

**THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM MILITANT GROUP ON NIGERIA'S
SECURITY**

BY

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DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

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DEDICATION

To my family, especially my sons Faruk Umar Kumo, Aliyu Umar, my beloved wife Ladidi, my lecturers, supervisors and classmates in Moi University for their support and encouragement.

ABSTRACT

Islamic extremism and radicalism in Africa is growing and compounding development challenges the continent is already facing. *Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Lid daawatiwal Jihad* popularly known as *Boko Haram*, which means western education is forbidden emerged around 2002 as a local Islamic movement mainly for preaching and charity to people in Maiduguri Borno State. Boko Haram, a largely domestic terror group in Nigeria, has become one of the main sources of insecurity and threat to economic stability not only to Nigeria but also to the neighbouring countries. No nation can develop in an insecure environment with the increasing presence of terror. The main objective of this study was to examine the threats of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian national security and development. The specific objectives included; to analyze the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency, evaluate the strategies used by Boko Haram in achieving their goals; analyze the security implications of Boko Haram activities and finally assess the possible solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency. The research used poverty theory to explain the convergence between deprivation, grievances and need to understand the root causes of Boko Haram. Using mixed method approach that included survey questionnaires and oral interviews with purposively sampled respondents in the eleven most affected states in Northern Nigeria, the study revealed that first, long term marginalization of Northern Nigeria has a strong relationship with Boko Haram insurgency, Boko Haram's grievances are rooted in cultural cleavages, and a sense of injustice regarding identity affiliation. Secondly grinding poverty manifested in widespread unemployment of the youth is partly responsible for the insurgency. Finally, ethnic and religious divisions fuel the grievances that people have and make it easy for Boko Haram to recruit young Muslim boys. The study therefore revealed that poverty together with misconceptions of religion are the major factors that facilitated the emergence and development of Boko Haram. The researchers recommend that Nigerian Government should address the root and symptom of the problem by eradicating poverty, providing employment to the people and enhancing security efforts.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

According to (Murtada, 2013) the real name of Boko Haram was *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lid da'awati Wal-Jihad*, (congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad). The word Boko Haram means western education is forbidden. The group emerged in early 2000s as small Sunni Islamic group advocating a strict interpretation and implementation of Islamic law in Nigeria. Initially, the sect's leadership did not call for violence; its followers engaged in periodic clashes with security during its formative years (Blanchard, 2014). There is a growing suspicion among Nigerians about the real identity and motive of Boko Haram sect. Most Muslims see it as an extension of *Maitatsine* sect which was established in 1945 to transport turmoil to Islam as it was confirmed that Maitatsine was not a Muslim until his death, while a reasonable number of Christians see it as an attempt to Islamize Nigerians while some are indifferent (Shehu, 2014). In 2009, the activities of Boko Haram had transformed from a local peace militia into a violent group, after the government attacked the members of the group in some major cities of Northern Nigeria, which led to five days violent clashes between the group members and the Nigerian forces and resulted in killing the sect leader, Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri, and more than 700 other people (Blanchard, 2014).

After the 2009 uprising, the activities of the sect slowed down somewhat. The violent re-emergence of the group occurred in 2010. The group devised new tactics that included suicide bombing, kidnapping, and attacking Islamic clerics, Mosques and churches in the country. Nigeria witnessed the first suicide bombings in police headquarters and United Nation's office in Abuja in 2010 (Blanchard, 2014). The

activities of the sect escalated when on 14th April, 2014 the group kidnapped 250 female students from Government Girl's Secondary school Chibok in Borno State (Zenn, 2014). Also, Boko Haram and Ansaru were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United State Security Department in November 2013. Ansaru was the Boko Haram faction that earlier in 2013 kidnapped and executed seven foreigners who were working with international construction companies. Subsequently, the United Nations Committee on Al Qaeda sanction blacklisted the group on 22nd May, 2014 as one of the world terrorist organisations. The United Nation listing entry describes Boko Haram as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda and also one of the organizations of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Reuters, 2014). Therefore, this study aims to examine the threat of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian National Security system.

1.1 Background of the Study

Islam is an Arabic word which means "surrender, submission, commitment and peace." Thus, Islam can be defined as a path to attain complete peace through voluntary submission to the divine will.

How did Islam begin?

Islam is a monotheistic faith centered around belief in the one God (Allah). In this regard, it shares some beliefs with Judaism and Christianity by tracing its history back to the patriarch Abraham, and ultimately to the first Prophet Adam. All the prophets preached the same universal message of belief in one God and kindness to humanity. The last in the series of prophets, according to Muslims, was Muhammad. Muhammad was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia around 570 CE. He worked first as a shepherd and then as a merchant. He was not happy with the people around him because of superstitions and social and economic injustice. The people were

worshipping many gods and had forgotten the message of Prophet Abraham to worship one God. Muhammad loved to pray and meditate in the mountains. On one of those occasions in the year 610 CE, when he was about 40 years old, he received a revelation from God through the angel Jibril(Gabriel).He continued to receive messages from God throughout his life and he began preaching to others what he had learned. His main message is that there was no other God but Allah and that people should lead their lives in a way that was pleasing to Allah.

How Many Muslims are there?

Islam spread quickly first throughout Arabia and surrounding countries and then throughout the world. There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world with 7 million in the United States. Only about 18% of Muslims are Arabs and live in the Middle East. The countries with the largest Muslim populations are Indonesia and India. There are two basic groups of Islam; the sun is (about 80% of the world's Muslims) and the Shi'ites (about 20% of the world's Muslims). Although they share the same basic beliefs, they disagree on who was the rightful leader of Islam after Muhammad's Death.

What dose Islam mean?

Islam is an Arabic word which means "Surrender, submission, commitment and peace." Thus Islam can be defined as a path to attain complete peace through voluntary submission to the divine will.

Who is Allah (God)?

"Allah" is simply the Arabic word for God. He is the same universal God worshipped by people of all faiths. The word "Allah" is sometimes preferred over God because it is neither masculine nor feminine .Also, there is no plural for "Allah".

Who is Allah (God)?

Belief in one God (Allah)

Belief in the Angels

Belief in the holy books sent to all the prophets including Torah that was revealed to the prophet Moses, Bible that was revealed to the prophet Jesus and Qur'an (Koran) that was revealed to the prophet Muhammad.

Belief in all the prophets sent by God including Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. Although Muslims believe in Isa or Jesus they don't think of Jesus as the Son of God the way Christians do.

Belief in the Day of Judgment and life after death. The best reward for performing good deeds is getting closer to God.

Belief in divine decree. This means that God is all-powerful and nothing can happen without His permission, however, has given human beings freedom to choose whether to be good or bad. In the end, everyone will be questioned about how they lived in this life.

What are the five pillars of Islam?

There are guides for daily life for putting the beliefs of Muslims into practice:

Shahadah (declaration of faith) —to bear witness or testify that there is no god except one God (Allah) and Muhammad is His prophet or messenger.

Salat (ritual prayer) - the five daily prayers are performed at dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset and night. The prayers are offered in Arabic language and facing the direction of Mecca.

Zakah (alms tax) - Giving 2.5% of one's wealth to the poor and needy.

Sawn (fasting) - Muslims fast during the daylight in the ninth month of the Islamic lunar calendar called Ramadan. The purpose is to remind people of the goodness of what they have and to show equality with the poor. Ramadan is a time for study and self-discipline.

Hajj (pilgrimage): Muslims believe in making a pilgrimage to Mecca to the Ka'bah at least once in their lifetime. The Ka'bah is believed to have been built by Ibrahim (Abraham) and one of his sons. Muhammad restored it to worship Allah. For this reason it is a very sacred place to Muslims.

What is the final revealed scripture (a sacred text) for Muslims?

Muslims believe that the last revealed scripture sent by God is the Qur'an or Koran. It is the speech of God revealed in the Arabic language to Muhammad during his mission of twenty- three years. The Quran was written down by scribes and memorized during the lifetime of Muhammad. The Qur'an emphasizes moral, ethical and spiritual values with the aim of establishing justice for everyone. Many Muslims try to learn to read the Koran in its original language, Arabic. It is not uncommon for Muslims to memorize whole chapters of it. They read part of it every day. The Sunnah is a record of Muhammad words and deeds. The Sunnah is used to help interpret the Koran. There are also instructions in it on belief, worship and behavior.

In its early years, the group was popularly and locally known as the "Nigerian Taliban" due to its shared anti-Western ideology and its willingness to use violence in an effort to impose a strict form of Sharia law. Likely founded in the mid-1990s as a religious study group, Boko Haram did not transform into the insurgent group it is today until a young and charismatic Nigerian Islamic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf assumed control. Calling themselves the Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram adopted a

"live-off-the land" lifestyle and established a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed "Afghanistan."

Since independence in 1960 until 1999, Nigeria was ruled largely by military rulers, a number of whom were northern Muslims. During this period, Nigerian Islam was fragmented with doctrinal debates between the Sufis and the Salafists, unaware of the fact that Christians were heavily evangelizing throughout the country, especially in the region of the Middle Belt. The growth of Christianity was reflected in the 1999 election of Olusegun Obasanjo, and the continued Southern Christian domination of Goodluck Jonathan. The Muslim response to the Christian political ascendancy was the move during the period of 2000 - 2003 to impose Sharia law in the 12 northern states in which they predominated. For the most part, imposition of Sharia law brought the previously disagreeing Muslim groups together, and there was no further use of takfiri. Takfiris have been classified by some as violent offshoots of the Salafism movement, yet Salafism is seen as a form of fundamentalist Islam," it is not an inherently violent movement that condones terrorism. *Takfiris*, on the other hand, condone acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals. While the imposition of Sharia satisfied the official manifestation of Islam in the north, it is clear that radicals who were takfiris doctrinally - such as members of Boko Haram - were left outside.

Relations between Boko Haram and other Nigerian radical groups are unclear. Although most observers state that the group's name is actually *Jarma'atahlal'sunna li-da'wawa- I'qital*, and that it is the descendent of the group that in 2002 was referred to as the Nigerian Taliban, it is not absolutely certain that these are the same groups. What can be stated with certainty is that the charismatic figure of Muhammad Yusuf, who was killed in July 2009, was the one who initiated Boko Haram's first ascent. The

first mission of Boko Imam was mainly focused upon withdrawal from society - following the example of Dan Fodio - and establishing small camps and schools in remote regions of Borno and Yobe states during the years 2002-2005. As police pressure against these smaller groups began to grow the groups morphed into more of an urban phenomenon practicing *al-amr bi-l-rna'ruf'we-l-nahy'anal-rnunkar* (enjoining the good and forbidding the evil). From such operations, usually against consumption of alcohol and other non-Islamic practices, the groups began to shape its identity. Again, the entire methodology is very much according to the example of Dan Fodio.

The philosophy of Boko Haram is rooted in the practice of orthodox Islam. In their interpretation/orthodox Islam abhors Western' education and working in the civil service. This explains why the sect is popularly known as Boko Haram, some sources stating that it literally means "Western education is sin.

"Boko Haram does not in any way mean". Western education is a sin' as the infidel media continues to portray us. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but is not determined by Western education.

The sect frowns at the media's description of it as the Boko Haram. Instead it prefers to be addressed as the *Jamaat Alisson Lidda'awatiwal Jihad*, meaning 'People committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'. Although the sect's name has changed over the years, its ideological mission stays quite clear, namely to overthrow the Nigerian state and impose Sharia law in the entire country.

Injustice and poverty, as well as the belief that the West is a corrupting influence in governance, are some of the root causes of both the desire to implement Sharia and Boko Haram pursuit of an Islamic state. The emergence of Boko Haram can signify the ripening of long-festered extremist impulses that run deep in the social reality of northern Nigeria. But the group itself can be described as an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos." The reintroduction of Sharia criminal courts were originally proposed by the governor of the state of Zamfara in 1999, but the proposal quickly became a grassroots movement that led to its adoption in twelve states. Experts say there was widespread "disillusionment" with the way Sharia was implemented, and that Boko Haram has tapped into this dissatisfaction, promoting the idea that an Islamic state would eliminate the inconsistencies.

Driven by the deeply-rooted anti-Western ideology, Boko Haram rejects all aspects of Western civilization. The group's positions were informed for many years by the extreme views of Muhammed Yusuf, who rejected evolution and scientific explanations for natural phenomena such as rainfall. Today, Boko Haram's leadership insists that its name encompasses a rejection of Western civilization in its entirety, including rejections of women's and gay rights, democracy, and the consumption of alcohol. The reason for referring to Boko Haram as the 'Nigerian Taliban, especially in its early years, traces back to its shared anti-Western ideology, and its use of force as a means to imposing a stricter form of Sharia law than that which was being implemented in northern Nigeria through government reforms. As a demonstration of its esteem for the Taliban, Boko Haram at one time flew the Taliban's flag at its headquarters. Leaders of Boko Haram have also indicated publicly that they subscribe

to Al -Qaeda's ideology. In a statement issued in the wake of Yusuf's death, Sanni Umaru, who claimed leadership of the group, declared that:

"Boko Haram is just a version of the Al-Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden; we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.

1.2 Research Objectives

Studies have examined the root causes of terrorism and the objectives of terrorists. Identified root causes can be classified as follows, economic, social, religious, ethnic and political. We now examine these studies in more depth. The main objective is to assess the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian Security?

