

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOMALI REFUGEES AT THE DADAAB
REFUGEE CAMP IN KENYA ON THE HOST COMMUNITY**

By

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DEDICATION

I Haithar Somo Ahmed dedicate this PhD thesis to all refugees in the world and more particularly to the Somalis who lost their lives, families, or were disabled and to those who are still suffering in refugees' camps. I also dedicate this work to my wives (Fatuma Mohamed Abdullahi and Zahra Abdi Sora) and my mother (Zeinab Ahat Ibrahim) who inspired me directly or indirectly to the accomplishment of the research report.

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Most importantly, my family was supportive, encouraging, patient, and tolerant of periods of time when I was hardly available.

I, however, remain solely responsible for any criticisms and shortcomings in this Ph.D. research.

ABSTRACT

Kenya has hosted refugees from diverse nationalities for many years but recently, the refugees' socioeconomic impact on the nation has been questioned. Evidence from global level indicate positive and negative impact of refugees, although local stakeholders have advanced the need for refoulement due to the belief that Somali refugees threaten Kenya's national security and are not beneficial to the country. This study believes that, just as it is the case with refugees across other nations in the world, Somali refugees have benefits and costs but the benefits outweigh the costs given that the country has refugee management laws that ensure the costs are dealt with. This study's main objective was to investigate the socio-economic impacts of Somali refugees in Dadaab to the host community in Kenya. The specific objectives were to determine the influence Somali refugees in Dadaab camps have on Kenya's socio-economic development; identify the security concerns associated with the keeping and maintaining of Somali refugees in Dadaab Camps; assess the challenges refugees in Dadaab camps face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya; and to establish the strategies for enhancing refugee's socio-economic contribution to host community. The study applied the securitization theory and the refugee aid theory. Mixed methods approach was used while a population of 229,233 people targeted. A sample size of 503 was chosen where 30 were interviewed face-to-face and 473 were surveyed using a questionnaire. The interviews collected qualitative data while the survey collected quantitative data. Refugee leaders at the sub-clan and religious level were sampled using simple random sampling where all leaders were given random computer-generated numbers from 1 to 120 and a computer picked randomly 92 numbers representing participants to the study. Stratified random sampling was used to sample host community members. The strata were defined based on position held in society after which, simple random sampling was used to pick 381 participants. Officers from government, county and UNHCR together with its partners totalling to 30 were chosen by census method. Quantitative data was analysed using descriptive statistics and presented using tables while thematic analysis was used to analyse qualitative data, which was presented in narrations and quotes. The qualitative findings showed that Somali refugees attract remittances, grow trade, rental opportunities, and influence infrastructural improvement. It was further found that refugees are generally peaceful and are challenged by inadequate market space to trade from. Quantitative findings showed that refugees create job opportunities (Mean=2.17; SD=0.801) and lower prices (Mean=1.68; SD=1.021). Majority (72%) of respondents agreed that closure of Kenyan-Somalia border was ineffective in controlling illegal imports, and weapon proliferation. Refugee management policies available promote participation in socioeconomic development (Mean=2.60; SD=0.938) but discourage integration and settlement (Mean=2.48; SD=1.067). The study concluded that Somali refugees have positive and negative socioeconomic impacts on Kenya and that border closure and reduced border manning are ineffective in ensuring cross border security. Recommendations are that Kenya government institute a policy that guides refugee contribution to socioeconomic development, revise refugee management policies to accommodate refugee settlement and integration, adopt technology in border security management including use of airborne mobile intruder detection sensors, surveillance drones, and real-time closed-circuit television.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACAPS:	Assessment Capacities Projects
AMIF:	Asylum, Migration, and integration Fund
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU:	Anti-Terror Police Unit
CAR:	Central African Republic
CCTV:	Closed Circuit Television
CEO:	Chief Executive officer
CIDP:	County integrated Development Plan
CORD:	Coalition for Restoration and Democracy
CPPT:	Community Peace Protection Teams
CS:	Cabinet Secretary
DCI:	Department of Criminal investigation
DRC:	Danish Refugee Council
DRCongo:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU:	European Union
FGM:	Female Genital Mutilation
FSD:	Financial Sector Deepening
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GISEDP:	The Garissa integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan
GoK:	Government of Kenya
HRW:	Human Rights Watch
ICARA:	International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa
ICCPR:	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR:	International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ICJ:	International Commission of Jurists
IED:	Improvised Electronic Devices
IHRC:	International Human Rights Clinic
IOM:	International Organization for Migration
IPI:	International Peace Institute
KCB:	Kenya Commercial Bank
KDF:	Kenya Defence Force
KNCHR:	Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights
KRA:	Kenya Revenue Authority
LAPSSET:	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs:	Non-Government Organisations
NPM:	Needs and Population Monitoring
NRC:	Norwegian Refugee Council
OAU:	Organisation of African Union
OCS:	officer Commanding Station
PHO:	Public Health officer
RAD:	Refugee Affairs Department
RAS:	Refugee Affairs Secretariat
RCK:	Refugee Consortium of Kenya
RPF:	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSF:	Rangers Strike Force
SALW:	Small Arms and Light Weapons

SLAA:	Security Laws Amendment Act
SNA:	Somali National Army
SPRAA:	Special Program for Refugee Affected Areas
TFC:	Transitional Federal Charter
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
TSC:	Teacher's Service Commission
UDHR:	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UIC:	United Islamic Courts
UN:	United Nations
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR:	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNICEF:	United Nations Children Fund
UNRWA:	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
URPN:	Urban Refugee Protection Network
USA:	United States of America
USD:	United States Dollar
VAT:	Value Added Tax
WFP:	World Food Programme
YEP:	Youth Education Pack

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Coerce:** Forceful influence of a person, a group, or a nation to choose a given option over another (Johnson *et al.*, 2003).
- Economic implication:** Effects of a phenomena that are economic in nature (Ahmed *et al.*, 2021).
- Government:** An organised system or group of people with internationally recognised legal authority and duty to lead a given community (Johnson *et al.*, 2003).
- Host community:** It is a country that offers residence to asylum seekers and involves all forms of government in that country, and the communities leaving in neighbourhood to refugees or their camps (UNHCR, 2011b).
- Implicate:** To claim or demonstrate that a person (e.g., refugee) caused something.
- Insecurity:** Lack of security; feeling of not being protected from physical harm or possible life-threatening event (Ramsay, 2012).
- Refugee integration:** A process through which refugees are prepared to adapt to a host community while preserving their cultural identity whereas the hosting community and public bodies accommodate and meet their diverse needs (UNHCR, 2014a).
- Refugee Settlement:** The process of permitting refugees to settle into the hosting population with or without official assistance. This includes granting refugee's permanent residency, full refugee status, and other civil, cultural, economic, and political rights (Jacobsen, 2001).
- Protection:** A formal or legal measure projected to preserve certain human rights and liberties (Ramsay, 2012).
- Refugee:** A person who has sought asylum in a county that is not their own (UNHCR, 1969).

- Security:** Measures taken to protect humans from physical harm or loss of life; Feeling of being protected from physical harm or loss of life (Johnson *et al.*, 2003; Ramsay, 2012).
- Social implication:** Effects of a phenomena that affect society (social interactions of people) (De Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).
- Terrorist:** A person or group of people unlawfully using violence and intimidation against civilians to advance their agenda (Mohamed, 2007).
- Terror attack:** An attack planned and/or executed by a terrorist (Mohamed, 2007).
- Xenophobia:** Refers to behaviours, prejudices, and attitudes that exclude, castoff, and habitually vilify an individual or individuals based on their foreigner status or national identity (Miller, 2018).

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview

The chapter laid the foundation to the research by addressing key issues including the study background, the problem statement, research objectives, and questions. The chapter also presents the area of study, justification of the study, significance, scope, and limitations of the study.

This study is about clarifying the socioeconomic impact refugees have on Kenya. It presents the general impact of refugees and analyses the case of Kenya to establish whether these impacts are evident locally. The study raises the question of whether refugees are a cost or benefit to the host community and elaborates the challenges they encounter in relation to the development of the host as they stay in the asylum country. The strategies associated with the impact of refugees are also presented.

1.1 Background to the Study

According to UNHCR (2020), the World had 79.5 million people displaced in 2019, 25.4 million of them were refugees, and around half are children. Although most of the refugees reside in the emerging world, the developed nations also do receive refugees. Research shows that refugees create crucial economic and social advantage for their families, the asylum country, and home country. Questions on the effect of refugees on host community and hosting nations are framed in form of burden versus benefits (Allen 2009). Most policy makers and states look at the public resources used to incur the cost of hosting refugees, which they think outweighs the micro- and macro-economic benefits accrued from the refugees (Zetter *et al.*, 2012).

There is a global literature from USA, Europe, Yemen, Jordan, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Kenya that document the negative impacts refugees have on host communities like creating national security threats, increased rents, heightened food prices, taking away jobs especially of low skilled host community workforce, stretching national public expenditure due to investment in education, health, security, water, and sanitation among others. On the flipside refugees positively contribute to the local economy through provision of cheap labor and increased payment of taxes through legitimate business engagement (Betts, 2009; Francis, 2015).

The refugee burden and problem has equally hit Kenya in various fronts including security, political, social, and environmental fronts. This problem is one that the state of Kenya and world at large cannot ignore. According to UNHCR Kenya (2020a), two of Kenya's neighbors-Somalia and South Sudan are among the top six republics contributing to a large number of refugees across the globe. Out of the world's 79.5 million refugees, 2.2 million of them are from South Sudan while around 1 million are from Somalia. Kenya has a total of 499,219 registered asylum seekers and refugees from Somalia (54%), South Sudan (24.6%), DRC (9%), Ethiopia (5.8%) and the remaining 6.6% was shared by Sudan (2.01%), Burundi (3.24%), Uganda (0.52%), Rwanda (0.37%), and Eritrea (0.38%). The highest population of Kenyan refugees came from Somalia and South Sudan totaling to 392,151 refugees as of September 2020 (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b), although the number could be higher since UNHCR only focus on documented refugees. Since, most asylum seekers are running from an unfavorable condition in their home country, rarely do they come with own dependency plan. On the contrary, they solely depend on donations and grants and, in some cases acceptable under the host country's laws of employment. In most instances, the host government is compelled by the international laws to offer asylum

and basic needs to such refugees. As such, when Kenya received a total of 499,219 registered refugees and asylum seekers, it means that it receives the burden of taking care of those asylum seekers who are jobless and majorly depended on aid. Thus, many views this as a burden to the country.

Kenya has accommodated many asylum seekers from several of its neighbors since the 1970s when Amin's government displaced thousands of Ugandans (Elliott, 2012). The country stands out as a major accommodator of refugees in Africa (Momodu, 2019). Kenya's accommodation of Somali refugees started years before the 1990s when the country received asylum seekers from its political-unstable Somalia. Before the 1990s when the country received refugees from Uganda, there was no need for refugee camps since the number of asylum seekers was small. The refugees were registered, given National Identification Cards (IDs), and allowed to integrate with host community (Elliott, 2012).

Additionally, the country did not have comprehensive policy and regulations on management of refugees since, at the time, the issue of refugees was neither burdensome nor common. As such, most of the asylum seekers were absorbed into the country's major towns like Nairobi, Thika, and border towns (Kiama & Karanja, 2013). As the asylum seekers increased in number, in the 90s, due to political instability in Somalia caused by the collapsing of Siad Barre's dictatorial leadership, the need for a camp to host the refugees was conceived (Ciisa-Salwe, 1996).

The Dadaab Refugee complex was institutionalized at that time to take care of the considerable number of Somalis seeking asylum in Kenya. The camp was designed to accommodate a maximum of ninety thousand refugees at the time (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). As time went by, continued political instability and harsh living

environment in Somalia increased the number of refugees seeking asylum in Kenya. Political instability in other Kenya's neighboring countries like Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Burundi, and Rwanda also saw the number of refugee's surge to about half a million (UNHCR Regional Service Center, 2018). This added pressure to the available refugee camps leading to the Kenya government, in collaboration with international community, instituting more other refugee camps. As of September 2020, Kenya hosted 499,219 refugees (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b) of which majority originated from Somalia (54%), South Sudan (24.6%), DRC (9%) and Ethiopia (5.8%) as presented in Table 1.1. The remaining 6.6% was shared by Sudan (2.01%), Burundi (3.24%), Uganda (0.52%), Rwanda (0.37%), and Eritrea (0.38%). These refugees are spread across the country's camps and urban areas including Dadaab, Kakuma, Kalobeyei camps, and urban areas of Nairobi and Moyale (UNHCR Kenya, 2020a). Dadaab complex is the greatest refugee camp by size in Kenya and number of refugees as shown in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1: Refugees in Kenya

Country origin	Dadaab		Kakuma		Kalobeyei		Urban		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Somalia	212,800	78.95	34,998	12.98	103	0.04	21,640	8	269,541	100
South Sudan	619	0.50	84,092	69	29,446	24	8,453	7	122,610	100
DR Congo	72	0.16	12,578	28	1,465	3	30,648	68	44,763	100
Ethiopia	7,438	25.72	5,477	19	4,967	17	11,033	38	28,915	100
Burundi	64	0.40	9,126	56	2,744	17	4,224	26	16,158	100
Sudan	23	0.23	9,476	94	354	4	178	2	10,031	100
Uganda	71	2.73	1,205	46	439	17	881	34	2,596	100
Eritrea	4	0.21	34	2	1	0	1,839	98	1,878	100
Rwanda	8	0.43	625	34	63	3	1,161	63	1,857	100
Other	3	0.34	107	12	41	5	719	83	870	100
Total	221,102	44.29	157,718	32	39,623	8	80,776	16	499,219	100

Source: UNHCR Kenya (2020b).

1.1.1 Dadaab Refugee Complex

The Dadaab refugee complex is situated to the north of the eastern region of Kenya near the Kenya-Somalia Border and is the largest refugee camp based on the number of refugees it hosts (Table 1.1). The Kenya government with request from UNHCR designed the Dadaab refugee complex comprising Dagahaley, Hagadera and IFO camps for the 90,000 Somali inhabitants seeking asylum in Kenya in 1991. As time went by, the Somali refugee populations increased as the situation in Somalia worsened. Although initially the refugees in this complex were people fleeing political instability, severe drought and famine in Somalia exacerbated the influx of refugees into the complex (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

The overcrowding situation in the available camps led to the setting up of the Ifo II and Kambioos camps in 2011. By 2012, the camps hosted over 460,000 refugees in the five camps (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). Since then, voluntary and forced repatriation and assimilation into the host population have lowered this number to 221,102 refugees as of September 2020 (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b). Over 90% of refugees in Dadaab are Somalis (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b) hence their impact on the host country cannot be overlooked. Some scholars have argued that among the refugees hosted in Kenya, those from Somalia stand out due to the direct positive and negative socio-economic effects they pose on the Kenya state (Hassan, 2013).

According to Kamau and Fox (2013), majority of Somali refugees in Dadaab have resided there for over ten years, with a significant count of them being second and third generation refugees. As such, a share of the refugees has given birth to and raised their children in the Dadaab refugee complex— these children have never gone

to Somalia and connect mainly with Kenya hence are uncertain of the reception they are likely to receive when repatriated to their native land.

1.1.2 Government Contribution to Refugee Settlement

Host government has a big responsibility to play concerning the protection and management of refugees (Nicholson & Kumin, 2017; World Bank, 2019). However, the background of how the host nation perceived and welcomed refugees at the beginning significantly informs the attitude hence perceptions towards them. This means that understanding Kenya's contribution towards refugees must be investigated from the beginning-whether the country was aware of its obligations to refugees when it accepted them.

History informs that as Somalia was going through a political conflict caused by Siad Barre's collapsed government, Kenya was also going through a political heat of its own—the multiparty democracy politics. As such, when considerable number of refugees came into the country from Somalia, Kenya was not prepared to receive them. Neither was the leadership of the country united to concentrate on the issue of settling refugees. The country lacked capacity to receive such substantial number of refugees at a go. The refugee issue was also abstract to Kenya based on lack of history and comprehension of refugee impact to the country due to the country's lack of elaborate international policy governing the handling of asylum seekers and refugees. Additionally, Kenya's hosting of refugees was more of a pressure from the UN rather than out of the nation's free will (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). As such, the government directed a lot of its focus on multiparty politics while it allowed UNHCR to proceed with the management of refugees (Abuya, 2004). The Kenya government in partnership with the UNHCR then agreed on encampment of the refugees to easily

provide to them the much-needed protection, easily identify them, and offer humanitarian assistance. This was the foundation of setting up refugee camps. To refugees, the downside of the camps was their restricted movement while to the government, camps ensured control and management of refugees (Elliott, 2012; Jaji, 2009).

The partnership between Kenya and UNHCR and the acceptance to host refugees meant that the Kenya government agreed to act as per the international laws on the management of refugees. As such, the Kenya government was expected to offer protection and other services to refugees according to the prescriptions of refugee management laws. Kenyan laws implemented later also emphasized the role of government on asylum seekers—according to the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the central government is tasked with managing refugees through the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) and in partnership with UNHCR.

The county government has no role besides that of providing land onto which refugee camps should be set up (The Law library of Congress, 2016). This means that, according to Kenyan laws, the national government is expected to co-partner in taking care of refugees. Although this article does not detail the kind of partnership the government should offer, it still details the role that needs to be played. However, in practice, the support the government offers towards refugee management excludes provision of relief assistance (The Law Library of Congress, 2016).

Encampment of refugees is a role of the host nation and is aimed at ensuring protection of refugees. However, critics view encampment policy as a violation of freedom of movement of refugees, which is protected by local and international laws (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000). Through the encampment

policy, Kenya promises to protect and support all refugees contained in camps according to the law (Elliott, 2012).

To control the violation of the policy, host nations tie relief aid to the location of the refugee such that those outside camps do not benefit from it (the aid). Additionally, host's security and policing agents are often accused to harassing refugees not residing in their camps as a way of enforcing the policy (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000). What is more, several cases of worrying situation in camps have been reported ranging from poor education, inaccessibility to safe drinking water, inaccessibility to reasonable sanitation facilities, insecurity, lack of access to reasonable health and inaccessibility to basic needs, among others (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

Although the Kenyan constitution under the bill of rights gives the state the responsibility of ensuring all people (including refugees) access these rights unconditionally, the actual practical happenings are different. Refugees are not granted some of the fundamental rights a human being should access as detailed in article 43 that all people (including refugees) have the right to safe clean water, adequate food, adequate and accessible housing, highest attainable health standard social security, and education. in Kenya, refugees live in places where the government does not provide them with basic needs or social security as is demanded in the article (43). To cover this neglect by Kenya government, Refugee Consortium of Kenya (2012) reveals that specialised departments of the UN like UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Programme, and some concerned NGOs provide the basic requirements to refugees comprising education, food and water, sanitation, healthcare, and shelter. Additionally, the 1969 OAU convention on refugee protection which has been ratified

by Kenya indicates that refugees should not be denied equal treatment to non-refugees (host) because they are equal human beings. The convention further warns member states against denying refugees freedom of movement, yet this freedom is not granted to refugees in Kenya. This is absconding or delegation of roles by the Kenyan government contrary to article 43 of the Kenyan constitution (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012). It also indicates government's lapse in offering administrative support to refugees (Nicholson & Kumin, 2017).

Similarly, the refugee security and safety expected from the government is not what is delivered practically. Reports show that many refugees have complained of extortion, unjustified arrests and detention, and harassment from police to the extent many refugees have lost faith in Kenya police offering protection in camps. On many occasions, refugees have become hostile against police in camps (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012; Yarnell & Thomas, 2014). These form examples of how refugees influence the social environment of the hosting government.

Additionally, various stakeholders like human rights defenders and NGOs criticized the protection African host nations offer refugees. They informed that host nations do not protect refugees from harassment and intimidation by political factions and hostile host citizens (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000). In support of this, a survey done in Dadaab camps revealed that 56% of the refugees felt unsafe being in refugee camps (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012). In fact, the survey report says that the Kenya government is to blame for all protection concerns, as it is the custodian of all policies that would enhance the safety of refugees. The government should also ensure that security organs like police stick to the mandate of offering

protection to all-including refugees. These events lie within the mandate of the government according to the law as already explained in this study.

1.2 Problem Statement

The conversation on the aftermath of refugees to the host and neighboring communities is an old issue at the international level. Across the globe, a country that receives a lot of refugees faces different kinds of positive and negative social and economic impacts. In Kenya, there is a perception that refugees are costly to the nation and have no benefits to national development. This perception has influenced the way refugees are treated across the country where the government does not care about the state of amenities in refugees' camps. As such, the human rights of refugees are always breached through poor sanitation and scarcity of basic needs like shelter, food, and water as the state does not recognize refugees to have any positive impact on national development. Rather, the state perceives refugees as pests whose existence is harmful and costly to Kenya.

It is well documented globally that refugees are a burden to the environment, economy, and social state (specifically security) of the hosting nation (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997; Miller, 2018). Negative perception on the impacts of refugees on Kenya's security and economy greatly lie on national decision-making. In terms of the economy, refugees are perceived as a burden as they compete with the locals for jobs, influence increased commodity prices and inflation, influence property prices to go up, pile pressure on available natural resources, physical amenities, and infrastructure among others. In fact, refugees are portrayed to have no positive contribution to national development, which makes the public to perceive them as invaders. However, this departs from the findings of several studies across the world

that indicate refugees, when well incorporated and settled into the host nation, have positive developmental impacts (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997; Richard, 2013; Miller, 2018).

Kenya, being one of the top refugee hosting countries in Africa (Momodu, 2019), has for long time, believed that refugees are a cost to the nation yet World over, refugee communities have significant flow of resources as well as engage in income generating activities and trade with the host communities. However, this benefit of refugees has not been vividly reflected in the Kenyan case as government and senior politicians continue to insist on the refoulement of Somali refugees and termination of Dadaab refugee camps because they are a cost and not beneficial to the country (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). There lacks objectivity in presenting the socioeconomic impacts of Somali refugees to the hosting communities in specific and Kenya in general. This is the problem this study aimed to answer by clarifying the diabolic view regarding the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees to the host communities.

1.3 The Study Objective

The main objective of this study was to clarify the diabolic view regarding the socio-economic implications of refugees to the host community by looking at the case of Somali refugees in Dadaab Refugee Camps.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- i. To assess the influence Somali refugees in Dadaab camps have on Kenya's socio-economic development.
- ii. To investigate the security concern of keeping and maintaining Somali Refugees in Kenya.

- iii. To analyze the challenges Somali refugees in Dadaab camps face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya.
- iv. To establish the strategies for enhancing the socio-economic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab camps to host community.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. Does the Somali refugee community in Dadaab make a significant socio-economic contribution to the host community?
- ii. What are the security concerns of keeping and maintaining Somali refugees in Kenya?
- iii. What challenges do Somali refugees in Dadaab camps face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya?
- iv. What are the strategies for enhancing the socio-economic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab camps to host community?

1.5 Justification of the Study

There are many studies and publications done on the issue of refugees globally and locally. However, majority of these works emphasize on the wellbeing of refugees rather than the socio-economic impacts they pose to the host communities. Additionally, just as it happens in other nations, Somali refugees in Kenya have been associated with insecurity and pressure on available physical amenities to the extent that these effects have encouraged opponents of refugee hosting and politicians to call for refoulement of the migrants and termination of Dadaab camps. These calls have been sustained by research like Lind *et al.* (2015); Zetter *et al.* (2012); Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) that indicate that refugee hosting is a costly affair.

Given the unclear impact of refugees in Kenya, there has not been created a policy that will clearly regulate the activities of refugees to encourage their positive impacts and minimize their negative impact to the host. This study therefore gives room upon which readers and policy makers will draw information to justify given policy creation to enable good management of refugees in the host nation.

What is more, in Kenya particularly, little has been written on the socio-economic effect of refugees to the Dadaab host society and Kenya at large. This is despite numerous submissions by the Government of Kenya and media reports that Dadaab refugee camps have caused environmental degradation, are transit routes to small arms and offer safe environment for the planning and implementation of terror acts. It is therefore based on these claims and reports coupled with the lack of empirical findings of the Somali refugees in Dadaab camp on the socio-economic influence on the host community that this research was founded.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study is of importance to several groups of people. First, the study informs the public the socio-economic impacts of hosting refugees to the host community. Through the study, Kenyans will learn of the costs and benefits their government takes in hosting refugees hence be informed of how refugees impact them and their country. This information will shape how the public and government perceives refugees hence contribute to development of policies that will reduce refugee costs and increase their benefits. Since the public is a major player in policy formulation, the information they gather from this study will be instrumental in helping them make decisions that are beneficial and useful in the creation of policies that are not retrogressive.

The study is also useful to NGOs and human rights groups like UNHCR in that it will inform them of the costs and benefits the Kenya Government goes through in hosting refugees in general and Somali refugees in specific. As such, the study prompts these organisations to engage refugee management strategies that will see the freedoms and rights of host citizens are not threatened by accommodating refugees. Thus, the study informs human rights organisations on the need to ensure they protect the rights and freedoms of refugees and host communities equally.

The study is also beneficial to policy creators, and researchers. Policy makers will learn from this study the gaps in policy that need to be addressed to ensure peaceful and beneficial stay of refugees and citizens as well as ensure the negative impacts of refugees are mitigated while positive socio-economic contribution of the refugees to the host community is enhanced. The findings and recommendations of this study will bring forth areas about refugees and socio-economic impacts that need further research hence the significance of the study to researchers.

1.7 The Scope of the Study

The scope of the study was defined by the study objectives, research variables, research philosophy, research design, and area and time of study. The scope was limited to investigating the socio-economic implications of refugees to Dadaab host community. The specific area of study was Dadaab refugee (complex) which currently has three small camps within it—Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. Previously the complex had five camps, but Ifo II and Kambioos camps were closed recently, and refugees distributed to the remaining camps while others were repatriated back to Somalia and/or other camps within the country. Since various locations might have presented different findings, limiting the study to these camps ensured that no foreign

variants arose to affect the study's findings and applicability to the case of Dadaab camps.

The scope was also defined by the pragmatic research philosophy and mixed methods research design. The respondents studied comprised the Kenya government officials dealing with refugees in Dadaab camps (Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS)), officials from the National Treasury-Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs and institute of Economic Affairs; Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) officers, UNHCR officials, UNICEF, Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), Danish Refugee Council, officers from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria and Eye on Security; Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant county commissioner—Dadaab, Postal Corporation of Kenya officers at Dadaab post office, Sub County assistant superintendent of police—Dadaab, Dadaab Sub-county police commander, Sub-county children's officer and education officer-Dadaab, Public Health officer-Dadaab, officers from Youth Education pack (YEP), Local Financial institutions—Dadaab; Somali refugees in Dadaab camps, and the local communities around Dadaab camp. The study targeted to collect qualitative and quantitative data whereby descriptive statistics were used to analyse the quantitative data while tables used to present findings. Thematic analysis used to analyse qualitative data, which was then presented using direct quotes and narrations.

in the current fast-changing world, many things change with time. in appreciation of the changing times, the study defined its study times as December 2020 to January 2021, which is the time when the study was conducted. Factors happening beyond this time were outside the scope used herein. These factors define the scope of the study.

1.8 Limitations of Study

The study sampled a section of the entire population (particularly for refugees and host communities) whose results might not have been an accurate representation of the entire population. However, to eliminate the possible bias in generalising the findings to the study, the sampling process was systematically implemented to ensure that the best- and well-informed informants were included to take part in the study.

There was likelihood of self-reporting bias by the respondents as this method called for participants' responses to the researcher's questions without his/her interference. Examples of self-reporting included surveys, questionnaires, or interviews. Nevertheless, self-reported data are often perceived to be undependable and threatened by self-reporting bias. To overcome this bias, the researcher triangulated the responses given using the different methods applied.

The study targeted participants like security officers and government officials like county commissioners who may only advance an agenda favourable to their lines of work. For instance, government officials may want to project a scenario where refugees are portrayed as bad while security officers may want to portray refugees as a security threat to advance government agenda. This was addressed through informed consent and confidentiality. On informed consent, participants were enlightened on the purpose of this study and encouraged to give facts not influenced by personal or employer feelings as this study was for academic and policy change purposes. During data collection, the researcher also requested for justifications or evidence for any claims made to ensure objectivity. On confidentiality, respondents were given a cover of hidden identity to allow them to share their view anonymously, which eliminated fear of being persecuted for participating or being objective in the study.

Most of the people in Dadaab are fluent Somali speakers and know little or no English or Swahili, which are Kenya's national languages. Since the study was likely to collect data using the Somali dialect, which is understandable to the locals, there might have arisen a problem in retaining the meaning as the content was translated from Somali to English. Interpreting the findings into English may have eroded the original meaning of some of the responses. To address this limitation, highly experienced interpreters were sought. Additionally, triangulation method was used where the researcher contracted three or four different interpreters whose translation was compared and merged to arrive to the best meaning as intended by the respondents.

Given the sensitivity of the security issue and its impact to the lives of refugees, it was likely that the responses to be given would be shaped by the side the respondent inclined. Those inclined towards the government side were likely to give information that criminalized the refugee camps while those against the closure of the camps or repatriation of refugees were likely to portray the camps as a source of peace. This was likely to give the researcher conflicting information. As such, triangulation method was used where data was collected from various sources and then harmonized.

1.9 Assumptions of the Study

Generally, the study assumed that the findings given by respondents were truthful and a reflection of the impacts of refugees to the development of the host country (Kenya). On the second objective concerning the existing insecurity threats posed to Kenya by Somali refugees, the study assumed that (1) the respondents would give truthful information whether it portrayed refugees in good or bad faith without advancing own interests and (2) that there exists security concerns associated to

Somali refugees in Dadaab camps. Concerning the objective that identified the challenges Somali refugees in Dadaab camps encounter when contributing to the socioeconomic development of Kenya, the study assumed that there were challenges that Somali refugees in Dadaab encountered while contributing to the socioeconomic development of Kenya. On the last objective, the study assumed that there were strategies that could be applied to Somali refugees in Dadaab to enhance their contribution on Kenya's socioeconomic development.

1.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter has introduced the background of the study and detailed what the rest of the study is all about. The chapter has defined what is known so far about the main thesis for the study, the problem description, the objectives under study, and the justification, significance, and scope of the study. Assumptions and limitations of this study are also presented in this chapter. The next chapter, chapter two, deals with the reviewed literatures and presents the empirical, theoretical, and conceptual framework literatures. The third chapter presents the research methodology where the research design, target population and sample, data collection methods and data analysis methods are detailed, and their choice justified. Chapter four shows data presentation analysis and interpretation while chapter five is the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Overview

This chapter presents the reviewed literature related to the study. The review presents what other researchers have done in the field of refugee hosting and the effect refugees have on national security, economy, social set up and environment. By reviewing relevant empirical studies, the study specified the gaps in existing knowledge that was addressed by this study. Relevant literature was reviewed from various sources including newspapers, articles, books, journals, periodicals, and electronic articles. The literature review was based on detailed analysis of the four major objectives spelt out in chapter one.

This section reviewed literature on the socio-economic, political, and environmental factors on how past refugees' flow have affected the hosting communities. Next, the chapter highlighted appropriate foundational information about Somali refugees in Dadaab to connect the investigation to the local scenario. This chapter presents literature review on the economic effects of refugees on the hosting populations. It sought to identify the theoretical and methodological gaps in the field.

2.1 Key Concepts

2.1.1 Global and Kenyan Refugee Situation

According to UNHCR (2020), the numbers of people forcibly displaced across the globe increased by 2.9 million from the previous year to 79.5 million in 2019 and out of these, 30 – 34 million were children below 18 years old. Emerging states host 85% of the world's refugees. Out of the people displaced, 26 million of them were refugees— 20.4 million being overseen by UNHCRs while 5.6 million (mostly Palestine

refugees) being managed by the UNRWA. Forty-five point seven million of these were displaced internally and 4.2 million were asylum seekers. UNHCR manages over 85% of the world's refugees—majority of whom are in the developing world. Lebanon has the highest number of refugees relative to the citizens— one in every six people in Lebanon is a refugee under UNHCR's mandate (UNHCR, 2020).

Sixty eight percent of the globe's asylum seekers originate from five countries— Venezuela, Myanmar, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria. The five main countries of asylum include Turkey (3.6 million people), Columbia (1.8 million), Uganda (1.4 million), Pakistan (1.4 million), and Germany (1.1 million). Children are the most affected by forced displacement as they are many refugees and that developing countries bare the biggest cost of hosting refugees. Developing countries are low-income and have a scarcity of resources to solve their citizens' needs. As such, burdening them with the hosting of refugees only indicate the hardships refugees go through in trying to earn a decent living. This statistic also indicates the great mandate UNHCR must ensure refugees in developing world are well taken care of (UNHCR, 2020).

Often, after crossing the borders of their countries, refugees encounter difficulties in host countries. Most of these difficulties arise from the competition for resources with host citizens and/or politicisation of refugee hosting. As such, many states host refugees in camps where they can easily monitor and take care of them until they are taken back to their countries. Across the world, many states bordering unstable countries have refugee camps (Raptim Humanitarian Travel, 2018). According to UNHCR (2020), out of every 100 refugees, 73 of them and Venezuelans displaced overseas settle in neighbouring counties to their home country in the developed

nations like the US and Germany, for instance, many refugees are given unique visas and integrated into the community—either in houses meant for homeless people or among the country's citizenries. Fewer refugee camps are available in these countries (Nowrasteh, 2016; Karasapan, 2017).

in other countries like Turkey, Jordan, and Gaza, refugee camps are very dominant (Starr, 2013). In Asian countries like in Bangladesh, the situation is similar to that of Turkey where refugee camps are the common centres for housing refugees. Africa hosts some of the largest camps for refugees across the globe (Raptim Humanitarian Travel, 2018). The largest refugee camps are found in Asia and Africa. However, the recent crisis in Syria has also led to ballooning asylum seekers flocking European and Middle East countries with majority of them seeking refuge in Turkey, Jordan, and Yemen.

According to UNHCR Kenya (2020b), in 2020, 85% of the world's refugees were from developing nations; 57% were from three countries namely South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria. Over one third of the refugees are in middle east/eastern European countries while the sub-Saharan Africa hosted one third of the world's refugees—6.3 million refugees. The increase was associated with the displacement happening in South Sudan. Uganda and Sudan received majority of these refugees. of the refugees displaced in Africa, South Sudan had the largest number (2.2million), Somalia (1 million), DRC (0.8 million), Sudan (0.7 million), followed by Central African Republic (CAR). While Uganda hosted majority of South Sudanese refugees, Kenya hosted majority of the Somali refugees. However, Somali refugees are found in Uganda but in small numbers while South Sudanese refugees are also found in

Kenyan refugee camps but on small numbers compared to Somali refugees (see Table 1.1 on page 4).

Kenya has two main refugee camps (Dadaab and Kakuma refugee complexes) known internationally and managed by the UNHCR in partnership with the Kenyan government. It is noteworthy that refugees based in Kenya are victims of persecution, war, and drought from their home countries, which have unstable political regimes. Somalia has undergone over two decades political instability after the collapse of the dictatorial Siad Barre's government coupled with a severe drought that affected Somalia in 2011 which displaced majority of the Somalis (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). In South Sudan, the country's political instability arose from disagreements between two centres of power-one headed by the current president Salva Kiir while the other side headed by the former vice president Riek Machar (Lemi, 2017). Political instability in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and CAR had also led to forceful displacement of some of their people to Kenya. Over 90% of the documented refugees in Kenya are under UNHCR's mandate (UNHCR Kenya, 2020a).

2.1.2 Legal Framework Governing Refugee Management

2.1.2.1 The international Refugee Laws

The international Refugee law is not only premised on the need to provide shelter to people persecuted by states but to offer refuge to those whose home countries are unable to protect them from persecution (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). The international refugee law is informed by several articles/conventions including the 1948 universal declaration on human rights, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees. Besides, there are other laws like the 1969 Convention of

the Organization of African Unity and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, which govern the management of refugees although they are specific to Latin America and Africa respectively. These laws are discussed in detail in the following sub-topics.

2.1.2.2 The 1948 universal declaration of human rights

The 1948 universal declaration on human rights is a group of laws that outline the rights and freedoms refugees should access and is one of the base guidelines towards the refugee protection law. The declaration was developed to bind all UN member states together with their jurisdictions. The declaration holds that all people are born equal and free to each other and as such should be treated with a brotherly spirit (UN General Assembly, 1948). This encourages people to treat asylum seekers with respect (brotherliness), their origin/nationality status notwithstanding.

The declaration further outlines that everyone should be allowed to access all fundamental rights and freedom including right to life, security of person and liberty among other rights and that race, religion, sex, language, age, colour, birth, nationality or social origin, wealth, political opinion, or any other factor should not be used to find any form of discrimination or violation of human rights. This sets the premise that refugees should not be discriminated based on their state, as refugees but rather, their life, security of person and liberty should be upheld. This binds states that receive refugees to take a role of protecting refugees as opposed to abandoning them (UN General Assembly, 1948). Apart from the right to protection and non-discrimination, the declaration, in article 23, informs that everyone has the right to employment and just remuneration, which allows refugees to freely work within the borders of countries in which they seek asylum (UN General Assembly, 1948).

2.1.2.3 The 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol

The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees gives the foundation to all international laws on refugee. It also sets out universal explanation of who a refugee is and the responsibilities and rights of a refugee and what the host country is obligated to do towards refugees. The law also specifies how to handle certain categories of people like war criminals, who should not enjoy the rights of a refugee. Kenya became party to these laws in 1966 and is therefore bound by them (The Law library of Congress, 2016).

The 1951 convention was set up to shield refugees arising from the world wars. As such, its scope was majorly European. With the growing issue of refugees across the world, the convention's scope had to be enlarged for straightforward application to non-European settings. As such, it was amended by the 1967 protocol. The 1967 Protocol did away with the temporal and geographic limitations to implementing the convention and embraced Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention as well as supplemented with additional provisions (comprising enhancements to the description of "*refugee*"). The 1967 Protocol is autonomous and essentially connected with the 1951 Convention and should be sanctioned by State organs autonomously to the Convention. The state of Kenya in 1981 assented to the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR, 2011a).

While all articles of the 1951 convention and the related 1967 protocol are important to this thesis, what stands out is the part on Non Refoulement. The State Party accepts specific obligations concerning the safeguarding of people identified as refugees, and the framework of non-refoulement is central to this safeguard. in the 1951 Convention, Article 33 informs that the non-refoulement principle is a duty on nations

to desist from taking refugees back to the frontlines where their freedoms or life is endangered. The rule also covers migrants awaiting determination of their status in asylum country but does not cover migrants who, if welcomed, are dangerous to the host community's security (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2011).

When the Kenyan government showed intent and initiated the process of closing Dadaab refugee camp, the court case determining the legality of the process invoked this article 33 of the convention in making its ruling. The court found that, regarding the non-refoulement clause, asylum seekers must be protected from going back to a place where their freedoms and life are endangered until such a time when the threats would be non-existent and that they would no longer be refugees. Otherwise, the state would be violating the non-refoulement clause. The Court also recognized that the principle covered all asylum-seekers and refugees irrespective of whether they are formally recognized as refugees or not, comprising in situations where the decision to admit one on individual's refugee status has not been reached (Petition No.628 of 2014).

The Court also found that there exist certain reasonable exemptions when the principle of non-refoulement may not apply—when there is adequate ground to believe that holding a given individual as a refugee may threaten the security of a nation or the individual was found guilty to have committed a gross crime hence is a risk to the society. This exception must be considered individually to eliminate collective condemnation or generalization of crime. As such, the Kenya government's call to close refugee camps because the entire refugee community was a threat to security did not stand according to this exception (Petition No.628 of 2014).

2.1.2.4 Refugee protection laws in Africa

2.1.2.4.1 The 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity

Towards the end of the colonial era, Africa experienced numerous conflicts that resulted in huge counts of asylum seekers being produced. This prompted the creation and implementation of the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention concerning the address to exact issues affecting immigrants in Africa. In this OAU convention, the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees was ratified for application in member states to the OAU. Besides adopting the definition of a refugee explained in the 1951 convention, the OAU law expanded those refugees included those forced to exit their countries due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of a person’s country of origin or nationality” (Article 1, OAU Convention). This means that people escaping civil conflicts, prevalent war and violence are entitled to refugee privileges in OAU member states even if their fear of persecution is not justified.

The provision also indicates that hosting refugees is the responsibility of all OAU member states, notwithstanding whether the state has refugees within its boundaries or not. In article 5 of the convention, the principle of voluntary repatriation is clearly detailed whether host states are not allowed to forcefully engage refugees to return to their home nations if they do not feel safe. What is more, asylum givers in collaboration with refugee home nations should work together to ensure safe voluntary repatriation and settlement. As such, these submissions indicate the OAU’s commitment to ensuring the lives and freedoms of refugees are safeguarded and that no ill-treatment or harassment is accorded to them in the asylum country.

2.1.2.5 Refugee Protection Laws in Kenya

2.1.2.5.1 The Constitution of Kenya and other laws

The constitution of Kenya acknowledges refugee rights and upholds the protection of these rights. In article 2(5, 6), the constitution recognizes all international laws, conventions, and treaties ratified by Kenya as binding laws of the country. This gives way for the application of any non-Kenyan law by origin/operation if the country ratifies it. As such, international laws, treaties, and conventions advocating for the protection of refugees and ratified by the country are binding to the state. These include the treaties and conventions concerning refugee protection comprising the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, OAU Convention and the African Charter. Additionally, Kenya is bound by other international laws governing people's rights like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the ICCPR (international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)(Malombe, Mavunjina, Medi, & Mbataru, n.d.).

Article 10 of the Kenya Constitution details that state organs and officials must treat all people within the country's boundaries according to these values and principles. Otherwise, they commit an offense that is punishable under Kenyan laws. In chapter 4 of the constitution, the rights guaranteed to all human beings are detailed. This bill of rights is foundational to Kenya's economic, social, and cultural policies. It details the rights and fundamental freedoms every human being within Kenya's boundaries should access as an entitlement (The constitution of Kenya, 2010, Chapter 4).

Notably, these essential freedoms and rights are not restricted for Kenyan citizens but should also be enjoyed by all within the country's borders (including refugees) regardless of their status or method through which they entered the country.

Nevertheless, limitations on the fundamental freedoms and rights in the Bill of Rights are justified in certain circumstances as indicated in the constitution of Kenya, article 24(1). The responsibility of establishing proof for limiting the rights lies with the state (Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 others vs Attorney General, 2013).

Additionally, the constitution prescribes that state organs have the duty to protect marginalized and minority groups is not a preserve of citizens but also for all the other individuals covered in the country's territory. The Kenyan Courts established that refugees, based on their circumstances, are an exceptional group of people who are minority and vulnerable (Kituo Cha Sheria & 8 others vs Attorney General, 2013). in article 238(2), the constitution provides that Kenya's national security should be ensured and guaranteed according to human rights principles, basic freedoms and by following the law. Here the protection of national security is strongly hinged into the Kenyan laws and human rights protection and not on heresies. As such, as the Kenyan Government targets to safeguard its national security, utmost upholding of human rights (including those of refugees) must be adhered to.

2.1.2.5.2 The Refugee Act 2006

in 2006, Kenya initiated the operationalization of refugee laws to ensure law protected refugee handling. The laws include the Refugees Act that was applied in 2007 and its subordinate legislation, Regulations whose application started in 2009. As per the Refugees Act, refugee status is not acquired automatically once an asylum seeker enters the country but is acquired when that asylum seeker applies to be registered and identified as a refugee (Regulation 11(1)). The refugee act, in section 3(1 & 2), groups refugees into two branches— *prima facie* and statutory refugees. The definition of 'statutory' was borrowed from the 1951 Convention and that of '*prima facie*'

borrowed from the OAU conventions' general description of a refugee as provided in Article I (2) (Republic of Kenya, 2012: The UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; OAU 1969 Convention).

The year 2017 saw the signing of the Refugees Bill 2016 into law—the Refugees Act, 2016. This new law created the Refugee Affairs Department (RAD), which is tasked with the management of all refugees in the country. The RAD is under the supervision of Cabinet Secretary (CS) to the ministry of interior and Coordination of National Government. This CS oversees announcing the refugee status of a person—whether *prima facie* or not— and is permitted to change or revoke such pronouncement. Since the Kenya constitution is the greatest Kenyan law, the revocation or alteration of refugee status must be according to the prescriptions laid by the constitution (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

The Refugees Act 2016 allows voluntary renunciation or end of refugee status arising from circumstantial changes. It also allows the barring of legal refugees using the same justification as the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention, comprising commission of grave crimes that are non-political outside the boundaries of the hosting nation prior to being admitted and acting against the UN and AU resolves and values. Additionally, under this law, the refugee status of a person can be revoked when that person commits a serious non-political crime inside Kenya. This means that by applying this law, the Kenya government would only need to prove that a given refugee has committed serious crimes inside or outside Kenya for them to lose their refugee status (Republic of Kenya, 2012: The UN 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; OAU 1969 Convention).

Noteworthy is the fact that the law targets to punish individuals who commit crimes not the entire group of refugees unless all of them, individually or as a group, are party to the crimes. The law further informs that the commissioner of refugees can revoke one's refugee status if there is justifiable ground to believe that the person with the refugee status endangers security locally or nationally. Additionally, the Commissioner can demand the dismissal of refugees because of public order according to the non-refoulement rule in part 18 of the Refugees Act 2016; and/or according to the action of the Cabinet Secretary according to the law (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

What is more, according to the Refugees Act 2016, once recognized as a refugee, the refugee together with his/her family members residing in host country (Kenya) are entitled to rights and privileges to a refugee subject to the provisions of the international laws and conventions ratified by Kenya according to the Kenya's constitution. Additionally, the Refugees Act embraces non-refoulement rule explained in the OAU Convention and 1951 Convention that submits: The Refugees Act, thus, offers guidelines for the extraction of refugees' status, and their refoulement as per the position agreeable with relevant international laws. Therefore, there is a chance for the Kenya state to institute a strategy of extracting refugee status (and, according to the receiving country's insecurity status, dismissing refugees whose statuses have been withdrawn), for instance, due to terrorist acts by refugees. The refugee act does not allow bulk expulsions, otherwise, a specific analysis of refugees should be done, and the findings assessed to establish whether there is justifiable reason for suspecting terrorist activity among them and whether the reason justifies expulsion (Republic of Kenya, 2012).

Government of Kenya employs encampment policy in refugee protection in Kenya, with the heightened concerns on terrorism. The concern in this is that encampment and extended refugee status expose many men, women, and children to weary living states, leading to unexploited human potential and severe attenuation of people's dignity. Research conducted in Dadaab refugee camp established that the dependence on aid, which in most cases is inadequate, discouraged refugees and caused them to feel less worthy, as they were unable to escape the refugee status in camps or make better their living conditions (Abdi, 2008).

Noteworthy, the host nation and international community do not seem to act towards reducing this feeling of unworthiness. For instance, in late 2012 and early 2013, the Kenya government through press release confined the movement of refugees (particularly Somali refugees) to within camps. This restricted right to mobility and work among the refugee community. The order also required all refugees outside camps to relocate to camps, but this was not implemented effectively due to various challenges including inability to identify non-encamped refugees among Kenyan cities. This order was done as a measure to manage attacks from Somali based terror group—Al Shabaab terrorists (Ombati, 2012).

As much as these orders sounded justified to the Kenyan government in fighting terrorist attacks, they were not constitutional as was established in a judgment challenging their implementation. It was ruled that restricting refugees to camps went against the rule of non-refoulement, refugees' freedom, which is a right, and freedom of movement enshrined in the Refugee Act 2016, the Kenya constitution, as well as other universal laws ratified by Kenya (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

2.2 Empirical Literature Review

2.2.1 Refugee influence on host's socio-economic development

2.2.1.1 General Implications of Refugees

Since majority of the countries hosting refugees across the world are poor, welcoming, and hosting refugees increases the prevailing pressure on economic, social, environmental, and sometimes political challenges in these countries. Moreover, the problem is augmented when refugee figures are a substantial proportion of the host society. The existence of refugees and the pressure they exert on the currently pressured services, infrastructure, and economy compound the destitution experienced by the host populations. As such, refugees are viewed as a hindrance or impediment to the advancement of the hosting nation. The negative implications may continue to persist years after the refugee issue is resolved. Rarely do the efforts of the international aid help avert this problem (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997). Noteworthy, refugees also have positive impacts on the host. For instance, Richard (2013) considers that sometimes refugee influx to a given area or country leads to positive effects like attracting investors and bringing cheap and skilled labour. Thus, refugees have positive and negative implications to the host community across the world.

2.2.1.2 Implication of refugees in Kenya

Proximity of the Dadaab refugee camp to Somalia coupled with the porous Kenya-Somalia border make it easy for rebels and militants from the Somalia to easily enter the camp and hide among refugees (Rabasa *et al.*, 2007) where they get better environment for retreating after engaging in terror acts hence leading to crime and conflict with the host communities. According to Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017), it is inaccurate to associate refugees with terror acts because (1) all refugees in

Dadaab are vetted and registered by UNHCR and Kenya government and (2) if stakeholders (particularly Kenya government) have intelligence about some refugees being involved in terrorism or crime, why not arrest them, and take them through the judicial processes.

Although generally refugees have been associated with positive and negative impacts as explained above, not much literature is available to establish empirically the same impacts of refugees in Kenya. It is against this background that this study investigated the socio-economic implications refugees have towards the host community in Kenya using a case of Somali refugees from the Dadaab camps.

2.2.1.3 Socio-economic impacts

It is in public domain that refugees create important social and financial advantages for their dependants in their home countries, as well as to their host destinations. Thus, the question of the effect of refugees on hosting populations and states is framed as a debate between burdens versus benefits (Allen, 2009). Most policy makers and states look on the public resources cost on hosting refugee which they think outweighs the micro- and macro-economic benefits accrued from the refugees Zetter *et al.* (2012). These narrow views with no empirical evidence in most cases define the political agenda and may create social tension between hosts and refugees. To some extent, based on this, refugees become a target through xenophobic attack, discrimination, racism, harassment, and marginalization in the host community and country.

Out of the refugees received across the world, some researchers like Nowrasteh (2016) consider them peaceful while Crisp (2017) observes that the European Union (EU) law enforcement agency and Europol consider majority of terrorists in the EU to

be refugees. Berlatsky (2017) argues that refugees are good people who can participate in economic development once they can integrate with the host nation. They only resort to crimes like terrorism when looked at as threats or lesser people. Nevertheless, a closer look at terrorist acts across the developed world reveals that in the United States of America (USA), 154 attacks by foreign terrorists between 1975 and 2015 were recorded. Out of these cases, those done by refugees were 20 while only four were asylum seekers. Terrorist attacks by refugees could only be associated with one death in every 3.64 billion people every year (Nowrasteh, 2016). This statistic indicates that the chances of a refugee causing a terror attack and killing citizens in the USA were minimal.

in Turkey, Starr's (2013) review established that although Syrian refugees did not threaten the security of the host nation, their camps offered some protection and hideouts for Syrian fighters. The fighters often visited the camps to get supplies, rest and visit their families. As such, refugee camps played part towards enhancing terror by offering refreshment centres for terrorists.

in Germany, Karasapan (2017) observed that the upsurge of refugees in the country in 2014/2015 years did not generally lead to increased crime, but Scally (2018) observed that in 2016, asylum seekers committed over 300,000 crimes. Reportedly, this number of cases had grown from what was experienced the previous year. Majority of the crimes committed were minor and included drugs usage and peddling, and dodging officers in large jurisdictions (Karasapan, 2017). Elsewhere, Koepke (2011) gives a case where the Iranian government blamed refugees from Afghanistan for causing insecurity in Iran through such acts as drug trafficking.

Although generally the developed nations have recorded fewer cases of attacks associated with refugees, Nowrasteh (2016) observes that in most developing nations, majority of the terrorist acts are associated with refugees. In the sub-Saharan Africa, refugees have been numerously associated with insecurity issues in countries like Congo, Uganda, and Kenya. In Chad and Sudan, there were reports that displaced people competed with locals over scarce natural resources like water leading to conflict. In Ghana, Ghanaians considered Liberian refugees as thieves and lawbreakers owed to their involvement in prostitution, gambling, drug trafficking, and robbery (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012).

The refugee dwelling among the host community has possible social impacts, raising conflict, tensions, and slow delivery of essential services particularly when refugees and host community have lived across neighbouring countries and traditional animosities existed due to cultural or ethnic formation or groupings. A case in hand is in 1990s when the existence of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in Macedonia caused inter-ethnic conflicts between the Serbs and Albanians in Macedonia (Pini, 2008).

According to UNHCR (2006), when the host community and refugees residing amongst them share linguistic and cultural ties, there is a higher likelihood of nonviolent co-existence, cohesion, and social interaction among them. An instance of such coexistence is presented by UNHCR where 25,000 Central African Republic (CAR) refugees who fled in 1990s into the Democratic Republic of Congo lived harmoniously with their host. Refugees from CAR were from Yakoma ethnic group just as the Congolese host community. The refugees' ethnic grouping has made them to easily reintegrate into the host community without any tension or problem.

Similar examples were given by UNHCR for the 3 million refugees of Afghan origin in Pakistan, who are mainly from the Pashtun ethnicity. Due to similar ethnic grouping in Pakistan, Afghan refugees have resided peacefully in North-West Frontier province of Pakistan for almost over a decade among the Pashtun communities. Additionally, such experience of peace and tranquillity has been witnessed in the Dadaab refugee camps and their fellow Somali community who are host in Kenya. The Somalis living in Dadaab camps (refugees) and outside the camps (locals) share a culture, clan, religion, tribal ties, and linguistic ties (UNHCR, 2006).

Social conflicts and tensions mostly arise because of inequalities among the host and refugees' populations (Betts, 2009). Traditionally refugees due to their nature of vulnerability do receive global humanitarian aid including food, service (livelihood, vocational training, education, water, sanitation, and health) and non-food items. Such support and assistance services are rarely limited in most host communities. This makes refugees to be looked upon as those who are profiting from fortunate access to livelihood means limited among the host society. To some extent, this creates tensions, conflict, and mistrust among refugees and host communities.

However, Betts further elaborated that such situation can be mitigated if the social services offered by donors are extended to host populations. This enhances the likelihood of the hosting communities to have a positive perception of refugees. To further support above narrative is the case of the Special Program for Refugee Affected Areas (SPRAA) in Tanzania (1997-2003), which profited host populations through encouraging various development projects in the surrounding areas including road constructions, farming, and other income-generating activities (Betts, 2009).

According to UNICEF (2015), global trends show that most refugees are children and as they increase, their demand for education significantly increases yet the education facilities do not increase simultaneously. Thus, the most affected sector is usually education in the host community or country. An example of such a case is given where 50% of the Syrian refugees in Jordan who were below 18 years were affected. For the Syrian refugee children in Jordan, in places like Amman and Irbid, 50% of the schools were overcrowded. This hampers better quality education for children.

Additionally, in some such areas, children access education on shift and rotational basis hence decreasing the time the student spends in class. On the other hand, teachers do double shifts as a strategy of attending to all learners, which make the teachers overworked, and tired yet they are not adequately compensated for that financially (UNDP, 2014). The capability to offer education admittance to all children between the host Jordanians and Syrian refugees amplified the tension in populations hosting refugees.

Such tensions have been witnessed elsewhere among Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese host communities. The intensive conflict involving the Armed Forces of Lebanon and the Fatah-al-Islam sect of Palestine caused the destruction of the refugee camp in Nahr-el Bared in 2007, which prolonged the poor state of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and led to the Lebanese government instituting a widespread all-inclusive approach that would enable the resolution of the prolonged state of the refugees in Nahr-el Bared. This sought to bring out the opportunity in the crisis. This tactic intended to connect relief, recovery, and rebuilding events using native development programmes in the Nahr-el Bared refugee camp and the adjacent surrounding areas (El-Amaout, 2010).

Gender-based abuses regularly surges in war and migration situations and of the most affected are children and women. Women and children are prone to cases of sexual violence, intimate partner abuse, and human trafficking. An example of gender-based violations increasing in a conflict area is given in DR Congo in the Kivu conflict where UN data indicates that in the initial three months of 2010, over 33% of the reported 1,200 sexual violence cases happened to women in these conflict prone provinces of North and South Kivu. The region witnessed unceasing conflict between the military and rebel groups and hosted internally displaced population and refugees from neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2010).

