

**HATE SPEECH, ETHNIC CLEAVAGES AND YOUTH VIOLENCE IN  
KENYAN POLITICS**

**BY**

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## **DECLARATION AND APPROVAL**

### **Declaration of the Candidate**

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father, Nom, who as my great source of inspiration would have been proud to share in this achievement; to my mother, Bilha, for teaching me to reach for the stars and to my husband, Edwin, for your patience and support that made it all possible.

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## ABSTRACT

This study highlights the emergence of hate speech, resulting from institutionalization of ethnic cleavages, as a potential risk for the Kenyan nation that could lead to dire consequences if not urgently addressed. The study's analysis is located in the historical context of political violence and the language of political discourse in Kenya. The study is anchored in critical postmodernism, focusing on the primacy of discourse, and seeks to critically analyze and determine the extent to which hate speech is a discourse, how we situate hate speech within the dynamics of violence and what should constitute the reform agenda if hate speech is to be muted. By adopting the postmodern approach, this study questions the dominant assumptions that belie the current models addressing hate speech and youth violence in Kenyan politics. The study constitutes a unique contribution to study on hate speech, providing critical insights on the extent of its influence in the Kenyan scenario. It demonstrates how political elites invoke ethnic identities to further their own agendas and argue that the power of hate speech derives from the mental concepts created through conspiracy theories spreading fear and hatred that then consequently result in violence. Using mixed methods, the study generates baseline data through quantitative methods, then further uses qualitative methods to critically engage in-depth discussions and validate varied aspects of the findings generated from the baseline data. The sample is drawn from the youth in Nairobi County. Questionnaires were administered on a sample of 150 students from the University of Nairobi, and 50 from the Technical University of Kenya. Focus group discussions were held with five university/college student leaders and five Mungiki sect members selected through snowballing. Further in-depth interviews involved three residents randomly selected from each of the study areas; Mathare North, Huruma and Kariobangi South and post-election violence victims numbering 18 from Kibera, 20 from Mathare North and 7 from Kariobangi South. The findings reveal that Kenyan communities co-exist in harmony except during elections when speech fomenting ethnic hatred dominates the campaign rhetoric, resulting in inter-ethnic violence. The study stresses on the incompleteness of research surrounding the hate speech discourse and its relevance to youth violence and calls for more analytical work on both their theoretical and practical aspects. It highlights the tenets of new policy imperatives to effectively augment efforts towards curbing hate speech, particularly in light of unprecedented developments in online media as an ongoing discourse in post-conflict societies struggling with institutionalization of ethnic cleavages. The findings suggest that hate speech is to date sufficiently harmful to justify constitutional protection and points to the urgent need to develop an open discourse among the citizens, especially the 'netizens', that is social media users, on the limitations of free speech on a seemingly 'free' social media platform and the dangers of hate speech to the society at large.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ICC	International Criminal Court
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GoK	Government of Kenya
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KPUC	Kenya Polytechnic University College
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
KNHDR	Kenya National Human Development Report
MP	Member of Parliament
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCRC	National Crime Research Centre
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity
RTL	<i>Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines</i> (Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills)
SMS	Short Message Service
TU-K	Technical University of Kenya
UoN	University of Nairobi

## **OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS**

*Hate speech.* The working definition of Hate Speech adopted for purposes of this research is based on a convergence of the many existing interpretations of what hate speech entails. In a 2009 study on Hate Speech on Commercial Talk Radio, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in America developed two definitions for types of hate speech as first, “words that threaten to incite ‘imminent unlawful action’, which may be criminalized without violating the First Amendment” (Noriega & Iribarren, 2009, p. 20; US Bill of Rights, which provides for freedom of expression). Second, “Speech that creates a climate of hate or prejudice, which may in turn foster the commission of hate crimes” (Noriega & Iribarren, 2009, p. 20). Webster’s New World Law Dictionary (2010) on the other hand defines it as speech that is intended to foster hatred against individuals or groups based on race, religion, gender, sexual preference, place of national origin, or other improper classification, while the American Heritage Dictionary (2000) defines it as “Bigoted speech attacking or disparaging a social or ethnic group or member of such a group”.

Article 33 of The Constitution of Kenya (2010) protects freedom of expression except pertaining to hate speech or the incitement of violence. In addition, the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008), criminalizes the use of speech that is “threatening, abusive or insulting” and where this behaviour intends to “stir up ethnic hatred” (p. 13).

However, of more relevance to this study, is the definition provided by US Legal, Inc. (2011) an entity providing free legal information for legal topics, terms, and situations: Hate speech is a communication that carries no meaning other than the

expression of hatred for some group, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence. It is an incitement to hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and the like. Hate speech can be any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic, and religious groups and other discrete minorities or to women (US Legal, 2010).

Given therefore that there is no standard definition of what constitutes hate speech, for purposes of this research, the context in which the speech is used remains the overriding factor determining whether it befits the definition of hate speech or not. The study does not concern itself with whether a particular word is hate speech, but rather whether its usage can be said to provoke youth to ethnic incitement or violence. Noriega and Iribarren (2009) identified four types of hate speech (i.e., falsehoods, flawed argumentation, divisive language, and dehumanizing metaphors). From this classification, it is clear that the issue of interpretation by the recipient is critical to the definition of hate speech. The researcher's assumption therefore is that there exists such a phenomenon as hate speech, even if it is not always obvious at first sight. Of interest, is the thought process that fuels the perception that the words used are tantamount to hate speech.

Secondly, the aspect of access to hate speech is not considered significant to this research, as it is virtually impossible to choose whether to access hate speech when one is a member of any particular ethnic group that is perceived to be the target. The researcher's assumption is that hate speech is a kind of aggression that represents a threat to its targets that is impossible to ignore by choice of the recipient. In the context of this research, ethnicity is the guiding factor in determining whether the



words used are hate speech or not. Thirdly, although it is acknowledged that hate speech can be communicated through body language (e.g., eye contact or being ignored), this research is only concerned with the more overt form of hate speech i.e. spoken, written.

***Youth violence.*** For purposes of this research, Dahlberg and Krug's (2002) definition of youth violence has been adopted. As such, youth violence shall denote:

The intentional use by youth of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation. (Dahlberg & Krug, 2002, pp. 1-21)

Hence, this research does not pre-occupy itself with the link between intent and outcome as some consequences might be unintentional.

***The Ocampo Six.*** 'The Ocampo Six' refers in this thesis to the six Kenyans summoned by the International Criminal Court to answer charges of crimes against humanity levelled by ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo. Five of the six Kenyans charged were holding public office at the time, namely; Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta (currently President), Education Minister William Ruto (currently Deputy President), Industrialization Minister Henry Kosgey (retired), Head of Public Service Francis Muthaura (retired) and Police Commissioner Gen. Mohammed Hussein Ali (retired). Kass FM radio presenter Joshua Sang was the only suspect outside of public service. Despite appearances in court for pre-trial proceedings, all six cases were terminated by 2016 due to lack of sufficient evidence and alleged witness tampering.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.0 Overview**

This chapter provides an introduction to the study on hate speech, ethnic cleavages and youth violence in Kenyan politics, commencing with a background of the context within which the study takes place. The chapter articulates the statement of the problem, the research problem, research objectives, scope of the study, limitations of the study, the justification for conducting research on this subject, ultimately underlining the significance of the study on hate speech and youth violence in the context of Kenya's political environment. This study focuses on the primacy of discourse, and seeks to critically analyze and determine the extent to which hate speech is a discourse, how we situate hate speech within the dynamics of violence and what should constitute the reform agenda if hate speech is to be muted. The study's analysis is located in the historical context of political violence and the language of political discourse in Kenya. The study highlights the potential dangers of hate speech to multi-ethnic communities in which ethnic cleavages have become institutionalized, identifying the need for urgent policy interventions to forestall imminent pitfalls.

#### **1.2 Background to the Study**

This study is set in Kenya's capital Nairobi commonly referred to as "the green city in the sun" (Myers, 2014, p. 328) by virtue of its unique high altitude and cool climate in an equatorial tropical location. Kenya is located in the East African region, bordering five countries; namely, Tanzania to the South, Uganda to the West, South Sudan, and Ethiopia to the North, and Somalia to the East. The Indian Ocean lies at its Southeast border. Kenya is a multicultural society; comprising 43 ethnic groups whose mosaic forms the population of the capital city Nairobi (see Appendix II on Ethnic Groups in Kenya). Agriculture is the mainstay of Kenya's economy however, the tourism sector

also contributes significantly to national income. Because of the emphasis on agriculture, land is an important resource to Kenyans, based on which many ethnic conflicts have arisen since independence. Indeed, as Roberts (2009) noted, the subject of land has been an acute issue in the majority of inter-ethnic conflicts since Kenya's independence in 1964. Roberts (2009) stated, "Often the members of the tribe in power were unethically given or allowed to use land, frequently at the expense of other tribes" (p. 155). The author noted that these historic land issues continued to represent a major cause of conflict between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities during the 2007 post-election violence (PEV).

Kenya is a predominantly Christian nation with 78% of its population identifying as either Protestant or Roman Catholic and hence, the Church plays a central role in the country's politics (Maupeu, 2007). In support of this view, Murunga and Nasong'o (2007) highlighted that the movement for constitutional reform following the 1992 elections "was energized by calls for a new constitution by the Catholic Church and the Church of the Province of Kenya (now Anglican Church of Kenya)" (p. 20).

Kenya's education system derived from an 8-4-4 model, which entails a primary (basic) education for children between 6-13 years, four years of secondary education, and a further four years of higher learning (university) at 18+ years of age (essentially adult). Kenya's prevailing development blueprint includes the Kenya Vision 2030 (2008), which seeks to transform Kenya into a middle-income industrialized country with a high quality of life for its citizens by the year 2030. Under its Social Pillar - the other two representing the Political and Economic pillars - the Kenyan Vision 2030 (2008) laid emphasis on investing in the People of Kenya, citing youth as a key focus alongside women and marginalized and vulnerable groups. It aims at empowering

youth with relevant knowledge, skills, and attitude, inculcating a culture of responsibility, hard work, and accountability.

Kenya is a former British colony, having gained its independence from British rule in 1963. The country conducts governance on a democratic system based on a people driven constitution. In a radical departure from Kenya's first constitution, the current constitution promulgated in August 2010 states in its Preamble that the exercise of sovereign power is vested in the people of Kenya (Njagi, Ndolo, & Malala, 2015). This constitution has a Bill of Rights (Chapter 4; as cited by Njagi et al., 2015), which safeguards the basic rights of the citizens. The principle of peoples' involvement and effective participation in government is emphasized, through which Kenya adopted a devolved system of government, with 47 counties and a bicameral parliamentary system.

As provided by the Constitution, elections are held in Kenya every five years. A bastion of peace in the region, the country has enjoyed relative stability since independence, over which period both single and multiparty elections took place, but has increasingly witnessed periods of uncertainty during elections, since the onset of the multiparty era in 1992, peaking to a climax when a disputed general election held in December, 2007 sparked violence. This was Kenya's fourth multiparty election, and as Maupeu (2007) observed, although Kenya had seen conflict and recurring large-scale violence over past elections, the magnitude of the trauma and structural violence took both Kenyans and the international community, alike, by surprise. The violence led to huge economic losses arising from a slump in both Kenya's tourism and export earnings, greatly undermining the nation's development progress. Roberts (2009) decried the destruction, "The carnage was horrific...in a span of 59 days between Election Day December 27, 2007 to February 28, 2008 when a political

compromise was reached...1,500 dead, 3,000 innocent women raped, and 300,000 people left internally placed” (p. 155).

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

Hate speech has consistently emerged as a serious problem in Kenya over the past decades, promulgating negative ethnicity conspiracy theories, which are normally manifested through electoral violence. Kenya stands to suffer regression in its social, economic and political spheres if hate speech is not checked.

Hate speech (or hate expression) is a discourse in political processes. It is examined in this study as a form of political communication. The discourse theory as articulated by French Philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) focuses on how the use of human expression (i.e. language) links with human knowledge, shaping what we perceive to be ‘truths’. Thus, in questioning how objective these truths are, this study associates with postmodernism. Modern (i.e. previous) perspectives present the world as rational and normative. The postmodern approach projects to the contrary, an alternative networked model where society appears irrational. By adopting the postmodern approach, therefore, my study questions the dominant assumptions that belie the current models addressing hate speech that incites youth violence in Kenyan politics. By critiquing the modern perspective, I aim to anatomize the socially constructed meanings expressed through hate speech and by so doing bring to light those interests represented by unraveling that construction.

Hate speech has often been used to spread suspicion, fear and hatred among the target audience with a view to influencing voting patterns in Kenya. In my view, as a communication tool, hate speech in and of itself may not be a discourse and therefore my intention to establish what it is about the Kenyan society and politics that makes

hate speech a cause of violence. Is the violence a function of the mere articulation of hate speech words or is it a function of the fact that there are prevailing circumstances in society that have the ability to mobilize people towards violence? Hence, we may be dealing with the wrong elements in trying to resolve hate speech, when there is in fact a different problem that we need to confront. I argue that the discourse may be different from reality, and therefore we ought to be examining the ideologies of construction, which compel audiences to place the content of hate speech within a certain context to fit in with their own ideology around the subject. Chandra (2007) suggests that context emerges as a critical factor in understanding ethnic identities.

In examining Kenya's case, the study isolates communication in the form of hate speech through various media as the conveyor belt for reinforcing ethnic identity and underscores its role in social differentiation and conflict in the Kenyan society. My underlying hypothesis is that there exist a number of fundamental interlinkages between hate speech and youth violence, that have remained indiscernible, either due to conceptual constructs or lack of sufficient research on the interaction of these two phenomena. The study traces in addition a causal link between hate speech and youth violence during political campaigns and elections, given that this form of communication is subject to the machinations of the political elite who exploit the ethnic card for political vantage. The study demonstrates how politicians manipulate ethnicity through hate speech in public speeches to incite violence in order to further their own agendas. Thus, Kenya's propensity for violence, or its 'predatory impulse' as defined by Goldstein & Rotich (2008) is most evident during election campaigns. The argument is then developed to demonstrate why Kenya remains susceptible to electoral violence perpetuated by youth and yet lessons learned over the multiparty era, which the study confines itself to, should have informed the designing of a sound framework to address the causal factors; key among them hate speech.

The use of hate speech in the political arena has potential consequences which paint gloom prospects for Kenya unless checked. Hate speech is isolated in the study as the key factor encouraging Kenyan youth to develop deep ethnic/linguistic cleavages and the catalyst for youth violence during elections. Hence, if more Kenyans refrained from hate speech, there would be less violence during elections by Kenyan youth. Negative ethnicity has perpetuated animosity between Kenyan ethnic groups to the extent that national cohesion efforts initiated since independence have come to naught. Politicians bent on withholding power ruthlessly exploit these feelings. This strategy has been sustained with speeches that are legally defined as incitement (Chandra, 2007). The use of hate speech by politicians to incite violence thus forms a key component of this study, with intense scrutiny given to the potential of politically driven hate speech to mobilize ethnic groups against one another.

An analysis of the discourse and its relevance to the Kenyan society is thus necessary to identify ways in which hate speech impacts imaging to spark intolerance and ultimately incite violence. The study aims at contributing to a more thorough understanding the use of hate speech as a persuasive power of speech in the public discourse, which has resulted in the increased incidence of youth violence in Kenya, particularly around general elections. Thus establishing a nexus between the twin problems of hate speech and youth violence is a central goal of this study.

This study was necessitated by the existing gaps in the available literature, which has complicated efforts towards identifying corrective measures to stem the increasing incidence of hate speech sparking electoral violence in Kenya. The researcher draws heavily on the Critical Race Theory (Derrick Bell, 1980s), which seeks to explain the race factor in the United States of America. According to this theory, race is a fundamentally critical factor in America, radically influencing a vast majority of

decisions at the political, social, and economic levels and perpetuating the use of hate speech. The researcher argues that in the Kenyan context, the critical race theory holds by virtue of the fact that ethnicity is a dominant factor in the country's political and social discourse, making it easy for hate speech to thrive and encouraging repression of those ethnic groups perceived to be inferior. Notably, the theory has found particular relevance in the field of ethnic studies.

### **1.5 The Historical Perspective**

Four decades after independence, Kenya should ideally be enjoying tranquility, with structures that guarantee respect of every citizen's rights solidly in place. After relative stability had been secured in the post-independence Kenya, the country entered into a new phase where attention turned to issues of equitable distribution of the national cake arguably arising from historical ethnic divisive patterns that had characterized the colonial era. Isolated sentiments of injustice steadily mounted into ethnic mistrust, tension and agitation over the unfair distribution of the country's resources, particularly land, and subsequently mounted into what is generally described as the struggle for Kenya's second liberation. Commonly known as land grabbing, well connected individuals were either allocated public land or were permitted to purchase public property at grossly lower rates than the market price.

One might justifiably argue that cohesion is intensified by a common purpose and therefore in the immediate post-independence phase, cohesion was driven by the broader need for national identity and emancipation in Kenya. The fibre of self-esteem had been lost during colonialist suppression schemes, to the extent that the individual and ethnic considerations took secondary significance. Attention however soon shifted inward, igniting the problem of ethnic conflict as characterized today.



Whatever the cause of this problem, adequate and urgent attention needs to be given to suitable solutions, to ensure peaceful coexistence of the Kenyan people.

One reason acknowledged as central to Kenya's internal instability over the years, has been the role of politicians. Mwalimu Mati (2010), director of Mars Group Kenya, an anticorruption watchdog group asserts that typically, the goal of politicians is to highlight contrasts between their policies and their rivals'. In Kenya, the aim has been to persuade the electorate about the spoils that they stand to gain if they vote for a candidate from a certain community. In the case of Kenya, the spoil-of-spoils is land. Hence, land has remained an emotive issue as explained in the background of this study. A strong undercurrent of antagonism runs between sections of the country's 43 tribes over feelings that lands that traditionally "belonged" to certain ethnic groups have been "stolen" by others. Negative ethnicity has perpetuated animosity between Kenyan ethnic groups to the extent that national cohesion efforts initiated since independence have come to naught. Politicians bent on staying in power ruthlessly exploit these feelings. This strategy has been sustained with speeches that are now legally defined as incitement (Reuters, 2010). The use of hate speech by the political elite with the intent to incite violence thus forms a key component of this study, with intense scrutiny given to the potential of politically driven hate speech to mobilize ethnic groups against one another.

The researcher isolates hate speech as the key factor encouraging Kenyan youth to develop deep ethnic/linguistic cleavages. Hence, if more Kenyans refrained from hate speech, there would be less violence by Kenyan youth. It is therefore a central objective of this study to establish a nexus between the twin problems of hate speech and youth violence. The deliberate use of hate speech to bolster political machinations is another core concern of this study as language plays a critical role in socializing a

community into violence. A case in point is the speech blamed for xenophobic attacks in South Africa in March, 2015 by the Zulu traditional leader King Goodwill Zwelthini in which he attributed the high crime rate in the country to foreigners. Although he retracted the statement insisting that he was misinterpreted, the damage was phenomenal and caused a mass exodus of foreigners from South Africa for fear of retribution.