1.2.1 Specific Objectives

1. To analyze the causes of Boko Haram insurgency
2. Evaluate the strategies used by Boko Haram in achieving their goals
3. Analyze the security implications of Boko Haram activities
4. Assess the possible solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency

1.3 Research Questions

In light of the above in this study I explore the following research questions in order to examine consistency between existing literature general belief and public opinion about Boko Haram Based on my assessment of the key areas of a possible divergence, I honed in on the following critical questions related to root causes and objectives of torrents.

1. What are the root causes of Boko Haram insurgency?
2. What are the strategies used by Boko Haram to achieve their goals?
3. What are the security implications of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria?

4. What are the possible solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria?

1.4 Justification of the Study

The nineteenth century constituted a momentous turning point in the history of Africa. Not only did it witness the end of the slave trade and the inauguration of legitimate commerce, the high tide of European imperial invasion, conquest and pacification, but it also heralded the introduction of Western education. While western education was a valuable instrument of effective colonization and pacification of Africa, ironically it was also very useful for the eventual decolonization of Africa. It is against this background that the history of Western education remains an overarching theme in African history. However, it is erroneous to assume that there was no system of education in Africa before the advent of the Europeans. The nature of colonialism resulted in the denigration and disruption of the African traditional cultures and systems of education to make way for Western education and European civilization. Although private schools were set up to reverse these distortions, they were too few to make any significant impact.

This article examines the central and pioneering role of the Christian missionaries in the introduction of Western education- specifically, the emergence of private and public schools- in the sub-Saharan Africa, and the place of Western education in the effective colonization and eventual decolonization of Africa. It is noteworthy that the mission school systems, modeled after European metropolitan institutions, became the cornerstone of future educational planning in post-independence Africa. At the higher education levels, European university systems were wholly adopted with little modifications in almost all of the newly independent African states. Western education became indispensable in the formation of new identities and national development.

1.4.1 Traditional Education

The concept of education in Africa was not a colonial invention. Prior to European colonization and subsequent introduction of Western education, traditional educational systems existed in Africa. The enduring role of education in every society is to prepare individuals to participate fully and effectively in their world; it prepares youths to be active and productive members of their societies by inculcating the skills necessary to achieve these goals. Although its functions varied, African traditional education was not compartmentalized. Fundamentally, it was targeted toward producing an individual who grew to be well grounded, skillful, cooperative, civil, and able to contribute to the development of the community. The educational structure in which well-rounded qualities were imparted was fundamentally informal; the family, kinship, village group, and the larger community participated in the educational and socialization process. In his *Education in Africa*, (Moumouni 1968) affirmed that the educational process essentially was based on a “gradual and progressive achievements, in conformity with the successive stages of physical, emotional and mental development of the child” (Moumouni 1968). The medium of instruction was the native language or “mother tongue” through which systematic instruction was delivered by way of songs, stories, they explore and conquer their natural environment.

The African child was taught the various tribal laws and customs and wide range of skills required for success in traditional society. Traditionally, education received by Africans was oriented toward the practical. Work by (Bassey, 1991) indicates that those who took to fishing were taught navigational techniques like seafaring, the effects of certain stars on tide and ebb, and immigration patterns and behavior of fish. Those who took to farming had similar training. Those who learned trades and crafts,

such as blacksmithing, weaving, woodwork and bronze work, needed a high degree of specialization and were often apprenticed outside their hoes for training and disciplined. Those who took to the profession of traditional priesthood, village heads, Kings, medicine men and women diviners, rainmakers, and rulers underwent a longer period of painstaking training and rituals to prepare them for the vital job they were to perform.

Teaching was basically by example and learning by doing. African education emphasized equal opportunity for all, social solidarity and homogeneity. It was complete and relevant to the needs and expectations of both the individuals and society. This is because it was an integral part of the social, political and economic foundation of the African society. However, the advent of the European missionaries and the introduction of Western education through the mission schools changed, in many fundamental ways, the dynamics of African education. Western education soon took the center stage in Africa, debasing, challenging and supplanting the traditional, informal education along with its cultural foundations.

1.4.2 Missionaries and Western Education

The history of western education in Africa is directly traceable to the relentless efforts of European Christian missionary bodies. Missionary activities in Africa began as early as the late fifteenth century following the successful exploratory missions sponsored by Prince Henry (“the Navigator”) of Portugal. For these expeditions, Prince Henry received several letters of indulgence from the church encouraging the propagation of the Catholic faith. Although a few Portuguese missionaries visited the courts of the oba (king) of Benin and Mani-Kongo for the purpose of conversion of Africans, their efforts did not translate into firm establishment of Christianity in these areas. Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, Christianity made practically no

headway in Africa as the Portuguese abandoned their idea of conversion. The new and lucrative trade in slaves on the coasts before their departure to the New World.

The evangelical revival movement in Europe during late 1700s reawakened missionary zeal. Encouraged by the reports of explorers of primitive, backward and so called “godless” races of Africa, many evangelicals committed themselves to the task of Christianizing and “civilizing” them. The Great Awakening witnessed the establishment of missionary societies led by a group of influential Englishmen- the Clapham Sect-who devoted their time energy to reviewing the problems of the moment. Two major issues of the time and energy to reviewing the problems of the moment. Two major issues of the time, the abolition of slavery and extension of Christianity outside Europe, dominated the deliberations of this group. Prominent members of the Clapham Sect, including William Wilberforce, Granville sharp and Zachary Macaulay, believed that the slave trade was abominable and repugnant on humanitarian ground and that abolition of the trade was a necessary precondition for the successful Christianization of Africa. Consequently, their struggles recorded a breakthrough in 1807 when the British Parliament passed bill to abolish slave trade in England. The passage of the slave bill gave stimulus to the growing number of Christian mission societies who were prepared to commence evangelical work in Africa.

Missionary concern for Africa was on two major fronts: first to help encourage Africans to abandon the inhuman trade in slaves, and secondly to teach African natives the noble ways of life. The reports of European travelers and their travelogues profoundly informed missionary endeavors in Africa. Their reports reinforced the myth of a Dark Continent and uncivilized and secular people, providing the *raison d’etre* for the European missionary enterprise in Africa. From the start, however,

Europeans were well aware that for effective conversion and civilization of Africans to occur, the introduction of western education with the Bible as the major master text. The ability to read and understand the Bible became an overriding index of success for the missionaries.

Missionaries in Benin. A group of European Christian missionaries pose with students in Porto-Novo, Benin, in this illustration from the History of the Catholic Missions (1882).

The earliest formal, western schools were founded in West Africa, attached to the castles in the Gold Coast, modern day Ghana. There were three of such schools; the oldest was established at Elmina by the Dutch West Indiana Company in 1644 and placed under the control of the castle Chaplain for the education of the mulatto children for whom they felt some responsibility. These children were to be educated as Christians, speaking the Dutch language and imbibing the Dutch culture. It was hoped that the Dutch who held subordinate posts might be replaced By Africans of partly European descent who would be more accustomed to the climate than European Afflicted by fluctuating fortunes- staffing, funds and public support –Elmina School still lasted for more than 200 years until the Dutch departed.

A similar school was founded at Christian Borg (also in Gold Coast) by the Danes in 1722, and like Elmina, it was for mulattoes under a Danish Resident Chaplain. The teacher was a soldier. At first, this school admitted boys who it was hoped would become soldiers who would form a mulatto guard for the Danish forts on the coast. Its curriculum was similar to Elmina's. Like the Elmina School, Christian Borg was frustrated especially by the minimal support it received from the Danish government.

The third school, which was established at Cape Coast by the English in 1752, by all accounts was the first real mission school in West Africa. Its founder, the Reverend Thomas Thompson. Was sent out from England by the society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG).Its curriculum was clerical. Reverend Thompson sent three Africans to England for training ,two of whom died and the third, Philip Quaque, returned to Cape Coast as missionary in 1766.He took charge of the cape Coast School and reorganized it for instruction in “religious knowledge, reading ,writing and arithmetic” (Priestley 1968). Like the other two schools that preceded it, the cape coast schools suffered changes of fortune and continued in an irregular fashion until it was taken over and reorganized by the colonial government of Sierra Leone under its governor, Sir Charles McCarthy.

The advances, activities and accomplishments of the European missionaries especially in relation to western education before the 1800s were at best only minimal.

The three schools were begun as isolated ventures rather than as coordinated beginnings of widespread educational systems. Their operations were quite irregular and their curricula were narrow as they were originally designed to serve a small percentage of the population, the mulattoes and their children. Be that as it may, there is no question that the schools influenced later education in the Gold Coast, providing an enduring educational traditional upon which others would build.

Though preceded by other groups such as the Lutheran Moravian Brethren and the London in 1799 was quite auspicious for evangelism and western education. This society subsequently provided the leadership for the European missionary enterprise in Africa. Soon, other missionary bodies became involved; it was no longer just a matter of converting Africans to Christianity as emphasis shifted to sects and

nationality. In a way, it was a scramble for the souls of Africans. These missionary groups included the Wesleyan Methodists Missionary Society (WMMS), the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and the Baptist from the (American) Southern Baptist Convention, the society of Africa Missions (the Catholic Mission) from France, the Jesuits, the Basel Missionaries and the Lutherans.

In 1804, for instance, two German Lutheran clergy, Melchior Renner and Peter Hartwig, trained in the seminary at Berlin, sailed to Freetown for missionary work, as did the Danish Basel Mission, which sent four missionaries, Holzwarthe, Schmidt, Salbach and Henke to the Gold Coast in 1827. Many Sierra Leoneans, especially the captives, were converted to Christianity.

But the death toll among missionaries was heavy from the start, reaching a peak in the yellow fever epidemic of 1823. This frustrated Europeans evangelical missions. Recognizing that Africans were better used to the harsh tropical West African Climate, the CMS, therefore, began to support a policy of training Africans as priests for the ministry.

Thomas Fowell Buxton, a prominent member of the British parliament and vice president of the CMS had urged the co-operation of the government and the missionary societies in the “deliverance “of Africa. Joseph Shanahan, the head of the Holy Ghost Fathers in Eastern Nigeria in the early twentieth century, affirmed: “Those who hold the school holds the country, holds religion, holds its future” (Jordan 1949). Father Wauter, a Catholic missionary in Western Nigeria pointed stated, “We knew the best way to make conversion in pagan countries was to open school. Practically all pagan boys ask to be baptized .So when the district of Ekiti-Ondo was opened in 1916, we started schools even before there was any church or

mission house” (Abernethy 1969). Clearly, education became central to the missionaries for the realization of these goals as understood by Buxton and others. Such education, it was argued, would help reshape the African economy in favor of legitimate trade, making it possible for the emergence of a generation of educated African middle-class elite who would become leaders of the church, commerce, industry and politics in Africa.

It was, therefore, in response to the ferment of the time that CMS founded a regular training college at Fourah Bay in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in 1827, for African Clergy. Unlike the three earlier schools in the Gold Coast, the story of Western education in Sierra Leone was that of expansion, although occasionally this was frustrated by the frequent deaths of the missionaries. Fourah Bay ultimately became an important institution for Western education, where many West Africans studied for clerical or teaching profession. Perhaps the most famous of Fourah graduates was Samuel Ajayi Crowther who was ultimately ordained the first African bishop of the Anglican Church by the CMS. In 1857, following a successful private expedition up the Niger, Crowther was commissioned to establish an African mission for evangelism. He later became instrumental to the establishment of schools and missions in Eastern Nigeria. Crowther died in 1891. By 1935; however, the CMS had established schools and missions in virtually all parts of the present-day Nigeria.

In East Africa, Anglicans, Scottish Episcopalians and Methodists had an alliance aimed at working toward a united ministry based on united training. The most enduring contribution of the alliance was in education. For instance, Alliance High School at Kikuyu in Kenya was opened in 1926 and a CMS missionary, Carey Francis was appointed headmaster in 1940. Alexander Mackay, a teacher, evangelist, builder and printer was central to the educational development in Uganda. The early

Christians were known as readers and by 1880 the first translations of parts of the Bible were circulating, printed on Mackay's own press. In the 1920s through the 1930s, almost exclusively missionaries ran East African schools.

The expansions of mission schools in Africa were quite dramatic, and missionary societies were at the center stage of this development. In Nigeria, for instance, the CMS, which started with 6 schools in 1849, increased the number to 150 by 1909. Similarly, the Wesleyan Mission schools increased from 3 (with 255 pupils and 9 teachers) in 1861 to 138 schools (with 5,361) pupils and 285 teachers) in 1921, while the Roman Catholic Mission increased their schools from 2 in 1893 to about 127 in 1922. The Basel Mission Society in the Cameroon enrolled about 100 students in 1904 and 6,600 by 1914. The trend of growth was also evident in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, especially in East Africa. For instance, in Uganda the CMS expanded the number of its schools from 72 (with 7,683 students) in 1900 to 331 schools (with 32,458 students) by 1913. In Nyasaland the Dutch Reformed Church set up 111 schools (with 10,000 students) in 1903 and by 1910 the figures went up to 865 schools with over 25,796 students.

From the start, European missionaries and their mission schools were contemptuous of African indigenous cultures. Instructions provided to Africans were designed to impart foreign (Western) cultures and values. Africans were persuaded to abandon their own culture and tradition. While the older people proved more reluctant to change, the younger ones readily succumbed to the new teachings of white missionaries, denigrating and rejecting their own cultures and tradition. Yet, the commoner and the oppressed classes were more inclined to discard the traditional ways that offered them little or no advantage. In other words, conversion depended upon the personal benefits, real or imagined that Christianity conferred. In things Fall

apart (1959), Chinua Achebe showed how the Osu (outcasts) of Umuofia were the first to abandon their customs and tradition, seek conversion to Christianity, and receive Western Education and the Nigerian Cultural Background (Onti, 1964), noted the contradictions of missionary education for Africa: While the school taught them one set of values based on European cultures and value, the home and the environment taught them African ways of life.