There are existing studies that examined gender-based assaults in relation to livelihood opportunities amongst asylum seekers and refugees. The studies indicate that increasing women's role in income generating activities enhances dissemination of resources at the household level, enhances gender relations, and affects the traditional role of family unit (Women's Refugee Commission, 2009). For example, incomes earned by female members of the family take care of many unemployed Somali men who are refugees in Sanaa City in Yemen. The Somali family structure stipulates that male figure in the family are providers as opposed to the situation of Sanaa City. This is a serious challenge that can lead to domestic violence, psychosocial complications, and suffering (Morris, 2010).

Similar situations to that in Sanaa City have been reported in the West Bank and Gaza, due to security related measures imposed by Israel state have significantly restricted freedom of movement for men and affected their access to livelihood opportunities. As a result, many women in the region engage in informal employment

(like small-scale trading in Gaza, sewing, running grocery shops, etc.) to earn an income that will be used to support their families (World Bank, 2010).

in Bangladesh, the host community view Rohingya refugees as highly lawless, rough, and less uneducated. The host are further threatened by the possibility of being outnumbered by the refugees. These factors have savoured the relationship amongst refugees and hosting communities in the area. From the time Rohingya refugees arrived, host communities grumbled about the increased insecurity cases and barrier points in the area. They indicated that most of the barrier points are guarded by male police officers, who sometimes harass host community women sexually (UNDP, UN Women and Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2018).

The locals also feel that since the arrival of refugees to the area, cases of child labour, kidnappings, domestic violence, robberies, youth drug use, human trafficking, and child marriage had gone up and that these crimes impacted social cohesion between refugees and host. Besides clashes between host and refugees, there also exist clashes between law enforcement authorities and refugees. Another effect of refugees in the Rohingya camps is erosion of the moral fabric of the host community as many host community members feel that the moral standards of many youths in the area have declined due to augmented association with foreign aid workers (UNDP, UN Women and Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2018).

Youth from the host communities in Rohingya were also found to sacrifice their long-standing professional growth forecasts in favour of short-term financial benefits of accepting job opportunities with NGOs rather than progressing with their education. This poses the risk of youths who lack relevant education qualification and skills to undertake certain formal jobs that are highly professional. This is projected to cause

adverse effect on future human capital development in the region. of a similar concern is the fact that young children of school-going age get engaged in hawking at the refugee camps common necessities to support family income, which denies them the chance of concentrating on their studies/schooling (UNDP, UN Women and Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2018).

Additionally, many host community members believe that their own problems are not being considered by government and other stakeholders because all attention has been focused on refugee assistance, which is a priority. Host communities feel ignored by humanitarian organizations and as such are extremely threatened due to the growing competition for jobs, hiked prices, deforestation, and destruction of natural and physical resources (ACAPS and NPM, 2018). Being humane towards refugees is fast fading, a sign that there is need for urgent action to assist the commonly impoverished host community that is the recipient of the extreme burden attached to the refugee crisis.

World over, refugees have been associated with creating scramble for opportunities, resources and social factors which restrain what the hosts would ideally get in the absence of refugees. For instance, According to Fajth, Bilgili, Loschmann, and Siegel (2019), hosting a large number of refugees is associated with high levels of poverty and enhanced economic vulnerability among the hosting communities. Since refugee's sail in the same economic status, there is caused a competition for available resources which triggers tensions and conflicts between refugees and the local populations in the host country.

UNHCR (2011) cited in Miller (2018, p. 5) submits that large numbers of refugees always cause social tensions, violence, and conflicts with the host community

particularly when the refugees are in a very disadvantaged position and/or have divergent ethnic and cultural orientations to the host community. Similarly, in many other countries, refugees have been associated with violence e.g., Ng'ang'a (2016); US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2000) although in most cases they are not the initiators but culprits of the violence. Additionally, refugees are associated with other negative social implications including gambling, alcohol consumption, crime, and prostitution as well as long-term mental health problems to the host community members (Miller, 2018). Refugees enhance multiculturalism and cultural diversity, bring about cheap and skilled labour (Richard, 2013; Miller, 2018).

2.2.1.4 Security Situation

2.2.1.4.1 Global Security Situation

According to Fettweis (2019), the world was safe in 2012 compared to the previous years as it was experiencing less terrorism, less coups, less ethnic associated conflicts, less one-sided conflicts, many countries were at peace with their neighbours, and civil wars had reduced significantly. Raphael (2018) confirms that conflicts, wars, and deaths have reduced significantly across the globe. He submits that diseases like Malaria kill more humans than insecurity does, and that increased democracy is one of the reasons why there has been increased security across the globe.

A study by Clifton (2018) also indicated that over two thirds of the people in the world feel safe while only a third feel unsafe. Although it is a good thing that majority of the people in the world are safe, it is concerning that about 32% of the people feel unsafe. Although these statistics would mean that generally the world is secure, the one-third who feel unsafe inform that there are still security anxieties that should be sorted to make everyone across the globe feel safe.

Currently, terrorism, gang violence, politically or socially motivated conflict, sectarianism, xenophobic attacks, civil wars, racism, and gun attacks are some of the notable security issues evident across the globe in the recent past (Miller, 2018; Clifton, 2018; Martini, Kaye, & Wasser, 2019). Across the developed world, terrorism has been the major security threat. In recent times, 205 terrorist acts have been reported in Europe alone with over 90% of them happening in UK, France, Spain, and Italy. A total of 68 human lives were lost and 844 injured in these attacks. A significant percentage of the incidences were foiled before they happened indicating that the fatalities would have been higher had all planned attacks been successful (Wills, 2018).

In the USA, since the 2001 attack, strategies to identify and foil terror attacks have been intensified. As such, terror attacks have reduced significantly but not completely wiped out. Crime still happens in the USA, which threatens the country's security (Inter Nations, 2019). In recent years, the US has suffered numerous gun attacks which have left many dead and hundreds injured (Berkowitz, Lu & Alcantara, 2019).

Sectarianism is the major cause of insecurity in the Middle East countries and according to Martini *et al.* (2019), countries seeking to control sectarianism must implement border controls, regulate foreign funding to sectarian leaders, offer good governance, promote the development of civil society, support local media, and ensure urban planning is well investigated to enhance connectivity, surveillance, and convenience. In other Middle East countries like Iraq and Syria, political instability and terrorism has caused serious security concerns which have seen many lives lost, many people being left homeless and displaced internally as well as refugees and asylum seekers. In the Far East countries like Indonesia, sectarianism has also been

reported with those who do not belong to the Islam religion being persecuted. Political instability and the nuclear mission of North Korea has also bred animosity between the North and South Korea and other neighbours (Kelly, 2018).

in Africa, the notable security concerns are terrorism, civil wars and insurgencies, state subjugations and human rights violations. To counter these threats, several organisations, and countries in partnerships with the affected African states have engaged insecurity counter measures of which some have borne fruits while others have been unsuccessful. For instance, the United States in partnership with African countries has provided Security Sector Assistance (SSA) measures to address the insecurity issues African states go through, however, this assistance has not been successful in bringing peace rather in some areas it has contributed to gross human rights violations or even intensified conflicts and wars as in the case of Somalia and DRC (Watts, Jackson, Mann, Dalzell, Johnston, Lane, McNerney & Brooks, 2018).

in North Africa, the Arab spring caused significant security concerns with the security of some countries like Libya, which was considered stable, dwindling, and not normalizing by the end of 2017(nine years on) (Abdessadok, 2017). However, although other counties like Egypt and Tunisia were affected by the uprising, they were able to regain stability and peace after some time. Sudan, the latest casualty is unstable since April 2019 after the ouster of Omar El-Bashir. These numerous insecurity cases have caused internally displaced people, asylum seekers and as well threatened the safety of foreigners and other people in those countries.

Global insecurity affects all people (whether refugees or citizens) in a country equally if there are within the unsafe region. However, certain attacks are specific to foreigners and refugees, being asylum seekers in a foreign country, have been

attacked severely in such attacks. For instance, xenophobic attacks against refugees are a common occurrence (Miller, 2018). Aljazeera News Network (2018) also presents a report of a case where several members of a terror group were convicted for intending to attack refugee shelters in Germany, an incident that would violate the rights of refugees in that country. in the US, since the terror attack of September 11, asylum seekers have not had peace in the country both on entry and residence (Kerwin, 2018).

in Europe, immigrant scrutiny has also been increased owing to the numerous terror attacks, which has placed refugees and other asylum seekers on unnecessary checks that degrades and are insensitive to the refugee situation. in Africa, insecurity has also changed how refugees are viewed. initially refugees were viewed as hopeless asylum seekers who need care but after the numerous security issues; cases of refugees being branded as terrorist are common.

2.2.1.4.2 Kenya's National Security

Kenya, being a recipient of a large group of Somali refugees significantly contributes to the global refugee agenda. The country has shouldered huge social, economic, political and security burden to accommodate the Somali refugees' rights within the international tenets. The country's contribution towards refugees is praised across the globe as one among the best countries that continue to host refugees (UNHCR, 2017). During his 2018 visit to Kenya, The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi conveyed to Kenya his appreciation for unending accommodation of approximately 500,000 refugees and opening its borders for asylum seekers from neighbouring countries. As other countries across the world close their borders and

institute restrictive policies towards hosting refugees, Kenya has turned out to be the opposite (Fleming, 2017).

The institution of refugee camps should be the last resort due to the huge social, economic, political and security burden refugees come with to the host countries. Kenya allowing hosting such huge Somali population for a quarter a century is not a mean task. The protracted refugee population has brought advantages and disadvantages to the neighbouring local communities as well as the larger Kenyan citizens. The advantages of refugees and refugee camps include economic benefits arising from enhanced and diversified economic activities to the communities living around camps (Enghoff *et al.*, 2010; World Bank, 2016), enhanced accessibility to money or food exchange for goods, labour, and services, to the host community (World Bank, 2016). The disadvantages of refugees and refugee camps include pressure on available resources and amenities and insecurity cases (Enghoff *et al.*, 2010; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

According to Lake and Rothchild (1998), refugee migrations across the world come with numerous security threats. internationally, the displacement of people threatens the global peace and security. Helton (2002) submits that countries refuse to allow refugee entry into their borders for various reasons including an influx of a significant count of people of a foreign tribal group may arouse xenophobic feelings and conflicts between host citizens and refugees. Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) submits that refugee camps act as safe havens and hideouts for terrorists. The terrorists use the peace of refugee camps to plan and execute terrorist activities against the host country. The report also submits that during the migration of refugees, criminals take advantage of the porous borders and minimal security checks

arising from the closed border and hide among the refugees as they sneak illegal weapons in the host country, which are later used to commit crimes and smuggled goods, which deny the country of VAT revenue.

The areas surrounding Dadaab have been deforested due to the high demand for firewood and charcoal which is the main source of fuel in refugee camps. Research by GVEP international (2016) found that 98 per cent of the refugee population and host communities mainly use firewood for cooking. The research also established over US\$6.3 million is spent on firewood every year as incentives to firewood dealers to cut more trees, which in the end degrades the environment leading to droughts and floods. However, the Kenya government has paid little attention to this environmental degradation compared to the focuses directed towards the country's security from terrorist agencies and proxies.

Kenya has suffered in the hands of terrorist agencies that interfere with international trade, causes religious wars, destroy its citizenry properties, and massacre it. The Government of Kenya has indicated that Dadaab refugee camps are a safe haven for Al Shaabab and other terrorist networks, but critics claim that the government has failed to avail evidence to justify this claim (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017) although a research done by US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (2000) revealed that refugee camps in Kenya and Tanzania were a source of insecurity as they harboured criminals as well as offered safe ground for planning and execution of criminal acts since security patrols in camps is regulated by UNHCR officials.

As the Kenya Government continues to pursue its national security interest, the refugees' basic human rights have been violated by criminal gangs and state police through harassment, intimidation, and abuse. There is regular police-round ups,

harassment, and haphazard arrests of refugees—specifically those of Somali ethnicity by Kenya’s security officers (Yarnell & Thomas, 2014). The Urban Refugee Protection Network (URPN) also posits cases of physical abuse, extortion, and loss of property among refugees as some of the consequences of security lapses refugees must bear. As such, refugees equally share the consequence of insecurity and ought to be protected by the Kenya government rather than being accused of being perpetrators of insecurity (Ng’ang’a, 2016; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

Research by Ng’ang’a (2016) shows that refugee camps located close to countries under conflict are easily used as recruitment dens for militias or terrorists. Since life in most refugee camps is wanting, young people from such refugee camps are promised a good lifestyle for them and their family members if they fight for given terror groups (Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005; Mohamed, 2017). Since they are desperate to escape the demeaning refugee life coupled with their need to effectively provide for their families, the young people are more than interested to join such factions. Others, particularly minors, are recruited forcefully to join the fighting groups in the conflict of the neighbouring countries (Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005). This does not only threaten the peace of refugees’ host country but also the neighbouring countries as the conflict and its effects can trickle to these neighbours.

It is also common to find firearms and other weaponry in refugee camps located near conflict areas. In the past, weapons from war-torn Uganda, South Sudan and Somalia have been found in Kenya’s refugee camps. The Dadaab and Kakuma camps offer a perfect example of this. Often, firearms, improvised electronic devices (IEDs) and grenades have been seized within these camps (Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005; Ng’ang’a, 2016). Most of these weapons have been blamed on the porous borders and

the closure of the Liboi border to Somalia, which removed scrutinizing officers from the area. This makes it easy to sneak into the country weapons and smuggled goods from the war-torn Somalia (Kiama & Karanja, 2013). By end of 2016, a report from gun policy indicated that the approximate number of guns in Kenya were 680,000 out of which only 6500 were licensed. The remaining 673,500 firearms were illicit and in the hands of civilians (Muindi, 2019). Latest statistics on the gun policy website indicate that by 2017, the number of firearms in Kenya was 750,000 out of which 8,136 were registered. The rest were illegal. This data shows that the number of firearms in the country was growing tremendously and majority of those were illegal and common among civilians (Alpers & Picard, 2021).

The common conflicts among communities living in North Eastern region of Kenya over cattle raids, pasture and water resource control are often fuelled and made fierce by the readily accessible weapons sneaked to these areas. Additionally, attacks in camps that often lead to casualties and death are common because of these readily accessible weapons. What is more, if the weapons end up into the hands of people with bad motives, they may use them to engage in criminal activities against the host government. When such happens, often the entire refugee population is blamed as it is challenging to differentiate them from the criminals (McSweeney, 2012).

There are also several cases of refugees being attacked in camps as well (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000; Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012). Some of the attacks have been associated with criminals outside the camps while others are linked to people within the camp— mostly sympathisers of terror groups like Al-Shabaab (Ng'ang'a, 2016; Mohamed, 2017). Better still, the Kenya police have also been associated with some of the insecurities in camps. Pursuit of

criminals from Somalia have ended up in Dadaab camps and since differentiating Somalis is challenging to the Kenyan police, they have ended up roughing up Somali refugees in the camps either as suspects or blaming them to have hidden the criminals.

Although some militia fleeing conflict zones leave their ways and turn back their weapons to the host government on seeking asylum in refugee camps, some of them are not genuine and often go back to their militant ways of life with more recruits from the camps. Often the recruits are radicalized to motivate their need to fight which threatens the security of the host nation as well as that of fellow refugees in camps (McSweeney, 2012).

World over, refugee camps have acted as hideouts for criminals who cannot hold with the fire at the battlefield or those who are looking for soft targets (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000; Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005; McSweeney, 2012; Ng'ang'a, 2016). For instance, the Goma refugee camp in DRC was, for a long time, the hideout for the Interahamwe militias escaping confrontation from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) after executing criminal activities. The militias were successfully hunted by the RPF from their hideouts in the camp, but its effects spread even to the locals who were attacked, raped, killed, and looted (McSweeney, 2012).

There have been claims by the government and people against refugee camps that Al-Shabaab militants are using the Dadaab camps as hideouts (Republic of Kenya, 2016).

Although the government has insisted that it has intelligence to prove the fact of this narrative, some researchers have challenged its generalization to the entire refugee community, as they posit that it is intended to justify the illegal intent to close refugee camps. They have tasked the government to identify and arrest the criminals in refugee camps and allow many refugees who are peaceful to live in camps.

Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that refugees are often hostile to security agents patrolling Dadaab camps although many consider this hostility a reaction to police mistreatment and unnecessary harassment of refugees (Yarnell & Thomas, 2014).

Provision of security to refugees is a responsibility of the hosting state according to local and international law. However, UNHCR plays a critical role in supporting the state while delivering its international mandate. Between 2011-2014, about \$25 million was invested in Security Partnership Project operations by UNHCR. The funds were used to construct offices and houses, purchase vehicles, communication apparatus, training on international protection and human rights and community policing and paying allowances to police officers.

A study by Mohamed (2017) investigated the relationship between repatriation of refugees and security and established that repatriating refugees influenced the security of the region although in a minimal way. Specifically, repatriated refugees will participate in civic education on security matters with warring communities hence bring about peace. Returnees are also instrumental in economic development which may lower conflict hence bring about peace. This is achieved when the returnees come up with economic activities that warring communities take part in hence drawing their attention from war/fights. Contrastingly, the study also found that refugees in Dadaab were not a security threat to the region contrary to what other studies had revealed.

Some Kenyans perceive refugees as criminals, unlawful and causers of anxiety. The former Vice-president Moody Awori further highlighted this perception in 2004, when he impugned the explosion of small weaponries and light arms on the immigrants (Campbell, 2006). These approaches have carried on and are spurred by

media. In 2006, an article published in one of Kenya's major newspapers, *The Daily Nation*, asserted that if the Kenya state persists in allowing the open-door strategy, competing Somali troops could soon be roaming Kenyan streets freely (Jaji, 2014).

Even though research that are more recent foreshadow cases of Somali gangs driving away security personnel from Eastleigh, misdeeds have been overhauled by the stereotypes levelled towards Somalis as being terrorists (Jaji, 2014; Kagwanja, 2000). Jaji points out the way local and international dialogue on terror attacks has permitted the portrayal of Kenyan Somalis as frightening, hostile, or fierce. The researcher directs towards messages in media that blame Somali refugees for dilapidation of environment, outbreak of measles, and prohibited artillery, notwithstanding dialogues with Kenyans expressing their fear of Somalis existing within among them because of being associated with extremist tendencies (Jaji, 2014). Somalis captured during security agents' crackdown preceding the 2014 encampment order informed that the security personnel blamed majority of Somalis for being terrorists (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2016).

Politicians are responsible for embodying and highlighting the prevailing approaches in perceiving refugees. For instance, the Kenya's Ministry of State for Immigration and Registration of Persons, asserted that inflow into Kenya of Somali asylum seekers generated 'a great security/terror threat and exerted excess pressure on social amenities and services and that extremist cells and Islamic radicals take advantage of the migration of refugees to smuggle into Kenya people and weapons which are later used to commit crimes or terrorize Kenyans (Campbell, 2006; Lind *et al.*, 2015). Similarly, a one-time assistant minister for internal security once claimed that Al-Shabaab was a snake whose head was in Eastleigh (Kenya) while the tail was in

Somalia, indicating that many of the group's major activities and planning are done in Kenya and what happens in Somalia is just a small effect. These state-endorsed claims concerning Somali refugees generated an environment of violence and stereotypes towards these refugees (Achieng, 2015).

Although some commentators disagree with the claim that Somali refugees in Dadaab camps are actively associated with Al-Shabaab terror group, others have raised queries concerning the extent to which refugees widely play a role in delinquency and terrorism. The commentators incriminate the susceptible group (refugees) by focusing on government statements that are fixated on accusing refugees for the country's main insecurity cases like the Westgate shopping mall attack and the persisting lack of security across the country. Researchers also contend that heightening insecurity is associated with the age-long cultural and geographic disagreements between Somalis and citizens coupled with the discriminatory security measures aimed at Muslims and Somalis, which directly contribute to Al-Shabaab's increased influence in Kenya's outlying areas (Lind *et al.*, 2015).

Associating refugees with terrorism and insecurity acts has caused a sequence of statutory amendments and reactions by the Kenyan government. One of these reactions include the control of inflow of Somali refugees to Kenya by closing the Kenya-Somalia boundary and stoppage of refugee registration and admission processes to lessen their count. This culminated in the Kenya parliament passing the Security Amendment Act of 2014 where a maximum of 150,000 refugees would be permitted to seek asylum in the country (Lind *et al.*, 2015).

2.2.1.4.3 Refugees and the Peace of Host

Proximity of the Dadaab refugee camp to Somalia coupled with the porous Kenya-Somalia border make it easy for rebels and militants from the Somalia to easily enter the camp and hide among refugees (Rabasa *et al.*, 2007) and as the warring factions continued to fight in Somalia, the likelihood of the effects spilling to neighbouring countries like Kenya is high. To overcome this, as the war progressed in Somalia, the Kenya government was looking for the best security measure to take to control its porous borders in anticipation that militias might cross over to Kenya and effect terror acts as a way of earning sympathy or inflicting fear among Kenyans (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012; Ng'ang'a, 2016). Dadaab refugee complex posed the greatest risk as it could easily house terrorists who may pretend to be refugees. As such, in December 2006, Kenya sealed her border with Somalia at Liboi as a measure to overcome the growing security concern posed by the Islamic insurgent group— Al-Shaabab.

This was a dilemma to Kenya, as it needed to ensure the security of its citizens by controlling its borders but also was expected to uphold the 1969 Organisation of African Union (OAU) convention that allowed safeguarding of refugee's rights (Kiama & Karanja, 2013) as well as allow free trade between the two countries (Ng'ang'a, 2016). Recent Kenya government communications, like the call for closing Dadaab camp and constructing a wall along Kenya-Somalia boundary, have clearly shown the country to put its national interests ahead of international obligations. As such, the issue of Kenya's security is weightier than the international obligation to offer asylum to refugees and this informs the government's approach towards refugee camps (Mumo, 2016).

The issue of hosting refugees versus securing Kenya's national security has been in the political discourse for almost two decades (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). It started in 1995 when the then President Moi of Kenya demanded the repatriation of refugees from the country as they posed a big security problem. No mass evacuation of refugees took place at that time, although the Kenyan government sustained it asking for the shutting of some refugee camps, and in November 1995 the Kenya government launched a crackdown on supposed illegal aliens in the country (US Committee for Refugees, 1998) but the findings of this operation were never made public.

For very many years, few insecurity issues were reported from the Dadaab Refugee Complex. Generally, the camps were peaceful. However, by 2009 reports of insecurity concerns within the complex became common. Cases of car hijacking and kidnappings of aid workers, shootings, rape, murder, and assault were regularly reported. The poor security situation in the complex was associated with Somali militants roaming the camps of the complex (Jaji, 2009). After the 2013 national elections in Kenya, the Government came up with two major decisions aimed at restoring security in the country building a 700-kilometer wall along the Kenya-Somalia border and repatriating refugees back to their country (Nkala, 2016; Wanjala, 2016).

The government proposed that the Dadaab refugee complex be shifted to inside Somalia because it is a security concern to Kenya. Kenya accuses the camp of being home to Al-Shabaab terror cells, poaching, human trafficking activities, a centre for smuggling contraband, and a centre for proliferation of illegal weapons (Wanjala, 2016). In 2016, the Kenya government resolved to halt the closure of Dadaab until

sustainable peace was attained in Somalia. The UN and NGOs dealing with refugees appreciated this information. Further, in 2017, a Kenyan court ruled against closure of the Dadaab as it was not legally procedural.

Critics believe Kenya failed to improve and overlooked homeland security on going to war with Al-Shabaab hence exposing itself to the common terror attacks (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). The Government of Kenya did not research on the capacity of Al-Shabaab, its penetration into Kenya and the effect it had on the local communities where it had sympathizers, and what is more, Al-Shabaab continues to attract foreign fighters mainly from Kenya (Mohamed, 2017). As such, the major social implication refugees have had to Kenya as a host nation have been increased crime and violence although this is disputed by other researchers like Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017).

As the country invested in seeking long-term resolution to the refugee issue, it was also engaging short-term measures, which include the attempt to counter the insecurity by increasing security within its borders given that the closure of Dadaab refugee complex is not as easy as thought. Based on the recent peace the country has experienced, it can be said that the strategy has brought positive results. However, there are complains that security operations in areas like Eastleigh in Nairobi have been discriminatory and profiling of Somalis, but the Kenyan state has denied these claims (Mukira, 2016).

Although the Kenya state focused greatly on the security issue and the involvement of refugees in terrorism, socio-economic implications of refugees, as indicated above, also exist; although only in speculation, as there has not been an empirical investigation to establish them, which is why this study was carried out. UNHCR and

NGOs supporting refugees contend that factually they provide economic gain for hosting countries, more specifically the fact that they are hugely financed externally through Diaspora remittances. These varying views can be addressed through an objective investigation to establish the exact impact refugees have in the host community. There has been hardly adequate attempt to learn about socio-economic effect of Dadaab refugees to the hosting societies in Kenya.

2.2.1.4.4 Terrorism incidences in Kenya

Somalia's dysfunctional government and lack of the rule of law has increased anarchy and insecurity cases in the country. As such, warlords, militia groups and their activities thrive in this state. This is one of the drivers towards the emergence and growth of Al-Shabaab group to the international status it has (Gomsrud & Gaas, 2010). Most terror group recruit and attract support by inflicting pain to unsuspecting groups through destruction of property and lives. The Al-Shabaab group does not use a different model from this. The group has ventured in international attacks on its neighbours as a way of gaining recognition and support (Lind *et al.*, 2015) and it is through this method that they were able to attract partnership from Al-Qaeda terrorist group in 2012. Al-Shabaab group is highly feared in Kenya owing to its past activities like kidnappings and attacks on innocent Kenyans, which have caused loss of lives and property and in other cases have caused injuries—some, which are lifetime injuries.

Kenya has faced the brunt of terrorism from the Somali militants outside Dadaab. Tourist kidnappings at the coastal towns and waters of Kenya coupled with other terror attacks across the country were rampant. This necessitated the Kenya government to initiate the operation *Linda inchi* in 2011 where the Kenya Defence

Force (KDF) entered Somalia to fight the militants and capture the country's cities under Al-Shabaab control (Miyandazi, 2012). This further exacerbated retaliatory attacks on Kenyan soil most of which were planned in Dadaab refugee complex. Some of the notable attacks that were associated with Al-Shabaab group include terrorism activities in churches, assassinations and even coordinated attacks in public facilities such as universities, malls and transport network in Nairobi and North-Eastern region of Kenya. Some of the unforgettable attacks include the Mpeketoni attack, the Westgate Mall attack, and the raid on Garissa University where many Kenyans lost their lives. These attacks are elaborated in the subsequent subtopics and their association to refugees depicted.

2.2.1.4.4.1 Westgate Attack

On the 21st day of September 2013 at around 11:30 am, four armed assassins of Somali origin entered the Westgate mall and indiscriminately shot at shoppers and revellers at the mall leading to the loss of 67 lives and injuring over 200 people. Even though the killing was random, majority of those killed were non-Muslim (Okwany, 2016). This was intended to cause a divide among Kenyans based on religion, an opportunity that would then be used by the group to recruit more sympathizers in Kenya. However, the attack instilled fear among the non-Muslim community in Nairobi.

It was claimed that two of the killers were citizens of foreign countries although all of them were of the Somali origin. The killers were heavily armed and took control of the mall for three days. Kenya's president, Uhuru Kenyatta, claimed that Kenya's security agents contained the assassins on the third day and that all of them died in the battle (Lind *et al.*, 2015). Eleven other suspects associated with the four gunmen were

arrested while the police wanted five others suspected to be involved in the same attack. According to Okwany (2016), the Westgate attackers were well educated and had better economic backgrounds meaning that their joining Al-Shabaab was not motivated by poverty or lack of adequate education. This makes the war against radicalization seriously challenged hence the trigger for increased fear among Kenyans. From this case, poverty was not the driver of extremist recruitment and radicalisation of the youth although in some areas the promise of a better life and riches have been the catalyst to joining terror groups(Lind *et al.*, 2015; World Bank, 2018).

The Westgate attack surprised Kenya and the world at large as it exposed the vulnerabilities of the Kenyan security and intelligence system. It also showed how unprepared and disorganized Kenyan security was in dealing with serious security challenges and arising emergencies (Lind *et al.*, 2015). The process of hunting down the gunmen and restoring order at the mall saw three security teams involved—The ATPU, police from the RECCE Company and the KDF RSF 62 force. There was poor coordination in the exchange of guard leading to the loss of several KDF/police officers in friendly fire (Anderson & McKnight, 2015).

However, to the Al-Shabaab group, the Westgate mall attack was a great success and presented the outfit as a major terrorist force on the international scene. It also showed how lethal and well planned the group was in executing its targets (Lind *et al.*, 2015). Internationally, the attack hit the world news with vigour giving Al-Shabaab the much-needed international publicity, which would then attract more support from the international sympathizers and terror groups. The Al-Shabaab spokesperson claimed responsibility for the attack and associated it to the operation *Linda inchi*, which,

according to him, had caused many Somalis great bloodshed (Mohamed, 2013). The challenges revealed in the siege prompted a change to the Kenyan laws to enhance efficient working of all Kenyan security organs towards securing the country.

The Westgate attack changed the way refugees are perceived in Kenya as the police in several media reports indicated that one of the attackers in the West gate mall was once a refugee in one of Kenya's refugee camps. It was believed that from this refugee camp, the attacker would gather intelligence about the target areas and convey it to other attackers in Somalia (Straziuso, 2013; Straziuso, & Odula, 2013). This prompted security agents and government officers associate the entire refugee community with terrorism, which convinced the Kenyan Public and some refugee sympathizers that refugees were a risk to the country and needed to be dealt away with. This justified the need to refoul refugees as a precursor to making the country safe and free from Al-Shabaab attacks.

2.2.1.4.4.2 Mpeketoni Attacks

On the 15th of June 2014 at about 8.45 pm, a group of about 30-armed Al-Shabaab militants attacked a small town in Lamu called Mpeketoni. The attack was symmetrical to the Westgate attack in organization and execution. It lasted for 2 days and was unique in the sense that the attackers did their damage on the first day and escaped only to come again on the second day for yet another attack. On both days, the Al-Shabaab 'enjoyed' killing their soft targets. Another uniqueness was that it involved many gunmen than were involved in the Westgate attack (Okwany, 2016).

The attackers attacked a police station, the town centre, and people's homes shooting victims at close range and burning the police station and people's houses and property. After about 3 hours of mayhem, about 50 lives had been lost, over 25 houses

burnt, and 44 vehicles torched (Anderson& McKnight, 2015). Most of the casualties were non-natives—the Kikuyu tribe. The attack saw the arrest of Lamu governor, Mr. Issa Timamy who was later released for lack of evidence to prosecute him. On the second day, the attack happened in Kijjioni village where victims were also shot at in close range while some were slit their throats. Eleven people were killed on this night and cumulatively over 60 people lost their lives (Okwany, 2016).

This attack once more showed how unprepared the Kenyan security system is in handling enemy attacks. It also exposed the weakness in Kenya's intelligence collection system and the inability to learn from experiences. In this attack, the Al-Shabaab took advantage of the internal divisions in Kenyan politics and religious differences to fashion the attack. At the time of attack, the politics of CORD and Jubilee were rife. Although Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for this attack, the Kenyan government insisted that politicians had incited local militia to wage the attack against a given Kenyan community for self-interests. This narrative saw a retaliatory attack against the Luo community in which four people lost their lives after being shot at (Anderson& McKnight, 2015; Okwany, 2016).

Just like the Westgate attack, the Mpeketoni attack also influenced how Kenya's security agents perceived refugees. Although the government agreed that the attackers were Al-Shabab fighters, security agents falsely used these attacks to profile refugees as part of the attackers, a stereotype that culminated in the *Usalama watch* which saw many Somali Kenyans rounded up and taken to refugee camps illegally. This brought about a scenario where uninformed Kenyans thought that Somalis should be refugees and that they are Al-Shabaab because of their ethnicity. This stereotyped refugees and affected how refugees are perceived and treated. However, researchers like Abdille

(2021) show that the Mpeketoni attack was not associated with refugees but was caused by disagreements in the prevailing local politics and perceived social inequalities.

2.2.1.4.4.3 Kidnapping of aid workers (Dadaab refugee camps)

in June 2012, foreigners employed by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) were kidnapped from Dadaab camp by armed gunmen believed to be from Al-Shabaab terror group. During the incident, their Kenyan driver was killed. In October 2011, a similar incident happened where two Spaniards from the 'Doctors Without Borders' foundation were also kidnapped and sneaked into Somalia where they were detained. Similar to the other incidence, the driver of the car in which the foreigners were in was shot. These events followed the kidnapping of a British national and a French tourist from the coastal city of Lamu in 2010. intelligence showed that the Al-Shabaab group was responsible for all the kidnaps. What is more, locals reported that the kidnappings that happened in Dadaab were done by Al-Shabaab members who had posed as refugees for some time. Additionally, witnesses revealed that some of the refugees at the camp were Al-Shabaab fighters but lived in disguise (Mukinda & Nyassy, 2011).

These events affected Kenya's tourism industry significantly and were threatening to affect Kenya's economy, which significantly depends on tourism. The not-ending abductions are some of the justifications the Kenya government used to enter Somalia through the *Linda inchi* operation (Okwany, 2016). What is more, the abductions made may Kenyans and foreigners live in fear of the Al-Shabaab group, which affected people's ability to perform their day-to-day activities well.

2.2.1.4.4.4 Garissa University students attack

On April 2nd, 2015, four armed Al-Shabaab gunmen attacked students at the Garissa University College, a constituent of Moi University thereby killing about 148 and wounding hundreds of others. The attack was one of the deadliest Al-Shabaab incursions on innocent Kenyans based on the number of people affected. Among those killed, include students, security guards, and police officers. Most of the victims were held hostage for a long time. A Mohamed Mohamud was accused of being the planner of the attacks (Okwany, 2016).

intelligence reports indicated that the planning of the attack happened in Dadaab refugee camp prompting the Kenya government to order for the closure of the camp, as it was a security issue. Most refugee camps are overcrowded hence making it easy for one to plan crimes unnoticed. Differentiating between a criminal and the real refugee is also a problem in this overcrowded environment. Additionally, the poor living conditions of refugees make them prone to taking bribes to conceal criminal activities. What is more, the crowdedness presents a governance challenge that compromises the ability to differentiate a criminal from a refugee. These factors provide a good breeding ground for Al-Shabaab to conduct its activities undetected. Further, it was established that the weapons used in the attack were smuggled into Kenya via the porous borders with Somalia (Okwany, 2016).

2.2.1.4.4.5 El-Adde attacks on Kenya Defence Forces (KDF)

At the beginning of 2016, the Al-Shabaab terrorist group pounced on a camp hosting Kenya Defence Forces at El-Adde and caused serious casualties to the Kenyan soldiers. Although the exact number of soldiers killed has remained a government secret, sources from Somalia indicated that over 141 soldiers were killed (IPI, 2016)

while the Mujahidin claimed to have killed over 200 Kenyan soldiers (Okwany, 2016). The early morning attack saw the KDF camp fully overrun, Kenyan soldiers killed, some maimed, and part of their artillery and supplies stolen while others burnt. Although the Kenyan government initially denied their camp being overrun, witnesses reported otherwise (Okwany, 2016). According to the Somali National Army (SNA), there was intelligence shared with KDF that an Al-Shabaab attack was imminent, but the Kenyan soldiers ignored it. While the SNA relocated to avoid the confrontation, the Kenyan soldiers stayed and never bothered to prepare for the imminent attack. After the attack, it took three days for KDF to regain the camp from the attackers.

The El-Adde attack put the Al-Shabaab group on the international map, exposing what they are capable of and consequently informing the international community (including the UN) the need to offer continued support to peacekeeping troops in Somalia. The attack also shelved the thought that the terror group only targeted soft targets because, in El- Adde attack, Al-Shabaab showed that they can fight an armed side ruthlessly (IPI, 2016; Okwany, 2016).

It is noteworthy in all these attacks; Al-Shabaab is greatly involved. Although in some cases refugees and refugee camps are involved, it is not clear whether it can be generalized that Al-Shabaab activities take place in refugee camps. Neither can it be concluded that those involved in the attacks are generally refugees. As such, the connection of the insecurity issues mentioned to refugees, or their camps remains to be a nut that should be crushed further to reveal more information. Certainly, this study aims to bridge this gap. What is more, in all the attacks, the Mujahidin aims to kill and destroy to attract international publicity and prove to the world that Al-Shabaab is a great terrorist force which is to be feared. Certainly, in Kenya many

Kenyans fear the Al-Shabbab group based on the harm it has caused Kenya and Kenyans (IPI, 2016).

2.2.1.5 Economic impact

Generally, UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Richard (2013); Miller (2018) submit that refugees have beneficial and detrimental economic implications they pose on host community. The positive implications include attraction of investment and investors, development of the area, job creation, skills sharing and increased business activities while the negative ones include competing with the locals for available jobs, increased commodity prices and inflation, increased property prices, and increased pressure on available natural resources, physical amenities, and infrastructure among others. These will come up clearly and clarified with examples in the subsequent cases of this section.

Refugees are a risk to the hosts' welfare, as well as to the commercial and political firmness of several regions of the world. According to UNHCR (2016), poor and developing economies, many of whom cannot adequately provide for their citizens, host majority of immigrants and refugees across the globe. Although the public, state, and non-state actors typically incline to increasingly emphasise on the bad effects of hosting refugees in a nation, it is significant to indicate that also refugees have positive impact to the micro-macro-economic indicators of the host country (Francis, 2015).

Further to above, Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) have elaborated that accommodating refugees is costly and significantly burdening during the first years but after refugees are reintegrated, the hosting communities and country also accrue both economic and fiscal benefits. For the positive benefits to be realised he proposed language training,

counselling, revising restrictive laws and policies, acceleration of the refugees vetting process and allowing them to work as quickly as possible. His rationale is that most developed countries have elderly population, and the deteriorating inherent populaces imply that the demand for refugees will likely go up, and incurring increased humanitarian, fiscal, and political costs connected to refugee repatriating makes little sense.

According to Van Mol and De Valk (2016), since 2015, the large count of refugees and migrant inflow in Europe had triggered a public discussion on the implications of refugees to the socio-economic, political and security landscape in the European Countries. European countries witnessed over 2 million people moving into their territory since the Second World War. To be more specific, refugees and migrants were running from civil wars, income inequality, climate change, and armed conflicts that were happening in Syria, Libya, some parts of Middle East and Africa.

in the public space, little has been emphasized on the global humanitarian nature of such large-scale displacement and the positive contribution refugee can to the host community and country. This resulted restrictive regulation at the point of entry to Europe for refugees, migrants, and closure of open-door policy that existed in Europe under the auspices of 1951 convention concerning refugees' state. in this regard, many European countries have adopted internal changes on refugee vetting process, 24-hour surveillance in potential border areas, building border fence, instituted internal border controls, made amendments to laws, policies, and integration policies for refugees (Van Mol & De Valk, 2016).

Further to discourage the mass migration issues, some countries including Norway, Finland and Austria have were put in place several other measures including raising

the bar for family reunification including establishing one can apply for family reunification only with a sufficient income; reducing financial aid to asylum seekers; restricting publicly provided legal counselling, confiscating (financial) assets upon arrival, restrictions on remittances and tighter regulations for rejected asylum seekers (Van Mol & De Valk, 2016).

As a result of above restrictive and inhuman measures, scholars such as Angenendt *et al.* (2016), emphasized the global role of European states as champions promoting refugee dignity and rights have been lost, the European countries moral authority and credibility they once had is questionable? Similar to the above conclusion, in 2016 the Human Rights Watch had questioned the legitimacy of European countries requesting other countries to continue hosting large refugee population that outstrip the fiscal capacity of the host community and nations while themselves bar and close their borders to prevent refugee's entry. The report indicated such position shows reluctance to share the fiscal and economic burden to support refugees. Within the overall economic impact of refugees to host community, we will focus on issues of jobs, food prices, and utilization of fiscal government resources which centrally often being complained and positioned by citizens and governments of host community and country.

The arrival of refugees in each area causes imbalance in the local economy and social environments, which affects the host community negatively. For instance, refugees bring about competition for the available natural and economic resources, which, in scarcity, attract increased prices hence leading to increased inflation—a factor that not only affects the local economy but also increases the poverty levels of the local communities. Refugees also take up jobs meant for locals and drive the cost of

commodities and housing up. Similarly, over time, the pressure refugees pile on the social services, infrastructure and health facilities also affects the economic and social being of the host community (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997; Miller, 2018).

in the past 10 years, Kenya has faced numerous terrorist attacks in its major towns like Nairobi, Garissa, Mombasa, Moyale, and Wajir where many innocent Kenyans have lost their lives and others seriously maimed for life. Additionally, these attacks have cost the country economically through reduced investor confidence, destroyed investment, deficient performance of businesses, and low tourist attractions. Majority of the said attacks have been blamed on the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab whose operatives are purported to reside in Dadaab refugee camp disguised as refugees from where they plan the attacks. However, the government has been unable to give evidence to the judicial system on how refugees are a threat to the nation's security although it (the government) still contends that intelligence information shows that the planning, organization, and execution of terror acts happens in refugee camps and commonly the Dadaab refugee complex. These statements need to be proven empirically to have ground upon which to conclude the social effect of refugees on national security which was the core of this study.

The impact of refugees is not only negative. Richard (2013) considers the thought that refugees pose as a burden to the host country as a myth. Sometimes refugee influx to a given area or country leads to positive effects. For instance, refugees cause economic stimulus in each country hence attraction of investors and development partners (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997), increase the general demand for commodities, create economies of scale, encourage creativity, and promote entrepreneurship, investment in housing, establishing trade linkages and opportunities

and contributes to agricultural production and job creation (Richard, 2013; Miller, 2018). To cause positive effects, Miller (2018) advice that refugees must have access to resources like land, freedom of movement and engaging in economic development and access to labour market. These impacts are further detailed in the reviews in the following subsections.

2.2.1.5.1 Growth of financial sector

Refugees promote the growth of informal and formal financial sector. Studies like Callamard (1994); Richard (2013); Miller (2018) shows that the arrival of refugees promotes the growth of trade activities which encourage growth of the financial sector though table banking, banking, and other informal money transfer services like Hawala. Refugees, given their nature of escaping hardships and going to unknown homes, are always without means to access basic items for their usual livelihoods. As such, even if one wanted to send an asylum seeker money for use to acquire basic needs, they may be unable due to this limitation. However, to combat this, many refugees resort to informal channels of money transfer-the Hawala which requires no sophisticated technology or paperwork. in many refugee areas and migrant situations, this system has widely grown and used to send remittances to refugees (Financial Action Task Force, 2013; Deejo, 2014) although studies like Financial Action Task Force (2013) shows that due to its lack of paperwork and secrecy, it is sometimes misused by terrorists and ill-intended people to do money laundering. As result, this system is not used in some counties like India.

2.2.1.5.2 Employment—limited jobs, wage rate and business

One among the issue's European countries, United States of America and other nations do close their borders from refugee entry is mainly to also safeguard their job

labour markets. Ensuring the job market is not flooded thus raising tension for low job opportunities and lowering the wage rates of native population. The entrance of semi-skilled asylum seekers is probably associated with a higher undesirable effect towards the job and remunerations prospects of preceding groups with similar qualifications as they are in direct competition for the opportunities (World Bank, 2006).

According to Eurostat (2015), 83 per cent of migrants seeking asylum in European Countries are below the age of 35 years, and particularly most of them were aged 18–34 years, which is within the acceptable range of one to work in European countries. In Europe, the existence of such huge workforce age created public fear within the state and equally for the native population that refugees will take jobs away from unskilled native population and lowering wages at the labour market. Further to that in the European Union establishments, accepting these huge refugees and releasing them to the labour market brought in dilemma when its members countries such as Italy and Spain had been grappling with high employment rate for its native populations especially with youth workforce.

According to Van Mol and De Valk (2016), this may increase opinions of social separation, disenchantment, and side lining. Hence, refugees are unable to bring to the hosting society and economy a major effect that is positive. Most outstandingly, refugees become soft prey for employment by terrorists, xenophobic attacks, or lawless cells. However, according to Dustmann *et al.* (2005), this is not true picture in a formal economy like the United Kingdom where there is no statistically significant finding that employment opportunities were affected by immigration to United Kingdom between 1983 and 2000. Building upon the above, Lucchino *et al.*'s (2012)

study on employment effects to United Kingdom from 2002 to 2011 did not find any association between refugees and unemployment specifically in United Kingdom.

Looking at the wider European region, Lemos and Portes (2008), studying 8 nations comprising Estonia, Hungary, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, found out that there is no effect of immigration on the unemployment of a large number of the native population of the studied countries between 2004-2005. Despite the previous studies finding no correlation between immigration and employment of host populations in any period in European countries, there is an agreement among many of the studies that immigration can lower wages of host employees. The reasoning for such depression is that immigration can withhold host populations' wage growth for the low skilled workers so that they compete with immigrants, while simultaneously alleviating wage progression for immigrant workers whose abilities match those host populations have (Dustmann *et al.* 2008).

Dustmann *et al.* (2008) further propose that to understand influence immigration has on remunerations requires the understanding of types of native workers versus the competing immigrants' workers. In real sense, this might not be possible at a short time frame and immigrants most often take lesser jobs hence making impossible to project which type person with certain skills competing with the other. According to Dustmann *et al.* (2013), the United Kingdom circumvent above problem by doing what is referred as occupational downgrading whereby refugees and asylum seekers are placed at the bottom of the citizen remuneration scale to reduce pressure of competition and to give an upper edge to the native workforce. Further, Dustmann *et al.* (2013) established that between 1997 and 2005 immigration in United Kingdom

had stagnated the growth in wages under the 20th percentile, although by a small margin.

According to Jamal *et al.* (2019), there are advantages accompanied with the European immigration inflows. The study showed an optimistic association between migration and economic growth through delivery of presently unavailable skills and participation in entrepreneurial opportunities that create jobs to the native workforce. As popularly thought otherwise that migration inflows take away the limited job available to native workforce, the current empirical evidence specifically the fear associated with adverse aftermath of immigration on employment are unjustifiable. As posited Borjas (1994), refugees adapt faster to the labour market environment in the hosting nations and have higher productivity levels, which contribute significantly to economic growth of the host nation.

Van Mol and De Valk (2016) argue that there is widespread public fear in some EU countries on refugees and migrants taking away jobs from the native workers. However, in opposition to the statement the study found that immigrants together with asylum seekers participate in job creation in the EU region. They further provided the example such as Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria as refugee sources while Sweden and Germany as hosts to majority of the refugees. The measures taken by these countries inspire division of burden among nations and deter civic opinions towards refugees as an economic liability to hosting nations.

Similar experiences of refugees contributing to economic development have been attested among other refugee hosting nations (Richard, 2013; World Bank, 2010; Campbell, 2006). The researchers identified that refugees promote entrepreneurship between immigrants and vulnerable host community individuals, which enhances

refugees' economic independence as well as contributes to the hosting country's wellbeing. Furthermore, such entrepreneurial opportunities create jobs to the citizens of the hosting nations particularly in the hospitality industry.

Additional effort given to refugees to thrive and flourish in business, consist of the donation of land for agriculture, provision of self-employed initiatives, and training in agricultural entrepreneurship to enhance business involvement. Since getting a job in cities and urban areas is challenging for less literate and qualified refugees, farming and other agricultural (or manual) jobs are lucrative to them. Such initiatives are however beneficial to locals and refugees in that it creates awareness to local communities concerning the input immigrants have to the local socioeconomic growth. On the flip side, the initiatives also promote refugee recognition as a critical and important contributor to the hosting society (UNCTAD, IOM & UNHCR, 2018).

Another critical benefit of refugees is their association with remittances. For instance, international Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2015) established that migrants across twenty-six European states emitted about USD 72.9 billion to many developing economies across the globe. These remittances improved the economic situation of people and countries and to some extent deterring others from becoming migrants and refugees. Additionally, the remittances formed a source of overseas exchange which was used by developing states to create a balance of trade income arising from the imbalance that exist in more imports versus less exports. Remittances reduce inequalities in marginalised areas that are hard to reach by common development initiatives. In contrast, remittances aggravate inequalities between people who are disadvantaged in accessing migration opportunities depending on the presence of economic, social, and educational resources (Carling, 2005).

Skilled migrants have an adverse effect on their home countries, as such movements brain drain the countries and while benefiting the hosting countries through brain gain where the host economies profit from the inflow of skilled labour. In the case of highly skilled refugee returnees, the refugees gain know-how and come back skilful than before. Some researchers propose that possible benefits arising from migrations of skilled people from nations that are developing are greater over the initial overheads incurred through the public coffers. Stark (2003) explains this occurrence by indicating that the view of the possibility of relocating motivates migrants to seek skills development and education which enhance skilful levels.

According to Taylor *et al.* (2016), using the case of Rwanda established that one commercial effect of refugees on hosting nations include currency aid offered to refugees which creates optimistic revenue overflows for enterprises and communities in the hosting country. Relief organisations like the World Food Program have shifted from helping in terms of food to monetary transfers to refugees, which stimulated indigenous markets and created market prospects for both the immigrants and individuals in the host communities.

Furthermore, Rwanda as a country is investing in economic incorporation and in local expansion to alleviate the harmful influences of immigrants. At the same time Rwanda has improved refugees' access to finance ensuring that 90% of refugees access banking services. This vision of the country's plan for including refugees economically has been proven to be realistic according to FSD Africa 2018 study that noted in Rwanda refugees have sufficient revenue to be part of the clientele in financial institutions. Financial inclusion of immigrants enhances their incorporation in economic matters hence contributing to the economic growth of Rwanda.

Additionally, as aid programs shift from food donations to monetary handouts, refugees' liquidity is enhanced and benefits the financial institutions in which they store the money (Taylor *et al.*, 2016).

According to Betts *et al.* (2018), generally refugees in Kenya have less economic activities than the host communities although the Kakuma camp-based refugees have higher odds of accessing an economic activity compared to other refugees in the country. In the Kakuma refugee camp, according to UNHCR data, around 5000 refugees have been employed as casual labourers with UNHCR and its partner agencies. The employed refugees work full-time with a paltry payment incentive of Kes 5,500, which is barely adequate and poses more challenges to refugee survival.

In Kakuma refugee camps, Congolese refugees have the highest economic activity with 73% of male and 59% of female Congolese refugees having an occupation. About half of these Congolese refugees at the camp are NGO employees who work as casual employees. However, the Congolese work in construction industry, a beauty/hair salon, own a small shop, or tailoring. Second to Congolese, refugees in terms of economic wellbeing are Somalis with 42% of male Somalis and 24% of female Somalis having an occupation. Somali refugees have fewer incentive workers than any other refugee groups and are more likely to own their shop. Lastly, the South Sudanese refugees are the least employed with an employment rate of 13% of them having a means of livelihood (Betts *et al.*, 2018).

The host community near Kakuma camps are Turkana who benefit from the refugees in Kakuma refugee camps. For example, most Turkana sell firewood or charcoal to refugees. Comparing the living standards between the refugee population and host community, Betts *et al.* (2018) noted that there is noteworthy disparity across contexts

and nationalities. First, the host community are significantly worse off than any other refugee population because of fewer meals per day, a mobile phone or a television ownership is low.

2.2.1.6 Impact on food prices

Refugee immigrations are associated with hiking prices, against dropping wages to employees who are lowly skilled which harm affected local communities. There also exist rising worries concerning environmental dilapidation, too much stress on available infrastructure, which is already weakened, enhanced pressure on public amenities that are often strained and increased conflict between host and refugee communities. Specifically looking on refugee experience in Asian countries, at macro-economic level reports show that the hosting society often bears the brunt of hiked food and commodity prices associated with refugee migrations (UNDP, 2018).

An example of the effect of hiked food and commodity prices is reported in the case of Rohingya refugees residing in the Teknaf and Ukhiya refugee camps in Bangladesh who sold significant portions of their aid food including rice, cooking oil and lentils due to lack of adequate income to purchase other basic items whose prices had been hiked. The basic items purchased include meat and its products, groceries, fuel, and fish. The refugees sold their excess food items at a reduced cost compared to the market rate since they were desperate for cash while they bought the needed basic items at a hiked price controlled by greedy businesspersons (UNDP, 2018). The UNDP (2018) survey also established that lowered daily wages frequently affected hosting society negatively. Findings of the survey indicated that agricultural sector and sectors that demanded unskilled labour offered miserable wages in many of the

districts hosting refugees. The justification for these low wages was that refugees in camps near the work areas could work as casual labourers at a lower rate.

Although the above effects are specific to Bangladesh, they are not unique only to that country. Soaring commodity prices coupled with declining wages are common effects of refugee migrations in many asylum countries across the globe. These effects frequently wound the poor and vulnerable individuals in those countries. Contrastingly, beneficiaries of such systems also exist. An instance is where the limited wages benefit employers and middle-income earners who exploit services offered by low-waged employees to reduce production costs and enhance profits. Similarly, traders and farmers can exploit price hikes to take advantage of market dynamics for enhanced profits. A vibrant improvement on the volume of businesses (influenced by sales and buyer spending) is witnessed, emanating from arrival and continual existence of a million asylum seekers demanding basic food items and consumer provisions. Fresh businesses have sprouted whereas the already existing one's function on overtime (UNDP, 2018; international Organization for Migration (IOM) & World Food Program (WFP), 2021).

The arrival of refugees might spur economic growth, expansion, novelty, enhancing the local economy dynamism and newness (World Bank, 2011). Callamard (1994) observed blossoming trade and money-generating activities in Malawi arising from dealings involving immigrants from Mozambique and the host community. These economic activities were driven by three factors including absence of diversity in the refugee food aid assistance, the refugees' aptitude to sell extra food aid provisions and the host community demand to buy items circulated to refugees that were sometimes expensive or not available in the market.

Similarly, Whitaker (1999) noted the economic chances offered by Congolese, Rwandan, and Burundian, immigrants to local communities in western part of Tanzania where local farmers were observed trading with the refugees and aid expatriates. In this context, refugees provided host community with food and non-food commodities that were donated to them by humanitarian aid agencies. In turn, the refugees received cash from the local populations and at the same time provided a huge market to the local food items and other products. This has resulted as an increase in the price of local crops in response to the sudden higher demand in the market due to refugees. This study has been collaborated by Alix-Garcia and Saah, (2009) who re-investigated changes to food prices due to the inflow of refugees in this same Tanzanian context. Alix-Garcia and Saah found out that the prices of select agricultural products including milk, beans, and bananas, were hiked. These commodities were locally grown and sold in markets closer to refugee camps. On the other hand, they also found a decrease in cost of food items donated as relief like maize and legumes due to product saturation and oversupply in the local market.

Still in Tanzanian refugee camps, Whitaker (2002) found out that there was an alarming price increase of agricultural items like milk, cooking bananas and beans and plummeted prices of food items distributed to refugee population including maize. This has resulted in increased demand for food items in the local market thus influencing most farmers to cultivate beans and bananas on a larger acreage in the planting seasons of the years 1993 to 1996. The refugee inflow increased the growth of local market size, which also boosted business and trade activities in the area around refugee camps. Finally, access and ownership to households with electric power, television sets, and refrigeration units grew among the households of host communities residing near refugee camps.

It was established in Alix-Garcia *et al.* (2017) that, in Kakuma refugee camps, 61% of the refugees in the camp obtained remittance disbursement from overseas sources. In Dadaab refugee camp, Horst (2004) approximated ten to fifteen per cent refugees obtained remittances of about USD 150–200 every month. The remittances formed a source of income that contributed to better livelihoods for refugee households as well as improved camp services like water supply, accommodation, and access to telecommunication facilities. De Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) explained how the communication infrastructure in Dadaab and Kakuma camps was advanced to sustain the increased number of overseas calls made to request and inform about transmission of remittances. In Dadaab, Enghoff *et al.* (2010) research established that nearly 5,000 business outlets recorded a total turnover of approximately USD 25 million and created jobs for over a thousand locals.

Concerning the housing market, Alix-Garcia *et al.* (2017) found that refugees' arrival failed to directly influence the housing sector because aid workers and refugees are housed in camps. However, the migrants indirectly created demand by attracting host people from other areas and towns to the areas near the camps where cases of increased commercialisation of property and issuing of titles was common.

2.2.1.7 Impact on Public Resources

Large inflow and prolonged refugee stay cause major effects on the economy of host countries. A number of these effects are accompanied with ballooning and uncompensated public spending linked to refugee protection and caring (World Bank, 2011). The first macroeconomic impact from the influx of asylum seekers is through aggregate demand while effects of supply of labour develop gradually. In a short span, extra public expenditure for the facilitation of initial welcoming and upkeep services

to asylum seekers, including food, health, housing, and education, is required. However, the main concern of these immigrants is whether the migrants' pay taxes for the services provided on arrival and whether those paid taxes are redistributed to the places where more service provision is required.

Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) provided an estimate of the financial cost of refugee resettlement in the United States of America (USA) to be around US\$10,000 in the year 2007. He also mentioned that the government would pay an additional annual social safety net cost to be USD 6,000 during the initial 8 years and thereafter reduce steadily. In simple terms, the initial cost will be higher and burdening but change positively to benefit of a country later. With USA, when the refugee finds a job, then the refugee will start to contribute to the yearly tax take of over USD 6,000 by year 8 of their arrival. These refugees will pay back to the government by year 13 or so. The scholars admit that refugees between ages 18-45 will eventually pay more in taxes than they got in between a 20-year period.

The degree of refugee integration in the local economy will define the economic influence of the refugees to the hosting nations and particularly on the EU. However, many asylum seekers are below the threshold of the essential need to obtain universal protection hence, they cause extra economic strain to the hosting state. For example, in 2015 Germany, Austria and Sweden spent on refugee's 0.5 percent 0.73 per cent and 1.35 per cent respectively on their Gross Domestic Products. However, due to unavailable data in most countries the refugee support costs cannot be calculated. This is further intensified by the varying political interests and broadcasting of misrepresentation that is not thoroughly examined in relation to the long-term economic implications (Evans & Fitzgerald, 2017).

Asylum, Migration, and integration Fund (2017) indicated that in 2008 – 2013 the European Refugee Fund supported European countries with EUR 630 million in receiving, an asylum process, resettlement programs and reintegration plans. Additionally, the Asylum, Migration, and integration Fund (AMIF) had awarded 3.137trillion euros in total for the 2014- 2020 period in the organization of movement flows and the operation, consolidation, and improvement of a collective Union perception towards immigration and asylum, plus the just and true yield measures and a migrant transfer arrangement consisting of strategies for sharing problems and roles. in addition to above the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa of 2.5 billion euros and the Refugee Facility for Turkey of 3 billion euros to contain illicit migrations.

The international Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank (2017) reported that Kosovar refugees have economically impacted on a host country of Albania and Macedonia. The report asserted that the huge inflow of refugees exerted pressure on the two countries' economic and social infrastructures to the extent of creating the need for emergency financial assistance. It is further estimated that Kosovar refugee crisis in 1999 had affected six countries with a direct host country budget cost of USD 52 - 188 million in humanitarian assistance.

According to Jordan Response Platform and United Nations (2015) report, the Ministry of Planning and international Cooperation in Jordan committed \$81.4 million to enrol 78,531 Syrian children in public learning institutions. By 2016, it was estimated that maintaining the infrastructure at the time including availing adequate water, connecting electricity network, roads construction and repairs, and continuing to enrol Syrian children would further require USD 130 million. On the health sector,

the government of Jordan had spent \$168 million with an additional \$62 million needed to cater for the expected increase in the refugee population. Further, in 2015, the Jordanian government spent 35% of its public budget on receiving refugees. Such public expenditure was projected to drain the Jordanian public coffers unless the international community came in with financial and technical support (Fakih & Marrouch, 2015).

According to Jordan Response Platform and United Nations (2015), Jordan had a 9 per cent loss caused by trade imbalance emanating from Syrian conflict. Before the conflict, Jordan exported its goods to Lebanon, Turkey, and Europe through Syria as the transit point (World Bank, 2013). However, the instability in Syria has caused Jordan to rethink this route and use expensive substitute routes like using the Aqaba port or through Iraq. This has lowered the competitiveness of the prices of Jordanian exports.

Some of the positive benefits to Jordan from the arrival of Syrian refugees is that they have stimulated enhanced public investment and growth of public sectors like telecommunications, transport, and construction as well as in the services sector hence resulting into GDP growth (Francis, 2015). Highly skilled and knowledgeable refugees can be utilized for the advantage and benefits of host community and country. Based on this, when refugees pursue their livelihoods through their skills and know how then they will cause important economic contributions locally. For example, in Jordan, Iraqi migrants work in healthcare facilities and universities hence offer to the local (host) society know how (Crisp *et al.*, 2009).

Refugees have the potential of causing positive contribution to host economy, community, and nation. However, such contributions have attracted winners and

losers in equal measure among the host and refugee societies. Pakistan particularly Peshawar, witnessed increased demand for rental units from migrants and expatriates working for NGOs in the provision of aid assistance during the 1980s and 1990s. This benefitted local investors in real estate while deprived poor Pakistanis in need for rental units (Schmeidl, 2002). Similarly, in Jordan there were reports of rising rental fees since the onset of Iraq and Syria refugee crisis. The Jordan Response Platform and United Nations (2015) study reported increased rent prices in Jordan rising six per cent in 2014 particularly in border areas (Maystadt & Verwim, 2009).

in Tanzania, refugees offer cheap workforce to local native communities in areas that require manual workforce like housekeeping, agriculture, construction, and catering. Through this cheap labour, refugees have reduced the wages of non-skilled employees from host community but benefited traders from the local communities (Maystadt & Verwim, 2009). Summarily put, refugee arrival in a country benefit among the host communities those who own important resources, power, and education and disadvantages the poor, less educated and the marginalised.

In Malawi, the influence refugees exert towards national public expenditure was noted through government capital expenditure in the infrastructural and social sectors in 1990. Government public expenditure related to hosting refugees were estimated at US\$ 17.4 million for 1988 and 1989 (Government of Malawi, World Bank, UNDP & UNHCR., 1990). This expenditure analysis has resulted change in the UNHCR emergency assistance program in to one that comprehensively serve the requirements of the refugees and host community around refugee areas (Zetter, 1995). UNHCR has expanded the capacity and infrastructure of healthcare facilities, water supply, road

infrastructure, and reforestation to compensate deforestation done by the refugees and reduce environmental dilapidation of wood reserves.

Research has indicated that the sum of camp benefits to the host community from Dadaab camp, both directly and indirectly, was USD 82 million in 2009 and expected to increase by USD 18 in 2010. A portion of these funds was channelled to infrastructural development to benefit the hosting society. Additionally, the effect of the Dadaab refugee camps to the hosting communities was significantly experienced through trade and lowered prices of food and commodities. What is more, the refugee camp created key host markets with noticeable power to purchase pastoral items like milk and livestock. Besides these benefits, the study also found that refugees in the camp contributed to the lessening of building materials like wood and firewood as well as the scramble for graze lands around the camps. The study concluded that refugee impacts towards the hosting society were broad and involved positive and negative effects. These effects influenced local households differently based on the specific situation prevailing in the households but generally, the benefits outweighed the negative impacts of the refugees to the host (Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology, 2010).

2.2.2 Security concerns associated with refugees

2.2.2.1 Global security issues associated with refugees

According to the European Commission (2016), one of the reasons, why refugees can engage in unsecure instances is when they are not well taken care of in terms of meeting their basic needs. As such, one of the ways of dealing with crime caused by refugees is offering them the required basic needs. Such an instance happened to Syrian refugees in Greece. Additionally, reacting to the Brussels terror attack,

Dworkin (2016) proposes that much attention be offered to the security flaws that terrorists take advantage of, there be a sharing of security intelligence among security organs of different EU nations, granting security agents greater power over suspected criminals, and reinforcing border controls.

Council of the European Union (2019) adds that several policies have been adopted by EU members to counter terrorism measures. The policies include criminalizing all terrorist activities including trainings, organizing, collecting, and offering funds for use in terror attacks, controlling weapon acquisition and possession, reinforcing checks at external borders, fight against online radicalization, having a European counter terrorism centre. These measures indicate that the EU has instituted both short term and long-term measures of dealing with terror attacks. However, majority of these measures are policy implementations with very few of them being actual steps taken.

As a way of curbing, insecurity associated with immigrants and asylum president Trump set the maximum number of refugees admitted to the US at 30,000 in 2018, which ensured that the country cannot be infiltrated by immigrants that the government may not be able to control. Although many human rights groups and NGOs have protested this view, the US authority has enforced it thus denying many asylum seekers entry into the US. This move has seen the country admitting only those “it can accommodate.” What is more, security checks have also been intensified to ensure that those admitted as refugees meet certain set criteria (Felter & McBride, 2018) while those who do not meet these criteria are denied entry into the country. Additionally, the scrapping of the Central American Minors programme has curtailed the possibility of criminals from the Americas entering the US in the pretence of

visiting their relatives. The US denies unapproved persons entry into the country at its border points. The zero-tolerance policy for illegal entry into the US is also in force and has helped the US control criminals and terrorists from entering the country (Kerwin, 2018).

in Libya, the political instability that accompanied the collapse of Gadhafi's regime was addressed by UN-backed unity government, which saw the warring parties share the national cake (TftWorld, 2018). Although this measure was intended to bring peace in the country, peace is yet to be found, as majority of the country is not peaceful. NATO's efforts to topple Gadhafi's dictatorship over the people of Libya as a way of liberating them failed as the state of the country has moved from worse to worst. Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) also attempted to intervene by supporting one side of the warring groups, but this did not bring the expected result. Libya continued to dwindle.

in East Africa, political instability in Somalia has been a security concern for East African states. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab has made things worse as it has empowered Al-Shabaab to become a lethal force in causing terror to east African nations. To attempt to neutralize the group's force, several countries in Africa sent their troops in Somalia on a peacekeeping mission. Although this measure led to many attacks on East African states, it kept the Al-Shabaab busy at home. Nevertheless, the attacks associated with Al-Shabaab have incited many citizens in the affected countries to think of withdrawal from Somalia, a measure that many see as fruitless and cowardly.

2.2.2.2 Government of Kenya response to Security Issues

2.2.2.2.1 Tripartite agreement

The Tripartite Agreement initiated towards the end of 2013 between UNHCR, Kenya government and Somalia for three years, provides an important and recent policy statement at a multilateral level governing the management of refugees. In general, the agreement is grounded on agreements between refugees' source country, hosting country and UNHCR, which is the internationally mandated and recognised refugee management body. According to the agreement, parties must assume their responsibilities and roles in the process of voluntary returning of refugees. The 1950 UNHCR statute considers tripartite agreements like this one as "special agreements" which is governed by international law hence legally binding to all signatories to the agreement (D'Orsi, 2016). Following the six-month extension, there has been no clear communication on the agreement. Since the last communication was issued in mid-2016, no public communication has been made concerning formally extending the tripartite agreement. Regardless, the agreement is an important policy agreed upon among several parties at state level.

The agreement offers a blueprint for voluntary, dignified, and safe returning of Somali refugees from Dadaab camps to their homes in Somalia overseen by a tripartite Commission. The mandate of UNHCR in this agreement is to ensure the voluntary decision of refugees to repatriate. The organization is also obligated to validate and ensure the free and voluntary state of resolutions to repatriate. This, UNHCR achieves by delivering important messages and creating awareness concerning the voluntary repatriation exercise upon which refugees will determine their position. So far this repatriation plan has been implemented successfully and resulted into the voluntary

repatriation back to Somalia of 0.435 million refugees in 2015 and 0.269 million refugees in 2019 (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

2.2.2.2.2 Security laws (amendment) Act

in the year 2015, when terrorist attacks were rampant on Kenyan soil, Kenya passed the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA). The SLAA saw a revising of 22 separate acts of Parliament regulating national security like the Refugees Act. in the SLAA, article 58 prescribed the amendment of Refugees Act Section 16 whereby a new section 16A was inserted. This new section highlights that the total refugee counts tolerable to reside in Kenya should not go beyond 150,000. This amendment was, however, challenged in Kenyan courts by rights bodies like the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) and Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR). The petitioners argued that since the total of refugees in the country at the period of passing SLAA exceeded half a million, implementing the new law would motivate illegal refoulement, deter new refugees from coming to the country, and violate international and local laws on the preservation of people's rights (specifically asylum seekers) (Petition No.628 of 2014).

On the 23rd day of February 2015 a judgement that the amendment was unconstitutional was passed by Kenya's High court. The amendment was judged to be unlawful because it breached the non-refoulement rule presented in the 1951 Convention that was ratified by Kenya and violated articles 2 sub-article 5 and 6 of the 2010 Kenya constitution which supersedes other laws in the country. The judges further argued that the rule of non-refoulement was foundation alto refugee safety locally and internationally and could not be violated. Additionally, the judgement refuted the argument by the Kenya government that the cases of insecurity in the

country were directly correlated with the number of refugees accommodated. The judges submitted that the Refugees Act already provided legal avenues to handle refugees who were criminals or supposed to cause insecurity in the country (Petition No.628 of 2014).

The judgement further indicated that in the Refugees Act section 19 was, if the commissioner of registration of persons could retract the refugee standing of immigrants who is reasonably believed to endanger the country or its people as per the law. in section 21(1), a refugee can be debarred from Kenya on consulting with the cabinet secretary in charge of immigration and registration of refugees on grounds of civic order or state security. Thus, the court concluded that the Kenya government had avenues to use to arrest any insecurity concerns from or associated with refugees and that limiting the count of refugees allowed to enter Kenya is a constitutional breach (Petition No.628 of 2014).

2.2.2.2.3 Providing Education, business environment and Jobs to Somali Refugees

Refugee education is one of the unmet needs refugee families residing in camps have. in Dadaab, high priority is directed towards the continued implementation of the education scheme that is centred on providing quality outcomes and progressing the application of technological innovations in the curriculum. According to UNHCR (2016), the education sector in Dadaab refugee complex was allocated \$ 12.8 million. One of the major challenges to the sector is the high teacher turnover, particularly among Teacher's Service Commission (TSC) managed teachers, who run away from the precarious security situation in north-eastern region and around the Dadaab camps. Another reason for the turnover is the preference by most trained teachers to

seek other incentive jobs that demand minimal time commitments. Additionally, some teachers return to Somalia to start education institutions, which is more lucrative than being employed.

Research established that a significant percentage of refugee children who have attained school going age do not attend school. Among the few who attend, there is a significant parity based on gender—many boys than girls attend primary school. As time progresses, many girls than boys attain secondary education although generally the numbers are minimal. Many learners attend primary than secondary school. The number of learners critically reduce as the level of education increases. The transition rate from primary to secondary schools is low among refugees with girls recording the lowest rates. Corrective measures like the provision of scholarships for girls, free sanitary pads, remedial classes, and free school meals have not changed the situation much. What is more, the admission slots available in secondary schools are low compared to the number of students graduating from primary schools (Ng'ang'a, 2016).

Without proper education and particularly secondary education, many refugee youths do not qualify to pursue professional training, which sanctions them to less meaningful jobs with which they may not support themselves and family adequately. In fact, with the Kenya state's directive to confine refugees in camps, access to jobs is limited for refugees and getting a work permit is a huddle for majority of refugee job seekers. As such, refugee participation in economic development of host nation is curtailed and this restrains refugees' ability to be self-reliant hence making them slaves to relief aid. This then opens the window of refugee youths engaging in

criminal activities, radicalization, or being recruited to terror groups as fighters, which negatively impacts the security of Kenya (Ng'ang'a, 2016).

in conclusion, offering good education to refugee youths and consequently offering them good employment opportunities can be a remedy towards preventing them from engaging in crime. However, given that Kenya has majority of its youth unemployed (World Bank, 2016) leaves one speculating as to whether the government can act towards providing jobs for refugees when its citizens are also in need.

2.2.2.2.4 Closing of Borders

Somalia's borders with neighbouring states are highly porous—particularly its border with Kenya. in recent years, this has been a major security concerns for the Kenyan government (Ng'ang'a, 2016). Proximity of the Dadaab refugee camps to Somalia makes it easy for rebels and militants from the country to pass through the porous border into the camp and hide among refugees (Rabasa *et al.*, 2007) where they get better environment for retreating after engaging in terror acts. in light of this, the Kenya government is researching the best security measure to take to control its porous borders in anticipation that militias might cross over to Kenya and effect terror acts as a way of earning sympathy or inflicting fear among Kenyans (Ng'ang'a, 2016; Fleming, 2017).

The greatest impact of the porous borders is likely to be transferred to Dadaab refugee camps as it could easily house terrorists crossing the porous borders who may pretend to be refugees. As such, in December 2006, Kenya sealed her border with Somali as a measure to overcome the growing security concern posed by the Islamic insurgent group— Al-Shaabab. This was a dilemma since, although it intended to curb criminals likely to take advantage of the situation and cross over to Kenya to cause

mayhem, it also went against the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) convention that allowed safeguarding of immigrants' rights by unhindered allowance of cross border migration of asylum seekers (Kiama & Karanja, 2013).

2.2.2.2.5 Operation Linda inchi

Operation '*Linda inchi*' was Kenya's first known external armed intervention in another country's territory. The operation happened in October 2011 when Kenya entered Somalia via the Liboi area with the main goal of protecting Kenya's territorial integrity from foreign attacks (Birkett, 2013). Specifically, the operation intended to achieve three goals: First, Kenya aimed to protect its national integrity and peace that had been distorted by the numerous cases of Al-Shabaab attacks and kidnappings, which were affecting the country's economy and peace. Second, was to create a buffer zone up to Afmadow settlement area, which would see the Al-Shabaab group's activities inside and near Kenya, crippled hence meeting the first aim (Lind *et al.*, 2015; Okwany, 2016; Williams, 2018). Third, the Kenya government wanted to restore peace in Somalia by reinstating the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Atta-Asamoah, 2015).

Kenya believed that Al-Shabaab activities in her territory were a serious security concern that warranted its intervention across its borders even though the country's international policy was not clear and had not been applied since the time Iddi Amin Dada threatened to invade Kenya (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Williams, 2018). The Kenya government argued that the decision to invade Somalia was adequately consultative, approved and well planned by the relevant parties. However, during the launch, the TFG of Somalia denied approving Kenya's armed interventions within its territory. Nevertheless, the intervention went on— first as Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and

later Kenya's armed forces merged with other troops under the AMISOM brand (Lind, Mutahi, & Oosterom, 2015; Okwany, 2016; Williams, 2018). According to the UN monitoring group, Kenya's entry into Somalia and its operations between October 2011 and June 2012 were against international law as they broke Somalia's general arms embargo. As such, the UN did not support the activities until Kenya became part of the AMISOM (Williams, 2018).

KDF's operations in the *Linda inchi* initiative were to be limited to the Southern Juba region of Southern Somalia (GoK, 2013). The *Linda inchi* operation commissioned Kenya's war with Al-Shabaab and although currently Al-Shabaab linked attacks within Kenya have significantly reduced, Okwany (2016) argued that the objectives of *Linda inchi* operation were yet to be achieved by 2015. Botha (2014) established that Al-Shabaab terror attacks had increased since the launch of *Linda inchi* while the Kenya human rights group supported this finding by giving the statistics that Al-Shabaab associated terrorist attacks increased from 27 in 2013 to 133 in 2014 out of which a total of 264 lives were lost and over 900 injured. Majority of these attacks were directed towards western interests and were intended to publicize the Al-Shabaab terror group as an international outfit hence enhance the group's chances of mobilizing human and financial resources from across the world (Lind *et al.*, 2015; Williams, 2018).

Before the launch of *Linda inchi*, Kenya was going through several issues that threatened national cohesion and security. One of these issues was the growth of the Al-Shabaab group in Somalia and whose activities were threatening the peace of Kenya. The group's growth was rapid and threatened to spread to Kenya. As a result, the Kenya government in partnership with the Southern Somalia administration

launched the Jubaland Project, which aimed to train and equip local militiamen so that they could fight the Al-Shabaab group. This project failed to bare tangible fruits and was later abandoned in 2010 paving way for a better and effective strategy to deal with Al-Shabaab-The '*Linda inchi*' (international Crisis Group, 2012).

The other issues threatening the peace of Kenya included the marginalization, ill-treatment, and abandonment of the coastal and North-Eastern Kenya communities by the national government, which prompted most people from the regions to rebel against the central government through acts like secession calls, radicalization, and joining terrorist cells and groups like Al-Shabaab. Denied secession coupled with uncouth strategies by the Kenya government to silence the rebels led to a lot of discontentment with the central government, which, additionally, the Al-Shabaab group used to their advantage by radicalizing and recruiting youth from the affected regions as they promised them better lives than the Kenya government offered (Botha, 2014). As such, the Al-Shabaab network in Kenya grew significantly and attacked Kenya from within which validated the operation, *Linda inchi*.

Linda inchi is a serious, vibrant, and delicate external policy resolution that domestically influences the country because of the shared people (Somalis) who are in Somalia and Kenya and the shared borders between the two nations. However, when it was launched, policy makers failed to foresee this challenge. The possible outcomes of the operation were miscalculated. Many analysts argue that the decision of Kenya entering Somalia was rushed and although some states consulted supported, some of them were sceptical of the move. Kenyan policy creators and analysts also disagreed about the validity of the move due to the lack of clear international relationship policy (Okwany, 2016). As such, the aim of just creating a buffer zone faded when the

Kenya government insisted that the length of time taken in Somalia would be limitless until the safety of Kenya was guaranteed (international Crisis Group, 2012).

Since *Linda inchi*, Kenya has faced numerous attacks by or associated to Al-Shabaab group. The Westgate attack in 2013 was the first major serious attack the group inflicted on Kenya. Most of the attacks have happened in Nairobi, Lamu, Tana River, Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, and Mombasa areas (Atta-Asamoah, 2015). The Garissa University remains to be the biggest and most painful of the attacks as it targeted innocent university students and resulted in many lives being lost as well as inflicting serious injuries on survivors (international Crisis Group, 2012). These increased attacks post *Linda inchi* operation has led some analysts to conclude that Kenya was not well prepared to face the effects and retaliatory attacks from the Al-Shabaab group.

Attacks by the Al-Shabaab group trigger poorly planned, coordinated, and wrongly directed reactions from the Kenya policing organs. For instance, after some of the attacks, the Kenya police have, on numerous occasions, stereotyped the Muslims and Somalis as part of the terror gang. The Al-Shabaab group has taken advantage of these poor reactions by the Kenya government by recruiting many Kenyan youth who feel left out and discriminated upon by the central government (Lind *et al.*, 2015; Okwany, 2016).

Stereotypes have also been reported to influence public opinion about how Somali refugees are perceived and this affects how they are treated by the host communities particularly communities who are not in close proximity to refugees like natives living far from the refugee camps. For instance, the movement restrictions have been exacerbated by the perception that if allowed to mingle freely, Somali refugees will

infiltrate many areas of the country hence cause widespread terror attacks and other crimes (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Lind *et al.*, 2015; Okwany, 2016).

Besides the attacks, the Al-Shabaab group have directed towards innocent Kenyans, they have also been fierce at the battlefield within Somalia. In January 2016 and 2017, the group launched one of the fiercest attacks ever on the KDF— The El-Adde and the Kulbiyow attacks respectively— where it is estimated that cumulatively hundreds of KDF soldiers lost their lives while some were captured as prisoners of war. KDF's artillery and supplies were also stolen in the fight that saw KDF's camp completely run over. Analysts say that what happened was worse than it could be imagined and that it amounted to the greatest loss the KDF had faced since independence (international Peace institute (IPI), 2016; Burke, 2017).

Currently, Al-Shabaab attacks across Kenya have gone down compared to the period between 2011 and 2015. However, this should not be interpreted as a win by the Kenyan government because no one knows what the terror group is planning. Nevertheless, as already promised by the Kenya government, Operation *Linda inchi* still goes on and, as a result, it is expected to attract many Al-Shabaab attacks within Kenya and on KDF troops in Somalia just as it has done in the past. Consequently, there is need for the government to reach out to groups susceptible to Al-Shabaab recruitment and engage them in economic activities that would deter their radicalization and misuse. This should be applied to all marginalized groups whether natives or asylum seekers, hence, the need to also reach out to people in refugee camps.

2.2.2.2.6 *Usalama Watch*

Following the numerous grenade attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa cities in 2014, the Kenya government introduced the operation *Usalama Watch*. In this operation, six thousand police officers were deployed in Nairobi's Eastleigh, South B and South C towns to identify and disrupt terror cells and their activities and identify illegal migrants who were believed not to be patriotic to Kenya and likely to participate in the numerous insecurity cases. Thousands of people, mostly of Somali origin, were screened indiscriminately and those who lacked valid documents (over 3,000) detained and held at the Moi Sports Center-Kasarani Stadium (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Lind *et al.*, 2015; Okwany, 2016).

Although the operation was criticized for various infringements, it bore some short-term fruits. The fruit of the operation was the disrupted terror cells and terrorism infrastructure in the area. However, the operation was criticized for poor coordination as the same house was frisked several times by different police officers who found nothing alarming at all searches. In the process, the rights of the residents in the area were infringed as the frisking was poorly planned and of an ambush nature. Additionally, the operation was founded on ethnic profiling of Somalis as terrorists. Many of them were arrested and detained at Kasarani stadium and released later after their documentation were verified. Those found in the country illicitly were returned to Somalia (Botha, 2014; Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Okwany, 2016). These profiling and illegal arrests significantly affected Somali Kenyans who felt discriminated upon. The operation enhanced stereotyping Somalis as terrorists. This made the Somalis lose faith in the operation hence its death. In other cases, security agents extorted money from the arrested parties whose identification documents were taken and detained

until they paid a bribe. in some cases, refugees with valid documentation were forced back to camps to avoid the extortion (Atta-Asamoah, 2015).

in Mombasa, a similar operation done in Bondeni, Ganjoni and Majengo, areas saw the arrest of over 300 youths alleged to belong to terrorist cells although some rights groups claim that majority of the arrested were innocent and were profiled based on religion. Later, with the intervention of the Governor for Mombasa-Mr. Joho, the youths were released without being charged (Atta-Asamoah, 2015). The *Usalama* watch ignited debate on the extent of integrating Kenyan Somalis into local communities. It also elicited discussion on the extent to which some Kenyans are more Kenyan than others.

The Al-Shabaab group significantly benefited from this operation as it easily recruited the wrongly discriminated youths who wished to wage revenge to the Kenya government for the sufferings they went through in the hands of the police. The operation also created a perception among the youths of the affected communities that they do not belong to the Kenya government hence shifted their allegiance to terror cells/groups (Lind *et al.*, 2015). Additionally, the operation increased mistrust between government and the affected communities hence blocking intelligence sharing with the government (Okwany, 2016). This further dented the war against terrorism and as such, the operation *Usalama* watch led to increased terrorist activities in the long term hence its ineffectiveness.

2.2.2.2.7 Nyumba Kumi initiative

Nyumba Kumi initiative is a community policing method where every dweller is required to know the profile of at least ten of their neighbours and, in case they pose any security threat, give such information to the police. New neighbours are also to be

reported to police (Atta-Asamoah, 2015). The initiative was launched as a measure of dealing with the numerous and common attacks from terrorist groups like the Al-Shabaab (Lind *et al.*, 2015). The foundation of this initiative emanates from the understanding that the police and the community are partners in ensuring community security. As such, the relationship between the two parties (police and community) should never be of a senior and subordinate but equals who should freely share security intelligence to avert any security threats (Okwany, 2016).

The *Nyumba Kumi* initiative did not just intend to enhance intelligence gathering by security agents; it also promised an effective way of ensuring safe neighbourhoods through the deterrent of neighbours engaging in any activities that could be security threats to others. As such, using this strategy, terror cells within our neighbourhood's would be destroyed hence denting the effectiveness of planning and execution of terror activities by groups like the Al-Shabaab. It is for this reason that the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative was recommended for adoption by Community Peace Protection Teams (CPPT) in Dadaab camps as the best strategy to adopt to ensure security in refugee camps (UNHCR, 2014b). However, the extent to which this initiative is effective remains to be tested (Leting, 2017) hence part of the reason why this study is important.

The *Nyumba Kumi* initiative has been criticized to bias towards collecting intelligence for security organs rather than it being useful or beneficial to the community. Additionally, some commentators have argued that politicians can abuse the initiative by using it to gather information to be used for selfish interests (Atta-Asamoah, 2015). However, this criticism can be debated since the intelligence collected by security agents is for use in protecting the community from attacks.

2.2.3 Challenges refugees face in contributing host development

2.2.3.1 Socioeconomic challenge

According to UNHCR, about 50% of the refugee population across the globe are hosted in cities and towns and only 33% of them are encamped (UNHCR, 2009). Most urban refugees stay in environments that are populous and poor, which enhances scramble and competition for the limited resources and amenities thus creating conflict among refugee and host societies. This advances the urban crisis and slum environment (Zetter *et al.*, 2012).

Egypt hosts Eritrean, Sudanese, Ethiopian, Iraqi, and Somali migrants who are challenged in various ways. High refugee and national unemployment rates, high cost of living associated with high commodity and rental costs, and restrictive refugee regulatory policies challenge refugee participation in socioeconomic development in the country (Egypt). Similarly, the high number of jobless refugee youth hinder refugee access to labour opportunities in Egypt, which also exacerbates the challenge. Therefore, many refugees are often led to work in regulated areas of work and jobs that offer no or minimal security and safety including employment as domestic workers in Egyptian homes (Buscher & Heller 2010). Chin refugees from Burma, who reside in urban centres in Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, and Malaysia India as unregistered refugees, go through similar economic and social situations (Alexander, 2008).

In Bangladesh, refugee surge was associated with frequent power cuts, which disrupted people's day-to-day life as well as increasing the cost of conducting business. There have also occurred transportation hitches, which have disrupted smooth flow of the supply chain to the local marketplaces. Local small shopkeepers

faced combined difficulties associated with the increased cost of conducting business and enhanced competition created by Rohingya participation in certain business lines resulting into pressure that diminished their profit levels. In Cox's Bazar district of the country, tourism, which was a big industry in the district, was on a declining level because of cross border security concerns and restrictions put in place along the Myanmar-Bangladesh boundary. The industry was substantively less developed due to poor infrastructure, which has worsened with refugee pressure (ISCG, 2018).

Additionally, host community learners have skipped classes or dropped out of school to pursue occupational activities like hawking items in refugee camps. When the inflow of refugees began, many schools and school playgrounds were used to hold refugees before they were relocated to accommodation camps. This destroyed the school infrastructure and equipment as well as dilapidated the playgrounds hence compromising their usage by learners. Similarly, college and school buildings were habited by law enforcement and security forces hence disorganizing the normal flow of activities in these learning institutions for many months. After relocating refugees from these institutions, repairs and renovation of the faulted facilities and fixtures lagged hence further prolonging the time it took normal activities to resume (UNDP, 2018).

According to World Bank (2011), in Rwandan context, refugees seek casual employment and labour opportunities outside camps daily where they take on informal jobs like working as guards, working on agricultural lands, and doing cleaning and housekeeping duties. Some refugees move to other districts to perform these duties thanks to increased mobility chances. Since most refugee camps are in interior parts of the country which offer limited job chances, freedom of movement

comes in handy to enable the refugees seek employment opportunities far from the camps.

Refugee traders in camps have created business interactions with wholesale businesses where they easily access items for sale. Regardless of these good business relationships with suppliers, many camp-based traders are unwilling to venture into out-of-the-camp market. Camps remain to the preferred marketplaces since businesses in camps do not pay rent or taxes and avoid out-of-the-camp competition. The employment choices that refugees make are significantly determined by taxation policies (World Bank, 2011).

in Mugombwa refugee camp, for instance, majority of the camp businesses fear initiating operations within the district due to fear of inability to pay the tax. Similarly, an association for tailors in the camps perceived taxes paid by out-of-the-camp tailoring businesses as a challenge to continued operation in that environment. According to a social enterprise, Inkomoko, taxation amnesty motivated many businesses to operate within the camps where the amnesty prevailed, which challenged any efforts to expand the businesses outside the camps regardless of whether the expansion could make the business grow. Thus, there is need for practical evidence to strategize business development operations that promote trader's ability to effectively predict expenses and revenues to motivate the adventure into out-of-the-camp market (World Bank, 2011).

Even though Rwandan refugees have the liberty to work anywhere, many of them lack identity cards thus challenging them to access certain job openings or formal sources of capital for financing their business. Additionally, majority of employers in the country fail to appreciate refugees' right to work hence are not motivated to offer

work to refugees. This challenge is being addressed in the Strategic Plan for Refugee inclusion 2019-2024, which aims to offer refugees in the country with identification cards by the year 2024. This will provide them an opportunity to apply for employment. However, the World Bank also recommends rigorous information sharing advocacy and drive across the entire country and specifically focused messages about the rights of refugees to work anywhere within their hosting districts, which is critical (World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2019).

In Rwanda, the district offered the current trading space for refugees within the above refugee camps but is currently reported in poor condition, which affects trading opportunities and investment into the area. Elevating the face of the facility is likely to enhance investment into the area and trade opportunities for refugees and hosting populations. It will additionally bring new traders since it is located along a major paved road. The location could be strategically marketed and turned into a recreation point for Nyungwe or Rusizi-bound travellers. Handicrafts and other items manufactured within the camps can also be sold to people at this point and the refugees taxed for the sales. The rehabilitated market will attract enhanced tax returns and rent payments from businesses, which will enhance the district's return on investment. Formalization of businesses will also promote refugees to run licensed and registered businesses and promote effective inclusion (World Bank, 2019).

Refugees face different and stringent regulatory environment that curtail their business and economic thrive within and outside refugee camps compared to host nationals. These restrictions arise on refugees' right to work and mobility (Bettset *al.*, 2018). For example, in Kakuma and Dadaab the enforcement of the encampment policy does not give refugees freedom of movement outside the camp and within the

host country. Special passes are granted to those who must move outside the camps although there have been numerous concerns from rights protection groups on the slow, complicated, and corrupt process of attaining these passes.

Although movement restrictions stand, refugees are permitted to move or work just outside the camp or in the nearby towns without a pass. Travelling beyond these nearby towns requires that refugees have authorisation from the Department of Refugee Affairs. These restrictions have motivated many refugees to sneak out of camps without permits and/or encouraging some to use dubious means, often illegal—e.g., through forgery or bribery, to acquire travel passes. For refugees to go outside the camps they need to justify reasons for applying movement pass by specifying whether the reason includes seeking medical attention, on business interests, or for education reasons. However, seeking the pass on business grounds is often denied. For this reason, as narrated by refugee it exposes them to pay bribe to acquire movement pass, which should be issued at no cost (RCK, 2012).

These restraints inflict limitations on refugees' socioeconomic contributions when paralleled to that of the host community. Refugees liken their camps to 'half prisons' and feel that the movement restrictions are infringements to their rights of movement and working outside camp regions hence clear obstacles to their socioeconomic progression. Additionally, the restrictions cause a ripple effect of acquisition of illegal identification and pass documents.

Research by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the international Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School (IHRC) (2017) indicated that due to the significance of birth certificates and national identification documents in unlocking movement restrictions towards refugees and access to vital government services,

many refugees were striving to access these vital documents illegally through bribery. Another study by Weitzberg (2019) shows how lack of access to national identification documents influenced some Kenyans to seek illegal acquisition of travel passports hence become citizens of other countries which denies their parent country of the benefits these individuals would have on economic development. This is a clear effect of how lack of movement pass can affect refugees.

Mitike and Deressa (2009) investigated the prevalence of FGM in Eastern Ethiopia among Somali refugees and established that FGM was a common practice among Somali refugees despite anti FGM initiatives launched by UNHCR, NGOs and the host nation. The practice thrives due to cultural and religious connotations it has. The study established that many parents (84%) had high intentions of circumcising their daughters although those who went ahead to engage the practice was low. About 42 out of every one hundred parents went ahead to circumcise their daughters. The study also established that as Somali girls aged, chances of taking them through FGM increased. At the age of seven to eight years, only half of all the girls in camps were circumcised but as the girls reached 11 to 12 years, 95% of them were being circumcised.

Since FGM was a traditional practice and based on its illegality, 81% of those who performed it among Somalis were traditional circumcisers while 18% were birth attendants. There were two forms of FGM practiced among this community—stitching of the vaginal canal to make it narrower and cutting of the clitoris. of the two FGMs, clitoral cutting was the dominant form with 64% of the participants acknowledging this. Only 36% of the women underwent stitching of the vagina infibulation, which is the severe form of FGM is not being practiced among this

community. Parental participation in anti-FGM initiatives enhanced chances of not falling prey to this vice. What is more, majority of men than women appreciated anti-FGM initiatives and were reluctant to allow their daughters go through the practice.

According to Kimonge (2011), FGM has societal, community, individual, and relationship costs. Societal and community costs for FGM include the healthcare issues associated with the medical costs required to reconstruct or rehabilitate women who have undergone FGM. The health issues can be as severe as loss of life due to complications associated with the practice—for instance in the case of excessive bleeding. The practice also affects school attendance of many girls, affects their performance and influence school dropouts as the practice is considered as a rite of passage to adulthood in some societies. As a rite of passage, girls who have undergone FGM are forcefully married off, as they are regarded as adults after the practice hence depriving families of their support and contribution. Some studies have also established that FGM causes marital problems. The early marriages limit girl's exposure and education on sexuality, which can cause her to have marital problems.

in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, refugees are prohibited from rearing livestock (goats, cattle, and camels) as this is likely to fuel conflict between refugees and host communities who are nomads. As a result, refugees do not own animals unless they are poultry. Tree cutting or felling for whatever reason is also prohibited among refugees because trees form a major natural resource host community in Dadaab and Kakuma depend on for their livelihoods. Allowing refugees to fell trees for whatever reasons would not only bring an unfair competition between hosts and refugees but will also open a possible door for tension and conflict between the two communities. Due to insecurity issues in the camps and areas near the camps, there is

a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the camps which has limited refugees' business activities during the night (Betts *et al.*, 2018) hence limiting their incomes and freedoms.

What is more, refugees who are entrepreneurs must seek for business permits to enable them pay local taxes in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. Refugees are subjected and threatened to pay bribes. Security agents focus on 'unauthorized' trading activities including illegal clinics, pharmacies, *boda-boda* operators, and local brew manufacturing, who must pay specific operational licenses to conduct their businesses in the country. Additionally, there is distinct dissimilarity in how individuals from the host community are handled by security agents compared to how refugees are treated. Individuals from the host community experience less harassment and bribery requests from police when compared to their counterpart refugees (Betts *et al.*, 2018).

Another challenge facing refugees is the refusal to allow them to operate a bank account. This challenge is justified in the inclusion rate, which is very poor in areas like Kakuma where just 3% of migrants and locals operate a bank account. This inability to access formal banking challenges the extent to which refugees can save or access loans for their own development. Refugees obtain loan to start or expand business through UNHCR or to an NGO. No refugee would request for a credit in a financial institution. To overcome this, for instance, Somali refugees exploit their close networks for credit. The main reason for excluding refugees from the financial system in Kenya is due to fear by the institutions that refugees could disappear with their money. This locks out refugee entrepreneurs who may have great ideas but lack financial ability to establish them into businesses (Betts *et al.*, 2018). This in the end

denies the country of business start-ups that would create employment or pay taxes to the government.

in Norway, a study by Brekke (2018) established that Muslim refugees considered lack of Sharia-compliant bank as one of the challenges that deterred them from accessing capital for use in starting businesses, which would alleviate their economic capabilities in the hosting nation. Muslim refugees consider conventional commercial banks a huddle to their setting up of businesses because they charge interest, which is against the Sharia law. To enhance adoption of loans and increased usage of bank products, the researcher advice the introduction of Sharia-compliant products. Thus, when refugees migrated to regions where they are not served with Islamic banking products, they influence the growth and/ or diversification of the sector to meet these needs.

The Refugee Act of 2006 offers refugees employment rights symmetrical to those of non-refugee migrants. The Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011 regulates the employment of all migrants where it introduces the ‘Class M’ work licence for refugees, which are offered for a validity of two years only. Applicants for this permit must attach the prospective employer’s recommendation letter together with DRA’s letter justifying the applicant’s state of being a refugee (Zetter & Rudel, 2017). Although theoretically refugees can be employed in the country, practically, it is impossible for various reasons—Kenya’s high (39%) unemployment rate among its citizens, overdependence on the informal economy, and limited period work permits (Zetter & Rudel, 2017). Due to these factors, it is common to find refugees employed in the informal sector as opposed to the skilled sector. However, there is a thriving informal sector in refugee camps and many urban refugees rely on Kenya’s extensive

informal economy. Many Kenyans have not benefited with jobs from humanitarian organisations operating in the country. Non-local Kenyan and casual labourers from refugee camps are often the beneficiaries, which has attracted numerous public complaints from the local communities (De Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).

The local community has also shown dissatisfaction with the transfer of major markets into refugee camps. These negatives have created a perception among host communities of significantly unequal wealth distribution with refugees in Dadaab (Ikanda, 2008). This perception was evidenced in Kakuma refugee camp where local Turkana community members were employed by wealthy refugees as casual workers and Turkana children given domestic work responsibilities (De Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Aukot, 2003). These opportunities for the locals motivated their protest to do away with Kakuma refugee camp (Alix-Garcia *et al.*, 2017). Contrastingly, another study found that local communities around Dadaab refugee camps supported the returning of refugees to Somalia because the locals associate the refugees with their economic woes (Ikanda, 2008).

The government of Kenya loses revenue associated with the informal economies' dominant among refugee societies although no data is available to indicate the quantity lost. De Montclos and Kagwanja's (2000) study give the history of Kenya government's intent to collect tax from encamped refugees in Dadaab motivated by pressure from the local populations. At the time, the camp was projected to yield USD 75,000 annually. Although no such calls have been revived concerning Dadaab refugees, in Kakuma, since 2014, the county leadership demands that businesses operating in camps be licenced and register where they are expected to give the municipal about USD33 per annum per business/shop (Omata, 2016).

2.2.3.2 Environmental challenge

The negative impact of refugees to the environment of host community and country has been documented worldwide. The damage to the environment is perceived as one of the gross negative effects refugee migrations to an area create. For instance, Bangladesh is considered increasingly prone to climate change due to the various environmental pressures associated with influx of Rohingya refugees to the country. (Mani *et al.*, 2018). The refugees have strained the food cultivation and supply chains by destroying large tracts of agricultural land estimated to be over 176 hectares in 2017/18 year. This has affected Bangladesh farmers with a loss of 19 metric tons of Rabi crops harvested in spring.

The Rohingya refugee influx occurred just before Bangladesh farmers harvested their produce, which destroyed standing crops (ACAPS and NPM, 2018). The influx has also contributed to the destruction of graze lands, which has led to a 10 to 15% deep in animal rearing and caused the clearance of 12 acres of mango trees to create space for refugee habitation. Forest Jagirdars were wiped out creating room for their destruction, which threatens the livelihoods of local people who depend on forests, as well as threatening the environment as the interaction of forests and the environment is inseparable. What is more, 65% of the refugee's used firewood from the forests as their main source of fuel where over 750 tons of wood, roots, and vegetation (enough to fill a football field) was harvested daily for use as cooking fuel (Martin, 2005). This did not only challenge the climate of the area but also increased the risk of landslides occurring in the area which destabilizes soil properties (Zaman *et al.*, 2010), increases the risk of flash floods, and the odds of experiencing harmful cyclones (ISCG, 2018).

in some places near the Myanmar borders, the Bangladesh government banned on cultivation because of heightened security tensions. This has denied host community to continue doing their usual farming activities on hundreds of acres. It was reported that the affected landowners received no compensation for the income they lost. Further to this, human faecal contamination and pollution hindered the cultivation of over 93 hectares of agricultural land near the camps and an additional 380 hectares was not put to agricultural use due to lack of irrigation water. Thus, by sharing the limited natural resources like forests and water the Rohingya refugees endangered the host community (Energy and Environment Technical Working Group, 2018).

According to UNHCR (2019), the protracted refugee presence in Rwanda created negative and positive impacts to the host community. The refugee camps have put pressure on the basic amenities as well as strained the availability of food in refugee hosting regions. Education sector is also affected where some host school students have increased by more than 300%. More so refugee camps in mountainous areas, have witnessed soil erosion and run-offs into arable land. Due to high demand for wood for fuel and timber for construction, there were Deforestation.

Further, UNHCR (2019) found that refugees affected the environment of the areas around the camps positively as well as negatively. Rwandan government realised that including refugees socioeconomically creates opportunities for poorer local communities. It was also revealed that five out of the six refugee hosting districts in Rwanda were poor. in such poor environments, the development huddles refugees encounter is alike to those the local communities face including poor education quality, low job opportunities, and overdependence on subsistence agriculture. Although refugee-host community interactions in the country are good, offering equal

development access assistance and promoting joint economic participation enhances the peaceful interaction among the host and refugee societies.

In Dadaab, the host area has become a crowded place due to human settlement and it has negative effects on movement and grazing arrangements. The host community of the area is well known for its large number of livestock. Because of the crowdedness of the place, the hosts look for water and pasture by going on long distance searches. The pasture and water base are diminished and totally exhausted. There is a significant pressure exerted on the forests of the area by the combined need for building materials and firewood from hosts and refugees. Due to refugee restrictions to fell trees, wood is supplied to camps at a very commercialized scale—often propagated by camp-based harvesters, which leads to deforestation in nearby environments. The camps' closeness to the forests largely contributes to environmental obliteration in the area. Encroachment by refugees and local populations to the forests in search of agricultural land, firewood, and construction materials is evident (Enghoff *et al.*, 2010). The encroachment coupled with the rapid population expansion out of the camps has caused serious human-environment conflict in the area.

According to Martin (2005), the settlement of refugees attracts environmental reactions that contribute towards motivating fruitless conflict with the environment. This conflict is preceded with increased population, poverty, deforestation, soil erosion, and water shortage. Therefore, environmental change can cause competition for resources amongst refugees and host communities, which in turn will escalate conflicts. In this regard, Homer-Dixon's (1999) argued the indirect contribution of environmental change for the outbreak of conflict between the host and refugee.

However, service provision in the Dadaab area indicates an acceptable level of provision of portable water and availability of healthcare and education facilities thus benefiting refugees and local population alike. Eighty-three per cent of locals appreciated enhanced access to water while 85% reported to have enhanced education access (Enghoff *et al.*, 2010). In Kakuma, the host community reported that access to affordable healthcare at the camps significantly benefited them and that in the year 2000, 10% of learners in schools in Kakuma camps came from the host communities (Vemuru *et al.*, 2016). Although some improvements are evidently associated with refugees in the area, the effect on the environment has been negative and dire given the semi-aridity nature of the region.

A study by Aukot (2003) revealed that Kakuma camp has exerted additional pressure on the available resources and principally firewood. The additional requirement for water posed by refugees in the camp also create temporary shortages at certain times and in the long run diminished ground water reserves. Another study by Braun *et al.* (2015) indicated that refugees contributed to an 11.8% reduction in natural resources around Dadaab refugee camps. Among the lowered resources, included foliage, water, and this affected an area of five kilometres from the camp. Enghoff *et al.* (2010) also agreed that refugees had contributed to the depletion of pasturelands in the areas near the Dadaab camps. The study presented that environmental dilapidation is mostly evident in the camps' close vicinity and is unavoidable effect arising from concentrating numerous refugees in one area. Recent reports indicate that recently, there have been efforts to minimize dependence on forests that leads to environmental degradation by introducing alternative sources of fuel like solar energy.

2.2.4 Strategies for enhancing refugees' socio-economic contribution to Host

2.2.4.1 Refugee Protection

2.2.4.1.1 Global refugee protection

Global refugee protection is strongly founded in universal humanitarian law, and the universal people's rights presented in the 1948 declaration. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 in article 14, it is stipulated that all migrants have the right to exercise the rights and freedoms of an asylum seeker in any country that offers asylum. As such, states ratifying this law have a right and not a duty to offer asylum since they have the sovereignty of exercising the right to admit people into their territory (Goodwin-Gill, 1996). Principally, the decision of whether to admit or allow entry of anyone to a country's territorial region belongs to the state (UNGA, 1951). Nonetheless, although every state has the mandate to embrace its self-designed process of judging asylum cases as it pursues national interests, it must make sure that the settlement procedures are geared at ascertaining that the least criteria prescribed in the universal human rights regulations, treaties that govern refugee and customary universal rules are attained (Abuya & Mukundi, 2006).

All European countries are signatories to the 1951 convention on refugee protection hence are bound to offer protection to all asylum seekers within their borders and not to refool them. offering protection means allowing the asylum seekers fair treatment, ensuring their safety, and understanding the situation they are fleeing. Protection also involves humane treatment and helping refugees (Buchanan-Smith, 2018), for instance, the provision of food, shelter, sanitation facilities, healthcare, and education. Although all EU countries must offer asylum to all asylum seekers, Open Societies Foundation (2018) shows that member states of the EU can take back asylum seekers

to their original state of entry into the EU to work on their asylum intent provided the nation has an asylum system that is effective.

According to European Commission (2016), the EU has a comprehensive framework—the European Agenda for Migration—that addresses the refugee crisis in the region. The EU’s humanitarian and civil protection section offers support to refugees and host nations in two major ways: funding and offering technical and physical support. The European Commission offers funding for supporting emergency humanitarian projects to assist refugees and funding used to meet refugee-hosting costs according to the member state’s request. An example is the 83 million euros offered to support refugees in Greece in 2016, which enable the Greece government to address the utmost urgent humanitarian needs of over 50,000 migrants and asylum seekers in the many refugee camps in the country.

often the funding is offered for use on food, shelter, and medicines for the refugees. This funding is offered to member states who are overwhelmed by unexpected influx of refugees. This assistance is complementary and is offered with the knowledge of UNHCR and other refugee protection organizations recognized by the EU. The EU also offers technical assistance to transit countries where refugees stay on their way to the chosen asylum country in the EU. This support is largely financial, although there are instances that the EU partners with the transit countries to set up centres for refugee management for effective protection of refugee rights and freedoms. Such centres have been set up in countries like Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, which are the source of many of migrants found in Europe (European Commission, 2016).

Since World War II, the United States of America has received refugees from across different areas of the world. Immediately after the WWII, the country received

majority of its refugees from Europe but presently, many of the refugees in the USA emanate from the Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The number of refugees settled in the USA has dwindled with time owing to the association of refugees with insecurity. When president Trump assumed office, he set the maximum number of refugees admitted to the US at 45,000 p.a. That number has been reduced further to 30,000 thus denying many asylum seekers entry into the US. What is more, security checks have also been intensified to ensure that those admitted as refugees meet certain set criteria (Felter & McBride, 2018) while those who do not meet these criteria are denied entry into the country. This goes against the principles of offering asylum hence the role to protect asylum seekers.

Additionally, the current US government has scrapped the Central American Minors programme, which permitted children whose parents were refugees in the US to enter the country and join their parents. The US has also stopped the temporary protected status for Haitians, Hondurans, El Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, Sudanese, and Nepalese living in the US. What is more, the US government deferred enforced departure of 4,000 Liberians who immigrated into the US over 20 years ago. At the US borders, it has also been established that US officials deny immigrants and asylum seekers entry into the US thus violating the refugee protection laws that US is party to. Other policies like “zero tolerance” rule for illicit entry into the US and the separation of parents from their offspring at territorial boundary points have also violated migrant rights and freedoms including those of refugees (Kerwin, 2018) and stand in the way for asylum seekers to sustainably participate in the socio-economic development of the host nation/community.

2.2.4.1.2 Refugee Protection in Kenya

in Kenya, the Refugee Act of 2006 gives guidelines for the entry, accommodation, and safeguarding refugees within Kenya's borders. With the increasing challenges emanating from migrations, states tend to adopt restrictive policies to protect their sovereignty. Control of national borders is paramount for all states. The restrictive policies, some of which are enshrined in national law, adopted by the states tend to infringe on the rights of refugees and other migrants within a host state through exploitation and abuse (international Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 2014). Helton (cited in Steiner, Gibney & Loescher, 2003) argues that the term asylum can be construed to mean the act of granting territorial protection to refugees. He postulates that refugees have no categorical right to asylum hence describes protection to entail the act of respecting the fundamental human rights provided in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR (Steiner, Gibney & Loescher, 2003).

Refugee rights are broad and include, right of non-refoulement, right to acquire movable and immovable property, intellectual property rights, right of association, right to access courts, right to employment, right to housing, right to education and mobility freedom. Kenya has an obligation to grant and respect these rights as well as those outlined in the bill of rights. However, this is not the case on the ground as the country has been accused of infringing on most of these rights towards the Somali refugees in the country particularly the freedom of movement and the right to non-refoulement (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000; Jaji, 2009; Ng'ang'a, 2016). Refugees are also not allowed to seek employment either (US Committee for Refugees or Immigrants, 2000).

Mohamed (2017) argued that the reason for denying refugee employment in the asylum country is to minimize conflict likely to arise from competition for jobs with the host citizens. Although this explanation may make sense to some quarters, it discriminates against refugees and condemns them to dependence on relief food and help from donors and the host nation (Abdi, 2008). The host country also loses when it denies refugees to work as it fails to tap from their intellectual skills (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2000). This begs the question; how does the Kenya government contribute to the hosting of refugees?

Although the Kenya government is party to international laws supporting the protection of refugee rights, the country has sought to repatriate refugees since 2013 and even declared the closure of the Dadaab refugee complex in 2016. However, a Kenyan court ruling in early 2017 termed the closure of the complex unlawful although the government still holds the intent to close it (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). According to Kiama and Karanja (2013), the Kenya government started Dadaab Camps to offer a home and protection to people fleeing persecution from Siad Barre's dictatorial regime. In 2011 when the Dadaab refugee complex received an increased number of refugees leading to overcrowding in the available three camps, the government in partnership with UNHCR commissioned the setting up of another two camps. By doing this, the government was offering additional accommodation and protection to asylum seekers even though it was working on a plan to do away with refugee camps due to insecurity issues.

The host country also acts as a conduit through which humanitarian assistance can be offered to refugee camps. In Nicholson and Kumin (2017), three ways through which international humanitarian assistance is delivered to refugee camps stand out:

intergovernmental basis; through international organizations like UNHCR and through Non-Government organizations (NGOs). Even though UNHCR is the most trusted channel used to deliver the assistance, the host government and some NGOs must be involved in the arrangements, delivery, and distribution of the assistance.

in the 2010 Kenya constitution, Article 43 on social and economic rights presents six basic rights that everyone should enjoy. The rights are right to good health comprising access healthcare and reproductive health services; right to adequate and accessible shelter with reasonable standards of sanitation; access to adequate food at decent quality; access to adequate, hygienic, and safe-water; access to schooling and societal security. All services provided to people residing in Kenya, whether citizen, visitor, or refugee, must meet the minimum prescribed in these rights. The rights must also meet the prescription by UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights.

The present state of refugee camps does not meet the minimum of these rights. The sanitation state in camps is worrying and access to quality education, good nutrition, reasonable healthcare, and access to good housing are all not met. The overcrowded camps even make access to these rights more compromised. As such, the Kenya government does not meet its obligation to refugees as is prescribed in the Bill of Rights. As much as this state of things is worrisome to refugees, it should also compel the Kenya government to act rightfully, as the Bill of Rights can be applied to compel the Kenya government meet her obligations concerning refugees as per the 2010 constitution (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012).

2.2.4.1.3 Engagement with Formal and informal Social Networks

Social networks, whether informal or formal, underpin a cooperative community. For example, participating in a formal network like being a registered member of a group

with a common goal designates a person's state of public commitment and non-passive involvement in the activities and life of the group or society (Fajthet *al.*, 2019). On the flip side, informal networks indicate a person's access to social support systems (Gesthuizen, Van der Meer, & Scheepers, 2009). Specifically, informal networks indicate the level to which a needy individual should depend for social, economic, physical, or psychological help from others.

The association between the availability of locals and refugees' social networks is analysed in different approaches. A common analysis is perception of refugees as a diversification of the hosting community (Fajth *et al.*, 2019). As discussed by Putnam (2007), increased diversity is associated with withdrawal from collective life, withdrawal from close friendships, and diminished appetite for volunteering. Refugee inflow in each host community may be associated with increased diversity hence can be directly linked to the withdrawals indicated among the host community. This indicates that inflow of refugees could result in diminished interest in social networks— whether formal or informal. Thus, applying this approach, we can argue that refugee influx can lead to diversities that influence host communities negatively.

Contrastingly, based on intergroup Contact Theory, diversity offers openings for positive and increased contact and out-group positive attitudes (Pettigrew, 1998). Other studies by Gesthuizen *et al.* (2009); Benos and Kammass (2018) also disagree with the presentation that migrants weaken social networks within a community although the studies stress the influence of the uniqueness of the social environments of migrants and local communities. In another study, it was revealed that inflow of refugees could 'revitalize' communities and trigger useful social networks in the

neighbourhoods hence enhancing safety (Feldmeyer, Madero-Hernandez, Rojas-Gaona, & Sabon, 2019).