In Kenya, a review of events preceding 2008 confirms that the PEV was no isolated incident. It is alleged that in 1992, a then member of parliament (MP) William Ole Ntimama backed the forceful removal of the Kikuyu tribe from what he claimed was Maasai land, and infamously called for the Kikuyu community in the Rift Valley to "lie low like envelopes". Mukhongo (2009) agreed that:

The impression that government was either callous or had lost control was reinforced by rampant killings in Mombasa, which were attributed to influential politicians. The killings created a sense of insecurity and thousands of civilians became internally displaced...there was a widespread perception that the government had deliberately engineered the killings, and had targeted certain nationalities, as a political electioneering tactic of reducing the number of potential opposition voters at the coast. (p. 20)

Mutahi (2005) supported this view and notes that the 1992 general elections largely targeted the Luo, Kikuyu, and Luhya in the Rift Valley Province. Four broad reasons were identified as reasons for the violence. These four reasons featured prominently as concerns in this study: Firstly, the violence was to confirm the prediction that multipartyism would bring tribal animosity and chaos. Secondly, it was to displace the non-Kalenjin communities in Rift Valley so that the *Majimbo* agenda could be

successful. Thirdly, it aimed at provoking a mass reaction in support of the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party among the Kalenjin so that groups like the Nandi and Kipsigis could not join the opposition. Kagwanja (2001) argued that in the end the violence not only ensured that Kenyan politics became ethnicized, but it also increased ethnic animosity and hatred. In addition, the violence also ensured that KANU gained victories in areas where it had slim chances of winning.

The scenario was repeated again in 1997 when general elections drew near and the Coast Province also became a hotspot for electoral violence. In other areas, the non-Pokot were also evicted from West Pokot, while the non-Maasai were intimidated and chased out of Trans-mara/Gucha districts. In addition, the Marakwet who had started criticizing the government suffered the brunt of violence through cattle rustling. Could it then be argued that incumbent governments have used violence indiscriminately as a tool to entrench political power and ensure electoral victory? Maupeu (2007) reinforced this view by pointing out that, “in retrospect, the violence that occurred could not only have been predicted, it could most likely have been prevented” (p. 193). Thus, multiparty politics in itself has provided new opportunities for entrenching negative ethnicity in Kenya; yet another concern under scrutiny in this study.

The researcher sought to investigate the fact that rather than engage themselves in productive activities for Kenya’s development, Kenyan youth seemed more inclined to being used as instruments of revenge attacks based on ethnic biases – a direct result being the youth gangs. The increasing role of youth in ethnic mobilization is a matter of concern under review in this study. Mutahi (2005) noted that in multiparty Kenya, new forms of ethnic violence, banditry, and cattle rustling emerged where it was propagated to settle political scores. The warriors who traditionally were cattle

rustlers now started wielding modern firearms alongside the traditional ones and carried out the practice of “punishing” people who were perceived as supporters of opposition parties. It is noted that *warriors* traditionally fall within the age group defined as youth in this study and hence their role in settling political scores because of the sponsoring agent is seen as crucial in the particular context of this study.

Frustrations visited on youth arising from economic difficulties, unemployment and lack of representation in the country’s political space, to name a few, are contributing to the growing number of violence and youth gangs in Kenya. This study submits that hate speech has led to the proliferation of youth gangs; and that youth gangs are a manifestation of youth violence, principally because the youth form an attractive constituency for the political elite in the run up to general elections in Kenya as they are easy to manipulate given that they have “nothing to lose”. The term “nothing to lose” is used loosely in Kenya to refer to the challenges facing the youth such as high rates of unemployment, high poverty levels and poor standards of living, high crime rates and insecurity.

Politicians have therefore devised ways of manipulating the youth as a voting bloc during elections by using the youth gangs to mobilize voters, particularly through hate speech. Therefore, hate speech as a form of communication among politicians and their various audiences and publics during political campaigns is a key concern of this study. This aspect is critical to the study because of the notably increasing presence of militant youth gangs during Kenyan elections as will be expounded in Chapter 2.

### 1.6 Research Objectives

The study's objectives were derived from the above three foundational research questions, which guided the collection of data for this study. As such, the study focused on the following objectives:

- To investigate the relationship between hate speech and ethnic animosity in Kenya and establish the predominant features of hate speech in Kenya.
- To examine to what extent hate speech is responsible for entrenching negative ethnicity and a catalyst for youth violence and the formation of youth gangs during electoral periods in Kenya.
- To assess the challenges associated with eradicating hate speech and instigation of the youth violence in Kenya's elections.

### 1.7 Research Questions

The research seeks to examine the role of hate speech in instigating youth violence during election campaigns in Kenya. I posit that election violence propagated by youth in Kenya are founded on ethnic cleavages, which are incited by hate speech. The research assumption was informed by Kenya's experience since inception of multiparty politics, over which period hate speech and youth violence during election campaigns have been predominant factors each successive election year. The research questions guiding the study were:

- What constitutes hate speech and what are the factors that then explain the differentiated responses?
- How do we situate hate speech within the dynamics of violence and under what circumstances does the discourse of hate speech find meaning in the power of action?
- What should constitute the reform agenda if hate speech is to be muted?

## 1.8 Scope

The study was carried out in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, which is cosmopolitan, and comprising a multicultural population of 3,138,295 according to the 2009 Kenya Population and Housing Census results. The ethnic factor is now considered so vital to Kenya's development policy planning, that enumeration based on ethnic affiliation was included for the first time in Kenya's history, during the 2009 national Census. Nairobi County's unique identity is probably its ethnic diversity – a cocktail of Kenya's 43 ethnic communities enumerated during the Census namely; Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, Kamba, Kenyan Somali, Kisii, Mijikenda, Meru, Turkana, Maasai, Teso, Embu, Taita, Kuria, Samburu, Tharaka, Mbeere, Borana, Basuba, Swahili, Gabbra, Orma, Rendille, Kenyan Asian, Kenyan Arab, Ilchamus, Sakuye, Burji, Gosha, Taveta, Walwana, Nubi, Dasenach, Galla, Galjeel, Waat, Leysan, Njemps, Kenyan European, Isaak, Kenyan American, and Konso.

The study's population sample derived from Nairobi County. In the researcher's view, this urban area is representative of the larger Kenya albeit on a smaller scale, and constitutes a mosaic of the range of Kenya's multi-ethnic groups. As the study aimed at establishing perceptions of various ethnic groups towards hate speech based on their cultural norms and values, basing the research on any of Kenya's rural areas might lead to skewed findings based on the predominance of any one resident ethnic group. I confined this study to a sample of youth from one university and one mid-level college that is, the University of Nairobi (UoN) and the Technical University of Kenya (TU-K) - at the time the Kenya Polytechnic University College (KPUC, 2010) - respectively over a six-week period. The latter is unique as it is dedicated to the education and training of technologists.

The UoN is one of the largest public universities in Eastern Africa, currently with over 80,000 registered students. The University comprises six colleges offering both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in Architecture and Engineering, Agriculture and Veterinary Services, Biological and Physical Sciences, Education and External Studies, Humanities and Social Sciences, and Health Sciences. On the other hand, before its elevation to full university status under the name Technical University of Kenya in 2012, the institution was at the time a constituent college of the UoN (2011), an independent tertiary college offering principally technology and vocational education and training. In addition, the college offered full-time diploma courses, evening study undergraduate degrees, which derived from four schools; namely, this included the School of Applied Sciences and Technology, School of Architecture and the Built Environment, School of Computing and Information Studies, and School of Hospitality and Tourism Management (KPUC, 2010). Only the registered full-time non-graduate students are covered in the scope of this study and these number 4,000 (30% female and 70% male), according to the admissions office (KPUC, 2010).

In the context of this research, Kenyan youth are that section of Kenya's population between 18-35 years of age; consistent with the definition provided by Kenya's Health and Demographic Survey. The Report on the 'One Kenya, One Dream: The Kenya We Want' Conference held in 2009 described Kenya's Youth as "Persons aged between 15 and 35 who are the largest, most dynamic and active segment of the Kenyan population". I have adopted the 18 years threshold because in the Kenyan context, this is the average age at which a person completes high school, joins institutions of higher learning, or enters the job market. It is also the age at which one is legally considered an adult and is eligible to vote. In the previous constitution of Kenya, which was replaced in 2010, an individual could not run for the presidential office if one was not above 35 years of age.

The term ‘politicians’ encompasses within the scope of this study, all the six elective posts provided for by Kenya’s current Constitution, namely; President, Governor, Senator, Women Representative, Member of National Assembly (MP) and Member of County Assembly (MCA).

The study entailed both face-to-face interviews and administration of questionnaires. Additionally, the researcher used Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) directed at specific interest groups such as leaders of University Student Organizations and Associations based on ethnic affiliation. This had the twin purpose of determining to what extent ethnic considerations drive the Student Associations’ agenda and whether leaders of ethnic affiliated University Student associations serve as a campaign tool for national political leaders, to influence national voting patterns along ethnic lines. Could the purpose of Student Associations be to promote ethnic affiliation as opposed to advancing the interests of the university students’ home constituencies’ interests as they portend? This would suggest that by the time the students leave university/college for the workplace, they are already inclined towards negative ethnicity making it difficult to break this cycle.

Besides the educational institutions, the study was confined to Kibera and Mathare neighbourhoods of Nairobi County because besides ethnic predominance, Kibera and Mathare share similar characteristics in terms of large populations of unemployed and idle youth and high poverty levels. Although available national poverty statistics are limited to the constituency level (at the time Langata and Kasarani constituencies respectively), I took the decision to focus on the specific neighbourhoods of Kibera and Mathare, recognizing that the relevant variables might have been distorted if the research covered the entire constituencies due to the existence of pockets of high



income neighbourhoods within the constituency such as Langata/Karen in the case of Kibera and Muthaiga in Mathare's case.

The research used a representative sample of five members of the Mungiki youth gang to isolate intricacies influencing practices of youth gangs in Kenya. I included Mungiki within the scope of my study despite recognizing that it is an outlawed criminal gang, given that the Government of Kenya (GoK) acknowledges the continued existence of criminal gangs engaging in criminal activities across the country despite outlawing 33 of them by gazette notice of 18th October, 2010 following the enactment of the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act of August 2010. A more recent study by National Crime Research Centre (NCRC, 2012) - a state corporation in Kenya's State Law Office - puts the number of organized criminal gangs in Kenya at an alarming 46, most of which are situated in Nairobi's larger informal settlements. An in-depth study comprising six of these criminal gangs, including Mungiki, conducted out of concern over the increasing crime rates by the NCRC (2012) provides critical insights into the operations and extent of influence and impact of these gangs within the political context as highlighted by my study.

Further, as acknowledged by the NCRC (2012), most of the organized criminal gang members have low levels of formal education, with the highest educated being secondary school dropouts. Hence, including the Mungiki in the scope of my study ensured that I captured data on this unique category of youth within the 18-35 years range, in contrast to the more educated university and mid-level college category captured under the UoN and TU-K sample.

Mungiki is acknowledged so far as the most organized youth gang in Kenya given their long existence and established structure. Although the Mungiki is outlawed in

Kenya, it is widely acknowledged as one of the most active youth gangs in Kenya, with its leaders often publicly agitating for its recognition based on a self-professed role in community development. The members of the Mungiki sect are increasingly becoming vocal particularly within legitimate institutions such as the church and youth associations, and are therefore more easily accessible for interview by the media, spiritual leaders, researchers and politicians.

I argue that the inclusion of members of Mungiki as a sample group carries strategic significance to the subject of hate speech and youth violence in this study. Isolating the Mungiki case enabled me to limit the scope of the underlying principles in the Mungiki case and arrive at generalizations based on the assumption that this case is representative in character of other youth gangs in Kenya. Thus, one can logically assume that the suggested links or theoretical propositions developed of the Mungiki case hold for other youth gangs in Kenya.

The study of the Mungiki group was retrospective, basing the criteria for selection of the Mungiki youth gang for inclusion in the study on existing historical records of youth gangs in Kenya. The method was the most appropriate because of the need to examine a limited number of variables, facilitating an in-depth longitudinal study that allows for the progressive examination of the role of Mungiki in inciting negative ethnicity during elections in Kenya in the current multiparty era.

Possibly best known for their acts of extortion, Mungiki's activities are most pronounced in the Mathare informal settlement of Nairobi County, although they have a strong presence in Kayole, Kinoo, and Dagoretti, among other areas. I engaged in interviews and participant observation of the Mungiki youth gang over a 4-week

period to map out consistencies in their roles, relationships, and other identity related issues.

The justification for inclusion of the Mungiki group in the research sample is due to the need to articulate reasons why the youth gangs continue to play a significant role during successive elections during the current multiparty era. The study relied on both quantitative and qualitative evidence (triangulation) to build on a theoretical proposition and by so doing, determined those elements that might be crucial and that could be the focus of more extensive investigation in future in providing solutions to the growing threat of vigilante groups in Kenya.

Possibly best known for their acts of extortion, Mungiki's activities are most pronounced in the Mathare informal settlement of Nairobi County, although they have a strong presence in Kayole, Kinoo, and Dagoretti, among other areas. I engaged in interviews and participant observation of the Mungiki youth gang over a 4-week period to map out consistencies in their roles, relationships, and other identity related issues.

I observed members of the sect in the performance of their regular activities at these locations for approximately four hours per week, typically during morning hours, leaving open the possibility of afternoon observation to track any critical observation. Given the informal nature of the group's organization, I decided not to schedule structured interviews but rather, interview group members informally to provide insight into certain behavioral observations. Besides the Mungiki sect members, I interviewed three each randomly selected residents of Mathare North, Huruma and Kariobangi South to corroborate my findings from the Mungiki sect interviews.

I additionally interviewed PEV victims comprising 18 youth from Kibera (dominated by the Luo and Luhya ethnic communities) and 20 from Mathare North. I also interviewed 7 youth from Kariobangi South, which has been largely peaceful over past elections. The comparison between those involved in violence and those from peaceful areas provided critical insights into political machinations that led to violence and the role (if any) that ethnic cleavages and hate speech by politicians played in mobilizing youth to election violence.

Kibera is a vast informal settlement stretching over the southern part of Nairobi County, which has been consistently cited as Africa's biggest informal settlement where residents experience great hardship. Prior to 2013 elections, Kibera was situated in the Langata Constituency, where Raila Odinga, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) leader, predominantly reigned as MP. Kenya's Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission thereafter created Kibra Constituency (neighboring Langata constituency), which continues to attract immense attention from the donor and Non-governmental Organization (NGO) community, with numerous donor run projects on civic engagement and social change being initiated in the sprawling informal settlements.

Kibera is itself deconstructed into a number of socio-economic enclaves segregating the resident ethnic communities. As such although the Luos number the most in Kibera, they are resident mainly in Kisumu Ndogo, Raila village, Gatwekera and Kianda, while Mashimoni and Lindi are dominated by Luhyas and Kikuyus confine themselves to Laini Saba and Soweto. Nubians who also form a sizeable proportion of the Kibera population are associated with the Makina area.

The methodology used in this study aimed at ensuring that the various dimensions associated with contemporary Kenya were captured. As such, besides the traditional methods such as questionnaire administration and face-to-face interviews, a deliberate focus on the emerging importance of internet as a channel of unfettered access to information was adopted as a primary and secondary source of data.

### **1.9 Limitations of the Study**

Although there appears to be a consistent correlation between the trends in youth violence and election campaigns in Kenya, necessity existed to eliminate other variables as profoundly influencing the youth's tendency toward organized violent activities in the country. Indeed, some analysts have argued that youth violence in Kenya is directly linked to the growing abuse of drugs obtaining in Kenya. That in fact violence has been precipitated by frustrations associated with socio-economic factors, especially arising from unemployment due to limited job opportunities and secondly low standards of living linked to dwindling disposable incomes. Whereas one cannot dismiss these hypotheses wholly, it was thus crucial to isolate the significance of hate speech as a trigger of youth violence, relative to other mentioned factors. This would prove difficult in cases where all the variables are intricately intertwined.

Language plays a critical role in socializing a community into violence. In Rwanda, it all began as a joke with Hutus referring to Tutsis as "cockroaches," before picking up momentum into a movement to expel all Tutsis. In Kenya, through jokes, cultural stereotypes, media portrayal of violence as 'normal', Kenyans purvey ideas that legitimize brutality against perceived enemies both through overt and subtle means. There was as such need to interrogate those aspects of hate speech interpretations that are likely influenced by ethnic cultural perceptions on the one hand and secondly

where ethnic stereotypes have predominantly influenced hate speech. However without a perfect grasp of all the ethnic languages within the study's scope, it proved challenging to delineate the interface between ethnic stereotypes and language in all instances, as of specific interest to this study. Establishing this intricate link would only be facilitated by a deep understanding of the cultural norms and values of some of the ethnic groups in question.

The researcher argues that the use of hate speech and its potential consequences paints a gloomy picture for Kenya unless it is checked. The Kenya We Want Conference report (2009) states that even though Kenyans managed to live together practically regardless of ethnic or racial origins, they still harbour many biases and stereotypes against each other, about which jokes are sometimes made. The report notes that this takes a negative and dangerous direction when stereotypes and demeaning language is applied by one group against another and when that is inculcated in children by parents, friends, religious leaders, journalists, opinion leaders and worst of all by political leaders seeking power for themselves.

According to Linda Ochiel (2008), principal human rights officer at Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), many Kenyans are accustomed to making derogatory statements about other ethnic groups, not realizing the implications of what they are doing:

People treat it as a big joke. They don't know such stereotypes eventually get fixated in people's minds when they begin to kill people. It's one of the triggers of violence in this country. When we begin to dehumanize other Kenyans and depict them as animals, it's easy to take a machete and hack them to death. (p. 20).

Politicians have been particularly adept at using and therefore making fashionable forms of language that encourage and justify violence against adversaries particularly

during elections. Of interest to this research, was the extent to which hate speech campaign has influenced the political discourse in the run up to elections in Kenya.

Additionally, it was necessary to establish whether the media acted as a catalyst for the PEV alongside the role played by politicians. Of key concern was the need to highlight the exclusive role played by the media in amplifying these messages and rallying support for retaliatory actions. Impressionable rural populations interpreted these obscure references, broadcast on local language stations, – accurately – as a call to arms against rival tribes. Unchecked until too late, the propaganda helped launch the PEV that killed 1,300 people and left Kenya's reputation for stability in tatters (Reuters, 2010).

Kimenyi (1997) argued that the introduction of multiparty politics to Kenya in 1991 led political parties to splinter according to ethnic groupings; because of which the two subsequent elections in 1992 and 1997 revolved around ethnic alignments. However, the 2002 general elections defied this arrangement, with a broad coalition of ethnic groups voting for Mwai Kibaki. This and the 2007 election brought to question the argument that voters vote principally along ethnic identity lines. Besides cultural identities, other factors considered important in determining voting patterns are economic interests and government performance in service delivery, therefore reinforcing the notion that both identity and interest can co-exist. Indeed, Norris and Mattes (2003) pointed to the condition of the national economy or future expectations of personal economic wellbeing as overriding ethnicity in election in Zambia and Ghana thus reinforcing the need for eliminating this variable as a key course of youth violence in Kenya.

My attempts to access members of the outlawed Mungiki for interview were initially met with suspicion, as most believed that I was an under-cover government intelligence agent, gathering information that would later be used to incriminate and get them convicted. However with the help of my research assistants we were successful in convincing a kinsman with links to the Sect to arrange a meeting with one of the leaders in the Mathare informal settlement. After a brief ‘interrogation’ and inspection of my identity documents and research permit, his fears were allayed and we secured the necessary ‘clearance’ from the leader and were granted access to more members for the in-depth interviews identified through snow-ball sampling.

