit. He informed the delegation that two doctors qualified in Russia had successfully gone through a selection board to pursue post-graduate studies along with other doctors, qualified in Kenya and elsewhere (ibid). He,

however, noted that there may be initial language adjustment problems. The language issue was revisited by J.C Likimani, Director of Medical Services who in his letter dated 21st July, 1970 to the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Health wrote:

Our experience with Russian personnel at Kisumu hospital has conclusively shown that their contribution to the hospital is greatly handicapped by lack of communication. Although their qualification and ability are beyond any question, the fact is that they have only been able to communicate through their interpreters who have no medical knowledge to translate into English. This has often got to be translated into the patients' local language, often through Swahili. This goes backwards and forwards and puts a serious handicap to Russian Doctors where their efficiency is greatly minimised (KNA, BY/24/97, 1967-1974).

Senator Wasonga Sijeyo (Nakuru) on 17th June 1965, charged that the government had refused employment to Kenyans trained in communist countries. He alleged that four Kenya military police trained in the USSR, twenty in Communist China and fifty others trained in Czechoslovakia had been refused government assignments though KANU itself had sent them abroad prior to independence. For fear of being unemployed, some graduate students forwarded their employment letters well in advance before their travel home and some had even to take time off in western cities. One Oyugi Otama wrote:

Having been in Czechoslovakia for a period of six years and finished my studies in the Faculty of Social Science with specialization in Sociology, I beg to apply for employment in our Government. I am a holder of Masters of Arts in Science… I would like to contribute to the development of our Nation in the sphere of sociological research (KNA, XJ/12/26, 1968).

The Ministry of Education referred the application to the Permanent Secretary Ministry of Labour suggesting that the candidate might be of greater contribution to the Government if he served in the Ministry of Labour (KNAXJ/12/26, 1968). The government was appreciative of students who were willing to return and accorded them with necessary guidelines for employment in Government. Employment with Government was twofold, it offered training at work and it was the largest employer, two it was open to many specialities and diverse graduates from both the East and West blocs.

In reply to Oyugi Otama's application for employment in government, F.E. Makila, Director of Personnel wrote:

> Your letter of 13th January, 1968 which you wrote to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education, has been copied to me for necessary

> action. I am glad to learn that you have obtained a Masters of Arts degree from Czechoslovakia and that you are interested to return to Kenya... In order to place your application in record I send you herewith application forms for employment (PSC.2. in triplicate and A/T8/1 in duplicate) which you must complete and return to me at once. Please omit section one) which relates to advertised vacancy) on the first page of PCS.2. Enclose in Photostat copies of your up-to-date documents... on arrival to Nairobi please call to room 406 Harambee House (KNA-XJ/12/26.1968).

The above communication shows that search for employment after completion of studies in Russia and Eastern Europe was many a time credited to personal efforts and that government encouraged students to return home to contribute to nation building. Nevertheless, prejudice against Eastern European trained persons was overt. Cases were given where open sarcasm was directed towards those seeking employment on their return. According to Mbakaya (oral interview, Eldoret, 31 October, 2009) in her first attempt in the search for employment, in one company the first person she met advised her to apply for employment to teach in a Harambee school instead of wasting her time in her office since no one will employ those who studied in Russia.

Other respondents noted that they were not able to get employment for long and once they managed, they were put in low grade job group placement (Oloo, oral interview, Eldoret, 26 September 2009; Ochieng, oral interview, Eldoret, 23 June 2009; Ataya, oral interview, Kisii, 2 April 2009; Bungei, oral interview, Nandi, 10 June 2009). The notions advanced were that they learned nothing from the communist world apart from communist ideology. Others even had the image of Eastern trained persons as non performers and drunkards- a situation exacerbated by the wide spread perception that students who went for overseas education were “left over” or “undesirable elements” or that they had been selected on a political basis.

The perceived fear that graduates from Russia and Eastern Europe were indoctrinated and received military training made the employers in the Public Service and the private sector develop cold feet in the job markets. In 1965 the Ministry of Internal Security and Defence figures to the Senate indicated that 150 Kenya citizens had received military training in communist countries.

The Ministry spokesman said that they had not been sent by the government for such training and, therefore, government was not obliged to employ them on their return (African Report, November, 1965). Later scholarship

holders were equally branded potential revolutionaries with a military training thus anti establishment.

Early scholarships holder qualification greatly influenced the general perception of those who studied in Russia and Eastern Europe. In 1965, for instance, some of those Kenyans who went to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were admitted to high schools (KNA, ED/3/3/370, 1964; KNA, ED/3/2707, 1965). Despite students requests to be elevated to the university status, some had very unsuccessful academic progression at the vocational training (secondary level) in Czechoslovakia

It is possible that the problem emerged from lower qualifications of selected candidates or language adoption issues. A letter from the Embassy of Czechoslovakia indicated that of the three students requesting to be elevated for university admission Constanziana Thumbi was qualified and was considered due to her satisfactory performance while Duncan Bomu and Mohamed Kiprono had unsatisfactory performance (KNA, XJ/12/26, 1967). This suggests that they were actually students who returned without middle level college certificates or university degrees. This complicated how classifications of degrees from these countries were to be done and competence of the holders of these degrees, a situation that led to generalization.

It is prudent to note that those who did not finish their studies and came back without degrees and could not be absorbed into the employment market played a big role in reinforcing later stereotypes associated with former Eastern Europe trainees. There were those who did not have proper qualifications to join higher institutions of learning on arrival and were sent back to Kenya. Others accepted to be taken back to high school, while others were absorbed into middle level colleges. There were those who went on short courses, particularly those sponsored by party schools and cooperatives. Difficulty in identifying who did what and received what level of education became a problem that led to misunderstanding in evaluating the level of each qualification to both students and sending countries. The problem was worsened by the fact that the reference, for instance, to both Bachelors and to a masters' degrees translated loosely as Diploma bachelors or Diploma Masters (see definition of terms and conceots page 3). It was ambiguous given that in Kenya a "diploma" is always considered to be lesser than an undergraduate degree. The terms were adopted from Greek, French, German speaking countries, Scandinavia and other East European countries. The graduates of this system have proved that the content and system was solid despite the name confirmed the interviewee graduates

As more students attained their education and returned to join others who also trained outside the country and those from the local institutions, slowly by slowly, the bias began to soften. Further, with former Eastern trained persons taking up many offices of responsibility, the general attitude began to change. The other factor that greatly influenced this attitude was the thaw in the East West rivalry. From the 1980s, the West entered into dialogue to work together with Russia thereby changing the perception that the US President Ronald Regan had once called "the evil empire". The world also changed. The West's allies in Africa changed since their positions were always influenced by the West.

Overtime, it has been proven that those who trained in Russia and Eastern Europe are qualified to work in their areas of specialisation. They are found in all sectors of national development (civil service, the private sector, institutions of higher learning) United Nations, UN Agencies and in international organizations. Amina Mohamed, for instance, has shown exemplary service both in UNEP and government ministries. She has worked as an ambassador, Permanent Secretary United Nations Under Secretary of UNEP and presently Cabinet Secretary (Mohamed, oral interview, Nairobi, 18 June 2009). Many of them have made successful careers in politics and governance. Examples include Raila Odinga, Oburu Oginga, Hezron Manduku, Joseph Misoi, Abdullahi Sharawe, among others (Oginga, oral interview, Nairobi, 13 August 2009; Manduku, oral interview, Kisii Town, 2 April 2009; Misoi, oral interview, Nairobi, 25 July 2009; Sharawe, oral interview, Nairobi, 4 May 2009) and others are lectures, professors, administrators in institutions of higher learning in Kenya and beyond.

Plate 5.3 Dr. Paul Kurgat (left) and Hon. Dr. Hezron Manduku (right) at Hema Hospital Office, during an interview in Kisii on 2/4/2009

Source: Field Research

The research further showed that a good number of them are engaged in research in specialist institutions like KEMRI and in various other sectors of national development. An overview of those interviewed showed that majority of them work worked in institutions of higher learning. The capability to perform in the various job placements upon return Russia and Eastern Europe is and indication that they were focused in academics hence the widely perceived belief of ideological indoctrination through courses and programmes to the detriment of academic specialization does not surface. In the period of our study one can hadly point at individual graduate, from the Russia and East who advocated for communist or socialist orientation. Pro-Eastern political activities or writers have continuously emerged from those trained locally in Kenya, Africa, Western Eurpe or USA. Indeed, foreign training does not just automatically create a cadre of friends, as it may just help expose one to understand the but it also helps others to do their jobs better by exposing them to a different mindsets at play in the International arena.

SuMMary

The students' experiences analysed were from those who studied in different higher institutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe taking a diverse range of specialization. The study's finding concluded that although these students repatriated after graduation, the years lived in their host countries were sufficient for them not only to experience many acculturation challenges, but also to become diplomatic bridges to the collaborating countries. International students are evidence of internationalism.