Soon, earlier African converts began to feel the yoke of a religion that was closely tied to European culture and colonialism and they challenged not only the teachings of the missionaries but mission schools curricula and instructions. As early as the 1880s of their churches. Consequently, they formed their own independent Christian churches, a movement that later spread across central Africa in the wake of European applicable to all humankind; they also considered the second coming of Jesus Christ as signaling an end to oppression and colonialism. Similarly, the idea of private schools began to gain ground in order to check cultural alienation and to include secular education in the curricula.

In East Africa, as in other places, trouble started when the Church of Scotland missionaries (CSM) demanded that all African church elders and head teachers renounce female circumcision. As a result, the CSM lost 80 percent of its students as kikuyu established independent, private (community) schools under their control. By 1933, there were 34 such schools with 5,111 students and by 1936 the figures had increased to 50 schools. Similar private schools emerged in many parts of Africa. They include the Majola Agbebi's Agbowa Industrial Mission School in Nigeria established in 1895, John L. Dube's Ohlange Institute in Natal established in 1900, Eyo Ita's Independent School in Nigeria established in 1920 and Aggrey memorial School established in Uganda in 1935. In a sense, the African independent church

movement and private school initiatives were both an early an early expression of nationalism.

1.4.3 Western Education and Colonialism

The successful imposition of European colonial rule on Africa between 1890 and 1900 challenged and redefined the purpose of western (commonly referral to as colonial) education in Africa. For quite some time, tensions existed between the missionaries and the new colonial governments over who should control of the schools. The missionaries jealously guarded their schools. Although they were in dire need of African auxiliaries for the colonial service, the ecclesiastical focus of instructions at the mission schools troubled the colonial administrators. In his article “Educational policies and reforms,” Apollos Nwauwa argued that, while missionaries used education as an instrument for effective conversion of Africans to Christianity, colonial governments saw difference meant that a clash between the missionary bodies and colonial governments saw education as means of socially and politically controlling the subjects. This marked difference meant that a clash between the missionary bodies and colonial officials was inevitable. The establishment of public, government schools in many parts of Africa was a consequent of this face-off. In Nigeria, for instance two government schools a Muslim school and King’s College both in Lagos were opened in 1900 and by 1930, the number of government schools had increased to 51 and that of assisted schools increased to 275 while unassisted (mission) schools were 2,413. In comparison to the mission schools, government-run schools were too few. Yet, colonial governments were not prepared to commit their meager budget toward the complete takeover of education in Africa.

Thus, despite the continuing tension between them, the missionaries and the new colonial regimes recognized that they needed each other. While the various colonial

governments protected the missionaries from, sometimes, hostile African groups, the missionaries were very useful agents of colonial pacification and acculturation. Since the sheer costs of running schools independent of the missionaries worried colonial administrations shared similar interest in the role of education in the civilization of Africans and in creating a body of literate, obedient, organized, and productive Africans for the benefit of European imperialism. Not surprisingly, by 1925, as Roland Oliver and J.D Fage noted, the British embarked on a far-reaching education policy “where colonial governments would spend their limited funds in subsidizing, inspecting and improving the schools already operated by the Christian missions instead of founding rival and far more expensive systems of state education” (Oliver & Fage 1979). Therefore, for financial reasons as well as for a marriage of convenience, mission schools not only co-existed with government and private school, but also surpassed the latter in their rate of expansion and African patronage. As many sub-Africans became Christians, mission-run schools continued to be attractive.

Nevertheless, the nature of colonial involvement in education depended on the administrative style of each colonial power. A common feature was that in the early years of European occupation, the education of Africans was left to private, missionary initiatives, with occasion colonial government subsidies. The various colonial governments eventually became more involved far reaching educational policies and reforms, providing broad guidelines for the schools. The French assimilation policy dictated the nature of its education policy in Africa. Since assimilation was based on the assumption that Africans were primitive and should be transformed and absorbed into the so-called “civilized” French culture and way of life, education became a veritable instrument for accomplishing this objective.

Assimilation accorded qualified Africans the rights to French citizenship with all its subordinated privileges.

To qualify for assimilation, however, the acquisition of Western education that meant the adoption of French culture was a prerequisite. Since the religious focus of the mission schools was not adequate in accomplishing the assimilation's objectives, the French colonial administration intervened to realign education accordingly. Fluency in French was a prerequisite. School administrators and teachers were directed to replace the mother tongue hitherto used by the missionaries as a medium of instruction with the French language. The use of French at all educational levels was a key element in fulfilling the policy of assimilation. It was a powerful instrument in the dissemination of French culture among the natives. The policy of association that later replaced assimilation also targeted the elite classes of Africans who met the criteria for French citizenship and who would become assimilate through adoption of French culture and education.

The French educational scheme for Africans was quantitatively limited and elitist. The educational focus was in the provision of primary, secondary, and vocational training meant to fit Africans to their physical environment as well as subordinate positions in the colonial service. As Ralph J. Bunche acknowledged, the French colonial educational policy was shaped by a preconceived notion of what Africa was to be, of what his status in the changing world should be, and hence the need to provide education for them "along his own lines" (Bunche, 1934). The sweeping changes of the post-World War II 1941-1945 period did not result in significant shift in the French colonial educational policies. The educational system adopted by the Portuguese, Belgium, and Germany followed the French pattern very closely. Liked the French, assimilation constituted the cornerstone of the Portuguese colonial policy

in Africa. Believing that the African was primitive, the Portuguese designed their colonial educational system to impact Portuguese culture and values. Consequently, they regarded their colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and the islands of Sao-Tome and Principe as overseas extension of Portugal, merely physically separated from Portugal. This notion gave a misleading signal that they were genuinely dedicated to the principle of equality with Africans. The selective and restricted educational practices of the Portuguese colonial governments contradicted their declarations on assimilation. In his article "Portuguese Africa" (Duffy 1961), observed that the Salazar's regime envisaged the formation of a devout, semi-literate, hardworking, and conservative African population.

The purpose of Portuguese education in Africa, as outlined in the Regulation of 1899, was to prepare Africans for their future roles as peasants and artisans. Thus, the type of education provided for the masses was for psychological and cultural assimilation with limited political integration. The school fees were quite high. White children were privileged over blacks. As a result, only a handful of Africans received sound primary and secondary training that prepared them for university education. This was hardly surprising because Portugal was a poor country and could not afford the educational promises based on mass education, civilization, and assimilation. Nevertheless, the limited instruction provided became a tool for the spread of Portuguese culture, language, and civilization that was essentially non-African in character.

The Belgium educational policy in African can be described as Platonic; it emphasized the transmission of certain unquestioned and unquestionable ethical values to Africans in relation to predetermined status and function. The policy favored primary school to the complete neglect of post primary and university education as

the case of the Congo demonstrated. For the Belgians, as George Kimbe intriguingly stated, “It is better to have 90 percent of the population capable of understanding what the government is trying to do for them . . . than to have 10 percent of the population so full of learning that it spends its time telling the government what to do “(Kimble, 1960).

As a result, by 1951, even though there were about 30,000 students who were enrolled in Belgian schools in Congo, no one qualified for college entrance. At independence, there were less than twenty university graduates in the whole of Congo to run the country. No doubt, the Belgians had the worst record in the provision of education of Africans. The German educational policy was also designed to train Africans as laborers. General Von Trotha was the principal architect of the German education policy, which allowed Africans to receive practical training as laborers to ensure the regular supply of workers for the colonial system.

Under the British indirect rule system, which, in principle, preserved the African indigenous political system, basic and vocational education-and not higher education-was privileged. This was simply because there was no role for a highly educated African in a political set up that depended on the use of traditional political instructions under the kings or chiefs. The report of the Educational Committee of the Privy Council of 1867, which was quite critical of the literary education provided by the missionaries, advocated a strong vocational education for Africans. Yet, for a long time, the British left education to the discretion of the missionaries only to increasingly intervene as colonial rule became firmly established. For instance, in 1872, as work by (Abernethy, 1969) notes, the government of Nigeria instituted a system of grant-in-aid, whereby mission schools meeting certain minimal secular standards received a bursary to help defray expenses incurred in running the schools.

Similar practice was also introduced in the Gold Coast, according to Foster. However, notwithstanding the increasing involvement of colonial governments in setting the policies and guidelines for education, a total take-over of mission schools did not occur before independence. The logistics for such a complete take-over proved daunting for the British colonial administrators.

On the eve of independence, therefore, government and private schools, comparatively fewer in number, co-existed with the mission schools. By 1945, there were comparatively few literate Africans who had not received all or part of their education in mission schools. Missionary control of education throughout most of the colonial era meant that the colonial rulers paid only lip service to the education of Africans. It was not until 1948 that the British established four universities in four of their African colonies after resisting the pressure by African educated elite for almost one hundred years. Inadvertently, however, the coalescence of doctrines of the Bible, the preaching of missionaries, the teachings of the mission schools, and colonial education had ingrained in the African the formidable and liberating ideas that would shake the foundations of European colonial rule.

1.4.4 Western Education and Decolonization

The enduring impact of Western education produced its own contradictions. Early enough, the colonial governments had recognized that their power over Africans depended not necessarily on physical but mental (psychological) control through the school system. Deficient in scope and content, colonial education promoted vocational studies and neglected technology, pure and applied sciences, and engineering. African studies were excluded from the colonial education curricula. For instance, the history syllabi emphasized the history of European activities in Africa instead of the history of Africa and Africans. It praised the Europeans who supposedly

discover Mount Kenya and Rivers Niger and Congo as if Africans who lived in the areas did not know about these rivers. In most all instances, no mention is made of Africans who led the European explorers to their targets. Unquestionably, colonial education resulted in the erosion of African identity and imparted a limited sense of the African past.

The novelist (Wa Thiong'o, 1981) noted the isolationist and alienating influences of colonial education in Africa, including contempt for their African names, languages, environment, heritage of struggle, unity, and mental abilities. Educated Africans not only became deluded hybrids alienated from their cultures and tradition, but individuals who longed for alien and "more civilized" culture of the West. It was on this score that Walter Rodney argued that colonial education in Africa "was education for subordination, exploitation, the creation of mental confusion and development of underdevelopment "(Rodney 1972). By killing the communalist spirit in Africans and replacing it with a capitalistic one; by corrupting the mental sensibilities of Africans; by providing selective training to fix auxiliary positions in the colonial service, by disregarding the people' cultures in the educational curriculum, colonial education, according to Rodney, fostered under development of Africa's intellectual resources. However, despite its limited and misplace purposes and negative effect, wester education produced some unintended positive consequences for Africans. It served a catalyst to African nationalism.

Following the successful European invention and imposition of colonial rule, Africans had been disconcerted by the humiliation and loss of sovereignty. European Christian missionary's evangelism and religious instruction, embraced by many Africans mainly for their implicit benefits, gradually became perceived as agents of European imperialism. African suspicion increased. Revolt became imminent. From the

discontent of the earlier African convert who founded their own independent Christian churches through the establishment of private schools, slowly but surely, African began to protest against not only Europeans occupation but also the concomitant cultural dislocation and alienation. Many missions –educated Africans, a number of who become teachers and members of the clergy, were not satisfied with their limited education. Consequently, they began to seek for advanced training. Because the various European colonial powers refused to establish universities in their colonies, Africans who could afford it proceeded overseas (especially the United States and United Kingdom) for further studies. Completing advanced (university)training in various fields abroad coupled with exposure to the deep cultures of the West-politics, economics, social issues-and various powerful concepts such as liberty, self-determination, equality, it was only natural for them to relate these notions to their own conditions in Africa. As the work of (Ajayi, 1965) has affirmed, educated Africans began to use those same ideas as a standard by which to judge the intentions and actions of the European administration. Empowered and emboldened, they returned home to confront the colonial situations that would force them to question not only the very basis and justifications for European colonial rule but also other intriguing imperial notions, including racial hierarchy, colonial differential salaries for Africans, and employment discrimination.

Unfortunately, European colonial officials were not prepared to accommodate or address the aspirations of the new but potent elite. Initially, some of these educated elite only demanded appointments and salaries in the colonial civil service commensurate with their training, with the hope of working their way up to the political ladder, but European colonial officials who saw them as a threat to the status quo frustrated their hopes. This was a tactical error. African elites consequently felt

marginalized. Decolonization became their ultimate goal. Implicitly, Western education had become instrumental in helping Africans in their articulation of imperialism as a global phenomenon.

By mid- 1950s, graduates of African universities joined the ranks of their overseas-trained counterparts in pressing for political reforms toward the ideals of self-government. It was from the graduates of these universities that the currents of nationalism flowed across much of Africa. Yet, the effects of World War II on European power and their ultimately provided African-educated elites (nationalists) with the *raison d'être* for mass mobilization against colonial rule. They readily employed political concepts, tactics, and slogans of sovereignty and self-determination, as tested in the West, not only to mobilize the masses into action but also to launch major onslaughts against European colonial rule. European retreat from the empire soon resulted in outright decolonization in Africa by the late 1950s to mid-1960s. Without a doubt, Western education remains relevant in any analysis of the rise and fall of European empires in Africa.