### **1.10 Justification of Study**

The Research highlights the emergence of hate speech as a potential area of risk for the Kenya government that could lead to dire consequences with respect to peace, human rights, security and ultimately the country’s stability, if not urgently addressed. Two key elements serve to justify this research. Firstly, from an academic standpoint, I submit that a new way of grasping reality is imminent given the overwhelming proof that defies the logic of traditional theories. I demonstrate that existing literature fails to address significant questions sufficiently relating to the nexus between hate speech and violence. I argue that a need exists to advance related theory to conform to contemporary realities and arrive at a new theory.

Secondly, from a policy viewpoint, I posit that Kenya remains vulnerable to election violence because lessons learned have failed to adequately inform strategies for dealing with hate speech as a primary cause of election violence during competitive politics. The need for a policy review thus remains urgent. As underscored by Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission Atsango Chesoni, “Hate speech is the precursor to violence and has been every electioneering year in this



country. We must begin to seriously hold people accountable for inciting people to violence and hatred” (IRIN, 2012).

The research isolates youth as an instrument of unique appeal for partisan politics, increasingly in use during Kenya’s elections for settling political scores and advancing patronage, in the pretext of protecting perceived ethnic interests hence undermining the concept of national identity and patriotism (although ethnic and national identity are not necessarily mutually exclusive). As the Kenya We Want Conference report (2009) noted, “deceptive and inflammatory language is used to convince people that their interests are threatened by another ethnic group” (para. 2).

According to Murunga and Nasong’o (2007), the tendency to use youth to settle political scores was inherited by the post-colonial government from the colonial administration: “youth wings existed on both sides of the divide and were basically charged with carrying out instructions from above.” Well-connected, mostly former university student leaders, who use them as vehicles to launch their political careers, usually lead these youth wings. The youth wings are most visible during general elections and are mainly used by the political elite to intimidate rivals, but as well serve as votes for sale. Youth during this time, unfortunately, are reduced to pawns, with most of them blindly engaging in politically instigated violence in support of *mtu wetu* (our man) after a small bribe and incitement into tribal bigotry (Youth Voice Pambazuka News).

Being a relatively vast *virgin* territory, the youth are perceived as the kingmakers in Kenya’s political game, as they have the numbers to significantly influence voting patterns. They are therefore a group to ‘keep under watch’. It is estimated that around 1 million youth were not allowed to register to vote during the 1992 multiparty

election because they were denied the national identity cards needed to register. This, Mutua (2008) described as structural violence.

This study aims as such to understand Kenyan youth's life experience of their perception of conflict through the dominance of the political elite. The use of relevant benchmarks on the international platform formed a central part of this research; mass student movements and youth gangs being of particular interest in view of prevailing economic concerns encumbering youth in Kenya, which expose youth as an easy target for political manipulation. The Kenya We Want Conference report (2009) articulates that during and after the 2007 general elections, politicians misused Kenya's youth to cause wanton destruction of life and property to settle political scores. In Rwanda, the formation of the 'Interhamue' youth gang militia socialize the youth into violence long before the actual genocide began, just as did 'Mungiki' in Kenya before the Kenyan PEV. Additionally, I examined the myriad of hate speech features associated with youth violence in Kenya over the election period, with a view to isolating consistent attributes that could serve as a focus while addressing the issue of hate speech in Kenya. I conducted an audit of ongoing initiatives to determine their effectiveness and additional measures considered for addressing gaps.

### **1.11 Significance of the Study**

The research seeks to unravel questions over why Kenyans seem to consistently develop higher affinity for youth violence around election time and provide a more vivid picture of this disturbing trend that is taking on a new dimension on the global platform. Another underlying concern is why so many years after independence; the Kenyan population seems to have become more polarized into ethnic blocs, with voting patterns clearly influenced by ethnic affiliation. To contribute positively to the search for solutions to violent conflict that is instigated by hate speech during

elections in Kenya's post single-party era, I have been guided by the ongoing debate on the subject by diverse audiences in Kenya including scholars and interest groups. Reinforcing the study's concerns, Nyairo and Hossfeld (2010) pondered over how possible it was to step outside the charged rhetoric in those heady days after the elections and isolate ideas, patterns and connections between them that might allow one to grasp some aspects of what was unfolding with such fatal force...questions that demanded sustained inquiry and dispassionate analysis.

Robert's (2009) conflict analysis argued that what took place during the Kenyan 2007 elections had its roots in a weak national constitution, which progressively lacked a healthy checks and balances system between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government with amendments merely systematically eroding these balances. However, despite the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010, there has been little progress noted in checking the causes of violence during elections. This study recognizes that today's world is one dependent on ever-changing networks of relationships as governed by the media. Thus with the promise of a new political dispensation under provisions of Kenya's new constitution and as elections draw closer, social cohesion is likely to cease to be a priority. The search for answers to the questions raised in this study therefore becomes even more pressing, reinforced by the inevitable re-alignments under the three arms of government of a magnitude never before witnessed in the history of Kenya. As a researcher, this represented a decisive moment in history that needs intense scrutiny for posterity.

We have a habit of standing here and proclaim we belong to Kenya, but out there, we sing tribalism the loudest and preach divisive politics, [Ephraim Maina MP Mathira, Safina] said in parliament. National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) head Mzalendo Kibunjia agreed, "Stopping hate speech is a civic duty of all Kenyans" (Hansard Parliament, 2011, para. 2).

But as true as this might be, there is need to see beyond the horizon to determine the critical steps that we as a nation need to undertake, to succumb the ills

visited upon as by historical injustices. Mwalimu Mati (2010) aptly described the nation's predicament:

The NCIC's moves might be enough for the politicians to restrain themselves, but the sentiments they're expressing may have a worrying resonance in their communities. There are a lot of underlying prejudices in Kenyan society that need to be addressed (p. 20).

One striking fact is that Kenyan academicians have taken an especially low profile in Kenya's political discourse. (Eldon, 2009) noted that:

For many years, scholars were suppressed. In order to survive like others, they had to lie low. The last thing they could afford to do was speak out, never mind in controversial ways, many of the best simply left our universities either to work in the private sector here or to join academic institutions elsewhere - indeed it is some of these intellectuals who until today email their columns back to our local newspapers. (para. 1)

Eldon (2009) posed the question that despite these more liberal times, "why still the noiselessness?" (para. 2). In apparent agreement with Rusesabagina's (2006) argument that academicians played a decisive role in the Rwanda conflict, Eldon (2009) averred, "We live in a society where as soon as we hear that someone is a doctor or professor so-and-so we feel compelled to listen that much more carefully and respectfully" (para. 2). In Kenya's case, Mũngai and Gona (2010) raised concern that academicians abdicated their role and failed to offer direction about the course of events leading to the 2008 PEV. Academicians allied to various political parties took highly partisan and narrow positions, which negated the spirit of nationhood and further justified sentiments of hatred against certain communities.

Notwithstanding the ongoing peace and reconciliation initiatives, it is my conception that time is ripe for academicians to engage themselves with the explosive issues surrounding Kenyan politics among them negative ethnicity and their impact on youth gangs and violence; in light of which this study should contribute significantly to the ongoing search for solutions to the Kenyan dilemma and serve as a useful reference

tool for a broad audience including communication practitioners, policy makers and donor agencies funding various peace and reconciliation initiatives in Kenya and other settings with similar context. Although media regulation and establishment of a code of conduct for media houses continues to attract attention in light of their role in instigating violence, it was not a central concern for this paper and did not therefore feature within the scope. However, it is recommended as a critical area for further study.

### **1.12 Chapter Summary**

This chapter sets the stage for the research, by providing a background to the research questions and objectives and highlights its significance in the context of Kenya's political environment. The study's relevance from an academic perspective is also featured. The purpose has been to demonstrate that the research is worthy of study, and additionally that it is testable within a reasonable period. The fact that elections were held within the timeframe of this study, and further at a time when Kenya is implementing a new constitution with radical changes to the political structures existing hitherto, renders this research even the more valuable. The next chapter comprises a review of existing literature with a view to determining to what extent the questions posed have been previously examined, identify those aspects that have not been addressed and highlight possible interventions that could address the problem. My focus was therefore to affirm that the questions posed are sufficiently valid to justify this thesis.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher will articulate the variables that served to define the research problem and ultimately demonstrate the value of this research study. Using a selected sample of the literature reviewed, the researcher sought to expound on the direction of this research and on the outcome that the data was expected to yield. In so doing, the research objectives of the study were designed to confirm that hate speech has played a central role in instigating youth violence during election campaigns in Kenya's multiparty era. A conceptual framework was thus developed demonstrating that when hate speech, negative ethnicity and the youth interact during elections, youth violence is likely to erupt. However, the insufficient literature available provides evidence that this is a subject that has not been accorded due attention in the field of academia, in which respect this study forms a unique and important contribution.

Hate speech/negative ethnicity during elections + Youth = Youth violence

(Independent variables) (Dépendent variable) important

#### 2.2 Background

Besides personal interest, this research is grounded on previous research literature on the subjects of hate speech and youth violence within Kenya's political discourse. The goal is not only to replicate but expand previous literature to address any gaps that might have resulted in weaknesses in generalizability, thereby adding value to this field of research. The study therefore aims at validating previous findings or interpretations, examine emerging trends and determine whether a need exists for further investigation in a related area.

Based on existing literature on research methods, the researcher opted to design the study using a distinctly different approach purposely to facilitate control of the different variables that would help in authenticating previous findings and confirm that the results previously obtained by use of different methodologies were not in fact flawed. Ultimately, besides enhancing prevailing knowledge, it is the goal of this research to contribute to the development of more superior interventions to address the problem of hate speech and its potential to incite ethnic animosity amongst youth, subsequently ignite violence.

Aspects that I consider significant that were featured in this study include among others, the role of student leaders and university/student associations in entrenching negative ethnicity. Channels of hate speech such as the social media networks also likewise received special attention. The literature review included both historical and contextual information that have a bearing on negative ethnicity within the Kenyan context. Whereas successive spates of violence around general elections points to the view that violence is typically politically driven in Kenya where the greatest political event is the general elections, it is noted that although significant attempts have been made in recent times to address the matter of electoral violence during the multiparty era in Kenya, available literature on this subject still fails to either sufficiently highlight either the role of youth as pawns in the political game surrounding Kenya's multiparty elections, and subsequently role of hate speech in entrenching negative ethnicity among the Kenyan youth and ultimately in instigating youth violence in the country.

### **2.3 The Kenyan Scenario**

As described in Chapter 1, Kenya is beset by after-shocks of decisions taken back in the pre-independence days by our colonial rulers. Much of the acrimony in Kenya

today is as a result of the colonial policy of promoting imbalances among communities that was consciously adopted to entrench the British colonialists' power over the Kenyan people. Successive presidents have attempted to address the question of ethnic inequities in the distribution of resources, primary among them being land. However, achieving optimum distribution and hence peace has remained an illusion that is bound to haunt the country for many years to come. Indeed, the question that begs for answers is whether adopting a different political governance approach at that critical moment of independence, would have put citizens in better stead.

The genesis of negative ethnicity can be traced to ancient Roman times where the term tribe was used to denote a geographical or political entity with identical culture and language (William Ochieng, as cited in Wanyonyi, 2010). In referencing people later, the term was derogatory. The word tribe meant, tributary or third rate (Njogu, 2010). This is a system through which the Roman Emperor Julius Caesar used when he conquered and colonized people – to divide and lord over them. However, over the post-colonial era, the term assumed a positive connotation simply used to identify a people, converting it into a useful tool for fostering national cohesion. Indeed, the Republic of Kenya's three successive governments have relied heavily on this factor to forge national unity, but faced challenges of ethnicity-bound governance arising from the distribution of the national cake.

As writer Jody Clarke (2011) observed, Kenyans are no strangers to ethnic mobilization as in almost every post-independence election, politicians have played on the prejudices of the country's ethnic groups to build a support base. I subscribe to Clarke's view that much of Kenya's politics has been dominated by machinations based on ethnic affiliation, the climax of which included the PEV in 2008. By examining the Kenyan 1992 and Zambia's 1991 transition cases, Posner (2005)



concluded that transition from single party to multiparty rule altered the dimension of ethnic cleavage around which political competition takes place. Thus, he demonstrated that political systems possess multiple lines of potentially mobilizable ethnic cleavage, be they tribal affiliation, clan, geographic region, language, or race oriented. Hence the existing regime is a pointer to the constellation of ethnic cleavages that matter over that term of office; based on which this group of politically-correct citizens is exclusively entitled to certain benefits, ostensibly on the grounds that it is their turn to eat (the national cake).

Unlike Kenya, Tanzania's destiny has clearly benefited from the policies introduced by founding President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party. Havnevik (2010) explains that by linking the modernization approach with traditional values and cultures such as redistribution and reciprocity, TANU was able to pre-empt a growing opposition from traditional cultural and religious bodies and thereby, at least in its early phase, provide some political and cultural cohesion to the post-colonial model. The launching of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 signaled some form of African socialism, where the policies of Ujamaa, were the major elements.

As such, as Kenya chose to allow free market forces to determine its path, Nyerere sought to tie the values of Ujamaa with the values and norms that had prevailed in pre-colonial Tanzania and use this as a model for the future. This was the point of divergence. Assensoh (1998) notes that, comparatively, it was clear that Kenyatta was not interested in social philosophies and slogans. Spencer et al. (1998) also had cause to compare Kenyatta and Nyerere and subsequently underscore, "Unlike his (Kenyatta's) neighbor Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenyatta articulated no particular social philosophy."

However, a number of factors could have contributed to the changing role of the youth in Kenya. According to the Kenya National Human Development Report (KNHDR) 2009, just as colonialism occasioned major constraints to people's political participation, independence brought new challenges for the youth. The new political context changed some fundamental elements of Kenyan politics, but this had little impact on the political role of the youth. A number of young people distinguished themselves in the political realm in the first three decades of the post-colonial period. However, the politics of exclusion was most glaring in the ninth constitutional amendments of 1968, which, by imposing a minimum age of 35 years for the presidency, reinforced the association of young people with immaturity. Youth became associated in the public imagination with one role, that of '*watu ya mkono*' meaning repair people to be used for the purposes of others.

Hence, youth dynamics had been largely influenced by cultural dimensions during the immediate post-independence era. Much of the societal authority was vested in the 'Elders' and the youth had little say over how matters of national interest were conducted. In most indigenous ethnic settings, the hierarchical structure was so well defined that the youth dared not consider assuming any role in decision making well beyond the 35-year-old threshold. In Kenya, the society makes deliberate attempts to delegitimize any idea that may suggest that the youth can legitimately hold power and use it responsibly. Roberts (2009) suggested therefore, that one should view conflict as part of the African culture that values elders over its youth.

The idea of dominant icons explored by Mũngai and Gona (2010) has it that politicians will go to any length to ensure that the patriarchal authoritative institutions are preserved. Hence, Kenyan political aspirants have readily adopted the tradition of elders in every community to ensure a firm foundation for their political ambitions.

Calestos Juma, quoted by Mũngai and Gona (2010), explained that this then becomes the basis upon which other crucial ideas and practices such as leadership, power, success, and social prestige are formulated.

Youth therefore have little room for venting their aspirations or frustrations except through violence as a means of power. This position is consistent with the dominant view on the political platform, where questions abound on how much free speech is good for the youth, with most arguing that rather than enlighten them, exposure to extremist views in the form of hate speech in reality radicalizes youth. British universities stunned opponents of this view in April 2011, when eight UK university vice-chancellors in a working group on academic freedom issued a report that rejected demands to ban controversial speakers on campus, arguing that you need to "engage, not marginalize" (Lloyd, 2011, p. 20) extreme political views on campus.

Lukalo (2006) observed that since the early 1980s the youth have increasingly begun to agitate for political accountability from their leaders including through artistic expressions such as music. Lukalo (2006) said:

The youth musical discourse in Kenya in the late twentieth century provided a channel for political and social engagement by urban youth and enabled them to expand their message as crucial...popular compositions were interwoven with Kiswahili and vernacular, thus serving a positive cultural linguistic function. (p. 20)

In an interesting twist, artists/musicians have become the "unlikely Twitter Kings" on the Kenyan scene, commanding the greatest following as opposed to the traditional authority figures (e.g., politicians). Supporting this view, Njogu (2010) examined the role of popular culture through theological settings e.g. gospel songs rewording to suit political context such as "Yote ya wezekana.." and "Wakenya Msilale, bado mapambano" (p. 20) the popular theme songs that bolstered the NARC Rainbow coalition party quest for power leading up to their securing the reins from KANU.

Njogu (2010) noted that music has the unique ability to promote violence since it arouses emotions and has brainwashing powers especially when repeated. Thus, youth have ensured their social inclusion within spaces from which they can question corrupt practices and agitate against social decay in the society. Lukalo (2006) disagreed with the view that youth activities can be equated with terror and acts of idleness. Quoted in the Nairobi Star (2010) Kenya's Kiss FM presenter Caroline Mutoko explains the Kenyan youth dilemma:

Half our problem in Kenya is leaders who didn't know how to lead except through intimidation and power. Our political class doesn't listen, don't know how to read and interpret the culture around them. Their egos blind them to our needs and numb them from even caring. Look around you and listen to what our political class sound and act like. Totally out of touch and even verging on flippant. (Mutoko, 2010, p. 20)

The Mungiki youth gang, a self-proclaimed political and religious outfit, which has a commanding presence in the capital Nairobi despite originally emanating from Central province, has been selected in this study as a sample for other youth gangs in the country. The name *Mungiki* means "united people" in the Kikuyu language. In the context of this study, the interest in Mungiki lies not only in its role in influencing youth mobilization and politics, but also in its strong foundation on African cultural traditions and rejection of western values and Christianity; factors which appear to predominantly determine the course of their actions.

Worthy of note however was the fact that Waruinge and Njenga (2015), a self-proclaimed leader of the Mungiki sect, announced his decision to withdraw from Mungiki's membership, in preference for a new leadership role in the Protestant Church with a considerable number of his followers in tow. An amazing new dimension was that key politicians in the mainstream PNU and ODM parties appeared to be courting Waruinge and Njenga (2015) to join their party, in an apparent bid to attract the vote of the youth who form his key support base, in the run up to the 2012/2013 general election. Whereas this study is not purposed to interrogate this

interaction between the Church and the Mungiki, this new development does appear to support the view that regardless of the legitimacy of their cause, the youth remain an attractive voting bloc to politicians in the run up to general elections in Kenya.

Through a considerable number of policy pronouncements, Kenya's government has continued to acknowledge over the years the need for youth participation in national governance, introducing the National Youth Policy, the Youth Council Bill, '*Kazi Kwa Vijana*' initiative, and the National Youth Service. However, youth are the least represented in political party governance, calling to question the government's commitment to an equal partnership with the youth.

The KNHDR (2010) asserts that in the first and second items of its 2007 manifesto, the Party of National Unity (PNU) pledged to "ensure that all Kenyans, including women, youth, and people living with disabilities are fully involved in the management of party affairs". The Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) manifesto pledged to "promote greater youth participation in Kenyan political and cultural activities, entrench the rights of young people in decision-making, and introduce a new national youth leadership program to integrate the youth in leadership." According to the KNHDR (2010), during the 2007 elections, the University and college students played an important role in mobilizing constituents to rally support for their preferred leaders. This was an avenue for students to contribute to the policies and party manifestos of their preferred parties.