Kenya foreign students in Russia and Eastern Europe were exposed to two cultures and values. They had an understanding of the system back at home and in their host country. The scholarship students having lived in a Soviet society made them less inclined to the radical Marxist Leninist ideology. Nonetheless, the reality of African presence in the USSR was far more multi-layered and complex. The importance of the experiences of Kenyans who spent almost six years in the USSR and Eastern Europe as the privileged guests of their host countries is invaluable. For most respondents, there was a double culture shock, the initial adaptation to the foreign culture and then the almost equally difficult transition upon return. The next chapter ties the presiding chapters together and discusses how educational scholarships were used as a foreign policy tool.

6

Education as a Tool for Inter–State Relations

This chapter analyses the link between education and foreign policy. It expounds on how educational scholarships were used as instruments of foreign policy by Kenya and the countries that offered the scholarships; namely the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. It attempts to interrogate how scholarships were utilized during the Cold War period to serve states' interests, the impact of the end of the cold war on the scholarships and the special role of the students' airlifts in bolstering informal diplomacy.

eduCation and foreign poLiCy

Education is a states' "soft power" tool as it has the value to influence other countries. In offering scholarships, countries hope to create cadres in other countries to acquire friends and allies, especially as students are disproportionally drawn from children of elite. Training is not just about skills, but also about values and ideological beliefs. Russia and Eastern Europe drew on their educational institutions during the Cold War to lay the foundation for public diplomacy to advance the national interest. The core missions of public diplomacy are education and cultural affairs, general information, policy information, and policy advice. For these activities to be well integrated with foreign policy, there is need to be merged with the Public Services, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Migration, Ministry of Education and other stakeholders. International education has emerged as a characteristic form of countries' involvement in world affairs.

Education is the key to economic progress in the country and the level of human resource and technological development is one of the indices of national development and national power. High quality manpower provides

quality labour for economic production. The level of technology impacts on the capacity or the ability to use scientific tools. The level of technological achievement of a state is probably one of the most important elements of national power. It is the foundation of industrial, economic and military power. Technological achievement enables a state to turn natural resources into economic wealth and military equipment. It is also the only solid basis for freedom, social justice, and equal opportunity. Such example is what Zubok (2009:127) in the case of the USSR termed as a lasting "Sputnik effect" whereby there was a widespread belief in emerging Soviet technology that fed the faith that science and technology could help resolve social and economic problems and contradictions and further boost the Soviet power image abroad.

Conservative statism was the pragmatic interest of Kenya and the Soviet Union and not necessarily ideology that informed their international behaviour. During Nikita Khrushchev's tenure, at first just a few and eventually hundreds and even thousands of young Africans began to take advantage of generous educational scholarships extended to them by the Soviet government. The Soviet Union sought to attract African students as a way of enhancing its standing and popularity in the Third World at a time when nations were undergoing the rapid process of decolonization and the newly independent states were in need of human resource development.

For the then nascent developing nation, a university degree in Kenya was seen as a ticket to status and prosperity. Teachers, technicians, civil servants with degrees earned higher salaries and for educational scholarship awarding states a bonding partnership with future policy decision makers. Russia and Eastern Europe, like other powers, throughout history, frequently used surrogates to project power and influence into the Third World. Soviet surrogates were specialized in tasks and missions they undertook and varied depending on ideological, political, geostrategic and economic nature of the

client state. The Soviet techniques employed included foreign propaganda, international organizations and political action in the United Nations (Shultz, 1986). Eastern European states and Cuban surrogates were used to support these aspects of the defunct Soviet policy. The Soviets used surrogates as part of a policy of assisting newly established pro-Moscow Leninist regimes in consolidating internal control by training their manpower for the civil service, arming and training their security forces.

Educational scholarships as a foreign policy tool during the cold war had emerged even before Kenya attained full sovereignty. The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, while awarding scholarships and bursaries favoured regional institutions while the favourite countries of destination abroad were: United Kingdom; USA; Canada; New Zealand; Austria; South Africa; India; Pakistan and Holland. The preferred courses were Public Administration and Personnel Management, Journalism, Medicine, Local Government, Agriculture, Information Science, Law and Engineering. Before independence there were more European and Asian beneficiaries to overseas scholarship compared to Africans sent abroad between 1957 and 1962 (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1962).

In 1962 John Keen in the Legislative Council questioned why Moscow had not been considered as a scholarship destination and the then Education Secretary Mr. Macleod told the Legislative Council that communism was undesirable, local institutions had expanded enough and that it was not government policy to give scholarships and bursaries when similar courses were available within East Africa (ibid). On the same question CMG Arwings - Khodek wanted to know from the Education Secretary if courses that were not available in the countries earlier mentioned were availed in Moscow what would be the government policy? In a cynical way Macleod stated that taxpayers' money would well be spent studying astrology in Siberia. Here Siberia represented the undesirable cold or political detention camps since the Tsar's era and symbolically the Cold War.

To many Kenyans, communism within the iron curtain implied a rigid form of totalitarian regime maintained by harsh and brutal disciplinary methods. It was understood that only one party and one political doctrine was permitted, and any deviation bore dire consequences for individuals concerned. It was feared that communism worked through party members, travellers, sympathizers and possibly foreign students (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1958). Kenyan authorities believed that the aim of communism was to impose their dictatorship, infiltrate non-communist

countries with their nihilistic and godless theories. Warning was raised on how communism achieves its objectives by force and infiltration by human methods, and therefore resistance to it must have full support (ibid). Cusack, Kenya's Minister for Defence argued that communist support for liberation movements in the colonies was meant to deprive the metropolitan powers of supplies of raw materials thus creating unemployment, a climate for revolution.

The Kenya security forces were watching for any communist literature and anybody discovered in possession of the banned materials was rendered liable to legal penalties. Cusack noted that passports were refused those who sought to travel to the communist countries and those who succeeded were restricted persons on their return. State travel restrictions to Russia and Eastern Europe during the colonial era were so severe that VIPs like Jaramogi Odinga, Ngala and Ochwada were searched, their personal luggage ransacked, detained at the airport for several hours and even their passports confiscated. This was done whenever one returned from East European or Asian socialist sympathetic countries.

Ellerton, the temporary Minister for External Security and Defence, argued that searches were conducted by the East African Customs Department, and not by the Nairobi Government. He emphasized that Customs had a statutory duty to collect revenue, but also to enforce the prohibition of the entry into the country of obscene, subversive and seditious publications, and in this he said they acted as law enforcement officers (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1960). This trend of suspicion continued till the 1980s with regard to students going to Eastern European countries. Although the scholarships were channelled through the Ministry of Education, students were always followed and questioned on their motives behind their going to the USSR after visiting the USSR Embassy to apply for a visa. All the respondents that went to the USSR recounted how they were rounded up immediately after going for a briefing at the embassy before their travel and taken to Nyayo House for questioning. For those that boarded the bus and were not "arrested" outside the embassy, they were followed to the places where they stayed.

In a broadcast to the nation on the eve of Kenyatta Day, the thirteenth anniversary of his detention in 1952, President Jomo Kenyatta announced that education in Form V and VI would be free from January 1966 and appealed to the people to safeguard the nation from intrigue by "those who take their directions from foreign masters … East or West" (*Africa Report*,

December, 1965: 23). Deportation orders were issued on June 1, 1966 for a South African writer Ruth First for assisting KPU President Oginga Odinga in writing his autobiography. She was later expelled from Kenya.

On June 8 1966 the American born wife of Minister for Labour Gikonyo Kiano, Ernestine Hammond Kiano, was deprived of her citizenship on grounds that she had "shown herself by act and speech to be disloyal and disaffected towards Kenya," and on August 3, 1966 according to the Minister for Home Affairs Daniel arap Moi two Asians had to be deported from Kenya, six more Asians were deported on August 14, two of them Kenyan citizens for reasons of national security (*Africa Report*, 1966: 28). At the height of the cold war any person or group that was perceived to be sympathetic to Oginga Odinga's brand of politics or any person showing interest in the USSR or Eastern European countries was a suspected communist. Despite government approval to take up scholarships, students that went to the Eastern bloc were feared that they might be turned into agents of communism.

the thaw and Kenya–russian CuLturaL reLations

The early 1970s witnessed a warming up of Kenya Soviet relations. Kenya USSR Cultural Cooperation Agreement was signed on July 29th 1972. In accordance with part II act. 3 of the agreement, Moscow was to send 2 to 3 English speaking doctors to work at medical institutions of Kenya for a period of two years at its expense. The Kenya government was to provide the doctors and their families free of charge accommodation, medical cover, waivers on electrical and water bills. The doctors were to be exempted from paying customs and other duties and taxes as may be levied upon personal and household effects imported to Kenya during the first three months after arrival to Kenya, income and personal gratuity taxes with respect to salaries and allowances (KNA, BY/24/94, 1972, 1973).