Without a doubt, Western education also provided the necessary tools needed by African nationalists to dislodge European colonial rule. In a sense, Western education created a kind of Frankenstein Monster for colonial rule. It was introduced by the Europeans to consolidate their imperial rule in Africa, but it ended up assisting Africans in the liquidation of colonial rule. However, the departure of Europeans from Africa did not result in the dumping of neither Western education nor European cultures and value systems. Rather, what followed was the wholesale adoption of European customs, political systems, and other ways of life through what has popularly become known as neo-colonialism. A contradiction remained. While empowering to Africans, Western education was also alienating.

Thousands of people lose their lives annually in the hands of terrorist organizations and their violent acts. In order to prevent or reduce such unnecessary deaths, I need to generate in-depth knowledge and information on terrorism. Due to their *modus operandi* terrorists don't differentiate between civilians and armed security agents. Their objectives seem to spread as much as fear as possible and cause widespread destruction which undermines both political and economic stability especially in developing countries of Asia and Africa.

While scholars and governments agents can only guess what drives individuals to carry out such violent including suicide, interventions are required urgently to stem the rise of domestic terrorism. This study is therefore a small contribution to the literature and knowledge on causes of terrorism and possible solutions.

By analyzing Boko Haram in the context of Nigeria with widespread poverty, security agents and policy makers can appreciate that certain economic and social intervention rather than security operations can starve terrorist organizations new recruits. Boko Haram the has become the new Al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their affiliated splinter groups' ever-present activity in North and West Africa combined with unsettling terror in Nigeria makes for this study's importance. .

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the theoretical approach of the study; Poverty theory was adopted to explain the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria. Moreover, the sub-sections of the literature review explained the conceptual framework in which a diagram was designed to predict the relations between the above variables. The last part of the literature explained the historical evolution of the group.

The concept of security and conflict has evolved considerably over the years. Traditional security was defined primarily at the nation-state level and almost exclusively through the military point of view. This focus on external military threat to national security was particularly dominant during the Cold War. It would be misleading however, to associate the origins of security studies with the Cold War and the associated nuclear threat the nature of security has become one of the most widely-discussed elements in the intellectual ferment that has been triggered by the end of the Cold War. Optimists have declared that the end of the Cold War and of that century would usher in a new era of peace and cooperation, based variously on liberal democracy, transnational capitalism, international organizations, or a combination of the above. The more pessimistic offered warnings of an anarchic future filled with anti-civilization or ethnic conflict and weapons proliferation. Still others, less absorbed with questions of military statecraft, have focused on new threats or new understandings that require a basic rethinking of security itself. It seems even before the September 2001 attacks leading to the world focusing its attention on the seriousness of terrorism and the threats, there was serious need for re-examining the concepts of security and terrorism.

In the past few years, an increasing number of terrorism scholars have moved away from conventional emphasis on problem-solving theory to a focus on critical scholarship. Terrorism scholars' focus on problem-solving had meant research on terrorism was seen outside of theoretical reflection in the discipline of international relations (IR.). Previously, terrorism was studied within other related fields such as conflict resolution, strategic studies, military studies etc. International Relations scholars studying political violence from a critical perspective - like Critical Security Studies, mostly ignored terrorism as a topic of study and left it to other subfields. Thus, terrorism studies' place in IR was marginalized, an aspect that has now become exemplified in terms of the debates that are ongoing in the subfield of security studies. Among conventional security scholars and critical scholars, such as the Copenhagen, Paris and Aberystwyth Schools' respective critiques of conventional security scholarship, have been missing in discussions regarding how terrorism should be studied.

Terrorism and the development thereof are now one of the fastest-expanding areas of research, in the Western academic World; this follows a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the field and its voluminous output by senior scholars, security practitioners and sections of the public. Making the case for Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) depend on credible and compelling critique of the current state of orthodox terrorism- and security studies. One of the most fundamental problems is that the central concept of the field 'terrorism' remains essentially contested. In practice, its use is always highly subjective and politically stigmatizing. To avoid legitimizing or naturalizing the 'terrorism' label, many scholars denote the inherent artificiality of the term 'terrorism'. CTS rely on the articulation of a relatively coherent and consistent set of epistemological, ontological and ethical normative commitments,

as well as a clear research programmer and future trajectory. Without discounting contributors of positivist social science, CTS rests on an understanding of knowledge as a social process through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices. It can be said knowledge always reflects the social-cultural context within which it emerges the highly gendered and Eurocentric approach of some of the more orthodox research subject. CTS begins with an acceptance of the basic insecurity of all knowledge and the impossibility of neutral or objective knowledge and study of terrorism.

2.1 Theoretical Approach

This study adopts Poverty Theory to examine the threat of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigerian National Security.

2.1.1 Poverty Theory

The Poverty Theory can be used to explain one of the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. According to (Liolio, 2013), the successful recruitment of the people into the group depend on the nature of the economic and poverty level in the area mostly insurgent gain members by claiming their struggle is for the people and that they would provide basic necessity for the general population if supported. The insurgent may succeed if such society embedded by poverty, illiteracy, ineptitude, corruption, discrimination to modernization and globalization, which create artificial poverty to many underdeveloped countries, such countries would become recruitment target of the terrorists. (Liolio, 2013), further stated that, it is significant to know that the root causes of the insurgency often relate to a long cloudy set of problems culminating into uncontrolled grievances and exploding violence. Such problems are socio-economic and political, that is why insurgencies are more rampant in underdeveloped countries or countries engulfed by corrupt regime, ethnicity, social prejudices religion and disparities in the distribution of resources or even lack of it.

Also, (Olojo, 2013) contends that one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation. Several scholars believed that poverty and longstanding economic disparities in the northeast part of the country made the youth join the sect.

Similarly, (Adesoji, 2010) stresses that, In Nigeria the marginalization and imbalance distribution or implementation of the resources made some radicalized scholars to preach against the government and democratic setting, which later gave birth to the present Boko Haram insurgency.

The Poverty theory further explains that domestically the politicization of religious traditions and the radicalization of religious communities are especially likely in times of economic decay, social integration or state collapse. Hopeless people below the poverty line; people who are marginalized or physical threat turn to their religious in search for an alternative political order that satisfies their need for welfares, recognition, and security (Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2005). In present time, there are many violent uprisings around the world, some transformed into full terrorist organizations like the Boko Haram. The theory shows the significance of socio-economic factors in explaining religious insurgency like Boko Haram.

Furthermore, Nigeria is a country with more than 160 million people with nearly 330 ethnic groups and more than 250 languages. In terms of religion 50% are Muslim and while 40% are Christian while a further 10% practice traditional beliefs. Poverty is what is seen by many observers and analysts as the root cause of most of the ethno religious crisis in northern Nigeria which Boko Haram insurgency is among. With the death of infrastructure development, 90% of Nigerians are permanently in crippling poverty. The country was ranked 153th out of 177 poor economic countries on the

human development index (UNDP, 2008), despite its rich cultural endowment and abundant human and natural resources (Adenrele, 2014). Northern Nigeria in particular has the highest figure of relative poverty in comparison with south- west and south-east zones that have relative poverty of 67.0% and 59.1% respectively. The northeast and north-west zones have the higher figure of 76.3% and 77.7% relative poverty respectively (NBS, 2012).

Moreover, the rate of unemployment in the country has continued to increase despite the abundant human and natural resources available in the country. Unemployment has become a major problem tormenting the lives of the Nigerian youths and this poses a serious menace to Nigeria as a country (Adebayo, 2014).

Furthermore, 64 million Nigeria Youths are unemployed while 1.6 million are under-employed. Unemployment causes dejection, frustration, desperation and dependency on family members and friends. This dependency situation has left the youths in a vicious cycle of chronic poverty that daily erodes their confidence of bright future. In such a case, most of these unemployed youths are the primary target of the insurgents (Adebayo, p, 22, 2014).

In addition, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2007) said “despite Nigeria’s plentiful resources and oil wealth, poverty is widespread to the extent that the country is ranked one of the 20 poorest countries in the world”. Indeed over 70 percent of the population is classified as poor, with 35 percent living in absolute poverty (Adenrele, 2014; Blanchard, 2014).

Understanding Boko Haram’s appeal among some citizen in Nigeria’s far north requires an examination of underlying development challenges facing northern Nigeria, where high rates of poverty and unemployment are exacerbated by extreme

population growth and low level of literacy. These factors combined with weak governance, rampant corruption and inadequate public service delivery, has contributed to the widespread disaffection that some suggest may facilitate Boko Haram recruitment.

A country with legacies of economic stagnation, a higher level of unemployment and uneven economic development is a fertile ground on which terrorist seed can flourish (Umar, 2013). Moreover, individuals and group grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister group to get support and recruit for terrorist violence. This explains how economically deprived youth can easily be recruited by the extremist group, due to the economic hardship in the region (Umar, 2013).

The increasing rate of unemployed youth in the region provides easy target for recruitment by Boko Haram. Some scholars point out that the connection between poverty, illiteracy and terrorism is indirect and complicated. The huge number of young people living on the margins of Nigeria society intensified these linkages (Olojo, 2013). In 2013 the federal government released some detainees of Boko Haram, mostly wives and children of the sect members, some children confessed of providing kegs of fuel to Boko Haram to set school and other buildings ablaze in Maiduguri for the sum of 5000 naira equivalent to USD14 (Olojo, 2013). These show how the people in the area were living in absolute poverty due to the failure of the government to provide education and economic opportunity in the area for more than a decade. These socio-economic problems contributed to the escalation of Boko Haram violence in north-eastern Nigeria.

The theory explains that in most cases, conflicts occur as a result of growing economic, social, and political inequalities in and between nations (Hensenclever & Rittberger, 2005). (Ojolo, 2013) noted that individuals and groups grievances such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalization, can be used as mobilizing instruments by sinister group to get support and recruit for terrorist violence. The predominantly Muslim northern Nigeria provide the group a steady stream for recruitment, the deprived youths and Almajiris are willing to join any movement for them to find an alternative to the current economic and political inequalities that existed in the country; believing that the sect version of radical Salafism to be the answer to their problems.

2.2 Root Causes of Terrorist Organizations

2.2.1 Economic and Social Root Causes

Poverty and unemployment have been identified by some studies as common causes of terrorism. However, several studies have found no link between poverty, unemployment and terrorism. The general belief of the security and intelligence community is that people who are economically deprived are more likely to resort to violence as a way to express their grievances. That is poverty and unemployment fuel terrorism. The theory of relative deprivation explains that when people feel deprived of something they are expect to have, they become discontent, hence could use violence to express their grievances. Although, it is argued that poor economic conditions such as lack of employment opportunities' and poverty create the condition for people to join terrorist organizations. A study by Kavanagh found that poor but highly educated people were the ones likely to participate in terrorism (Kavanagh, 2011).

Bhatia and Ghanem in their study that examined the relationship between education, unemployment- and violent extremism, however, found that unemployed educated youth are more likely to be radicalized by terrorist groups due to the unemployment and lack: of employment opportunities in Arab countries(Bhatia & Ghanem, 2017).

Similarly, the lack of economic opportunities has been found as a root cause of terrorism. A study by (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011) found a negative relationship between lack of economic opportunities and terrorism. The study further shows that countries that restrict economic freedom are susceptible to more terrorist attacks than countries that promote economic freedom (ibid). For example, Mohammad argued, "the deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the Middle Eastern societies has contributed in many ways to the eruption of terrorism in his study that examines the relationship between poverty, minority economic discrimination and domestic terrorism (Mohammad, year). Piazza revealed that countries that subject minority groups to economic discrimination are more likely to experience domestic terrorism than countries where minority groups are not affected by economic discrimination (Piazza, 2011). Lai also found evidence to show that states with greater economic disparities between groups are susceptible to higher terrorist attacks (Lai, 2007).

Low income and economic inequality are found to be possible causes of terrorism. Pinar DerinGure found evidence that the greater the income inequality there is in a country. The greater the incidence of domestic terrorist attacks (Pinar, 2009). (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2009) sampled 114 countries between 1985 and 2012 and found that income inequality is correlated with terrorism. In addition, Enders et al, found a robust nonlinear income-terrorism relationship. Which suggests that terrorist attacks are more concentrated in middle- income countries (Enders et al, 2008). But, other

empirical studies have found no support to suggest that the income distribution of a country is related to terrorism.

In northern Nigeria, there is the common perception that violent extremism is entrenched in the socio- economic problems of the country. For example, (Ayegba, 2015) argued that poverty and unemployment are the driving forces behind the insurgency in Nigeria. Further in the study, Ayegba claimed that the high rate of youth unemployment has resulted in poverty and insecurity in the country. (Ojochemeni, 2015) argued, "socio- economic indices such as poverty, unemployment, inequality economic underdevelopment, low education, inter alia, underlie the emergence and persistence of Boko Haram terrorism. These assertions suggest that the pervasive poverty and unemployment in northern Nigeria create the condition for especially young people to be manipulated and recruited by Boko Haram. Although, some studies have found no link between poverty and terrorism. The vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment make it easy for people to become prey for Boko Haram recruitment. A study by (Botha & Abdile, 2017) confirmed that, due to adverse economic conditions and unemployment in Somalia, some people viewed al-Shabaab as a potential employer. A recent public opinion study on Boko Haram by Botha et al revealed that some of the respondents interviewed perceive that people are motivated to join Boko Haram because "they are unemployed and see Boko Haram as a job:"(citations)

Western and US interests on Nigeria oil Production

The US, the UK, France and some NATO countries are strengthening their grip in Africa as they watch the ongoing violence. It would not be misleading to say that in twenty years' time, these forces will hold great influence over Africa's defense.