Although this active participation strengthened student engagement in governance at their institutions, it also weakened their unity on matters of common interest at the institutions because they tended to be aligned to political parties. This fact is significant to this study, because as Roberts (2009) observed, political parties in

Kenya typically align with ethnic lines, “valuing ethnicity above political ideology and policy” (p. 141). This view, which I subscribe to, is supported by Mutua (2008), “The reality on the ground is that most African political parties are not communities of political ideology or philosophy; rather they are vehicles of ethnic nativism” (p. 20). This means that ultimately, the affiliation of students to political parties is determined by their ethnic identity. Hence, ethnic-based conflict becomes a factor to watch at the institutions of higher learning.

The participation of youth in political affairs notwithstanding, it is interesting to note that although the two parties PNU and ODM were in power in a coalition government, they failed to nominate to parliament a single youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years; again relegating the youth to the sidelines as has been the practice. A casual glance at the secretariat of the main political parties would reveal an almost total exclusion of youth, especially at the top. The trend with political parties has been to form youth wings that are parallel to, but not integrated into, the mainstream party. The KNHDR (2010) explains that each of these youth wings existed to give direction to the young people, providing purpose, resources, and support, to harness their energies productively but notes that in reality, they served to protect and consolidate political power bases by any means necessary. “In today’s politics, it has become difficult to draw the line between vigilante groups and political youth wings, as when the need arises to protect their political masters, they appear to unite their leaders” (KNHDR, 2010, p. 20).

#### **2.4 Media and Hate speech**

The Agenda Setting Theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) advances the argument that the news media has a great influence over what people think about (i.e., that the recipient of the media message is compelled to think about what the message says);

hence, the media's power to "set the agenda" (p. 20). Hence, people with the same media exposure are bound to prioritize and focus attention on the same issues.

This theory ties in with the Media Dependency Theory (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976). This theory includes that the more an individual becomes dependent on the media as a sole provider of information, the more the media is able to influence that individual and exercise power over them, thus making it incredibly simple to set the agenda for that individual because of the inherent predictive power.

In light of these two theories therefore, the errant media house has the capacity to perpetuate hate speech campaign, by merely reporting hate messages on its media channel to set the agenda in the public domain, where it holds considerable influence. In Kenya, freedom of the media has considerably expanded over the years, particularly during the era of competitive politics. However, events related to the 2008 PEV demonstrate that if left unchecked, "infinite" media freedom is rather a liability as it can serve to perpetuate negative ethnicity and violence in the country as exemplified by the Rwandan case, as reported by Rusesabagina (2006). In Kenya's case, Joshua arap Sang was one of the Kenyans charged at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, allegedly for committing crimes against humanity during the PEV through dissemination of hate speech on Kass FM, a vernacular radio station.

Myers (2008) identifies free-ranging music shows hosted by disc-jockeys, live call-in programs where the public is allowed to express its opinions unfettered as the main platforms for hate speech, 'insinuated by way of jokes, proverbs and vernacular sayings..through careless reporting of rumour as fact, through allowing extremist politicians free-rein, and from inflammatory language used, often unwittingly, by presenters'.

Media Council of Kenya official Mitch Odera (quoted in Ismail and Deane, 2008) said of talk shows, “a politician suddenly comes out of nowhere calling on people to stand up and fight for this cause and sometimes literally calls on the youth to rise up and fight”.

Attempts to regulate media in Kenya have been undermined by the fact that they are typically government driven and lack the backing of the media fraternity. The Media Council of Kenya, which should be at the forefront of these efforts, has been dogged by resource and capacity deficiencies rendering regulatory efforts at best ad hoc and more of a wish list. As such, hate speech continues to be readily transmitted unchecked by the growing number of FM radio stations, alternative press, mobile phones, etc. Advances in Kenya’s telecommunication environment have also made it easier to spread hate speech in Kenya, particularly given the lack of legislation or credible structures to curb abuse of media freedom currently enjoyed in the country.

#### **2.4.1 Print Media and Hate Speech**

Print media has a long history in Kenya, some of which came into existence in the early days of independence. In later years, a number of newspapers have crowded the Kenyan print media scene, although most have tended to be associated with prominent political figures of the day. With this growing trend has been the capacity to misuse editorial advantage to fight political battles in the print media. In perhaps its most crude form, the Standard (2011) newspaper fell victim to a raid on its premises, during which equipment and newsprint worth millions of shillings were destroyed. Speculation was rife in both the mainstream and gutter press that this raid was a stage-managed personal retaliation ostensibly for a smear campaign lodged by The Standard (2011) against the first family. Numerous examples abound of individual newspapers relentlessly pursuing perceived opponents of their owners or his/her associates using



hate campaign. In the context of the 2007 general election, The Standard (2011) newspaper came to be identified with the ODM party, persistently initiating negative reporting on PNU leaders, while the Nation Newspaper on the other hand was identified with the then ruling PNU party. Overall, however, the Kenyan mainstream media has been variously credited by international observers and development partners. These partners were responsible and balanced, reporting the actual election, relative to the broadcast media, with none cited as having directly contributed to the fanning of hate speech that led to the PEV.

#### **2.4.2 Mainstream Print Media**

Since independence, the Daily Nation run by the Nation Media group owned by the Aga Khan foundation and The Standard (2011) with longstanding ties with the family of former President Daniel arap Moi, have maintained a commanding lead as the two mainstream print media houses in Kenya. This has blossomed in response to a more elite Kenyan readership into more authoritative newspapers addressing various topical issues; the result of which has been editions such as the Weekly East African newspaper and the Business Daily (both Daily Nation sister newspapers).

Other newspapers have also however mushroomed in the intervening period, although these have typically tended to be associated with prominent political parties/figures. A case in point is The People newspaper, owned by a one-time presidential opposition candidate Kenneth Matiba. The GoK affiliated Kenya Times newspaper, which was heavily subsidized by the KANU regime folded after KANU lost its bid for presidency in 2002 against the then opposition National Rainbow Coalition. The Star newspaper more recently made its debut into the print media, possibly in anticipating attracting readership proportionate to the relatively large audience enjoyed by its sister Kiss FM Station.

The structure of media ownership in Kenya presents unique challenges to a proposed regulatory framework. The mainstream media houses Nation Media Group, East African Standard, Royal Media Services, and Kiss FM have a majority control of the media. Even more worrying is the emergence of cross-media ownership i.e. one media entity owning the series of media channels i.e. radio, television channel, print, and online. Royal Media Services has a majority ownership of vernacular FM stations countrywide. These are also linked to or associated with powerful personalities i.e. the Aga Khan with Nation Media Group, Former President Daniel arap Moi's family with East African Standard, Business magnate S.K. Macharia (a close associate of former President Mwai Kibaki) with Royal Media Trust and the Zipporah Kittony family (close associates of former President Moi) with the Kiss FM/Star newspaper.

More recently, then Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta (now President) joined the fray with his acquisition of The People newspaper, K24 TV channel, and Kameme FM radio station. In a world where the extent of media coverage is seen as decisive to the success of a candidate, ownership of this cross-section of media put Uhuru, who had already declared his intention to vie for Kenya's presidency come the 2012 elections, in good stead during election campaigns where he was guaranteed favourable coverage. The effect of this is demonstrated by the 2010 election success of Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, Sudan's incumbent President, who won another term with 68% the votes, which was attributed in part to his media coverage dominance over other candidates during the election campaigning period (Sins, 2010).

The mainstream media is also easily identified with certain ethnic groups, hence controlling public opinion, stifling competition, and making fertile ground for the spread of hate speech and propaganda amongst other forms of political manipulation. In support of this argument, Iraki (2010) observed that powerful political families are

aligned to certain media networks. The repercussions of this trend mean that only ideas of the few media houses reach the citizens, dangerously narrowing down options and ideas reaching the public. As such, unelected business tycoons find themselves in positions of considerable power over public discourse. The need for establishing alternative media sources and media regulation to check this trend thus becomes critical.

### **2.4.3 Gutter Press**

The Gutter press has been largely unstable in Kenya, with the proliferation of new publications concentrated around election time. Many of these are encumbered by resource deficiencies and easily wind up when rulings are made against them in court over charges pressed usually by politicians over defamatory or libellous statements. Usually viewed as merely a source of amusement, the gutter press has often been dismissed by the Kenyan elite as sensational rumour mills, but is a trusted source for the lower income cadres, fuelling gossip and speculation within social circles. For this reason, they have become the preferred channel for news which mainstream media would be hesitant to print for the simple reason that they would be hard pressed to provide evidence.

The gutter press has gained reasonable stability over the era of competitive politics in Kenya, where freedom of the press has increasingly become a reality as opposed to the single party era when it was not unusual for a publication to wind up literally overnight after an exposé touching on an issue that the government of the day perceived as sensitive. However, the power of the Gutter press should not be ignored particularly during electoral periods when the temptation to use every available channel for scaring off or mudslinging of political opponents is at its highest.

#### 2.4.4 Broadcast and Hate Speech

While Kenya's mainstream media was applauded for balanced coverage during elections, the spotlight focused squarely on vernacular radio broadcasts. This view was reinforced by the naming in May 2011 of KASS FM's radio presenter Joshua arap Sang amongst six Kenyans who appeared before the ICC in The Hague to answer to charges of crimes against humanity. Sang is accused of using the Kalenjin vernacular radio station to launch a hate campaign against certain tribes, for instance by using hate speech to incite Kalenjins to rise up and evict the Kikuyu inhabitants of the predominantly Kalenjin Rift Valley province.

The ICC action against Kenya's vernacular radio station would appear justifiable, if only as a deterrent to Kenyans, particularly in the context of the role Kigali's Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines played in inciting Hutus against Tutsis during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Rusesabagina points out that hate speech is sometimes thinly veiled, with the source of hate speech typically a trusted source; a respected leader or academician. According to Rusesabagina, hate speech's primary motive is political power – in this case, propaganda was geared at creating a civilian army against the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that had crossed in from Uganda and was steadily advancing towards the capital Kigali. Hate speech normally has political backing – the ownership of the *Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines* (RTL) station was linked to President Habyarimana and a clique of his homeboys. The station had preferential treatment, using government radio frequencies and drawing directly on the national grid to ensure that it never went off air.

Rusesabagina raises the red flag on FM station celebrities and other popular opinion leaders. Allowing hate speech to be aired on FM stations presenters effectively grants the sentiments some measure of legitimacy that then subsequently justifies the

rallying of a community around a common cause and heralds attacks on other ethnic groups.

#### **2.4.5 Television**

For many years after Kenya attained her independence, the government maintained a strong hold on television, ignoring calls by local and international critics to liberalize airwaves and allow competition in TV broadcasting to enhance objective and fair reporting. The single TV broadcasting station was the government-run Voice of Kenya, which was dominated by the government and ruling party propaganda and a heavy presence of politically correct individuals. The station today known as the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), which was eventually liberalized alongside other government parastatals after the government adopted the liberalization policy in the 1990s, has to contend with competition from a handful of other local TV stations including the Kenya Television Network (KTN), Nation TV, Citizen TV, K24 and a myriad of other channels available to Kenyans via satellite transmission. With these numerous TV broadcasting sources, it is today virtually impossible to gag the media in Kenya.

Although certainly a positive trend in the context of communication, the effect of increased competition continues to pose a significant challenge to stations striving to capture a share of the market, thus making sensational reporting the more attractive. During elections, those politicians who are more adept at gaining attention by use of unorthodox antics have a definite advantage with regards to securing TV coverage than their more demure opponents. The commonplace airing of TV footage featuring the antics of seemingly enraged Kenyan politicians speaking with reckless abandon in the guise of defending their constituents' rights, forms a good reference point.

### 2.4.6 Radio

Although Kenya's radio stations have gained popularity as strategic launching pads for countrywide public outreach given their wide coverage particularly at the grassroots, this very reason renders them vulnerable for misuse by unscrupulous leaders out to fan hate speech. Although vast majorities of radio stations are committed to causes such as community development, a few have been accused of promoting negative ethnicity in Kenya.

"The vernacular radio stations have perfected the art," Caesar Handa, chief executive of Strategic Research, the company contracted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to monitor media coverage accorded to the main political parties in Kenya in the run-up to the 27 December presidential and parliamentary elections. Among the FM stations singled out for criticism were the Kalenjin-language station Kass, the Kikuyu stations Inooro and Kameme, and the Luo station, Lake Victoria. "The call-in shows are the most notorious," said Handa. "The announcers don't really have the ability to check what the callers are going to say." He observed that vernacular music was also used to raise ethnic tensions. (IRIN)

KNCHR singled out a Kikuyu song by Miuga Njoroge, broadcast on Inooro FM, as worrying. "I hear it was sponsored by the governing PNU" (Mucheke, 2008, p. 20).

The gist of it is Raila is a murderer. He is power hungry. He doesn't care about other tribes. He only cares about his tribe, the Luo community. It says that Luos are lazy. They don't work. They are hooligans. That when they rent houses, they don't pay rent. (Mucheke, 2008, p. 20).

Although the language used by radio presenters is often quite subtle and obscure to the outsider, the undertones are usually easy to discern for the native speaker. Kamanda Mucheke (2008), Senior Human Rights Officer with the KNCHR, which monitored hate speech in the countdown to the elections, gives an account of some of

KNCHR findings: “On Kass FM, there were references to the need for "people of the milk" (Kalenjins) to "cut grass" (get rid of non-Kalenjins) and complaints that the mongoose (Kikuyus) has come and "stolen our chicken" (p. 20). Of this unique power enjoyed by Radio presenters Kiss FM's Mutoko (2010) stated, “You see I'm privileged to work in an environment where that fire of a young man or women is so alive; you actually have to try and tame it” (p. 20).

In a genesis of events leading to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, Rusesabagina (2006) posited FM stations in Rwanda were instrumental in spreading hate speech against the Tutsi minority way before the genocide. The New FM Radio Station RTLM began to broadcast on August 1993 seven months before the genocide and began by playing music, then moved to short interactive call-in programs, where most made jokes about Tutsis. This progressed to open debates, normally airing extremist views vis-a-vis ultra-extremist views against the Tutsis through song, proverbs, racist nicknames, etc. This literally culminated in an appeal to all Hutus to “do their duty” by destroying the enemy when the time came.

In their study of Hate Speech on Commercial Talk Radio, Noriega and Iribarren (2009) supported Rusesabagina's view by observing that false statements were extensively used to validate the hosts' points and to promote public opinion; the use of simple falsehoods, exaggerated statements, or decontextualized facts rendered the statements misleading. Noriega and Iribarren (2009) stated, “Social agents were frequently placed into an ‘us versus them’ framework...we identified 185 dehumanizing metaphors, which often evoked warfare, enemies, biblical characters, criminality, persecution, corruption, evil, animality, disease and conspiracy” (p. 20).

## 2.5 Social Media

Social media has heralded a revolutionary era in Kenya, easily toppling all other forms of media existing in the country. This fact is seen in the growing use of internet technology to enhance human interactions on a day-to-day basis. The positive side of this is that the new technology is making greater demands on Kenyan leaders to be more accountable. Today, the vast majority of Kenyan politicians maintain active Twitter and Facebook accounts that keep their electorate and followers abreast of the contributions the leaders make on a daily basis. Examples abound of the positive outcomes of these initiatives, among them individual Constituency Development Fund (CDF) offices dedicated Facebook pages which chronicle how CDF is used or abused, send out feeds to other news sources, and enables constituents track the use of their CDF. Another innovation has been the [www.uchaguzi.co.ke](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ke) website, a platform developed by Kenyans that was dedicated to monitoring elections. The website proved an important source of information for the Kenyan public and registered millions of hits during the referendum on Kenya's constitution in August 2010.

To demonstrate the growth of blogs and the hitherto unimaginable freedom they provide free expression on virtually any subject, Onyango-Obbo (2011) cited the popular Nairobi Nights blog by a self-confessed Kenyan prostitute writing under the name *Suzy*. According to Obbo, the blog represents the in-your-face new ways of telling stories in digital space. The growth of the blog has defied the language barrier, with three Swahili blogs among the top 20 most popular blogs in East Africa. Obbo (2011) emphasized that blogs have become so powerful that it is a preferred platform for market endorsement of products that promises phenomenal results. Obbo (2011) pointed to the successful media blackout petition against coverage of the ICC six and observes, "Digital outlets have allowed citizens to bully media into issues reporting" (p. 20). In a sense therefore, social media has not only saved Kenyans, but also



humbled them. To succeed in today's world, one has little choice but to engage with social media (Obbo, 2011).

Beyond the realm of benefit, the danger posed by the growing popularity of blogs cannot be overlooked; highlighting the need of some measure of regulation. Kenyan blogger Joseph Karoki (as cited in Motoko, 2010) reported on January 2 2008 that Uganda forces had entered western Kenya in support of the incumbent government during the PEV. Despite the lack of any tangible evidence and denials by officials in both Kampala and Nairobi, an enraged Kenyan public continued to hunt down Ugandan truck drivers, killed, and burnt their vehicles.

Additionally, as demonstrated by developments in the Arab League states during the Arab Spring rebellions of 2011 in which the governments of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were overthrown with subsequent threats to the leadership of Syria and Yemen, new social media have taken a critical place in democratic governance and are influencing decisively the direction of politics. Bahrain had a narrow escape owing to the intervention of the Saudi Arabian army, while Saudi Arabia itself recognized in good time the need to quell unrest amongst disenchanted youth and took a decision to pay university fees for all Saudi students studying abroad (with capacity to spread propaganda back home via the net), increased education supplements and minimum wage, which potentially targets youth who are new entrants on the job market.

Upon the announcement of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's ouster from power in February 2011, popular Kiss FM presenter Caroline Mutoko (2010) sent out a passionate appeal to Kenyan youth:

To the youth of this nation, I beg you to carefully decipher and consider the lessons from Egypt. You see I haven't forgotten what it means to be under-30 and fearless. It's like having the wingspan of a Boeing 777. It's heady, it's mad, it's good, it's bad, but it's powerful. (Mutoko, 2010, p. 20)

Indeed, as Mutoko (2010) pointed out, most newspaper columnists and even politicians cannot begin to understand what happened in Egypt: “Need I remind you that Martin Luther King was just 26 when he started the civil rights movement? . . . by God, being under 30 is potent” (p. 20). Mutoko (2010) made reference to a quote by Amr Ezz, a 27-year-old lawyer who was one of the group as part of the April 6 Youth Movement, which organized an earlier day of protests last via Facebook said pointedly “Most of us are under 30, we’ve got to make this happen” (p. 20). Mutoko (2010) emphasized that that phrase and that alone should ignite the imaginations of the youth of this nation and send chills down the spines of anyone who thinks he or she can stand in their way. In apparent reference to the youth bulge, she highlights that our world is seeing a swelling of youth, populating so many influential nations and argues that when the young people make up more than 30% of the total population (especially when jobs are scarce) unrest is to be expected. However, one may argue that Mutoko’s (2010) comments constitute hate speech; bearing content which can serve to foster resentment and mobilize youth against the perceived enemy.

The other half of the problem is us - especially the youth and the middle-class. The Egyptian revolution reminds us of what can happen when a people put fear aside and come together for a common goal... You can’t cut and paste what happened in Egypt, but you can start thinking of a brighter tomorrow and commit to taking this nation back. It will always be the young who will rise up against the injustices that still hinder us. After all, change never comes on its own. So for the second time this year I say in this column: Over to you. (Mutoko, 2010, p. 20).

There is increasing evidence that Kenyan youth are on a different frequency from the last generation, not merely as a result of online media, but also in terms of language, popular culture and online media, which drive perceptions beyond the ethnic divide. This will no doubt be the next frontier for policy makers determined to make sense of the youth variable in contemporary Kenya.