It was agreed that Russia was to receive and the Republic of Kenya was to send 20 students for 1972-73 and 20 students for 1973-74 academic years respectively to train in higher institutions of learning and in conformity with the curricula of respective institutions. The students were to travel from Kenya to USSR and back to Kenya after completion at the expense of the USSR side. The two sides recognized the need to initiate negotiations leading to the signing of a protocol relative to the equivalence of Diplomas

and Degrees issued and awarded in the USSR and the Republic of Kenya (Ibid).

Part II of the agreement stated that one lecturer of Russian language was to work in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Nairobi in the 1972-73 academic year, 15 medical staff to work at the Kisumu Hospital, 11 doctors, 2 interpreters and 2 laboratory technicians and a lecturer to deliver public lectures for 21 days on subjects to be agreed upon by both sides in 1973.

The contracting parties undertook to exchange Radio and TV programmes, documentary and musical TV films and three scientists were to deliver lectures and get acquainted with scientific institutions in either country and a further three man delegation to acquaint themselves with the system of public education (Ibid).

A large number of academic trainees were taken to Soviet educational institutions and this aspect of Soviet aid grew rapidly from its beginning in the academic year 1956 – 57 when only 46 students from less developed countries were on scholarship. Training was provided at regular universities of the Soviet Union and at new universities and institutes established especially for students from the developing countries.

The average period of training for academic students in the U.S.S.R was about five years, plus one year of Russian language study. Lumumba University (Russian Friendship University) popularly known as RUDN was established to cope with the sudden influx of students brought to the USSR in the early 1960s from the underdeveloped world and now had students representing 132 countries. It is a kind of an educational diplomatic hub, a mini united Nations. Most of the new graduates, like their predecessors, are specialists in engineering, chemistry, agronomy, and other technical fields and there are a high proportion of medical doctors. In the mid 1980s, approximately 25, 000 students were studying in 67 cities in the former Soviet Union from 52 different African countries (Kriilov, 1996:15) with the majority being from Ethiopia where as early as 1979, there were 1,500 Ethiopian students at higher and secondary specialized schools in the Soviet Union (International Affairs, 1979:89). According to Jackson (2006) in 2006, some 1,000 African students were studying at RUDN.

Re–tooLing foreign poLiCy through eduCation

In Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, the USSR was a country without the baggage of colonialism and with an ambition of spreading international cooperation and friendship to implant

the communist ideology to make itself felt. Thus USSR interest in Africa was an extension of the fight for a sphere of influence with the U.S. with science and technology and education in general being mobilized for foreign policy.

Technical and education assistance was emphasized in recognition of the fact that shortages of technical skills and trained administrative and managerial personnel could obstruct the effective implementation of all soviet aid commitments and it was also believed that such efforts help deprive imperialists of important levers of sponsored influence on liberated countries and for the dissemination of reactionary, antisocialist ideas (Nielsen, 1969; Kovner, 1967).

The images that were fed to Soviet and Eastern European people were not essentially different from those fed to Western citizens. Westernisers justified their presence as that of protecting Africa from the Reds (communists), while the Eastern bloc sought to convince their proletariat that it was their moral international duty to liberate these people from the western capitalist oppressors. Pro Soviet trade unionists, students and other Third World people were taken to the Eastern bloc countries for training in the universities and technical schools as evidence of this internationalism.

Plate 6.1: A half a century formation of world elites.(RPFU billboard marking the 50th anniversary of the University foundation)

Source: Researcher

In July 1959, the Communist Party's Central Committee adopted a special resolution provision for the creation of a Research Institute of African Studies (later to be known as the African Institute). Less than a year later another party resolution of 5 February 1960 stipulated the founding of a new University to train "the national cadres for the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America". Friendship University, also known as Lumumba University, would emerge as the flagship institution of higher learning, catering to the needs of Third World students on one hand and to the needs of Soviet foreign policy on the other (Matusevich, 2009; Mazov, 1998).

A Soviet African friendship body was formed in July 1959 and inaugurated in Moscow. The meeting was attended by scientists, workers, writers and students who elected Dr. Ivan Potekhin as president. Invited guests included the Charge D'Affairs of the United Arab Republic, the Counsellor of the Ethiopian Embassy, the Charge D'Affairs of the Sudan, and a number of students from African countries (*Africa Report*, 1959).

According to Matusevich (2009) as of January 1, 1959, there were only seven students from sub-Saharan Africa officially enrolled in Soviet institutions of higher learning and by the time of the collapse of the USSR in 1990, the number of Africans in the country had risen to 30,000 or about 24% of the total body of foreign students (Gribanova & Zherlitsyna, 2008).

While the Soviet Union was establishing institutions to cater for students from the developing countries, it was also seeking to construct the same in these countries. In Kenya, the 1960s witnessed debates brought to the floor of the National Assembly on restriction on importation of communist money to Kenya. Members urged the government to legislate against importation of such money by individual politicians or party so as to save Kenya from political confusion, enslavement and economic chaos before or after independence. Wafula Wabuge argued that:

Now if, as I understand them Communist ideas are that one individual is not allowed to own property. I feel that the Government should see to it that this country as it approaches independence should remain in the state it has been up to this day, that is to say, that each individual in this country should be free or should be allowed to own his own property and not to be asked by the government or the state not to have his own property (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1962: 1323).

Wabuge emphasized that communism introduces confusion, conflict and chaos. He linked the instability in Kenya after the 1960 London Conference

to a secret trip made to the communist countries on the sides of the Lancaster conference. He claimed that the Member imported Communist ideology and received money to facilitate establishment of Communism (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, 1962: 1323). The individual involved was not named in parliament because he was absent and a substantive motion could not be moved. However, other Members thought it would only be fair if money from both East and West was stopped to avert Kenya from the Cold War thus making it neutrally non-aligned (ibid).

Other Members like James Gichuru, the Minister of Finance emphasized that Kenya needed money to help her properly invest in development and raise the standard of living of Kenyans. However, addressing a rally in ElgeyoMarakwet District on February 28, 1965 he assured them that "communism" is not and will not be our policy… the tradition of our people cannot accommodate communism as was interpreted in Russia or China" (*African Report*, 1965:30). Kenyatta's position was that there was nothing wrong with help from any country or region. Commenting on his early tours to Moscow he noted:

> I have visited Moscow, I have been there twice, like everybody else, as I know some of the conservatives in England have done just that for education purpose. But some people who want to destroy my career naturally take the view that Kenyatta has been to Moscow and therefore he is a communist … I was never closely associated to the communist party … I have no contact with any communist or any communist country… What we are looking forward to do and what we are trying to do is not to make Kenya follow somebody else's policy or ideology. We intend to make our own ideology and we are free to take good things from all quarters (The Listener, 1961:958).

Behind the backdrop of the debates was the construction of the Lumumba Institute in Nairobi and other proposed colleges funded by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was to construct, as a gift to Kenya, a new technical college for 100 students and 200 bed hospital capable of handling 1000 outpatients a day for the first two years at no cost to Kenya. Following a joint evaluation by experts, assistance was given to the construction of a textile mill, a radio station, a fish cannery, a food processing factory, sugar factory and a paper mill. According to Njoroge Mungai, the USSR in conjunction with Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, constructed the Lumumba Institute in Nairobi and "the institute was to symbolize Soviet presence in

Kenya and the region; Soviet education, culture and technical aid" (Mungai, oral interview, Muthiga, Kikuyu, 10 June 2009).

Plate 6:2 The Late Hon. Dr Njoroge Mungai, (right) Peter Ndege (middle) and Paul Kurgat (left) for an interview at his home in Muthaiga Kikuyu, June 10, 2009.

Odinga, in defence of his action of associating with the East, maintained that Kenya should benefit from both camps. In this respect, he said that he had received £10,000 pounds from some friends in Great Britain to help Kenyan students to go to the Soviet Union, the United States, or anywhere else for the purpose of acquiring an education. He stressed that he would always welcome money from anywhere in the world if it came from sincere people with no strings attached, but he would never be bought (Republic of Kenya, Legislative Council Debates, 1960:883).

In his first official action as President, Mr. Kenyatta opened the new Lumumba Institute, on December 12, 1963. Apart from other courses, a course on African Socialism was to be taught to 108 selected students each session with the president indicating that academic studies in African culture and Anthropology would also be included in the curriculum.

During the official state opening of Parliament, President Kenyatta outlined the policies of his government, notably: the determination to work for a welfare state based on the philosophy of African Socialism; adherence to the charter of the OAU and the good of African solutions to African problems, maintenance of a policy of positive neutrality between East and

West, and dedication to the task of eliminating the problems of poverty, disease and illiteracy (*Africa Report*, 1965). Unveiling a new statue of President Kenyatta in front of Parliament building in Nairobi, the Vice President Oginga Odinga paid tribute to him as "…the man who delivered the nation from a life that was poor, nasty, brutish, and short. His is God's masterpiece." (ibid: 45).