Inviting all the regional nations to participate in a summit – including Nigeria, Chad, Benin and Niger-France took an important step helping the neighbors agree to work together to defeat Boko Haram. Just as Nigeria wanted, the summit resulted in the UN Security Council, France, the UK, the US and all UN registering nations black-listing and sanctioning the group.

In reality this decision was quite surprising, because the UNSC only usually makes such decisions if a threat is considered regional or international. Boko Haram has up until today only carried out attacks in Niger and Cameroon.

The UNSC decision took Boko Haram from being a local threat to becoming a regional threat. It is possible that this decision was made to justify Western operations in the region. One may argue that if Boko Haram is able to conduct three separate attacks in Nigeria in one day, they can of course do the same in Niger and Cameroon. On the other hand, one may interpret the hunt for the innocent kidnapped schoolgirls not to be limited to Boko Haram's location. Rather, it could be a bid to carry out a more widespread operation across the entire region with a hidden agenda.

The UK, which has sent a search plane to support the operations, is just one of the countries to promise its help. Israel has also promised intelligence help. However, the greatest help promised has been from the US .The US has spread the word through social media. President Obama and his wife have led a number of campaigns and protests across the US girls to be released.US –based Nigerian NGO'S have started travelling the African continent to raise awareness of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram.

The US recently discussed sending 80 military experts to the Chad border to fight Boko Haram. Despite US officials opposing a wide –scale operation at the moment,

the sending of this units would be considered an expedition. The US has sent such units to Uganda in the past, but Uganda's geo-political a strategic position is very different to Nigeria. As there is nothing threatening US interests in Uganda, that region is not need of a huge army.

Nigeria's oil production

Nigeria is Africa's largest oil exporter and has a mass of untouched natural gas reserves. It has a population of 170 million and is the continent's biggest consumer market. Despite the political instability, the Nigerian economy is growing, passing the growth rate of South Africa. Although growth has also been noted in Kenya, Tanzania and Ghana, they cannot catch up to Nigeria. Thus, investors are set to turn their attention to Nigeria.

Setting aside an extra budget, the Nigerian government has increased spending on defense by 130 billion Naira. With 22% of the country's budget assigned to the military, Nigeria is also set to assign arms deals with the US, Israel, the UK, France and China. France actually had no interest in making sales to Nigeria before, but after the events in the Ivory Coast, Nigeria's became an economic partner. As for Israel, they have an important portion of the signed 12 defense deals. The UK, not including the post-independence years of 1960-1969, has been the main arms dealer to Nigerians.

Is the US Playing Messiah?

If I look back on the military side of things, the US may still be yet to settle a unit in Chad, but their drone airbase in Niger is known to all. However, the US choosing Chad over Niger shows their plan to open up a new front. It is also known that 150 soldiers destined for Uganda are yet to be sent to fight Joseph Kony, as these soldiers

are currently spread across Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Central Africa and South Sudan to train native soldiers. This way, they are controlling an even wider region in Africa. On One hand it could be said that the US, the UK, France and some NATO countries are strengthening their grip in the region as they watch the ongoing violence. It would not be misleading to say that in twenty years' time, these forces will hold great influence over Africa's defence.

The US navy maintains soldiers in Guinea to fight the drug trade as well as piracy as part of an AFRICOM project, which also includes the coast of Cameroon, Nigeria and Benin. In 2010, the US wanted to set up a base in Lagos after Nigeria pull-out of an earlier agreement which was supposed to help stop illegal petrol exports from the Niger delta. After Nigeria agreed to forgive the Niger Delta Commission the plans for a US base have been silenced, as the US soldiers are not coming for petrol, they are supposedly coming to support the country defend itself in the biggest struggle against terrorism in its history.

The US will now provide training for the Nigerian army near the Chad border so they can find the missing girls. However, it is clear that this training is not being given with good intentions. After all, is not the problem in Somalia caused by the US- back Ethiopian occupation? Was it not the US who trained Ethiopian troops to destroy the Union of Islamic Courts, which had adopted a moderate character? This occupation only led to instability in Somalis, which gave rise to radicalism.

In Nigeria, there is a huge Muslim population that the US is not taking into consideration. The US war on Boko Haram will affect this population the most. They are already suffering the most due to the Boko Haram attacks. With the radicalization of Nigeria's majority 80 million Muslims, the possibility of in Franz Fanon's words

‘the wretched of the Earth’ heading for a collision with the Western allies should not be forgotten.

Perhaps as was the case in Congo, Nigeria may be leading for a civil war. The US and France may be preparing to renew their lies about their intention to simply save people and bring peace the same way they lied regarding their interventions in the Uganda and Rwanda Civil wars, which left a total of 5 million people dead.

2.2.2 Religious and Ethnic Causes of Terrorism,

It is common belief that religious tension and religious fundamentalism cause terrorism. There is empirical evidence to support this argument. With respect to Boko Haram, religion plays a vital role in their discourse. The group holds extreme religious ideology, which they use as the basis to commit their heinous crimes. Akinola and Oriola argued that the rise of Boko Haram is embedded in Islamic fundamentalism, 'which they use to justify their actions (Oriola & Akinola, 2018). For example, the group aims to promote Sharia law and create an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria. As a result, it has waged war on any group or western idea, which they believe is against Islam, This has created the notion that terrorism is linked to religion fundamentalism. In the study, why do people join Boko Haram? Onuoha found that, "ignorance of religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among youth" in all the northern states surveyed (Onuoha, 2014).

In addition, religions and ethnic tensions are found to cause terrorism. Historically, Nigeria has experienced intermittent ethno-religious clashes. Although it is hard to claim that the emergence Boko Haram is related to religious or ethnic conflict. Some studies have found a positive relationship between religious and ethnic tensions and

terrorism (any example of such studies). This implies societies experiencing religious tension can become a breeding ground for terrorists to operate. If people feel discriminated by the dominant religion, in this case Christianity and the Anglo-saxon culture

2.2.3 Political Causes of Terrorism

With respect to the political root causes of terrorism, several studies have indicated that the lack of civil liberties, corruption, weak political institutions, political instability, weak government, high level of repression, civil wars can foment the incidence of terrorism.

In additional study by (Piazza, 2011) shows that societies with large complex multiparty systems are more prone to terrorist incidence than those with few homogeneous systems. Also, democratic countries, which are assumed to be in a better position to stop terrorist attacks, are more prone to terrorist attacks than autocratic countries. Krieger and Meierrieks argued that democratic countries are prone to terrorist attacks due to the promotion of democratic ideals like respect for civil liberties and free press, which open doors for terrorists to operate and also hinder counter-terrorism measures (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2009).

On domestic terrorism in Northeast Nigeria, some studies blamed the emergence of Boko Haram on the country's elite politics. (Botba, 2012), argued that "Boko Haram is a political construct, sponsored by politicians. According to (Mbah, 2017), Boko Haram emerged from the struggle among northern and southern political elites to gain control of state political power, especially after the death of President Yari Adua. The re-election of Jonathan Goodluck in 2011 then led to the use of Boko Haram as an instrument of destruction by northern political elites. However, these claims cannot

fully explain the emergence of Boko Haram, since other political and social phenomenon could contribute to the rise of the group. For instance some scholars have argued that emergence of the group could be linked to bad governance, corruption and economic deprivation in northern Nigeria, which has fostered the rise radical extremist groups.

2.2.4 Objectives of Terrorists/Boko Haram (Not all terrorists have the same objectives)

In general, the literature suggests that terrorists operate with particular goals in mind. Studies have shown that terrorist organizations may have political, Religious, social and economic objectives. Which inspired their operations. The objectives of a terrorist organization influence its choice of targets and modes of attacks. Like other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State which has a core goal of establishing a caliphate in the Middle East, Boko Haram has the objective of removing all western and anti-Islamic influences and establishing a society built on Islamic law in northern Nigeria. With this goal in mind, Boko Haram insurgents use violence as the acceptable means to bring about the change they want. The objectives of terrorist organizations may play a role in how they recruit and radicalize people.

2.2.5 Public Perceptions of Terrorism

The literature on public perception on terrorism is sparse. Only a few studies, if any at all, have studied how the public perceives terrorism or government actions to contain terrorist activities. Krueger examined the public attitude in one country toward another country and its effect on the likelihood of terrorism (Krueger, 2009). His results revealed the greater likelihood of terrorist attacks on one country if another country disapproves of the leadership and policies of that country. A study by the Pew Charitable Trust shows that the majority of Nigerians are concerned about the rise of

Islamic extremism in the country, with 82% respondents saying they have unfavorable view and 10% said favorable view of Boko Haram. Probably much of the 10% with favorable Boko Haram view (about 20 million) come from areas of the north that have had similar challenges as the Northeast.

Another study by Loschky indicated that 95% of Nigerians see Boko Haram as a major threat to the country's future, whereas, only 3% said minor threat (Loschky, 2017). In a recent study by Poushter on how the public perceives extremism, the result shows that majority of people in Europe and North America are worried about extremism (Poushter, 2017)). This implies that the Incident of terrorist attacks has increased citizens' fear and stimulated public view about the threat of terrorism. The authors are not aware of any studies that have looked how citizens in countries facing terrorism feel about the perpetrators and the actions of government.

It is important that the efforts of government in eradicating terrorism are grounded on four foundations:

1. They are effective in addressing terrorism.
2. They are effective in addressing its root causes.
3. They are efficient and cost effective,
4. They are supported by a significant segment of the public or enjoy broad - based support.

The last has proven important in many countries. Terrorists rely on a pool of sympathizers from within which they recruit. Understanding how the general public perceives terrorism is important because this helps to understand the perspectives of the public concerning the root causes and objectives of terrorists. It also helps to understand how the public feels about the issue and the segment of the public that are

sympathizers of terrorist acts. In addition, estimating the relationship between public opinion and terrorism can help government, military, humanitarian agencies and security agencies the appropriate services and support to victims of terrorist acts.

2.3 Strategies and Tactics used by Boko Haram

Ethno-religious violence has bedeviled Nigeria as a sovereign and independent country since its return to democracy in 1999. The Boko Haram insurgency has continued to pose a serious threat to the country's security system and corporate political entity (Zenn, 2014). Since the violent re-emergence of the Boko Haram in 2010, the attacks and suicide bombing carried out by the group has increased beyond the national boundary. Furthermore, in pursuit of their violent objectives, the sect engages in bombing police station, schools and Mosques. The sect also engages in kidnapping of foreigners, and the recent tactics of kidnapping women. The group kidnapped more than 250 school girls in Chibok town of Borno state. According to (Anyadike, 2014), the changing dynamic of the operations and tactics of the group confused many scholars and analysts. Its initial campaign of violence targeting security personnel and their formations have now expanded to include civilians, nongovernmental targets and the entire Nigeria populace.

The major violence started in 2009 between the Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces. This violence has claimed the lives of more than 1000 people with over 700 killed in Borno State capital Maiduguri (Umar, 2012). The violence has exposed the weakness of Nigerian security system by its inability to curb the crisis on time. Subsequently, the group carried out another attack, when it orchestrated a large prison break in Bauchi in 2010 which freed more than 700 inmates including the sect members. This prison break shows how capable the group is in undermining the security of the country and exposes its weakness to the international community

(VOA, 2012). The sect claimed responsibility for police headquarters attacks that was believed to be the first suicide bombing in Nigeria in 2011. The attack is said to target the former Inspector General of Police. This attack shows how powerful the group is with its ability and strategy to attack such an important place (Blanchard, 2014). In the same year, the group carried out another suicide attack on United Nations Headquarters in Abuja in which twenty people were killed and more than sixty were injured (Nossiter, 2011).

The attack drew the attention of the international community about the threats of the sect that is now goes beyond national issue. “The Boko Haram attacks since 2011 have featured improvised explosive devices (IEDS), car bombs, and periodical suicide bombing. The members of the group cause a lot of damages and unpleasant moments to the people by continuing burning and destroying the communities using arms and arsons (Plouch, 2014). This made the United States security department to designate Boko Haram and Ansaru as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) in November, 2013. Subsequently, the United Nations Committee on al Qaeda sanction blacklisted the group on 22 May 2014. The United Nations listing entry describes Boko Haram as an affiliate of Al Qaeda and organization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Nicholas, 2014).

Furthermore, there were several incidents that happened while soldiers were fighting the group that exposed the weaknesses of Nigerian security for tackling the menace of the group. For example on 14 May 2014, some of the battlefield soldiers fighting the group in Maiduguri attempted a mutiny by firing at their commanding officer. The soldiers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more sophisticated weapons used by the sect members. This problem shows endemic corruption within the Nigerian security system, where billions of Naira was allocated

to defense ministry for the fight against terrorism, but the outcome has not been positive. In a related issue, a group of soldiers fighting the group in Maiduguri had refused to go to the battlefield until modern weapons are provided to them. The Nigerian Army officials are not ready to fight Boko Haram; a Nigerian soldier said, the soldiers fighting the insurgents has no sophisticated weapons and adequate arms and ammunitions which made it difficult to confront the insurgents

2.4 The Challenges of Boko Haram insurgency to Nigerian Security

The threats posed by the group recently are undermining the existence of Nigeria as one political territory. The group captured more than local governments in the affected states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The insecurity has caused displacement, about 500 Nigerian soldiers and refugees flee Boko Haram to Cameroun (Sahara Reporters, 2014). Moreover, the sect's leader Shekau declared areas under the sect's control as new caliphate that would be governed according to strict Islamic codes (Sahara Reporters, 2014). All these have exposed the weaknesses of Nigerian government in curbing the group, despite the country being the giant of Africa. According to (Onuoha, 2014), also Boko Haram has become a threat to regional security and its violent activities have impacted regional stability. These threats by the sect can be assessed from at least four dimensions. Namely, the group expansion in the form of recruitment, training equipment and funding its target, the increased problems of border attacks, transnational implications of these attacks, as well as diminishing the potential of Nigeria as a de-facto leader of West Africa.