Closer home, Whitaker (1999), while examining the case of Tanzania established that there existed strong social relations (networks) amid refugees and host communities particularly in areas closer to refugee camps. The relations (which were mainly informal) comprise visits to one another, participating in competitive sporting activities, and attending social gatherings like weddings. Whitaker further analyses that host communities associate the drastic population increase in an area where there is an influx of refugees as an ingredient to changing social dynamics. In the current study, the researcher seeks to establish whether refugee migrants have any impact on the social networks prevailing among the host communities residing in Dadaab area.

2.2.4.2 Assimilation of Refugees into the Host Country

Majority of asylum seekers across the globe are exiled for longer period, which allows for long-term social collaborations amongst refugees and host societies. These long-stay possibilities prompt refugee rights defenders to advance the agenda of assimilating refugees into host communities to allow them to economically and socially coexist in a mutually beneficial set up. However, most host communities and nations have always opposed such a move on grounds that it would increase competition for the limited resources available. The daily interactions coupled with the opposing views between refugee rights defenders and the host communities entice researchers to study the social dynamics existing in such societies (Fajth *et al.*, 2019).

Bevelander (2016) submits that integrating refugees into the host country is economically beneficial to refugees and host alike although he contends that intake policies at the host countries fail to offer refugees adequate assistance to integrate into

the (host) economic market. This disadvantages refugees to the extent of causing poor economic performance from them compared to the economic performance of host communities particularly in the first few years of arrival of the asylum seekers.

Additionally, Bevelander, while reviewing refugee data from the USA from 1980-1990, indicates that in the first few years of arrival, refugees record lower employment rates, earnings, and development and that this can be corrected if the integration policies are made friendlier and the integration process is fast tracked. However, as the refugees settled, their economic impact increased and, in some instances, surpassed the economic impact of economic migrants to the USA. This concurs with the argument that Muhammad and Abdulmajeed (2018) presented that refugees come with their own capabilities, skills, and the zeal to participate in socioeconomic development of the host communities who welcome them. Since such research are not replicated on local soil, this study is relevant to excavating the economic issues related to Somali refugees in Dadaab and thereby indicate how integration can influence the impact.

One of the critical determinants of assimilating/integrating refugees into the host nation is trust. The host communities must trust and accept refugees for there to be smooth assimilation and thereafter a mutually beneficial relationship. In the developing nations, host communities where asylum seekers settle are not economically stable and often find themselves in economic competition with refugees over the scarce resources present. This competition often causes increased tensions between hosts and refugees owed to the diminished trust. Noteworthy, greater trust amidst refugees and host societies is drawn from the economic and social interaction the two groups have (Fajth *et al.*, 2019).

Depetris-Chauvin and Santos (2018) present two ways in which refugee assimilation can affect socially. They submit that refugees, particularly those fleeing from political instability or chaotic environments are predisposed to violence hence are a safety concern once assimilated into the host population. They argue that refugees threaten perceived or real safety of the host because their prior exposure to violence enhances the possibility of perpetrating violence in future. Additionally, not assimilating refugees into the host community or depriving them of useful economic and social engagements augments the propensity of them taking part in crimes. Thus, from these arguments, two conclusions can be drawn: First, caution should be taken when assimilating refugees into the host community because they are predisposed to violent behaviour hence a threat to their new neighbourhood. Secondly, assimilation should be encouraged since it can be a way of reducing crime by creating meaningful economic and social engagements for migrants.

The host populations' trust in refugees and organisations offering support to refugee camps is critical. Negative perceptions directed at refugees, which weakens trust, originates from sources such as perceived or actual rivalry over employment opportunities, limited resources, public utility facilities, and differences in conventions and values (Christophersen, Liu, Thorleifsson, & Tiltnes, 2013; REACH, 2014).

The quality of interactions with refugees also influences trust. Laurence and Bentley's (2018) study revealed that when the interactions with migrants were positive (mediated by positive contact), hosts developed positive attitudes and trust towards migrant communities. Contrastingly, cases of negative contact resulted in negative attitudes, which underpinned mistrust. Hosts attitudes and trust towards humanitarian

organisations supporting refugees is determined by real or perceived fairness or unfairness of the support and aid delivered to refugees, which is often perceived as isolating the poor among the host communities (Christophersen, Liu, Thorleifsson, & Tiltnes, 2013; REACH, 2014).

Further, Putnam's (2007) 'Hunkering Down' Theory indicates that trust among the host community is threatened by higher diversity although no empirical evidence is presented on this issue from a developing nation. However, as Fajth *et al.*'s, (2019) study revealed, the interaction between trust and diversity is varying across nations and studies where the interaction is positive in some cases and negative in others. The researcher did not come across any empirical literature that objectively indicates the trust locals in Dadaab have towards Somali refugees, hence validating this investigation.

Based on Fajth *et al.*'s, (2019) study, there is a general assumption that refugees distort the social cohesion of hosting communities. However, other studies reviewed under this subtopic indicate that with time refugees and host communities build and sustain nearby social associations, which are a precursor for socioeconomic interactions that are mutually beneficial to hosts and refugees.

2.3 Gaps in the Literature Review

Developing countries are low-income and have a scarcity of resources for addressing the requirements of their citizens. Therefore, when such nations are faced with the responsibility of hosting refugees, stakeholders wonder whether the host nation will be able to contribute satisfactorily. Although the UN and NGOs may set in, the host government has the biggest responsibility of hosting refugees. As established in the literatures, this responsibility may vary between nations owed to internal policies and

politics of host countries. For instance, the USA handles refugees differently from how Turkey does, and this causes varying influences on the social and economic environment of hosting countries.

This therefore leaves room to establish how refugees in Kenya impact the host socioeconomically. Several laws detailing how refugees should be managed are available comprising the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol, The 2010 Constitution of Kenya and other laws like the Refugee Act 2006. Kenya, having ratified these laws and policies is obligated to accept and host refugees regardless of their socioeconomic effects to the nation. It is however not clear whether the country tolerates or appreciates the hosting of refugees as refugee impacts is not certain due to limited empirical evidence upon which the conclusion can be made.

It is also shown that host nations have the responsibility to protect refugees in terms of offering the basic needs for life and healthy living-like food, shelter, security, and good sanitation as well as support for own development and independence like education and occupational opportunities. However, the review indicates cases where host nations may fail to offer these for various reasons. Although few reports reviewed have shown inadequacy on government side, they are not based on empirical investigations. Additionally, since the reports are outdated, it is possible that things have since changed with time in the Dadaab refugee camps. Other reviews present cases of different settings to the one of Dadaab. All these reasons indicate the gap that necessitates this investigation. The study has also reviewed literatures that indicate varying socioeconomic impact of refugees across the world. Similarly, the study has established that while hosting refugees' various challenges prevail that affect refugees' socioeconomic impact to the host and that the challenges are specific

to the setup of the research. Given the uniqueness of this research, the challenges are likely to be unique to others from different setups. This leaves the gap that the current study will fill.

The literatures show that the issue of insecurity in Kenya has seriously persisted based on the number of attacks. Different government measures like *Usalama watch*, *Linda inchi*, border closure among others have only born short-term results. Unconfirmed reports by government indicating that planning and execution of terror acts is done by refugees or takes place in Dadaab camps have been refuted by human rights defenders and some refugees (Okwany, 2016). Kenyan courts have also tasked the government to prove refugees' involvement to the insecurity in the country, but this has not been forthcoming. As such, the clarity of refugee involvement in security is unavailable, hence necessitating this investigation. The study has also revealed the gaps in the strategies for enhancing socioeconomic contribution of refugees to host communities including the generalizability gaps where certain strategies have been evidenced to bring positive results in some setups and negative in others. This study will establish the applicability of these and other strategies in the local setup.

2.4 Theoretical Framework

Two theories were explored as a foundation to the study's ideas. The theories include Refugee Aid and Development Theory and Securitization Theory.

2.4.1 Refugee Aid and Development (RAD) Theory

The RAD theory was first used in 1984 in the international Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) by Betts Robert and Gorman Robert (Gorman, 1993). The Roberts informed that refugee aid ought to be development-linked and should address the needs of the host communities. This theory puts the needs of the

host communities at the centre-stage indicating that the communities' profit economically from refugee presence against the traditional assumption that refugees are burdensome (Gorman, 1993).

Strengths

The RAD theory recognizes that movements and settlement of refugees in host nations has benefits and challenges intertwined. The theorists argue that, although refugees come with the burden of exerting pressure on available host infrastructure, resources, and environment, they also have advantages to the host communities including providing cheap labour to local employers, offering additional market for local goods, engaging in trade, and offering a reason for enhanced foreign aid. Given the basic and shortage of resources, developing nations have to offer their citizens agricultural and infrastructural development, good healthcare, and accessible education it is realistic to undertake that abrupt and huge arrivals of refugees in such countries will overwhelm the ability of that nation to respond positively (Gorman, 1986). However, this theory provides a framework of managing such risk.

Under this theory, United Nations General Assembly underlined the vitality of the complementarity of the cost of hosting refugees against the effect they have on the host communities, a move that has influenced refugee management organizations like UNHCR to align refugee assistance programs with the host communities' development plans by including a development orientation in refugee aid to support self-reliance among refugees and promote social and economic structures in host countries. These development-oriented principals consider both refugee and host communities (Betts, 2004; Morfor, 2012).

The theory further advocates for strategies associating refugee relief aid assistance to host development programs and policies in a way that make the refugees benefit the host country and communities (Crisp, 2001). This indicates that this theory and its tact can address the shortness between development and relief approaches in protected refugee conditions such as the case of Dadaab refugee camps. By attaining a move from an aid to a developmental viewpoint, programs and policies for refugees will be characteristically endowing and all inclusive (Castles *et al.*, 2005). By focusing on the broader goal of harmonising relief and development, the RAD theory propagates ideas that concern empowerment and participation.

The concept of this theory can also be traced in UNHCR literature, and it is defined as assistance that is geared towards development, which creates a way for refugee progression from relief dependence to self-sufficiency and self-reliance from the time they arrive in the asylum country. This approach offers the less developed countries capacity to handle the pressure refugees exert on the economic and social resources (Stein, 1994).

This theory is well placed to enable the researcher to interrogate the impact of refugees by using a two-pronged view of analysing their costs as well as benefits they pose to the host. This theory allows understanding of the socio-economic costs and profits linked to the existence of refugees by interrogating how government and UNHCR support mechanisms towards refugees result into positive influence on host communities with time. As it stands, it is not possible to clarify whether the effect Dadaab refugees have to the host is positive or negative.

Criticism

The major limitation to the Refugee Aid and Development (RAD) theory is that it has focused more on macro-level system comprising issues of management between host states, institutions, and donors, as the central tenets to expedite development-based approach. Nevertheless, the theory overlooks a realistic and micro-level approach concerning the challenges and opportunities refugees pose to developing nations. In support of this claim, Frerks (2004) notes that bridging the relief-development gap should not be simply associated with institutions hence dictating appropriate funding contracts or organisation procedures.

Contrastingly, the 'gap' encountered by "programme beneficiaries" is commonly associated with inadequate attention to their known specific needs (Kaiser, 2002). This is the challenge associated with the institutional emphasis, which is commonly achieved at the cost of practical justification for the 'gap' as per refugee feelings. To overcome this challenge at the micro-level, Frerks (2004, p. 177) advice that the interests and views of other stakeholders like the refugees, program beneficiaries, internally displaced, hosts, and the stayees must be considered. As such, influences on refugees do come from the aid givers as well as from the other stakeholders affected by or who affect refugees in their areas of asylum.

The issue of refugee empowerment has been used increasingly in RAD strategies, yet the definition of 'empowerment' has not been clarified and explained. More so, there is a lack of analysis and elaboration of the circumstances that present refugee presence as a burden. As is explained, the RAD theory is founded on unclear philosophies of changing the refugee existence from a 'burden' to a 'benefit,' without regard to the circumstances that will enable the achievement of such a shift. In refugee

aid and development theory, dependency has been presented as the inverse of development approaches that aim at sustainability, empowerment, and participation (Meyer, 2006; Betts, 2009).

The term dependency is commonly applied in the setting of discussions concerning the challenging idea of switch between development and relief, whereby relief is considered intrinsically unwanted because it leads to dependency. A specific concern raised from this approach is that relief assistance challenge development initiatives. The fear is that when people (refugees) are used to receiving free aid assistance, they will not be motivated to contribute to local development projects particularly if they are not paid. Critical is that arguments around dependency should be aligned with extensive literature around social protection, livelihoods, and coping approaches in reaction to crises. The literature on livelihoods and coping approaches indicate that people affected by crises and emergencies do not passively focus on aid but use it as a way of survival and recovery. Thus, aid relief is one of the ways through which people in need use it to deal with the struggle of containing a crisis (Meyer, 2006; Betts, 2009).

Although these criticisms are valid, they do not negate the fact that incorporating refugees into the host communities can settle them and influence their involvement in socio-economic development of host nation through such activities like trade. As such, despite the criticisms, this theory stands a chance in enabling the study to understand the impacts of refugees—whether positive or negative. Specifically, this theory is useful in enabling the study to solve all the research questions presented to meet the main purpose of the study.

2.4.2 Securitization Theory

Securitization theory was first proposed in the early 90s by Copenhagen School of researchers as an approach to a wider attempt to re-explain the concept of security (Emmers, 2007). It aimed at widening security plan at the close of the Cold War after criticism emerged on earlier definition of security that concentrated on the threat or actual application of force among political players. The traditional perspective of security emphasized on the military matters and the state played the role of the main actor as well as the entity of reference.

According to the securitization theory, issues only become security concerns when they are politicized and considered security problems on entry into the public debate. Otherwise, the issues do not qualify to be security problems. As such, securitization occurs when issues are considered security threat, which justify the controversial actions that overtake the ordinary political measures. Sometimes the difference between a securitized and politicized matter may be slim hence the need to have a precise criterion for use to securitize issues (Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, 1998; Balzacq, 2010). Public statements and communications from people tasked with securitizing issues form the foundation towards securitization. often, the communications create urgency in the need to securitize issues by signalling that ‘if we don’t act it will be too late.’ The speech often signals the actions to come in future (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 24).

There are five key concepts that define securitization, which are further broken down into core constituent elements. First, referent object, which represent entity that is existentially threatened, and that state or nation must protect. Second, there is the referent subject, which is the threatening entity whether real, imagined, or perceived.

The subject may comprise another country, a divergent conservative individual, or group culture. Third, are the securitization actors who comprise those who declare the threat on a referent object (Buzan *et al.*, 1998).

Based on tradition, securitization actors comprise government representatives, or the state's spokesperson who, on behalf of citizens of a state, communicate speeches that aim to securitize the state. The UN, media and other actors from the politico-economic group do not form part of the securitizing actors (Buzan *et al.*, 1998). Fourth is the audience, which represent the individual(s) or group(s) that are convinced that the issue threatens the referent object and consent to the legitimisation of the proposed measures of action through security practice (Cote, 2016). Fifthly is the customized policy, which is policy measures (sometimes extraordinary), used by securitizing actors to alleviate insecurity (Balzacq, 2010).

Criticisms

One of the major limitations of the securitization theory is that it is socially constructed in nature and is difficult to relate to the actual situation at hand. For example, in the context of Somali refugees, despite the government of Kenya rhetoric that refugees are causing insecurity, no evidence has ever sufficed to point that refugee were responsible for the terrorism acts in Kenya since 2009 to date. in political sphere, securitization narrative is extremely used by governments and elites to influence or maximize power (Boswell, 2007). This is in line with undemocratic regimes where political parties and actors whip the emotions of the masses to ascend or cling on to power in the guise of maintaining and protecting national security interest.

The securitization theory is best applicable in this study to explain the securitization of refugees and refugee camps. Borrowing from the key elements of the theory, the referent object includes the host citizens or the peace/security of Kenya. The referent subject are the criminal elements hiding in refugee camps although given recent government actions towards refugees, the subject is construed to mean Somali refugees in their entirety. The Kenya government has resorted to claiming that Somali refugees to be the referent subject to legitimize the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp whose majority refugees are of Somali origin (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). However, as established by Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) no solid evidence has been established to advance the claim that Somali refugees in entirety threaten the security of Kenya state.

The securitization actors include the political leaders, led by the executive, and security advisors to the government who comprise those who declare the threat on Kenya's peace. The audience in the case of this study comprise some Kenyans including politicians who are convinced that the issue threatens Kenyan citizens and consent to the legitimisation of the proposed measures of action. Although there is no clear policy towards encampment of refugees in Kenya, the Kenya government has used various Kenyan laws to prescribe conditions under which refugees in Dadaab refugee complex should be decamped or repatriated— like the Bill of Rights in the 2010 constitution of Kenya, the refugee act of 2006 and the security amendment laws. As such, this theory can be used adequately to interpret and explain the issue of security in camps as submitted by the Kenya government.

2.4.3 Conclusion and complementarity of the theories

The two theories reviewed in this study—Refugee Aid and Development (RAD) and securitization theory are better placed to enable the researcher to understand refugees' socio-economic impact to the hosting country-Kenya. As already explained, RAD is best placed to address the entire socio-economic effect of refugees by dissecting their positive effects (development activities to the host nation) and the negative effects (their costs to the host nation). The theory goes further to detail how its application could associate the aid refugees receive to the development approach likely to be born in the host nation for there to be mutually beneficial relationship amongst refugee and host communities.

Securitization theory, on the other hand, enabled the study to understand the issue of insecurity and how it may be associated with refugees and shade light on how to address the security concerns likely to taint the positive development impacts refugees have on host communities. Mainly, the theory was useful in informing the security threat as a cost of hosting refugees in Dadaab camp. A combination of the theories ensured a deeper understanding of the costs associated with hosting refugees in Dadaab camp (specifically the cost of insecurity, which has been a thorn in Kenya's flesh) and the appreciation of the advantages of accommodating refugees. As the theory of securitization thoroughly informs on the security threat perceived to emanate from refugees, RAD is informing on the possible disconnect between refugee aid and host development, which leads into the security problem.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1 is a representation of the conceptual framework adopted by this study. This framework indicates the association of variables under study as per the study

objectives—the dependent and the independent variables. The framework indicates that the socioeconomic implications refugees pose to hosting society are determined by the socioeconomic influences of refugees on host nation, the security concerns associated with refugees, the challenges refugees face while contributing to socioeconomic growth of the host and the strategies for enhancing socioeconomic contribution of Refugees.

The impacts of refugees on host communities and nation can be grouped into positive and negative ones where the positive ones promote socioeconomic development while the negative ones have a negative effect on the socioeconomic development of the host. The refugee aid theory is applied here to explain the role refugees and refugee management organisations play in ensuring the development of the host communities. This theory was also used in explaining the challenges refugees face while contributing to the development of the host nation and the strategies for enhancing refugees' socioeconomic development of host nation.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Author (2022).

2.6 Chapter Summary

The literatures reviewed indicate the theoretical and empirical literatures on the socioeconomic impacts of refugees to host nations. The chapter is organized beginning with the key concepts on the issue of refugees, then the theoretical framework where the Refugee Aid and Development and Securitization theories were reviewed. The chapter then presented the empirical literatures, which were organized and discussed according to the research objectives, the gaps in the reviewed literatures, and the conceptual framework. The next chapter presents the research methodology.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Overview

This chapter presents the research philosophical worldview, research design, site where the study was conducted, the population targeted, and how it was sampled to arrive to the sample size, the methods for collecting data, validity, and reliability of the instruments, and the methods the researcher applied in analysing the data and presenting the findings. The ethical issues the researcher applied in the study are also presented in this chapter.

3.1 Research Philosophy

This study used epistemological approach to investigate and address the research questions. Epistemology was chosen because it is critical in helping the researcher decipher what constitutes knowledge (useful information) and how to gather that knowledge for purposes of addressing the research questions and objectives of this research. Out of the many branches of epistemology, this research used empiricism because it allows the combination of observations, experiences, feelings, beliefs, and senses as sources of knowledge (Dudovskiy, 2018). The objectives of this study were achieved by using the researcher's subjective interpretations and analysis of refugee and host behaviour to understand the pertinent issues under investigation as well as using the objective count of facts. Empiricism favours this kind of approach to deciphering reality.

Out of the major research philosophies used by researchers, this study chose pragmatism, which considers that in a world with multiple realities, researchers must use multiple ways of understanding reality—objectivity and subjectivity. Pragmatism

combines positivist (objectivity), and interpretivist (subjectivity) approaches as per the research questions to achieve more robust findings and understanding of a phenomenon (Dudovskiy, 2018). Positivism deals with collecting objective and quantifiable evidence while interpretivism concerns gathering subjective information that is often qualitative. Combining the two methods allow robust evidence gathering through complementarity and minimized weaknesses of individual philosophies hence the preference of pragmatism.

As already explained in the literature, different stakeholders hold varying views about the impact of Dadaab refugees to Kenya. Thus, interacting with these stakeholders would gather the subjective perceptions each of the stakeholders have and this was best achieved by using an approach that allows for subjectivism associated with the researcher analysing the subjects hence the need for interpretivism. Additionally, some of the impacts of refugees are directly quantifiable and objective hence were decoded by use of a positivist approach hence the positivists angle. For instance, the implications refugees have on the host environment and the day-to-day activities that they engage in as well as the relationships between refugees and host communities were objectively perceived and quantified by respondents using positivism approach while subjective implications of refugees like how they (refugees) perceive the host community or the behavioural implications they have towards host community were collected using interpretivist approach which allowed the collection of subjective evidence. As such, there was need to use pragmatic philosophy that allows the combination of positivist and interpretivist approaches that allow the interrogation of subjective and objective evidence in research.

Thus, pragmatism offered this study a robust approach of gathering rich evidence using observable and non-observable occurrences that exhaustively inform the impact of Somali refugees in Dadaab to the host communities. Observable implications include effects that are readily perceived by the researcher's senses such as environmental degradation or protection demonstrated in acts like destroyed trees for firewood or planted trees among others. The non-observable evidence included (but not limited to) behavioural acts, which were deduced, based on the effects of the behaviours. As such, by using pragmatism philosophy, the researcher was able to conduct a quantitative and in-depth enquiry on the study objectives.

3.2 Research Design

According to Saunders *et al.* (2009); Rubin and Rubin (2012); Creswell (2014), the research philosophy chosen determines the research design applied. Since pragmatism champions the combination of objective and subjective forms of inquiry, it was best associated with mixed methods approach (research) design, which was the design chosen by this study. This design allowed the researcher to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches to inquiry—in line with the pragmatist philosophy—with the aim of ensuring the qualitative and quantitative approaches complement each other's weaknesses (Creswell, 2014). In mixed methods, the qualitative approach focused on in-depth data collection to enable greater understanding of the problem at hand (Creswell & Clark, 2011) and the gathering of in-depth information, which enables the researcher to understand the lived experiences of Dadaab refugees and the meanings made from those experiences (Seidman, 2006). Quantitative approach focused on collecting data that is objective and easily generalised to the whole population (Creswell & Clark, 2011; Saunders *et al.*, 2009; Dudovskiy, 2018). Additionally, mixed methods design was preferred in this study because its rigour was

desirable to enable the researcher gather data that is in-depth and adequate to answer the study's complex research purpose—the socio-economic implications refugees pose to the hosting populations (Dudovskiy, 2018).

There are several types of mixing methods but the commonly applied one is triangulation design whereby the methods are mixed to complement each other to give the researcher a good conceptualization of the question under research. In this design, the qualitative and the quantitative methods are converged to enhance the robustness of the findings. Additionally, by using the triangulation design of mixed methods, the different strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods are combined while the weaknesses are outdone by the complementarity (Creswell & Clark, 2007). In the case of this study, the researcher wanted to triangulate the statistical results with the qualitative ones as well as expand the quantitative findings with the qualitative ones to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomena. Method mixing can take place at different stages including at the design level, data collection, data analysis, and data interpretation levels (Creswell & Clark, 2011). For this study, method mixing took place at the analysis stage where the qualitative and quantitative data were merged (converged) to arrive to one conclusion to the research questions.

3.3 Study Area

The study site was in the Dadaab refugee complex, which is in north-eastern region of Kenya, Garissa County, Dadaab Sub-County. Garissa County has a population of 841,353 of which males are 458,975 and women are 382,344 and the rest are classified as intersex. The population density of the county is 19 people per square kilometre (KNBS, 2019). Twenty-five-point one percent of the county population live in urban areas (KNBS, 2022d). Majority (56.9%) of the people in the county are poor

while 18.7% are rich. The rest are in the middle-class category (KNBS, 2022a). A significant portion of the population in the county are in schools with the largest part of the school goers being in primary school. The progression level in education is 51.3% and girls are the most affected with lack of progression and the county has the least number of people who have completed primary or higher level of education across the country with 16.3% cases against the national percentage of 70.3%. Additionally, most of the uneducated are adults who are currently attending formal education where they are taught literacy and numeracy skills (KNBS, 2022b). The life expectancy rate of the county at birth is 57.4 years. The county is one of the counties in Kenya with the least number of elderly people living alone. The main source of fuel across the county is firewood and charcoal (KNBS, 2022c).

Garissa County is in an arid and semi-arid area of northeastern region. It receives rainfall of about 27mm per annum and has an average temperature of 36degrees Celsius. The main economic activities in the county include small scale agriculture, pastoralism, business and trade, fishing for those residing near river Tana, and tourism. The challenges the county faces include the harsh climate, insecurity, social inequalities, lack of adequate storage facilities and market for agricultural products/harvest, low agricultural harvest, cultural discordant, high population growth, inadequate water supply, and low literacy levels (Republic of Kenya, 2017).

Garissa County is divided into seven sub-counties among which Dadaab is one of them. The sub-county boundaries are also constituency boundaries. Dadaab sub-county has a population of 185,252 including 99,059 males and 86,185 females. The population density of the sub-county is 29 people per square kilometre (KNBS, 2019).

About 11,524 people in Dadaab live in urban areas (KNBS, 2022d). People here are predominantly traders, small scale farmers and pastoralists (Republic of Kenya, 2017).

In 2010, Garissa was considered one of the safest towns in Kenya according to Interpol (Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2017). However, the years succeeding 2010 saw the insecurity status of the county dwindle significantly with the worst ever being the 2015 massacre at Garissa university where 148 people lost their lives (Okwany, 2016). Many other ambush attacks by suspected Al-Shabaab militia have been reported on several occasions in the county, mainly near border towns with Somalia. Some of the attacks have been retaliatory while others have been done with the intention of inflicting harm on the country and to showcase the militant group as a formidable force to be feared (Okwany, 2016). Several other insecurity cases like use of explosives and attacks on security agencies in the county and tensions among resident communities perpetuated by disagreements on water points, grazing lands, and land ownership. Political disagreements and marginalisation have also exacerbated insecurity in the area as those who feel mistreated seek to avenge to gain what is rightfully theirs (Wakube et al., 2017). Cases have been reported on conflict between refugees, police, and local communities over issues of misuse on natural resources and destruction of the environment through frequent poaching and felling of trees (Obi, 2020; Ahmed, Mohamed, Ali, & Sitati, 2021).

In Dadaab Sub-County is Dadaab refugee complex, which is a constituent of five camps namely Kambioos, Dagahaley, Ifo I, Hagadera, and Ifo II and hosts refugees from different countries although majority are from the war-torn Somalia. Dagahaley, Ifo I, and Hagadera camps were built in early 90s while the other two were built in 2011. As such, the old camps have refugees whose children were born and raised in

camps and have never set foot in their home country—Somalia. The old camps also mirror naturally existing towns and are crucial commercial hubs for residents of Southern Somalia and North-Eastern Kenya. The new camps host recently migrated refugees who are predominantly pastoralists. Although different based on age, the camps are managed in a similar manner and are faced with similar problems. The fact that majority of the dwellers in these camps—the Somali—share the same culture also lowers the ability to differentiate refugees based on camp or culture.

Dadaab Camps are managed by the UNHCR in partnership with the Kenyan government which is mainly tasked with registering refugees. Some NGOs also offer support in the managing of refugees in this camp but do so under UNHCR's mandate. Although currently the Kenyan laws identify land as a devolved item, the national government oversees all the happenings in Dadaab; the county government has little to do with it. Since the late 90's the Kenya government has shown interest in closing the Dadaab refugee complex as they are a security concern to the country but none of these interests have succeeded. Recently, a Kenyan court ruled against the closure of the camp terming it against refugee protection laws. Noteworthy, Dadaab's proximity to Somalia has been associated with it being a safe haven for criminals and militia affiliated to, sympathizing, or supporting the acts of the Al Qaeda linked Al-Shabaab terrorist group that operates and controls a significant part of central and Southern Somalia.

According to UNHCR Kenya (2018b), Dadaab complex is the largest refugee camp in Kenya by size and number of refugees. As such, the camp had a large pool of subjects from which participants could be chosen. This puts the camp at a good position as a centre for research on refugees as findings from the camp could be generalized to the

other camps with ease. Dadaab also has asylum seekers from different African counties although majority of the refugees are Somalis. As such, the predominance of the Somali refugees in Kenya forms a large group of subjects that were studied with ease, hence the target of Dadaab Somalis.

The Dadaab refugee population is very diverse, consisting of multiple nationalities like Ethiopians, Burundians, Rwandese, Eritreans, South Sudanese, and Somalis (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b). Hence, the main inquiry is why this study solely focuses on Somali refugees. Somali refugees are selected as the populations of inquiry since they share many similarities with their host Kenyan Somali, they are largest refugee population in the camps with high socio-economic impact to host community as well Somali refugees are perceived as a threat to the national security based on media, local communities, Garissa County, and national government reports. Hence, this research aims to explain what the socio-economic implications of refugees are to host community.

3.4 Target Population

Given that this study required in-depth and generalizable information about the variables under study, it targeted several populations including Kenya government officials dealing with refugees in Dadaab camps— the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), officials from the National Treasury-Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs and institute of Economic Affairs; Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) officers, UNHCR officials, UNICEF, Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), Danish Refugee Council, officers from the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria and Eye on Security; Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant county commissioner—Dadaab, Postal Corporation of

Kenya officers at Dadaab post office, Sub County assistant superintendent of police—Dadaab, Dadaab Sub-county police commander, Sub-county children's officer and education officer-Dadaab, Public Health officer-Dadaab, officers from Youth Education pack (YEP), Local Financial institutions—Dadaab; Somali refugees in Dadaab camp, the local communities around Dadaab camp.

Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) is involved in the registration, documenting, and protection of refugees as a government representative hence was well placed to track and document the effects refugees have on the host country. The director general (DG) of the National Treasury-Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs and institute of Economic Affairs is tasked with coming up with macro and fiscal policy issues, researching and tracking key areas of economic interest to the nation and following them up to ensure they are productive and contribute to the national economic performance. The DG is also in charge of allocating and monitoring budget to various functions in the nation hence are rich in information concerning economic performance of different groups of people like refugees and host communities.

Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) enforcement officers; Postal Corporation of Kenya officers at Dadaab post office and Local Financial institutions—Dadaab gave information on the economic activities' refugees engage in and how those activities contribute to the socioeconomic development of Kenya by, for instance, tax payments. Financial institutions also gave a history of the income sources of refugees while officers of the Postal Corporation informed the study on history of movement of goods and services among the refugee community in Dadaab and how these affect the local economy. Youth Education pack (YEP) manages all technical institutions in Dadaab camps where youth enrol to be equipped with various artisan/craft skills after

which they are funded to begin own enterprises. officers from this institution highlighted the skills development of refugees and how the knowledge and skills are instrumental in socioeconomic development of the host.

UNHCR (independently and/or with partnership with NGOs, UNICEF), RCK, and Danish Refugee Council undertook various protection and refugee management measures in hence its top officials are rich in information concerning the challenges refugees face and their effect to the host. Rights watch groups—Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria and Eye on Security highlighted how refugee rights are upheld and how that influences their participation in national development of the host.

The security organs including, Sub County assistant superintendent of police—Dadaab, Dadaab Sub- County police commander and national government leadership at the county level Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant County commissioner are rich in information about the social activities' refugees engage in and how those activities affect national stability and security. Thus, the targeting of this group ensured the researcher access information concerning how refugees affect security and whether that security impacts socioeconomic development in any way. The Somali refugees, being the main study participants highlighted the things they do that affect or relate to the hosts socioeconomic development. They also shared how challenged they were in contributing to the development of the host nation. Similarly, the local community gave information concerning how they have perceived refugee activities in Dadaab and whether the activities contribute to socio-economic development. As such, the target population was well placed to inform the study about the research questions being investigated.

The study targeted Somali refugees from Dadaab refugee complex. Somali refugees are the dominant refugee group in the camp and by extension in Kenya and given the continued political instability in Somalia, they are likely to continue being a concern in the region. This refugee category is the one whom the Kenya government has been mainly concerned with to the extent of associating them with the recent terror attacks in the country, a stereotype that has portrayed Somali refugees as bad in the eyes of the public.

As of 31st August 2020, the count of targeted Somali refugees at the Dadaab camps were closing to 221,102 which is 44% of the entire refugee population in the camp. These Somali refugees are organized into 5 clans which are Darood (30%) clan, the Hawiye clan (11%), Ogaden clan (26%), the Rahan-Weyn clan (8%), and the Somali Bantu clan (7%) (UNHCR & IOM, 2015). Each clan had a leader who was recognised by the local authorities and security organ in the Dadaab region. The clans were divided into sub-clans, which are led by appointed sub-clan leaders. Clan leaders are supported and appointed by sub-clan leaders. There were approximately 76 Somali sub clan leaders in Dadaab complex.

The homestead level was the next unit of bureaucracy in the organisation of Somali refugees in Dadaab. A sub-clan was made up of several (between 20 and 100) homesteads. Homesteads (often comprising an average of 15 households) are led by a homestead leader while the head of the home (often the eldest male in the home) leads the households. The homestead and household leader were the eldest and wisest members of the homestead/household. Each household comprised members of a nuclear or sometimes extended families. The leaders of the sub-clan and homesteads act as supreme decision makers and advisers at their levels hence making them

justified subjects to be interviewed in this study. These leaders are the source of information to clan leaders; thus, this makes the clan leaders secondary sources of information about the specific and detailed operations of the Somalis.

From this, the researcher was strongly convinced that sub clan leaders and homestead leaders were the best to participate in this study. However, given the large number of available homesteads studied, the researcher chose to interview sub-clan leaders whose traditional role in Somali culture (sub-clan spokesperson who was the wisest leader) positions them to better inform the study. Religious leaders were also interviewed instead of the entire refugee fraternity for the same reason. In Somali and Muslim culture, religious leaders are given significant role in society in terms of guiding, shaping, or influencing the behaviour of people (refugees) according to the Quran. Religious leaders also play the role of adjudicators at local levels hence based on these positions; they are placed at a vantage point in terms of accessing information about their followers including information concerning refugees' social, cultural, and economic lives.

Compared to targeting the entire refugee population, targeting sub-clan and religious leaders was easier for the researcher to handle as the numbers were within manageable reach. Religious leaders were also sampled since, based on their position in society, they were exposed to information about the socioeconomic factors affecting their flock—refugees. From the five clans identified, there are 76 sub-clans. The total number of religious leaders identified among the refugees were 67—out of whom 23 doubled up as sub-clan leaders and 44 were religious leaders with no other additional community leadership role leading to a total of 120 leaders. Thus, the target

population was 120. These were targeted to represent refugees because of the kind of information they were exposed based on their positions in society.

The number of UNHCR Kenya staff targeted was 200 (UNHCR Kenya, 2020b). of the UNHCR staff, only 5 senior officers, each in charge of a given sub-camp in the Dadaab complex, are overseers of all operation activities in their camps. This study targeted the 5 (one from each of the five camps in Dadaab complex). Since they are overseers of all operations in their sub-camps, the five were better placed to inform the study on all refugee activities and how they are likely to affect the socioeconomic development of the host. UNHCR works closely with UNICEF in overseeing the education of all refugees, RCK as a relief/aid mobiliser and in the management of refugees and Danish Council of Refugees in researching policy issues about refugees and aid mobilization and distribution. From each of these partners, the study targeted one of their seniors most managers who was adequately informed on the issues affecting Somali refugees in Dadaab. The Dadaab Sub- County children's officer and education officer are government representatives at Dadaab in charge of children rights and interest and their education hence they shared useful information on the education of refugees as a key ingredient towards socioeconomic development.

The RAS had about 75 staff who are organized according to ranks and job description. As such, there are those who work at the secretariat, those tasked with policies, and those positioned at the camps. All the RAS staff worked under the supervision and guidance of four section heads who reported to one superior—the head of RAS at Dadaab. The head gets daily updates of all issues affecting refugees living in Kenya and take part in creating or influencing procedures and policy decisions affecting refugees. Based on this role, he/she is exposed to valuable information about refugees

in Kenya and was, thus, justified for inclusion in this study. The Dadaab sub county have one Sub County assistant superintendent of police and one Sub- County police commander who were targeted because of their ranks, they are always informed of issues that affect or are likely to affect security and stability of their areas of jurisdiction.

The Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs has five technical departments (Budget Department; Macro; Financial Sector; inter-Governmental; Public Procurement and Fiscal Relations, Department) that are headed by directors who in turn report to the DG. The technical departments gather all information related to their functions and report to the director general who then reports to the cabinet secretary. This positions the DG at a vantage point of information relevant to this study hence he/she was the target. Two KRA enforcement officers in Dadaab ensure that all according to the law adhere to tax payments. These two were targeted as they are at a vantage point of receiving all tax related information from refugees and host populations in Dadaab.

The local branch managers of Postal Corporation and local dominant financial institutions in Dadaab (KCB, Equity, Hawala) were targeted since they are the highest authorities of their institutions at the Dadaab sub-county level. The Youth Education pack (YEP) is a tertiary institution led by a principal who is the overall overseer of the implementation of the institution's mission to achieve the set goals and vision. This principal was better placed to detail the achievement of the set goals which include ensuring local youth are equipped with skills and financial enablement to initiate their own enterprises to solve local problems. As such, the principal was targeted based on this positioning.

The deputy county commissioner and the assistant deputy county commissioner—Dadaab are the national government representatives at the sub county level. Since governors do not report to the national government, those interested in ensuring the national government remained relevant at the county level advised on the introduction of county commissioner positions. As such, this position allowed the commissioners to gather relevant information through local administration—chiefs, sub-chiefs, and community elders for decision-making and policy creation at national level. As such, the deputy county commissioners and assistant commissioner for Dadaab sub-County are better placed to share similar information about refugees and the host communities living around them.

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) is organised such that it has four commissioners and one chairperson. The chairperson of the commission presides over all meetings, as well as directs and supervises the activities of the Commission. He/she is the authorised spokesperson for the commission. This positions the chair as the most appropriate person to be targeted to inform the study on the human rights issues associated with refugees and host communities.

Amnesty international has a similar mandate to that of KNCHR but slightly different because it aims to directly defend refugees and asylum seekers as well as protect against discrimination, undignified living, torture, police violence, disappearance, and climate change among others. From Amnesty international, the study targeted the chairperson of the board who is the authorised person to communicate the body's decisions and actions. Kituo cha Sheria acts to ensure the poor and disadvantaged groups in society access justice. The senior-most member (chairperson to the Board of directors) was targeted to participate in the study. Eye on Security is concerned with

security consulting, and counter terrorism programs and was useful to inform the study on the security issues in the Dadaab camps. The CEO of the magazine was targeted to share information about security.

The local (immediate host) community targeted included the non-refugee population living in Dadaab area, Garissa County. The host community were easily identified according to their economic activity or the leadership role they assumed in society including *Nyumba Kumi* officials, community leaders, pastoralists, businesspersons/traders, religious leaders, and others (including all that were jobless or were not captured under the other activities/roles). Hosts from each of these categories have experienced refugee impacts differently based on the positions. For instance, pastoralists encounter with refugees and how they perceive refugee impact to them differs from how traders and businessmen perceive the same refugees. Targeting all these categories of host community, thus, ensures that there is no biased presentation of how refugees affect host communities.

According to statistics gathered from local administrative officers in the Dadaab region, there are about 2,000 registered traders including *boda-boda* riders, 300 religious leaders, 400 community leaders, 400 *Nyumba Kumi* representatives, numerous pastoralists (researcher estimated that among every three households one was pastoralist household leading to an estimated total of approximately 3,000 pastoralists) and about 2000 immediate host community adults who were in other categories like farming, or employment. This brought the total number of estimated target population among the host community to 8,100 (Republic of Kenya, 2019). This target population is depicted in table 3.1 on page 149.

Table 3.1: Target Population

	Population Category	Target Population
1.	Refugee leaders at Dadaab (No. of people) (at the sub-clans' level and comprising 76 sub-clans' leaders and 44 religious' leaders)	120
2.	UNHCR officials (No. of people)	5
3.	UNICEF	1
4.	RCK	1
5.	YEP	1
6.	RAS staff (No. of people)	4
7.	DG of Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs	1
8.	KRA Enforcement officers	2
9.	Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab	1
10.	The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)	1
11.	Amnesty international	1
12.	Danish Refugee council	1
13.	Kituo cha Sheria	1
14.	Eye on Security	1
15.	Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer	2
16.	Sub-County Children's officer, education officer, and PHO	3
17.	Managers of Financial institutions (KCB, Equity, Hawala)	3
18.	Host (local) community (No. of leaders, traders, and <i>Nyumba Kumi</i> representatives)	8,100
19.	Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county	2

Source: Author (2021).

3.5 Sampling Procedures and Sampling Size

3.5.1 Sampling Techniques

The study used different sampling methods according to the target population. Refugees (sub-clan and religious leaders) were sampled using simple random sampling. In simple random sampling method, all the leaders were given random computer-generated numbers from 1 to 120. These numbers were made known to them during the pre-study visit the researcher did to the target area. The sample size of participants to be chosen from these 120 leaders was determined and a computer used to randomly choose 92 participants from the 120 who the researcher approached and

interviewed. Simple random sampling method was favoured since it recognizes that all sub-clans and religious leaders are well and equitably informed about the activities of their people and how those activities affect the host country socioeconomically. Quantitative data was collected from these sub-clan and religious leaders.

As indicated in the study population, the study targeted 4 RAS staff, 5 UNHCR officials, 1 DG of the directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs, chairpersons/spokesperson /senior-most members of KNCHR, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria, Eye on Security, UNICEF, RCK, YEP, KRA Enforcement officers, , Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab, Danish Refugee council, Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer, Sub-County Children's officer, Sub-County education officer, Sub-County PHO, Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county were sampled using census sampling because (1) all the participants in these groups served in privileged positions where they were, in one-way or the other, informed about the socio-economic implications of refugees to the host community and (2) the participants from these groups were few and/rich in unique information and experiences that could be studied with each of them giving information of value to the research (Babbie, 2010). Census sampling allowed all the respondents targeted to participate in the study hence offers the study both intensive and extensive information. From these participants, qualitative data was sought.

Members of the host community who engage in activities that allow interaction with refugees (like, traders/businessmen, *Nyumba Kumi* representatives, religious leaders, community leaders and pastoralists), were considered to have information emanating from the contact or interaction they have with refugees which they could share in the

study. Given that the target population comprises of these select individuals, all of them have an equal chance of given useful information to this study. As such, stratified simple random sampling was applied to identify specific subjects from this purposively chosen population. From these, quantitative data was collected. A summary of the sampling methods is in Table 3.2 on page 151.

Table 3.2: Summary of Sampling Methods

Population Category	Sampling method	Justification for the sampling method	Type of data to be collected
Refugees at Dadaab (No. of people) (organized in clans and sub-clans)	Simple random sampling	Sub-clan and religious leaders are informed about all happenings in their communities.	Quantitative
RAS staff, UNHCR officials, Directors of departments at the directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs, chairpersons /senior-most members of The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria, Eye on Security, UNICEF, RCK, YEP, KRA Enforcement officers, Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab, Danish Refugee council, Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer, Sub-County Children's officer, education officer, &PHO, Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county	Census	Each of them has unique information relevant to the study; officials are few/specific.	Qualitative
Host (local) community (Traders, local leaders, religious leaders, <i>Nyumba Kumi</i> representatives, & pastoralists) (No. of people).	Stratified random sampling	Since the target population comprise of all participants who interact with refugees socioeconomically, all of them have similar chance of giving useful information to the study.	Quantitative

Source: Author (2021).

3.5.2 Sample Size and its Determination

Several sample calculation formulas exist for use to choose a definite size whose results are adequately generalized to the entire population. However, most of these methods are championed for use in quantitative research or when probabilistic sampling methods are used (Yin, 2003; Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, & Fontenot, 2013; Singh & Masuku, 2014; Boddy, 2016; Van Rijnsoever, 2017). Qualitative studies lack a generally acceptable method of determining sample sizes and have been criticized for the lack of sample size justification (Boddy, 2016). However, Yin (2003); Van Rijnsoever (2017) submit that in qualitative enquiry an adequate sample is one which offers saturation of information— that is, any additional participant to the size does not bring new information according to the purpose of study. The researcher's advice that qualitative studies focus on quality rather than quantity hence numbers of participants do not have the weight that the quality of collected evidence carries.

Although the researchers allude to information saturation as the limit to the number of participants, they do not clarify on how one can justifiably choose a sample that leads to this saturation. As such, attaining the size likely to lead to data saturation was achieved through trial-and-error method or continuous addition of participants until saturation was achieved. Saturation level was important level for determining the number of participants in this study. in this study, samples chosen by census reach saturation level, as there was no extra participant to be added.

Boddy (2016) advised that the scientific paradigm and the research context of a qualitative enquiry determines what constitutes an adequate sample size. This means that researchers can choose and justify a size according to their specific enquiries. Marshall *et al.* (2013), by recognizing the subjectivity of adequate sample sizes in

qualitative research, also support this interpretation. The researchers also recommend that case studies should have samples of 15 to 20 participants to enable in-depth enquiry. As such, while appreciating the subjectivity of sample size determination, the researcher in this current study determined the sample size using Marshall *et al.*'s (2013) recommendation as the minimal size while choosing 30 as the ideal sample size in line with what other qualitative researchers like Creswell (1998) and Morse (1994) recommended. Thus, a sample size of 30 was chosen.

Considering that the 5 UNHCR officials, UNICEF (1), 4 RAS staff, Director General of departments at the directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs (1), chairpersons/spokesperson/senior-most members of KNCHR (1), Amnesty international (1), Kituo cha Sheria (1), RCK (1), YEP (1), KRA officers (2), Manager Postal Corporation (1), Eye on Security (1), Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County (2), Sub-County Children's officer (1), education officer (1), and PHO officer (1), and Managers or local financial institutions in Dadaab (KCB, Equity and Hawala) (3) are sampled using census sampling, all of them are part of the sample size.

For quantitative data collection method (used on refugees and host community), the sample was calculated statistically using Yamane's formula— $n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$ which is used when the population is finite as was the case in this study. In that formula, N is the population size while 'e' is the margin of error. As is the case in many social sciences, a confidence interval of 95% and margin of error of 5% was appreciated and used in this study to calculate the size as indicated below. For sub-clan and religious leaders, the population was about 120, at 5% error, the sample size was:

$$\text{Size} = 120 \div (1 + (120 \times 0.05 \times 0.05))$$

$$= 120 \div (1 + 0.3) = 120 \div 1.3 = 92.31 \text{ rounded down to 92 leaders.}$$

For the host community whose population is 8,100, the calculated sample size was:

$$\text{Size} = 8100 \div (1 + (8100 \times 0.05 \times 0.05))$$

$= 8100 \div 21.25 = 381.18$ rounded down to 381 (which is 4.7% of the population and distributed at the 4.7% ratio as indicated in Table 3.3.)

Table 3.3: Breakdown of Sample size of Host Community

Population Category	Population	Sample Size
Traders/businessmen	2,000	94
<i>Nyumba Kumi</i> representatives	400	19
Religious leaders	300	14
Community leaders	400	19
Pastoralists	3,000	141
Farmers and those employed	2,000	94
Total	8,100	381

Source: Republic of Kenya (2019).

Thus, the sample size for all who participated in the study is shown in table 3.4 on page 155.

Table 3.4: Sample Size

Population Category	Sample Size
Quantitative sample size	
Refugees at Dadaab (leaders of sub-clans/religions)	92
Host community (representatives)	381
Total quantitative sample size	473
Qualitative sample size	
UNHCR officials	5
RAS staff	4
Director general department of the Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs	1
UNICEF (1), RCK (1), YEP (1), Amnesty international (1), Danish Refugee council (1), Kituo cha Sheria (1), Eye on Security (1)	7
KRA Enforcement officers	2
Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab	1
Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county	2
Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer	2
Sub-County Children's officer, education officer, and PHO	3
Managers of Financial institutions (KCB, Equity, Hawala)	3
Total qualitative sample size	30
Total sample size for the study	503

Source: Author (2021).

The sample sizes chosen for qualitative and quantitative methods led the researcher to subjects who would give adequate information to address the objectives of the study.

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

The study collected primary data. Given the research paradigm and research design used, this study applied a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. Quantitative data was collected from surveyed subjects using a questionnaire (See Appendix VI on page 348) while qualitative data was collected using in-depth interviews (See Appendix III on page 344, IV on page 346, and Appendix V on page 347). The unit of analysis in this study were the Somali refugees encamped in Dadaab refugee camps.

3.6.1 Qualitative Data Collection Methods

in-depth interviews were used to gather data from UNHCR, RAS, DG of the Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs, KNCHR, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria, Eye on Security, UNICEF, RCK, YEP, KRA Enforcement officers, Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab, Danish Refugee Council, Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer, Sub-County Children's officer, education officer, and PHO, Managers of Financial institutions (KCB, Equity, Hawala), Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county.

The choice of interview method was justified based on two major reasons. First, the choice of the target population and the census sampling methods used to pick participants were discriminatory to the extent that the chosen participants were those well informed about refugee implications, which presented participants who are rich in information that could best be tapped using an in-depth data collection method like an interview. Second, interviews allowed the collection of qualitative data that was adequate to inform the facts about the actual happenings in the study environment as well as the perceptions subjects have towards those happenings. These justifications rest on the foundation that human subjects know much more than can be observed (Seidman, 2006) and that interviews are better placed to allow the gathering this detailed information.

Thus, the interviews allowed in-depth investigation of phenomena, gave researcher chance to investigate complex issues and allowed adaptive investigation where the interviewer could follow up on the interviewees responses to get clarifications relevant to address the questions at hand (DeCarlo, 2018). This is contrary to

questionnaires, which do not allow follow up from interviewer since he/she is not present at the time of responding. The subject of this study is a complex one that involves various intertwined variables (DeCarlo, 2018). Interviews, therefore, allow the researcher to investigate such complex issues. These qualities further justified the researcher's use of interviews in this research.

The interviews were used to collect information on all the research objectives but were customized based on the type of population. The interviews were structured and administered by the researcher and his assistants using the face-to-face method to increase participation and return rate as well as allow the researcher collect non-verbally communicated cues (e.g., facial expressions, discomfort about certain questions and other body languages), that are important in informing the questions asked by the researcher.

The notable weaknesses of interviews include the difficult to administer and were time consuming which made it challenging to apply them on a large number of participants. This was mitigated by limiting the number of participants interviewed while using questionnaires to collect quantitative data from a larger number of the respondents. The interviewees were also likely to be affected by the interviewer's appearance and personal attributes (for instance, his education level could easily intimidate some who were less educated). This was overcome when participants were made to feel comfortable in addressing the study questions to the best of their understanding without crediting to the appearance of the interviewer.

3.6.2 Quantitative Data Collection Methods

Data from refugees and host community was collected using questionnaires because these subjects are high in number and were assumed to have equal chance of giving

the researcher important information about the study questions. According to Babbie (2010), questionnaires offer a researcher the opportunity to collect data from many subjects in short time and with minimal resources. Thus, given the large number of respondents targeted for quantitative data collection, a questionnaire was best positioned to collect data from them at a faster and less costly rate. Questionnaires were used because they are better suited when a researcher wants to survey a large group of subjects, they allow respondents to attend to the study questions at their opportune time (Babbie, 2010) and collects data that can easily be analysed to establish trend or pattern (DeCarlo, 2018).

The questionnaire used in this study had open-ended and closed-ended questions. Closed-ended questions were designed using a mixture of continuous and categorical scales. Open questions allowed the respondents to explain their responses and/or give responses that require explanation. The questionnaire collected quantitative data on the implications of refugees from the host community representatives and refugees point of views. The questionnaire was divided into five sections each section addressing an objective except the first section, which presented the demographic information of respondents. It was administered using the drop-and-pick style to enhance the response rate. Illiterate respondents and those with language barriers were offered research helpers who recited the questions and interpreted them to an understandable language and recorded the responses given in English.

The weaknesses of the questionnaire used include inability to allow respondents to give explanations or clarifications to their opinions. This leads to abstract responses that are difficult to contextualize. Questionnaires can allow respondents to hide behind one word answer particularly on sensitive issues like the ones this study was dealing

with hence fail to collect truthful evidence. This study mitigated against these limitations by complementing quantitative methods with qualitative methods. A summary of the justification of chosen methods is presented in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5: Summary of research instruments used

instrument	Justification for the instrument	Type of data collected	Mode of administration
interview guide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows investigation of complex issues • Allows in-depth investigation • Promotes adaptive investigation (according to the initial responses) 	Primary (Qualitative) data	Face-to-face by the researcher— using a structured interview guide.
Questionnaire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows collection of data from a large number of participants at a low cost and short time • offers data that can be easily analysed and generalised 	Primary (Quantitative) data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administered by the researcher or his assistants through Drop-and-pick method • Illiterate respondents offered an interpreter to assist them.

Source: Author (2021).

3.7 Data Collection Procedures

After getting the university's authorisation to go ahead with data collection exercise, the researcher sought permission from the National Commission for Science, Technology & innovation (NACOSTI), which licenses all researchers to undertake research in Kenya. Authorization was also sought from the County Government of Garissa, and the local authorities in Dadaab refugee complex. The researcher then physically sampled participants to the study and educated them on the study procedures and the ethical considerations adhered to. The researcher then agreed on the research dates with the respondents while considering respondents whose

timelines were tighter to the proposed ones. On the study date, the researcher, with the help of assistants, deployed the data collection tools.

3.8 Piloting

The researcher did a pilot study to pre-test the research instruments. The pilot study was done in Kakuma refugee camp in August 2020 between the 10th and 16th day of that month. Kakuma camp has similar characteristics to the Dadaab refugee camp hence offered suitable environment. The population for the pilot study included 5 RAS officers, 1 OCS and 1 DCI, 5 UNHCR officials, 5 refugee leaders and 5 people from the host community around the Kakuma camp (comprising 2 traders, a *Nyumba Kumi* representative, a local leader, and a religious leader). These participants were chosen purposively because of the intention of the pilot study-to learn on the effectiveness of the methods to be applied in conducting the actual study and correct cases where the methods would be less effective. As such, having participants able to address effectively the questions posed by the researcher was critical.

Data from all the 22 respondents was collected using an interview guide customized to each category of participants. Apart from the OCS and DCI, all the other respondents were asked questions on all the objectives under study while the OCS and DCI were asked questions on the second objective alone where they shared on the security threats associated to refugees. An interview was preferred because it allowed the researcher and the participant to engage in a communication that would ensure clarity of the questions asked and responses given. The interviews were conducted face-to-face by the researcher (and his assistants). The unit of analysis in the pilot study were refugees as they were the main subjects under study.

The main challenge encountered was with some refugees and host community members where they feared being victimised particularly when they shared or failed to share information about security threats of refugees. This was addressed in the main study using informed consent and guarantee of confidentiality. Some refugee and local community leaders were not fluent in reading and writing in national languages although they seemed to understand them to some extent. This required a simplified data collection tool administered with the help of a research assistant who would offer interpretation and explanations and write the responses where possible.

3.9 Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability of quantitative data-collection instrument was determined during the pilot study. Content validity was checked by certifying that the questions presented in the questionnaire capture the intended purpose. In the pilot study, draft questionnaires were administered by the researcher and the resultant inconsistencies arising from ambiguities in the questionnaire addressed. Additionally, the researcher offered multiple-choice questions, which minimized invalid responses. On reliability, the study applied Cronbach's scale to check the instruments' reliability and the irrelevant or unnecessary items deleted or rephrased until the desired reliability was achieved. A reliability of over 0.5 was appreciated as it indicated over 50% acceptability (Metsamuuronen, 2017). This study's reliability result was as indicated in Table 3.6.

Table 3.6: Reliability Results of the Questionnaire

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
0.683	0.726	43

Source: Author (2021).

The instrument was therefore considered reliable as it had a Cronbach's Alpha of more than 0.5.