## **2.6 Mobile Phones**

The mobile phone has grown in popularity thanks to the development of unique smart features, which have propelled it to world fame. The Executive Editor of the Nation Media Group's Africa and Digital Media Division, Charles Onyango-Obbo (2011) said that the mobile includes "where it will all happen in the end" (p. 20), pointing to projections that by the end of 2014, mobile phone penetration in East and Central Africa would have exceeded 79%.

This prediction was accurate. In Kenya, mobile phone use has grown so rapidly and cuts across generations to the extent that even if they do not own a phone, virtually every youth owns a personal subscriber identity module (SIM) card, which they use to make calls, text or network on social media platforms whenever they can activate it by borrowing a mobile phone device from a good Samaritan. With this shared access, the actual number of mobile phone 'subscribers' is grossly underestimated.

Stein (2010) advocated the use of mobile phones for advocacy campaigns in developing countries, noting that mobile phones are the easiest and least expensive way to get a telephone line and are far more pervasive as a means of communication than the internet. Stein (2010) justified his argument by pointing to the relatively low learning curve to using a mobile phone, making it "far more accessible than computers to a wider range of constituents...it is a highly personal means of communication, reaching target constituencies directly, immediately, and therefore conducive to instant participation and response" (p. 20).

Indeed, Short Message Service (SMS) text messages calling for violence were used extensively during the 2008 PEV, while information on the cases of violence was

shared across the world on the internet on online community platforms such as Mashada and by Kenyan bloggers.

Analysts say that inflammatory statements and songs broadcast on vernacular radio stations and at party rallies, text messages, emails, posters, and leaflets all contributed to post-electoral violence in Kenya (IRIN, 2008). Nevertheless, hate speech spread via mobile text messaging, was singled out as a key factor in sparking the violence. During Kenya's dark moment at the height of the 2008 PEV, one text sent before three days of demonstrations, called by the opposition ODM from 16 January, read in part:

We say no more innocent kikuyu blood will be shed (Kibaki was overwhelmingly supported by Kikuyus). We will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of all Luos and Kaleos (slang for Kalenjins) you know at work, your estate, anywhere in Nairobi, plus where and how their children go to school (Luos and Kalenjins mostly voted for ODM). We will give your number to text this info. (IRIN, 2008, para. 2).

Stremlau and Price (2009) said that SMS was a critical tool in mobilizing protests in Ethiopia and Kenya, as the Ethiopian government's efforts to shut down SMS services after the PEV attests. It was also effective in spreading rumours, which often confused fact and fiction. Rumours have always been part of the political landscape, but it is now far easier for local rumours to go national in minutes...as one Kenyan blogger lamented, anonymous messages spread rapidly among Kenya's nine million mobile phone users.

Noting that mobile phones and the internet are relatively new to Africa, Goldstein & Rotich (2008) however highlight, "incidents like the crisis in Kenya provide a flash of insight into the emerging power of these tools" (p. 40).

## 2.7 Cyber Wars

The internet has had a decisive impact on global freedom of expression granting unfettered access to anyone with a phone or computer. I argue that youth have considerable power over the political society given their affinity for the social media networks. In fact, the power the youth today command over political events through the internet is ominous to the extent that one might argue that they have rapidly reincarnated into the “political leadership” of today’s world. Although members of the Mungiki may not form a primary resource on the new social media front, they are the personification of the power of the media in that news on the Mungiki activities has overwhelmingly dominated discussions on Kenyan internet discussion platforms as evidenced by blogs, such as Domo Domo.

Social media networks have given new meaning to the term e-government through exponential membership registration on such sites as Facebook and Twitter. According to Obbo (2011), whereas Facebook added more than 200 million users in a single year (mid-2009 to mid-2010), Radio took 38 years to reach 50 million users, Internet took 4 years, and the iPod 3 years.

Because they are anonymous, blogs have quickly gained particular popularity in Kenya, with tags such as “Mashada Forums” providing unique forum for venting of youth frustrations and hate speech. The threat posed by the internet is perhaps best demonstrated by the embarrassing WikiLeaks saga that strained diplomatic relations between the United States government and her international allies after leaked confidential cables authored by America’s Ambassadors abroad providing personal opinion exchanges on political developments in the host countries and wired to their Foreign Office were maliciously intercepted and exposed on the internet.

The rising cases of cybercrime appear legitimate, attracting the interest of intelligence organs the world over - democratic and socialist regimes alike. However, it is noted that harmless as one might assume, the growing use of social media networks is in itself a threat under scrutiny particularly by the more leftist governments, as evidenced by a decision taken by the China government to ban the use of Facebook and YouTube in the country. Kenya's Deputy President William Ruto, while serving as Higher Education minister, was accused of setting up a Facebook page with inflammatory posts that would easily break the hate speech law. Although he denied control of the site's content, he came under intense scrutiny amid accusations of political machinations related to the said hate speech. The Deputy President's innocence notwithstanding, there is little doubt that the advent of the internet has given a new and powerful tool for spreading hate speech. Today, anyone can disseminate information to an audience of millions worldwide in an instant at literally no cost. Through social media platforms, users wield excessive influence commanding authority similar to that of broadcasters. Already there is credible evidence that these sites have aided political mobilization particularly for their twin advantages of wide access and speed.

In an article entitled *Sour Young Men* featured in the Economist of January 8, 2011 an account is given of the genesis of the Middle East unrest. The weekly notes that with formal politics and the press allowing little outlet for grievances, discontent has festered. At the same time, better education has turned nearly 4 million of Tunisia's 10.5million people into internet users, with some 1.8million running accounts on Facebook alone. This, despite efforts at censorship that put Tunisia's government among the worst offenders in global listings of enemies of free expression. (Economist, 2011).

Hate speech has as such found a new avenue in the social media vehicle. Stremlau and Price (2009) observed that the use of new technologies, including mobile phones and SMS messaging, and the proliferation of radio station, among other factors, facilitates and accelerates the spread of messages in a less controllable way. They note that while technology does not necessarily alter the message (rumours and stereotypes that have been propagated for decades are still central in much PEV) it greatly speeds up the ways in which such messages penetrate communities and mobilize individuals and groups for action.

## **2.8 Politics of Machinations**

Based on the available literature, a number of factors are seen to impact negatively on the wellbeing of the Kenyan youth, making them vulnerable to the machinations of the political elite.

### **2.8.1 The Youth Bulge**

This study isolates the youth bulge as a key concern in the context of Kenya's political stability. The researcher argues that, given the numerical strength of Kenyan youth, Kenya is nurturing a generation of ethnic biased young people with grim prospects for the country's future stability. The youth factor emerges critical given the increasing wave of youth as a dominant factor of violent political conflict in Africa, as exemplified by cases in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Congo, Central African Republic, and Southern Sudan.

Kenya's total population officially stands at 38.6 million (2009 Census) as opposed to 8.6 million recorded just before independence in 1962. With a population growth of almost 10million over the past decade, Kenyan planners are grappling with the threat of a relatively young population imposing great strain on the country's capacity to

provide social amenities to its citizens. Additionally, poverty levels are still high with 46 percent of the population living below the poverty line.

Many analysts agree that key factors contributing to the vulnerability of youth to becoming pawns in the political chess game is the frustration visited upon them by economic difficulties and unemployment. Lukalo (2006) noted, “The youth are particularly sensitive to transformations in the economy as their activities, prospects, and ambitions are dislocated and redirected” (p. 20).

Roberts (2009) argued that the 2008 PEV in Kenya involved many facets of society but cites the youth as the most volatile of these with the reason that they had little opportunity for jobs and had even less hope for the future. Roman Catholic Church Pope Francis at the end of a visit to Kenya in December 2015 decried the plight of those living in Kenya’s informal settlements and underscored that the youth’s future aspirations were threatened by what he termed ‘idolatry of money’ - in apparent reference to corruption.

I met the poor in Kangemi and the youth in Kenya. I felt pain and sorrow and I thought about how people don’t realize what is happening. The uneconomic system is at the centre of everything. (Burrow, & Mumo, 2015, p. 20).

The Kenya We Want Conference report (2009) also reinforced the argument that unemployment among the youth has led to despair and frustration, increased crime rates and the formation of youth criminal gangs and militia groups that featured prominently during the 2008 PEV. There is need to examine unemployment as a contributing factor to the propensity of youth incitement into violence, particularly with regards to the use of hate speech as an instigator.



Data provided by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics indicates that the relationship between Kenya's youth unemployment and age is inversely correlated. Unemployment rates are relatively high among the younger age groups, and much higher than the total unemployment rates. In 1999, the overall unemployment rate among youths aged 15-19 was 24.3 percent; 27.1 percent among those aged 20-24 years, 15.5 percent among those aged 25-29 years, 10.8 percent and 8.4 percent for the age groups 30-34 and 35-39 respectively (KNBS, 2003b).). Unemployment rates in 2005/2006 declined with age and were generally lower than in 1998/1999. Nevertheless, the 2005/2006 unemployment rates of youth aged 15-24 were nearly double the overall rate.





Figure 1: Kenya's youth unemployment rate by age

\*Urban unemployment rates; \*\*Total unemployment rates (urban+rural).

Adapted from *Youth and Human Development: Tapping the untapped resource*, KNHDR (2010)

Youth unemployment is variously identified in Kenya's policy documents as a key development concern (Kenya Vision 2030, 2008), coupled with a high youth population currently standing at 60% of the country's population. A youth bulge is characterized when over 20% of a country's population is composed of young people. Kenya's economic growth projections are distorted by the rapid population growth

rate resulting in a youth bulge, meaning Kenya can continually expect to be subjected to the burden of providing for a rapidly expanding younger population.



*Figure 2: Kenya's population pyramid, 2008.*

*Adapted from KNHDR (2010).*

The KNHDR (2010) notes that “Conventionally a large population means that the economy will be strained to support large and growing numbers of youth and per capita incomes will of necessity shrink”, cautioning that developing countries undergoing a “democratic transition” are especially vulnerable. Heinsohn (2000) offered a telling explanation over why this phenomenon should be worrying to any government. Heinsohn (2003) argued that an excess in especially young adult male population predictably leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, as the “third and fourth sons” that find no prestigious positions in their existing societies rationalize their impetus to compete by religion or political ideology.

Although it acknowledges that a vibrant youth population can serve as a springboard for a country's development growth as attested by the experience of the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, the KNHDR (2010) observes, "a large proportion of young adults and a rapid rate of growth in the working-age population tend to exacerbate unemployment, prolong dependency, diminish self-esteem and fuel frustrations".

The attendant frustrations render youth easy fodder for politicians willing to pay even paltry sums to turn youth into agents of Hate Speech propaganda. Heinsohn (2007) claimed that most historical periods of social unrest lacking external triggers (such as rapid climatic changes or other catastrophic changes of the environment) and most genocides can be readily explained as a result of a built up youth bulge, including European colonialism, 20th century Fascism, and ongoing conflicts such as that in Darfur, The Palestinian uprisings in 1987-1993 and 2000 to present, and terrorism. The recent media exposé on Kenya youth's easy recruitment by the dreaded Al Shabaab supports this view, within which context hate speech could be seen to facilitate recruitment.

This view is supported by the Economist weekly publication of December 4, 2010, which raises the red flag over the Northern Ireland case. Indeed, it is worrying that despite the large number of arrests, the terrorist groups of Northern Ireland once thought to consist only of a handful of ageing 'irreconcilables' are both recruiting new members and improving their technical capabilities. There are fears that a handful of PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) are now passing on their bomb making skills to a younger generation. Intelligence sources think that the economic crisis in the republic has aided recruitment. (Economist, 2010).

### **2.8.2 The Education ‘Curse’**

Arising from the Kenya government’s Free Primary Education Policy, Kenya was able to achieve the Millennium Development Goal no. 2 on attainment of universal primary education by the 2015 timeline. Education permeated to the Kenyan grassroots with the introduction of the Free Primary Education Policy whose implementation started in January 2003, effectively granting access to education for marginalized and disadvantaged segments of the Kenyan society. School enrolment rates rose exponentially, with more and more rural students gaining access to higher learning institutions hitherto reserved for privileged Kenyans. Affirmative action – a conscious policy of Kenya’s single party era - additionally contributed to the educational progression of the minority ethnic communities in Kenya. With this, Kenya begun to witness greater ethnic diversity at the higher learning levels and beyond, with the ripple effect that cultural norms begun to be diluted. As a result, Kenyan youth became more aware of their rights as enshrined in international instruments, thereby demanding greater space in decision making in society.

This development also means that Kenya has progressively ensured a relatively well-educated youth population who are then more empowered in the use of innovative cyber tools. Literature abounds on the growing threat of the internet as a tool of isolation even on the domestic front where parents are unaware of what their children are up to even if they are under the same roof. This threat has become even more real with the growing figures of mobile telephony in Kenya coupled with the growing use of smart mobile phones for internet browsing.

### **2.8.3 Kenyans in the Diaspora**

Njogu (2010) argued that given their immense financial contributions amounting to over USD 600 million annually, Kenyans in the Diaspora have remained connected to

Kenya through the internet, SMS and other social network tools. Njogu (2010) demonstrated how Kenyans in the diaspora used virtual media – internet chat rooms and email – to spread hate speech and actively summon their relatives, resident in Kenya, to dismember the country during the 2008 PEV. Writing in the Daily Nation, Clay Mugenda (1999) referred to “tribal footprints all over the internet” (p. 20) It is noted that most Kenyans in the diaspora still retreat into ethnic groupings despite being abroad. Though their contributions to national development through remittances are acknowledged as significant, this peculiar attribute of the diaspora can lead to ethnic fundamentalism because members seek “to compensate” for their absence, an absence that may be viewed as a betrayal to the community (Njogu, 2010). For instance, a group going by the name *Kalenjin Online* called for unity of the community against the “enemy”, whilst GEMA (Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba) communities in the diaspora begun organizing themselves in earnest to respond to the PEV.

Further, advances in electronic banking options and regulations make it easy for funds to be transmitted to facilitate youth mobilization through facilities such as the Kenyan mobile phone-based money transfer M-Pesa and Hawala, a system favoured in the Muslim world for transfer of money through proxy, without the actual movement of the money, making tracking virtually impossible. Financing a hate speech campaign hence becomes a relatively easy process in Kenya. On the contrary, there is a distinct difference in cases where face-to-face transactions are used. Most developed countries have maintained water-tight tracking procedures over face-to-face financial transactions, demanding that Forex Bureaus and banks secure detailed identification of persons carrying out any financial transactions in their country. China enforces this law as well, but so does other more liberal economies such as Australia and the

United Kingdom. In Kenya however, it is relatively easier to change money at Forex Bureaus without the authentication of identification documents.

## **2.9 The Role of Politicians**

It is not difficult to see why one miscalculated sentiment might spark resentment and animosity of enormous proportions if left unfettered. A seemingly harmless statement by then Prime Minister Raila Odinga (ODM party) in February 2011 had the PNU up in arms, accusing the PM of propagating hate campaign against the people of Mt. Kenya. Party Deputy Secretary General Jeremiah Kioni demanded that the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) investigate Raila over the claims he had allegedly made in Wajir that people from Mt Kenya region perpetrated the Wagalla massacre (The Standard, 2011).

Claiming that the PM had embarked on divisive politics after losing numbers in parliament, Kioni said, "The trend that was used in 1997 is being replicated. Some politicians want to create a wedge between certain communities" (as cited in The Standard, 2011, para. 2), adding that the utterances by the Premier were similar to those made by politicians before the 2008 PEV.

In Kenya, people have expressed sentiments by various human rights organizations that the 2008 PEV was not random, as many had initially thought, but rather, well-choreographed with deliberate hate speech propaganda campaigns being launched several months before. Tales are told of the purchase of thousands of machetes six months prior to the election, which fuel suspicion that in fact the election was more the excuse for violent attacks than the reason.

Indeed, in an October 2007 report entitled *Still Behaving Badly*, state-funded KNCHR, hate speech by politicians is identified as a major concern in the lead-up to the 2007 elections. At public rallies, Central Kenya Members of Parliament allied to the governing PNU party, equated top ODM presidential contender Raila Odinga to Idi Amin and Hitler, thus appealing to the Mt Kenya voting bloc to reject Raila's candidature (IRIN, 2008).

Then there is the popular Kenyan rumour mill where the only thing that beats the speed at which news travels is possibly light. In no time, one false rumour can spark off violence of untold proportions. An albeit comical account by Mutahi (2008) painted a vivid picture:

Kenyans put a distinction between rumours and gossip. Rumours are about serious matters such as politics and public figures while gossip is what women talk about when they are drawing water...The explosion of a car tyre could churn out one of the biggest rumour stories of the day...A man hears the explosion from a distance and makes up his mind that the explosion cannot be anything but gunfire. One hour later, he is talking about the explosion at his rural market claiming that gun explosions were renting the air when he left Nairobi. An hour later, the story has picked up by another wavelength of the bush telegraph and somebody is telling another that people are dying in Nairobi like houseflies. Another version surfaces that people are fleeing from the city in hundreds because of the violence that has erupted there. By the end of the day, there might be reports on the houses that have been burnt down, the vehicles destroyed and the hundreds maimed. (Mutahi, 2008, p. 20).

In acknowledgment of the power of the mobile phone in instigating hate campaign, a new text service funded by international donors to report hate speech in Kenya was launched ahead of the referendum on a new constitution and the NCIC mandated to monitor it. NCIC head Mzalendo Kibunjia provided to international media the turnaround time for response to the hate speech as 12 hours. The free SMS number - 6397 – was established at the cost of USD 700,000 (The Daily Nation, 12 July 2010). Nevertheless, there were doubts over the efficacy of this intervention in checking the growing use of hate speech to advance personal ambition on the political platform coming as it did so late in the day.

I argue that the inaction over hate speech has encouraged a culture of impunity in Kenya, because leaders know that they can get away with it. After the 2005 referendum, KNCHR tried to sue members of parliament who had used hate speech. Amos Wako, Attorney General at the time, terminated the case. On grounds that it was a scheme to curtail their freedom of speech, Kenyan MPs in 2007 rejected attempts by the rights group to introduce legislation into Parliament incriminating hate speech. Many Kenyans dismiss elders' lukewarm efforts to charge a handful of MPs engaging in hate speech.

During the run up to the constitution referendum in Kenya in 2010, then Roads Assistant Minister Wilfred Machage was charged alongside two other legislators, MPs Joshua Kutuny of Cherangany and Mt Elgon's Fred Kapondi with inciting hatred against some ethnic groups who they claimed would have to be evicted from their land if the constitution was approved. Many feared that this was the prelude to violence post-2007 election style and a grenade blast at a public rally campaigning against the draft constitution, which left six people, killed and over 100 injured, was a sure sign of things to come. This is one example of politicians provoking pre-election violence with the aim of instilling fear in their co-ethnics to convince them that for security reasons, it would be in their best interest to ensure that one of their own is voted into office. The rally, which had been organized by Christian groups opposed to the draft constitution because of the inclusion of the Islamic courts and a clause on abortion, also introduced a new dimension of hate speech based on religious beliefs.

Muthoni Wanyeki, executive director of the Kenyan Human Rights Commission, endorses this argument advising caution as these actions have potential to lead to religious warfare. "There are disturbing moves to entrench stereotypes of different groups ... especially Kenyans who are Muslims, to sow divisiveness that way,"



(Ndüing'ü, 2010). As Ndüing'ü (2010) observed, “Violence that is presented in the religious context or based on religious philosophies is particularly volatile since the divine aspect is deemed unquestionable” (p. 20).