The presence of Boko Haram 'spread beyond the national borders of Nigeria, expanding international network that enables it to recruit and train members from the countries of the Sahara-Sahel region. The United Nation reports have linked Boko Haram with al - Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Onuoha, 2014). The

groups have a good connection with one another, and Boko Haram was influenced by the ideology and tactics of the (AQIM) (Nossiter, 2012). According to the report, many of the group members were trained in Sahel alongside (AQIM). This connection continues where a large number of Boko Haram members attended an (AQIM) training center in Timbuktu Mali during the summer of 2011. These members later came back and became the influential figures of the Boko Haram.

Boko Haram dispatched some other members to far away Somalia to join Al-Shabaab and run training camp, where members were taught on how to construct and detonate improvised explosive devices, and how to carry out suicide bombing. Before the June 2011 suicide bombing, there was little attention to the connection between Boko Haram and other Jihadist groups in the African region. Also, the groups run an international network of recruitment, training and indoctrination camps in different countries Gao, and Kidal in Malia, Cameroun, Chad, Sudan and some cells in Central Africa Republic. This shows how the group is well connected with major African Jihadists, which are all allies of al Qaeda. And shows how dangerous the connection will be to the entire African countries. Subsequently, the expanding of the cross-border attacks by the group poses a serious threat to neighbouring countries in the region, among which are Cameroun, Chad, and Niger Republic. Nevertheless, the threats of the group have transnational implications; the deteriorating nature of the violence affected economic, humanitarian, and diplomatic stability of the affected countries.

The Boko Haram insurgency has reduced the power and influential role of Nigeria as a de facto leader of the West Africa and the entire Africa, this violence posed a serious security threats that hinders the country to continue its influential role in peacekeeping operations in many countries. Consequently, the Nigerian and U.S

government's long bilateral relation had broken when the later refused to render military hardware assistance to the former (Guitta, & Simcox, 2014). Government of United States would not work closely with Nigerian security forces as doing so would violate the 1997 "Leahy law" which prevents the U.S defence and state Departments from providing assistance if there is credible information that (a foreign security force) has committed a gross violation of human right.

Boko Haram like most organizations is a hierarchical group run by resolute men who insist on articulating, explaining or defending their rhetorical vision to the Nigerian public, and perhaps the world. With a mission to convert the nation or parts of it to Islam, liberate Muslims from persecution, keep Islam from criticism, and revenge perceived acts of injustices against Muslims, leaders of Boko Haram have carried out attacks on Churches, the United Nation Headquarters in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, universities, and several security establishments. In his approach to movement discourses in his 1941 rhetorical analysis of *Me in Kamp*, Kenneth Burke argues that political actors must inevitably resort to the tactics of victim age such as recruitment, motivating action, solidarity, and attacks on adversaries, when addressing the public, in order to achieve their objectives. These tactics involve vilification of opponents and the heroization of the troops. Boko Haram employs victim age tactics, in conjunction with image appeals, in order to persuade moderate Muslims, sympathizers and would-be-recruits, the subsequent sections will delve into how the leaders of Boko Haram allotted blame, vilified the oriental other, pressed for a holy war, encouraged martyrdom, and alluded to an apocalypse.

Leaders assume responsibility toward other participants, especially when they have access to the tools of communication. (Ismail, 2009) explores how resorting to cyberspace may help those classified as terrorists to express their deeds, stances and

objectives in order "to speak for themselves, as opposed to letting conventional media represent their causes" (p. 8). In the face of perceived misrepresentation, Boko Haram leaders turned to the Internet to clarify their insurgency. Self-proclaimed leader Mallam Abu-Bakr Shekau emerges on You Tube to articulate Boko Haram mission and reconstruct its identity. Shekau presents Boko Haram, not as a societal ill, but as societal liberators

2.5 Conceptual Framework

Based on the poverty theory, constructivism theory and Islamic theory, the research tried to establish a relationship between the variables of the study. Below shows the predicted relationship between Boko Haram, poverty, illiteracy, and misconception of religion.

The independent variable is Boko Haram, while Nigerian Security System is the dependent variable. Based on the above diagram Poverty, illiteracy, and misconception of religion are significant factors that led to the independent variable. According to (Olojo, 2013), one significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment and support for Boko Haram are economic deprivation. Moreover, Nigerian National Bureau of statistics report (2012) shows the level of poverty in the area. According to the report, the Northeast of the country where Boko Haram is strong has the higher figure of 77.7% of relative poverty. Individuals grievances such as poverty, unemployment and illiteracy, were used as mobilizing instruments by the group to get support and recruit for terrorist violence (Olojo, p, 35, 2013).

Adesoji, (2010), stresses that, marginalization and imbalance distribution or implementation of resources is the major factors that led to poverty in Nigeria which

simplified the recruitment process of the group. Moreover, the failure of Nigerian leaders to establish economic policies that will improve the living standard of people and create employment opportunities among the youth has created a vacuum of unemployment, poverty and illiteracy among the youth, which resulted in various communal, ethnic, religious, and class conflicts that have now characterised the country and contributed to the emergence and Boko Haram.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This study employs qualitative research method in which analytic approach was used to address the research problem. A qualitative analytic method refers to identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within the data collected for the purpose of the study (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This study is part of a wider study carried out in Nigeria as from 2013 on the insecurity situations. Some of the data are therefore drawn from there and accordingly acknowledged. The researcher was part of the research team.

3.1 Research Design

For the purpose of this study, the researcher used the both structured questionnaire and interviews as data gathering instruments. The target population for the present study comprises the security agents of Nigeria. Respondents were drawn from police officers with the ranks of assistant superintendent of police (ASP) and officers in the department of state service (DSS) who are with the ranks of senior intelligence officers (SIO). Furthermore, there were inspectors from Nigerian security and civil defence corps (NSCDC). The respondents comprises of Army personnel with the ranks of lieutenant. The research is beneficial by having various respondents across multiple security organizations who are also involved in the fights against Boko Haram with different strategies, tactics and modes of operation.

The researcher used descriptive statistics to analyze the survey data and thematic analysis approach to analyze the qualitative data. Thematic data analysis consists of minimally organizing and describing the data set in (rich) detail (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data collected has been spread across various security organizations and

their personnel, the majority of whom are still involved directly or indirectly in the fight against the insurgents.

3.2 Sampling Procedure

We conducted a survey of respondents from eleven (11) states in Northern Nigeria in August 2013 which was part of the active phase of the Boko Haram insurgency and a period where some of the deadliest attacks were recorded. Rather than focus only on the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY states), where the bulk of the Boko Haram attacks occurred, we expanded the survey for several reasons: (1) uncertainty about the ability to collect adequate data from some states during the height of the insurgency, (2) to see if opinions varied between north easterners and other northerners and (3) Boko Haram activities have impacted directly or indirectly on residents of most of these states. All selected states have very high Muslim population and it is often claimed that Muslims in the North generally support Boko Haram. In addition to the BAY states other states surveyed include the other three Northeast states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba (BGT); the states of Kaduna, Kane, Kebbi and Sokoto in the Northwest; and the state of Niger in the North-Central Zone. The inclusion of states beyond the primary impact states allowed us to gauge broader public opinion in the Northern regions. Vis-a-Vis the immediate impact area.

In each state, we organized fieldwork to gauge the perceptions of individuals on terrorism. Our survey targets included the youths, workers traders, traditional rulers, serving and ex-security personnel women, etc. We utilized availability sampling in selecting the required number of respondents due to the nature of the insurgency, the associated risks to the lives of enumerators, the skepticism of many potential survey respondents, and the sensitive nature of the surveys. However the study made efforts

to ensure a balanced representation and gave opportunities to all groups to be represented in the study.

3.3 Data Collection Techniques

The primary data collection instrument used in the survey is a structured questionnaire. This is available upon request. This instrument was intended to generate statistical information, however only 1,079 were found to be properly completed and usable in further analysis. To supplement our survey results in each state, we conducted in-depth interviews with three persons; (1) a traditional or religious leader (2) security personnel (serving or retired) and (3) a prominent citizen in the area. Because the research covered many other areas only the survey results relating to the focus of this particular paper are reported here. That is, there were more survey questions than what we analyses in this paper.

To answer this research question, I will deconstruct and interpret the Communicative options used by Boko Haram leaders to reveal the version of reality that has been selected, and is being presented to the audience. I begin by examining Boko Haram's messages published on the Internet using rhetorical criticism and the theoretical framework of victim age ritual. My facts will be examined closely in order to construe how the separate components of Boko Haram messages fit together to reflect the sect's ideology and values. Thus, I will identify the social myths, pathos, logos, and metaphors that Boko Haram rely on to initiate an expected response from their target audience.

3.4 Data Analysis

Analysis will include detailed description of the themes or issues that emerge from dissecting Boko Haram messages. I will compare observed strategies established in previous studies, and in different contexts, to my findings (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).

I will establish a clear chain of evidence from my initial guiding questions to the thesis conclusions (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). At the end of my analysis I will draw conclusions about the overall meaning derived from the artefacts. My assertions or explanations will reflect lessons learned from this study.

This study focuses on the messages published in 2011 and 2012 because the sect's position, its mission and its resolve was clearly established in 2012 (Marshall, 2012). This time period proves sufficient to yield substantial cyber discourses reflective of Boko Haram's embraced ideologies. The chosen time period also marks a particularly pronounced level of merino and tension in the Boko Haram uprising. By describing and understanding Boko Haram's Internet messages, this thesis enters the scholarly conversation about power, discourse and victim age rhetoric. Understanding the rhetorical choices and strategies of Boko Haram is important because it allows for the advancement of counter strategic communications, counter propaganda, and public diplomacy activities to be effectively implemented.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.0 Introduction

In this section, we present survey results from all eleven Northern states. The views and perceptions about terrorism 'while root causes and terrorists' objectives were relatively consistent across states, with a few exceptions. In our reporting, we focus on the aggregate views of the 1079 respondents from the eleven Northern States, we also highlight areas where the results from specific state deviate from overall findings.

4.1 Root Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency

The root causes of terrorism suggested by the literature appeared in section B. Survey respondents essentially confirm many of these causes, with only a few surprises. The general perceptions of the public about the causes of terrorism for the entire region are summarized in table 1. The strongest opinion centers on the notions that terrorists are typically unemployed people who are easily recruited by sponsors. Survey results also show that respondents believe that terrorists are motivated by poverty and economic problems. Results also suggest that the public feels that terrorists dislike government, harbor extreme political ideology and have extreme religious feelings. There is also strong is the perception that terrorists are manipulated by politicians as a ploy to stay in power and democracy provides greater latitude for terrorists to operate. These last two findings can be considered as somewhat unique about Nigeria. Less than 50% of those surveyed felt that terrorists were driven by the following factors: religious marginalization (42%) dislike for democracy (30%) or ethnicity (27%).

Table 1: Public perceptions on the causes on terrorism statements

	Strongly Agree or Agree	Disagree or Strongly disagree	Neither Agree or Disagree
1. Terrorists are unemployed people and easily recruited by sponsors	80%	20%	0%
2. Terrorists are driven by poverty and economic problems	72%	18%	10%
3. Terrorists are driven by dislike for the government of the day	66%	18%	16%
4. Terrorists are driven by extreme political ideology	63%	19%	18%
5. Terrorism is a grand design by political ideology	62%	20%	18%
6. Terrorism is a grand design by politicians to stay in power	61%	39%	0%
7. Democracy has given room for terrorists to operate	58%	42%	0%
8. Terrorists are influenced by extreme religious feelings	42%	41%	17%
9. Terrorists are driven by dislike for democracy	30%	46%	24%
10. Terrorists are driven by ethnicity	27%	50%	23%

4.1.1 Poverty

We examined the individual level causes of terrorism by asking respondents to identify specific statements that best explain the reason why people engage in terrorism. Respondents were asked to choose the leading one of several alternative statements. Hence the percentages reported in figure 1 above are generally low as the first choices vanned. However, the figure presents an ordinal ranking of the personal/micro causes of terrorism.

Respondents from Borno, Adamawa and Yobe where Boko Harams attacks have been mostly concentrated were of the strong opinion that the following were the causes of

insurgency. Unemployment ranked first with Yobe state scoring 83%, while Borno state returned 82% and Adamawa, 71%. Unemployment is closely followed by poverty and economic hardship especially in the three states. In Yobe 73% of respondents thought that poverty is the second most important cause, in Borno state, poverty scored 71% and Adamawa state, 70%. The third factor is extreme political ideology (Noma. 70%, Yoba, 64% and Adamawa, 62%), and dislike for government of the day (Borno, 74%, Yobe, 58% and Adamawa, 57%), (4) extreme religious feelings (Borne, 77%, Adamawa 53% and Yobe, 40%), and (5) hatred for others (Borno, 70%, Yobe, 51% and Adamawa, 51%) were the cause of terrorism in their respective states.