For the qualitative data collection instruments, trustworthiness of data was ensured through credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability, which are the equivalent of validity and reliability in quantitative studies. As explained by Bengtsson (2016), credibility is the procedure of ensuring that the gathered information and its analysis process do not exclude any relevant information. Graneheim and Lundman (2004) advice that credibility is enhanced through triangulation— where two or more researchers separately perform the analysis on similar data, after which they discuss the findings to arrive to a unified consensus. The use of different data collection tools that measure the same thing also adds up to validity (Bengtsson, 2016).

Additionally, Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, and Walter (2016) submit that credibility should be checked using member checks where the investigator shares the findings with respondents to establish whether what was recorded is what was intended. This study used these three methods to check for credibility. The principal researcher together with the assistant researchers involved in the study performed independent analysis on collected data after which they discussed about the outcomes to ensure a unified consensus was achieved. Where need be, the researcher sought clarifications from the respondents to ensure that what was captured was the true representation of facts on the ground. The researcher used multiple data collection methods (interviews and questionnaires) to collect data on similar questions, which were then crosschecked to ensure validity. What is more, the face-to-face data collection methods like

interviews allowed the researcher to clarify questions (member checking) until the expected response was achieved.

Transferability, which refers to the application of the results of a qualitative study to other settings to achieve generalizability, is the other aspect the researcher aimed to achieve in this study. The thick description method was used to achieve transferability. In this method, the researcher explained the exact set up where the interview took place and the exact description of the nature of respondents—whether tired after work, just waking up and fresh or during working hours. This information informed readers the exact set up the study takes place in and the nature of respondents so that the readers can know the kind of set ups to which they can generalize the findings of the study (See chapter four of this study).

Concerning the dependability of this research, the researcher allowed an internal audit of the collected data and the analysis process by a contracted researcher. This contracted researcher counterchecked the findings against the raw recordings and notes made during the data collection process to establish coherence and ensure all that was presented by respondents is captured in the findings without alteration or ambiguity. The internal auditor also used to conformability. Conformability relates to whether the interpretation and analysis of data is neutral. Neutrality is important in research as it ensures factual presentation of findings without the researcher's subjectivity. From the internal audit, the contracted researcher established and corrected the areas where the principal researcher presented fabricated, subjective, or own views instead of communicating what the respondents intended (Korstjens & Moser, 2018).

3.7 Data Analysis and Presentation Methods

3.7.1 Methods of Analysing Quantitative Data

The analysis of quantitative data was done using a descriptive statistical method while content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data. Quantitative data was cleaned to do away with any responses that were out of order or any incomplete questionnaires. The 'clean' data was then coded such that the responses were given numerical value and then entered SPSS program, which was used for processing the data. Percentages and frequencies as well as the means, and standard deviations were used to present the data descriptively. Descriptive method was preferred as it gives the researcher chance to vividly explain the facts of the host and refugee behaviour from which conclusions were made. Data presentation of the summarized data was through tables. The study did not use inferential analysis methods since it intended not to prove hypothesis and that the researcher desired to describe the variables under investigation as they were on the ground.

3.7.2 Methods of Analysing Qualitative Data

Content analysis was applied to analyse qualitative data consistent with the research design used (Merriam, 1998; Rossman & Rallis, 2012; Yin, 2003; Babbie, 2010; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Creswell, 2012). According to Babbie (2010, p. 530) content analysis is "the study of recorded human communications." As such, through this method, the researcher reviewed all findings collected de-contextualized it, then re-contextualized the raw data, categorised it by creating themes according to the study objectives and questions and then compiled it to address the questions at hand and, where necessary, used verbatim to substantiate the themes realised as explained in Table 3.7 on page 165.

Manifest style of content analysis was used over latent analysis, as the researcher would often refer to respondent's words during the analysis and discussions. Manifest analysis allowed the use of quotes and narrations to reinforce the discussion of the analysis. This was intended only to advance respondents views in the final discussion. The researcher did not immerse himself into the data to gather hidden meanings since this could erode the exact sentiments intended by the respondents. Therefore, latent analysis was not preferred.

Table 3.7: Content Analysis Stages

Stage	Activity done by the researcher	Goal/aim to be achieved
De-contextualization	Transcribing: Researcher read all recorded information and organized it according to the questions they answer. At this stage, the data was 'raw'-in the form it was collected.	To have written record that is well organized for the researcher's easy analysis.
	Identifying meaningful phrases: Researcher read through the raw data and identified the meaningful units or phrases out of the collected data. This is termed as data cleaning where the researcher only retained useful information from the raw data. This was based on the questions asked.	To understand the findings of the study in relation to the context of the study. To establish blocks or patterns of respondent's opinions
Re-contextualization	Re-checking: The researcher went through the raw data while counterchecking with the cleaned data (meaningful phrases) to ensure that all-important information was captured. (All meaningful phrases in the raw data were marked for easy highlighting).	Not to discard any useful information. To ensure that all data retained answers the aim of the study.
Categorization	The researcher reduced the number of words of the meaningful phrases without discarding the value of the phrases. Themes and sub-themes were developed out of the phrases.	To retain information of value to the aim of study—according to research objectives and questions.
Compilation	The analysis and write-up process take place at this stage. The researcher presented a summary of the themes and sub-themes for quick understanding. in some instances, codes were derived from the themes to come up with variables that could be presented quantitatively using tables. Finally, the researcher related the collected findings with the literatures to establish the answered gaps.	Present the established summarized findings that will be used to make study conclusions.

Source: Bengtsson (2016).

Presentation of the analysed data was in form of narrations, and quotes. Where necessary, the researcher converted the qualitative analyses into quantitative data and presentation done in form of tables and charts for easy reference.

3.8 Ethical Issues

The researcher observed several ethical considerations while conducting the study including informed consent, which was guaranteed by educating the sampled population on the purpose of study, and the role they are required to play as respondents. No coercion or force was used to lure respondents to participate in the study; only personal free will was used. People who, for one reason or the other, did not feel safe participating in the study were excluded without penalty/reprimand. However, they could inform the researcher of their need to leave so that replacements could be sought. Respondents' identity was confidential and, as such, actual participant names or identity was not used. Random numbers were used to refer to respondents. Based on the strong cultural practices the population had, the researcher refrained from engaging in discussions that might agitate respondents. The researcher also refrained from being too inquisitive on private/personal details that respondents were uncomfortable with.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Overview

This chapter concerns the presentation of the collected data, the analysis of that data and its presentation. The chapter begins by presenting the return rate, then the background data of the interviewed participants before presenting the collected data as per the objectives under study.

4.1 Return Rate

The return rate of the sampled population for the study was as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Return Rate

Population Category	Sample Size	Returned questionnaires	% Return rate
Quantitative sample size			
Refugees at Dadaab (leaders of sub-clans/religions)	92	92	100
Host community (representatives)	381	278	73
Total quantitative sample size	473	370	78
Qualitative sample size			
UNHCR officials	5	5	100
RAS staff	4	4	100
Director general department of the Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs	1	0	0
UNICEF	1	1	100
RCK	1	1	100
YEP	1	1	100
KRA Enforcement officers	2	2	100
Manager Postal Corporation of Kenya-Dadaab	1	1	100
Deputy County Commissioner and Assistant deputy county commissioner- Dadaab sub-county	2	2	100
Amnesty international	1	1	100
Danish Refugee council	1	1	100
Kituo cha Sheria	1	1	100
Eye on Security	1	1	100
Sub County Police Commander and assistant superintendent of police- Dadaab Sub County officer	2	2	100
Sub-County Children's officer, education officer, and PHO	3	3	100
Managers of Financial institutions (KCB, Equity, Hawala)	3	2(1 from Equity Bank, 1 from Hawala)	67
Total	30	28	93

Source: Author (2021).

The study attained a return rate of 93% from the qualitative sample and 78% from the quantitative sample as indicated in table 4.1. The high return rate in qualitative sample was attributed to the method of data collection used (face-to-face interviews), which promote respondent's active participation. The 78% return rate in quantitative samples was caused by some respondents not committing to the study timelines while others not fully addressing the study questions. Nevertheless, the study achieved an acceptable return rate since majority of the sampled respondents participated.

4.2 The Thick Description Method of interviews

The thick description method involves the researcher explaining the exact set up in which interviews happened to give readers a sneak peek into the interview room. All the participants except the KRA officers were interviewed on weekdays in the morning hours between 7 am to 11.40am, which were official working hours. The researcher preferred morning hours as these were the most active and productive hours of many workers. The two KRA officers participated in out-of-the-office activities during the time of study hence were interviewed in the afternoon (3 pm to 6pm) as per their availability. In fact, the interview with one of the KRA officers failed twice due to official reasons like having impromptu field trainings as well as personal reasons like tiredness. Only one interview (to the Director General) flopped due to his busy schedule and inability to reassign the researcher to interview any other appointed staff at his duty station.

All interviews took place in the offices of interviewees or boardrooms at their workplaces thus the set-ups were familiar grounds. The researcher preferred this to give interviewees confidence and allow them to feel in control of the interview session. Except for the KRA enforcement officers, all the interviewees were active

and looked interested during the time of interview. They showed no sign of stress and did not act as if the interview was a bother. On the other hand, the KRA officers interviewed seemed in a hurry during the time of interviews particularly when the clock hit 4.30pm. The researcher deduced that probably they were looking forward to retiring from the day's hard work. Although the KRA officers were cooperative in addressing the interview questions posed at them, they showed little interest to elaborate further unless prompted to but were quick to quote documents (not availed for the researcher's review). To mitigate against these reactions, the researcher verified their findings with other participants in the study who were taxpayers and could know information concerning refugee taxations. Such participants include the UNHCR officers, Posta Manager, some of the Hawalas and the equity bank manager. The proceedings of the interview were recorded on phone as well as short notes taken on what was said. All interviews ended well and achieved the goal for which they were intended. (See Appendix IX on page 358-363 for sample photos of interview sessions).

4.3 Demographic information

4.3.1 Gender and Marital Status of Refugees and Host Community

The gender of respondents was as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Participants' gender and marital status

	Gender				Marital Status							
	Male		Female		Single		Married		Divorced		Widowed	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Refugees	49	53	43	47	13	14	61	66	17	18	1	1
Host community	95	34	183	66	47	17	171	62	30	11	28	10
interviewed respondents	20	71	8	29	6	21	22	72	0	0	2	7

Source: Author (2021).

The distribution of the gender of participants indicates that majority (53%) of the refugees were male while 47% were female compared to the host community among whom majority (66%) were female and 34% were male. Among the interviewed respondents, 71% of them were male while 29% were female. Thus, males were the dominant respondents among refugees and interviewed participants while females dominated participants from the host community. Thus, all genders were represented.

On marital status, Majority (66%) of refugees and 62% of Host community were married. Those who were single, divorced, or widowed were a minority as indicated in the table. Among the Key informants (interviewed respondents), 72% were married and 21% were single while 7% had been widowed. As such, the various marital groups in society were represented in the study. These findings indicate that the views presented herein were not a representation of one side (whether defined by gender or marital status), as there was representation from each side.

4.3.2 Highest education level

The highest education level of refugees and host community was indicated in table 4.3

Table 4.3: Respondents Education Level

	Highest education level											
	None		Primary Certificate		Secondary Certificate		Diploma		Degree		Postgraduate degree	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Refugee	34	37	24	26	24	26	6	7	1	1	0	0
Host community	145	59	52	21	33	13	7	3	6	2	2	1
interviewed respondents (Key informants)	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	28	15	52	6	20

Source: Author (2021).

Table 4.3 shows that 37% of the refugees lacked any form of education while 26% had primary education, 26% had secondary education, 7% had diplomas, 1% had degrees while no one had a postgraduate degree. Overall, 63% of the refugees were educated while 37% were not educated. Among the host community participants, 59% had no education while 21% had primary education, 13% secondary education, 3% had diplomas, 2% degrees and 1% postgraduate degrees. This shows that refugees are educated than host communities, which is associated with the many projects UNHCR, and NGOs have in the area that ensures refugees access basic rights including education. The lack of education among majority of host community members is associated with possible low enrolment levels combined with the possible low affirmative actions that fail to adequately promote education among the host community. The finding agrees in part and disagrees on the other part with the one indicating that over 50% of the population in the county of Garissa lacked primary or post primary education qualification (KNBS, 2022b). This variable is discussed in detail in sections 4.4.3.6 on page 189 and section 4.6.1.1 on page 242 to present the

reasons behind this finding. By showing that majority of refugees have some form of education, the finding disagrees with Refugee Consortium of Kenya (2012); Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) who observed that refugee and host community education is poor. However, the finding on the education status of majority of host community members concurs with Refugee Consortium of Kenya (2012); Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) as well as with by Ng'ang'a (2016) who indicated that majority of host communities do not go beyond secondary education.

The key informants interviewed, on the other hand, are well educated as majority (52%) of them have degrees 28% diplomas and 20% master's degree. Considered wholly, the respondents' education cut across. However, since crucial respondents to the study were the key informants, they were well educated to provide in-depth data to the study. This education levels could give sneak view into the kinds of occupational activities refugees and host communities engage in and could play a role in explaining why it is easy to lure the youths of the are into radicalism and terrorism.

4.3.3 Length of time of being a Somali refugee in Dadaab

Table 4.4 shows results on the length of stay of refugees among the host community.

Table 4.4: Time spent as a refugee in Dadaab.

	Count	Per cent (%)
Less than 5 years	2	1
5-10 years	25	28
11-15 years	17	18
16-20 years	12	13
Over 20 years	36	40
Total	92	100

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (40%) of refugees have stayed in Dadaab Camp for over 20 years. The rest have stayed for less than 20 years. This period is long and therefore the effects of the Somali refugees must have been felt among the people they interact with (host

communities) as well as by the nation at large. Given this long stay, no doubt the impacts refugees have had on Kenya are notable and vividly depicted in the subsequent sections of this chapter. This analysis is in concurrence with Fajth *et al.*'s (2019) study that indicted that when refugees stay longer in a given area of asylum, their impact on the host is greater.

4.3.4 interaction with Refugees

Host community was investigated on how long they had interacted and lived with Somali refugees in Dadaab. Results are in table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Length of stay with refugees

	Count	Per cent (%)
Less than 5 years	40	15
5-10 years	51	19
11-15 years	55	20
16-20 years	75	27
Over 20 years	51	19
Total	272*	101

Source: Author (2021).

*Six host community participants did not address this question adequately.

Twenty seven percent of the host community had lived with the Somali refugees for 16 to 20 years while 20% had lived with them for 11-15 years and 19% had lived with them for over 20 years. This finding shows that the host communities and refugees had lived in communion for many years hence the inter-relationships between them were strong. As such, the influence hosts and refugees had imparted on each other socially and economically was significant. This concurs with the submissions by Fajth *et al.* (2019) who considers the time refugees coexist with hosts as instrumental in shaping influences on each other.

4.4 Extent to which Dadaab refugees influence host socio-economic development

The first objective of this study investigated the extent to which refugees in Dadaab camps influenced the socio-economic development of Kenya. The findings of this investigation are listed in the subheadings that follow.

4.4.1 Refugees' Economic Activity

Table 4.6 shows the findings on the common economic activity among refugees.

Table 4.6: Common economic activity among Somali refugees in Dadaab

	Count	Per cent (%)
<i>Boda-boda</i> Rider	3	1
Formal employment	8	2
Subsistence agriculture/farming	13	4
informal (unskilled) employment	17	5
Pastoralist	17	5
Small scale trader	137	36
Multiple activities**	175	47
Total	370	100

Source: Author (2021).

** Multiple activities comprised a combination of two or more of the other mentioned economic activities.

Majority (47%) of respondents indicated that refugees have multiple economic activities that are common to them. of the multiple economic activities mentioned, small-scale trading, informal (unskilled) employment, pastoralism, charcoal making and *boda-boda* riding (in that order) were common economic activities. All these economic activities are less lucrative hence earn refugee's little income. This finding therefore means that refugees are not highly enabled in terms of accessing high-income opportunities with which they can access high incomes for high impact on socioeconomic development of Kenya. Although agriculture is a common economic activity in Kenya, it is not common among the refugees because their camps are in an arid area.

Among these economic activities, the study further found that that small-scale trading was the most common economic activities among refugees (as supported by 36% of the respondents). This confirms the findings by Republic of Kenya (2017) that trading is one of the economic activities the people of Dadaab engage in. The commonality of small-scale trading is associated with the ease with which small businesses can be started since meagre resources are required. Two scenarios are the likely cause of this— push factors and pull factors.

Pull factors are those that attract refugees into trading and include factors like easy access to cheap goods from Somalia and other neighbouring countries and the availability of a large pool of customers (refugees and host community) not supplied with or in need of the goods. The cheap goods arise from the porous border, which allows smuggling of goods while evading taxes, as well as contraband goods whose quality is not satisfied hence are cheaper than Kenyan goods whose quality is satisfied and have gone through the appropriate taxation measures. This is confirmed by Respondent KI 2 who indicated:

“Since Kenya is party to international laws on refugee accommodation, it was forced to open its borders with Somalia to allow the refugees come in. This also allowed a lot of smuggled items into the country which are cheaper and highly demanded in border towns than Kenyan items” (Respondent KI 2, Dadaab, 12th January 2021).

Additionally, the arrival of Somali refugees to the camp created a large community of people who required basic items that were not initially supplied since the refugee camp was set on an area that was initially not occupied by locals.

Push factors are those that forced refugees into small scale trading. The findings show that many refugees are less educated although they have skills to engage in informal (unskilled) employment hence are not competitive to participate in formal employment particularly when compared to local/host communities. Additionally,

restricted movement, poor (arid) climate, and limited land resource limit refugee migration to search for alternative opportunities across the host nation as well as discourage them to engage in agricultural activities respectively. These factors pushed Somali refugees into small scale trading.

Trading does not only provide a source of livelihood for refugees but also benefits the host country as is seen in the paragraphs that follow. The findings that trading was the most common economic activity deviates from the presentation by Bettset *al.* (2018) who established that most camp refugees engaged in informal employment as their main economic activity. However, the finding concurs with parts of the studies by Callamard (1994); Whitaker (1999); Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009) who submitted that trade was one of the dominant economic activities' refugees participated in.

Although pastoralism was ranked among the least common economic activities among refugees, the study established that refugees keep small flocks of livestock as an economic activity. Among refugees, pastoralism and livestock keeping are discouraged by the county and national governments (Betts *et al.*, 2018) hence those who did it committed an illegality as was submitted by Respondent KI 6 that:

“Livestock farming and pastoralism among encamped refugees is prohibited to prevent conflict with the locals over pasture, water, and land,” (Respondent KI 6, Dadaab, 16th December 2020).

However, sometimes government officers on the ground unofficially allow this activity to continue humanitarian grounds since it is sometimes the only economic activity among some refugees particularly in homesteads whose head of the family is a woman. The researcher looks at such initiatives as unofficial strategies that empower the helpless refugees to participate in socioeconomic development of Kenya because the animals reared can be used to provide food (milk and meat) as well as income (through sales of the products or the animals). Overall, this finding indicates that

refugees had an economic activity they engaged in from which they could draw income to support their families as well as use it to develop the host country. This finding on the impact of empowered refugee is also evidenced in the works by ACAPS (2018); Fajth, *et al.* (2019).

4.4.2 Socioeconomic impact Somali refugees have to Kenya

Concerning the kind of socioeconomic impact Somali refugees had to Kenya, the results in table 4.7 were collected. (Scale used: 0=I don't know; 1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly Agree).

Table 4.7: Socioeconomic impact of refugees to Kenya

	Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused positive socioeconomic impacts	Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused negative socioeconomic impact
I don't know	1%	1%
Strongly disagree	7%	26%
Disagree	5%	43%
Agree	49 %	28%
Strongly agree	38%	2%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (49%) of respondents in the study agree and 38% strongly agree that Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused positive socioeconomic impacts to the country and majority (43%) disagree while 26% strongly disagree that Somali refugees had a negative socioeconomic impact to the country. This finding shows that majority of respondents consider that refugees have positive and not negative socioeconomic impacts to the nation. This finding shows that many people believe that refugees have more benefits to the nation than costs. Respondent KI 4(Dadaab, 15th December 2020)agreed that the host communities and its leaders have, for a while, refused to support the repatriation of refugees or closure of refugee camps because of the

positive socioeconomic contribution refugees have on Kenya. The findings here concur with those of UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Richard (2013); Miller (2018); Enghoff *et al.* (2010); World Bank (2016) that refugees have beneficial and negative economic implications posed on local community.

The finding by majority (43% disagreed and 26% disagreed strongly) that refugees do not have negative effects to Kenya is attributed to the positives of refugees outweighing the negatives. However, there still exist negative impacts of refugees as will be presented in the next paragraphs of this study. The fact that respondents here consider refugees not to have negative impacts socioeconomically is in comparisons to the positive impact which according to them outweighs the negative impacts. This finding shows the action of refugee aid development theory (RAD) which holds that refugees have both positive as well as negative impacts to the host nation (Gorman, 1986). From this finding, it can be summed that the host nation has a lot to reap from refugees if they are well enabled and facilitated as per the RAD Theory. The positive and negative impacts are explained in detail in the succeeding paragraphs.

4.4.3 Positive Impacts of Refugees on the Host's Socioeconomic Development

4.4.3.1 Remittances from Diaspora

The study found that refugees get monthly remittances from their family members and close friends abroad to the tune of USD 50 to USD 700 per family per month through the UNHCR facilitated resettlement package. Respondent KI 5 (Dadaab, 8th January 2021) estimated that about 70% of refugees in the camp get remittances mainly from the USA, Canada, Italy, UK, and some other European countries. The remittances benefit host communities and the country in three ways: First, the remittances are taxed a fee, which goes to the national government for economic building. Secondly,

the remittances have increased refugee patronage of financial institutions available in Dadaab. Respondent KI 1(Dadaab, 12th January 2021) noted that some of the refugees had opened bank accounts with local financial institutions to receive and manage the remittances from abroad. He was quoted saying:

“Some of the refugees who have bank accounts with us have no other source of income than remittances. We help them exchange the remittances from USD to local currency as well as offer them a safe storage of their reserves.”

Thirdly, Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December2020)informed that:

“The remittances refugees receive are used to finance personal needs, education costs, as well as business costs, which improve the living state of Somali refugees in Kenya.”

As such, remittances to refugees in Dadaab play a crucial role in the development of Kenya. Not having the remittances would disadvantage refugees who lack alternative ways of earning a livelihood by, for instance, leading them into criminal activities like stealing to survive. Respondent KI 29 (Dadaab, 14th January 2021) indicated that

“...without the remittances, some of the refugees would suffer as they have no alternative source of income. in fact, some would engage in criminal activities to make ends meet...”

These revelations concur with the ones presented by Carling (2005) that refugees received remittances, which improve the economic situations of people (refugees and host) as well as addressed the economic inequalities between refugee and host communities.

4.4.3.2 Trade Opportunities

The study found that the arrival of Somali refugees in Dadaab had promoted trade activities in the area both directly and indirectly. Directly, refugees engaged in trading activities at different markets in or near their camps where they exchange goods and services with money. For instance, the host communities trade their livestock and products, which have ready market among refugees in the camps (Respondent KI 15

(Dadaab, 18th December 2020). Further, Respondent KI 6(Dadaab,16th December 2020) noted that Dagahaley refugee camp is the second largest livestock market in the entire Northeastern region after Garissa town. indirectly, the study found that the arrival of refugees to the area had attracted businesspersons to the region. Refugees created a consumer market that these businesspeople aimed to tap into. For instance, real estate investors, businesspeople in hospitality and accommodation sector among other traders were attracted to the area courtesy of the arrival of refugees. These trading opportunities generate many livelihood opportunities for host and refugee communities and provide market for Kenya and even to neighbouring countries like Ethiopia and Somalia from which livestock and other commodities come for sale in Kenya via the Moyale and Liboi border points respectively. What is more, the businesses associated with refugees are taxed by the county and national government to benefit the country.

At the same breath some importers (traders), bring in from Somalia essential commodities like Sugar, Cooking Oil, Milk products, drugs, clothes among other things, which are highly sought after by the refugees and host communities due to its lower competitive pricing when compared to Kenyan products as already indicated above by Respondent KI 2. Besides generating household incomes for refugees and host communities, the study found that the trading activities refugees engage in also create a lot of employment opportunities for many refugees and host community youths who work as salespeople, goods loaders, and county/national government on-the-ground tax agents (Respondent KI 15(Dadaab, 18th December 2020). This finding concurs with Whitaker (2002); Callamard (1994) who, based on their study cases, indicated that refugees opened business and trade activities in and around camps and UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Richard (2013); Miller (2018) revelation that

the positive impact of refugees include attraction of investment and investors, and increased business activities.

Through Respondent KI 26. 2021 (Dadaab, 14th January 2021) the study found:

“For Kenya to economically prosper, it should encourage and promote trade along border lines. There are a lot of trade opportunities between refugees and host communities which are undocumented and tracked by the Government of Kenya thus loosing revenue and taxations that could spur the socio-economic growth of its people.”

The undocumented trade arises from the lack of effective cross border control measures since the reduction of border manning officers when the Liboi border point was closed. This indicates that although Kenya benefits from the trade between refugees and the outside world, there are many other undocumented trade activities that are not tracked for taxation hence the need for the government to follow up with this as a way of increasing the economic impact refugees will have on Kenya.

4.4.3.3 Taxation opportunities

The study found several taxation opportunities associated with Somali refugees in Dadaab. Refugees who are employed were taxed PAYE while those undertaking trade activities paid licence fee to the county government (see Table 4.8). Other indirect taxation like VAT on commodities and services refugees bought also applied (Respondent KI 2, Dadaab, 12th January 2021). This finding concurs with the one presented in the literatures by De Montclos and Kagwanja (2000); Evans and Fitzgerald (2017); Betts (2009); Francis (2015) that refugees provide taxation opportunities for the host nation both directly and indirectly. The finding, however, shows that Dadaab refugees were not treated similar to the submissions by World Bank (2011) where refugees were exempted from direct tax payment.

Among the direct taxpayers, the kinds of taxes paid were as indicated in the table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Types of taxes paid

		Count of refugees who pay taxes	Percent (%)
If you pay tax, which ones?	Business permit levy	22	88
	PAYE	3	12
	Total	25	100

Source: Author (2021).

Eighty eight percent of the Somali refugees who pay taxes pay business permit levy and 12% pay PAYE. The finding that majority just pay business permit taxes corroborates the finding that majority of the refugees are small-scale traders. Since majority of the refugees are small-scale traders, the only tax they can pay is business permit levy. Refugees who pay PAYE are those in structured employment.

Other indirect taxation opportunities associated with refugees were given in the study: Using the Postal Corporation, refugees send and receive goods and services from across the world. For instance, Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December 2020) stated:

“Through the Posta, refugees receive dried fish, local herbs used as medicines, cultural gifts, and religious documents from Somalia.”

Another Respondent KI 5 added:

“Postal Corporation connects Dadaab to other countries like USA, South Africa, Germany, and UK from which refugees receive goods like cameras and laptops as they send cultural items. All these are taxed to benefit the country.”

Respondent KI 5 (Dadaab, 8th January 2021) adds that:

“Refugees attracts taxations on goods and items they receive from their families, relatives, and friends from overseas. Goods and items, they normally receive through Kenya Postal Corporation are laptops, shoes, beauty, cosmetic products, sports jersey etc. Which they pay taxation and postal corporation collects on behalf of KRA. When goods reach Kenya, the goods are valued by Domestic Custom department and taxation is implied/ calculated and receiving clients pays it.”

It was further established that in 2020 the Postal Corporation of Kenya at Dadaab office provided support to 624 refugee clients with a total revenue collection of Ksh. 6,486,039. This together with the verbatim findings show that refugees were an

important source of taxation or levy that was beneficial to the country hence they should be recognised for this indirect tax contributions because without their activities, the country would lose this source of revenue yet, based on the heavy national budgetary requirement, every coin is critical for the country to meet its budgetary obligations.

Additionally, all services provided in the Dadaab refugee camps including cleaning, consultancy, construction, and security services are provided by Kenyan companies that make tax returns to the Kenya Revenue Authority annually (Respondent KI 2, Dadaab, 12th January 2021). Additionally, the result from other key informants showed that all humanitarian organizations employing refugees, Kenyans and expatriates must pay PAYE to the Kenyan government. Traders who import goods from outside Kenya for the refugee and host market pay import duty to the Kenya government. Some of things imported to Kenya include livestock from Ethiopia, and Sugar, Milk products, Rice among others from Somalia.

The average monthly household income upon which refugees pays taxes was investigated and presented in the Table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Average Monthly Household income for Refugees

	Count	Percent (%)
Less than Ksh. 1,000	7	12.1
Ksh 1,000-10,000	42	72.4
Ksh 10,001-20,000	6	10.3
Ksh 20,001-30,000	3	5.2
Total	58	100.0

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (72.4%) of refugees earn between Ksh. 1,000 and 10,000 every month, 12.1% earn less than Ksh. 1,000 while 10.3% earn between Ksh. 10,001 and 20,000. This indicates that majority of refugees are low-income earners who according to

current tax regulations are exempted from paying tax. According to the current tax regulations (2021), earners of Ksh. 0-24,000 are expected to pay PAYE tax of 10% while those who earn Ksh 24,001-32,333 pay 25% PAYE. Beyond Ksh 32,333.00 earners pay 30% PAYE. The refugee earnings indicate that 5.2% of the refugees pay PAYE taxes hence contribute to economic development of the host nation (Kenya Revenue Authority, 2021). The refugees who pay PAYE reside in the camps and are humanitarian workers with the NGOs serving refugees in Dadaab. The incomes in the table 4.9 show that most of the economic activities' refugees were engaged in were low paying. This prompts the question of how refugees can be economically resourceful to the country should they be integrated or allowed to engage in high revenue economic activities.

4.4.3.4 Growth of the financial sector

4.4.3.4.1 Saving of income

The study investigated the average monthly savings that refugees made on the incomes they earned. The refugee leaders interviewed gave the following responses concerning the saving culture of refugees.

Table 4.10: Percentage of income refugees save

	Frequency	Percent
0 (No savings done)	23	26
1-10%	42	45
11-20%	15	16
21-30%	12	13
Total	92	100

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (45%) of Somali refugees with a monthly earning save 1-10% of their income, 26% do not save, and 16% save 11-20% while 13% save 21-30% of their incomes. This indicates that among the refugees, they have a culture of saving since they save despite their small incomes. The reason why refugees manage to save

despite the low incomes is because of remittances which refugees do not disclose as incomes and the relief food voucher that they get. The refugees can use these options for their basic needs and save part of their incomes even if the incomes look small (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). Savings benefit the nation in various ways including the savers using the savings as capital to start businesses that are taxed to earn the county revenue. Savings also enable the growth of financial institutions, which also return tax to government as was detailed by Brekke (2018) in the literatures.

The study further investigated the country of origin of the institution where Somali refugees save their income and the findings showed that majority (78%) save locally (in Kenya) and 22% do not. Saving locally means growth to local financial institutions and contributes to local and national economic growth of Kenya since the savings earn an interest for the local financial institutions hence economic development. M-PESA was the platform that most of the refugees were found to save with due to its convenience and accessibility. The savings attract financial service providers to the area hence leading to the growth of that sector similar to the case advanced by Brekke (2018).

4.4.3.4.2 Need for financial services suppliers

The study found that majority of the refugees and host communities needed financial institutions significantly to the area, which saw the growth of the sector. This finding arises from the fact that financial institutions are critical for facilitating currency change, receipt or sending of money and access to credit. Specifically, the study established that as refugees traded with the host communities, they needed banks to facilitate the trade, offer capital, and keep refugee monies safely, which led to the

growth of financial sector of Dadaab (Respondent KI 4, Dadaab, 15th December 2020). This finding concurs with Brekke (2018) who indicated that the need to meet financial obligations of refugees caused growth in the financial sector. Respondent KI 23 (Dadaab, 13th January 2021) substantiated that, “This bank [Equity] has over 10,000 refugee customers who mostly trade with the host communities.”

indirectly, refugees have seen the growth of the financial sector in two ways (1) The rapid and booming business activities have attracted banks like Equity to the area and (2) Organizations that engage in refugee-related activities like NGOs, UNHCR and government institutions in Dadaab need financial partners to transact their business including paying employees and suppliers, paying taxes, and receiving payments. This analysis is arrived at based on the knowledge of supply and demand as a driver of market reactions—marketers will enter a market (or supply their products) to a market whose demand for their products is feasible hence the justification of the finding.

The study also found the Hawalas (informal financial institutions) have grown significantly in Dadaab camps as they facilitate refugees to receive remittances, give soft loans, and facilitate refugees to send and receive money to/from their kin in Somalia and other areas. The findings revealed that the Hawalas are less bureaucratic hence their dominance over the formal banking system (Respondent KI 27, Dadaab, 14th January 2021). Although the Hawalas were found to have positive effect on the economy of Kenya, Respondent KI 23 (Dadaab, 13th January 2021) established that they are also used in money laundering-particularly by the Al-Shabaab group, which destabilizes Kenya more.

“...some of these financial institutions [Hawalas] do propagate illegal transfer and delivery of financials services to groups in Somalia which is a crime under this country’s [Kenya’s] laws” (Respondent KI 23, Dadaab, 13th January 2021).

The money laundering by Al-Shabaab was triggered by the hefty pays that the group offers. However, this was done secretly since the Hawalas had been licenced and were monitored to ensure that they only engage in legal transactions and there was no previous evidence that the dully registered Hawalas were engaging in such illegalities. This finding therefore brought new revelations to the study about the role these institutions play in stabilizing terrorism in the region.

The study also found that the financial sector in Dadaab made things easy and cheaper for refugees and local populations. For instance, the growth of the financial sector in Dadaab has seen a reduction in the cost of doing business, which has also lowered commodity prices of certain things compared to the pre-2012 period when there were no banks in Dadaab, and businesspeople had to travel to Garissa to seek the banking services. Banks (Equity) receive business permit payments for the county government hence supporting local revenue collection. What is more, the bank also engages in corporate social responsibility (CSR) of planting trees to combat deforestation, which will benefit refugees, the local communities and local/national government (Respondent KI 23, Dadaab, 13th January 2021).The picture below shows part of a nursery of trees used to reforest the region.



Plate I: Researcher at a tree nursery

The picture was taken on 13th January 2021, and it shows the researcher at a tree nursery. The tree seedlings cultivated at this nursery are used by Equity bank as part of its CSR to reforest the Dadaab region, which has been extensively deforested. Source: Author (2021).

Perhaps these benefits would not have arisen without the growth of the financial sector in the area. Additionally, as trade and financial activities increase in Dadaab region, there is increased money circulation that spurs economic growth, which then benefits Kenya (Respondent KI 23, Dadaab, 13th January 2021).

This finding concurs with the result that showed that refugees spur economic growth, expansion, and innovation into the local economy (World Bank, 2011; Brekke, 2018). The finding also concurs with Francis (2015) who indicated that Syrian refugees in Jordan had triggered increased public investment and influenced the telecommunication, transport, construction, and the service industries to grow leading to enhanced GDP (Francis, 2015).

4.4.3.5 Improved infrastructure

Results from 16 (55%) key informants showed that refugees in Dadaab had influenced infrastructure development in the area. Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) indicated that before refugee camps were set up in Dadaab, the area did not have infrastructure as it is. Somali refugees and high-level advocacy of UNHCR and other international agencies lobbied the Government of Kenya and private sector to improve the road and telecommunication networks in the area hence ease access and operations to refugee camps. As a result, infrastructure was improved/built. Currently, the roads from Liboi to Garissa and Wajir to Dadaab are annually paved to ease transportation of goods and people to and from refugee camps or the surrounding areas. Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) indicated: “There are a lot of infrastructural development...” This finding was confirmed by the researcher who

observed that the roads, buildings among others were well done. Roads were passable even though some were not tarmacked but well filled while building structures in Dadaab town were modern compared to the informal housing in camps and among host community around the camp. The findings also concur with that presented by Betts (2009); Francis (2015) that refugees had influenced road construction, sector construction and telecommunication system. infrastructural development has opened the Dadaab area, eased transportation of goods and services, and promoted connectivity, which attract investment to the area, which is beneficial to the country.

4.4.3.6 Improved Social Services e.g., water, education, hospitals

The qualitative data indicated that Somali refugees, owing to their vulnerabilities, have been provided by important amenities courtesy of the efforts of UNHCR and other NGOs in partnership with the government. The refugees have access to water, education (as evidenced in section 4.3.2), and hospitals, which are a critical part of their livelihood. in some instances, the services (like access to clean water) offered to refugees are better than those of the neighbouring host communities to the extent that the hosts come to camps to access such services thanks to the 22 boreholes sunk by UNHCR to ensure reliable water availability in the camps. Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) while giving an example of how services have improved noted:

“Previously refugees had access to water twice a week which is different from the host communities who access the water on rotational basis. This is better from what existed before— thanks to UNHCR, which has sunk boreholes in various places in the camps where refugees can easily access safe and clean water.”

Additionally, the study established that the host communities are provided with free health services by UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies at the hospitals/dispensaries in Dadaab refugee camps. Refugee camps have hospitals that

are better equipped to offer extra advanced services like scanning and lab services. Non-Governmental Organizations that support health services in refugee camps have also supported some sub-county (government) hospitals by providing equipment and subsidizing services to make them affordable or free for the host community—another instance of the RAD theory at play. Some critical surgeries are free of charge in the Dadaab Sub County hospital courtesy of the support of these organizations. The free services include Caesarean surgery and special clinic for ear, nose, and throat (ENT) and eyes. However, even though some charity organisations have come in to help government sponsored hospitals in the county, financial constraints limit the extent of support and as is presented in section 4.6.1.1 on page 242, there still exists challenges in the health sector of the Dadaab sub-county.

UNHCR with the support of stakeholders have also lobbied for the construction of schools in Dadaab refugee camps to ensure refugees/their children access education easily, which is evidenced in section 4.3.2 (page 170) that shows that majority (63%) of refugees are educated. The study revealed that the coming of refugees to the area had caused the construction of public schools and the mushrooming of private schools. There were several public schools in the Dadaab neighbourhood to which refugee children were enrolled. The schools were owned and operated by Kenya government although UNHCR had hand in equipping them. The private schools mainly cater for the children of the many workers and businesspeople in the area (Respondent KI 12, Dadaab, 17th December 2020).

This finding disagrees with the one that indicated refugee camps do not have access to education, healthcare, and nutrition (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012) but agrees with Enghoff *et al.* (2010) and Betts (2009) who observed that refugees contribute or

influence enhanced measures that enhance access to water, education, and health facilities in camps and among local populations.

4.4.3.7 Employment Opportunities

Table 4.11 indicates results on whether Somali refugees influence increased employment. (0=No extent; 1=Small extent; 2=Average extent; 3=High extent).

Table 4.11: Employment Opportunities

	Somali refugees have increased employment opportunities
N	370
Mean	2.17
Std. deviation	.801

Source: Author (2021).

The study also found that to an average extent Somali refugee have increased employment opportunities to Dadaab area 2.17 times (mean =2.17; S.D. =0.801). The standard deviation indicates data that is not largely dispersed from each other. A key informant, Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) also informed that refugees create employment opportunities directly and indirectly. For instance, health facilities and schools built to support refugees were found to offer hundreds of job opportunities to refugees and host communities. Hundreds of Kenyan health professionals (nurses, clinicians laboratory experts and doctors) and teachers, engineers, planners, among others have been employed to serve in these projects thus supporting their families as well as generating revenue to the government through the PAYE (Pay as you Earn) scheme.

Additionally, refugee camps have created job openings for refugees and host communities. The UN officers at the camp, international government organizations (IGOs), NGOs, Private organizations and CBOs offer employment opportunities to refugees and Kenyans. Respondent KI 21 (Nairobi, 23rd January 2021) estimated that

over 5,000 employees including refugees and host communities were employed directly and indirectly in Dadaab refugee camp working informally and formally. Based on Nasrullah (2017), the number of humanitarian workers directly dealing with refugees in the camp are 1000. Adding to that the number of government officers, workers in financial sector, hospitality sector, traders and other service providers service the camps, the number could be approaching the stated 5000. of concern to note is the fact that refugees take up most of the unskilled employment opportunities while hosts take up most of the formal employment opportunities. However, the significance of refugees even in the informal sector is appreciated:

“The refugees provide critical workforce to host community in the areas of animals rearing, domestic workers, cooking and serving in restaurants and working in minimarkets or shops”(Respondent KI 12,Dadaab, 17th December 2020).

The reason for this imbalance according to the study is that most refugees do not progress to post primary education and are usually employed by the host community at a lower wage of Kes 3,000 to 7,000 per month compared to the host community workforce. This is below the minimum wage legislations and some employers do it as a way taking advantage of the refugees.

Thus, the increased employment opportunities have been created by the growth of various service providers that came to the Dadaab region to meet the needs of the refugee migrants. This finding corroborates the one submitted by Bettset *al.*(2018) that refugees and refugee camps have attracted NGOs and similar organisations that offer numerous job opportunities to the refugee and host communities and World Bank (2011) report that indicates that refugees were mainly involved in the informal sector of employment.

4.4.3.8 Inter-marriages between Somali refugees and hosts

Concerning whether the settlement of refugees to Dadaab had influenced intermarriages with the host community, the findings in table 4.12 were collected.

Table 4.12: There exist intermarriages between refugees and host

	intermarriages between host and refugees
N	368*
Mean	2.24
Std. Deviation	0.808

Source: Author (2021).

*Two respondents did not address this question well hence the n=368 instead of 370.

The influx of Somali refugees to the area has also enhanced intermarriages between host and refugees to an average extent (mean =2.24; SD = 0.808). The mean shows that 2.24 marriages out of every 3 are intermarriages between refugees and host communities. This finding is associated with the inter-relationships' refugees have with the host communities owed to the shared values in their midst. It should be noted that Kenyan Somalis and refugee Somalis speak the same language, are predominantly of the same religion, and share the same culture, which makes it easy for intermarriages to happen as opposed to when the culture and religion are divergent. This finding confirms the submissions presented by UNHCR (2006).

4.4.3.9 Harmony and animosity between refugees and host

Concerning animosity and harmony between refugees and host communities, the findings in table 4.13 were collected.

Table 4.13: Harmonious coexistence

	There exists animosity between Somali refugees and Host communities in Dadaab	Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab coexist harmoniously
I don't know	2%	0%
Strongly disagree	27%	1%
Disagree	55%	7%
Agree	12%	46 %
Strongly agree	4%	46%

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (55%) of respondents disagreed that there exists animosity between Somali refugees and host communities and 27% disagreed strongly. Additionally, it was found that 46% agreed while 46% agreed strongly that Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab coexist harmoniously hence agreeing with the findings by UNHCR (2006). This is evidenced by the intermarriages and celebrations that happen between the two groups, which are social events that promote relationships.

Respondent KI 16 (Dadaab, 21st December 2020) concurred that:

“There are a lot of inter-marriages that exist between the host communities and refugees at the Dadaab refugee camps. This has created cohesion, trust, and co-existence of both communities.”

The cohesion and good relationship developed eliminates mistrust and animosity while creating harmonious coexistence. Although refugee-host community intermarriages are common, high rates of divorce is a concern as well.

Respondent KI 6 (Dadaab, 16th December 2020) indicated that there has been no investigation to establish the cause of the divorces but speculated that sub-cultural differences and some refugees marrying for the sake of getting Kenyan identity cards were the main culprits. This finding disagrees with that presented by Helton (2002); Pini (2008); Rabasa *et al.* (2007); Betts (2009) that refugees created conflict between

them and local people. It clearly indicates that generally refugees are not a source of conflict between them and host communities.

4.4.3.10 Vocational Skills and Technical Training development

The qualitative results also showed that as part of supporting the host community and giving back to them, UNHCR and Norwegian Refugee Council set Youth Education Pack (YEP) Centre for Dadaab refugees and host community that is supporting youth aged 18-35 years to enrol for professional courses of certificate and diploma, Vocational Skills development and Technical Training such as electricity, plumbing, Solar and Air Condition Repair, and short high impact courses (including hairdressing, Samosa making, Cakes, and Tie and Die). The graduates usually use those skills to earn a livelihood. Graduates are encouraged to start micro-business enterprise to utilize the skills gained where they are trained on entrepreneurship and given seed capital to facilitate them (Business per group varies one business to another 200-300k) (Respondent KI 18, Dadaab, 8th January 2021). The respondent added that this initiative was geared towards cushioning refugee and host youths from unemployment and its effects. The other reason was to address the issues of radicalization and youth ending strategically and silently up in the extremist and violent groups like Somalia's-Al-Shabaab or Al-Qaeda. The findings presented in the reviewed literature presented a similar scenario to the current one where Betts (2009) indicated that refugees were offered vocational training due to their vulnerabilities [which then influenced them positively by equipping them with skills relevant to pursue employment].

4.4.3.11 Lowered Commodity Prices

Table 4.14 indicates the findings on the impact of refugees on commodity prices. The scale used was such that **No extent = 0; Small extent =1; Average extent =2 and High extent =3.**

Table 4.14: Lowered commodity prices and rental costs

	Somali refugees Contribute towards lowering commodity prices
N	370
Mean	1.68
Std. Deviation	1.021

Source: Author (2021).

The study also found many respondents to agree to an average extent that Somali refugees contribute towards lowering commodity prices (Mean=1.68; S.D. =1.021). The refugees had influenced the lowering of commodity prices by 1.68 times (based on the mean) and there was a slight disparity in the data as indicated by the standard deviation. This finding can be attributed to the cheap contraband commodities that are sneaked into the country through the porous Kenya-Somalia border. Additionally, the lowered commodity prices are associated with the relief aid that refugee receive which refugees sometimes sell to host communities at lower prices. Aid offered in terms of foodstuffs reduces refugees' demand for similar products hence attracting lower selling prices for such commodities.

The qualitative findings showed that refugees contributed to lowering of prices of food in the following ways: First, refugees sold to host communities a portion of their relief food they receive in exchange for money to buy alternative foods not catered for by the relief voucher. This is because the voucher is commonly specific to purchasing authorized food items (Sorghum, beans, oil) hence refugees must find ways they will use to get basic items (like milk, rice, wheat, and firewood) hence they sell part of

their relief food to get income to purchase the non-supplied items (Respondent KI 8, 11,12,15,17, & 23). This is however illegal as relief food should not be sold or transferred to third parties. However, it helps in reducing food prices in Dadaab (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

Second, UNHCR negotiates with the County government to provide designated places for farming within the refugee camps where refugees can plant vegetables like red pepper, okra, cowpeas, cassava, spinach, kales, tomato, and bananas. This farming yields food items that are consumed by refugees and some sold to host communities for income. As such, this lowers the prices of similar food items, as supply is plenty. Additionally, it ensures that refugees and host community are supplied with nutritious foods, hence creating healthy people. Respondent KI 13 (Dadaab, 17th December 2020) stated,

“Refugees plant Red Pepper, Okra, Cowpeas, Cassava, Spinach, Kales, Tomato, and Bananas and then sell some of these produces to host communities. The commodities are critical to supporting and preventing malnourishment of refugee and host communities.”

Currently Danish Refugee Council is working with over 200 farmers on this farming program and the results are astounding.

Besides the participation in farming to get food, farming activities improved the environment of Dadaab region. The study established that farming activities in refugee camps are being expanded to host communities by upscaling the food forest (planting of fruits and vegetable) currently done by the Refugee Reconstruction and Development Organization to build resilience and conserve the environment. Before this dry land farming interventions, all vegetables and fruits came from Garissa, Thika, Nyeri and Meru but now very few of that consignment come from the stated towns (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). However, the produce from

refugee camps and host communities are fresh and cheaper than those imported from the towns stated because of the long journey and transportation costs.

Additionally, most Dadaab refugees are traders who bring about increased suppliers of commodities who in return create increased competition thus lowering commodity prices. This finding disagrees with that submitted by UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Miller (2018) that refugees drive the cost of commodities and housing up but agrees with the Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (2010) whose research indicated that the impact of refugees in Dadaab camps is felt through reduced food and commodity prices.

4.4.3.12 Impact of refugees on rental cost

Table 4.15 indicates the findings on the impact of refugees on rental costs. The scale used was **No extent = 0; Small extent =1; Average extent =2 and High extent =3.**

Table 4.15: Impact of refugees on rental cost

	Somali refugees have influenced lowering of rental cost
N	370
Mean	1.18
Std. Deviation	0.938

Source: Author (2021).

Respondents also agreed to a small extent that Somali refugees have influenced lowering of rental cost (mean=1.18; S.D. =0.938). The findings indicate to a small extent because refugees do not compete with host community on renting available houses since they are restricted to staying in temporary structures constructed in camps by UNHCR. This finding disagrees with that submitted by UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Miller (2018) that refugees drive up the cost of housing.

The findings of the study are associated with the arrival of refugees that attracted service providers and other inhabitants in Dadaab area which increases demand and construction of rental units in the area leading to high supply of rental units resulting in lowering of rental prices. Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) stated that:

“There was high demand of housing by different cadres of workforces offering services to refugees and refugee camps which drove up rental prices of properties in Dadaab and its environs.”

The high demand then triggered an upsurge of development of commercial buildings that catered for the demand. The peak of this socio-economic development was in 2011 to 2015 and the host community cashed on this business boom significantly. Currently, office blocks retail at Ksh. 200,000, commercials at Ksh. 12,000, single rooms Ksh. 8,000 and lodges from Ksh. 2,500 per night (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

4.4.3.13 increased investment to Dadaab

Table 4.16 indicates the findings on the impact of refugees on increased investment to Dadaab area. The scale used was such that **No extent = 0; Small extent =1; Average extent =2 and High extent =3.**

Table 4.16: increased investment

Statistics	Somali refugees have influenced increased investment to the Dadaab area
N	370
Mean	2.17
Std. Deviation	0.907

Source: Author (2021).

The study found that, to an average extent, the Somali refugees have influenced increased investment to the Dadaab area (Mean= 2.17; S.D. 0.907) which is attained as investors are attracted to the area. The qualitative results showed that the arrival of

refugees to the area attracted service providers like banks (KCB and Equity), private schools (about 6), business investors, real estate investors, hoteliers, accommodation providers, general traders, among others, who collectively increased investment to the area as supported by the submissions of Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020). The findings show that before refugee arrival and the set-up of Dadaab refugee camp, many of these investments were inexistent. The area was barren and deserted. However, refugee arrival had changed things. This finding agrees with the one submitted by UNHCR Standing Committee (1997); Richard (2013); Miller (2018) that refugees attract investment and investors and increased business activities to the area where they are hosted.

4.4.3.14 increased wages, diversification, and low inflation

The study investigated whether Somali refugees in Dadaab influenced the increase in wages, economic diversification, and lowered inflation and the result shown in Table 4.17. (**No extent = 0; Small extent =1; Average extent =2 and High extent =3**).

Table 4.17: Additional Economic Impacts

	Somali refugees have increased wages	Somali refugees have influenced economic diversification	Somali refugees have influenced the lowering of inflation
N	366*	364*	365*
Mean	1.76	1.90	1.38
Std. Deviation	.858	1.034	1.022

Source: Author (2021).

*=Some participants failed to respond to these questions well.

The study found that the arrival of Somali refugees has influenced the increase in wages among employees in the area, to an average extent. Refugee arrival influenced an increase of 1.76 times the wages of employees in the area and this information was significantly reliable owing to the small standard deviation (Mean =1.76; SD =0.858).

several factors as discussed herein are the cause for this increase in wages. First is that generally humanitarian jobs have a higher pay since humanitarian employers like UN use international scale when determining wages. This scale is often attractive to employees from developing nations like Kenya who are generally not well paid (Respondent KI 20, Nairobi, 26th January 2021). Secondly, the key informants indicted that the north-eastern region of Kenya is one of the regions with lowest education levels among its natives hence as refugees arrived; many of these locals could not provide specialised skills and services leading to the attraction of employees from other parts of the country who, based on their education levels and skills, demanded higher wages. The employers also increased wages to attract the employees to work in this area.

Additionally, the region was classified as a hardship area, which according to UN and Kenya government standards warrants that employee in the area be paid more to compensate them for working in a hardship area, hence the finding. This finding disagrees with the one established in the literature that shows that refugee arrival lowers the wages of native workers as they bring in cheap labour (World Bank, 2006; Eurostat, 2015; Dustmann *et al.*, 2008). This variation is brought about by the fact that the arriving refugees were limited by personal factors (like illiteracy, language barrier, and lack of relevant qualifications) and environmental factors (like restriction to get work permit, and restricted movement) to offer formidable competition for the available jobs at cheaper wages. This left the employees from host communities and expatriates unchallenged for the available opportunities hence their demand for high wages.

Somali refugees have influenced economic diversification to an average extent (Mean = 1.90; SD =1.034) which is in line with the finding by Enghoff *et al.* (2010); World Bank (2016) who indicated that one of the advantages of refugees and refugee camps is enhanced and diversified economic activities to the communities living around camps. Kenyan Somalis have been predominantly pastoralists for a long time but with the arrival of Somali refugees, those staying closer to Dadaab have diversified into business/trading, and some got employed in various sectors in and around the camps hence the finding. The trading was enhanced by the large refugee market ready to be served and the increased movement of goods to the Dadaab area from within Kenya and across neighbouring countries like Somalia and Ethiopia.

The study also found that Somali refugees have influenced the lowering of inflation to a small extent. The standard deviation is large compared to that of other variables in table 4.17 indicating that the dispersion in the collected data was greater than in the other variables (Mean = 1.38; SD =1.022). This can be associated with the lowered commodity prices, lowered rental costs, and increased wages associated with the arrival of Somali refugees to Dadaab as already discussed. When prices go down and people's incomes increase, the value of their money rises hence lowered inflation. The finding that refugee arrival lowered inflation in Dadaab deviates from the previously known finding that refugees increase inflation through scarcity of items and increased prices (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997; Miller, 2018).

4.4.4 Negative effects refugees pose on socioeconomic development of Kenya

4.4.4.1 General insecurity in the camps and host community areas

All (100 percent) of the security sector personnel interviewed agreed that Somali refugees threaten Kenya's national security. For instance, Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) noted that:

“All the security cases associated to terrorism and taking place between 2011 to 2020 were linked or associated to Somali refugees or refugee camps.”

However, the study underscored the fact that not all Somali refugees are terrorists and/or support such acts just as was established by Starr (2013) for the case of Syrian refugees in Europe. Respondent KI 14 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) observed that refugee issues should not entirely be securitized but refugees should be treated as people in need of Kenya state protection and support.

Respondent Dadaab, 8 (5th January 2021) indicated that:

“Refugee camps and host community areas are equally insecure, and consistently hit by terrorists.”

This result shows that both refugees and host populations are equally targeted by terrorists hence, as a section of the victims, refugees should not be blamed for the waywardness of a few terrorist immigrants. Additionally, several respondents like KI 14, 15, 20 and 22 submitted that refugees were not involved in crime and were not party to the insecurity cases witnessed in the area. This finding is similar to the one presented by Starr (2013) who indicated that Syrian refugee camps and surrounding areas were equally insecure. This finding disregards the ones reviewed in the literature like Nowrasteh (2016); Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012); Koepke (2011), Ng'ang'a (2016) which indicated that refugees were associated with insecurity.

Although they did not terrorise Kenya's national security, the study found that refugees were associated with insecurity based on the following findings:

- Dadaab refugee camps borders Somalia through Hamey, Abdisugow and Liboi border towns of Kenya in addition to over 300 undocumented routes or border sites where terrorist can enter to Kenya. Somali refugees in Dadaab sneak out of the country and back using these sites without notifying the UNHCR or GoK of their movement. It is possible that terrorists take advantage of these movements to sneak into the country as well and/or hide in refugee camps or that the refugees who sneak out and into the country engage in terror acts.

This finding concurs that presented by Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) that terrorists take advantage of the porous borders to sneak into the country and engage in crimes. The challenge from the Kenyan side is that the government has inadequate financial and human resource capacity to man these porous borders hence the porosity. To substantiate, Respondent KI 8 (Dadaab, 5th January 2021) informed that:

“The free flow and movement of people between Somalia and Kenya, allows terrorists to come to the refugee camps to visit their families, for leisure, relaxation and recreational purposes.”

Findings that are similar to those found among Syrian fighters concerning the Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries (Starr, 2013).

- The number of police vehicles blown around the Dadaab camps by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are 9 since 2011 to 2020 with hundreds of Police officers losing their lives. Al-Shabaab group has claimed responsibility in most of these acts. Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) explained that:

“The terror acts have seen properties being destroyed including several hospitals, schools, and Safaricom telecommunication Masts, damaged beyond repair, maiming, injuring, and killing of civilians and security members.”