As Rusesabagina observes, hate speech is normally decimated very slowly into the public consciousness – stripping the humanity of an entire group takes time. In 2010, President Mwai Kibaki, sending a strong signal to politicians that hate speech had taken new significance as a matter of serious concern to the high office, relieved Machage of his duties. These actions were based on provisions of the National Cohesion and Integration Act 2008. President Mwai Kibaki further ordered the police and commissioners of the NCIC to take stern action against any leader found to be inciting Kenyans, regardless of his or her status. The arrests of parliamentarians on hate speech charges was to demonstrate that tough rules set down after the post-election violence killed 1,300 people in 2007 were being enforced. The rules faced a growing test in the run up to the August referendum (Pflanz, 2010). “Seeing arrests is very positive, when in the past there has been a lot of buck-passing” (Pflanz, 2010, p. 20), which raised alarms on hate speech ahead of the 2007 election.

Though not charged in court, then Higher Education Minister William Ruto (now Deputy President), popularly perceived as the Kalenjin leader, was also mentioned the same week for purportedly asking Muslims to reject the proposed constitution if they did not want a war with Christians. Nevertheless, as has become the norm in Kenya, politicians campaigning for the No vote on the new constitution cried foul, claiming that this was yet another political ploy to silence those opposing the new constitution. NCIC chair, Mzalendo Kibunjia, wrote to then President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, insisting that politicians ought to be prosecuted quickly after the experience of 2008. Mwalimu Mati (2010) observed that part of the peace deal

that ended the PEV was an agreement that hate speech would be outlawed. “Before that ... this kind of rhetoric was seen simply as the normal thrust of politics” (Pflanz, 2010, p. 20).

## **2.10 Vigilante Groups**

Criminal gangs in Nairobi are associated with violence, most notably manifesting themselves as security personnel for politicians during campaign rallies and otherwise surviving from proceeds from running protection rackets for businessmen (protection money), community policing and extortion from the public seeking services such as at matatu (public transportation vehicles) terminals where touts are forced to part with ‘taxes’ as protection money. A report commissioned by the NCRC identifies the exclusive purpose of two outlawed Criminal Gangs, in Nairobi namely; Jeshi La Mzee (Kangemi) and Kamukunji Boys (Kamukunji) as ‘Hire by Politicians for Campaign and Bodyguards’ (NCRC, 2013). Jeshi la Embakasi (Embakasi) is identified with hire by politicians for illegal activities, while The Taliban (Kayole, Dandora) is also for hire by politicians. The Mungiki’s main type of activity is identified as extortion, illegal levies, violence, hire for revenge, executions, and illegal oathing.

Mutahi (2005) noted that information collected by the Central Depository Unit (CDU) showed that 325 lives were lost due to electoral violence from January to December 2002. The number of deaths reported by CDU monitors was 116, while the media recorded 209 deaths. A proportion of 53.3% of these incidents were of assault, 13.8% due to inter-ethnic violence, banditry and cattle rustling; 12% due to forcible disruption of public meetings and gatherings; 10.7% on threats, intimidation and hate speeches; and 9.8% on political thuggery. In March 2002, the Police commissioner outlawed vigilante groups and private armies known to exist in the country.

The groups were identified as Mungiki; Taliban; Jeshi la Embakasi; Jeshi la Mzee; Baghdad Boys; Sungu Sungu; Amachuma; Chinkororo; Dallas Muslim Youth; Runyenjes Football Club; Jeshi la King'ole; Kaya Bombo Youth; Sakina Youth; Kuzacha Boys; Kamjesh; Charo Shutu; Sri Lanka; and Banya Mulenge. Most of the banned groups were linked to politicians from both KANU and the opposition who were accused of using them to settle political scores. The groupings, however, continued to exist informally and were to feature prominently in the electioneering period (Mutahi, 2005).

Though seemingly dormant, is the continued existence of these vigilante groups then not a time bomb lying in wait to explode come the next general election? There have been unconfirmed allegations that Mungiki has links to both the old KANU government and some MPs in the current government (Pflanz, 2010), with analysts forecasting their re-emergence into active politics come the next elections. Hence, their relatively dormant disposition in the intervening period notwithstanding, it would be logical to assume that these groups are indeed malignant and will progressively re-package themselves into 'useful' political tools and take a central position in the political warfare of Kenyan political opponents at subsequent elections unless decisive measures are taken to ensure their extinction. As Eldon (2009) remarked:

I think about the lingering reserve of many Rwandans as they carry within them so much pain and sadness and as they try ever so hard to focus on healing and forgiveness, and on developing the skills of their people and the strength of their economy. And I think about us here in Kenya, where last year (read PEV 2008); only a tiny number lost their lives compared to the hundreds of thousands killed in Rwanda. Have we learned enough from our relatively much more limited suffering to prevent future barbarity? Have enough Kenyans been to see what unspeakable awfulness happened in Rwanda? Or are we set to continue with our chaotic and undisciplined way of behaving with one another. (para. 2).

According to the 2009 Economic Survey, out of 88,414 prisoners, youths aged between 16 to 25 years comprised 44,080 (about 50%). As the KNHDR (2010) asserts

that while inclusion and participation of youth might improve the quality of national governance, “exclusion and despair can lead to resentment, crime, and political violence by the youth”. The report attributes the rise in youth associations that have become a threat to Kenya’s social stability and peaceful co-existence of Kenyan Communities to rising unemployment and economic hardship.

The climax of this was the 2008 PEV where youth associations converted themselves into private armies in the name of defending their communities. The existence of vigilante groups such as Nchikororo, Amachuma, Sunbgusungu, Baghdad Boys, Angola Msumbiji, Mungiki Taliba, Jeshi la Mzee and the SDLF, among others, marked the climax of youth exclusion during the PEV. Kenya’s state run NCRC (2013) identified 46 organized criminal gangs spread across Kenya. According to the NCRC study, Kibera informal settlement has the highest concentration of organized criminal gangs in the Nairobi County. The NCRC concedes that besides extortion and robbery, the gangs also benefit from funding by politicians who solicit their support. The number of terror gangs identified in Kibera include Siafu, Kibera Batallion, J-10, Nubians, Kamukunji Pressure Group, and Yes-We-Can. The Taliban dominates Kayole and Dandora, while the Al Shabaab operate cells in the Somali-dominated Eastleigh neighbourhood. However, the Mungiki sect dominates most parts of the Nairobi County. These groups tend to promise their members alternative avenues for participating in decision-making processes (KNHDR, 2010).

These recent developments confirm that time is ripe for interventions to check the role played by youth in advancing the culture of vigilante groups in Kenya. A case for scrutiny is the reason for youths deserting Kenya’s disciplined forces. The KNHDR (2010) notes that youth have played a large role in national governance through their prominence and participation in internal and national security organs. They are the

majority in the security forces including the National Defense Forces, Administration Police, and the Kenya Police. This extends to other specialized units of disciplined officers such as prison officers, Kenya Wildlife Services, Kenya Forestry Services, National Youth Services and local authority by-laws enforcement officers. The youth also participate in the private sector through various private security firms in the country. All the recruitment criteria for the disciplined forces require that officers seeking recruitment are youth.

However according to the KNHDR (2010), effective youth participation in security agencies is hindered by many challenges, for instance the fact that police officers are generally poorly resourced, with most salaries and allowances low. Additionally, they often lack the basic equipment that police require to function properly and professionally. Hence, in this context, Kenyan youth without alternative options make easy fodder for recruitment by agents willing to offer them better remuneration. Going by recent media revelations that youth serving in the Kenyan military forces have been the main targets of a recruitment drive by the Al Shabaab militia group in Northern Kenya, isn't it time Kenyans woke up to the monster of a new movement that thrives even beyond her own borders for ready use by her neighbours against Kenya's own citizens?

### **2.11 Implications of Ongoing Peace and Cohesion Initiatives**

Peace initiatives have taken the frontline in Kenya since the 2008 PEV, with results being at best lukewarm. The Kenya government's publication of the Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, 2009 that would have set up the special tribunal for Kenya sent a flicker of hope that justice would finally be done for the PEV victims, but Parliament debated and rejected the Bill. With the expiry of the deadline for the establishment of

the Tribunal, the names of the PEV suspects were handed over to the ICC at The Hague in Netherlands in July 2009.

In November 2009, the ICC prosecutor filed a request to pre-trial judges for an authorization to begin investigations into the PEV in Kenya. Following approval of the request, the ICC conducted independent investigations that led to the naming of six individuals in December 2010 for further investigations that could lead to their trial. The six were in The Hague in early April 2011 for an initial appearance during which the charges raised against them by ICC Prosecutor Louis Moreno Ocampo were read to them and confirmation of the charges scheduled for September 2011. The charges were eventually dropped for lack of evidence.

The NCIC had also been set up and mandated to handle issues of national cohesion and integration, including tackling inequality; consolidating cohesion and unity; and promoting ethnic harmony and cohesion. Since its operationalization, the Commission has been engaged with various communities and stakeholders and has received and processed complaints regarding discrimination, hate speeches, and has hosted a National Cohesion/elders conference. According to the Second Annual Progress Report (2011), the Commission has managed to accomplish a number of steps since inception.

First, a national elders' conference on cohesion and integration was held in April 2010, bringing together community elders to spearhead national cohesion. An outcome of the conference was the agreement to promote the establishment of a legally constituted National Council of Elders and the commitment by all elders present to promote the peaceful co-existence between communities and the support of GoK efforts towards national cohesion and integration;

Second, the Commission received complaints and information on hate speeches and successfully investigated over 21 cases. Seven Members of Parliament (MPs) were summoned after investigations where evidence was collated and submitted to the police. Additionally, three Members of Parliament were arrested in June 2010 during the campaigns for the constitution referendum and charged in court alongside a political activist. The President thereafter suspended an Assistant Minister pending determination of the alleged hate speech case. More recently in 2015, a number of politicians across the divide have also been arraigned in court on charges related to hate speech including the Governor of Kiambu County William Kabogo and the MP for Gatundu South Moses Kuria, who was charged over hate speech on Facebook. Former Nairobi Mayor and ODM party's Nairobi County branch chair, George Aladwa, was also arrested in October 2015 over alleged ethnic hatred and incitement to violence while addressing youth from the Kibera informal settlement on Mashujaa Day (Heroes Day).

However, despite these notable achievements, challenges have emerged over the last few years with respect to the implementation of the above initiatives, key of these related to inadequate capacity – according to official sources, a direct result of additional areas of focus emerging from the post-election crisis, which necessitated the progressive capacity development amid stringent government policy for staff recruitment.

Additionally, unforeseen programs resulting from other national emerging priorities have been introduced in the middle of financial years; posing challenges in terms of requisite funding. Kenya's donors have also contributed to reconciliatory efforts in various ways including youth friendly channels such as media. The United States Embassy in Kenya's support for youth peace initiatives however met criticism across

the political divide, with suspicions that then US Ambassador Michael Rannerberger's sole aim was to finance a youth uprising against the political establishment in readiness for then impending 2013 elections.

## **2.12 Chapter Summary**

By reviewing available literature on this subject of research, this chapter has sought to build a case for further study in this field. Overall, more questions still beg for answers. The underlying thread and spirit of most available literature has been a sense of urgency to forestall a possible eruption of ethnic violence during future elections. The continued existence of the vigilante groups remain proof of the ominous cloud looming over this country's destiny. Certainly, these groups do not portend well for Kenya's political future, casting a dark shadow on the nation's ongoing initiatives aimed at enhancing peace and ethnic reconciliation.

Indeed, this has been the most compelling justification for the deluge of donor supported governance initiatives in Kenya. In support of participatory approach advocated in the study of development communication, I however argue that the solution to this problem must essentially emanate from Kenyans themselves. It should not be lost on our partners that the cultural orientation forms the foundation critical for understanding of the problem at hand. This cannot therefore be adequately assimilated by any amount of research or observation. Aware of the dynamics at play, Kenyans at all levels would do well to spearhead efforts towards identifying a raft of suitable interventions and further ensure a more participatory approach in their implementation. Likewise, Kenyan academia must realize that too much is at stake and not abdicate their role. We must not lose the moment.



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Any research must be founded on a philosophical or theoretical ancestry, which provides the setting for the research strategy to be used. This was done so as to ensure that my research objectives as outlined in Chapter 1 were adequately addressed. A consideration of the research paradigm on which to found this research was necessary not only to ensure that the researcher arrives at an informed decision concerning the research design but further, in view of its importance in determining the approaches that are suitable for this study. A knowledge of the different research traditions ensures that the research design is adapted to safeguard against possible constraints, allowing the study to proceed successfully. Hence, a study of the conceptual framework and practical elements of the research was necessitated by the need to place the research within an ontological position with a review of the epistemology to determine how the research questions would be addressed. However, a primary focus for determining the best approach to satisfy the needs of this research was its foundation on the appropriate research paradigm.

This chapter begins with a preliminary consideration of existing research philosophies and paradigms, reviewing both the strengths and limitations of the various worldviews, before concluding by supporting the validity of the chosen research methodology. In providing a detailed account of both the research philosophy and research approach, this chapter additionally focuses on the sampling procedures, data instruments, data analysis, trustworthiness of the data and ethical considerations and challenges.

I examine the mixed methods methodology used for this study, explaining why it was considered suitable and how I went about logically mixing and integrating various methods within the single topic of hate speech and how it relates to youth violence. Further, this chapter provides details on the data collection methods, analysis and how these proved useful for making inferences and generalizations on the topic of the research, thus focusing on the key aspects of validity and credibility. Finally, this chapter dwells on the ethical considerations that arose over the duration of the research and how these were resolved; with critical attention paid to the role of the researcher.

### **3.2 Philosophical Paradigms**

Research paradigms are opposing worldviews or belief systems that are a reflection of and guide the decisions that researchers make (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). According to Creswell (2013), a strong association is seen between the design approach and the underlying paradigm position. Traditionally, two opposing camps have been identified in the social behavioural sciences associated with two major philosophies obtaining in contemporary science i.e. positivist and interpretivist or constructivist. Bryman (2003) distinguished between two ontological positions: objectivism and constructionism. Positivists seek to explain the situation, while the interpretivists' aim is to understand human behaviour.

Although both research traditions emanate from Classical Greek times, with Plato and Aristotle for positivist and Sophists for interpretivism, the researcher's choice was informed by the overriding purpose of the research; transforming belief into the known (epistemology). Basing on arguments advanced by various authors (Creswell, 2013; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 2003; Feldman, 1998), the quantitative approach would be founded on the positivist paradigm, whereas the qualitative approach

presumes the holding of beliefs consistent with the interpretivist paradigm position. Consequently, I chose to use a research philosophy with a direct bearing on how I would collect and analyze the study data.

First, the evolution of the paradigm debate is considered, examining the three approaches to research, namely: Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed Methods and with the focus thereafter shifting to the rationale for preferring the mixed methods approach. Hence, a review is provided of developments beginning from the dominance of positivism in the first half of the twentieth century, on to the emergence of the post-positivism position and finally how this became discredited and led to the adoption of constructivism, which heralded the idea of the constructed nature of social reality.

### **3.2.1 Positivism**

Positivism is based on the early 19<sup>th</sup> century philosophical school of thought founded by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the founder of French positivism. Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who is considered by many to be the father of sociology (Gunter, 2000), later developed it. With the Positivist paradigm, predictions derived from previous observed realities and their relationships. A decision for the positivist school of thought derived from the assumption that reality can be observed (realism) and described from an objective viewpoint (Levin, 1988). Therefore, this would mean collecting facts and thereafter studying the relationship of one set of facts to another, thereby identifying regularities and forming relationships between elements of the social world by manipulating reality with variations in a single independent variable. The type of research associated with this paradigm tends to be quantitative in nature, using experiments, surveys and statistics (Gunter, 2000). This results in quantifiable and generalizable conclusions.

According to Bryman (2003), “social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” (p. 20). Thus, positivists believe that truth exists independently of the observer and has no concrete correlation with the person who observes it. Positivism places emphasis on the objective scientific method and mirrors research processes used in the natural sciences. The Positivist paradigm is associated with the quantitative approach (Feldman, 1998). In the positivist position, the focus is on describing a situation. Consequently, the data collection will centre on “hard data” and when the material is analyzed, the result is a description of a situation, which creates a foundation for knowledge (Mikkelsen, 2005).

Until 1968, social sciences were predominantly quantitative and positivist (Somekh et al., 2005). Because of its long history, the Positivism tradition has taken such a firm hold, that it has been variously identified as the single most valid and scientific research approach although critics have pointed to its inappropriateness in dealing with social sciences (Hirschheim, 1985). Hence despite its considerable influence, positivism has been subject to many strong criticisms. Criticisms lodged against the positivist approach have however brought to prominence a completely different approach to social science known as interpretivism.

### **3.2.2 Interpretivism**

The interpretivism (or constructionism) tradition emerged as a response to positivism. This paradigm contrasts with positivism by switching attention from the external and observable to the internal factors of forces that move people. The origins of this perspective have been identified with the writings of Max Weber, a German sociologist (Neuman, 1994). Constructionists believe that people have an active role in the construction of social reality and social structures, and that these social phenomena are in a constant state of flux as people and their society changes

(Bryman, 2003). Interpretivists therefore believe that human beings construct knowledge and that therefore facts are a product of shared human understandings and meanings and could be unpredictable. Interpretivism rests on idealism, holding the view that the world is interpreted through the mind and is as such a creation of the mind.

The interpretivist paradigm is founded on the inherent belief that the world can only be understood by first processing through our system of languages and symbols. It is similar to social constructivism where generalizations are difficult (as opposed to positivism). The interpretivist philosophy is based on the belief that subjective interpretation and intervention in reality is the only way in which that reality can be understood and therefore these interpretations are in their own right part of the scientific knowledge. In the interpretivist tradition, researchers cannot avoid getting involved and will influence situations to some extent. It has been argued that the observer has to access the cultural world through empathy (Dilthey); that to understand the past, one needs to identify with it.

I subscribe to the Interpretivist view that scientists must inevitably affect the phenomena they study. Reinforcing this thinking is epistemology, which seeks to address two fundamental questions encountered by researchers i.e. what is knowledge and how is it acquired? This perspective emphasizes a detailed reading or examination of text, which could refer to a conversation, written words, or pictures (Neumann, 1994). In this paradigm, the researcher also analyses transcripts of conversations or studies video tapes of behaviour in extraordinary detail, analyzing non-verbal as well as verbal communications among those under investigation (Gunter, 2000; Mukhongo, 2010).

Although the Positivist approach would be useful for answering certain questions in the research, certain unique aspects of the study necessitate a foundation on the Interpretivist philosophy for the reasons that the Positivist approach would be unable to investigate those aspects adequately. The qualitative approach is consistent with the interpretivist paradigm and as such qualitative data collection is the standard choice method for this nature of study. Further, the interpretivist approach is relevant given the need to study phenomena in their natural environment and doing so without being involved or without a measure of subjective interpretation would be unavoidable.

The constructivist paradigm is associated with the qualitative approach, using strategies such as the case study, narrative, and data collection methods like open-ended interviews that yield textual data. Also notable is the reliance of interpretivism on interviews and subjective observation to describe truth (or what is perceived as such). A great advantage of this approach is that because of the flexible structure it allows the researcher to respond to changes that occur in the research process that necessitate changes of research emphasis. However, it is acknowledged that the interpretivist approach can be time consuming and data analysis difficult.