Despite Kenyatta's assurance of Kenya's non aligned position, the anti communist radicals in parliament were pursuing the issue of Lumumba Institute. A motion was tabled in the House of Representatives by J. Tipis who urged the government to place the institute in Nairobi under the Ministry of Education and allow the Minister for Education to dissolve the board of Governors and form a new board of which it was comprised on March 31st, 1965. Fifty KANU branch officials taking a three months course on African Socialism in the Lumumba Institute had issued a statement pressing the government to nationalize land, factories, banks, and heavy industry to prevent what they termed as perpetuation of capitalist exploitation in disguise (*Africa Report*, 1965: 24). On May 2 1964, the House of Representatives passed a motion that would place the Lumumba Institute under the general management and control of the Ministry of Education.

In September, 1965, David Munyendo, Secretary of the Lumumba Institute Students' Union and Adila Wanguhu Ng'ang'a were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment in a Nairobi court as "ringleaders" of the 27-member group which attempted to "take over" the head office of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) in Nairobi on July 7. Other members of the group were given oneyear jail sentences except for an elderly man and a woman with six children who were granted conditional discharges (African Report, August 1965: 28). Following the above incident a KANU Parliamentary Group meeting under the chairmanship of Kenyatta endorsed a resolution that urged the government to ensure the proper security of the state. This led to a constitution of Kenya amendment Bill passed in the House of Representatives and Senate on 2-3rd June, 1965 respectively (Republic of Kenya, 1965).

To counter the Soviet aid, the Minister for Finance, James Gichuru, and the Minister of Agriculture Bruce McKenzie returned to Nairobi after a three week tour of Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Poland and the USA and reported that: Britain would provide $56,000,000.00 over the next 10 years for loan to settlement projects; that Germany would provide

$14,000,000.00 for sugar factory projects; that the US might provide $36,000,000.00 for rolling stock for the Kenya Railways; France would send agricultural experts, and International Development Assistance (IDA) would extend low interest loans spread over 40 to 50 years for a number of sound projects (ibid).

These visits to Western Europe were followed closely by a two week boycott of classes at the Soviet University of Baku, 29 Kenyan students were returned to Nairobi by chartered aircraft (Ibid: 34). The students were protesting against poor facilities, racial discrimination and the death of a Ghanaian student. This incident was followed closely by a rumour that arms had been smuggled to Kenya to overthrow the legitimate government. Responding to persistent rumours of police operations against arms smuggling, the Minister for Defence and Internal Security, Njoroge Mungai told a press conference on April 15, 1965 in Nairobi that the rumours may have been inspired by the dispatch of troops to Mombasa to supervise delivery of a small gift of Soviet arms to the Kenya army. The Minister said, "We are grateful to the government of the Soviet Union for the present. It is not, connected with any of the rumours that are going on … It is coming direct to the Kenya Army to remain in the hands of the Army" (*Africa Report*, June, 1965).

On April 27, 1965, a long awaited cabinet paper on African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya (Republic of Kenya, Sessional Paper no.10 of 1965) was released at a presidential press conference (ibid: 23) and on April 29-30, 1965 President Kenyatta announced the government's rejection of the Soviet gifts of military materials which arrived in Mombasa aboard the Soviet Freighter, *Frizik Lebedev*. He declared that the "The government has come to the conclusion that all the arms are old, second hand, and would be of no use to the modern army of Kenya" (ibid).

The arrival of the arms was also linked to the perception that there were Kenyans who had undergone military training in the Eastern bloc countries and the arrival of the arms was intended to overthrow President Kenyatta's government. Some students were recalled back as advised by Mr. Attwood the US ambassador. The debacle of the arms gift was confirmed by the then Minister of Defence and Internal Security (Mungai, oral interview, Muthiga, Kikuyu, 10 October 2009). A seventeen man Soviet military training team which had already arrived in Kenya to demonstrate the use of the arms left Nairobi by air on April 30, 1965. On the same date, the Vice President

Oginga Odinga's office issued a statement denying new reports of a sour relationship between President Kenyatta and the Vice President.

In the long debate, the Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Tom Mboya noted that President Kenyatta's original intentions for the institute were being distorted (ibid). On May 3, 1965 a joint statement by MPs' called for Vice President Odinga to resign because he was embarrassing the government by "singing the communist tune." To undermine the support from the USSR, on May 7 1965 Sweden's Uppsala University and the Swedish government pledged to provide the faculty more than $2,800,000.00 and other assistance for a 300 student science teacher's training centre outside Nairobi to be completed by 1968.

In a speech marking Madaraka Day, the second anniversary of internal self government June 1, 1965 President Kenyatta criticized those leaders that were sympathetic to the Eastern bloc stating that:

> What we want is Kenya Nationalism which helped win struggle against imperialism. We do not want somebody else's nationalism. It is a sad mistake to think that you can get more food, more hospitals or schools by crying communism (Africa Report, 1965: 25).

On 23rd July, 1965 Mungai told the House of Representatives that Kenyans would no longer be allowed to receive military training in communist China, Russia and Eastern Europe and some Western countries without government permission and advised the large number receiving such training overseas to change their courses to technical subjects which would help Kenya's development (*African Report*, 1965).

In March 1966, the Kenyan Minister of Defence stated that it was known that about 180 Kenyan students were receiving military training and that it had not been authorized or sponsored by the government in foreign countries. Of these, 70 were undergoing training in Bulgaria whilst the rest were in the USSR, East Germany, or Egypt. The Minister warned that the Kenyan Government was demanding that this training should be discontinued. However, this demand was met with much less response. In 1973, it was estimated that the number of Kenyans who had received such training in Bulgaria alone at various times had reached over 200. In later years, the assassin of the Kenyan politician Mr. Tom Mboya, murdered in 1969, was thought to have been granted a commission in the Bulgarian army after receiving such training (Greig, 1977).

The 1980s saw a modest expression of Soviet contacts with a few African states with which the USSR traditionally had limited ties. For

instance, in December 1981, the USSR signed a Protocol for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation with Kenya which provided for the extension of scholarships for Kenyan students and postgraduates to study in the Soviet Union and for the exchange of teachers, scientists and artists. Prior to that, in August, a consumer society delegation from Kenya had visited the USSR.

A delegation from the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited Kenya in March 1983. It concluded an agreement with the Kenyan Chamber of Commerce to promote trade relations. This was quickly followed up in July by the dispatch to Nairobi of a Soviet trade delegation, headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade. It pressed Kenyan officials to sign a formal trade agreement. At about the same time, a Kenyan trade group was in Moscow and a trade agreement emerged from the negotiation in Moscow. In early December, the USSR and Kenya also signed a new cultural and scientific cooperation agreement providing 60 scholarships for Kenyan students to attend Soviet educational institutions, as well as for two Soviet doctors to be sent to Kenya at Moscow's expense, and for six more Soviet doctors to work on contract in Kenya hospitals. A Soviet delegation headed by a Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet participated in the celebrations of the 20th anniversary of Kenya's independence in mid-December.

On the need to staff Bulgaria, East Germany and Czechoslovakia with Educational attaches/ offices, Education Minister Mr. Jeremiah Nyagah informed Mr. J.M. Kariuki during question time in parliament that educational attaché had been posted to West Germany and the educational attaché in Moscow would serve Russia and Eastern European countries. He specifically noted that Kenya had no diplomatic relations with East Germany and there were only 60 students insufficient to warrant an educational attaché (KNA, Republic of Kenya, 1970). It is significant to note that the higher the number of students the more significant the bilateral relations.

Airlifts to Russia raised concerns in United States of America opening more educational opportunities to Kenyans. Education began to be recognized as an instrument of the Cold War. Cohen (2003), analyzing the U.S relations with Africa over the past 60 years noted that after the Second World War, the USA had chosen to neglect Africa following an understanding in the 1950s that the former colonial powers would take care of Africa, while the USA would focus on Latin America. But this was reversed because of the threat of communist takeover in many newly

independent African countries. However, by the end of the 1960s, the U.S official perception of the airlifts had changed from disregard to active concern (Smith, 1966) if the "Reds take over" was to be averted.

According to Smith, the East African airlifts to America immediately after Kenya's independence revealed that officials of the Federal Government were involved to a little extent in the airlifts programs, but later the degree of involved apparently increased in each successive year. Education programs began to be considered in terms of their relative effectiveness in serving American's long term foreign policy objectives with the newly emerging nation states of the world.