- Some idle refugee youths and sympathizers of Al-Shabaab terror group have been radicalized and joined the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. These few cases have spoilt the name of the entire refugee fraternity as all of them are considered sympathizers. Respondent KI 22 (Nairobi, 22nd January 2021) submitted:

“There are some Al-Shabaab sympathizer and sleeper cells that recruit and radicalize idle and unemployed Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps. We know youth who were in Dadaab and currently working with Al-Shabaab.”

It is unfortunate that the Government of Kenya and UNHCR do not fund programs in the Dadaab refugee camps that address youth enrolling in violent extremist groups just as was established in an earlier study by (Ng’ang’a, 2016). This gap needs to address as soon before things slide into worse. However, we take note, UNHCR works with agencies that deal protection and social services outreach programs that talks against radicalization of youth through Muslim leaders, youth groups and women leaders but it is not large program. It only focuses on sensitization, keeping refugees a law-abiding citizen, information sharing platform and updating refugees what is happening in Somalia.”

4.4.4.2 Population increase (crowding)

Concerning the number of children refugees have, Table 4.18 presents the findings.

Table 4.18: Number of children refugees have

	Count	Percent
Less than 5	194	53
5-10	163	44
Over 10	13	3
Total	370	100

Source: Author (2021).

Fifty three percent of Somali refugees have given birth to less than 5 children while in Dadaab camps, 44% have given birth to 5 to 10 children while the remaining 3% have given birth to over 10 children while in the camp. This result indicates that the Somali refugees have contributed towards population increase, which is related to the pressure the refugees exert on available natural resources and physical amenities. Additionally, the key informants informed that the refugee flow from Somalia has never stopped although the asylum seekers are fewer compared to earlier figures. These new migrations of asylum seekers also contribute to the overcrowding in the camps which also exerts pressure on the available resources. Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December 2020) concurred that the increased numbers of refugees have constrained the available space in Dadaab camps to the extent of causing overcrowding which is unhealthy. The study showed that some refugees have set up temporary houses on the outskirts of the camp, which according to the central government is illegal. Overcrowded camps are a problem that has existed in camps before based on the findings of the previous research by Refugee Consortium of Kenya (2012); Kiama and Karanja (2013) and this problem limits or puts pressure on access to basic amenities and limited resources which affects the budget allocated towards refugee camps by UNHCR while piling pressure on the host nation as well.

4.4.4.3 Refugee Education

Qualitative findings established that refugees are well supplied with education premise—schools since there are 102 schools in and around the refugee camps which comprise private and public and cover ECD, primary, secondary and college levels. More on the education facilities is presented under section 4.6.1.1 on page 242 because it is more of a challenge.

The number of Somali refugee children going to school is indicated in table 4.19.

Table 4.19: School-Going Refugee Children

Number of school-going children	Count (n) of refugee leaders	Percent (%)
0	11	12
1	8	8
2	32	35
3	15	17
4	8	8
5	11	12
6	4	5
7	3	3
Total	92	100

Source: Author (2021).

Majority of the Somali refugees' children (88%) are school going. Out of these, 35% of the refugees have 2 of their children attending school, 17% have 3 of their children attending school, and 12% have 5 of their children attending school. This result indicates that many of the refugees' children are school goers hence disagreeing with Ng'ang'a (2016) who established that a significant percentage of refugee children who have attained school going age do not attend school. This is in line with the finding that schools have been built in the camps for refugees.

Concerning whether the schools are adequate to cater for the growing population of refugees indicated above, the study found that 144 refugee children shared a class in primary/ECD and 104 shared a class in secondary school as indicated in Table 4.20.

Table 4.20: Learner/Classroom Ratio

Level	Learner/Classroom Ratio			Remarks
	Classrooms	Students	Ratio	
Primary	393	56502	144	Both pry/ECD
Secondary	109	11370	104	
	502	67872	135	

Source: Author (2021).

This shows that the classes were congested because when the classes were built, they were to hold half the current number of students on average. Analysing this finding in relation to the one presented in section 4.4.3.6 on page 189 means that although education was accessible as shown in section 4.4.3.6, it was of poor quality as the learner-teacher ratio and number of learners per class was high. Thus, the finding in table 4.20 shows that the teachers were overwhelmed because the high number of learners per class affects teacher attention to learners and the problem is even augmented by the shortage of teachers in the region due to fear of insecurity just as was indicated by UNHCR (2016). From the qualitative findings, this overcrowding mainly affected public schools to which refugee children are admitted. The available private schools had no or minimal overcrowding but due to budgetary constraints, refugees were not admitted there.

This finding indicates the state of poor education that refugee children are exposed to in camps characteristic of refugee camps as indicated in previous studies (Refugee Consortium of Kenya, 2012; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017). The impact of this is half-baked learners who are less competitive compared to their counterparts from the rest of Kenya who are in schools with better facilities. Additionally, the congestion is a health risk. Respondent KI 9 (Dadaab, 11th January 2021) added, “in fact with the MOH protocols of social distancing to combat COVID-19 spread, the classes should hold fewer learners than 40.” This means that the public schools in Dadaab are a time bomb of spreading COVID-19 and other possible communicable/contagious diseases.

Despite these challenges, UNHCR and some of its partners were carrying out some measures to better the education status for refugees including funding the construction

of more classes and refurbishing the available facilities and providing funding for paying temporary (casual teaches) who were not employed by TSC.

4.5 Security concerns associated with the Somali refugee

The second objective of this study investigated the existing security concerns on Kenya associated with the Somali refugees in Dadaab. The findings are indicated in the subtitles that follow.

4.5.1 Relationship between refugees and Kenya's security

The study first investigated the relationship between Somali refugees in Dadaab camp and the security of Kenya. Findings were as indicated in Table 4.21 and the texts that follow. (Scale used: 0=I don't know; 1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly Agree).

Table 4.21: insecurity threats posed by Somali refugees.

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Somali refugees are directly responsible for the insecurity in the nation	370	1.91	0.839
Somali refugees are indirectly responsible for the insecurity in the nation	370	2.16	0.909

Source: Author (2021).

The findings show that majority of respondents disagreed that Somali refugees are neither directly nor indirectly responsible for the insecurity in the nation (Mean=1.91, SD=0.839; Mean=2.16, SD=0.909) respectively. This finding indicates that respondents do not consider majority of refugees to be involved in insecurity cases whether directly or indirectly. The means show that on a 5-point scale, refugees were 1.91 times likely to cause direct insecurity and 2.16 times likely to cause indirect insecurity. This is low possibility of refugees being source of direct and indirect insecurity to the nation. This is attributed to the fact that largely majority of refugees

are peaceful and those involved in insecurity are a minority. Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21st December 2020) stated:

“Refugees are people seeking protection; they come to build their lives. I think the risks of refugees are sometimes exaggerated to create fear. Not all refugees are a threat to the national security and economy.”

This finding concurs with the one presented by Ng’ang’a (2016); Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) who indicated that majority of refugees are peaceful and only a minority are not.

The direct security concerns include conflict arising from destruction of the environment or natural habitat, scramble for natural resources like water, pasture and land, banditry, and terrorism (where refugee youths are recruited into criminal sects or terror cells operating from the camps). The state security agencies also blame Somali refugees to fuel inter-clan conflict in northern part of Kenya by providing constant supply of arms and light weapons. For instance, the conflict between Auliyahan and Abdiwak clans who were entangled in a protracted dispute over a grazing land and water points, conflict between Garre tribe and Degodia tribe in Wajir and Mandera over land dispute, and the conflict between Auliyahan clan and Borana tribe who were entangled in a protracted dispute over a grazing land and water points are suspected to be fuelled by the small arms and light weapons sold to them by refugees (Respondent KI 17, Dadaab, 21st December 2020; Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

indirect security concerns include terrorism where refugees do not participate directly but provide safe accommodation or intelligence to terrorists. Unregistered refugees also form a risky group, as they can be involved in criminal activities without detection or capture. What is more, terrorists disguise themselves as refugees to cross

the Somali-Kenya boarder and gain access to refugee camps where they plan their acts.

The study also established that refugees came to Kenya in 1991 yet insecurity cases began getting prominence in 2011. This indicates that refugees are peace seekers and not terrorists just as Ng'ang'a (2016) had considered. A respondent stated that:

“As far I know the Somali refugees are people who crossed to Kenya border because of insecurity and are seeking peace, safety, and security under the protection of Government of Kenya. I have not come across, in my work, any refugee who is supporting, or is directly or indirectly linked with the armed group across the border. We hear from the Government of Kenya and media that the Somali refugees are a threat to Kenyan national security, but these people are displaced by the same insecurity back in Somalia” (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

The findings here show that majority of refugees are peaceful and that only a minority of them engage in insecurity issues just as submitted by Ng'ang'a (2016); Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017); yet the information in the public domain in Kenya and internationally is that majority (if not the entire refugee community) are a security threat to Kenya and only a minority (or none) are peaceful. This is a clear play of securitization theory whereby government and politicians together with biased media have securitized the issue of refugees to the extent that the public perception is altered where they are looked at as a security threat to Kenya rather than a group who can also impact the country positively. Thus, the finding clearly shows that the issue of refugees has been securitized to portray them as a security threat as detailed by Buzan *et al.* (1998) in the securitization theory.

4.5.2 State of security in Dadaab

On the state of security in Dadaab camps and its environs, the study found that generally, the state of security in Dadaab has been calm for a long time until 2011 as

clarified by Respondent KI 7(Dadaab, 6th January 2021). So far, there have been isolated cases of insecurity including Al-Shabaab attacks and threats, Jihadism and radicalization, overcrowded camps, internal conflicts between hosts and refugees, murder cases associated with domestic wrangles, fire outbreaks associated with mishandling of equipment that can cause fire like diesel power generators, transit point for drug traffickers, hazards like sexual/gender based offenses, theft/banditry, assault, contraband goods, illegal/undocumented refugees prone to human trafficking, hideouts for FGM perpetrators, land disputes and hideouts for terrorist cells. These security issues were also earlier established from other camps/ areas by Wanjala (2016); UNDP (2018); Jaji (2009).

Notably, the threat of terror stands out owing to its effect on the entire country of Kenya and the casualties involved. The study revealed that before 2011 there were no notable terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil. As such, Government of Kenya, its citizens, and the World viewed Somali refugees as helpless population caught in the middle of failed state of Somalia and not a threat of national security. At the time, Kenya's security agencies did not put emphasis on Dadaab in terms of security surveillance and deployment of intelligence officers. Terrorist found an open door and hid in Dadaab refugee camps. They built terrorist cells among the refugee community. It was easy for sleeper cells to hide because GoK and international Community looked at these people as hopeless people and no need of making things harder for them and nobody looked so keenly (Respondent KI 22, Dadaab, 22nd January 2021).

Respondent KI 22 (Dadaab, 22nd January 2021) informed:

“...The wakeup call was when aid workers were kidnapped from Dadaab refugee camp by Al-Shabaab operatives. This showed the real state of refugee camps. [...] for a long time, Kenya considered refugees harmless and took no

role in gathering intelligence from refugee camps until the country was hit by someone who authorities claimed resided in Dadaab camp.”

In 2011, members of one of the sleeper cells organized and executed the kidnapping of aid workers and other similar back-to-back kidnappings across Kenya including that of a French Tourist in Lamu and took them to Somalia via Indian Ocean. Immediately Dadaab refugee camps were classified as areas with sleeper cell habitation and attracted great interest of security agencies and since the GoK was unable to identify the specific criminals and bring them to book, the government and politicians securitized the matter to earn more relevance. Following these events, Kenya’s president at the time announced the closure of the camp since it was a security threat to the nation (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 5th January 2021). Although the camp was not immediately closed, the refugee repatriation process began. Recently, the government has given UNHCR a new deadline of closing the camps. Although forceful closure of the camp goes against refugee protection laws, the government is not relenting on this issue hence the securitization of the matter.

4.5.3 Causes of Dwindled Security in Dadaab

The factors that the study found to be responsible for the dwindled security in Dadaab refugee camps in the recent past are as presented in the subtopics that follow. (The scale used to interpret the tables under this subtopic is (0=I don’t know; 1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly Agree).

4.5.3.1 Refugees Cooperating with GoK

Concerning whether Somali refugees in Dadaab cooperated with the government’s security organs, the table 4.22 shows the findings.

Table 4.22: Refugees cooperate with government security agencies

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Somali refugees in Dadaab do not cooperate with Government's security organs	370	2.09	1.116

Source: Author (2021).

Participants to the study disagreed that Somali refugees failed to cooperate with government security organs (Mean=2.09; SD=1.116). This means that Somali refugees cooperated with security agencies and therefore shared intelligence information they had on the security state in Dadaab. This finding is attributed to the fact that refugees share intelligence information with security agents perhaps after the numerous cases of them being blamed for taking part in the security threats. Respondent KI 12(Dadaab, 17th December 2020) corroborated this information when he informed that:

“Refugees have formed clubs that create awareness against terrorism and encourage members to share information about criminal activities with the security agencies for action.”

The respondent noted that initially, refugees were not involved in intelligence gathering and community security activities, which created the gap in using intelligence from refugees in preventing insecurity. This led to the thriving of insecurity threats that erupted in the 2000s. This knowledge was not initially available, as it has been assumed that refugees have been involved in security maintenance since their arrival. This finding concurs with Mukinda and Nyassy (2011) who observe that witnesses share information with Kenya’s security agencies that enabled the gathering of adequate intelligence to make conclusions on the crimes happening in Dadaab. The findings also show a deviation from the lacklustre state to

an intelligence gathering state that security agencies in Kenya exhibited (Okwany, 2016).

4.5.3.2 Tensions and conflicts between refugees and host communities

Table 4.23: Tension and conflict between Somali refugees and host

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
There has been tensions and conflicts between Somali refugees and host	370	2.05	0.900

Source: Author (2021).

Majority of the respondents disagreed there had been tensions between refugees and host communities (Mean=2.05; SD=0.900). As indicated earlier, refugees and host communities have intermarried and live-in harmony with each other hence have become part of each other's environment. These intermarriages enhance relationships hence minimizing confrontations, which in turn leads to the absence of conflicts and tensions. Generally, this finding deviates from the one that showed that arrival of refugees arouses xenophobic feelings and conflicts between host citizens and refugees (Helton, 2002).

The lack of conflict reported here is on a large /general scale. However, on a specific scale, the key informants indicated that there existed minor conflicts between parties living in close association in Dadaab and surrounding areas. The informants submitted that there exist internal conflicts caused by disagreements on resources (Land disputes), business rivalry (particularly *mirra* (khat) business), conflicts in inter-marriage, environmental degradation, destruction of natural habitats, and defilement of girls, sodomy, and rape cases (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 5th January 2021). These issues cause minor conflicts between refugees and the host community as well as between refugees and government officials enforcing various protection laws.

On resources, unequitable distribution or scramble for minimal available resources causes conflict. Respondent KI 18 (Dadaab, 8th January 2021) asserted that:

“Environmental degradation where one party (refugees) cut down trees for firewood and charcoal disregarding the effects it will have on the host community also causes conflict.”

Destruction of national habitat also takes a similar cause to that of environmental degradation. The picture below is evidence of the way trees are felled to get firewood or use by hosts and refugees in the Dadaab region.



Plate II: Evidence of environmental destruction

Source: Author (2021)

The photo shows the researcher standing in a consignment of firewood owned by a non-licensed harvester. The photo was taken on 16th December 2020 by the researcher.

Defilement of either gender is also a major cause of conflict as it is rampant in refugee camps where youth girls and boys are taken advantage (Respondent KI 10, Dadaab, 11th January 2021). The study revealed that defilement cases cause serious conflicts

particularly when security agents and UNHCR officials intervene because the effects are dire. However, among the poorest refugees, some cases of defilement did not attract any conflict as the parents of both sides often strike a deal to keep such cases private. In other cases, the culprits were unknown or unrecognisable by the victims.

Concerning how the conflicts were resolved, the study found that clan leaders and elders were often the central figures to conflict resolution between refugees and host communities. These leaders/elders form a traditional court where they invite all parties to present their cases before, they make a judgement. Their decision is always final and cannot be appealed to any other traditional courts. Sometimes the conflict is grave and requires government machinery like the police, chiefs, and sub-chiefs and UNHCR be involved to intervene and where need be, such cases may end up in a court of law. The perpetrator may pay fines where possible. The last resolution method is through a court of law where the matter is not discussed locally but in court. All conflicts that cannot be addressed locally also end up in court. Here the judge presides over the case to determine the person in error and is either jailed or fined or both (depending on the grossness of the charges). The researcher considers that these resolutions are short term because they do not end the conflicts but solve the disagreements encountered at a time.

Respondents also informed that closure of the refugee camps was another solution to dealing with refugee-host conflicts. This, the researcher considers as the long-term conflict resolution measure as it ends the refugee-host community interactions, which are a source of conflict. Closure of the camps will see the repatriation or relocation of refugees in the camps thus eliminating host-refugee conflicts. Although closure of the camp is a form of conflict resolution, it is not an effective strategy for managing once-

in-a-while conflicts since it is a process that takes long time to conclude and involves many stakeholders and logistical planning. It can only be effective when the conflict between hosts and refugees is perennial, and its causes are unresolved otherwise.

4.5.3.3 Poor state of security in and outside camps

Table 4.24 indicates the findings concerning the state security in and outside camps.

Table 4.24: State of security in camps and among host communities around the camps

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
The state security in Dadaab camp is poor	370	2.14	0.864
State of security in communities near Dadaab refugee camps is poor	370	2.36	1.076

Source: Author (2021).

The finding show that majority disagreed that the state of security in Dadaab camps is poor (Mean =2.14; SD =0.864) while another majority disagreed that the state of security near the Dadaab refugee camp is poor (Mean =2.36; SD=1.076). This means that the state of security in and outside the camps was not poor. This finding is associated with quantifying the extent to which the security state is good compared to it being bad. Since majority of refugees are peaceful people, it indicates that a larger part of the camps will be secure owed to the confirmation that majority of the refugees share intelligence information with security agents to ensure security. Contrastingly, the few cases of insecurity in and out of the camps are associated with few refugees who either directly or indirectly engages in crime hence a larger part of the camp/refugees does not participate. The finding disagrees with what Jaji (2009) presented about the security of refugee camps.

4.5.3.4 Infiltration of non-refugees to refugee camps

The infiltration of non-refugees to refugee camps is a security risk since the group can easily commit a crime and escape or hide undetected given that they are not registered. Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) stated:

“...there are so many unregistered refugees in the camps who pose a great threat to the national security because they can easily commit a crime and sneak back to Somalia without a trace.”

This finding is in concurrence to that submitted by Atta-Asamoah (2015); Okwany (2016) in the literatures.

The finding shows that the migration of asylum seekers from Somalia attracts opportunists whose aim is to cause crimes on the hosting (Kenya's) soil. Perhaps there is need for enhanced scrutiny of cross border immigrants into Kenya as well as an exercise (like the *Usalama* watch) to comb out illegal refugees from the camps as they are a security threat. Since the Somali fighters are not well equipped, they leverage on opportunities for soft targets hence their infiltration. This infiltration is exacerbated by the intent of criminal groups in Somalia to cause mayhem that led to them being feared as a lethal force and gain international recognition, which attracts international funding, and recruitment of new fighters.

4.5.3.5 Porous Somalia-Kenya border

The study established that the porosity of the Somalia-Kenya border and nearness of the camp to this border adds up to the country's security concerns as terrorists and criminals easily cross over to commit crimes in Kenya and/or hide in the camps where some of them have relatives or friends. Respondent KI 8 (Dadaab, 5th January 2021) submitted that:

“...there is overwhelming evidence of insurgents crossing into Kenya in the guise of being asylum seekers but once they are encamped, they engage in criminal acts including smuggling and storing of weapons, planning terror attacks to this country [Kenya], and gathering intelligence for the attackers. You also heard from the media how some terrorists had relatives in this camp [Dadaab] where they used to refresh on their way to Somalia after gathering intelligence across the country.”

This means that the Dadaab refugee camps act as hideouts for many of those terrorists like the findings by Starr (2013) who indicated that Syrian fighters also hid and refreshed in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. The Kenya-Somalia border at Liboi was closed to permeate it against illegal movements that were a security threat to the nation, but this finding shows that the closure has not born fruits but rather exacerbated illegal cross-border movements. This is because of the withdrawal of enhanced surveillance by Kenya state when it closed the border, which, based on this finding shows that it was a misguided idea, as it did not achieve the intended cause.

4.5.3.6 Radicalization of youth

Radicalization was found to be the other concern that respondents associated with the dwindled security in Dadaab region. Many refugee youths are unemployed and lack professional skills with which to compete for opportunities in Kenya. As such, their desolate state makes them vulnerable for enticements to enrol as fighters for economic gains hence the finding. The study was informed that, “Many idle youths were easily lured by small handouts and false religious ideologies to become radicalized” (Respondent KI 21, Nairobi, 23rd January 2021). Once radicalised, the youths joined terror cells, which committed many crimes inside and outside the camps just as was established by Botha (2014); Ng’ang’a (2016). Naturally, human beings shun evil acts towards the innocent, and this is highly detrimental to the Al-Shabaab group’s fighter recruitment measures. To overcome this, the group radicalizes vulnerable youth who are then recruited to the group as fighters to continue the terrorist agenda. It is easier

to lure idle (jobless) youths since they are easily enticed by the associated economic gains, as they have no better alternative. The youths are then promised huge economic gains if they successfully cause mayhem in Kenya, which is a great security, threat to the country and its people.

4.5.3.7 Contraband Goods

Table 4.25 shows the data on presence of contraband and smuggled goods in the Dadaab camps and surrounding areas.

Table 4.25: Availability of contraband goods in the camps

	Strongly agree	Agree	I don't know	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Total
Frequency	162	102	6	66	34	370
%	44	28	2	18	9	100

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (44%) agreed strongly while 28% agreed that there were contraband or smuggled goods in the Dadaab refugee camps and surrounding host community areas. Eighteen percent disagreed while 9% disagreed strongly that the contraband goods were available in camps. This finding shows that indeed contraband goods were smuggled into the camps and its surrounding areas. The researcher considers that the thrive of contraband goods in the camps and its environs was caused by the closeness of the camp to a porous border with a lawless country whose goods are cheaper as they are not well regulated and untaxed. Additionally, due to regulations and taxing, Kenyan goods were expensive and unattractive to greedy traders who smuggled in contrabands whose sales were quick owing to their low prices. Since contraband goods have not undergone quality checks in Kenya, their security is questionable. Additionally, weapons smuggled into the country are used to cause insecurity. The

qualitative findings also indicated that Dadaab refugee camps offered ready market for contrabands just as was indicated in an earlier study by Wanjala (2016).

4.5.3.8 Drug and Human Trafficking

The study established that the porous border between Kenya and Somalia also promoted the trafficking of drugs and people through Dadaab refugee camps, which act as transit points hence concurring with Wanjala (2016), who opined that drug and human trafficking were major crimes rampant in Dadaab refugee camps. The researcher was informed that many barons take advantage of the fact that refugees are vulnerable to lure them into drug trafficking and use. Respondent KI 7, (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) said that:

“Since many refugee youths are jobless, they are easily recruited to move drugs and contraband items. Some of them are also heavy users of the drugs, as they have nothing else to do. The camps also form good transit points where humans being trafficked from Somalia and Ethiopia pass en-route to South Africa and other countries.”

Human trafficking from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia was reported to be rampant in the camps as the aliens pose as refugees before they are trafficked out of the camps to other countries like Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This trafficking is rampant in the refugee camp because it is home to many foreigners hence one can easily hide within undetected. Additionally, refugees are less scrutinized as they are considered vulnerable and traumatized by the situation causing them to escape. However, this finding informs that stakeholders and particularly security agents must act swifter to contain such crimes.

4.5.3.9 Gender-related human rights violations

What is more, the study also found that eroded Somali culture make it easy for the introduction of unsafe practices like FGM, child marriage and child abuse which also

add up to the security concerns in the camps. Respondent KI 12 (Dadaab, 17th December 2020) emphasized that commitment in enforcing the Somali culture as refugees come into foreign ground was the main catalyst for FGM to take place. FGM and child marriage are outdated African practices and therefore the low literacy levels among the Somali refugees owed to the collapsed education system in their country are the causes of continued administration of these practices.

The illiteracy positions the refugees at a point where they do not appreciate the negative effects these practices have on their girls. These practices cause dwindled security by propagating abuse towards girls and children. Since these practices are considered rites of passage, girls who undergo them are immediately considered adults and ushered to marriage and child rearing hence denying them the chance to attend school and enjoy childhood. FGM has also been associated with excessive bleeding in some girls leading to heavy medical costs and in some cases death of the victims (Respondent KI 14, Dadaab, 18th December 2020) just as Kimonge (2011) established in the literatures. These effects compromise the victims' future contribution to the socioeconomic development of Kenya. These security concerns are in concurrence to those established in the literature review (UNDP, 2018; ACAPS and NPM, 2018).

4.5.3.10 Environmental degradation

The study showed that environmental degradation was a cause for insecurity in Dadaab area, which then affected refugees' socioeconomic development in Kenya. Respondent KI 3 (Dadaab, 14th December 2020) informed:

“There have been many confrontations between locals and refugees over charcoal burning and felling of trees [purportedly] meant for locals. often, government officials and environment protection groups have engaged in chase games with locals and refugees who are found felling trees for firewood.”

The interviewed respondents informed that through unfavourable practices like deforestation to harvest charcoal and firewood as well as physical littering coupled with destruction of natural habitats were a source of security concerns as they caused conflict between refugees and host communities or government as was also indicated in the reviewed literatures (Jaji, 2014; UNDP, 2018). Since both refugees and host communities use charcoal and firewood as their main source of fuel, access to this limited resource causes conflict as the hosts feel entitled over refugees to the natural resources in Dadaab. The study also found that although the local government advocates against environmental destruction for firewood and charcoal, they do not offer alternative fuel to refugees and locals.

4.5.4 Measures instituted in Dadaab to ensure refugee and host security

The study investigated the measures instituted in the camps and its environs that would secure refugees and the host communities and established several measures which involve bringing on board all stakeholders to play their specific part in advocating for peace, discouraging participation in crime, terrorism, and other insecure activities, promoting cohesiveness to deter conflict, and creating awareness on terrorism.

4.5.4.1 Deployment of security apparatus

The study found that there were several special forces in Dadaab including General Service Unit, Rural Border Unit, Rapid Deployed Unit, Response Quick Unit, Critical Infrastructure Police Unit (CIPU), department of Military intelligence, National

intelligence Services and Anti-Terror Police Unit and Kenya Defense Forces that gather intelligence, man the borders points, take charge of security concerns within the camp and man government and private vital installations (Respondent KI 4, Dadaab, 15th December 2020). These security agents are multifunctional, as they comprise units involved in intelligence gathering, investigation and policing/maintenance of public order within the camps. Having these units would then create an environment where criminal behaviour within refugee camps is detected and arrested before it becomes an actual threat to national security. However, the fact that the government complains that the camps are havens for criminals causes one to question the effectiveness of these security agencies operating within the camps. Perhaps their training and equipping is inadequate to enable them effectively to execute their functions to ensure a peaceful camp and nation.

The respondents also indicated other security measures deployed within the camps to include:

- Respondents argued that there were police stations and posts established within refugee camps and among host communities to take care of any security concerns in camps and its environs. Although the researcher showed that some of the stations were instituted before the increase in insecurity associated to Al-Shabaab group, these stations have contributed significantly to creating peace and order among the camps particularly managing conflicts between refugees and locals and arresting petty criminals and law breakers within the camps. Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21st December 2020) asserted:

“Cases of robbery in this section [a village in Dagahaley camp] were very high at night but when the police post was set up, night patrols were executed, and it resulted into peace.”

- Security patrols in the region (outside camps) were however done with caution as Respondent KI 8 (Dadaab, 5th January 2021) indicated that:

“The Islamist terrorists often target and ambush patrol convoys which inflict serious harm to the police.”`

This, the researcher established, was due to lack of adequate and versatile equipment like hard body patrol vehicles: an area that the national government needs to investigate.

- Community policing initiatives, which have seen the police engaging refugees and host communities in talks that result in policing strategies that are accommodative and working for all. Through this measure, the community was involved in offering intelligence on insecurity threats to security agents for action. Additionally, through this measure, the community was required to assess the behaviour of their members and rehabilitate those with ill-intended behaviours that are likely to affect national security. *Nyumba Kumi* clustering block leaders and religious leaders were some of the community policing initiatives applied. In *Nyumba Kumi*, one was expected to know the conduct and actions of their neighbours and share with security organs any queer behaviour observed that affected security. By having block leaders, the community uses elders from both refugee and host community areas to sensitize their people against participating in terrorism. Engaging religious leaders in matters of security so that they can use their influence to educate and create awareness among refugees and host communities on the importance of peace and the need to avoid insecure instances.
- The study also found that involving the political and administrative leadership was also a measure instituted to enhance security, which would lead to

refugees' socioeconomic development the country. Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December 2020) said that:

“...since past security address measures were not working, all stakeholders including political and administrative leadership of Dadaab were brought on board to bridge the gap and bring forth innovative and new ways of doing things.”

The politicians involved are local MCA's, MPs, and senators while administratively, DCCs, ACCs, Chiefs, assistant chiefs and UNHCR together with its partners were required to sensitize refugees and locals on the effects of insecurity and deter involvement in such. When all these stakeholders work together, they increase intelligence sharing and awareness creation on eliminating security concerns just as was submitted by Ng'ang'a (2016); Jaji (2014).

4.5.4.2 Repatriation of unregistered Somali refugees

Qualitative data from the research showed that repatriating refugees who are a security risk to the country of origin was a measure of reducing security risks in the country. The study established that refugee registration was suspended to some refugees who were deemed to have entered the country illegally and were to be repatriated any time after this study's data collection exercise because they were a potential risk. According to the findings,

“There are 7,198 Somalis who were asylum seekers in Kenya as of January 2021 who are yet to be recognized by Government of Kenya and will be repatriated to minimize their involvement in crime,” (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th January 2021).

The researcher believes that unregistered refugees are a security risk as they can easily engage in crime undetected. Additionally, having unregistered refugees is a risk because criminals can easily hide among them in disguise and gather intelligence for terrorist aim. Since the effect of crimes to Kenya's development are negative,

repatriation of undocumented (and insecure) refugees is good for the development of the county. This finding tallies the one presented by Botha (2014); Atta-Asamoah (2015); Okwany (2016) that the deportation of illegal refugees/migrants reduces crime/insecurity.

4.5.4.3 Community peace and protection Teams

The study revealed that Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) and UNHCR have established a community Peace and Protection Team within each of the refugee camps that are responsible for supporting government to ensure law and order and report incidences of insecurity. Respondent KI 8 (Dadaab, 5th January 2021) informed that:

“After the various security threats emanating from the camp, the government together with UNHCR initiated a security team led by block leaders to share information on security threats and promote peace.”

This security team and refugee leaders do usually meet once a month with all refugees elected leaders who provide security related information and enhance police-community relation. This is in line with the finding that refugees shared intelligence with government agencies to manage insecurity in the area.

The finding reflects government appreciate community-policing measures as a way of combating insecurity. Such measures are good because they are proactive meaning that they help security agents gather intelligence and use it to avert security threats before they occur as opposed to reactive measures that have been witnessed in the past where security agents get surprised by the attacks that happen and act only to clear the crime scenes. Thus, this finding has positioned refugees as a group focused on ensuring peace rather than the previous perception that refugees are insecurity promoters. This finding reiterates the importance of intelligence sharing as indicated in the literature reviewed (Okwany, 2016; Jaji, 2014). These are representation from

the block and section levels who are the elected leaders and youth members. Ifo refugee camp has 9 sections spread on 108 blocks, Dagahaley refugee camp has 12 sections spread on 139 blocks and Hagadera refugee camps has 16 sections spread on 150 blocks.

4.5.4.4 Relocation of non-Somali and repatriation of Somali refugees

The study also found that there was repatriation of Somali refugees as a measure of enhancing security of Kenya and relocation of non-Somali refugees to Kakuma/Kalobeyei refugee camps as a way of protecting them from insecurity were taking place in Dadaab camps. Respondent KI 3 (Dadaab, 14th December 2020) informed the study that:

“...we have managed to repatriate over 200,000 Somalis from Dadaab camps because this camp [Dadaab] was a source of many insecurities to the nation...”

As such, the government considered repatriation as a measure of dealing with refugees who it claimed that were associated with insecurity. Some interviewees informed that the repatriation was not entirely voluntary as expected, based on the tripartite agreement signed by Kenya, UNHCR, and Somalia. Therefore, in such involuntary returnees, Kenya went against the refugee protection laws it is a signatory to.

What is more, repatriation is a poor way of dealing with insecurity, as it does not deter future offenders. It is an umbrella strategy that assumes all refugees are a danger to national security hence all should be dealt with which is also against protection laws. It also assumes that there will be no future refugee migrations into the country. However, it is worth noting that although this measure would achieve security associated with refugees, it takes away an important human resource and participants in Kenya's socioeconomic development.

Although stakeholders felt that this was a good idea to enhance peace in Kenya, the move of relocating non-Somali refugees created fears to the Somali refugees and looked like discrimination from the GoK and UNHCR. Respondent KI 16 (Dadaab, 21st December 2020) protested:

“All over the world refugees live within towns that border their countries and taking non-Somalis to Kalobeyei and Kakuma is deemed discriminatory. Somali refugees should not be made to feel they are ethnically being profiled and we should not create a policy like that.”

However, UNHCR feels there is no discrimination but misinformation and lack of awareness from Somali refugees on the relocating of non-Somalis to Kakuma/Kalobeyei camps as it was agreed upon by stakeholders as a way of progressive implementation of closure of Dadaab and safe and voluntary repatriation of Somalis to Somalia. UNHCR has indicated that this was part of UNHCR, GoK and other partners Solution Strategy for Dadaab which came in after the tripartite agreement between GoK, Federal Government of Somalia and UNHCR, the protracted refugee situation in Dadaab, Government of Kenya pronouncement that Dadaab camps be closed and high insecurity incidences around the camps or in Kenya. Currently the relocation from Dadaab to Kakuma has been stopped due to COVID-19. Nevertheless, the employment of repatriation measure to create peace is echoed by Nkala (2016); and Wanjala (2016).

4.5.4.5 Reopening of closed border, and innovation in security surveillance

The study found that the closure of the border and withdrawal of security agents manning it were ineffective ways of dealing with cross-border illicit movements (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). Closing the border and withdrawing security had just propagated illicit entry since the border is highly porous. Perhaps the involvement of this strategy was not well thought out by the

government and need to be rethought. Re-opening the border and reinforcing its security will promote legal cross border movements and deter illegal ones. This will reduce the insecurities associated with illegal crossings. The study further found that to enhance security of refugees and host communities hence augment refugee contribution to socioeconomic development of Kenya, government needs to re-open the closed borders to allow cross-border business to take place. This will earn the country revenue, create job opportunities, and minimize youth idleness and radicalization just as was established by World Bank (2016).

4.5.5 Effectiveness of Kenya government measures in fighting insecurity

4.5.5.1 Security amendment laws

The study found that the security amendment laws have given NIS ability to arrest anyone they feel is dangerous to the security of the nation (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 5th January 2021). On the other hand, respondents agreed that the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) supported the work of the National Police to detain terrorist suspects for a period of 30 days thus give time to the investigative agencies to complete investigations. Through the amendment, the study found that NIS had been empowered to deal with insecurity although some respondents affiliated to UNHCR indicated that the laws were to some extent discriminatory as many refugees had been held and tortured for being suspected as per these laws.

Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020); Respondent KI 21 (23rd January 2021, Nairobi) separately argued that "...although the laws were good, they encouraged unconstitutional detention and harassment of refugees." This shows that the laws created room for mistreatment of refugees, which is likely to arise from the earlier analysis in this study that showed that although relevant security measures had

been implemented to avert insecurity cases associated to Al-Shabaab, the measures were ineffective. When security measures are ineffective, security organs are likely to sidestep their mandate while forcing the expected result. This finding could be looked at as the justification of the petitioners' argument in Petition No.628 of 2014 that passing of security amendment laws would promote abuse of refugee rights.

4.5.5.2 Nyumba Kumi initiatives

The study found that the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative was ineffective in addressing its mandate as several terror attacks had happened since its inception. Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) submitted that:

“The Nyumba Kumi program has been promoted greatly by the local administration and NGOs but whether it is effective remains to be discussed. The reported cases of terrorists being hosted in the camps and the illegal arms transit reported in the camps all happened after Nyumba Kumi. It is not known whether the Nyumba Kumi members colluded or were not aware of these crimes.”

The *Nyumba Kumi* initiative was intended to help identify criminals among refugee/host communities, provide early warning on any criminal activity within the host/refugee communities, help host communities and refugees to live harmoniously, and develop trust and confidence between refugees, host communities, and security agencies. These have not been achieved several years after the launch of the initiative.

Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December 2020), concurred that conflicts and lack of civilian-police cooperation still existed among refugee and locals. Respondent KI 7. (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) added that there still exist villages where its youth engage in crime with the knowledge of the *Nyumba Kumi* leaders who do not share that information with the police. The failure of this initiative is attributed to lack of proper leadership, funding, and training for homestead leaders. Additionally, most Somalis owe significant allegiance to their culture and families that they will not disclose any

security information concerning their family members to the police. As such, attaining the goal of this measure is challenged at the operational and socio-cultural level. This finding does not seem to address the concern raised by Leting (2017) on the effectiveness of the initiative thus putting to question its continued application as a security enhancement initiative. Perhaps more sensitization needs to take place to inform refugees and locals of the importance of this initiative.

4.5.5.3 Closing territorial borders with Somalia

The study found that contraband goods are still being sneaked into the country while humans trafficked across the border despite the closed border. GoK is also losing taxation/ revenues due to closure of the border. Respondent KI 2 (Dadaab, 12th January 2021) reported that, “Closing of the border has not achieved its intended objectives as contrabands are still rampant.” Smuggled goods are often taken to court of law or sometimes are burnt since they are counterfeit products that expose public health risk to the local population. KEBS has verified most of goods that come from Somalia are counterfeit product that exposes public health risk to the locals.

This finding is attributed to the activities that followed the closure of the border including reduced surveillance and reduced presence of cross-border security officers, which have allowed criminals to take advantage of the need of cheaper products to border towns on the Kenyan side. As such, the border closure could not bear the expected results. This finding deviates from the expectation presented by past research showing that the closure of Kenyan-Somalia border was intended to regulate refugee and other movements across the border, control human and drug trafficking, reduce contraband goods from sneaking into the country, and control infiltration of arms and light weapons (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012; Ng’ang’a, 2016).

4.5.5.4 Operation *Linda inchi*

The study found that this operation has created peace to some parts of Somalia to a notable extent and improved diplomatic relationships with Somalia. However, a recent maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia worsened the relationship leading to poor diplomatic ties. “Linda inchi contributed to the stability of Somalia’s TG and diplomatic associations between Somalia and Kenya” (Respondent KI 22, Dadaab, 22nd January 2021). Al-Shabaab being an opportunist group that is less equipped cannot thrive on direct battlefield hence the possible reason the operation *Linda inchi* has succeeded inside Somalia. Contrastingly, the study also established that the operation had enhanced the scale of Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya as the militia group tried to fight back by attacking Kenya’s soft spots and the KDF troops in Somalia (e.g., The El-Adde attack) to force KDF to retreat.

This indicates that the militia group aims to attack soft spots as a way of seeking world relevance and recognition to attract funding and international fighters hence its target in Kenya. This finding indicates that the country did not prepare well in terms of securing its territory internally as it launched this operation. However, since internal security should be enhanced by different security organs from the *Linda inchi* team, it can be deduced that the operation was successful as it is meeting its external aggressive mission to some extent. Additionally, Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 6th January 2021) indicated that:

“Cases of attacks from the militia have been minimized with the neutralization of its bases by the AMISOM forces of whom Kenya is party.”

This finding, therefore, disagrees with the previous ones that the operation has not achieved its goals (Botha, 2014; KNCHR, 2014; Lind *et al.*, 2015; Williams, 2018).

4.5.5.5 *Usalama* Watch

The study found that before the *Usalama* Watch, there were sleeper cells in Kenya more organized and dangerous, but the government pursued them through Operation *Usalama* Watch. Since the operation, terror attacks have been witnessed in Kenya, the worst one being the Garissa college massacre. However, the number of attacks has reduced significantly when compared to those that preceded the operation although respondents could not singularly associate *Usalama* watch to these reductions but said the reduction was based on various efforts (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 5th January 2021). The success of this operation could have been associated with the fear it brought among the targets that forced them to share intelligence with security agents on whatever threats they perceived. These findings echo those presented by Botha (2014); Atta-Asamoah (2015) that the *Usalama* watch operation positively contributed to minimizing attacks.

However, although intended for a good course, it was revealed that the operation was not done well in respect to human rights—reports of torture, abuses, and excessive use of force to many innocent Somali refugees were reported. These violations, some respondents submitted, lowered trust between Somali refugees and police. This low trust is influenced by the mishandling and abuse the police did to the innocent Somalis. This finding concurs with Atta-Asamoah (2015) who found that the operation caused abuses that lowered trust in the security agents.

4.5.6 Effect of security concerns Somali on refugee's socioeconomic impact

The study found that the security concerns on Dadaab refugee camps and its host had influenced negative effects towards refugees and refugee camps.

4.5.6.1 Donor Withdrawals

The study found that security issues influenced donor withdrawals, which limited investment to the area hence lowering the tax collected by government. Respondent KI 2 (Dadaab, 12th January 2021) informed that:

“The frequent terror attacks to Kenya and Dadaab area specifically reduced donor funding to Dadaab refugee camps thus lowering or cutting off some taxation opportunities that would generate revenue to the national and county government as well as create jobs and business opportunities to host and refugee community.”

Donors wish to see their donations being put to good and just use but when they hear people, they are donating to engage in crime, they are persuaded to stop donating. Alternatively, the government of Kenya’s persistence calls for repatriation of refugees and closure of Dadaab refugee camp make some donors feel obligated to divert their donations elsewhere. These withdrawals have led to reduced number of refugees and consequently reducing the number and scale of businesses operating in Dadaab to serve the refugees hence the finding. From the literatures in this study, UNHCR Kenya (2020b) indicated that refugees are a burden to developing nations, which makes it easier for government to disconnect with them hence the refoulement calls.

4.5.6.2 Illegal Imports

Respondents indicated that security concerns in the country influenced the reduction in legal importation of commodities like sugar, milk and others from Somalia thus increasing chances of smuggling contraband items into the country (Respondent KI 2, Dadaab, 12th January 2021). This is associated with the closure of the Kenya-Somalia border as a measure to manage infiltration of Al-Shabaab Militia into Kenya, which cut legal and cheap imports to towns near the border. Since the Kenya-Somalia border is highly porous, the limited legal imports opened a door for goods smuggling into the country. This influences the sale/competitiveness of local products; tax

collected on importation of goods and VAT, as well as lead to the sale of unsafe food items to Kenyans and refugees as supported by the submissions of Respondent KI 10 (Dadaab, 11th January 2021). Wanjala (2016) who associated insecurity linked to refugees with contraband goods corroborated this finding.

4.5.6.3 Diminished trust in Kenya's security organs

The study found that the way the security issues are handled among the Somalis negatively influenced the trust the Somalis and other Kenyans had in security agencies. According to Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020),

“The manner in which the Kenyan security agents handle insecurity issues has lowered trust in the country's security agencies because Somalis, both refugees and host communities, are victimized by being branded as terrorists because of their ethnicity.”

This has demoralized against participating in development of Kenya. Additionally, it has influenced some to want to belong to the terror cells as a way of hitting back at the security agencies. This has also influenced their developmental contribution to Kenya. When an individual is victimized or handled unfairly their reaction is to consider the perpetrator as an enemy and devise a way of hitting back or affecting the perpetrator in a manner that they also partake of the pain. This is the reason for diminished trust and joining of terror cells among victimized Somalis. This finding concurs with the one submitted by Atta-Asamoah (2015) that when people are mishandled by security agents their trust in the agents diminishes.

4.5.7 Threats to state security organs concerned with host and refugee safety

The study investigated the threats deterring state security organs from ensuring the safety and security of Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab and several challenges were presented as explained here in.

4.5.7.1 Language barrier and Illiteracy

Illiteracy rates are high among Somali refugees and as put by Respondent KI 6 (Dadaab, 16thDecember 2020) few can speak English and Kiswahili making it difficult to share intelligence or communicate well with hosts particularly non-Somalis. Not being able to communicate well or being illiterate challenges one's ability to detail issues with accuracy to security agents. Their understanding of complex plans is also challenged, and they can easily be told lies about plans and operations that are a threat to security. When security threats occur, they drive away investors, shorten tax options for government, and destroy property and life hence affecting the development of the nation. Therefore, illiteracy and language barrier threaten the efforts by security agents to ensure security hence economic contribution of refugees to Kenya's development. Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) while realising the significance of effective communication refugee-host relationship proposed training on language, which is a measure critical to ensure Somali refugees defeat the language barrier issue that can threaten state security.

4.5.7.2 Poverty and Unemployment

Respondents revealed that poverty and widespread unemployment among the refugees were threats to security organs accomplishing their role of securing the country (Respondent KI 7, Dadaab, 23rdDecember 2020). Poverty and unemployment create people who need a source of livelihood and at the same time are idle populace. This exposes youth to recruitment to violent extremism and terrorist cells to earn a living. often, terror cells target such youths because they are easy to lure and the need to make a life can make them do whatever they are told to earn money that will enable them to escape the problem. This finding concurs with the one submitted by Lind *et al.* (2015); World Bank (2018) in the reviewed literatures.

4.5.7.3 Poor community-police relationship and intelligence gathering

Poor community-police relationship and secrecy of intelligence gathering jeopardize efforts to pursue effective community policing and gathering of intelligence on imminent terror attacks and other crimes (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 28th December 2020). This has been exacerbated by the discriminations and mistreatment that many refugees and some Somali host communities face in the hands of the police/security agencies. The discriminations and mistreatments arise because of the stereotypes refugees and Somalis receive in general that they are terrorists. As established by Okwany (2016), such poor relationship between community and police jeopardised effective intelligence gathering and action that would have enabled the abating of terror strikes on Kenyan soil.

On the secrecy of intelligence gathering, the study found that before 2011, Security agencies kept security information preserved for themselves and not to share or involve civilians in it. This caused an ineffective intelligence gathering system that was often skewed. However, with the many attacks that happened in Kenya, this has changed as intelligence gathering involves civilians at all fronts. Respondent KI 3 (Dadaab, 28th December 2020) reported:

“People just ignored giving intelligence information to security agencies. When they did report insecurity issues, they ended up being suspected as perpetrators. They were asked how they got to know the information and their details taken and the next day the police came to their offices/homes to harass them.”

This discouraged many participating in intelligence sharing with security agencies. They put on a do not care or say-nothing-be-safe attitude.

After 2011, the security agencies realized they cannot do security issues alone, but they require the citizen support. That is why the President of Kenya started a rallying

call “Security starts me and with you.” Since involving the public, many would be attacks have been averted hence the relative peace that the country is now enjoying. Public participation provides early warning system.

4.5.7.4 Marginalization, discrimination, and ethnic profiling

Qualitative data collected shows that many refugees and Somali host communities feel government oppresses them through security agencies to the extent that they feel discriminated and of lesser value to national development (Respondent KI 22, Nairobi, 22nd January 2021). This means that the way the security agents have handled terrorism and Somali ethnic groups is wanting and has made many Somalis feel profiled as terrorists. This also discriminated them to the extent of demoralizing their participation in intelligence gathering. This analysis presents a wake-up call on security agents to change the way they treat Somalis and refugees in Dadaab area to benefit from their intelligence sharing. indeed, this finding concurs with Botha (2014) who indicated that marginalization, ill-treatment, and abandonment threatened peace of Kenya hence refugee’s socioeconomic contribution.

4.5.7.5 Skewed Islamic teachings and Harmful Cultural practices

False teachings, which praise Jihad ideology and radicalize the youth to join violent extremist groups, are the other threats to ensuring security of refugees and host communities. Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 22nd January 2021) quoted that:

“Most idle refugee youths are an easy target for radicalised teachings and recruitments to fighter groups including Al-Shabaab group.”

These teachings promote killings of innocent people for greater gratification and reward in the next life hence make recruits highly motivated to execute terrorist crimes. The teachings also create a foundation for recruitments of future fighters as

they brainwash recruits by indicating that joining terror cells is religiously rewarding. This finding concurs with that by McSweeney (2012) who indicated that radicalization and Jihad ideologies erode the progress made in fighting terror and insecurity as they form a basis for recruitment of terrorists as well as motivate the terrorists to launch attacks.

Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 16th January 2021) also said, “Lack of anti-radicalization forums contributes to the threat to security of refugees and hosts” since there is no measure to counter wrongful belief inflicted during radicalization. Government of Kenya has not given anti-radicalization campaigns sensitization to the Somali refugee youths who are idle and not permitted to travel to other parts of Kenya, this makes them fertile ground for radicalization since they are unemployed. The study further revealed that harmful Cultural practices like FGM and child marriage also threaten security gains as they form some of the gender-related security issues rampant among refugees and in camps.

4.5.7.6 Poor budgetary allocation

Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 22nd January 2021) revealed that the allocation of resources to the security sector is low from the exchequer, and this challenges the ability to implement safety and security measures relevant for the people of Dadaab area. Budget constraints limit government’s ability to invest heavily in equipment and training relevant to fight terror. This, hence, challenges police patrols in camps and neighbouring areas and demotivated many of the officers who feel unsafe since they do not have armoured vehicles but instead use soft body vehicles that can be wrecked by IEDs or landmines. The number of police vehicles blown around the Dadaab

camps by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are nine since 2011 to 2020 with hundreds of Police officers losing their lives (see samples in Plate III and IV)



Plate III: Shell of a police vehicle destroyed by Improvised Electronic Devices

Source: Author (2021).



Plate IV: Shell of a police truck destroyed by an improvised bomb

Plate III and IV show the shells of patrol vehicles that were bombed by IEDs. These soft body vehicles cannot withstand the explosives. This photo was taken on 16th December 2020 by the researcher at the Administration police offices in Garissa. The photos were taken while the researcher was on data collection mission.

Source: Author (2021).

According to Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 22nd January 2021), the

“...lack of armoured vehicles has led some police officers to resign from the services and those who are still working are severely demoralized to an extent they are mentally prepared to go after terrorists without good equipment and organisation.”

This exit and demoralization emanate from the poor working conditions the officers are exposed to due to lack of appropriate facilities caused by low budgetary allocation. However, through the submissions of Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020), the study revealed that this problem is being addressed by UNHCR by boosting the officer's morale through incentives by paying police constables an additional monthly flat rate of Ksh. 9,000, Corporal 11,000, Sergeant 13,000, ASG 15,000, inspector 17,000, Chief inspector 19,000, ASP 21,000, and other senior security teams D1 Ksh. 25,000 to Ksh. 30,000. This support is an indication of the RAD theory at play, as not only the refugees by security agents are given monetary aid for a greater effect to the hosting nation. This finding supports the one presented by Gorman (1986) that most developing countries have rudimentary resources for allocating to their various public sectors and the arrival of refugees overwhelm them.

4.5.7.7 Maslaha System (Traditional courts)

The study revealed that there is a *Maslaha* System of traditional courts where elders solve criminal cases instead of reporting them to the police hence denial of justice to the victims (Respondent KI 20, Nairobi, 26th January 2021). This system threatens security state by relying on the strong pro-patriarchal rules, which are not just to female victims or offenders. often the system is biased and chauvinist hence denying victims the rightful justice, particularly if they are women.

4.6 Challenges Somali Refugees Face in Socio-Economic Development of Host

The third objective investigated the challenges Somali refugees face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya and presented them in the succeeding subtopics.

4.6.1 Social challenges

4.6.1.1 Education status in Dadaab refugee camps

Concerning the education status in Dadaab and whether it gave refugees a chance to contribute to social development effectively, the study established that there were schools set by UNHCR (in partnership with the government) to cater for educating the Somali Refugees in Kenya. According to Respondent KI 11 (Dadaab, 13th January 2021) and verified by the researcher's observation, there were a total 102 schools in the refugee camps comprising of ECD, primary and secondary. This finding show that at least basic education infrastructure was available for refugee use. Given the importance of education towards unlocking people's ability, talent and skills, the finding show that relevant measures had been put in place to equip refugee learners so that they can effectively participate in the development of Kenya. The study further found that education was considered the most critical tool for refugee response to socioeconomic development and for protecting the youth from activities and practices that are backward and/or harmful. Respondent KI 16(Dadaab, 7th January 2021) said,

“Refugees who are educated are highly productive to the country [Kenya] as they engage in various economic activities including employment and wholesale businesses...in the same way, educated youths are difficult to radicalize or recruit to terror groups.”

Thus, this finding concurs with (Nganga's, 2016) submissions.

4.6.1.1.1 Education attainment by Somali refugees

The average education attainment by Somali refugees in Dadaab is indicated in the table 4.26.

Table 4.26: Average education attainment of Somali refugees

	Count	Percent (%)
Primary Certificate	104	37
Secondary Certificate	83	29
None	75	26
Degree	10	4
Diploma	9	3
Postgraduate degree	2	1
Total	283	100

Majority (37%) of Somali refugees have Primary certificate as their highest education attainment, 29% have secondary education certificate and 26% have no education. Primary and secondary certifications are just basic education steps and do not equip one with job-specific skills relevant to give one a cutting edge in the job market. Those who have post basic education are 4%-degree, 3% Diploma and 1% have postgraduate degree. Data (Appendix I on page 341) provided by UNHCR's education officer indicate that out of all refugee children who enrol in primary schools, only one third progress to secondary school. All the others drop out after primary education. Some even fail to finish primary school (see Appendix I table 3 on page 342). This could be associated to practices like FGM, child labour, child marriages, and recruitment into terror cells, which encourage learners to drop out. These findings concur with those presented by Ng'ang'a (2016) that many learners attend primary than secondary school and that the number of learners reduced as the level of education increased.

However, the finding that majority of refugee learners do not proceed to tertiary institutions presents a worrying situation because it indicates a future generation that

will not be adequately qualified to take up certain jobs (particularly those that require higher education attainment) similar to the case established in the literatures by UNDP (2018); ACAPS and NPM (2018). To correct this, UNHCR in partnership with GoK and other stakeholders have come up with various strategies that aim to advance education attainment in Dadaab refugee camps and its environs.

The Education in Emergencies framework is one such strategy that gives support on basic education (Primary and Secondary) while also supporting and facilitating Scholarship programs currently being run by Danish Refugee Council, Windle Trust international, and UNHCR to Secondary school leavers to get a certificate, a Diploma, or a bachelor's degree. Additionally, UNHCR strives to build a broader partnership with other Universities, Satellite Campuses, Dadaab Borderless Higher Education for refugees with Kenyatta University, York University, and other Universities in Canada. Other scholarship from *Wisconsin Scholarship Hub* (WiSH) and the DAFI (Albert Einstein German Academic Refugee initiative) scholarship program that offers qualified refugee and returnee students the possibility to earn an undergraduate degree in their country of asylum or home country (Respondent KI 16, Dadaab, 21st December 2020). This brings efforts to better refugee lives through higher education opportunities. This finding indicates that the concentration of refugee education is not only limited to basic education but is also concerned with equipping refugees with post-secondary education. However, these scholarship opportunities demonstrate that the lack of high education among refugees is not because of unavailability but due to other reasons of which cultural practices (rites of passage) are the most prominent.

4.6.1.1.2 School going children by age and gender

The study investigated the primary school going children by age and gender and established the result in table 4.27.

Table 4.27: School-going children by age and gender

Age	Boys	Girls	Sum
6 to 13 years majority (70%)	12,125	9,974 (46%)	22,099
13 to 15 years few (30%) (Primary school)	(54%)		(100%)

Source: Author (2021).

Majority (70%) of the primary school going children are aged between 6 and 13 years old while 30% are between 13-15 years old. Gender wise, 54% of the school goers are boys while girls are 46%. Respondents informed that these numbers drastically fall as the learners' transit to secondary school. Respondent KI 11 (Dadaab, 13thJanuary 2021), indicated that:

“Many girls than boys drop out after primary education but on average only half of the primary school attendees proceed to secondary school.”

This indicates the vulnerabilities of girls as a group expected to contribute to the development of Kenya. However, the skills development for all genders comes in handy to bridge the gap and enable those not well educated to acquire skills for the job market. This finding also concurs with Ng'ang'a (2016) who submitted that many boys than girls attend primary school and that many girls than boys attain secondary education.