### **3.2.3 Critical Social Science**

Labelled the Third Way, the mixed methods research design continues to attract much debate from proponents of the mono-paradigm approach for conducting research. What Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) had commonly defined as the “paradigm wars” (p. 20), which challenged the dominance of the mono-method era of the 1960s (a choice for purely quantitative or qualitative research). This subsequently led to the emergence of the mixed methods and thereafter in the 1990s to the era of mixed models (i.e., where aspects of quantitative and qualitative approaches are mixed at multiple phases of the research). Debate during the paradigm wars was generated by

sharp differences over whether the two traditional paradigms (positivism and constructivism) were compatible and could be mixed at all and additionally focused on the relationship between methodology and paradigm.

Development of the pragmatist paradigm (allowing for the use of quantitative and qualitative methods) was a response to the paradigm wars that enabled mixed methodology to gain credence alongside the positivist and interpretivist schools of thought. Different authors refer to mixed research variously as mixed methods research, mixed method research, mixed methodology, multi-method research, and multiplism. All these terms are synonymous but commonly used terms in mixed methods research. Proponents of mixed methods research believe that it helps to improve the overall quality of research and advocate the compatibility thesis, which simply states that quantitative and qualitative methods can be used together in a single research study (Brewer & Hunter, 1989; Johnson & Christensen, 2008; Morgan, 2007; Pring, 2000; Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Reichardt & Rallis, 1994; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998)

Only a small minority of researchers subscribe to the critical science approach, with many advocating for either the positivist or the interpretivist (anti-positivist) tradition, with many in the field generally perceived as less credible by non-researchers. Despite this fact, my study was situated in this camp as this philosophy is considered more relevant for investigating my research problem, this choice being primarily based on its consistency with the objectives of the study as identified in Chapter 1. I aimed at establishing how and why hate speech is influencing youth engagement in electoral violence and whether youth violence is a derivative of hate speech. By preferring the mixed approach, the researcher benefits from both the Positivist and

Interpretivist traditions by consolidating advantages of both paradigms in a single study.

The argument for the mixed approach is well explored by Creswell (2013). Those arguing for the pragmatic paradigm (the third way), insist that real life problems are lost where sole consideration is given to adherence to methodological pureness of the mono-paradigm. The rationale for mixed methods is therefore its deliberate choice for a series of pragmatic decisions. It is pluralistic based on a rejection of the forced choice between post positivism and constructivism (Creswell, 2013). Indeed, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argued for the benefits of pragmatism to theoretically underpin social research; key of which are the fact that pragmatism is problem centred, pluralistic and real world practice oriented (Bryman, 2006). Pragmatists link the choice of approach directly to the purpose of and the nature of the research questions posed (Creswell, 2013). The decision for quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods is therefore based on how suitable the design or methodology is to the purpose of the research in question.

### **3.3 Research Methodology: A Case for Mixed Methodology**

In the discussion on research strategy, the key methodologies used in this study will be introduced alongside their features. The study's philosophical grounding will be expounded and the case for selecting the mixed methodology research approach additionally argued.

In the context of this study, the greatest strength of interpretivism would lie in the fact that it facilitates understanding of the how and why. This would serve useful in this study, by providing information on how hate speech is used to incite youth violence during elections in Kenya and why this has become the modus operandi. In addition,



the study seeks to answer questions on how culture and identity based on ethnic allegiances shapes the youth's views in the context of violence. To borrow from Bryman (2003), I would like to “see through the eyes of the participants” (p. 20) and could describe and provide sufficient context to the study. This approach also provides flexibility and thus would enable me to adjust processes in the course of the research, to suit the needs of the study. However, whereas this would be useful in offering an insight on the intrinsic aspects of the study, the need for baseline data from which to generate generalizable findings on the relationship between the different variables in the study would not be satisfied.

It has been argued by various scholars that research based on a single methodology within the traditional spectrum of philosophical perspectives, is superior to that based on the contemporary choice for mixed methodology. As pointed out by Gunter (2000), positivism is purposed “to prove or disprove hypotheses and ultimately to establish universal laws of behaviour through the use of numerically defined and quantifiable measures analogous to those used by natural sciences” (p. 20).

However, I subscribe to the view advanced by Creswell (2013) that the single methodology does not allow science to explain significant amounts of a particular observed phenomenon. Mixed methods research offers an answer to these concerns raised by Creswell (2013). It includes both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis procedures in a single research design or study (Johnson & Christensen, 2008; Saunders, Philip, & Adrian, 2007).

Therefore, notwithstanding the strengths of both approaches, I determined that neither the positivist nor the interpretive perspective alone would be able to address adequately all the questions of my research topic. Hence, despite the divergence

between the epistemological and ontological assumptions and value systems of the qualitative approach and the quantitative on the other, I arrived at the opinion that it is possible to arrive at a convergence where a combination of the two approaches can interface and prove to be complementary. This means that each address a particular analytical concern related to the phenomena under study. For instance, whereas a researcher could use a survey to determine correlational features to derive predictions, a phenomenological inquiry could simultaneously serve to provide descriptions capturing intrinsic aspects of the phenomena through interrogating the lived experience.

The ontology of the pragmatic approach, assures that the study captures multiple realities of Kenya's social, political and cultural environment. Basing on its epistemology, this approach underscores that knowledge is historically, socially, politically situated thus justifying the interactive link between the researcher and participants in the study. The axiology of the study is as such based on the framed values/beliefs and experiences of the participants. One advantage of this approach that influenced my decision to adopt it is that besides an in-depth study of a particular phenomenon (e.g., the thought process influencing actions of youth such as those of the Mungiki sect, be it based on cultural or economic factors), is that it facilitated isolation for scientific validation particular aspects of interest within the study (e.g., whether hate speech hastened directly to acts of violence).

The research keeps in perspective the contextual or historical aspects that reinforce the need for political violence, the key purpose of selecting this methodology should be understood to be the researcher's quest for promoting social change by being able to critique the prevailing trends to come up with actions - be they policy or political -

that liberate Kenyans from the threat of violence during elections. The direction therefore taken by the researcher serves to ensure this emancipation.

Although one should not wholesomely dismiss authors such as Guba (1990), who have argued that the human mind can only work within one type of paradigm at any one time, in the context of this research topic and objectives, the researcher contends that the modern world is not that simplistic. There is indeed intrinsic value in adopting a multidimensional view of the world, by virtue of the fact that the world itself is pluralistic and made up of complex situations. It is for this reason that mixing or integrating research approaches, is today routinely advocated in the social sciences, hence its description by Creswell and Clark (2007) as the “third methodological movement...one that is perhaps reaching adolescence” (p. 20).

Barnett (1953) argued that the only way a researcher can fully describe a phenomenon, is by supplementing quantitative data with qualitative description. “A theoretical concept is emptied of content to the very degree that it is divorced from sensory experience. For the only world man can truly know is the world created for him by his senses.” As a researcher therefore, one cannot isolate oneself from the reality of a context and partition his/her mind into objective closets, completely detached from the real world, without taking cognizance of the value standard of the individual/s under study.

In consonance with this view, I subscribe to the expectancy-value theory by Martin Fischbein (1970s), which posits that behaviour is a function of the expectancies one has, the value of the goal one is working towards, and that attitudes are developed and modified based on assessments about beliefs and values. The theory predicts that, when more than one behaviour is possible, and that the behaviour chosen (based on

mental calculations) will be the one with the largest combination of expected success and value. Expectancy-value theories hold that people are goal-oriented beings. The behaviours they perform in response to their beliefs and values are undertaken to achieve some end (KNHDR, 2010).

Hence, my decision to associate this study more with the pragmatist paradigm, to ensure that it captures the myriad of perspectives likely represented within the emerging arguments. As Patton (1987) asserted, “The intellectual mandate to be open to what the world has to offer surely includes methodological openness. In practice it is altogether possible to combine approaches and to do so creatively” (p. 20). Further, the pragmatic paradigm has intuitive appeal, permission to study areas that are of interest, embracing methods that are appropriate and using findings in a positive manner in harmony with the value system held by the researcher (Creswell, 2013).

From a pragmatic perspective, concern is on the consequences of actions, it is problem centred, pluralistic, real world practice oriented (Creswell & Clark, 2007), and therefore mixed methods enable researchers to address a wide and a more defined range of research questions. In addition, as already pointed out earlier, a researcher can use one method to overcome weaknesses in another method and hence have stronger evidence for a conclusion (Yin, 2002).

Yin (2002) argued that mixed method design does not only entail mixing of the two traditional approaches, that in fact mixing of either exclusively two quantitative or two qualitative approaches is also acceptable. Yin (2002) explained that a researcher could combine experiments and surveys (both quantitative) to enhance internal and external validity emphasizing that many distinct designs are possible under a mixed

method study based on the study's objective. The weight accorded to either one method is thus determined by the objective.

I concur with the view advanced by Bryman (2007), who stated that a researcher's choice of paradigm should be influenced by the principal orientation to the role of theory in relation to research. This should occur whether this is deductive or inductive. In addition, this includes the epistemological orientation, whether this incorporates the practices and norms of the natural model of science or sees the world as interpreted by individuals, and the ontological orientation that includes whether social reality is viewed as external and objective or as a constantly shifting dependent on creation by the individual.

Advancing a similar argument, Creswell (2013) asserts that the use of mixed methods adds to the richness of any research project. The use of both approaches enhances the integrity of the study findings. The use of mixed methods research is largely encouraged when it is feasible (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2011). In the case of this research, the researcher contends that a need exists for the use of both the qualitative and quantitative approaches to facilitate the focus on the complex social phenomena addressing the subject of hate speech and its link to youth violence; necessitating the answering simultaneously of both exploratory and confirmatory questions. This need is consistent with the use of a combination of approaches; be it mixed methods or triangulation to fill in the gaps – thus enhancing reliability and validity. Reliability is defined as the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials, while validity refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects what humans agree on as the real meaning of a concept (Carmines & Zeller, 1979).

I argue that it is desirable to conduct this study by using multiple methods for corroboration to ensure superior results and eliminate the chances of arriving at a misleading, narrow view in which diversity of views are not incorporated. Adoption of this pragmatic approach bolsters the study with different perspectives, enabling the research to explain more factors and ultimately generate a more complete or holistic perspective.

The research is critical postmodernism oriented, providing the study unique ways in which to understand the impact of language on human behaviour. The postmodern perspective is subjective and is distinctly different from modernism in that it rejects the notion of logical thinking; modernism being more theoretical and objective. Postmodernism focuses on the primacy of discourse, emphasizing interconnectedness and intuition. Of direct relevance, the critical and postmodernism approach are used in this study to demonstrate how values embedded in language systems within certain contexts can give rise to poor decision routines that then significantly impinge on the country's capacity to guarantee citizens' rights. Hence, the study is able to demonstrate that hate speech used within the Kenyan context has served to spur youth violence.

As well, the study associates with Baudrillard's (1983) view that the postmodern society is a platform for constantly conflicting demands, thus promoting ambiguity and an infinite possibility of mental constructs of reality, such that the line between real and appearance is blurred. Further he perceives postmodern society as technologically specialized, flexible and adaptable, as well rejecting traditional authority by seeking alternative sense making.

Yu (2004) advocated the use of a variety of methods and use of triangulation, arguing that the two goals of triangulation are convergence and completeness. Indeed, Yu

supported triangulation as a means of ensuring rigor when using mixed methods, “New methodologies and epistemologies have emerged that allow for the integration of a variety of methods and researchers should be encouraged to use mixed methods, including quantitative and qualitative approaches” (p. 20).

The choice for mixed methods allows for the flexibility of mixing approaches at any level of the study; be it at the collection or analysis of data and interpretation stage as may be necessary, notwithstanding controversy over what one deemed acceptable levels resulting in terms, such as “multi-methods” (Brewer & Hunter, 1989, p. 20), and “mixed strategy approach” (Bryman, 2015, p. 20).

The choice for postmodernism is made cognizant of the fact that there are immense possibilities of cultural configurations influencing the mental constructs that determine whether an expression is hate speech. Therefore, multiple meanings can be socially constructed from a similar set of variables within different contexts. By adopting the postmodern perspective, the research associates with relativism by conceding that no one universal truth exists but rather, truth is determined by the individual himself. Thus in associating with postmodernism, the researcher recognizes that unraveling these diverse meanings cannot be sufficiently accomplished purely by either the positivist or the interpretivist approaches.

### **3.3.1 Mixed Methods Design**

I identify five methods of mixed methods design; namely:

- Triangulation/QUAN-QUAL Design, which is a one phase design integrating two data sets in interpretation and analysis (a study drawing on both qualitative and quantitative methods equally);

- The Embedded Model, which has one data set providing a supportive secondary role in a study based primarily on the other data type;
- The Explanatory Mixed Methods/The QUAN-Qual Model, which comprises quantitative data collected first and more heavily weighted than qualitative data which is collected in the second phase (quantitative study including a quantitative aspect);
- The Exploratory Mixed Methods/The QUAL-quan Model, which constitutes a two phase study in which qualitative results collected first used to develop/inform second quantitative approach (a qualitative study with quantitative aspect);
- The Sequential Embedded Design (Community Based Participatory Research)/qual-QUAN-qual Model: three phase study in which the qualitative approach is used before the intervention, proceeding to a heavily weighted quantitative phase at which the intervention trial is done; and finally, to a qualitative phase after the intervention.

The decision for the mixed methods design derived from the view that it enhances the constructing of validity. Based on the argument advanced by Creswell and Clark (2007), the decision to use a mixed methods research design should be guided by three factors, namely; timing (sequentially, concurrently), weighting (emphasis on Quan or Qual), and mixing (merging, connecting, embedding). Consequently, the mixed method design to feature in the study is Triangulation.

The Triangulation/QUAN-QUAL Model includes a one-phase design integrating two data sets in interpretation or analysis. Types of triangulation could include Data Triangulation, Theoretical Triangulation, Investigator Triangulation, Analysis Triangulation, or Methodological Triangulation. The main advantage of triangulation is that the strengths of the qualitative data offset the weaknesses of the quantitative



data and vice versa. QUAN provides outcomes, and QUAL processes (Bryman, 2006). Therefore, they answer different questions. By mixing both quantitative and qualitative approaches, either simultaneously (QUAN+QUAL and QUAL+QUAN) or sequentially (QUAL/QUAN or QUAN/QUAL).

I was guided by the decision for the methods that best address the research questions articulated in Chapter 1. I effectively avoided the pitfalls inherent in the limitations described by (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) of adopting the single paradigm, thus arriving at a more superior robust approach that generates stronger inferences and therefore a more holistic and sound conclusion. QUAL can explain QUAN results and vice versa and this is important, particularly when the researcher confronts unexpected results. QUAL provides context (depth), while QUAN provides general findings.

In seeking to test the hypothesis that when hate speech stirring negative ethnicity and the youth interact during elections, youth violence is likely to erupt, the quantitative method provides the net effect of both independent variables hate speech during elections and youth, while the qualitative method serves to generate data on the dependent variable, youth violence.

### **3.4. Sampling**

#### **3.4.1 Sampling Procedures**

A sample can be defined as a set of respondents selected from a larger population (the sampling frame) for the purpose of a research, while sampling is the process or technique by which a representative part of the population is selected for purposes of determining characteristics of the entire population. Sampling is an economical (cheaper and less time-consuming) and therefore logical way of conducting research

in instances where a census is not feasible (either due to limited resources, time or accessibility).

In the case of this study, based on budgetary and logistical considerations, a sample of youth from Nairobi County was used to ensure that the findings are representative of the larger population. Given that the scope of the study is Nairobi County with over 3 million inhabitants, it would be virtually impossible to carry out research on 3 million people within the allotted timeframe. Additionally, the related expense would not be justifiable.

Therefore, in this study various sampling procedures were employed to ensure that an appropriate and representative mix catering for the various target groups is captured in the study. The study targets three main categories of youth that are considered representative of Kenyan youth based on the definition captured in Chapter 1, namely; University of Nairobi [UoN] full-time students, Technical University of Kenya [TUK] students and Mungiki Sect members resident in Nairobi County. Kenya's youth in this context refers to that section of Kenya's population between 18 to 35 years of age; consistent with the definition provided by Kenya's Health and Demographic Survey.

The sample of University and college students is based on the recognition of these student groups as being representative of youth in Kenya within the political context of Kenya's era of competitive elections. I subscribe to the view expressed by the KNHDR (2010) that given that a number of prominent politicians started their careers in student politics, it is clear that institutions have provided alternative avenues for youth to participate in politics. At universities and colleges, the youth have played a critical role through participating in active party politics. They have the capacity to

engage leaders at a higher level of intellectual debate. To enable the researcher to generalize from the sample to the country, simple random sampling was used to identify a cross section of full-time undergraduate university students to participate in the study, because this category of the sample forms a major reference for the study as explained in Chapter 1.

To provide sufficient breadth to the study, this simple random sample included a total 200 students with 150 participants drawn from the UoN's Undergraduate Module 1; (full-time government-sponsored) student; and 50 from the KPUC (now TU-K) full-time diploma courses respectively. The number variance is because of the significantly larger population at the UoN (2011; i.e., 17,282 students undertaking the Undergraduate Module 1 in academic year 2010/2011, relative to the TU-K). The simple random sample ensured that a diverse majority of views were captured, as each student's chance of being selected for the study was the same, which ensured therefore that the study was free from sampling bias. This provided a snapshot of diverse views of students with regards to hate speech, the Kenyan political discourse, and youth violence.

To facilitate qualitative (in-depth) investigation of the phenomena under study, purposive sampling was used to provide flexibility on the sample size. Thus, the researcher identified respondents for the Student Associations by using purposive sampling to identify up to five members of ethnic affiliated student associations. This study captured the views of five leaders of these associations from both the UoN and the TU-K because they are more familiar with and additionally have a direct influence over the operations of the associations. This way the researcher was able to gain insight on the driving principles of each association and thus was able to determine whether there is a nexus between ethnic affiliation and the decisions taken by the

individual associations. Additionally, in so doing, it was possible to determine the role (if any) of Kenyan politicians traditionally nominated as patrons of these associations in manipulating the activities of these associations (the power behind the associations) particularly in expanding their influence and hence their presumed ethnic supremacy across campus. The research thus sought to establish whether national voting patterns have any impact on the choice of student leaders elected at these higher institutions of learning.

By using the simple random sample for the administration of questionnaires, it was possible to capture as many diverse views as possible from this group of youth who by character are a resource to the study given that they are on the verge of entering Kenya's workforce and therefore likely to take any deep-rooted biases with them into the Kenyan public space, either introducing negative ethnicity or enhancing it. Further, convenience (non-probability) sampling was to be used for the group discussions on internet. This is because participation in the forum would not be limited to any specific group of students as it would be open to all University students. This way, any student with an opinion to express on the subject of hate speech and youth violence would be able to log in and contribute to the discussion; making it a more vibrant source of information. Information generated from this forum was considered useful in supplementing data gathered from other sources, making it easier to identify consistencies at the data analysis stage. However, this failed to materialize after university authorities declined to authorize students' participation, therefore the study had to dispense with this method. Nevertheless, the questionnaire was amended to capture more information and the response rate was high enough to suggest that the outcome of the internet discussions would add insignificant value.