Apart from the airlifts to America, the 1960's and 1970's saw the flow of American teachers to Africa. The Peace Corps programme brought educational ideas into classrooms in remote villages in African countries and American researchers and professors became increasingly common in institutions of higher learning. Education it is argued, acts also as a tool of cultural influence. America's wealth and its generosity in providing different forms of welfare opportunities to other parts of the world have resulted in a constant flow of nationals of other countries to the United States for study. Both the numbers in absolute terms and the proportion of Africans studying in the United States have been rising steadily over the years. Most scholarships to the U.S were arranged by Tom J. Mboya during his visit to the United States in 1959. Education captured not only the Russo- American rivalry, but also the discomfort of Britain on America's rapidly growing influence in Kenya, a traditionally British sphere of influence.

Nathan Fedha, a Kenyan who had written from Wisconsin, USA to the British Embassy, Washington D.C., and copied to the Director of Education, Nairobi, noted that a famous British lecturer had a positive impression of American colleges and their degrees after he had taught in one of them to see for himself the work they covered and had this to say:

The American system of general education taken by and large does tend to have the advantage of breath and disadvantage of relative superficiality, while British university education scores with greater depth but runs the risk of narrow-minded specialism. The American student is given the depth later, at his graduate school, and by the time he has finished his studies there he is just as level qualified in his specialty as is the British scholar. But it takes longer to get there (Fedha, 1960).

If it was not for the Cold War, the super power interest in Africa would have been minimal. The Cold War impacted on educational training just like it did with decolonization. According to White (2005), the U.S supported African decolonization not because they felt sympathy for the Africans over colonial oppression, but in order to prevent African countries from falling for Chinese and Soviet communism. Examining the foreign policy of the U.S under President Eisenhower White, notes that:

Decolonization was necessary to prevent the communist orientation of the people throughout the third world. The U.S policy should be, not so much to coerce nations to line-up with the west, but to prevent their gravitation towards the communist bloc (Ibid: 25).

The US used different mechanisms to influence events in Africa. One such channel was the Peace Corps Volunteer Program, an independent US Federal Agency that was established by executive order to promote world peace and friendship by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women and promotion of mutual understanding between Americans and the people of other countries. Under the Peace Corps program, young American graduates were sent to the developing countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia as teacher trainers, economic planners, public health educators, youth and community outreach workers; business partners; agriculture extension workers and environmental conservation educators; health workers and information technology experts (http:// www. peacecorps. gov/index. cfm?shell = learn. Whatispc .mission; http:// www. peacecorps. gov/ index. Cfm ? Shell = learn. whatispc).

Through the activities of the Peace Corps, the Americans sought to endear themselves to the people of the host countries, they operated in the American values and knowledge about its culture and democratic way of life, to the people of the world, was thought would make them appreciate it get converted to it and turn their backs on communism (Katono, 2008). Sandy (1986) observes that, another duty of the Peace Corps, according to its Congressional mandate, "was to counter Soviet development efforts in the Third World", adding that the original Peace Corps Act even provided that volunteers be instructed in the "philosophy, strategy, tactics, and menace of Communism".

The Fulbright Program was established in 1946 with the aim of increasing mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries, through the exchange of persons, knowledge, and skills. It is sponsored by the U.S State Department and is the largest U.S

international exchange program offering opportunities for students, scholars, and professionals to undertake international graduate study, advanced research, university teaching, and teaching in elementary and secondary schools worldwide (U.S Fulbright online, accessed 23 November 2010).

Under the Fulbright scholarship program, the Hubert Humphrey Fellow Program and other organizations, thousands of foreigners from the developing countries travelled to the USA for short study trips while thousands of Americans also travelled for months and years in overseas countries to have a chance to interact with the people of these countries. (http//www.exchanges. state.gov/education/jexchanges/background.htm).

The United States Information Agency (USIA) was created under the State Department for the purpose of information dissemination and educating the people of the world about America and their way of life. It was meant to counter the Soviet Union propaganda attack against imperialism and economic and social inequalities in the capitalist world. The USIA organized film shows, exhibitions, educational seminars about economic, cultural and political life in America targeting students, academicians, civil servants, political parties and many others. The Voice of America (VOA) broadcast programs directed at overseas people. These educational and cultural programs were not only for public relation but for propaganda purposes also.

In Kenya, capitalist ideas and values were finding free access but anti capitalist ideas especially Marxism, were systematically kept out by regulations concerning the importation of books and by specific strategy in the educational system involving ideological censorship.

According to Dr Njoroge Mungai, the Former Minister of Health and later Defence and Foreign Affairs, the British were not happy about Kenyans acquiring education outside Kenya or Britain. The colonial government had used education as a tool to influence the chiefs and their sons by according the privileges to study in national schools and later British universities. He gave the example when those trained outside Kenya and not in Britain being discriminated. Mbiyu Koinange, for instance, had a Masters Degree in 1943 from the USA and could not get a job in Kenya, so he ventured into politics. The US, on the other hand, linked Kenya with US by offering scholarships to Fort Hare in Cape Town University before going to America.

In Kenya, Schools were alert to many threats of communist ideas among their pupils and radical publications were therefore ruthlessly kept out or

suppressed (Mazrui, 1977:24). But enough liberal and capitalist ideas entered African countries to give them an advantage against alternative schools of thought in Europe which were opposed to either capitalism or liberalism or both. Africanization was to be attained through modern western education. Education and scholarship played a major role in states' quest to reach out to other strategic allies. Revolutionary books on Marxism-Leninism or Mao Tsetung were banned in Kenya and recruitment of Soviet trained human resource was not allowed and the slogan was "weed them out anywhere" (Okumu, oral interview, Eldoret, 15 June 2009).

the roLe of MediCaL aMbassadors in Kenya–russian reLations

The Government of Kenya and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, desirous in promoting bilateral relations agreed to conclude an agreement that brought to Kenya Russian medical personnel, equipment and offered medical scholarships to Kenyans. This team of medical Ambassadors was to be entrusted with the development and care of national health system in Kenya in accordance with the 20th November, 1964 agreement.

The Russians constructed a 200 bed hospital with a clinic capable of handling 100 out-patients at the cost of £1 million. The establishment of a technical college for 1000 students with an annual enrolment of 200-250 people in the existing buildings. The Russians were to equip the hospital with medicines, for initial two years of operation and medical workers including lecturers (KNA, BY/24/7, 1964; KNA, BY/24/102, 1971).

The Soviet chief engineer was V. Oussenko and the local constructor was Panesar Building Company limited (KNA, BY/24/39, 1972). The Soviet government sent to Kenya up to 15 medical workers plus required interpreters who arrived in September 1967 and were paid their salaries by the USSR. The USSR provided eight technicians for the Kisumu Hospital and the Kenya government had to pay for the services of these officers (KNA,-BY/24/102, 1971). More medical Ambassadors were sent to Kenya following the 1969 agreement and included: 1 surgeon; 2 Technicians, 1 biochemist; 1anesthetist; 1 radiologist; 1 maintenance engineer; 1 pathologist; 1 paediatrician; 1 pharmacist; 1 lab. technician; 1 physician; 1 radiographer and 1 gynaecologist (ibid).

By March 1972 Russian medical ambassadors who were directly paid by the Kenyan Government included two surgeons, 1 pathologist, 1

paediatrician, 1 technician, 1 Gynaecologist and 1 Radiographer. The following specialists: 1 Physiotherapist; 1 Paediatrician; 1 Physician; 1 Haematologists; 1 Pharmacist; 1 Radiologist and 2 Interpreters were paid by the USSR government (ibid).

The then Minister for Health, Mr. Joseph Otiende, while inspecting the progress of the Kisumu hospital paid tribute to the former vice-president, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and leader of opposition, for his excellent work and effort in getting the hospital for Kenya. Kenya-Russian relations were further strengthened through health education, the use of multiple media (films, slides, exhibitions, posters, radio, etc.) that ensured a wide audience, even in the rural areas. There was also an intention to establish medical school linkages, short term lecturers' exchanges, training of paramedics and language training to prepare Kenyans for training in the USSR in the medical and non-medical fields (KNA, BY/24/102/1971). Though the full phase implementation of the agreement was never attained, the Nyanza General Hospital (Russia hospital) and the scholarships left a mark in Kenya Russian relations. Till the collapse of the USSR, in every year scholarships were given to Kenya medical scholarships inclusive.

It is prudent to note that the number of students applying for medical scholarships in the post-Soviet era has kept on increasing. This is explained by the fact that unlike the communist time, when scholarships were channelled through government to government agreements, majority of today's scholarships are the self-sponsored programmes and the students deal directly with respective institutions with select educational commercial companies acting as intermediaries.