Still on education, the study found that the education crisis experienced recently in Dadaab was affecting refugees hence their contribution to the country's socioeconomic development. Due to insecurity, Kenyan teachers who were non-Somalis left teaching in schools in the communities around Dadaab camps. Respondent KI 11 (Dadaab, 13thJanuary 2021) further stated that,

“...104 Kenyan teachers’ who were non-Somalis have left host community schools in Dadaab Sub County due to terrorist deliberate target towards them. The schools are being manned by a few host community teachers who are Somalis thus the workload for teachers have increased tremendously.”

This has created a huge workload for the available teachers hence compromising the quality of education offered to refugee and host community children.

This finding concurs with Refugee Consortium of Kenya (2012) who established that access to quality education in refugee camps is unmet. As it stands, every teacher is responsible for over 100 learners with only one-third of the teachers having teaching qualifications. With Covid-19 and shrinking emergency funding, education budgets continue to reduce affecting critical areas such reducing number of teachers, school suppliers, education infrastructure, transition and national assessments and certification of refugee learners. Ratio of teachers to pupils in Dadaab is one teacher for 107 pupils (Respondent KI 11, Dadaab, 13th January 2021).

Respondent KI 11 (Dadaab, 13th January 2021) further delivered that insecurity is affecting the Dadaab refugee camps negatively in terms of teacher attraction from other parts of Kenya. Less than 10% of Dadaab teachers are trained and qualified which further adds on to the likelihood of poor-quality education. This is a result of two main factors including insecurity situation in the area and Government pronouncement of closure of camps at Dadaab informed by cross border security issues. Due to these factors, UNHCR was unable to attract prerequisite funding and qualified teachers from other parts of Kenya to come and work in Dadaab.

Respondent KI 12 (Dadaab, 17th December 2020) added that:

“...in case you attract a teacher, the cost becomes expensive, accommodation, logistic and other security concerns.”

The host community face the same problem of attracting teachers as like the refugee's schools. This means that the problem will be dire soon (for both refugees and host communities) hence the breed of refugee learners given to the market will not be adequately qualified. This finding concurs the one presented by UNHCR (2016) on how insecurity had caused high teacher turnover from the region.

4.6.1.2 Refugee skills and benevolent support

The investigation into whether Somali refugees have adequate skills to perform formal jobs and whether they depend on benevolent support yielded the results in table 4.28. (0=I don't know; 1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly Agree).

Table 4.28: Refugee skills and benevolent support

	Somali refugees in Dadaab have adequate skills to perform formal jobs	Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others/organizations	Dependence on benevolent support challenges refugee socioeconomic contribution
N	369	370	369
Mean	2.52	3.18	2.40
Std. Deviation	.900	1.585	1.003

Source: Author (2021).

The findings show that Somali refugees have adequate skills to participate in formal jobs (Mean=2.52; SD=0.900). The Mean of 2.52 out of a scale of 5 shows that refugees had 2.52 times skilled which is just average (based on the scale used). This shows that although refugees had acquired skills, the skills were just average hence not highly adequate to enable refugees attain a higher competitiveness. This finding is linked to the fact that majority of the refugee youths do not access higher education which would open their ability to access formal jobs that require higher education. This finding departs from what was presented in the literatures that refugees dropped

out of school prematurely which led them not having adequate skills to undertake future formal jobs (UNDP 2018). Although the findings indicate that refugees are skilled to take up formal jobs, earlier findings on their economic activity indicated that very few are formally employed, perhaps because many of the formal jobs require higher education learning which many refugee youths do not have. As such, youths with formal skills but low education attainment may be forced to fight for the few informal jobs available. This could be one of the reasons for the thriving informal industry in and around camps.

The finding that refugees have adequate skills despite the low education qualification indicated in earlier findings on this objective show that the youth engaged in a skill acquiring session even though they had dropped out of school. The study found the YEP to be responsible for equipping refugees with skills even after dropping out of school. Respondent KI 18(Dadaab, 8thJanuary 2021) indicated that refugee youths normally enrol in the YEP to acquire skills and knowledge useful to enable them access job opportunities or/and start their own businesses. This therefore bridges the gap created by the low education that most of the refugees have as demonstrated in the findings of this study.

Majority of respondents agree that Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others/other organisations (Mean=3.18; SD=1.585) just as was indicated by Abdi (2008). This mean further indicate that refugees were 3.18 times likely to depend on benevolent aid while the standard deviation shows that the dispersion between those likely to depend on aid and those least likely were slightly high at 1.585. Asylum seekers across the world are considered vulnerable, as they do not have sustainable engagements or economic activities that can earn them adequate income to

facilitate access to basic needs. Additionally, refugees are restricted in terms of access to employment opportunities, which disadvantage them. As such, many of them depend on aid to survive hence the finding. Among the Dadaab refugees, they receive the aid in form of cash vouchers as indicated by Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020)who submitted:

“Refugees are given a relief aid voucher dubbed ‘Bamba Chakula’ whose worth is Ksh 500 to 600 per month per head to use to purchase approved food items that are Sorghum, beans, and oil.”

Majority of respondents disagree that dependence on benevolent support challenges refugees’ socioeconomic contribution to Kenya (Mean =2.40; SD= 1.003). The level of disagreement is 2.4 times as indicated with the mean which shows that among the majority of respondents, dependence on benevolent aid could only challenge refugees’ socioeconomic contribution by 2.4 times. This indicates that even though refugees depend on aid, it does not prevent them from participating in socioeconomic development of the host nation. This is associated with refugees’ alternative income generating activities like remittances and economic activities, which are used to supplement refugees’ access to basic needs hence giving them ability to contribute to socioeconomic development of Kenya. This finding disagrees with Abdi’s (2008) findings that dependence on aid, which was commonly inadequate, discouraged refugees in participating in the country’s socioeconomic development.

The table 4.29 indicates the social factors that challenge Somali refugees to contribute socioeconomically to the development of Kenya. (**Scale used: 0=I don’t know; 1=Strongly Disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Agree; 4=Strongly Agree**).

Table 4.29: Government neglect

	Somali refugees face Government neglect	Somali refugees in Dadaab are stereotyped/profiled ethnically
N	370	370
Mean	2.18	2.41
Std. Deviation	0.922	1.227

Source: Author (2021).

Majority of respondents disagree that Somali refugees face government neglect (Mean=2.18; SD=0.922). This means that the government has not neglected Somali refugees but rather takes care of them. Thus, this finding agrees with the one presented by (Ng'ang'a, 2016) that host government has a big responsibility to play concerning the protection and management of refugees. During the feasibility study, the researcher observed that Dadaab camps have government facilities that provide services to refugees including government schools, medical facilities, government offices like the immigration (RAS) department, and security organs. All these government service provision functions offer evidence that government has not neglected the Somali refugees in Dadaab. This finding shows that government neglect is not a factor to affect refugees' socioeconomic contribution to Kenya.

Majority of the respondents also disagreed that Somali refugees in Dadaab are stereotyped/profiled ethnically (Mean=2.41; SD=1.227) which is contrary to what Lind *et al.* (2015); Okwany (2016); Jaji (2014) and (Mukira, 2016) established—that Somalis are profiled/stereotyped ethnically as terrorists. Further, the key informants indicated that stereotypes were initially held among most Somalis where locals considered any of them as a terrorist. However, when some Somalis defended non-Somali Kenyans from terror attacks in Mandera and the information publicized in various media stations, the stereotype reduced significantly. This is because the locals

felt that not all Somalis are terrorists and that most of them, like the ones who saved them are pro-life even to the non-Somalis. As such, the non-Somalis learnt that the stereotypes were baseless and stopped them. This was evidenced in the position held by Respondent KI 21 (Nairobi, 23rd January 2021) that:

“Non-Somali Kenyans have also learnt that stereotypes don’t help the fight against terror...”

4.6.1.3 Refugee stereotypes and participation in socioeconomic activities

The study investigated how stereotyping Somali refugees as terrorists influenced their participation in socio economic development of Kenya. The findings collected show that when refugees are stereotyped to be terrorists, it is very disadvantaging to them as individuals and as a group as it denies them various opportunities and puts them at a risk of attack to the extent that this affects their involvement in socioeconomic development of the nation. Several respondents noted that when Somali refugees are stereotyped to be terrorists, it causes hatred between them and the local communities leading to the locals giving wrong intelligence to security agents about refugees (Respondent KI 22, Nairobi, 22nd January 2021).

in some instances, the study found, that commotions and conflicts arising from misunderstanding between refugees and host communities have led to security organs falsely arresting and accusing refugees of causing terror. Additionally, the security agents have publicized such misunderstandings as terrorist acts, which have driven away investors from the region. For instance, one respondent elaborated that:

“Some doctors, teachers, and other professionals ran away from an area in Dadaab due to insecurity arising from police mishandling a small disagreement between a refugee and host community leader,” (Respondent 62. 2020. Additional explanations of quantitative responses, Dadaab).

Such acts, the study found, led to strict restrictions being offered to refugees and that these restrictions deterred or minimized refugee involvement in socioeconomic

development of the host nation. This finding agrees with the summary given in the literatures that stereotyping refugees was a source of [perceived] criminality (Kagwanja, 2000; Jaji, 2014).

The study also found that being stereotyped as terrorists had affected refugees negatively in all aspect of their social and economic life. For instance, refugees and their children could not access higher learning institutions, were denied job opportunities, were profiled as dangerous and harmful to others, were mistrusted, and handled with suspicion among other mistreatments. These treatments demoralized them (refugees) to the extent of affecting how they participated in socioeconomic development activities of the nation (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020). The stereotypes were directed towards Somali refugees due to fear towards them caused by the allegations and untrue messages that generally portrayed the refugees as terrorists and a danger to their neighbourhood. This demoralized refugees because majority of them were peaceful as has been indicated in earlier findings of this study. Demoralized refugees had a negative effect on socioeconomic development, as they feel offended by the host communities and nation who are the perpetrators of the stereotypes.

Additionally, the mistreatments refugees went through denied them access to important services/documents. For instance, Respondent KI 19(Nairobi, 21stJanuary 2021) indicated that:

“...the mistreatments experienced by refugees denies them access to identification documents that would allow refugee traders to travel to Garissa town for replenishing essential commodities for their businesses.”

This reduced the refugee contribution to development of Kenya, as taxes the traders would have paid are lost, loss of employment opportunities and increased inflation in

the local economy. This finding is associated with the public opinion native communities had towards Somali refugees in Dadaab, which determined how the various government agencies perceived and treated (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Lind *et al.*, 2015; Okwany, 2016).

At a national level, the study found that when refugees are stereotyped as terrorists and this information is broadcast to the public, it influences the creation of policies that disadvantage refugees (Respondent KI 20, Nairobi, 26th January 2021). For instance, when kidnappings took place in Dadaab camps and along the coastal counties bordering Garissa County, the government started contemplating on the refoulement policy even though (the refugees feel) no evidence was found to associate them to these events. One respondent complained,

“The kidnaps were not caused by refugees but as a result refugee movement in Dadaab was made stricter to the extent that some refugees wished to go back to their country despite the political instability there,” (Respondent 31, 2020. Additional comments in the questionnaire).

The restricted movement was implemented and enforced by the security organs in the camps and as one respondent indicated, many youths suffered because of this restriction.

Additionally, a repatriated refugee would have no development contribution to the host. Similarly, the restricted movement denied many youths who worked far from the camps access to their workstations hence limiting access to finances that they would use to support their families and create a better people. All these findings can be associated with the public opinion formed from the stereotype as indicated (Atta-Asamoah, 2015).

4.6.1.4 High prevalence of FGM and child marriage cases

The study established that majority of the refugee women aged 10-49 years had undergone FGM while half of all the women aged 18 to 24 years and a third of the boys aged 18 to 24 years got married before they attained 18 years of age, which is the consent year in Kenya. This finding concurs with Mitike and Deressa (2009) who established that refugee girls underwent FGM practice. However, the finding differs on the age group since the current study established that Somali refugee women underwent this practice when they were older than women in Somali refugees in Ethiopia.

Nevertheless, this risky practice negatively affects development of refugee women, as they affect their education and economic contribution to national development similar to the finding by Kimonge (2011). Most Somali refugees follow their traditional culture and due to low illiteracy levels as indicated elsewhere in this study are unable to adopt modernity over their culture even if it is harmful. This is the justification for high FGM and child marriages among them. Noteworthy, the fact that refugees continue undertaking traditional practices that are harmful to women and children in a country (Kenya) that has outlawed the practices means that implementation of the laws against gender-based violence is poorly done in refugee camps. Perhaps, an area the government needs to investigate to arrest such practices.

The researcher was informed that FGM was rampant in Dadaab camps because it is easy to procure the services. Respondent KI 16 (Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020) stated:

“I have been informed there are abundance of traditional circumcisers in the refugee camps that charge refugees Ksh. 500 per girl, Ksh. 2,000 for host community, Kshs. 5,000 for others within the country and Ksh. 10,000 for Somalis from the Diaspora.”

Clearly, the service was available as per the amount of money one was able to pay. No doubt, this attracted many to the camps for the service. The study also established that the practice was rampant business thriving in camps to prevent detection by security teams. Girls from all over the host communities were brought in the camps for this heinous act. The traditional circumcisers performing the practice were found to be supported by quack pharmacist or chemists who administer anaesthesia and inject tetanus jabs to girls who are circumcised. This plays a role in further enhancing trust in the practice as well as concealing it.

Although this is a horrific ordeal for the girls, the host and refugee communities see it as a sign of maturity for the girls; fulfilling religious rites/obligation, and a means to control girl's sexual desires thus preventing sex before marriage and marital infidelity. The proponents of FGM fail to appreciate how it affects the girls' future. It was substantiated that:

“Female genital mutilation (FGM) is a very sensitive and harmful cultural practice connected to Islamic religion and rampant in the camps. Due to this reason, no humanitarian organization in Dadaab is addressing this issue directly. FGM is the worst human rights violation that happens in Dadaab refugee camps,” (Respondent KI 20, Nairobi, 26th January 2021).

The practice is a cultural practice because it is considered as a rite of passage to adulthood. This finding also confirms the one submitted by Mitike and Deressa (2009) who agreed that the circumcisers are traditionalists, and that culture and religion were catalysts to the practice not to mention the finding that the practice was perceived as a rite of passage.

The study also found that child marriages do happen between the host and Somali Refugees in Dadaab similar to the finding by Mitike and Deressa (2009). Child marriage is more common for girls than boys. It happens due to the following reasons:

- as result of fulfilling religious obligations, protecting, or preventing families from shame of the girls getting teen pregnancies, concealing teenage pregnancies, desire to get dowry and bride price, peer pressure and Men believing young girls have cleansing power, as a sex tool for old men and for maintaining their age to look young (Respondent KI 14 & 15, Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020). As such, children married at an early age are unable to continue with schooling and post-primary/secondary education that allows acquisition of skills for the job market hence unable to stand on their own. This brings up people who are less empowered to offer positive socioeconomic contribution to Kenya.

These gender-based violations are also indicated in the literatures to be associated with refugee camps and its environments. UNHCR (2010) indicates an instance in DR Congo where similar gender-based violations associated with refugees occurred. Although FGM is not indicated as one of the violations in the literatures, an upcoming violation affects refugees in Kenya as has been revealed.

4.6.1.5 Human rights abuses/violations

There are documented and undocumented human rights abuses of the host community and refugees mostly by the Kenyan Police including detention of refugees—often due to a lack of awareness or illiteracy— on suspicion of being a terror sympathizer or being one of them. This happens with disregard to the rights accorded to refugee or registration cardholders (Respondent KI 20,Nairobi, 26thJanuary 2021). Before 2011, Police and Kenya security team abuses to Somali refugees were unknown until the increased cases of terrorism happened when cases of indiscriminate beating and torture became common. Most captives were freed after presentation in court or mediation by organizations like the Refugee Consortium of Kenya.

Respondent KI 20 (Nairobi, 26th January 2021) further informed that:

“Human rights violations do happen to refugees by law enforcement agencies. These include forced extortions, harassment, and bribes towards refugees in the pretext of enforcing the law for those refugees lacking the proper documentation of asylum certificates/appointment slip, proof of registration with details of family members and their photos, refugee identity card issued by Refugee Affairs Secretariat or movement pass.”

These abuses are general and against the human rights laws. These violations are executed by demoralised security agents owing to how they are attacked or caught off-guard by terror attacks. As such, the demoralised security officers find it easy to stereotype all Somali refugees, which leads them in engaging in the backward human rights violations. These abuses demoralize refugees from making positive contribution to the development of Kenya and instead encourage their involvement in acts that are against the Kenya state like not cooperating with the security agents through such acts like withholding intelligence on imminent attacks and/or enrolling in terror cell groups as has already been indicated.

Sometimes, the host community perpetrate abuses towards refugees including sexual and gender-based violence (like domestic violence, defilements, sodomy, rape assault, denial of resources within a family, female genital mutilation, and child marriage). These affect refugee contribution to the development of Kenya as well (Respondent KI 4 (Dadaab, 15th December 2020). The abuses create a negative perception refugees have towards host populations and country hence influencing them (refugees) to feel demotivated to participate in positive socioeconomic development of Kenya.

Child labour is also another rights issue common in the refugee camps. Sometimes poverty pushes families to send their children to labour at the expense of their education. Such children engage in roles like shoe-shining, firewood collection, working in the hotels as waiters, and engaging in recycling of plastic and scrap metals

for sale. This disadvantages the children's access to education and challenges their future productivity as indicated by UNHCR (2010) by limiting their contribution to the development of Kenya.

The findings about the human rights violations are similar to those presented in the literatures where refugees faced numerous human rights violations like harassment, intimidation, abuse, police-round ups, and haphazard arrests of refugees (Yarnell & Thomas, 2014). These violations go against the provided laws including the Kenya constitution (2010) and the UN General Assembly (1948) charter that prescribe the protection of refugees and prevention of any forms of rights violations. The findings therefore show a gap in implementation of the provided protection laws among the perpetrators of the abuses.

4.6.1.6 Health Crisis

Refugees have contributed to the improvement of the health sector in Dadaab as indicted in section 4.4.3.6 on page 189. However, their large numbers and unpredictable increase to the refugee camps have collectively overstretched the national health system, as demand for health services is high than the supply. This has put pressure on the health workforce in the understaffed government health facilities. Health personnel employed in government funded hospitals outside Dadaab camps usually seek transfers to other relatively conducive areas or even seek greener pastures by joining UNHCR funded health organizations including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Dagahaley, Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) in IFO and international Rescue committee (IRC) in Hagadera (Respondent KI 10,Dadaab, 11thJanuary 2021; Respondent KI 14,Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020). Thus, this causes an inadequate health personnel crisis for host community most of the time because of the high

turnovers. This challenges effective health care to host communities and refugees who cannot access the few UNHCR supported health facilities in camps. These unreached refugees are often stricken by disease outbreaks like Polio, Cholera, and Measles because they are unvaccinated as they come in.

The health crisis also opens the door for smuggling fake drugs and substance into the country, which endanger the lives of refugee and host communities. Since the available health facilities are not adequately equipped to handle the large numbers of refugees and host communities in Dadaab, a gap of unreached populace is available, which opens demand for smuggled and cheap drugs and services from quack clinicians. What is more, the prevailing insecurity and porous border points in Kenya have seen the mushrooming of fake chemists and pharmacies that purport to provide health services, which they are not qualified or certified by the Kenyan government to offer. The illegal chemists/pharmacists also act as a conduit for dispensing smuggled drugs and substances. An unhealthy population (whether of refugees or host communities) is a risk to local and national socioeconomic development.

These findings concur with the finding that refugees exert additional pressure on the health systems of a country (Betts, 2009; Francis, 2015) of which the effect is dire for a developing country like Kenya. However, it is critical to note that the Kenya government is required by the international laws which it has ratified and local laws like the constitution to offer adequate healthcare to refugees and hosts alike. Therefore, the finding indicates the gap in the healthcare system that ought to be addressed to meet the policy requirements provided in the said laws.

The study further investigated the things the government of Kenya was doing to address this crisis and the findings gathered revealed the following factors.

Response to the health crisis

- There is coordination of cross border disease surveillance between Kenya and Somalia via the partnership of Alight formerly known as American Refugee Committee. This group gathers data on diseases common across the Kenya-Somalia border and advice respective governments so that the countries can affect measures to deal with the diseases hence curb spread of the same (Respondent KI 10, Dadaab, 11thJanuary 2021). This reduces pressure that would have been piled on the healthcare system as the diseases are dealt with before they occur through such measures as vaccination and quarantining suspects.
- investigating and responding to existing disease outbreaks by the coordination committee including Sub County Administrator-County Government and co-chaired by Deputy County Commissioner, Medical officer of Health, UNHCR and other development partners reduces pressure on the healthcare system as well. There is also available the rapid response team to address any disease outbreaks identified. The team includes the Disease surveillance officer, Public Health officer., Laboratory Personnel, Health Promotion officer, Data officer, Clinician, Nurse, and Development partners. These bodies research and identify diseases among refugees that could harm host communities and address them to contain their spread and effect on the nation and healthcare facilities. Through this pro-active management, the government can minimize pressure piled on the healthcare system in the region.

4.6.1.7 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

According to Respondent KI 7 and 8 (Dadaab, 5th and 6thJanuary 2021),

“Dadaab is the transit hub for small arms and light weapons including pistols, light machine guns, sub-machine guns, and rifles.”

These weapons are transported from Somalia and are brought into Kenya via the porous border points, sometime concealed inside a car, sugar, rice, milk, and oil products. Al-Shabaab normally tax such weapons that end up in Kenya and depend on this tax for their operations. Al-Shabaab sees the ferrying of small arms and light weapons (SALW) into Kenya as part of their longer strategy to destabilize Kenya, ensuring illegal weapons are in the hands of unauthorized citizen.

Previously it was believed that Al-Shabaab smuggles into the country small arms and light weapons for immediate attacks to the country, as was the case in Westgate and Garissa College. However, this finding shows that the smuggling of weapons into the country is for a long-term purpose. The intention here is to smuggle into the country as many weapons as possible into the hands of civilians such that in future the civilians will use the arms to destabilize their country. No wonder the recent media reports that indicate increased number of guns among civilians, increased crime, and higher gun (weapon) usage rates among civilians (Muindi, 2019; Alpers & Picard, 2021). Dadaab refugee camps play a key role to the militia group’s attainment of this agenda, as it is a safer temporary storage and smuggling route that is difficult to detect.

Al-Shabaab feel aggrieved against Kenya State because Kenya supports stabilization of Somalia state through the Federal Government of Somalia, Gedo region and Kenya has inflicted heavy losses to them via Kenya Defence Forces under AMISOM. The weapons are off-loaded at the Dadaab refugee camps as the smugglers look for/find a willing buyer from Kenyan towns including Garissa, Wajir, Moyale, Marsabit,

Samburu, Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Isiolo, Mandera and sometimes Nairobi.

According to Respondent KI 8 (Dadaab, 6th January 2021), the consequence of these SALW to socioeconomic development comes in these ways: (1) The insecurity caused by use of these arms drives away investments, causes loss of lives and inflicts harm to Kenyans. (2) The arms are used to commit criminal acts like poaching, and thuggery, which destabilize the environment for investment and good social cohesion. (3) The arms are used to threaten or attack government officers enforcing taxation and security measures. (4) If not controlled and managed, Respondent KI 7 (Dadaab, 5th January 2021) added that the smuggled weapons will be used to destabilize the country (which is Al-Shabaab's end goal for Kenya). These findings are similar to what was earlier indicated that refugees were a source of arms smuggling in Kenya (Campbell, 2006; Verdirame & Harrell-Bond, 2005; Ng'ang'a, 2016). This finding rebuts the defence by UNHCR and like-minded stakeholders who uphold that refugee camps are not an arm smuggling point.

4.6.1.8 Closure of Liboi border

Although the closure of the Liboi border to Somalia should have denied refugees access to legal and cheap food and non-food items that were initially traded across the border from Somalia as (Ng'ang'a, 2016) indicated in the literatures, the study found that refugees still access these goods but illegally. The study established that the porous border allows the goods to be smuggled into the country hence denying KRA revenue it got from these goods as import duty. The smuggled goods deter refugees from buying Kenyan goods, which denies the country revenue (VAT) and kills local industries and job opportunities created by these industries. Additionally, the

challenge these smuggled goods pose to refugees' health is dire as they are poor quality standard goods. Although no research has associated these smuggled goods to health issues, respondents speculate that the food is unsafe, and its effects will be felt years later (Respondent KI 1, Dadaab, 12th January 2021).

Border controls and security ensures that all goods crossing the borders are safe, taxed, and controlled so that they do not flood the market over local goods. This increases the pricing of imported goods to a level that is closer to local goods. However, the absence of those controls due to lack of cross border security management, goods smuggling thrives and since they are not exposed to relevant taxation and checks, they are cheaper and attractive to many consumers, which explains the finding.

The study additionally found that the closure of the border had fuelled terrorism financing since Al-Shabaab had taken over the control of all routes where the smuggled items pass to whom the smugglers pay tax (Respondent KI 23, Dadaab, 13th January 2021). One notable fact about the closure of the border is that it was followed by withdrawal or limiting the number of security agents positioned to watch over the border. As such, this exacerbated illegal trade fuelled by the militia from which the group collects tax. The militia group then uses this tax to finance their activities and Kenya is one of the soft spots often hit. If the borders were well manned, then the quantity of illegal trade across the border would be minimal if not non-existent. This would cut the taxation the militia group collects from the illegal cross border trade hence limit or dent its operations. The effects of the terror activities to refugees and host community are evidently negative to Kenya.

Concerning how the militia groups manages to collect its tax, the study was informed through Respondent KI 5 (Dadaab, 8thJanuary 2021) that:

“Al-Shabaab own trade routes or small corridors for goods and items to pass. The routes have barriers that collect illegal revenues and tax, which is then used to finance their operations. The group charges a tax of USD 1,500 to 3,000 for every vehicle transporting smuggled goods to Kenya.”

The militia group also facilitates free movement of buyers, traders and businesspersons and women to Mogadishu, Kismayo and other business towns where they can source the goods to smuggle and back to their destination. Al-Shabaab also offers cash transportation services for the Hawalas based in Dadaab camps into Somalia to earn revenue. This intricate revenue collection method is one of the common ways through which the group acquires financing. With this benefit, the group would not want peace to be regained in Somalia so that they can continue being relevant, which is one of the reasons why they strongly attack Kenyan operatives and citizens. This finding is also in concurrence with the one submitted by Kiama and Karanja (2013) that the withdrawal of manning officers at the closed border with Somalia has caused the smuggling of goods and weapons into the country which Thomson Reuters Foundation (2017) indicates are used to commit crimes (weapons) and deny the country of VAT.

4.6.1.9 Illegal acquisition of vital documents

Due to the encampment policy, many refugees feel restricted to move or denied the freedom to freely move. As a result of the restriction, the study realised that many illegally seek and acquire documents that enable them escape camp life. Respondent KI 3 (Dadaab, 14thJanuary 2021) indicated that:

“A few months ago, some refugee youths who were born in Kenya were denied applying for National IDs and as a result, they got them through corrupt means. Currently they are employed as casual workers in Garissa.”

This leads to vital documents including birth registration certificates, national identity cards and passports being acquired illegally by thousands of refugees through dubious means in collaboration with host community and State officials who have been corruptly induced with bribes ranging from Ksh. 50,000 to Kshs. 200,000.00 for a national identity card, which opens access to Government services (Respondent KI 3, Dadaab, 14th January 2021).

The study found that with protracted refugee situation in Dadaab, donor fatigue to support the refugees and limited resettlement opportunities there has grown a new trend of rich Somali refugees who deliberately register their new-born babies as Kenyans by falsely obtaining genuine Kenyan birth certificates from Garissa and as far as Wajir and Mandera Civil Registration offices via a network of brokers/cartels at a fee ranging from Kshs 3,000 and Kshs. 5,000 within a day while the rest of Kenyan Somalis wait for a month or months (Respondent KI 3, Dadaab, 14th January 2021). Additionally, as evidence of the rampant illegal acquisition of identification documents meant only for locals, Respondent KI 6 (Dadaab, 16th December 2020) gave a scenario of several cases where people were denied their national identity cards through the Ministry of interior or courts after establishing that the IDs were acquired illegally, and that the person/people are refugees from Somalia.

By having these documents, the refugees can access services similar to Kenyan citizens including freedom of movement and working anywhere in the country hence escape the limitations encamped refugee's encounter. However, this brings about competition for the already pressurized resources with the locals who should be the rightful beneficiaries hence indirectly challenging the host community's contribution to Kenya's development. Additionally, this competition may create unfair inequality

where refugees who access aid and other relief advantages still compete with locals for opportunities. The result would disadvantage locals compared to the refugees. The finding agrees with the findings of the investigation done by NRC and IHRC (2017); Weitzberg (2019) that indicated that illegal acquisition of national identification documents thrived among refugees. This then presents a gap in implementation of available policies to deter or minimize any such illegal document acquisitions.

4.6.1.10 Limited freedom of movement and lack of business permits

The study found that limited freedom of movement hinders socio-economic development of refugees (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020) similar to the submissions by Betts *et al.* (2018). Respondent KI 15. Further indicated that:

“All refugees including businesspersons and women are subjected to get movement pass from the Refugee Affairs Secretariat led committee.”

The committee has a lengthy bureaucratic process, and its officers are accused of seeking bribes, sexual favours, and harassment from applicants. Through Refugee Act Section 17 (f) and Section 25 (f), a refugee who moves outside refugee camp/s without a movement pass, (which is an authority from the Refugee Affairs Secretary) commits an offense. This has restricted refugee movement and many rights-based organizations advocating for refugees' rights. This law is considered unconstitutional according to the 2010 constitution of Kenya Article 39 (1) and international Human Right Charters and Principles that permit free movement unless critical issue permit.

While the refugee movement restriction within Kenya affects all refugees, this approach could have been carried on individual-by-individual case manner than a blanket restriction. The movement pass has a time limit and many of the businesspersons and women are forced to cut short of their business trips before the expiry date of their movement pass thus raising the cost of doing business, narrowing

profit, and making commodities and service prices to be higher in refugee camps. High cost of doing business leads to fewer businesspeople, which translate to lower taxes for the government, fewer job opportunities, and poor people, which are a burden to the state of Kenya. One respondent was quoted saying,

“All movement passes are processed and approved at the Dadaab Sub County Headquarters under the leadership of Refugee Affairs Secretariat with an oversight from the Dadaab Sub County Security Team. Refugees are forced to travel from the camps, come, and seek this service here thus incurring fare cost, food, and beverage cost. Again, they are forced to pay illegally from KES. 15,000 and KES. 40,000 or else their request is rejected” (Respondent KI 20, Nairobi, 26th January 2021).

4.6.1.11 insecurity

The study found that insecurity challenges the safety of people, property, and businesses in camps and its environs, which affects how they participate in socioeconomic development (Respondent KI 8, Dadaab, 5th January 2021). When a threat to national security takes place, its effects include loss of refugee revenue strains from job/business that are lost due to the security threat, deformed/disabled bodies and or loss of lives arising from the attack. These challenge refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya by denying them the economic and physical capability to effectively do so. This finding is in concurrence with the many literatures that indicated the effect of insecurity in this study (e.g., Okwany, 2016; Wanjala, 2016; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017 among others).

4.6.2 Economic Challenges

4.6.2.1 Commodity and rental costs, investment, and employment opportunities

Table 4.30 shows the findings on how prevailing commodity prices, rental cost investment and employment opportunities challenged refugees' economic contribution.

Table 4.30: Commodity prices, rental cost, investment, and employment opportunities

	Prevailing commodity prices challenges Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development	Prevailing rental cost challenges Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development	investment into the area employment opportunities challenge Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development	Available employment opportunities challenge Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development
N	366	370	363	366
Mean	1.92	2.22	2.00	1.78
Std. Deviation	1.020	1.022	0.942	0.918

Source: Author (2021).

The study found that majority of respondents disagree that prevailing commodity prices challenges Somali refugees' contribution towards economic development (Mean=1.92; SD=1.020). The mean show that the prevailing commodity prices had a 1.92 chance of challenging refugees' contribution to socioeconomic development. Based on the scale used, this is a low effect hence the consideration by majority. This study's finding is associated with the relief aid that refugee receive which limit their dependence on sold commodities. This minimises the influence of commodity prices to their economic undertakings hence the finding. The finding disagrees with Buscher and Heller (2010) who advanced that high commodity prices was one of the things challenging refugees. Elsewhere in this study, it was revealed that refugees contribute towards lowering commodity prices. The low prices cannot therefore be a challenge since they are appreciated by refugees hence the finding.

Prevailing rental cost was also found not to challenge Somali refugees' contribution towards economic development in Kenya (Mean=2.22; SD=1.022) contrary to the findings of Buscher and Heller(2010) who indicated that rental costs challenged

refugees although the case used was of urban refugees and not encamped refugees. The mean of 2.22 based on a scale of 5 shows that prevailing rental costs only have a 2.22 times chance of challenging refugees' contribution to economic development of Kenya. This finding is attributed to the fact that refugees stay in temporary shelters in camps for which rent is not paid. As such, the prevailing rental costs do not affect their socioeconomic contribution to development in Kenya.

The study found majority to disagree that investment into the Dadaab area challenged Somali refugees' contribution towards economic development (Mean=2.00; SD=0.942). The mean shows that investment into the Dadaab area only had a 2.00 times chance of challenging refugee contribution to Kenya's development which is below the average (based on the scale used) hence the finding. Since investment into the area was high due to influx of refugees, it had created opportunities and not challenges as has been revealed in the findings of this study. This is the justification for investment not being a challenge to refugee participation in development of Kenya. This finding agrees with that presented by World Bank (2019) that investment into an area inhabited by refugees did not challenge refugee contribution to economic development.

Majority disagree that available employment opportunities challenged Somali refugees' contribution towards economic development. Available employment opportunities only had a 1.78 (out of 5) chance of challenging refugees' contribution to the development of host (Mean=1.78; SD=0.918). This finding could be associated with the finding that arrival of refugees was linked to increased employment opportunities, which, being positive effects, do not challenge but promote participation in economic development through enhanced incomes that are used to

better the lives of refugees, invest in businesses, and upon which tax is paid to the government. Thus, the finding also concurs with World Bank (2019) who indicated that employment opportunities were not a challenge to refugee participation in the host's economic development.

4.6.2.2 Wages, economic activities, inflation, and buying power

The study also investigated how prevailing wages, available economic activities, prevailing inflation, and people's buying power challenged refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. The table 4.31 shows the findings.

Table 4.31: Additional economic challenges to socioeconomic development of Kenya

	Prevailing wages challenge Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution	Available economic activities challenge Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution	Prevailing inflation levels in Dadaab challenge Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution	Refugees' buying power challenge their contribution to socioeconomic development
N	370	370	370	370
Mean	1.91	1.84	1.88	1.64
Std. Deviation	.887	.759	.982	.993

Source: Author (2021).

Prevailing wages do not challenge Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution to development of Kenya since the wages only have a 1.91 chance (out of the possible 5 chances) of challenging the development (Mean=1.91; SD=0.887). As already presented, Somali refugees in Dadaab accessed remittances and relief aid which cushioned them from the effects of lowered wages. Additionally, refugee influx into Dadaab had caused an increase in wages for employees to the area since it is a

hardship area. Thus, increased wages are more promotive than restrictive to participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. This finding departs from the widely known evidence in the literatures that indicate how refugee arrival was associated with lowered wages, which were restrictive to their participation in development (World Bank, 2006; Dustmann *et al.*, 2008; Dustmann *et al.*, 2013).

Majority of respondents disagreed that available economic activities challenge Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution (Mean =1.84; SD=0.759). The mean indicates that the available economic activities had a 1.84 chance of challenging socioeconomic development in Kenya while the standard deviation show that the views given by respondents were not significantly dispersed. This finding is associated to three factors— (i) Refugees have several economic activities they are involved in as indicated earlier in this study findings. (ii) Dependence on aid (benevolent support) make it inconsequential the reduction of available economic activities and (iii) Refugees increased economic activities (not reduction) which is not expected to challenge participation in socioeconomic development. These factors justify why majority of respondents disagreed that available economic activities challenged refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. The finding concurs with World Bank (2019).

As to whether inflation in Dadaab challenged Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution to Kenya, majority disagreed (Mean=1.88; SD=0.982). The mean shows that chance of inflation challenging refugees' socioeconomic development of Kenya was 1.88, which was low based on the scale, used indicating that majority of the respondents were not challenged. Certainly, inflation failed to challenge refugee participation in developing Kenya because they depended on aid for their basic needs.

Additionally, the prevailing inflation in the region, as presented elsewhere in the findings of this study, was not high to affect refugee participation in development of Kenya. This finding was contrary (in part) to the one presented in the literature review chapter that showed that influx of refugees was associated with enhanced inflation but agreed in part with the finding that inflation was not high to challenge refugee participation in host development (UNHCR Standing Committee, 1997; Miller, 2018).

The study also found majority to disagree that reduced refugees' buying power challenged their socioeconomic contribution to Kenya (Mean=1.64; SD=0.993). This finding indicates that refugees' buying power did not challenge their involvement in socioeconomic development of Kenya. This is associated with dependence on benevolent support, which limits refugees' purchase. This finding is like that by Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (2010) who indicated that peoples buying power in refugee areas was not restrictive.

4.6.2.3 Lack of electricity

Apart from Hagadera refugee camp, the study showed that all the other Dadaab refugee camps (IFO and Dagahaley) are not powered by electricity, which challenges refugees' effective participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). Lack of electricity denies refugees the comfort of engaging in businesses that require use of electric power hence limiting the quantity of economic contribution to development refugees would have if they accessed electricity. Lack of electricity also reduces security—particularly at night, which threatens safety of businesses as well as safety of critical human resource, which should be used in developing host nation. This finding corroborated the submissions by UNDP (2018).

4.6.2.4 Limited freedom of movement and lack of business permits

The study found that lack of business permits hinders socio-economic development of refugees. Respondent KI 15(Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020) said,

“Many refugee traders have to play hid-and-peek with the administrative authorities because they run their businesses without permits. This affects the refugees negatively.”

These submissions concur with the ones submitted by Betts *et al.* (2018). Business permits legalize the businesses refugees engage in without which they are harassed by security agents and extorted or forced to close their businesses, which affects their ability to create jobs and revenue important for use in development activities. Additionally, by paying the licences required to acquire the permits, the businesses contribute to the development of Kenya since the taxes collected in terms of the permit levy is used by the government to develop the country.

4.6.2.5 Inadequate market and poor set up

There is a shortage of market space in Dadaab refugee camps and given that refugees have no land, which they can use to generate wealth, trading is their key economic activity. The shortage of market space has raised the cost of doing business, scramble for the little available space, high commercial rental costs, limited taxation opportunities for county and national government and limited employment opportunities. Additionally, the available markets are poorly constructed, temporary, and have poor sanitation. The markets in refugee camps are made of iron sheets, which are not durable in the long-run and allow penetration of heat during a sunny day. This is uncomfortable and risky for perishable items as they easily get spoilt hence lost revenue that would be put to good use by refugees (Respondent KI 21,Nairobi, 23rdJanuary 2021). This finding confirms that the arrival of refugees

increases the demand for market space just as was indicated by UNDP (2018) and that if the space is not increased, many businesses get locked up.

The study further found that this market setting is unplanned with poor sanitation blocks that form a waiting time bomb for cholera. The market and its traders are usually affected by fire/arsonist almost yearly, which causes wastage and losses. The market is also a health and safety hazard as power generators and private powered lines are scattered on top of the iron sheets which is risky to people and property (Respondent KI 21, Nairobi, 23rd January 2021). During the data collection exercise, the researcher observed with concern that the people in the market were disregarding the COVID-19 protocols of hand washing, sanitation, and social distancing which is also another time bomb. These factors limit refugees' ability and businesses to be productive as desired hence the challenge posed on the socioeconomic development of the country.

4.6.2.6 Lack of Islamic compliant banking products

in Dadaab, Equity Bank is the only formal bank that operate yet it does not provide Islamic compliant banking products that allow business-borrowing, purchase of assets etc. (Respondent KI 23, Dadaab, 13th January 2021). With the missing of such banking products, most of the businesspersons and women who are refugees shun away from Equity Bank, which only provide commercial loans that are strictly prohibited by the Islamic faith which Somali refugees profess (Respondent KI 21, Nairobi, 23rd January 2021). This means that Islamic Somali refugees keen on following the Sharia law are unable to access capital from banks with which to start or boost their businesses. This limits the number of businesses refugees operate as well as cuts their revenue sources, which reduces the taxes, paid to the Kenya government, and the jobs that would have

been created with adequate access to financing. The finding concurs with Brekke (2018) who also established that refugees in Norway shunned conventional banking products and as a result failed to access loans from such institutions for development.

4.6.2.7 Loss of donor confidence and budget support for refugee operations

According to Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020), Dadaab refugee operation is currently facing funding challenges and is least funded compared to Kakuma/Kalobeyi refugee camps. Across all the sectors Education, Health, Protection, Water, Food, non-food items among others, Dadaab operations funding has been reducing by 20 to 30 percent and its effect on relief shortage expected to last 2 or 4 years. The first sign of funding constraint was felt when UNHCR closed Kambioos refugee camp on 31st March 2017 and the IFO 2 on 3 camps on 1st May 2018. According to Respondent KI 14(Dadaab, 17thDecember 2020):

“The two refugee camps were having lesser refugees per camp (than the threshold for UNHCR standard for setting a camp) thus not financially prudent to maintain bearing in mind the limited donor funding.”

The study also found that the international Community and donors were having funding fatigue with protracted 30 years refugee situation in Dadaab refugee camps (Respondent KI 17,Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020). The unending global wars leading to large population displacement and refugees in countries like Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya etc. have been prioritized over the Dadaab refugees who have been there for longer. As such, food ration, teachers, and health workers were reduced due to funding constraint. To substantiate the reduced donor funding, Respondent KI 12 (Dadaab, 17thDecember 2020) observed that in 2012 there were 42 agencies providing a myriad of services and in 2021 there are only 19 agencies providing humanitarian services.

The study presented that Government of Kenya restriction of refugee operation environment for those humanitarian organizations in the Dadaab refugee camps also caused donor withdrawal. According to the agencies interviewed these restrictions together with delayed processing of work permits for expatriates contracted to support refugee operations and delayed tax waiver for essential goods and items were silent policies that donors were not needed and that the camps needed to close. This led some funders and humanitarian organizations to wind up operations in Dadaab and/or scale down and concentrate on Kakuma/Kalobeyei refugee camps. Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020) asserted:

“The Government of Kenya is silently shunning away from the Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camps. UNHCR’s mouth is gaged and cannot publicly come out to challenge silent policies that keep pushing these vulnerable refugees.”

Additionally, other humanitarian agencies are keeping quiet fearing to lose UNHCR funding and government targeting their operations and personnel. Now in Kenya Somali refugees are alone exposed and only God is with them.” Additionally, the frequent calls by the Kenya government for closure of the Dadaab camps also drives away donors whose aid is limited to encamped refugees. This showcases the needy situation that Somali refugees are in, and which significantly affects how useful the refugees would be to the development of Kenya.

Limited donor funding reduces relief aid to refugees hence challenges their ability to participate effectively in socioeconomic development. It limits refugees’ ability to save and invest, increases possibility of joblessness as investments to Dadaab are taken away, increases chances of conflict with host communities resulting from scramble for resources and livelihoods and increases idle youths who are prone to engage in crime all which affect refugees’ socioeconomic development of Kenya.

These findings concur with Fakhri and Marrouch (2015) who indicated that the modern world of limited resources is challenging for future sustenance of refugee hosting.

4.6.2.8 Smuggling of goods and merchandize

The study found that Smuggling of goods and merchandize deprives the country of taxation and revenue opportunities and kills local industries and market producing similar products to the ones smuggled into the country. The contrabands are also cheaper than locally supplied goods hence cannot compete successfully (Respondent KI 17, Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020). As earlier established in this study, the smuggling of merchandize thrives with the porous border, which is unmanned by Kenyan forces. This finding concurs with the earlier one that goods are smuggled through the porous Somalia-Kenya border, which deny the country an important source of, tax e.g., VAT (Kiama & Karanja, 2013; Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2017).

Smuggling of contraband goods including sugar, rice, fake milk products, drugs, and substances etcetera. also pose a health risk to consumers, as the goods are not checked for quality standards. Thus, besides loss of revenue and job opportunities, the contrabands also cause a security threat, which indirectly affects development in Kenya. This occurs because when refugees are unhealthy due to consumption of poor-quality goods, their effective participation in socioeconomic development is challenged.

Smuggled goods and items also fuel terrorism because they are taxed by Al-Shabaab to fund their terrorist actions in Somalia and neighbouring countries (Respondent KI 17, Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020). The study further established that the high cost of

Kenyan goods fuelled the smuggling of merchandize into the country. Respondent KI 17, opined that:

“Counterfeiting and smuggling goods into Kenya is not a refugee problem but a market issue which will continue as long as Kenyan goods continue to be expensive than smuggled goods even if the border was manned and Dadaab refugee camps closed. Customers tend to buy good and items that make a cost-effective sense. This reflects the failure of Kenya’s economic policies which do not promote the production of cost-effective goods compared to her neighbours—i.e., Somalia.”

On the side of the government, the study established that Smuggling is dealt with in several ways: (1) Prevention measures where there is border control, surveillance and monitoring through multi-agency team comprised of Kenya Defence forces, Kenya Revenue Authority, Immigration department, Rural Border Unit, National intelligence Unit, Anti-terror Police Unit, and General Service Unit. This team ensures that no contrabands access the Kenyan market unless due process is followed. (2) Response measures where smuggled goods are destroyed through fire with or without a court order (see Plate V and VI on page 278 and 279); Arrest and prosecution of perpetrators through a court process to determine confiscation of properties, fines, and jail terms for the perpetrators.



Plate V: Preparation for destroying smuggled goods

Source: Author (2021).



Plate VI: Destruction of Smuggled Goods

Plate V shows officials of local administration, police, and national government preparing to destroy a consignment of illegal sugar imported from neighbouring country. Plate VI shows the burning of contraband sugar. This photo was taken by the researcher on 20th December 2020 in Dadaab.

Source: Author (2020).

4.6.2.9 Money laundering rackets through for Hawalas/Forex bureaus

The study established that there are seven major informal banking systems in Dadaab refugee camps such as Dahabshiil, Touch, Barwaqo, Iftin, Amana, Amal, and Juba Express that do 'genuine' business with most Somali refugees and their kin in diaspora (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). When asked whether it was possible for the informal banks to engage in money laundering, Respondent KI 23 (Dadaab, 13th January 2021) informed that the institutions were accused of money laundering of millions of shillings to Kenyan market spaces and other countries and continue to damage the healthy growth of Kenyan economy as well making Kenya to get bad financial reviews internationally, as the country is considered a transit hub as well as destination of ill-gotten wealth in the horn of Africa. What is more, the Hawalas were accused of evading tax charges from Kenya and were a conveyor belts for sending, passing, and receiving financial support to Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and other violent extremist groups through proxies.

By acting as legal financial transfer institutions, these informal banks acted positively by being conduits through which refugees received remittances from abroad and exchanged foreign currency for local one. This enabled refugee to effectively invest locally hence contribute to the development of the nation through creation of businesses that pay tax or employ others, and for supporting their families. However, by acting as money transfer agents to non-terrorists and terrorists alike, the informal banks act negatively as they take away resources that could be used to develop Kenya. Additionally, they deliver to terrorist's funds that are then pumped into promoting terrorist activities just as was reported by Financial Action Task Force (2013), which are detrimental to the country.

These findings brought on board new evidence of the significance of these informal banks to the survival of Al-Shabaab. Although these institutions were licenced to deal only with legal transactions, they were found to secretly engage in transporting remittances to Al-Shabaab operatives, which is against the Kenyan law, and the study revealed that such transactions were more lucrative to these informal banks. This opens a window for the Kenya government to justify its suspicions about the institutions, which were racketeered to conceal all tracks by government agencies. This calls for enhanced implementation of anti-money laundering and anti-terror laws.

4.6.3 Environmental Degradation

The populations in Dadaab bear the brunt of environmental degradation associated with refugee influx. The vegetation and trees have been cleared to provide land to build houses for refugees, create graze lands for refugee livestock kept under proxies, offer-building materials and for firewood or charcoal burning. This causes degraded environment, loss of ecosystem and conflict between the refugees and neighbouring host communities due to fight for the available resources including wood, building materials, pasture, and water (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18th December 2020) noted:

“...refugees use almost 99% charcoal and firewood for domestic cooking and commercial purposes which are locally sourced.”

This attracts a higher demand for trees from refugees and host communities, which even leads to increased cutting of trees for charcoal and firewood hence a dire environmental concern. Additionally, some indigenous trees are uprooted by refugees for medicinal value, and others cut for wood cutlery, cups, cultural and artistic purposes making the rate at which trees are cut to be alarming and in future will lead to serious climatic change, hazards such soil erosion and floods, diseases, drought and

hunger to the host communities whose livelihoods depend on the trees—since they do not receive relief aid as refugees do and are in a non-arable land hence solely depend on the trees for a livelihood. This is a direct challenge to the nation as it affects future socioeconomic state of the host communities and Kenya at large because the degraded environment affects climate, which affects the entire country. This finding is in concurrence with the findings by GVEP international (2016); Bettset *al.* (2018); Martin, 2005; Energy and Environment Technical Working Group (2018) that refugees contribute to environmental degradation.

The fact that refugees are prohibited to cut trees, yet no alternative fuel sources is provided leads to a bigger problem as they play hide and seek in felling trees without any plan of planting new ones. Additionally, the trade in firewood and charcoal is rampant as the demand for these commodities in refugee camps is high (Respondent KI 3, Dadaab, 14th December 2020). This threatens the relationship between refugees and the host government where refugees consider host government unnecessarily restrictive to the refugees' wellbeing. This is likely to affect how in turn the refugees are positioned to contribute positively to the development of the country. The poor relationship is a trigger to engagement in acts that harm the hosting nation.

On the other side, Refugee, Reconstruction, and Development Organization (RRDO) is working with UNHCR to mitigate the environmental impact of refugees with measures such as tree planting initiative, food forest and supporting the development of stove production and energy saving Jikos. However, the scale of this change is slow and might not fully make the environment to recover on time. The cost UNHCR uses to support RRDO is 10 million on annual basis of which 5 percent (KES. 500,000) is for tree planting which, as Respondent KI 3 (Dadaab, 14th December 2020) informed, is

insignificant when compared to the scale of devastation of the environment done by the refugees in Dadaab Refugee Camps. This therefore means that the negative effect that refugees pose on the environment is likely to be outdated—if the tree growing practice is sustained.

Such an initiative as this was not known across the country as it is less publicized, yet it is a critical initiative of reforesting Dadaab region that is associated with refugee management organisations. Without refugees, perhaps, such initiatives would not have arisen. Many arid areas in Kenya do not access such privilege of afforestation from similar organisations. Thus, this initiative is significantly associated with refugees in Dadaab.

4.6.3.1 Poaching of wild animals

There are reported cases by the host community that Somali refugees are using guns and arrows to poach Giraffes (for meat and skin), Ostrich (for meat and eggs), and antelopes (for meat and skin) for home and commercial purposes. It was found that some of the wild animal products are sought after because of their medicinal value. This affects Kenya's environment negatively as it destroys the national heritage, distorts Kenya's natural habitat, and threatens future livelihoods that would depend on the wild animals. It was also found that refugee poaching had. This has created conflict (to a small extent) between the host community and the refugees as the host community accuses some refugees of poaching 'their' animals.

The poaching activities have also justified the government's need to repatriate Somali refugees as it forms a good reason for considering them as a threat to national security (Respondent KI 3, Dadaab, 14th December 2020). The shrinking donor funding particularly to Dadaab refugee camps, which has affected the quantity of relief aid

given to refugees, the lack of employment and idleness among refugee youths, has heavily affected refugees hence forcing them into engaging in the poaching activities. This finding concurs with Wanjala (2016) who also associated refugees in Dadaab with poaching. The fact that the issue of poaching was highlighted by a 2016 study yet persists indicates a gap in having or implementing measures supposed to end it. This study will therefore aim to give recommendations supposed to address this to minimise its effects of the nation.

4.6.3.2 Restriction on livestock keeping

The study revealed that the main traditional livelihood for Somalis is livestock rearing for milk, meat, skin/hides, and ghee production. The local and national governments have restricted this practice in Dadaab refugee camps, which undermines the culture of many Somalis. As a result, some Somalis keep livestock among host communities through proxies, which is illegal (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

inability to keep livestock has seen many Somali refugees sell part of their relief food to purchase items like milk and meat hence committing an illegality because relief food should not be sold. The sale of relief food leaves some refugee families with less than enough food for their own consumption hence challenging their ability to save or invest which affects Kenya's development. The huge refugee influx from Somalia also caused a high need for milk and meat from the hosting communities, which increased the cost of these products in the region because supply was limited similar to the finding submitted by Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (2010). This lowers the finances available at disposal for refugee's use in investments and saving and affects local economy hence affecting the development such refugees pose on Kenya.

4.7 Strategies for Enhancing Socio-Economic Contribution of Refugees to Host

The fourth objective of this study investigated the strategies for enhancing the socioeconomic contribution of refugees to host community. The findings gathered are presented in the following subtopics:

4.7.1 Cultural/traditional activities

The cultural activities refugees engage in were investigated and the study found celebrations to be the main tradition practiced among the refugees in Dadaab. The study revealed that Somali refugees cherish their culture and even in refugee camps celebrate important occasions as defined by their culture. The occasions include wedding celebrations, birth of new-borns, circumcisions, Islamic holidays, and other national holidays. In these celebrations' banquets are prepared, music and dance done, and gifts shared. One key goal of these celebrations is bringing Somalis together and inviting the poor (whether refugees or host community) to come celebrate with those who have (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). As such, these celebrations act as an informal social network that connects Somalis together and takes care of the vulnerable in society just as was indicated by Gesthuizen *et al.* (2009) in the literatures. As such, the celebrations contribute to protecting lives hence easing the burden of poverty on refugees.

4.7.2 Effectiveness of Refugee Management Policies

The effectiveness of refugee management policies in enabling refugee involvement in socioeconomic development was investigated and findings presented in Table 4.32.

Table 4.32: Effectiveness of refugee management policies

Strategy	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Refugee management policies promote refugee integration and settlement	370	2.48	1.067
Refugee management policies available in Kenya promote refugee participation in socioeconomic contribution	370	2.60	0.938

Source: Author (2021).

Majority of respondents disagreed that refugee management policies promote refugee integration and settlement (Mean= 2.48; SD=1.067). The extent to which the policies promoted refugee integration was 2.48 times (slightly below average). The standard deviation indicates that the dispersion between the responses was slightly high, thus the views of the majority and minority were significantly different. This finding means that Kenya lacks a refugee management policy that allows refugees to be integrated and settled fully into the host community. Kenya's immigration policy has perceived refugees as a security concern rather than a group that can pose positive socioeconomic development to the country hence the lack of a relevant immigration policy to integrate them. This is confirmed by the way refugees are handled in Kenya, whereby they are restricted within camps and denied national identification documents that can enable them to move freely across the country. Having refugee management policies that enhance integration would settle refugees quickly hence give them adequate environment to be productive socioeconomically to Kenya. The finding concurs with Bevelander's (2016) note that many host countries fail to have policies that promote refugee integration.

The Garissa integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISED), a project meant to enhance livelihood opportunities for the refugees and host-communities in

Garissa County is expected to bridge the inherent policy gap. This marks the beginning of a paradigm shift in which the socio-economic needs of both refugee and host communities will be addressed through concerted efforts and collaborative partnerships. The national government, development partners and foreign missions including EU, USA, and UN agencies, backs this development plan. This plan is a negotiated document among all stakeholders as stated by Respondent KI 15 (Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020) that:

“GISED P which is a culmination of a series of informal and formal discussions we had with the national government and development partners is structured within 8 thematic components that are aligned to our CIDP II and is premised on the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework that Kenya is a signatory to.”

The plan will focus on reducing legal, regulatory, and administrative obstacles to business development and refugee economic inclusion, as well as enhancing sustainable management of environment and natural resources to boost agriculture. It will also focus on creation of sustainable energy solutions and strengthening management and administration in the health sector. The project will also be expected to strengthen provision of water and sanitation as well as improvement of roads and infrastructure in the county. This will change with Kenya developing specific strategies and policies of how to benefit socio-economically from the existence of the refugees. It was Kenya’s interest to have a policy that allows people to capitalize their capacities and skills in the community thus tapping unique skills (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18thDecember 2020).