Overall the findings of the survey, particularly the result that suggest that terrorists are motivated by poverty and economic problems, confirm the common perception that the rise of violent extremism in Northern Nigeria is entrenched in socio-economic problems. These findings imply that the prevalence of poverty and unemployment in Northeastern Nigeria create the conditions for people to join Boko Haram. These results, however contradict the finding by (Piazza, 2011), and (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002) that poverty and economic conditions do not necessarily cause terrorism. Generally, this study seems to suggest that socio-economic factors are among the drivers of terrorism.

4.1.2 Political Causes

Regarding the political causes of terrorism, the general perception in Nigeria is that Boko Haram dislikes the Nigerian government and unequivocally rejects Nigeria's political system which they deemed as corrupt and un-Islamic. In addition, since Boko Haram aims to create an Islamic State in Northern Nigeria, it is not surprising that respondents strongly believe that extreme religion feeling has a role in influencing

terrorists. This is corroborated by empirical studies of a link between terrorism and religious fundamentalism. However, a recent opinion survey by Borah et al. (p, 53, 2014) showed that the majority of respondents think religion has little of no influence on people's decision to join Boko Haram, hence the study did not consider religion to be a major reason for people to join Boko Haram.

There is also claim that Boko Haram is supported and financed by some politicians in Nigeria to promote their political agenda. Wole Soyinka, Nigeria's Nobel Laureate, indicated that there are some Nigeria politicians who actually support the activities of Boko Haram "because in their lust for power and pursuit for power, they were ready to sacrifice anything or ally with anything: Interestingly, from the survey the majority of respondents believe terrorists are manipulated by politicians in order to remain in power.

State-Level Observations

Across all eleven states, there was not much variation in citizen's responses about the root causes of terrorism. A significant majority of respondents from all the surveyed states clearly recognize that terrorism is rooted in the socio-economic, political and religious problems of the region. Since a major part of Northern is engulfed in poverty limited economic opportunities and unemployment it was not surprising that majority of respondents conflated terrorism to the socio-economic and political challenges facing the region.

Conversely, while respondents from Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Gombe strongly opposed the statements that terrorism is driven by ethnicity, regional marginalization and dislike for democracy, respondents from Borne in particular were of the strong opinion that regional marginalization (51%). ethnicity (42%) and dislike for

democracy (56%) cause terrorism. Similarly, more respondents from Kano and Kaduna also indicated that dislike for democracy is to be blamed for the rise of Boko Haram in Northern. Nigeria. Finally, a significant majority of respondents from Sokoto state indicated that regional marginalization is a cause of terrorism.




Figure 4.1: Conditions that Best Explain Why Some People Engage in Terrorism

Figure 4.1: Conditions that Best Explain Why Some People Engage in Terrorism see unemployment as the main cause of terrorism (Taraba == 34%). Yobe = 26%, Kaduna = 22% and Gornbe 20%). Similarly, a considerable percentage of citizens see poverty as the main cause of terrorism (Sokoto = 33%, Kebbi = 28%, Niger = 21%). Only citizens from Borne (46%) indicated that extreme religious ideology is the prime condition that compels people to engage in terrorism in their state.

4.2 Objectives of Terrorists

We provided respondents with a list of potential terrorist objective to choose from. Each respondent had the option of choosing as many as possible. Based on the results, the top four responses are as follows: (a) revenge against security forces (65%

strongly agree or agree and 31% strongly disagree or disagree); (b) fight economic inequalities (42% strongly agree or agree and 48% strongly disagree or disagree); (c) fight political inequalities (43% strongly agree or agree and 46% strongly disagree or disagree); and (d) adjust the regional imbalances (40% strongly agree or agree and 40% strongly disagree or disagree) (see Figure 4.2). Respondents felt more strongly about revenge against security forces as their main objective as terrorists than they did about fighting political and economic inequalities. These results may indeed be unique to Boko Haram, given the perception that violent government actions helped spur Boko Haram.⁸⁴




Figure 4.2: Objectives of Terrorists

A significant number of respondents from Borne, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Niger, Kebbi and Sokoto states indicated that the objective of Boko Haram is to destroy the North and revenge against security forces. To the contrary, some respondents from Kebbi (47%) opposed the idea that Boko Harams objective is to destroy the north, however, the majority of respondents (74%) believed Boko Harams aim to revenge against the security forces.

While respondents from Boom (46%) and Bauchi (49%) believe Boko Haram has no objectives, some from Gombe (47%), Bauchi (49%), Kebbi (48%) and Sokoto (63%) strongly disagree or disagree that they have no objectives. However, respondents from Yobe (strongly agree [40%] and strongly disagree [40%]) and Niger (strongly agree [39%] and strongly disagree [40%]) are divided in their opinion about Boko Haram's objectives.

Conversely, while Borno citizens perceive the objectives of Boko Haram are to destroy their opponents (66%), overthrow the government (62%), want to become rich (49%), settle personal scores (48%) and are just common criminals (50%), respondents from Yobe completely opposed these statements. The respondents from Yobe strongly disagree that terrorist groups like Boko Haram want to destroy their opponents, overthrow the government (52%), want to become rich (55%), settle personal scores (60%) and are just common criminals (52%).

In addition, a significant number of respondents from Borno, Yobe, Gombe and Bauchi, strongly disagree that Boko Haram aims to fight economic inequalities, tight political inequalities and adjust regional imbalances. However, the majority of citizens from Sokoto and Bauchi strongly validate the statements that Boko Haram aims to fight economic and political inequalities and also adjust the imbalances in the region.

4.3 Level of Sympathy for Boko Haram

Many in Nigeria believe in the conspiracy theory that Northerners invented Boko Haram as a mechanism for heightening their political voice and therefore support Boko Haram. If this is true, one should see strong support for Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Our survey results suggest that some 46% indicated that they have

very low or low sympathy for the Boko Haram. Some 25% of the respondents indicated that they have very high or high sympathy for Boko Haram. Considering that the population of Northern Nigeria approached 100 million, this could mean 25 million people. Additionally, some 24% indicated average sympathy for Boko Haram (see Figure 4.3 below), adding the very high and average. One gets 49%. In essence, Northern Nigeria is 50/50 split in the level of sympathy for Boko Haram. That may be as much as 50 million people. Assuming that Christians in the North do not support Boko Haram, it would be the case that the majority of northern Nigerians support Boko Haram.




Figure 4.3 Level of Sympathy for Boko Haram

4.4 The Strategies Used By Boko Haram to Achieve Their Objectives

4.4.1 Mass Media and Social Media

The literature reviewed for this study lays the argumentative foundation upon which I present and analyses Boko Haram's You Tube videos, a BlogSpot web page attributed to Boko Haram, and e-mail messages sent by Boko Haram to journalists. These messages contain the kind of data that are the focus of rhetorical analysis. Through

inquiry and explanation of the discursive acts emerging from my artifacts, the relevant aspects of Boko Haram's discourse will be identified, and claims will be made and supported by warrants, backings, and qualifiers.

Bockstette, (2008), argues that the mass media and especially the Internet have become the key enablers and the main strategic communication assets for terrorists and have ensured them a favorable communication asymmetry. With the Internet, terrorists are able to compensate for a significant part of their asymmetry in military might. According to (Bockstette, 2008) Jihadists craft their strategies based on careful audience analysis and adapt their messages and delivery methods according to proposed scope of this thesis, therefore, would be the messages of Boko Haram published on the Internet because the Internet and the advent of the World Wide Web in particular, have significantly increased the opportunities for terrorists to secure publicity, and promulgate psychological warfare by purveying strategically constructed messages (Conway, 2006). (Rowland & Theye, 2008) argue: "If terrorism is fundamentally rhetorical, understanding the nature of that message and why some find it so appealing that they are willing to sacrifice for it is essential" (p. 53). To order to describe, analyses, and understand the persuasive devices by which Boko Haram leaders create, express, and sustain jurisprudence on acts of violence, I will rely on the guiding research question: What are the core values of Boko Haram, and how do leaders of the group construct and express the group's values, sway belief, and justify violence to its audience?

Boko Haram has employed the media to its advantage. The security system has been exposed to public knowledge, as it is no longer a secret that they are being overrun and defeated in some instances. This has affected the public confidence towards security matters. In short, most of the respondents as they are security men, believed

that the conflicts have affected them individually as well as within their respective security agencies. Only one of the respondents thinks that the impact of the insurgency on security agencies is still very minimal and low. This could be linked possibly with increasing men who still want to be in the service.

4.4.2 Violence

The escalation of attacks and bombings, as well as direct attacks on public institutions and security formations is quite different from any ethnic and religious of yester years. The kidnapping of young girls in Nigeria has suddenly racked the international media's attention, raising issues regarding Boko Haram. Although Boko Haram issues have been in the social media before, the international media increased widespread awareness, especially by using the very popular *#bringbackourgirls* handle on the social media site, Twitter. The conflict in Nigeria can be described' as a conflict between different identities in the country. It is, however, important to remember that a variety of identities do not necessarily lead to conflicts. The fact that a country has several ethnic or religious groups does not make conflict inevitable; it is only when mobilization around identities occurs or they are politicized that they constitute the basis for conflict²⁰⁰⁹ after the Nigerian government crackdown on its followers as a result of which spiritual and political leader Muhammad Yusuf was killed. From 2009 to 2015 Boko Haram insurgency claimed the lives of more than 13,000 people.

The group has intensified its attacks on security agents and their formations, top government establishments, schools, Mosques, and the general populace. The group kidnapped 250 schoolgirls in Chibok in April 2014. The threat posed by the group is undermining the existence of Nigeria as one sovereign political territory. In August 2014, the sect leader declared areas under their control as new Islamic Caliphate which would be governed according to strict Islamic laws.

4.5 The Security and Development Implications of Boko Haram Activities

The research asked the respondents on how the crisis has affected the Nigerian security system. A great majority of the respondents agreed that Boko Haram insurgency has seriously affected the nation's security system in the high degree. The security organizations were totally changed in combat operations, tactical and strategic approaches to security. The security system has been weakened. Its ability to win the war is seriously affected, as some of them were turned into helpless force with no clear focus or blueprint on how effective to stop the insurgency. This can be validated in recent cases of mutiny and fleeing of Nigerian soldiers to neighboring countries and the consequent trials of many soldiers in Military court martial where many soldiers has either sentenced to death, or expelled from the service.

Boko Haram possesses sophisticated weapons and ammunition including ballistic missiles which poses a significant to the Nigerian security forces. Report shows that Boko Haram fighters possessed more superior equipment that is far better than those held by the security agents of the country. There is also the challenge of gathering accurate and timely intelligence and security tips that could assist security organizations in fighting against Boko Haram insurgency. In short, all of the respondents believed that Boko Haram has really made effective security a difficult task to provide as this is not unconnected with a high level of corruption within top-ranking officers of the organizations, poor and outdated weapons, problems of logistics and many other internal security issues.

In popular press, it was often claimed that weak governance, high handedness of security agents and hatred of the Jonathan government were major causes of Boko Haram. As shown in the previous pages from the perspective of the public, the leading personal causes are poverty, unemployment extreme religious ideology and ignorance. While weak governance, feeling of hopelessness, Military and police high handedness, hatred of the government and security lapses made the list of causes they occurred less frequently as the best reasons cited by respondents. This suggests that the public believes that they are only marginal contributing factors perhaps through the recruitment pool of terrorists. The relative values of these responses are helpful in informing policymakers about the roots of terrorism and the necessary preventative strategies, at least from the perspective of the public bystander.

Furthermore, the respondents revealed that Boko Haram has severely affected the Nigerian security formations. About 90 % of the respondents opined that Boko Haram remained faceless within mainstream Nigerian population. Hence, the targeting of security officers even on private life has placed the men of these services extremely in danger. The security has also been affected in terms of spirit and morale of its agents in facing the enemies squarely. With this evidence has shown that more of them are fleeing and abandoning their post or turning to mutiny. And, as a result, Nigerian military hierarchy has sentenced about 200 of the military personnel to death, and about 300 have been expelled from the service, a situation that negatively affected the Nigerian security formation.

4.6 The Possible Solutions to the Insurgency

On the possible solutions to the insurgency, the respondents believed that for effective end to this insurgency, government must improve the quality of its security organizations. Respondents especially those with security background propose that

the government should provide modern ballistics and weaponry so as to arm their operatives with sophisticated weapons that could enable them to match Boko Haram superior arms possession. Also, to make proper arrangements for incentives to maintain the operatives fighting spirits. Dialogue was also suggested by some respondents. Some of the respondents remain optimistic that it is the only viable way to put an end to this insurgency. Conversely, some of the respondents pointed out the need to approach the solution from the scratch, by improving the general conditions of the people, providing employment opportunities, reduction of corruption and injustice. Improving these conditions will deny insurgents any rational for violence since some of these insurgents lay their justifications on negative effects of leadership prevailing in the society. The responses also indicated the need for government to arrest and bring to justice all those perceived to be sponsors of Boko Haram. Such action could increase commitment and dedication on the part of security personnel, particularly those engaged on the actual war fronts. The security agents also think the strategy such as effective community policing and intelligence gathering could reduce the level at which Boko Haram coordinators penetrate and link up with their networks in unleashing attacks.