This trend, nevertheless, has not lessened the importance of the training received and its role in training medical manpower for Kenya. Their presence adds value to Kenya- Russian relations for they are medical and cultural ambassadors in their host institutions and society. Anyang Nyong'o observes that:

> Kenya medical students are medical ambassadors in Kenya Russia relations. They live to tell the story that education in Russia is no different from education in Kenya. They are excellent in the private and government sector, academia and research...the current generation is young and have all the time to study and do research (Nyong'o, oral interview, Moscow, 29 April 2011).

the transforMations of post–Soviet union sChoLarships

Today's world is characterized by rapid movement of both tangible and intangible material leaving in its wake profound changes in society. The university being the home where new ideas are born and disseminated without necessarily ignoring the classical old and the invaluable of yesterday. But it has meant that it has had to constantly redefine itself to be able to retain the traditional and accommodate change. Scholarships offered to Kenya by the USSR as had to undergo transformation occasioned by identity change and the global dynamic in the post-Soviet and cold war education environment.

All of the Soviet Union assistance came to a halt in 1991 and those already on scholarships were inherited by the Russian federation. While the USA, no longer competing with USSR for the affections of non-aligned developing world, shifted its focus to influencing Russia itself. Since 1994, under the aegis of the Freedom Support Act, the USA has been subsidizing the education of scores of students from the former Soviet Union in America.

In 1996, the Russian government reduced the granting of scholarships at Russian universities to citizens of developing countries (Deich, 2003:112). Nonetheless, at the People's Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) and Patrice Lumumba University, almost half of the 950 African students enjoy Russian government scholarships; others study on a commercial basis. The scholarships are rather modest, covering only tuition and accommodation; airfare and other expenses have to be paid by the relevant governments or the students themselves.

African students after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the time reported a rise in the number of racist incidents as well as mounting difficulties in maintaining government scholarships to continue their education in the country. With the country undergoing a tumultuous period of transition and eventual disintegration, Africa largely slipped off the radar of public consciousness in the teetering Soviet Union. Similarly, there was a widespread disillusionment on the African continent with the direction of Soviet reforms which entailed the USSR's near complete withdrawal from the third world.

The 1990s saw a massive disengagement from Africa by Russian foreign policy, with socialist solidarity replaced by outright anger with economic crisis being blamed on the aid given to Africa and other developing countries at the expense of national development. Scholarships and other

forms of aid to Africa were stopped or brought to a mere minimum and the continent was almost given a blackout.

However, it is evident that there is a rise in numbers of students going to Russia and Ukraine for further studies with the majority falling under selfsponsored programmes given the limited number of government scholarships. The most popular courses are science and engineering. The upsurge of students taking up scholarships and Russia's resumption of offering scholarships to Kenya has reconnected the collapsed social, economic and cultural ties after the breakup of the Soviet Union. According to the responses from former Kenyan ambassadors to Moscow, former and present Russian ambassadors to Nairobi (Langat, oral interview, Kericho,11 July 2009; Kathambana, oral interview, Nairobi,17 September, 2009; Nyambati, oral interview, Eldoret; 17 May 2009; Yegoshin, oral interview, Nairobi, 12 August 2010; Makarenko, oral interview, Moscow, 20 July 2011) and a former Kenya's educational attaché' to Moscow (Spira, oral interview, Nairobi, 4 August 2011) and other sources discussed in the research, the conclusion derived is that education was the major link between Russia and Kenya despite the challenges of the cold war for the education department was singled out to be the busiest department at the embassy.

SChoLarships and inforMaL dipLoMaCy

Traditionally, the humanitarian and moral responsibility for developed nations to the achievement of universal knowledge and education to developing nations has over the years been reflected in their policies. By the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union had signed hundreds of agreements with African countries. About 53,000 Africans were trained in Soviet/Russian universities and *Technikoms* (tertiary institutions) in various fields, as well as thousands of graduates from military and political schools. Foreign students are good business and are good for business. The revenue they generate as students and "tourists" are helpful to universities and to the economy at large. Foreign students are also perceived to be good future customers since they have special attachment to the places they spent their youth.

The introduction of the self-sponsored programmes where students pay for their studies and upkeep has given the educational links a new dimension. If earlier educational scholarships were purely for good

interstate relations today's have a commercial component. Though in their universities and colleges foreign paying students are seen as paying customers in the outside society, they are still seen as objects of philanthropy a detested hunger over of the Soviet internationalism.

Nonetheless, foreign students continue to act as bridges for international collaborations (Zheltov, Moscow, oral interview, 27 November 2011; Korondyasov, oral interview, Moscow, 18 January 2012). Foreign students in their host country's institutions provide contact with other cultures and worldviews for fellow students and bring different research perspectives and life skills into the learning environment. By virtue of living and studying in a foreign country, international students exemplify drive and resourcefulness that could be modelled by all students. According to the Dean of Veterinary Sciences Faculty at Skryabiu Academy in Moscow, African students faced language problems. However they always show commitment and zeal in their studies. A positive attitude that she noted should be emulated by the host students (Larionova, oral interview, Moscow, 3 October, 2012). Asked whether she would recommend her institution taking in more African students, she answered with an affirmative yes "for they are good students". Further, foreign students are ambassadors in their institutions. She narrated an incident on campus when a representative of students from Africa in her school during a function recited a poem and addressed the audience in Russian language. The student on behalf of his colleagues went further and presented her with a bouquet of flowers (ibid). The little gesture to those present was not little for it was full of symbolism. The giving of flowers is central to Russian culture. Flowers are given to celebrate an occasion, to loved ones, to welcome and as a sign of appreciation. Students' understanding and appreciation of the Russian way of life make students' to "fit in" and opens up future institutional collaborations.

Moscow mixed cultural politics with continuing education in various professionalism (short term scholarships, conferences etc) targeting participants (delegates) from non-aligned countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Pham (2008:2) notes that by the time the Soviet Union formally dissolved on Christmas Day 1991, more than 80,000 Africans had been trained in Soviet universities, military and technical institutes. It has been observed that a large number of heads of governments around the world pursued part of their education outside their own country (Kurtz, 2011), including the heads of state of Angola (Jose Eduardo dos Santos, an engineering graduate of the Ajdzerbajan Oil Chemistry Institute), Mali

(Amadou Toumani Toure who trained as a parachute commando in the Soviet Union) and South Africa (Thabo Mbeki, who received military and political training in the Soviet Union). Other alumni are the presidents of Cape Verde and Mozambique. Besides, at least 200, 000 specialists were trained by the Soviets on African soil (Shubin, 2004).

Although previous African students often studied beyond the borders of Russia proper, that is, in other Soviet republics such as the Ukraine, their teaching medium was Russian language and many activities especially extramural were co-ordinated from Moscow (Focused Group Discussion, Eldoret, 10 March 2010). They, therefore, often felt a certain affinity not only to their alma mater but Russia as well. The assumptions are that students who later attain positions of economic or political importance in their own countries can have a most beneficial effect on Russia's commercial relationships. They speak Russian, appreciate their culture and even some of their products and may be sympathetic to placing private or government contracts with the Russian firms. The graduates of Soviet/Russian universities can act as a channel of communication between Russia and Kenya and act at sub-state level to promote Russo – Kenyan links. Mazrui (1969) points out that international scholarship enhances standardization of world culture. He observes that many leading journals in the natural sciences and in the social sciences are in fact American journals. They are read and assigned to classes in many parts of the world, and this contributes not only to the standardization of world culture but the globalization of American culture in particular.

The Soviets were fascinated with science. The pioneering work of Soviet space programme was seen as a proof of Soviet's superior science and indeed a leader in world technology. In schools textbooks, higher school and institutions of higher learning the Soviet space success formed part of the syllabus. This was meant not only to cultivate a sense of national pride among the host pupils and students but instil in them the love for sciences. For foreign students it was likely to capture their attention on the Soviet technological power information that students as future policy makers in their countries' will make them sympathetic to Soviet technology.

SuMMary

States in their quest to advance their national interest engage several instruments. One tool was the use of educational institutions and

scholarships during the cold war period to enhance cultural diplomacy to advance their national interests. Kenya and the Soviet Union pragmatic interest and not necessarily ideological informed their international behaviour. The Soviet Union sought to attract Kenya and African students in general as a way of enhancing its standing and popularity in the Third World as the cold war raged and the struggle for a sphere of influence was at its zenith, while Kenya was in need of human resource development. Soviet surrogates' states of eastern Europe offered scholarships and were tailored along the Soviet line. The USSR interest in Africa was an extension of the fight for a sphere of influence with the U.S. with science and technology and education in general being mobilized for foreign policy.

The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the delinking of East European countries from Moscow saw scholarships and other forms of aid stopped or brought to a bare minimum.

7

Summary, Conclusion and Way Forward

This book sought to contribute to our understanding of how education can act as a foreign policy tool with special reference to Kenya, Russia and East European educational scholarships. It is based on research carried out amongst students who were beneficiaries of the scholarships. The objectives of the study were to; identify the genesis and historical development of Kenya Russia and Eastern Europe student airlifts, assess the cold war impact on Kenya, Russian and Eastern European bilateral relations; investigate the role of education as an instrument of political socialization; analyze how educational scholarships were used as a foreign policy tool at the zenith of the cold war and discuss students' experiences and how they informed Kenyan, Russian and Eastern European relations. One area of co-operation between states is the establishment of technological and cultural relations to enhance good relations that add value to the countries' domestic and national good. The problem, therefore, was to analyse how educational scholarships were used as an instrument of foreign policy.