Additionally, it is a policy failure from the government of Kenya to distinguish those refugees that need assistance and those with skills to work and contribute to the socio-economic development of host community and nation at large. Narrow-minded immigration policies are designed and skewed. However, Comprehensive Refugee

Response Framework, which Kenya has signed with UNHCR, ideally changes the previous setting mode to support refugee integration with the local economy, which is a change of tact previously employed by UNHCR and other agencies funding refugee relief assistance. These will ease pressure from the host community, enhance refugee self-reliance, and expand access to third country solutions, supporting condition in the country of origin/return to safe and with dignity (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020).

Even though this policy may not benefit Somali refugees when it is implemented (because the government has announced the need to repatriate them and close the camp), it will be useful for including other refugees and appreciating their socioeconomic contribution to the country. This will increase the positive effect these refugees have on the host nation as well as make it easier for the Kenya government to recognize and appreciate the same hence reduce the perception of refugees as a burden.

The finding of Mean=2.60; SD=0.938 show that majority of respondents agreed that refugee management policies available promote (to a small extent) refugee participation in socioeconomic development in Kenya. Despite the weakness in the policies ability to integrate refugees, the policies are positive in enabling refugees contribute socioeconomically to the host development although not comprehensively. This means that these policies allow refugees to engage in activities that are directly or indirectly contributory to the development of Kenya.

This finding can be linked to earlier findings of this study where refugees can engage in businesses and employment within the camp area as well as receive remittances, which are taxed by the government and create jobs for refugees and citizens. This is

like what Bevelander (2016) presented although he remarked that such contribution can be enhanced when the policies are made friendlier. On the case of this study, the policies need to be made friendlier since their influence is to a small extent. What is clear about the refugee management policies as revealed in the study is that the policies allow participation in socioeconomic development but disallow integration and settlement within the host nation.

4.7.3 Education offered is adequate for socioeconomic development

Table 4.33 shows results of whether the education offered to Somali refugees allows the acquisition of skills and knowledge.

Table 4.33: Education allows acquisition of skills and knowledge

Strategy	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Education offered to Somali refugees allow them to acquire relevant skills and knowledge	370	2.71	0.919

Source: Author (2021).

Majority of the respondents agreed that the education offered to Somali refugees allows them to acquire relevant skills and knowledge to participate in socioeconomic development (Mean=2.71; SD=0.919). Out of a scale of 5, the education offered to refugees had a 2.71 times chance of equipping refugees with relevant skills and knowledge. This finding seems to consider the education from ECD to YEP college where learners acquire job specific skills to perform jobs. Although the study established that most refugees do not go beyond basic education, the introduction of the Youth Education Pack (YEP) enhanced the skills of most of the refugee youths.

Respondent KI 18 (Dadaab, 8thJanuary 2021) indicated that the YEP equips refugees who have not gone beyond primary and secondary school with skills that give them a

cutting edge in the employment and entrepreneurship world. The findings show that refugees had been offered opportunity to access education that would be useful in developing them to acquire relevant skills and knowledge for socioeconomic development of Kenya. Education is a right in the local and international laws hence in offering it, UNHCR and its partners followed such. This finding concurs with Ng'ang'a (2006); Muhammad and Abdulmajeed (2018) who indicated the significance of education in enabling refugees access skills that enable them to participate in socioeconomic development.

4.7.4 Existence of Social networks that promote socioeconomic development

As to whether there existed social networks that promoted socioeconomic development of refugees to the host nation, the findings in table 4.34 were collected.

Table 4.34: There exist social networks

Strategy	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
There exist social networks that promote socioeconomic contribution of refugees	370	2.75	0.988

Source: Author (2021).

The study found majority agreeing that there exist social networks that promote socioeconomic contribution of refugees (Mean=2.75; SD=0.988). The small standard deviation shows that the responses given were not significantly dispersed hence reliable while the mean shows that the social networks had a 2.75 times chance of promoting socioeconomic development but not to a very high extent. Social networks offer social protection to people by sharing basic needs hence giving them a soft landing in times of need. This creates an environment where one is not overwhelmed by life's problems hence the peace of mind to participate in socioeconomic

development of the hosting nation. This finding disagrees with that presented by Putnam (2007) that refugees diminished interest in social networks.

The study found that there are associations and groups in Dadaab that support different interest groups including the economic activities like farming, animal milk traders, livestock, general traders, and shop owners/traders. These groups' goal is to ensure refugee co-existence and trade with host community to support their (direct or indirect) contribution to the welfare of the host community and the nation at large. The groups target refugees, farmers & traders in refugee camps, and the host communities and engage in various activities including resolving disputes and conflicts, offering revolving funds to members, and in selecting committee members to present their interest in agencies providing or supporting livelihood and resilience programs (Respondent KI 21, Nairobi, 23rd January 2021).

The groups also support members who are affected by fire/arsonist in their businesses with a pool of a voluntary money contribution from members as well as raise refugee/host community grievances, challenges, and recommendations with the UNHCR and other development partners and Government agencies (Respondent KI 21, Nairobi, 23rd January 2021). These factors indicate that these groups main intention is to offer safety nets and social protection for refugees and host communities to thrive and have normal livelihoods. As such, the social networks cover a collection of protection activities to its members, all which are aimed at stabilizing them so that the beneficiaries can effectively contribute to the socioeconomic development of Kenya. This finding concurs with the finding that indicated social networks offer safety nets that are critical in enabling all refugees lead better livelihoods (Whitaker, 1999; Gesthuizen *et al.*, 2009; Benos & Kammass, 2018; Feldmeyer *et al.*, 2019).

4.7.5 Trust, economic resources, and secure environment

The table 4.35 shows the strategies for enhancing the socioeconomic contribution of refugees to the Host communities.

Table 4.35: Impact of trust, economic resources, and secure environment

Strategy	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
There exists trust between host and refugees which promotes socioeconomic contribution	370	2.70	0.950
Refugees are equipped with relevant economic resources that allow participation in socioeconomic development	370	2.51	0.905
Somali refugees are protected to allow a secure environment in which they contribute to socioeconomic development	370	2.87	0.925

Source: Author (2021).

The study also found that there exists trust between host and refugees which promotes socioeconomic contribution of refugees to the host nation (Mean= 2.70; S. D=0.950). The findings were not significantly dispersed while trust had a 2.70 chance of promoting socioeconomic development of the host. Respondent KI 17 (Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020) further added that, "...99% of host community trust the refugees." Somali refugees are trusted because they share same ethnic group, religion, and culture to majority of the host communities. Trust between refugees and host is the foundation for acceptance, good cooperation, and sharing of socioeconomic space where host community members can share, employ, or transact with refugees without fear. As such, when refugees cooperate with locals, share information, and transact with each other harmoniously, they direct their energies towards socioeconomic development rather than on things that kill development. The fact that there is trust between refugees and locals despite the earlier findings in this study that showed that refugee and host populations conflicted due to scramble for resources and poaching,

indicate that the extent of the conflict is minimal and does not affect trust between the two populations.

This finding concurs with Fajth *et al.* (2019) who indicated that trust was a major determinant of refugee acceptance and assimilation into the host, which then enhances their socioeconomic contribution.

The study further established that Somali refugees are equipped with relevant economic resources that allow participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya (Mean=2.51; S.D. = 0.905). This is based on the earnings received from the economic activities that refugees have and remittances, which range from USD 50 to USD700 a month as indicated in the findings of this study. This finding indicates that refugees will not have any resource-related conflict with the hosts that would jeopardize refugee contribution to socioeconomic development of Kenya. This analysis therefore concurs with Fajth *et al.* (2019) who submitted that availability of adequate resources was critical towards socioeconomic contribution of refugees and eliminates conflicts with hosts on resources.

Majority of respondents agreed that Somali refugees are protected to allow a secure environment in which they contribute to socioeconomic development (Mean =2.87; SD=0.925).Based on the mean and in comparison, with the other variables indicated in table 4.36, protection to provide a secure environment was the greatest variable influencing refugees' socioeconomic development of Kenya (mean of 2.87). One of the goals of encampment was to offer protection to refugees. Since Somali refugees in Dadaab had been encamped, their affairs were handled by UNHCR together with its partners and they felt well protected. As such, the refugees felt that the environment they were in was free from major deterrents to socioeconomic development of Kenya,

which then promoted the said development. Protection offers refugees a secure environment within which refugees can effectively deliver socioeconomically to the host nation just as was upheld by Kiama and Karanja (2013).

4.7.6 Opening border points and creating new markets

Respondents argued that opening of Kenya-Somalia border points would promote regulated free-flow of goods and services, which would then impact Kenya socioeconomically. The cross border free flow of goods will enhance refugees' access to cheap and legal commodities, which they can sell to local communities thereby creating jobs, offering safe commodities to the local population, as well as allow refugees export Kenyan goods to their kin in Somalia (Respondent KI 27, Dadaab, 14th January 2021). Free flow of goods and services across the border opens businesses' opportunities for refugees and host alike, hence the finding.

The study also found that development of existing markets and creation of new market for refugees to conduct their trade activities would enhance refugees' contribution towards Kenya's socioeconomic development (Respondent KI 2, Dadaab, 12th January 2021). Creation and development of markets offers an opportunity for trade activities among the refugees, which on implementing provide a source of revenue for the country (through taxation), a source of employment for refugees and locals. This concurs with the findings of Whitaker (2002) that increased markets increases trading opportunities for refugees.

4.7.7 Infrastructural development

The study established that having the best infrastructure also boosts refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya (Respondent KI 15, Dadaab, 18th December 2020). Good infrastructure availability promotes movement of goods

and people hence opening the area for trade activities, reducing the cost of transportation and communication, which leads to reduced commodity prices. These effects in turn earn the country revenue and jobs for refugees and its people. Infrastructure also promotes communication nationally and internationally hence allowing refugees request remittances from their kin. This also benefits the country. As such, the study informed that government should promote and support the improvement of infrastructure. This would support local economies and reduce local inflation. This finding agrees with that submitted by the Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (2010) that investments in infrastructure are beneficial to refugees and host communities because the development opens business opportunities that develop the local economy (Betts, 2009; Francis, 2015).

4.7.8 Positioning refugees according to capabilities/skills

The study further found that differentiating and allocating duties to refugees according to capability was suitable to allow enhanced refugee contribution to the development of Kenya. Kenya must distinguish those refugees that need assistance and those with skills to work and contribute to the socio-economic development of host community and nation at large (Respondent KI 17, Dadaab, 21stDecember 2020). By making this differentiation, the host nation will allocate skilled refugees' duties where they can use their knowledge and skills to create a positive impact on the nation while assisting those without skills to acquire preferred skills for further deployment. This will create a refugee population that is well equipped to positively influence the host country. This ensures Refugees' different capacities and skills are tapped by fellow refugees and host communities for socioeconomic development. However, for this to succeed, the integration laws must be put in place, clearly detailing how refugees can be engaged in the host country. This finding presents new knowledge as no previous

studies have revealed that differentiating refugees based on skills can enhance socioeconomic impacts to the host. This finding is in concurrence with Muhammad and Abdulmajeed's (2018) argument.

4.8 Chapter Summary

The chapter has presented the findings and discussions attached to them. The chapter has revealed that refugees pose positive and negative socioeconomic impacts to the host country just as is indicated in the RAD theory. The issue of refugees is highly securitized given that majority of them are peaceful and not a threat to national, peace. Only a minority of refugees are a threat to national security. The chapter has also shown that several challenges exist that hinder refugee participation in socioeconomic development. Similarly, several strategies exist that enhance refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. The next chapter presents the summarized findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Overview

This chapter presents the summary of findings, the discussions, the conclusions, and recommendations the study makes. The organisation of the chapter is as per the study objectives.

5.1 Summary of Findings

5.1.1 Impact of Somali refugees on the socio-economic development of Kenya

The first objective of this study investigated how refugees in Dadaab camps influenced the socio-economic development of Kenya. Findings show that majority of respondents have multiple economic activities including small-scale trading, informal (unskilled) employment, pastoralism, charcoal making, and *boda-boda* riding. Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused positive and negative socioeconomic impacts to the country. The positive socioeconomic impacts of Somali refugees in Dadaab to Kenya include attracting remittances from diaspora, which are taxed, have increased need for use of financial institutions, and are used to finance refugee needs. Refugees have created trade opportunities, which is a source of income for refugees and hosts, a source of taxation for local and national government, and a source of highly demanded and cheap commodities. Refugees have also created numerous taxation opportunities for the government including business levy tax, VAT, PAYE, Import duty among others.

The study also found that Somali refugees in Dadaab have contributed to the growth of the local financial sector as financial institutions had to come up to offer financial saving services for refugees and hosts, money sending services, facilitate trade

activities including exchange of foreign currency, offer capital, reduce cost of doing business, and offer banking/financial services to organizations offering services to refugees in the area. Somali refugees have influenced improvement of infrastructure and social services like water, education, and health services in Dadaab area. These services benefit refugees and host communities. What is more, the study found that refugees had provided many employment opportunities for locals and refugees directly and indirectly. All employees benefit from the opportunities through salaries while the host nation benefits through PAYE and improved livelihood of its people.

The arrival of refugees to Dadaab influenced intermarriages with the host community, which have enhanced peaceful coexistence and harmony and eliminated animosity among communities living in the area. Somali refugees have also influenced the institution of training colleges like YEP which equips dwellers in the region with skills and knowledge relevant to enhance their employability and socioeconomic development of Kenya. Additionally, the YEP offers capital financing and business training relevant for starting businesses that contribute to the socioeconomic development of the host nation.

The study also established that Somali refugees contribute towards lowering commodity prices, lowering of rental costs and growth of rental opportunities, increased investment to the Dadaab area, increased wages, influenced economic diversification, and influenced the lowering of inflation, all which contribute to the growth of local economy. Additionally, the environmental effects the Somali refugees have had encouraged small-scale farming among refugees as well as attracted organisations that invest in the afforestation of the region which contribute to environmental conservation. The negative impacts of Somali refugees to the

socioeconomic development of Kenya include the threat to Kenya's national security, which threatens business thrive and peace among all dwellers in Kenya, overcrowding, which has piled pressure on available natural resources and public amenities, and poor quality of education, which delivers less qualified refugees and host community members unable to attract high paying professional jobs which would lead to a greater socioeconomic impact to the hosting country.

5.1.2 Security concerns associated with Somali refugees

The second objective of this study investigated the existing national security concerns associated with Somali refugees in Dadaab. The findings show that majority of refugees are not involved in insecurity cases whether directly or indirectly; only a minority are. The direct security concerns include conflicts, banditry, and terrorism. Indirectly, Somali refugees offer hideouts for criminals and weapons, which are used to fuel inter-clan conflict in northern part of Kenya and terrorism across the country. Notably, the threat of terror stands out owing to its effect on the entire Kenya and the casualties involved.

On the causes of dwindled security in Dadaab area, the study found that Somali refugees cooperated with government security organs and that they had no major tensions with the host communities. The minor conflicts Somali refugees had with host communities did not significantly affect the refugees' contribution to Kenya's development. Short-term conflict resolution methods like traditional and formal courts existed to address such conflicts. Long-term conflict resolution methods include the repatriation of Somali refugees and relocation of non-Somali refugees from Dadaab camps. The state of security in Dadaab camps and its environs was found not to be poor. The study also found that before 2011, refugees were not involved in

intelligence gathering by the local security organs, which caused a success of many terror acts as the planning was not detected and arrested. However, this mistake was realised and corrected and correctly, refugees have been involved in intelligence gathering process. This knowledge was unavailable previously.

The infiltration of non-refugees into refugee camps is a security risk since such people can easily commit a crime and escape or hide undetected. The porosity of the Somalia-Kenya boarder and nearness of the camp to this boarder is another security concern because it allows criminals and weapons to easily cross over to Kenya and used to commit crimes. Radicalization of refugees, refugee camps offering a direct market for contrabands and drug/human trafficking, infiltration of small and light weapons and unsafe practices like FGM, child marriage and child abuse also add up to the security threats in Dadaab refugee camps. Environmental degradation through unfavourable practices like deforestation for charcoal making and firewood harvesting, littering coupled with destruction of natural habitats also threaten security in the Dadaab region as they propagate conflict.

The measures instituted in the camps and its environs to ensure security and enhance refugee socioeconomic development to Kenya include involving all stakeholders and leaders to play their specific part in advocating for peace, discouraging participation in crime, terrorism and other security threats and promoting cohesion and deterring conflict. The leaders involved are block leaders who ensure and address security issues in their areas, religious leaders, local political leaders like MCA's, MPs senators, and Governors, National Government Administrators/ leaders like the DCCs, ACCs, Chiefs, and assistant chiefs, and UNHCR officers in charge of camps. Other measures the study found include deploying security apparatus like police and

detectives, establishing police posts and stations, engaging community policing initiatives, implementing *Nyumba Kumi* initiatives, repatriating unregistered refugees, establishing community Peace and Protection Teams, relocation of non-Somali refugees and repatriation of Somali refugees.

The study also found that to enhance security of refugees and host communities, which would enhance refugee contribution to Kenya's socioeconomic development, government needs to re-open the closed borders to allow cross-border business to take place and earn the country revenue, create job opportunities, and minimize youth idleness and radicalization.

Concerning the effectiveness of the measures instituted by Kenya government to fight insecurity, the study established that the security amendment laws were effective in empowering security agents' role in dealing with suspected criminals but ineffective in ensuring the rights of suspects are protected. The *Nyumba Kumi* initiative had not achieved its intended mandate as several terror attacks have happened since its inception and the closure of Kenyan-Somalia border was ineffective in controlling illegal imports (contraband goods) and human trafficking. Operation *Linda inchi* has created peace to some parts of Somalia to a notable extent and improved diplomatic relationships with Somalia but enhanced the scale of Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya as the militia group tries to fight back by attacking Kenya's soft spots and the KDF troops. *Usalama Watch* led to Somali refugees exposing terrorist and their hideouts leading to relative peace achievement. Additionally, the *Usalama Watch* Operation was not significantly effective in arresting terror acts in the country although it minimized them. The operation created suspicion between security agencies, host

communities, and refugees and fear among Somali refugees and locals as they felt their ethnicity targeted.

The effect of the security concerns on the socioeconomic impact of Somali refugees include donor withdrawals, increased illegal importation of commodities from Somalia, enhanced intention to repatriate Somali refugees from Dadaab back to Somalia, uncertainty among host communities due to fear of Dadaab becoming a ghost town after successful closure of Dadaab camps, and demoralised Somali refugees as they feel victimised ethnically by security agents, which has created the need of refugees wanting to belong to terror cells as a hit back.

The threats to state security organs ensuring the safety and security of host and refugee communities include language barrier and illiteracy, which challenge effective communication with security agents, poverty, and widespread unemployment, which expose refugee youths to recruitment into violent extremism and terrorist cells, poor community-police relationship and secrecy of intelligence gathering, which jeopardizes intelligence sharing with the police. Another threat is the Somali refugees feeling marginalized, discriminated, and profiled ethnically by Kenya's security agents, which predisposes them to rebel rather than cooperate with security agents. Skewed Islamic teachings like Jihad ideology, which radicalises youths to act against Kenya, harmful cultural practices like FGM and child marriage, which harm refugee women and children, poor budgetary allocation to the fight against insecurity, traditional courts system that is biased are the other threats to security organs achieving secure and safe environment for Somali refugees and host communities.

5.1.3 Challenges Somali refugees face in socio-economic development of host

The third objective investigated the challenges Somali refugees face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya and found them to be grouped into social, economic, and environmental challenges. On the social challenges, the study found that refugee children attend school although majority drop out in primary school, few progresses to secondary school and the least progress to post-secondary education. Many boys than girls in Dadaab region attend school. What is more, there is overcrowding of learners and shortage of trained teachers in Dadaab schools, which leads to less qualified teachers being hired, and overburdens available teachers and facilities leading to poor quality education that leads to half-baked refugee learners.

The findings also show that majority of Somali refugees have adequate skills to participate in formal jobs (that do not require higher education attainment) thus, dropping out at basic education does not challenge them access these skills. Majority of respondents agree that Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others/other organisations, but this dependence does not challenge Somali refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. Majority of respondents disagree that Somali refugees face government neglect hence this is not a challenge as well. Majority of the respondents said that the stereotype that refugees are terrorists was not true because refugees are peaceful. When refugees are stereotyped to be terrorists, it disadvantages them by causing hatred towards them, making them a target by security organs, makes them suspects in any terror crime, denies them opportunities like access to higher education, job opportunities, unrestricted movement, leads them to being considered dangerous and harmful to others and influences the creation of anti-Somali refugee policies. This demoralizes them and affects their effective participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya.

FGM and child marriages were found to affect the education, skills and knowledge gathering of the affected hence challenging their socioeconomic contribution to national development. Human rights abuses/violations mostly by the Kenyan Police including forced extortions, torture, beatings, harassment, and bribes as well as those perpetrated by fellow civilians like domestic violence, defilements, sodomy, rape assault, denial of resources within a family, female genital mutilation, child labour and child marriage demoralize refugees from making positive contribution to the development of Kenya and instead encourage their involvement in acts that are against the Kenya state.

The health crisis, denies refugee and host communities' good healthcare to participate in socioeconomic development of Kenya. Proliferation of small arms and light weapons which forms a source of income for Al-Shabaab group to continue their mayhem are associated with insecurity cases that drives away investors and destabilize Kenya. The proliferation of these arms are long-term goal by the group-to ensure many illicit weapons are available in Kenya for future instabilities. The study further established that porous border between Kenya and Somalia allow illegal goods into the country which denies the government tax as well as kills local industries. Other challenges to Somali refugee participation in socioeconomic development include illegal acquisition of vital documents like national identification cards and birth certificates, lack of proper identification documentation and insecurity, which challenge Somali refugee participation in socioeconomic development.

The economic challenges to refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya include lack of electricity, limited freedom of movement and lack of business permits, inadequate and poorly developed market space, lack of banking products that

are Islamic compliant, funding constraints (inadequate donations), smuggled goods and merchandize/ contrabands, and money laundering through the Hawala rackets. The Hawalas also act as conduits through which cash is transferred to Al-Shabaab group and later used to finance terror. These factors deny the government tax, deny refugees access to banking products, limit business productivity, minimize job opportunities, and destroy local companies hence the socioeconomic impact on the nation. On the other hand, the study found that the prevailing commodity prices, rental costs, investment into the Dadaab area, employment opportunities, prevailing wages, available economic activities, prevailing inflation, and people's buying power do not challenge Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development of Kenya.

The environmental challenges to socioeconomic development of Kenya include environmental degradation (through such activities like charcoal burning, firewood harvesting, pastoralism, medicinal trees/roots harvesting, and harvesting trees for cultural and artistic purposes), and poaching of wild animals for meat, eggs, skin, and medicinal purposes. This environmental destruction is a source of conflict and destroys the natural resources that would be used by future generations, not to mention the climatic change. These factors challenge effective participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya.

5.1.4 Strategies for enhancing refugee's socio-economic contribution to Host

On the fourth objective, the study found that Somali refugees cherish their culture and celebrate important occasions defined by their culture to bring Somalis together particularly the needy. The available refugee management policies in Kenya were found not to promote refugee integration and settlement but promote refugee

participation in the country's socioeconomic development activities. Majority of the respondents agreed that the education offered to Somali refugees allows them to acquire relevant skills and knowledge to participate in socioeconomic development, that there exist social networks that promote socioeconomic contribution of refugees, and that there are associations and groups in Dadaab that support different interest groups including their economic activities.

Additionally, the study found that there exist trust between host and refugee communities, which promotes socioeconomic contribution of refugees to the host nation. Somali refugees in Dadaab are equipped with relevant economic resources and are protected to allow a secure environment for participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. The reopening of Kenya-Somalia border points, creation and development of new markets, infrastructural development, offering banking products that are tailor-made for Islamic bankers in Dadaab (refugees and Host communities), and positioning refugees according to their capabilities and skills were all found to be strategies that enhance refugee socioeconomic development of Kenya.

5.2 Conclusions

5.2.1 Overall Conclusion

The study concludes that Somali refugees hosted in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya have many positive socioeconomic impacts to the country than the negative ones. The specific conclusions are presented in the succeeding subheadings organised as per the study objectives.

5.2.2 Influence of Somali refugees on the socio-economic development of Kenya

The first objective of this study investigated the extent to which refugees in Dadaab camps influenced the socio-economic development of Kenya. The study concludes that Somali refugees have positive and negative socioeconomic impacts to Kenya just as is advanced by the Refugee Aid and Development theory. The impacts arise as refugees attempt to make a living out of their environment and are not guided by any policy document. The positive socioeconomic impacts associated with Somali refugees in Dadaab are attracting remittances from diaspora, creating trade and employment, opportunities, creating taxation opportunities for County and national government, growing the local financial sector, and influencing improvement of infrastructure and social services.

The study further concludes that intermarriages and peaceful and harmonious coexistence between the host community and refugees, the institution of skills training colleges, lowering commodity prices, lowering of rental costs, growth of rental opportunities, increased investment to the Dadaab area, increased wages, economic diversification, and the lowering of inflation are the other positive impacts of Somali refugees to Kenya. The negative impacts of Somali refugees to the socioeconomic development of Kenya are the threat to Kenya's national security, overcrowding, and pressure on available amenities and natural resources, and poor quality of education to locals in the area due to withdrawal of qualified teachers escaping insecurity associated to refugees. What is more, there lacks an operational framework that is focused on minimizing the effect of these negative impacts to the development of Kenya.

5.2.3 Security concerns associated with Somali refugees

The second objective of this study investigated the existing national security concerns associated with Somali refugees in Dadaab. The study concludes that only a minority of refugees are involved in insecurity issues directly and indirectly while majority of refugees are peaceful, hence the claim that refugees are terrorists is securitized. Thus, those who stereotype the entire refugee population to be terrorists are misguided. Clearly there lacks an operational framework upon which criminal refugees can be isolated from non-criminal refugees. Somali refugees cooperate with government security organs and have no major but minor tensions with the host communities; thus, they have good coexistence. These minor tensions do not significantly affect the refugees' contribution to Kenya's development. Short-term conflict resolution methods—traditional and formal courts exist to resolve conflicts, but the long-term conflict resolution method is repatriation of Somali refugees and relocation of non-Somali refugees from Dadaab camps.

Terrorism is the main form of insecurity unique to Somali refugees and whose effects are gross to the development of Kenya. Other security risks associated with Somali refugees, and which impact their socioeconomic contribution to Kenya's development include infiltration of illegal or unregistered refugees into refugee camps, the porosity of the Somalia-Kenya border and nearness of the camp to this border, radicalization of refugee's youths, refugee camps offering a direct market for contrabands and drug/human trafficking, FGM, child marriage and child labour. Environmental degradation through unfavourable practices like deforestation, littering, and wildlife poaching coupled with destruction of natural habitats threaten security of Dadaab area as they are precursors for communal conflicts.

The study concludes that the measures instituted in camps and its environs to ensure security are involving all stakeholders and leaders to play their specific part in advocating for peace, and discouraging participation in crime, terrorism and other insecure activities while promoting cohesion and deterring conflict, deploying security apparatus, establishing additional police posts and stations, engaging community policing initiatives, enforcing the implementation of *Nyumba Kumi* initiatives, repatriating unregistered refugees, establishing community Peace and Protection Teams, relocation of non-Somali refugees and repatriation of Somali refugees. The study also concludes that the closure of Kenya-Somali border, current border surveillance and manning measures, and *Nyumba Kumi* initiative are ineffective in arresting cross border security threats that are detrimental to the refugee-associated socioeconomic development of Kenya.

The security amendment laws, *Usalama* watch, and Operation *Linda inchi* have been effective to some extent because they created security although they did not entirely attain their mandate. The security laws promoted violation of rights of refugees while operation *Linda inchi* succeeded in creating peace in Somalia but failed in Kenya. *Usalama* watch was also partially fruitful because although it has exposed terrorists and their hideouts, it also created fear among Somali refugees and locals, as they felt ethnically targeted. Thus, these measures negatively affect refugee involvement in socioeconomic development of Kenya.

The security concerns associated to Dadaab, and Somali refugees affect the refugees in the following ways: donor withdrawals, illegal importation of commodities, renewed GoK intention to repatriate Somali refugees back to Somalia, host communities fearing that Dadaab may become a ghost town after closure of the

Dadaab camps, and demoralised Somali refugees. The study also concludes that the threats to state security organs ensuring the safety and security of host and Somali refugee communities include language barrier and illiteracy, poverty and widespread unemployment, poor community-police relationship, Secrecy of intelligence gathering, Somali refugees feeling marginalized, discriminated, and profiled ethnically, skewed Islamic teachings which propagate violence, harmful cultural practices like FGM and child marriage, poor budgetary allocation to the fight against insecurity, and the traditional courts system that is biased.

5.2.4 Challenges Somali refugees face in socio-economic development of Kenya

The third objective investigated the challenges Somali refugees face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya. The conclusions indicate that there are social, economic, and environmental challenges affecting Somali refugee participation in socioeconomic contribution of Kenya. The social challenges include refugee children dropping out of school in primary and secondary school, many girls dropping out of school in favour of early marriages/FGM, overcrowded classrooms and shortage of trained teachers hence poor-quality education that leads to half-baked refugee learners.

The study concludes that inadequacy of skills, dependence on aid, and government neglect are not challenging to Somali refugee's participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. Stereotyping Somali refugees as terrorists challenges them by attracting hatred towards them, making them a target by security organs, makes them suspects in any terror crime, denies them opportunities like access to higher education, job opportunities, and freedom of movement, influences the perception that Somali refugees are dangerous and harmful to others and influences the creation of anti-

Somali refugee policies. All these effects demoralize Somali refugees hence limiting their effective participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya.

FGM and child marriages, Somali refugee human rights abuses/violations, the health crisis, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the porous border between Kenya and Somalia, illegal acquisition of vital documents like national identification cards and birth certificates, limited freedom of movement, lack of proper identification documentation and insecurity are the other social challenges that affect refugee contribution to the socioeconomic development of Kenya. Summarily, these conclusions indicate policy implementation gaps that jeopardize the successful participation of refugees in economic development of Kenya.

The economic challenges to refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya are lack of electricity, lack of business permits, inadequate and poorly developed market space, lack of banking products that are Islamic compliant, funding constraints, smuggled goods and merchandize/ contrabands, and money laundering through Hawala rackets. All these can be associated with lack of regulatory policy and poor implementation of available policies to manage refugees' economic contribution to the development of Kenya. Contrastingly, the prevailing commodity prices, rental costs, investment into the Dadaab area, employment opportunities, prevailing wages, available economic activities, prevailing inflation, and people's buying power do not challenge Somali refugees' contribution towards socioeconomic development of Kenya.

On the environmental challenges, the study concludes that environmental degradation through such activities like charcoal burning, firewood harvesting, pastoralism, medicinal trees/roots harvesting, and harvesting trees for cultural and artistic

purposes, and poaching of wild animals challenged Somali refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya. Once again, since deforestation and charcoal burning are crimes according to Kenyan environmental policy, it can be concluded that there is a policy implementation challenge that led to the effects mentioned herein.

5.2.5 Strategies for enhancing socio-economic contribution of Refugees to Host

On the fourth objective, the study concludes that the Somali culture is a critical social networking tool that advocates for reaching out to/caring for the needy. The available refugee management policies in Kenya do not promote refugee integration and settlement but promote refugee participation in the country's socioeconomic development activities. The education offered to Somali refugees which allows them to acquire relevant skills and knowledge, existence of social networks, existence of trust between host and refugee communities, equipping of Somali refugees with relevant economic resources and protecting them to allow a secure environment all promote Somali refugee participation in Kenya's socioeconomic development. Other strategies that would promote refugee participation in socioeconomic development of Kenya include the reopening of Kenya-Somalia border points, creation, and development of new markets, infrastructural development, offering banking products that are tailor-made for Islamic bankers and involving refugees in development according to their capabilities and skills.

5.3 Recommendations

5.3.1 Influence of Somali refugees on the socio-economic development of Kenya

The study recommends that the GoK should promote legal refugee hosting as they have numerous socioeconomic benefits posed to the country. In doing so, government

should appreciate that only a minority of refugees are involved in negative impacts on the nation and deal with them while protecting the majority whose impact is positive. Somali refugees should be encouraged to cooperate with the government as a way of promoting government-refugee relationships for mutual benefits to all. This can be effectively done by anchoring in law the refugee contribution to the development of Kenya. In the short term, the Kenya government in collaboration with UNHCR and other refugee management partners should fast track the rollout of the Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISED), which intends to recognize and promote refugee involvement in host development.

5.3.2 Security concerns associated with Somali refugees

Somali refugees should cooperate with the government on unmasking the few refugees who engage in insecurity cases across the nation and rightful judicial process be taken against such. Refugees should also be compelled legally (through institution of right policies or implementation of available policies) to share any information that is a security threat to the nation. The Kenyan security agents should have sensitization forums where they are taught on how to establish effective friendly relationship with the community (without compromising their work ethics) that will lead to enhanced intelligence sharing. The intelligence gathering measures put in place should be firm, friendly, and free from victimization to be effective in detecting and arresting crimes and criminals.

The policy on dealing with illegal refugees should be fully implemented to eliminate cases of undocumented refugees in camps. As the implementation happens, human rights protection should be ensured according to the local and international laws. These measures should also include dealing with any illegal refugees who are a

security threat. Government and UNHCR should come up with activities that engage refugee youths as well as offer them anti-radicalisation awareness talks to prevent them from being easy targets for radicalization. This should be effectively done with the institution of a policy that will regulate the activities of refugee youths and offer them opportunities that will keep them busy. Additionally, UNHCR and government should also have an updated database of activities refugee youths engage in as a way of addressing idleness and radicalization.

Government, through the local administration and village elders should call for surrender of illegal firearms among refugee and non-refugee arms holders and offer amnesty to all willing to return such arms. This should aim to reduce the number of illegal arms that have been proliferated into the country by Al-Shabaab. Enhanced screening at border points should be enhanced as per the measures explained in the next paragraph to prevent any further entry of illegal firearms.

Kenya government should ensure security across the Kenya-Somalia border to seal all porous routes used for committing crimes. The government should adopt airborne and mobile intruder detection sensors, surveillance drones, and fixed real time CCTV cameras along the Somalia-Kenya border to enhance border security and ensure real time monitoring of cross border movements as a way of ensuring Kenya's security. These technological innovations should always be monitored by qualified personnel and supported with secure cyber security to ensure their reliability in detecting and arresting any criminal acts at the border. Government should benchmark with countries like Israel which have successfully implemented such technologies to protect its borders from infiltration. These will enhance border surveillance and security as it

will ensure arrest of all illegal entries of goods and people which/who are likely to be involved in crime commission.

Additionally, the closed border point should be re-opened to allow legal activities to happen freely hence discourage insecurities that thrive due to lack of legal cross border movements. Screening should be enhanced at such border points to eliminate criminals or weapons being sneaked into the country at the disguise of being refugees or refugee goods. Similarly, where need be for ground patrol, the police should be equipped with armoured and anti-rocket vehicles and landmine/IED detectors, which they will use when making patrols in the risky areas of Northeastern Kenya.

Kenya government should address the operational challenges in the security initiatives like security amendment laws, *Nyumba Kumi* initiative, Operation *Linda inchi* and *Usalama Watch* to ensure they address the intended goal. To achieve this, the government needs to come up with periodical assessments and sensitization activities that will educate, highlight procedures of best practice, and establish achievements and challenges that need to be addressed to make the initiatives successful. Policy makers should relook at the security amendment laws and ensure they are in line with the constitutions to enhance their effectiveness.

Other insecurities in or around camps including FGM, drug trafficking, human trafficking, illegal arms holding, accommodating criminals among others should be addressed by multi-sectoral strategies. The strategies should include empowering UNHCR and like partners to be involved in educating refugees against involvement in crime, drafting and implementing laws that criminalize such acts, empower refugees and locals to share any intelligence involving such cases and where possible reward informers who give information that lead to successful arrests, training detectives on

refugee behaviours to empower them to detect such cases among refugees, ensuring a streamlined judicial system that will prosecute and judge within the shortest time any such cases.

5.3.3 Challenges Somali refugees face in contributing to socio-economic development of Kenya

UNHCR together with the GoK should sensitize refugees on the importance of completing schooling up to tertiary level and all hindrances to this be dealt with according to the law. For instance, proponents of FGM, child labour and early marriages should be prosecuted and punished to discourage such acts. These practices should be countered from a parent's point of view where parents are sensitized and educated on the cons and pros and compelled to refrain against allowing their girls to engage in such. Additionally, teachings against FGM should be incorporated in the syllabus of young girls (lower primary) so that they can be informed about it early and be equipped with escape measures.

Religious and community leaders should also be involved to help advocate against the vice. Human rights watch dogs should also participate in sensitizing the refugee community against these vices and help in identifying and prosecuting any related crimes. Government arms charged with implementing policies should also take up the responsibility to ensure effective protection of life and rights. Prosecution of offenders of gender-based violence should be brought to book within the shortest time to deter continued propagation of the practice among aspiring offenders. Other human rights violations should also be handled in a similar manner.

UNHCR in partnership with other stakeholders and local authorities should undertake a sensitization process of creating awareness of the benefits of refugees and

demystifying the peacefulness of refugees to minimize or eliminate blanket stereotypes that may portray refugees to be terrorists. Those who have any valid cases of terrorism among refugees should be encouraged to share such information with security agents for effective and lawful undertakings. Government should come up with an operational framework to give guidance on how suspected terrorists are handled from the community and prescribe punishment for unjustified stereotypes towards refugees to deter any blanket accusations that attract stereotyping.

Government in partnership with UNHCR should ensure all refugee camps are well provided with social amenities including setting up adequate classrooms, teachers, and education facilities and adequate hospitals, equipment and healthcare workers as provided in the local and international laws. The stakeholders should also explore the need for temporary or makeshift schools and hospitals to manage high refugee and host community numbers. These calls for UNHCR to bring on board more donors through partnerships and CSR activities. Adequate security should also be offered to those willing to work in the region to eliminate the high turnovers.

There is need for institution or implementation of policies that will guide the economic activities in which refugees participate and how to deal with arising challenges. The policy should allow unrestricted movement of refugees if they deal in legal trade and their movement is tracked, allow creation of markets and business centres in refugee camps and its environs to promote business activities, discourage trade of contraband goods hence prescribe punishment to refugees who contravene this and regulate all financial institutions operating to offer money transfer services to Somalia and other war zones across the world.

Environmental policies regulating charcoal making, firewood harvesting, and deforestation (for whatever reason) should be implemented fully to minimize destruction of the environment in Dadaab. The operational activities of all government bodies tasked with registrations and immigrations should be audited periodically to rid it of any illegal activities. However, qualifying and legally right individuals should not be denied access to vital documents regardless of where they reside.

5.3.4 Strategies for enhancing socio-economic contribution of Refugees to Host

The study recommends that UNHCR and NGOs operating in Dadaab strengthen and promote the cultural practices that reach out to the needy as a way of ensuring all refugees are well provided for and positioned in a manner that is socioeconomically beneficial for the nation. The Kenya government should strengthen skills development and education systems in Dadaab to continue equipping Somali refugees and host communities with skills relevant to enhance their socioeconomic contribution to Kenya. Additionally, even after repatriation and closure of Dadaab camp, the government should ensure continuity of education and YEP in Dadaab to continue benefiting the host communities in skills development.

The GoK as a policy maker should revise the available refugee management policies to make them more accommodative in settling and integrating refugees as a way of encouraging their continued socioeconomic contribution to the development of Kenya. The policies should give refugees tax and other incentives to promote refugee activities and involvement in business, which earn the government tax and create job opportunities.

The GoK should also consider reopening the Kenya-Somalia border or keep it manned to ensure regulated cross-border activities and invest more in infrastructure

development in Dadaab area as a way of opening the area for businesses, which will benefit the nation. The local (County) government should expand trade markets and equip them well as they are a source of revenue.

5.4 Areas of Further Study

The study realises that refugees have numerous advantages they offer to the host country. These benefits can be augmented if refugees can freely move and work within the hosting nation. However, encamping challenges such a move. This study therefore proposes an investigation into the possibility of decamping refugees and how this act can affect the country socioeconomically with the appreciation of the increased refugee issue across the continent.

The study has established that the Hawalas do engage in illegal transfer of cash to Al-Shabaab operatives in Somalia secretly so that they can preserve their license and continue operating. The study proposes an in-depth investigation on this matter upon which the government will take action to deter any such activities whose effect is detrimental to Kenya.

The study proposes a study that reviews all refugee management and settlement policies and laws that Kenya applies to clearly establish their adequacy in enabling refugees to contribute to the development of Kenya socioeconomically. This study should offer the specific advice, based on the gaps established, towards the new policies to be created.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Education status in Dadaab Camps

Table 1: School Enrolment in Dadaab by Camps

Row Labels	Sum of Boys	Sum of Girls	Sum of students
Hagadera	14570	9728	24298
ECD	1059	699	1758
Primary	6819	4707	11526
Secondary	2075	1001	3076
Primary (AEP)	173	163	336
ABE-SCI	928	987	1915
Secondary (Community sch)	787	340	1127
Primary (Community sch)	2606	1722	4328
ECD Community	123	109	232
IFO	11649	8111	19760
ECD	993	923	1916
Primary	6120	5036	11156
Secondary	2062	820	2882
Primary (AEP)	163	113	276
ABE-SCI	669	536	1205
Secondary (Community sch)	535	137	672
Primary (Community sch)	999	483	1482
ECD Community	108	63	171
Dagahaley	11747	8334	20081
ECD	818	672	1490
Primary	6839	5367	12206
Secondary	2835	1453	4288
Primary (AEP)	183	107	290
ABE-SCI	487	369	856
Secondary (Community sch)	70	39	109
Primary (Community sch)	450	280	730
ECD Community	65	47	112
Grand Total	37966	26173	64139

Source: UNHCR (2021).

Table 2: Number of Teachers in Dadaab schools

Row Labels	Sum of teachers
ECD	42
Primary	408
Secondary	219
Primary (AEP)	20
ABE-SCI	45
Secondary (Community sch)	28
Primary (Community sch)	119
ECD Community	2
Grand Total	883

Source: UNHCR (2021).

Table 3: Out of School Children in the camps

Out of School in the camp			
	Female	Male	Total
ECD	7,514	7,124	<u>14,638</u>
Primary	9,906	4,655	<u>14,561</u>
Secondary	8,108	4,643	<u>12,751</u>
Total	<u>25,528</u>	<u>16,422</u>	<u>41,950</u>

Source: UNHCR (2021).

Appendix II: introduction Letter

Dear Respondent

RE: Request for research data

I am a postgraduate student at Moi University. I am required to submit as part of my research work, a research project proposal on investigating “the socioeconomic implications of Somali refugees in Dadaab refugee camp on host community.” To achieve the objectives of the study, you have been chosen to participate in the study. I kindly request you to respond to the attached questionnaire/interview questions to generate data required to complete the purpose of this research. The information you give will be used for academic purposes and policy change. Note that your identity and responses will be confidential.

Your assistance and cooperation will be highly appreciated.

Thank you in advance.

AHMED HAITHAR SOMO

Student (Researcher)

Moi University

Appendix III: interview guide questions for officers from UNHCR, RAS, KNCHR, UNICEF, RCK, Amnesty international, Kituo cha Sheria, Deputy, and Assistant Deputy County commissioner

Extent to which refugees in Dadaab camps have affected the socio-economic development of Kenya

- a) What cultural/traditional practices do Somali refugees in Dadaab camp engage in?
- b) Are you aware of any socioeconomic impact's Somali refugees in Dadaab have posed to Kenya or host communities? Clearly differentiate the positive and negative impacts.
- c) Are there any schools and hospitals, in the camp that have come about to cater for the Somali refugees in Dadaab since inception of the camp?
- d) What is the average education attainment among Somali refugees in Dadaab as per gender and age?
- e) To what extent do Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others or organizations? If yes, who are the individuals or organizations offering the support and is it in monetary terms or in kind?
- f) What occupational activities do Somali refugees in Dadaab engage in? indicate the distribution of these economic activities according to gender and age.
- g) What is/are the main economic activities of Somali refugees in Dadaab? What amount of revenue do they generate for the county government and national government?
- h) What is the average household or personal income of Somali refugees in Dadaab? How does this income compare with that of non-refugees and the national/county average income for Kenya?
- i) What is the budgetary allocation to Somali refugees in Dadaab camp? Is this allocation commensurate to the socioeconomic benefits tapped from the Somali refugees in the camp?
- j) What taxes do Somali refugees pay to the government (county and national)?
- k) Are there any Somali refugees who own capital assets like land and property?

Security threats posed by the Somali refugees in Dadaab to the Kenya national security

- a) Has there been any kind of conflict or tension related to or caused by Somali refugees in Dadaab over the past years? If yes, who were the conflicting parties and what were the reason(s) for the tension(s)/conflict(s)? How was the dispute resolved?
- b) Are there security concerns to the host communities/nation that are directly or indirectly associated/linked to Somali refugees in Dadaab camps? Explain and give evidence where necessary.

Challenges faced by refugees in Dadaab camps in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya

- a) From your assessment and based on the knowledge you have about Somali refugees in Dadaab, what are the social and economic problems/challenges

that the refugees face? How do the challenges/problems affect the socioeconomic impact posed to the host communities in Dadaab?

Strategies for enhancing the socio-economic contribution of Refugees to Host Community

- a) Are there any groups, organizations, associations, or cooperatives in the Dadaab camps? What are these groups, their goals, target audience and activities? Do the groups act to influence Somali refugees' socioeconomic impact to the host nation (Kenya)?
- b) What things or areas should be done/improved towards Somali refugees in Dadaab to result in them contributing positive socioeconomic impacts to the host communities/nation?
- c) To what extent does the host communities in Dadaab trust Somali refugees to allow harmonious coexistence that promote the refugees' positive socioeconomic contribution to Kenya?
- d) What policies are available to promote Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution to host communities in Kenya? Are there any policies that are a hindrance to this contribution? Are there any policies that need to be instituted to enhance the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab to the host? Explain.

Source: Author (2021).

Appendix IV: interview Guide Questions for Directors of Departments at the Directorate of Budget, Fiscal and Economic Affairs, institute of Economic Affairs

- a) What is the average education attainment among Somali refugees in Dadaab as per gender and age?
- b) To what extent do Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others or organizations? If yes, who are the individuals or organizations offering the support and is it in monetary terms or in kind?
- c) What occupational activities do Somali refugees in Dadaab engage in? indicate the distribution of these economic activities according to gender and age.
- d) What is/are the main economic activities of Somali refugees in Dadaab? How much revenue is generated by these activities to the national basket?
- e) What is the average household or personal income of Somali refugees in Dadaab? How does this income compare with the national average income for Kenya?
- f) What is the budgetary allocation to Somali refugees in Dadaab camp? Is this allocation commensurate to the socioeconomic benefits tapped from the Somali refugees in the camp?
- g) What taxes do Somali refugees pay to the government (county and national)?
- h) What can be done by Kenya national or county governments to enhance the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab?
- i) What challenges prevent Somali refugees from contributing socioeconomically to Kenya? How can these challenges be addressed?
- j) What things or areas should be done/improved towards Somali refugees in Dadaab to result in them contributing positive socioeconomic impacts to the host communities/nation?
- k) What policies are available to promote Somali refugees' socioeconomic contribution to host communities in Kenya? Are there any policies that are a hindrance to this contribution? Are there any policies that need to be instituted to enhance the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab to the host? Explain.

Source: Author (2021).

**Appendix V: interview Guide questions for officers from Eye on Security, ATPU,
OCS, DCI**

- a) Generally, what is the state of security in Dadaab? (How often are safety and security concerns raised in the camp?)
- b) Based on your position, what can you say is the relationship between Somali refugees in Dadaab and insecurity in Kenya? Has the security of Dadaab/Kenya dwindled due to presence of Somali refugees? Explain your response.
- c) What are some of the measures instituted in Dadaab refugee camp to ensure refugee and host security? Are there any cases of conflict or violence reported between refugees and the host communities? How are such cases resolved in the short term and long term?
- d) Is there any association between the political instability experienced in Somalia and the security of Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab?
- e) Have the following measures instituted by Kenya government played any security role among Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab?
 - i. Security amendment laws
 - ii. *Nyumba Kumi* initiatives
 - iii. Closing territorial borders with Somalia
 - iv. Operation *Linda inchi*
 - v. *Usalama* watch
- f) How do the security concerns raised affect the socioeconomic impact of Somali refugees to Kenya?
- g) What challenges exist that deter state security organs from ensuring the safety and security of Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab?

Source: Author (2021).

Boda-boda rider []

Pastoralist []

Commercial crop cultivation []

Charcoal making []

Others (specify)

.....

in the table below, indicate the extent to which you agree with the statements given.

	I don't know	SD	D	A	SA
8. Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused positive socioeconomic impacts to Kenya					
9. Somali refugees in Dadaab have caused negative socioeconomic impact to Kenya					
10. There exists animosity between Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab					
11. Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab coexist harmoniously					

12. How many children have you given birth to while in Dadaab refugee camp? (**For refugees only**).

Less than 5 [] 5-10 [] Over 10 children []

13. How many of your children are school goers?

.....

14. What is the average monthly household income of Somali refugees? (**For refugees only**).

Less than Ksh. 1,000.00 [] Ksh 1,000-10,000 [] Ksh.10,001-20,000 []

Ksh. 20,001-30,000 [] Ksh30,001-40,000 [] Ksh. 40,001-50,000 []

Ksh. 50,000-100,000 [] Ksh. 100,001-200,000 [] 200,001-300,000 []
 300,001-400,000 [] Ksh. 400,001-500,000 [] Over 500,000 []

15. What percentage of your income do you save?

.....

16. Do you save in local (Kenyan origin) financial institutions?

Yes [] No []

17. If 'No', what is the origin of the financial institutions that you save with?

.....

18. Are you a direct taxpayer?

Yes [] No []

If yes, which tax do you pay?

Business Permit cost [] PAYE [] Import Duty []

Withholding tax []

Others (specify

.....

Economic factors	No extent	Small extent	Average extent	High extent
19. Somali refugees contributed towards lowering commodity prices				
20. Somali refugees have influenced the lowering rental cost				
21. Somali refugees have influenced increased investment into the area				
22. Somali refugees have Attracted investors to the region				

23. Somali refugees have increased employment opportunities				
24. Arrival of Somali refugees has increased wages				
25. Somali refugees have influenced the diversifying of economic activities				
26. Somali refugees have influenced the lowering of inflation				
Social factors				
27. Reduced crime and violent activities				
28. Improved inter-community relationships/harmony				
29. inter-marriages between host and refugees				
30. increased relief aid to the region				

Existing insecurity threats posed by the Somali refugees in Dadaab

	I don't know	SD	D	A	SA
31. There has been conflicts or tensions between Somali refugees and host communities in Dadaab over the past years?					
32. Somali refugees in Dadaab are directly responsible for the insecurity in the nation					
33. Somali refugees in Dadaab are indirectly responsible for the insecurity in the nation					
34. Somali refugees in					

Dadaab do not cooperate with the government's security organs					
35. Dadaab camps form a safe haven for criminals and criminal activities					
36. The state of security in Dadaab camps is poor					
37. The state of security in communities residing near Dadaab camps is poor					

Challenges Somali refugees face in contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya.

38. What is the average education attainment of Somali refugees in Dadaab?

None Primary certificate Secondary certificate

Diploma Degree Postgraduate

39. To what extent do you agree with the following statements about Somali refugees in Dadaab?

	I don't know	SD	D	A	SA
40. Somali refugees in Dadaab camps have adequate skills to perform formal jobs					
41. Somali refugees in Dadaab depend on benevolent support from others/ organisations?					
42. Dependence on benevolent support from others/ organisations challenges the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab to Kenya					
43. Prevailing commodity prices challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic					

development					
44. Prevailing rental cost challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
45. Lowered investment into the area challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
46. Prevailing employment opportunities challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
47. Prevailing wages challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
48. Reduced available economic activities challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
49. increased inflation challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
50. Reduced people's buying power challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
Social factors					
51. Government neglect challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
52. Criminal profiling challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					
53. Ethnic stereotyping/profiling challenges Somali refugees contribution towards socioeconomic development					

54. Somali refugees are portrayed by some people as terrorists. To what extent is this stereotype true?

No extent	Small extent	Average extent	High extent

What are the reasons for you answer above?

.....

How does the extent of your agreement (based on question 55 above) affect refugee participation in socioeconomic development in Kenya? (Explain)

.....

55. What other challenges hinder Somali refugees from contributing to the socio-economic development of Kenya? (Explain)

.....

Strategies for enhancing the socio-economic contribution of Refugees to Host Community

indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements:

	I don't know	SD	D	A	SA
56. The refugee management policies available in Kenya promote refugee integration and settlement into Kenya					
57. The refugee management policies available in Kenya allow Somali refugees in Dadaab to make their socioeconomic contribution to Kenya					
58. The education offered to Somali refugees in Dadaab allow them acquire knowledge and skills relevant to use to promote their socioeconomic contribution to Kenya					
59. There exist social networks/groupings that promote the socioeconomic contribution of Somali refugees in Dadaab					

60. There exists trust between the host communities and Somali refugees in Dadaab that promotes the refugees' socioeconomic contribution to Kenya					
61. Somali refugees in Dadaab are equipped with relevant economic resources that allow them to participate in socioeconomic development of Kenya					
62. Somali refugees in Kenya are protected to allow them a secure environment in which they can contribute to the socioeconomic development of Kenya.					

Thanks for your participation

Source: Author (2021).

Appendix VII: Research approval Letter from MOI University



MOI UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES

Tel: (053) 43093
(053) 43620 Ext 2515
Fax: (053) 43047
E-mail: deanarts@mu.ac.ke

P.O Box 3900
ELDORET
KENYA

19th January, 2021

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: AHMED HAITHAR SOMO - SASS/DPHIL/11/14

This is to certify that the above named is a bonafide student at Moi University, School of Arts and Social Sciences. He is a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) student in Sociology.

He has completed his coursework component and proposal and scheduled to go to the field work.

His Thesis is entitled: **“The Social-Economic Implications of Refugees to host Community: A case study of the Somali Refugees at Dadaab Refugee Camp”**

Any assistance accorded to him will be appreciated.



PROF. MARY WAHOME
ASSOCIATE DEAN, SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

(ISO 9001:2015 Certified Institution)

Appendix IX: Pictorial evidence from the field

Plate VII: interview session

Picture taken on 13th December 2020 showing one of the research assistants interviewing a trader in Dadaab host community near IFO camp.

Source: Author (2020).



Plate VIII: interview session near Dagahaley camp

Picture shows a research assistant helping one of the host community respondents to address the study questionnaire. Picture taken outside Dagaahaley refugee camp on 10th December 2020.

Source: Author (2020).



Plate IX: interview session with refugee leader

Picture taken on 10th December 2020 showing one of the research assistants interviewing a refugee leader in Dagaahaley, Dadaab camp.

Source: Author (2020).



Plate X: interview session with one of the local community traders

Picture taken on 13th January 2021 showing the researcher interviewing one of the host traders on the outskirts of IFO camp inside the trader's shop

Source: Author (2021).



Plate XI: Researcher outside Equity Bank Dadaab after an interview

Picture taken on 13th January 2021 after an interview with the manager of Equity bank, Dadaab branch. Source: Author (2021).



Plate XII: After interviewing the Principal of YEP

Picture taken on 8th January 2021 showing researcher after an interview with the principal, YEP in Dadaab town.

Source: Author (2021).



Plate XIII: After interview with DCC

Picture taken on 5th January 2021 showing the researcher after an interview with the deputy county commissioner at the officer's office in Dadaab town.

Source: Author (2021).

Appendix X: Research budget

Expenditure Description	Budget (Kes)	Justification for Expenditures
A. Personnel Services		
10 Research Assistants@1000* 14days	140,000	The Research assistants is responsible for conducting data collection and transcribing
B. Supplies and Services		
office supplies	30,000	Paper, pens, printer cartridges, photocopying, postage
Journal Articles	50,000	Purchasing journal articles for literature review
C. Travel and Meetings		
Travel for researcher and assistants	100,000	Travel for researcher and research assistant in collecting data and to present literature review to the University and other knowledge users
D. Equipment		
Printing	70,000	Printing research related materials
Total cost	390,000	

Source: Author (2021)