Moreover, the majority of the respondents believed that a coalition of international forces could help them in addressing the problem of Boko Haram especially if they can use their advancement in military and security technology properly. The political leaders of Nigeria or more specifically the government should employ an international practice that is not politicized to offer more assistance in curtailing the insurgent's activities. But few of the security personnel opined that international coalition may not always be the needed approach, as even with their presence now, they had little

impact on the ongoing insurgency organizations are still the better options, since they have fullest understanding of the issue at stake.

Finally, almost all the respondents agreed that Nigeria need regional cooperation among its West African neighbors. Most of the respondents pointed out that, since Boko Haram hub of operations still remained with borders of these West African states, notably among them; Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic, then Nigerian government must joint effort and work closely with these countries irrespective of their colonial history or other differences to tackle the problem. On the other hand, the establishment of constant border patrol teams, and sharing of intelligent information and logistics could surely assist in defeating Boko Haram insurgency

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Conclusion

The discourse on Boko Haram insurgency clearly revealed that Nigeria is confronted with security challenges. This is made manifest in the Boko Haram murderous campaigns against securities, government institutions, religious cleric and members of the general public. The escalating of the violence, with increasing attacks suicide bombing and kidnapping prevailed the failure of government to curtails the crisis .the paper has revealed how the group transformed from a local salafis militia into a regional terrorist group, with linkages and support from other Islamic insurgent in Africa like Al Qaeda in the land of Islamic Magreb (AQIM) and Al- Shabab. The sect becomes a threat to Nigerian national security.

5.1 Root Causes of Boko Haram

The study has analyzed both qualitative and quantitative data on the root causes of Boko Haram. While there is strong pointer towards poverty as the main cause of the insurgency, it is clear that there are many other variables at play. Although Muslims are the majority in the Northern States it is clear that poverty is attributed to discrimination, neglect and b poor political leadership. People blame their situation on what they perceive as continuous neglect and discrimination. Religion that rejects Western education is then a logical argument because the political leadership which is western educated thrives on corruption, discrimination and high-handedness. This therefore gives strong incentives for destitute youths who are unemployed an opportunity to turn back to a system considered unjust. To contain the insurgency therefore the government of Nigeria has to device ways of starving the group of new recruits.

5.2 Strategies Used by Boko Haram

Strategies used by Boko Haram combine both new and the old. First by cleverly employing propaganda, the group tries to win people's minds and hearts. Negative messages clothed as religious teachings may get receptive ears when people have grievances. However new technology especially the social media has enabled them to spread the message quickly and also to infiltrate government intelligence system. New communication channels also mean that the group can quickly activate international networks of terrorist organizations to come to their support. The government of Nigeria must therefore invest in intelligence gathering while at the same time countering the propaganda of the group.

By crossing into neighboring countries including Cameroun, Chad and Mali, the group may have widened its scope but may have also over exposed themselves. Nigeria therefore needs to cultivate a strong support from the regional governments.

5.3 Security Implications

Boko Haram has severe impact on Nigerian Security. It is estimated that over 10 000 people have lost their lives while many other people have been injured due the insurgency. The group has also opened a front for other international terrorist groups to operate in Nigeria. In the Northern states individual and group security is no longer assured. By venturing into the neighboring countries the group has undermined Nigerian National security and regional standing as the undisputed leader of West African region. In terms of socio-economic development the organization has made a bad situation worse. Poverty is no longer a cause of the insurgency but a consequence as well. For example, the insecurity means that the government has to divert increased resources towards containing the insurgency. While the group is fighting

discrimination and poverty their activities have turned out to be more detrimental to the type of efforts that can help alleviate poverty.

5.4 Possible Solutions

Having examined the causes, the strategies and the implications of Boko Haram insurgency, the solution should be multi-pronged to deal with the group. As some of the security personnel suggested during the field work, there is not only need for sophisticated and modern firepower, intelligence gathering to prevent terrorist activities is key. This however does not mean that other peaceful means including negotiations cannot be approached. For example some members of the groups or potential recruits may have genuine grievances that need to be addressed. Boko Haram seems to have employed social media to control the propaganda aspect of the conflict, it is therefore necessary for the government to also try to manage the struggle for citizens' hearts and minds through social media.

Poverty reduction strategies that target the youth should also be considered. Unemployment and idleness among large section of the youth is certainly a threat to any well thought fight against terrorist organizations anywhere. This is probably viable when the youth are involved in designing programmes that suit them.

5.5 Recommendation

Finally, the paper recommends that for any solution to a security situation like that of Boko Haram to be effective a multi-dimensional approach that address both the symptoms of terrorism and root causes must include addressing the problems that create the enabling environment. Lack of employment in Nigeria remains a monumental challenge. The northeast region were Boko Haram remain active is considered the worst affected. By creating employment opportunity in the region the

youths can be away from criminal activities .the government should improve school enrolment in the region to address the issue of illiteracy in the area. The government should denied the group require operating space to carry out its attacks by preventing the group from organizing, or reorganizing, recruiting and launching attacks, any form of support for the sect must be denied. The entire porous border network, through which the group might get weapons, and supports from other Islamic movement outside the country must be blocked

Further studies should also be conducted on how the social media can be used to enhance peace and reconciliation rather than used for spreading religious and ethnic extremism. In addition more research need to conducted on how best to engage youth in productive activities that reduces desperation and denies violent groups potential recruits.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I : Questionnaires

Physical Survey Questionnaire

From: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will suit your interests.

Personal Information

1. Name Muhammad Maimaka Gufuwa2. Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month May Day 25 Year 19994. Gender Male Female Prefer not to say5. Race
 Jihadist Arabian
 African American
 Native African
 Asian
 Hispanic
 Other
 Prefer not to say6. What is your current marital status?
 Single
 Married
 Divorced
 Separated
 Widowed
 Living with partner
 Prefer not to say7. Highest level of education
 Middle school
 High school
 Some college
 Graduate school
 2-year college
 4-year college
 Prefer not to say8. Household yearly gross income (Naira)
 Less than N20,000
 N21,000 - N40,000
 N41,000 - N60,000
 Over N60,000
 Prefer not to sayDo you know Boko Haram? Yes No9. If you answered yes to question 9, who are they?
 Youth
 Elders
 Women
 Men
 OthersHow many time did Boko Haram strike in your area? Yes No

If you answered yes to question 11, how often do they strike?

 Once a day
 Two to three times a week
 Once a month
 Twice a month
 Once a year

What do you think cause Boko Haram Insurgency in your area?

- Lack of education
- Poverty
- Extremism
- Marginalization
- Political

I certify that the answers provided in this survey are true and accurate. I certify that I have answered these questions to the best of my abilities and I understand that the Researcher may use my answers to offer more surveys that I may enjoy. I agree to allow the Researcher to send me more in depth surveys. If at any time I choose to no longer participate in these more in depth surveys, I may opt out at any time by emailing maisudanabega@gmail.com

Signature

Masuda

Date

24 Jan 2011

Physical Survey Questionnaire

To: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will be of your interests.

Personal Information

Name YUSUF Ibrahem

Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month Feb Day 9 Year 1965

Gender Male Female Prefer not to say

- Race
- Jihadist Arabian
 - African American
 - Native African
 - Asian
 - Hispanic
 - Other
 - Prefer not to say

6. What is your current marital status?
- Single
 - Married
 - Divorced
 - Separated
 - Widowed
 - Living with partner
 - Prefer not to say

7. Highest level of education
- Middle school
 - Highschool
 - Some college
 - Graduate school
 - 2-year college
 - 4-year college
 - Prefer not to say

8. Household yearly gross income (Naira)
- Less than N20,000
 - N21,000 - N40,000
 - N41,000 - N60,000
 - Over N60,000
 - Prefer not to say

Do you know Boko Haram? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 9, who are they?
- Youth
 - Elders
 - Women
 - Men
 - Others

How many times did Boko Haram strike in your area? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 11, how often do they strike?
- Once a day
 - Two to three times a week
 - Once a month
 - Twice a month
 - Once a year

What do you think cause Boko Haram Insurgency in your area?

Lack of education

Poverty

Extremism

Marginalization

Political

I certify that the answers provided in this survey are true and accurate. I certify that I have answered these questions to the best of my abilities and I understand that the Researcher may use my answers to offer more surveys that I may enjoy. I agree to allow the Researcher to send me more in depth surveys. If at any time I choose to no longer participate in these more in depth surveys, I may opt out at any time by emailing maisudanabega@gmail.com

Signature



Date

3 Jan - 2018

Physical Survey Questionnaire

From: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will fit your interests.

Personal Information

Name KASHIM BORNOMI

2. Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month April Day 29 Year 1995

Gender Male Female Prefer not to say

- Race
- Jihadist Arabian
 - African American
 - Native African
 - Asian
 - Hispanic
 - Other
 - Prefer not to say

6. What is your current marital status?
- Single
 - Married
 - Divorced
 - Separated
 - Widowed
 - Living with partner
 - Prefer not to say

- Highest level of education
- Middle school
 - High school
 - Some college
 - Graduate school
 - 2-year college
 - 4-year college
 - Prefer not to say

8. Household yearly gross income (Naira)
- Less than N20,000
 - N21,000 - N40,000
 - N41,000 - N60,000
 - Over N60,000
 - Prefer not to say

Do you know Boko Haram? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 9, who are they?
- Youth
 - Elders
 - Women
 - Men
 - Others

How many times did Boko Haram strike in your area? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 11, how often do they strike?
- Once a day
 - Two to three times a week
 - Once a month
 - Twice a month
 - Once a year

What do you think cause Boko Haram Insurgency in your area?

- Lack of education
- Poverty
- Extremism
- Marginalization
- Political

I certify that the answers provided in this survey are true and accurate. I certify that I have answered these questions to the best of my abilities and I understand that the Researcher may use my answers to offer more surveys that I may enjoy. I agree to allow the Researcher to send me more in depth surveys. If at any time I choose to no longer participate in these more in depth surveys, I may opt out at any time by emailing maisudanabega@gmail.com

Signature

[Handwritten Signature]

Date

17 Jan 2018

Physical Survey Questionnaire

From: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will suit your interests.

Personal Information

1. Name AISHATU ABUBAKAR

2. Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month JAN, Day 20 Year 1981

4. Gender

Male	Female <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Prefer not to say
------	--	-------------------

5. Race

- Jihadist Arabian
- African American
- Native African
- Asian
- Hispanic
- Other
- Prefer not to say

6. What is your current marital status?

- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Separated
- Widowed
- Living with partner
- Prefer not to say

Highest level of education

- Middle school
- High school
- Some college
- Graduate school
- 2-year college
- 4-year college
- Prefer not to say

8. Household yearly gross income (Naira)

- Less than N20,000
- N21,000 - N40,000
- N41,000 - N60,000
- Over N60,000
- Prefer not to say

Do you know Boko Haram? Yes No

If you answered yes to question 9, who are they?

- Youth
- Elders
- Women
- Men
- Others

How many times did Boko Haram strike in your area? Yes No

If you answered yes to question 11, how often do they strike?


- Once a day
- Two to three times a week
- Once a month
- Twice a month
- Once a year

What do you think cause Boko Haram Insurgency in your area?

- Lack of education
- Poverty
- Extremism
- Marginalization
- Political

I certify that the answers provided in this survey are true and accurate. I certify that I have answered these questions to the best of my abilities and I understand that the Researcher may use my answers to offer more surveys that I may enjoy. I agree to allow the Researcher to send me more in depth surveys. If at any time I choose to no longer participate in these more in depth surveys, I may opt out at any time by emailing maisudanabega@gmail.com

Signature



Date

JAN 2018

Physical Survey Questionnaire

From: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will fit your interests.

Personal Information

Name Prince # Aliyu Umar

Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month SEPT Day 3 Year 1988

Gender Male Female Prefer not to say

- Race
- Jihadist Arabian
 - African American
 - Native African
 - Asian
 - Hispanic
 - Other
 - Prefer not to say

6. What is your current marital status?
- Single
 - Married
 - Divorced
 - Separated
 - Widowed
 - Living with partner
 - Prefer not to say

- Highest level of education
- Middle school
 - High school
 - Some college
 - Graduate school
 - 2-year college
 - 4-year college
 - Prefer not to say

8. Household yearly gross income (Naira)
- Less than N20,000
 - N21,000 - N40,000
 - N41,000 - N60,000
 - Over N60,000
 - Prefer not to say

Do you know Boko Haram? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 9, who are they?
- Youth
 - Elders
 - Women
 - Men
 - Others

How many times did Boko Haram strike in your area? Yes No

- If you answered yes to question 11, how often do they strike?
- Once a day
 - Two to three times a week
 - Once a month
 - Twice a month
 - Once a year

- What do you think cause Boko Haram Insurgency in your area?
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Signature



Date JAN 2018

Physical Survey Questionnaire

From: The Researcher Mr. Kumo Idris

To: Affected respondent

This survey contains general interest questions, and will be used by the Researcher to find more in depth surveys that will suit your interests.

Personal Information

1. Name CAPITAN, MARYAM MAWADA - M.

2. Are you at least 18 years of age? Yes No 3. Birthday: Month FEB. Day 10 Year 2022

4. Gender Male Female Prefer not to say

- Race
- Jihadist Arabian
- African American
- Native African
- Asian
- Hispanic
- Other
- Prefer not to say

- 6. What is your current marital status?
- Single
- Married
- Divorced
- Separated
- Widowed
- Living with partner
- Prefer not to say

- Highest level of education
- Middle school
- High school
- Some college
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Signature

Mahere Cant

Date 2 JAN 2018