The study was guided by political socialization and the social constructivism theory. The Political socialization theory highlights how education can be used to socialize the citizens or group (students in this study) to act in a particular way. Institutions of learning can be used to advance the national interests.

In this book, the case of the scholarships is analysed. The study found out that education is critical to national development; must be consistent with national purpose and is crucial in the development of a national character of nations. The character, of education helps determine the character of society itself. Without national character, a country loses the purpose for which it exists. According to the findings, although political socialization was present both in the curriculum and everyday life in the Soviet Union, Kenyan students were equally aware of this and chose to ignore it. The fear of being turned into future communist revolutionaries on their return was farfetched. Furthermore, their experiences of what a communist system could offer alienated them from the very ideology. States like communities are social constructs. Kenya - Russian relations were influenced by the cold war environment. However, each had its identity and needs that made them design their relations guided by pragmatism and were, therefore, not static. It was characterized by both conflict and cooperation as defined by a given situation.

Limited research on the role of scholarships in foreign policy particularly between Kenya and former USSR and the eastern bloc necessitated an attempt to investigate the reasons behind the scholarships. Informants were former students who studied in the Eastern bloc, policy makers, some Russian citizens, diplomats and some politicians were consulted or interviewed to corroborate some of the information connected to the study. The study relied heavily on oral and written sources of information. Due to the nature of the research, the study favoured the use of oral interviews. The study used the snow-balling technique to get the respondents particularly the former students. Interviews were carried out with individuals and in group form. Archival materials and personal documents were further consulted for the primary data. Secondary sources relevant to the subject of this study were analysed. In addition was the consultation of select historical and archival material. Reference was also made to personal documents availed in the course of field work that formed a major part of the study. The data gathered from the secondary and primary sources were corroborated by the interviews. The overall study period ran from 2004 to 2012. The study was a case study in design. Purposeful sampling approach

was used in data collection. Personal interviews, group discussions and informal conversations were utilized.

SuMMary of findings

The relationship between educational scholarship and foreign policy is complex. From the 1960s, Kenya like most newly independent countries in Africa, embarked on the path of developing her human resource capital. The university was expected to serve nation building objectives. The post-colonial government consequently encouraged the expansion of institutions at home and allowed those that got scholarships abroad to cater for the citizens' thirst for education as a prerequisite not only for self-development but national development. Education both benefited the individual and served as public good. In allowing its citizens to go beyond national borders even to those countries referred to as being behind the iron curtain, the government enabled students to freely and widely access and benefit from the fruits of global technology and other resources. This was an avenue to alleviate the state's incapacity to produce manpower in all categories for development.

Kenya saw education as key to the development of modern industry, and the emergence of a modern society. The USSR utilized education to excel in technological development, space exploration, and foreign policy. The important role of the university in society cannot be under estimated. How education can bring in the desired economic and social transformation is subject to the general conditions that prevail in the society. In Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe the university was expected to generate not only cultural capital but also enhance cultural diplomacy.

Education is a global variable. However, educational systems differ from schools, regions and countries. Students' political beliefs and career choices are affected by particular schools or systems in which they find themselves. Specific factors constitute political socialization. These include ethnic or racial mix, political views of lecturers and lecture styles adopted, continuous processes of character building in the universities lecture halls, hostels, play fields, libraries etc. Kenyan students in the USSR and Eastern Europe found it easy to identify these objects of socialization and how other foreign students perceived them. Students from countries sympathetic to the socialist system were more appreciative of the Soviet symbols more than those from countries more aligned to the ideologies of the West. The relationship between personal destiny, students' career, performance or attitude toward their environment was directly related to national character.

The research findings show that individual needs were also the driving force behind the seeking for scholarships for there is a link between success in higher education and achievement within the world of work and the connection arises simply through the extra motivation provided by the possession of a university degree. There has always been an historic association between possession of a degree and access to a comfortable livelihood. The route to high earnings and satisfying jobs are more firmly blocked to those who do not posses higher education.

From the findings, it emerged that students who could not meet financial requirements to study in U.K or U.S.A and had no links at home or abroad ventured into Russia and Eastern Europe. The presence in Kenya of prominent professionals who had studied in the USSR and Eastern Europe bore a cause- effect relationship to the mounting surge of interest in USSR education and demystification of the perception of learning in the USSR and Eastern Europe as being communist. Aspiring students looked to examples of several prominent citizens, who had been trained in the USSR/East Europe, and they were encouraged by friends or relatives enrolled in USSR or East European colleges which raised hopes and encouraged more students to apply for scholarships in these countries. This helped in debunking the jinx of studies behind the iron curtain.

It is also observed that Kenyan society was not always receptive to news of scholarships to the Eastern Bloc. Reasons against the scholarships were partly because the students were going to the communist bloc, and partly for political, religious or personal reasons. Nevertheless, these educational scholarships were a useful contribution by filling a gap which the government of Kenya could not afford to fill. The study results showed that students chose to study in USSR and Eastern Europe to gain both personal and professional competencies for the purpose of contributing productively to their home countries. Furthermore, the former students are pleased with the education they received in the USSR mentioning the competencies they had acquired through research.

The research findings observed that for Kenya's foreign policy to be effective, the country must stimulate and promote institutional and structural changes essential for the achievement of desired social goals. This implies changing what is traditionally accepted, and challenging entrenched interests, both domestic and foreign. Therefore, the objectives, intensity instrumentalization and efficiency of development policies should be

flexible and have the freedom of manoeuvre according to the internal conditions and the international relations with the country concerned.

The establishment of diplomatic relations and maintenance of diplomatic missions with the Eastern bloc countries was a move, by the Kenyan government to support the avowedly non-aligned foreign policy posture. Essentially limited activity took place between Moscow and its allies and Nairobi over a period of time. In spite of the bilateral agreements on trade, Soviet trade with Kenya remained inconsiderable. Discriminatory practices in favour of the West and against the socialist countries were also reflected in Kenya's search for foreign financial and technical aid. Thus, despite the willingness of the Soviet Union and despite various political elites and parties' constant demand that aid should also be accepted or sought from any country or bloc, aid from the Soviet Union was scrutinized and at times openly rejected by the government.

Analyses on how the scholarships were secured, who the beneficiaries were, sponsorship, attitudes towards those who studied in USSR and Eastern Europe when they returned and sought employment and the debates they always generated in parliament explain how deep educational scholarships dragged Kenya into the thicket of the Cold War.

Both Kenyatta's and Moi's governments maintained a pro-western foreign policy posture with astonishing devotion, while keeping a sharp eye on radical elements and trade union leaders at home. Nonetheless, Moscow and Nairobi shared a common posture on the issue of decolonization. In essence, both Kenya and the USSR were committed to the transfer of power from the white minority regimes to the black majorities in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Other international issues in which Nairobi and Moscow shared a platform were on common ideals and objectives on world peace and disarmament. Kenya, however, opposed U.S.S.R intervention and the continued stay of its troops in Afghanistan. Consequently, Nairobi boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. The two countries positions were guided by their national interests and the prevailing Cold War environment.

The USSR never managed to promote the establishment in Kenya of a strong network of socialist sympathizers. USSR presence left remarkably little permanent imprint in Kenya in terms of either ideas or enduring links. In Kenya there were fears that the students would be turned into communist agents through indoctrination. The soviet schools and institutions of higher

learning were regarded to be places were foreign students could be turned into revolutionaries. Many of the Kenyan ruling elite rightly or wrongly shared the belief that if encouraged to have a firm foothold in the country, the Soviets might, among other things, harness the local revolutionary pressures to subvert the government in power. In reality, Kenya never produced a radical ideological cohesive proletariat, a class system, nor was there a well-organized communist party network with a sizable following in the country.

Political socialization in the schools was a constant factor throughout a Soviet child's education. It covered the entire range from short stories in elementary readers to comprehensive course on Marxism- Leninism in universities. This notwithstanding, research findings show that the weakness of the Soviet *vospitanie* (upbringing) was that the system denied them other sources of information only convincing them that the communist information was correct. In the Socialist bloc, education was focused to instil values appropriate to socialism thus suppressing individualist in favour of cooperate values. The National Curriculum and teachers were core in the implementation. The cooperative ideology was difficult to internalize as competition for scarce resources remained the dominant experience of every student and citizen all over the Socialist world.

The findings suggest that the youth in the USSR were more affected by the lack of information about non communist topics, such as a market economy and democracy than they were by political socialization from the state. Once in the Soviet Union, foreign students, even self proclaimed leftists, had to reconcile the obvious discrepancies between what was said and what actually existed. The major tenet of communism, that of constructing a classless society left foreign students with more questions than answers. Having lived in the land of socialism, they could not stop wondering why there were privileged groups (especially the communist party leaders) with access to special facilities that were inaccessible to majority of the *tovarich* (comrades). These groups had better salaries, incomes, housing, and access to consumer goods, special shops (*kommission*), hospitals, resorts and the privilege to travel abroad. With such real experiences, the absurdities of socialism were clear for them than those who simply heard about it.

The preceding chapters raised issues and interrogated paradigms on the role of education as a tool of foreign policy. The information contained in

various chapters established that there is a relation between international scholarships and states' national interests. The author argues that much of a country's foreign policy and national interest can be understood in the context of the country's relations with other states. Traditionally, international relations are a matter of interchanges among states. States oversee and promote bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of peace and security, trade and other economic relations and development.

Foreign policy is, therefore, the activity of developing and managing relations between the state and other international actors, which promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actors in question. It entails the use of political, economic and cultural instruments. The quest for bilateral relations between Kenya and the USSR formed an integral part of Soviet African and global strategy. The significance of Kenyans' presence in the Soviet space though minimal, formed part of Soviet foreign policy strategy.

In order to strengthen mutual understanding and friendship between Russians and people from Kenya the two states agreed to develop cooperation and exchange in the field of education, science, culture, economy and trade. Russia government set up a series of scholarship schemes to sponsor students to undertake studies and research in Russian institutions of higher learning.

Governments command a great number of instruments that can be used to influence other governments' policy. Such instruments vary from actors involved, situations and need. Governments use certain instruments to try and influence policy behaviour of other governments. The choices among policy instruments depend on the kind of instruments that are available, on the effects to be expected, and on the expected reactions. Through interrogating students' experiences, this book reveals and explores the utility of Africa and blackness (*Joryni*) not only in the official foreign policy discourse of the Soviet Union, but also in the Soviet everyday experiences of political and cultural encounters and adaptation. The study shows that there are no short cuts to understanding the host country and its people. It helps to know their language, history, and literature and to have lived or worked with them over the years.

The language of instruction was Russian and classes comprised both foreign and Soviet students. Prior to their actual study, exchange students were hosted in various Soviet institutions to learn the Russian language in

special intensive courses for foreign students for nine months and later continued to study Russian as a unit for the next five years of study. According to the findings, most respondents pointed out that they experienced stress in the first nine months (preparatory language course) and occasionally some loneliness in the course of their studies. Russian language proficiency and perceived discrimination exposed foreign students to homesickness. Results from this study indicate that students faced a number of challenges that affected their well being and scholarships, particularly feelings of isolation and loneliness.

Participants mentioned challenges such as lack of culturally familiar resources. Feeling of isolation, challenges adapting to different learning and teaching styles, financial constraints, and difficulties of acclimatising to unfamiliar climates and cultures were widely pointed out in the interviews. Generally, like other foreign students, Kenyan students tended to employ collectivist coping strategies through seeking social support from fellow compatriots and at times preferring avoidance behaviour as a coping strategy. A large perceived cultural distance was associated with less psychological adjustments and more interactions with host-nations.

There were linguistic and educational drawbacks particularly for the earlier scholarship holders but they worked on the whole harder than even the host students. From the research, it came out strongly that the treatment accorded to Africa and Africans by official Soviet culture was undoubtedly well-intentioned. However, it did not make the Soviets any more knowledgeable about Africa or Africans. Examination of encounters between “black” and “red” in the USSR showed that the students did not embrace the Soviet ideology while the Soviets little understood their guests. Since little was known or understood about Russia and the Eastern bloc in Kenya and on the other hand the Russians knew little about Kenya, students became natural conduits of conveying knowledge about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into Kenya and their presence in their scholarship host countries brought the image of Kenya right into their societies.

Kenyan students still arrived in Russia in search of affordable education, but what they faced in new Russia, however, was no longer the paternalistic internationalism of Soviet propaganda but an openly hostile ethnic supremacist ethos nurtured by the rise of extreme right political groups. At the same time that the business world and the scientific world were breaking down barriers, many foreign students had to contend with hostile attitudes in

their host country. Labels and stereotypes were forced upon them, particularly when they moved off the campus and into the broader community. However, despite this challenging background, there was a silent change taking place in society. There emerged social groups that were more open and embracive in society championing multiculturalism. Beginning of the 1990s, for instance, saw a rise in mixed racial marriages between Russians and foreigners. Cases of Kenyan female students marrying Russian men or Kenyan men settling in Russia with their Russian wives that were not common during the Soviet era increased, unlike early years when men married to Russian women came back to Kenya immediately upon finishing their studies with their spouses.

Conclusion

Non-state actors have been recognized as influential players in Kenya's diplomatic sphere. However, the role of students as non-state diplomats has not been adequately documented to inform intellectual and policy debates on Kenya's foreign policy in a changing world. Educational scholarships became an instrument of foreign policy with students being the non-state actors implicitly taking up the role of informal diplomats. It suffices to note that as universities across the world develop high levels of competence in particular areas of specialization, there is growing evidence for the globalization of knowledge, and the scientific community, continues together with the business community, to be the most internationalized. Contemporary society places great importance on human interactions and mutual understanding as a way to avoid conflict. It is also important to understand that human conflict is caused primarily by political, cultural and socioeconomic factors and there is no better place to inculcate the virtues of international peace and interstate cooperation than through international scholarship. The book revealed that even at the height of the Cold War, when Kenya had little business to do with the Soviet Union, students' continued admission to Soviet universities was almost the only steady engagement between the two countries. Thus, the conclusion is that education is an issue where countries can work together despite their differences.

This study established that one of the obstacles to developing Russo-African relations was a lack of objective information on the African continent available within Russia (as well as on Russia in Africa) and the lack of avenues to promote such ties. The African mass media had a very

limited number of correspondents in Moscow while the number of Soviet media offices in Africa were also few.

In conclusion, the pursuit of learning beyond national boundaries is an old phenomenon. The presence of foreign students on the host country's campuses provided opportunity to promote cultural and international understanding. It was imagined that, in addition to the achievement of their personal goals, adventure, joy, and stimulation in a foreign land, these "cultural ambassadors" would enhance international understanding and collaboration to tackle global problems. Therefore, students for many years have been bricks for future linkages in interstate relations.

Way forWard

From the foregoing, it can be deduced that there was a lack of national and international organizations and communities which could help newcomers in the Soviet Union. This book can help in the development of orientation and training programmes to facilitate students' academic and cultural adaptation. The study recommends the need to provide information on the host country to prepare students to their life in the host country. From the study's findings on the challenges Kenyan students faced as international students, it recommends to Kenyan academicians, administrators and the host community to learn more about the need to create beneficial learning environments for all students, particularly now that Kenya hosts a number of international students too. As students choose to study beyond their national boundaries, institutions of higher learning need to respond to the growing needs of globalization. The challenge is to make international diversity and multiculturalism a positive element in the lives of all students.

The book therefore adds to the limited literature on education as a foreign policy tool between Africa and the former Eastern bloc. However, more literature was on Kenya- Russian relations and interviews were limited to former Kenyan students in Russia and Eastern Europe. Suggestion for similar studies on other countries is recommended. Since the scope of this book was till the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of eastern bloc from the grip of Moscow, of interest will be another study given the new global dispensation after the Cold War. An inquiry, for instance, on how educational scholarships have been transformed from Cold War search for solidarity against capitalism and imperialism to educational services (a product like any other in the market) in the former USSR and Eastern Europe can bear interesting research findings.

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This book, a product of doctor of philosophy research thesis focuses on Kenyan students' educational airlifts to Russia/Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, identifies the genesis and historical development of student airlifts to the USSR and Eastern Europe; investigates the role of education as a foreign policy tool; and examines the impact of the cold war on students' scholarships to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Following the end of the World War II in 1945, the world order was dominated by the Cold War mindset. The USSR and USA started engaging in the de- colonization of colonial states in general and Africa states in particular. Both USSR and USA started supporting trade unions, political parties and strategized on to influence the Third World as education became a very useful tool.

The politics and economies of de-colonization were engaged through and within the Cold War lenses and self-interest. The book thus contributes to the understanding on how educational scholarships were impacted by both the internal and external environment of the Cold War. It also tells the story of a group of Kenyan nationalists, Russian and Eastern Europeans who understood the role of education in political socialization creation of allies both internal and external and subsequent spheres of influence. The students' airlifts to Russia and the Eastern bloc like those to America were aimed at supporting the anti-colonial movements around the world, creating national different cadres of human resource, allies and spheres of influence.

For the host country, international students' presence in colleges and universities is beneficial because these students contribute to the enrichment of higher education, to the strengthening of relations with countries in world trade and to the promotion of global understanding.

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