To complement data from the UoN and TU-K, I collected data from members of the Mungiki sect as a sample for youth gangs, with the justification that given its long history and organized structure, the Mungiki represents a rich case for in-depth study. Further, snowball sampling was used to identify up to five members of the Mungiki, who are representative of this group because of the relatively homogenous character of this target group. This made it easier to penetrate and access the Mungiki views on hate speech, causes of youth violence, and its link to elections. The group was initially unwilling to take part in the research due to suspicion that we were undercover government agents. However, with the help of research assistants I was successful in convincing a kinsman with links to the Sect to arrange a meeting with one of the leaders in the Mathare informal settlement, who subsequently granted access to the group members identified through snow-ball sampling for the in-depth interviews. Snowball sampling was preferred because a measure of uniformity of purpose was anticipated across the group and therefore it was expected that views would be largely replicated across the entire group. Based on budgetary and time limitations associated with conducting research on larger sample sizes, this trade-off (sacrificing numbers in preference for depth) was necessary. To corroborate these findings, I as well sought information on the Mungiki Sect on individual basis from randomly selected persons residing within the area of study who constituted three respondents each from within estates where Mungiki's operations are pronounced, namely; Mathare North, Huruma, and Kariobangi South.

Further, two neighbourhoods were sampled to ensure that any unique features related to location are captured, for instance whether neighbourhoods with higher poverty prevalence have a higher propensity for youth gangs or whether there is a correlation between number of youth gangs in a neighbourhood and dominance of ethnic groups inhabiting that neighbourhood (certain neighbourhoods in Nairobi are associated with

particular ethnic groups). As such, the study focused on Mathare, specifically estates within Mathare North, Huruma and Kariobangi South which are associated mainly with the Kikuyu community and Kibera where there is a significant Luo and Luhya presence.

In addition, I interviewed randomly selected residents from Kibera and Mathare area encompassing specifically Mathare North and Kariobangi South, to capture their lived experiences concerning hate speech, negative ethnicity, and youth violence subsequent to the PEV. The sample comprised 18 youth from Kibera and 20 from Mathare North, most of whom have been involved in election violence. I also interviewed 7 youth from Kariobangi South. My decision to include Kariobangi South was informed by the need to capture for comparison the variations between the study neighbourhoods of escalation and non-escalation of violence. Thus the views of residents in areas that were relatively calm over the period that the 2008 PEV was experienced in other neighbourhoods were important for identifying factors that check the mobilization of electoral violence. Is it all about which ethnic communities inhabit an area? The local actors? Or the dominant political party?

Again there was unease and hostility on my initial visits in the company of the research assistants, with many residents suspicious of our intentions, particularly in those neighbourhoods that suffered the most PEV such as Kibera, where residents suspected that we were on a mission to recruit witnesses to testify at the ICC in the case against *'the Ocampo Six'*, despite sharing all the necessary identity and research documents. However, we eventually met cooperation after they were placated by assurances from the local administration officer from whom we sought assistance to convince the residents that our mission was legitimate. The interviews thereafter proceeded smoothly, although there was as well general fatigue noted among the

residents over the many interested parties who had been seeking interviews in the aftermath of the PEV.

### **1.1.2. Selection and Training of Research Assistants**

The selection of research assistants for my study was influenced by a number of considerations, among which prior experience in undertaking research was key. Additionally, because of the fact that the research respondents fell under the youth cohort, I elected to recruit youth consistent with the peer group within the scope of my study that is between 18 to 35 years of age. One was a Master's student at a local University, while the second was a Bachelor's degree graduate from another local university. This made it easy for the students from both the UoN and TU-K to identify with the research assistants, making it relatively easy to conduct the research, particularly the FGDs. A second factor determining my choice of research assistants was the gender consideration. Cognizant of the fact that some of the groups in my scope such as the Mungiki sect members are influenced by strong cultural beliefs, I anticipated difficulties in securing certain information directly from them, based on my gender as a female. Having a male research assistant proved to be an asset in this regard, as he was able to interact and discuss freely on a diverse range of subjects that might have otherwise been a challenge. In addition, ethnicity was also a consideration given the sensitive discussion around negative ethnicity. Besides the challenge of language, I anticipated some measure of hostility from those ethnic communities traditionally perceived to be the enemy as reflected by local politics. Thus, to win the confidence of members of the Mungiki for instance, I ensured that the members were able to communicate their views freely by dedicating in each instance a research assistant with whom they could easily communicate and identify with.

### **3.5 Data Instruments**

#### **3.5.1 Focus Group Discussions**

In addition to administering questionnaires to the vast majority of University/college students, the researcher conducted FGDs with five University/college student leaders each from the UoN and TU-K, in order to capture the essence of group dynamics and group identity, which is a core aspect of this study. The FGDs proved a time saving and efficient way of collecting data simultaneously from the target population without having to conduct individual interviews. Students were asked about their perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes in an interactive group setting and by so doing views that were isolated were consistent across the target groups, while capturing the essence of group dynamics and identity.

In the social sciences, focus groups allow interviewers to study people in a more natural setting than a one-to-one interview. In combination with participant observation, they can be used for gaining access to various cultural and social groups, selecting sites to study, sampling of such sites, and raising unexpected issues for exploration. Focus groups have a high apparent validity - since the idea is easy to understand, the results are believable. In addition, they are low in cost, one can get results relatively quickly, and they can increase the sample size of a report by talking with several people at once (Marshall & Rossman, 2014).

Besides the face-to-face FGDs, I additionally preferred the use of electronic FGDs (i.e., internet chat room as a technique for conducting FGDs on students given that the students [university/college students] are acknowledged in modern day Kenya as internet savvy); a subject extensively explored in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The researcher established a Facebook group account to access data from identified respondents from the UoN and the TU-K. This would have the advantage of efficient



data collection without any intervention unlike the private Facebook account, which one might perceive as more personal and therefore intrusive. However, as explained under the Limitations of the Study section of this thesis, this ultimately proved a challenge based on the unwillingness of the university authorities to endorse students' participation in the internet group discussions.

### **3.5.2 Interviews**

An interview is a conversation between interviewer and respondent with the purpose of eliciting certain information from the respondent (Moser and Kalton 1971). The study additionally employed narrative methodology in order to understand the lived experience of victims of hate speech in Kenya. Differing from other forms of interviewing, the narrative interview was twofold in nature, as an empirical approach and ontological paradigm, thus capturing the whole story rather than disjointed bits, which are then later assembled for analysis (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). In this respect, an interview schedule was used to carry out in-depth interviews with a select proportion of the sample specific area of interest identified for further investigation at the review of literature stage, during either questionnaire administration or conducting of FGDs.

In the context of this study, conducting of interviews facilitated the capturing of unique views of the cross-section of participants, particularly emotive aspects that are key to this study. For instance, if a respondent was a victim of the PEV and is today an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) because their family was evicted from their home, they are likely to be unwilling to discuss their experience in a group setting or on paper (questionnaire). Hence, the content of the interviews was varied to suit the individual respondent's context. This approach provided the opportunity for deeper investigation, and served to elicit information from the Mungiki sect sample of the

identified population through the snowballing method as described in the previous section of this thesis.

While the interviews were not formal or structured purposely to provide flexibility to capture diverse views and suit the unique environment in which the Mungiki sect operates, the general strategy was to begin by pursuing broad questions before following up on the interviewee's responses with the more direct or sensitive questions. This enabled the study to capture the individual interviewee meanings and avoid imposing the researcher's own meanings on participants. Some participants of the Mungiki were not comfortable discussing their views openly within the group setting, particularly on gender-related cultural roles and were hence provided an alternative forum to provide them the freedom to speak out even if their views were inconsistent with the rest of the group. This served to authenticate/reinforce the findings secured from the rest of the sample.

### **3.5.3 Questionnaires**

As the mixed methods approach was used for this research, quantitative data was derived from questionnaires and structured interviews, while at the same time qualitative data collected from observation or unstructured interviews. Questionnaires were administered to the wider group wherever appropriate, incorporating standard questions to provide sound basis for comparison of responses at the analytical stage. This provided flexibility for respondents and ensured that they allocate adequate time to completing the questionnaire.

Additionally, because only the internet group discussions were disallowed by the UoN, the study was able to proceed by limiting contact with the students through the administration of questionnaires electronically. For this, email addresses were secured

upon the acceptance of students to participate in the study. Although internet administration suffers from a lack of tacit communication, it's relative benefit is that it provides access to wider audiences at less cost and has the advantage of ease of distribution and response times, attracting higher response rates. Walsh, Kiesler, Sproul, and Hesses (1992) attained a 76% response rate with a randomly selected sample and 96% with a self-selected sample responding to their computer network survey.

Another advantage of the electronic questionnaire is that it provides the researcher with data that can be readily transcribed. One must note however, that although relatively simple to administer, questionnaires have inherent shortcomings that the researcher needs to guard against. One of the key disadvantages experienced in the study is that because they are standardized, it was impossible to delve deeper into emerging ideas and additionally the researcher had no chance to correct misinterpretations in the completion of questionnaires. On the contrary, had the questionnaire had open-ended questions, the result might have been an accumulation of vast amounts of data, which would be difficult to analyze. Another challenge was follow up given the time lapse after administration of the questionnaire, after which participants may forget important details. In this case, follow up visits would be necessary to offer a chance for interviewees to revisit the questionnaire after consulting those who might have shared the experience. Nevertheless, questionnaires were the most appropriate means of collecting data from this large population sample although follow up to ensure higher response rates was often necessary.

#### **3.5.4 Secondary Data**

Secondary data also formed a proportion of this study. This was obtained from other sources that have had prior contact with the target group, namely DVD documentaries

by Ross Kemp and the Capital FM TV Talk-Show. The views of other institutions that were originally of interest in this category including NGOs involved in ongoing peace and cohesion programs such as Amkeni waKenya, Kenya National Human Rights Commission, Mars Group and Mercy Cops Kenya who engaged youth after the PEV through the *Local Empowerment for Peace* (LEAP) program in Rift Valley province, were captured under the Literature Review.

### **3.5.5 Observation**

Observation formed one component of the study given the decision for the mixed method approach. The use of observation techniques was also important for confirming that what participants say in the interview is indeed their honest view. Contingent upon the respondents' approval, a tape recorder was used while conducting the in-depth face-to-face interviews to maintain a record of the conversations wherever participants were agreeable to enable the researcher revisit interview content and pick up any emerging threads that might require further interrogation. This approach proved especially useful in the in-depth interviews conducted on the 2008 PEV victims from the sampled residents of Kibera, Mathare North and Kariobangi South.

### **3.6 Data Analysis**

The data analysis was designed to answer each of the research questions systematically, thus addressing the purpose of this research. The study focused on analyzing transcripts of conversations on hate speech and audio-visual materials (video tapes and other broadcast material) of what can be termed as hate speech specifically those relating to the Mungiki derived from TV Talk-Show Capital FM and DVD documentaries by Ross Kemp.

To ensure comprehensive analysis, the researcher was guided by the linking of the research questions to the data analysis procedure because research questions determined the methods used. The researcher adopted the analysis model provided by Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2006) on steps in the mixed methods data analysis process. This process entailed in sequence data reduction, data display, and then data transformation to generate either single or multiple data type. If multiple data type were generated, then the researcher would proceed with data consolidation, correlation, and comparison; after which the data would be integrated. This enabled interpretation of the data to establish legitimate data and facilitated the drawing of conclusions before proceeding to the writing of the report.

Thus, after consolidating all the data generated from the questionnaires, interviews and observations, I transcribed the data and analyzed textual content to determine features characterizing hate speech based on the target group's perceptions and its consequences. This made it possible to generate themes for analysis. Thematic analysis of in-depth conversational interview data was used to establish commonalities in the participants' experiences. By so doing, it became possible to categorize the consistent elements identified into emergent themes such as: recognition of stereotyping, feelings of pure resentment, perceptions of being targeted based on ethnic resentment, feelings of ethnic superiority, or even indignation, so as to determine levels of retaliatory action (if any) that they attract on a continuum, with youth violence taking the ultimate position at the end of the spectrum.

I then engaged in exploring each individual theme with a view to determining links that would facilitate the building of a theory (e.g., as a result of hate speech by a respondent's neighbour against his ethnic group), what action does he take? If he traditionally boards the neighbour's matatu (Passenger Service Vehicle) to college, he

might perhaps take a conscious decision to avoid his matatus, influence other members of his ethnic group to do likewise or even mobilize fellow youth to vandalize the neighbour's matatu after dusk. A more subtle approach can be to launch a counter-attack on members of his neighbour's ethnic group back in college. This link enabled me to interpret or generate meaning from the data.

### **3.7 Trustworthiness of the Study/Dependability**

A number of potential risk factors that could undermine the trustworthiness and dependability of the study were anticipated, most of which were mitigated by the researcher's choice of the mixed methods approach, which effectively permits the use of triangulation to make up for any inherent gaps. This section includes the number of anticipated risks.

#### **3.7.1 Sampling Error**

Sampling error occurs where there are differences between the sample and the population purely attributable to the particular units selected in this study. In the context of this study, it would have been difficult to study all existing youth gangs in Kenya, some of which are either dormant or inaccessible. The fact that generalizations were based on the study of a single youth gang (Mungiki) exposes the study to possible criticism over its representativeness for the rest of youth gangs in Kenya (character, values, vision etc.). Notwithstanding the value of comparisons, it is my view that any additional youth gang studies would not generate radically different results on the specific elements that this study is designed to address. This is based on existing literature review, which point to inherent similarities in the structure of these militant youth groups, cutting across both the ethnic and geographical divide. At another level, it might have been that the five participants selected for the study as representative of the Mungiki youth gang members, might actually not share

characteristics with the majority of the group's members due to sheer bad luck. Snowballing sampling method however served to reduce chances of error because members had the chance of identifying others with similar characteristics/views to participate in the study.

### **3.7.2 Participant Bias**

Participant bias might arise from the assumption that respondents are answering truthfully. To limit the risk in this case, a deliberate effort was made to enhance the trust of respondents during the face-to-face interviews by starting with a more general discussion allowing them sufficient time to be comfortable for the more delicate questions.

### **3.7.3 Observer Error**

Observer error is a reality when using a number of research assistants to help collect and analyze data. The more the number of researchers the higher the risk of observer errors. This was reduced by the fact that I used internet to collect data from the vast majority of the population sample (university/college students), thus negating the need for either many research assistants or discretionary analysis.

### **3.7.4 Observer bias**

Observer bias is typically inevitable where many researchers are mandated to undertake interviews and participant observation; because this has to do with personal interpretation and therefore different approaches might generate bias (no two interviewers are the same in dispensing interviews). By using mixed methods, this shortcoming was addressed adequately by limiting the observer role as far as possible in instances where this could compromise the quality of findings (i.e., strictly using other researchers in instances only where I felt that my safety might be compromised)

by interviewing a member of ethnic group traditionally hostile to mine or in instances where I anticipated that gender stereotypes might impede my capacity to gain access to information such as Mungiki. This ensured consistency among inquiries.

### **3.7.5 Language**

Language used by respondents is likely to be a challenge to the researcher as the youth in Nairobi County predominantly use and ever changing language identified as “Sheng” which is laden with codes of meaning that the researcher might not be familiar with if he/she is not within that age group or is not exposed to youth in that age group on a day-to-day basis. The same applies to English slang popular with the more elite youth (such as university students) in Kenya. Interpreting some of the data in either Sheng or English slang might therefore have been difficult unless additional measures were taken to minimize this challenge. Besides familiarizing myself with the prevailing version of “Sheng” and English slang therefore, in as far as practicable I tape-recorded interviews to facilitate revisiting of these discussions at a later stage and sought help on interpretation from third parties wherever I had trouble in unraveling meanings/inferences.

### **3.7.6 Gender**

As women are not typically associated with violence, it was important to review critically the extent to which they should be involved in this study. Based on existing literature, an examination of the vigilante groups revealed that the membership is male dominated, with roles reserved for women as simply supportive (intelligence gathering, information couriers etc.). One might argue that this is a stereotype, particularly with the emerging use of the social media networks as a tool for advancing hate speech and hate crime – effectively pulling women out of their traditional character of the demure, compassionate and peace-loving gender. A look at



current trends of car-jacking and kidnappings in Kenya point to the increasing role of women in these violent activities. Indeed, the changing character of the woman in this context might itself prove a valuable subject for further investigation; and is outside the scope of this study.

Given this development and to guard against bias based on stereotypes, the sampling frame based on full-time student registration records provided by both the UoN (2011) and TU-K (KPUC, 2010) from which the probability sample was drawn as described under the Scope in Chapter 1 of this thesis, included both male and female gender. Therefore, I maintained focus on the purpose of the study, which did not discriminate against gender notwithstanding the fact that the snowballing (non-probability) sampling of the Mungiki would likely include only male members based on the Mungiki sect's traditional values as expounded in the Statement of the Problem under Chapter 1.

### **3.8 Ethical Considerations and Challenges**

Whenever research is undertaken, certain ethical considerations are borne in mind (Bryman, 2003). Ethical considerations took centre-stage in this study given the emotive nature of the phenomena under study. Given the sensitivity of the subject under study and the volatile environment in which parts of this research were conducted, the researcher's letter of authority to conduct the research (permit) proved a convenient point of entry for accessing target groups who needed to be assured that the researcher was not merely a mole working for their ethnic aggressors. An informed consent form provided to the participants, providing them with relevant details on the research (purpose, benefits, risks, researcher's background), enabled them to take an informed decision on whether to participate in the research or not.

Likewise, to assure participants that my pledge to protect anonymity and confidentiality would be upheld, the participants were provided written assurance in the form of the Informed Consent form to this effect from the onset, committing to protecting their identity should they so desire. To assure them of genuine intentions, I provided participants with the option to retain a copy of the duly signed consent form for future reference.

It is widely acknowledged in Kenya that ‘nothing is for nothing’; therefore, I created provisions on the informed consent form for cash tokens. The inducement was purposed to increase overall participation and the response rate for questionnaires.

Anticipated challenges entailed safety concerns when dealing with a possibly hypersensitive youth groups harbouring deep negative-ethnicity sentiments. A case in point was the phase of the research involving the Mungiki youth gang, which I perceived typically as passionate about the values they stand for. As it was necessary to pursue some of the more sensitive ideological issues with the group members, in particular instances where the safety of the researcher could not be guaranteed, the option of an intermediary to arrange access to individual members of the target group was preferred, failing which the researcher would have to rely on secondary data sources.

As the researcher would be accessing the cultural world through empathy, it was acknowledged that it would be difficult to remain emotionally detached from the reality of experiences narrated by participants in the study particularly as these promised to be emotive and even irrational, in light of the phenomena under study. However, the fact that research assistants were engaged along with an independent consultant to support the data analysis process helped to sufficiently guard against this

risk. The final document was additionally peer-reviewed by scholars undertaking studies in similar fields.

It is recognized that cultural factors impinge on worldviews and hence on the capacity to analyze objectively. In the sort of polarized setting that Kenya is today and considering that the researcher is him/herself a member of a Kenyan ethnic group, it was crucial to take a conscious decision not to identify with sentiments that are likely to be expressed either for or against the researcher's own ethnic group during the study so as to generate data that is free of bias. In contexts in which there was a potential danger of researcher bias arising from ethnic affiliations, an alternative research assistant perceived more neutral within that context was assigned to collect data.

Other anticipated challenges include those consistent with the choice of methodology and the fact that several paradigms might suggest a conflict in the findings. However, a thorough understanding of the inherent divergences in itself favoured the finding of more solutions than initially envisaged. Cognitive abilities might predispose a researcher to a particular paradigm (e.g., the logical thinker) that causes them to lean towards quantitative methods. Having opted for the mixed approach however, it was possible to either weight heavily towards the preferred method, where a particular phenomenon emerged of interest or engage research assistants with stronger competencies in the alternative paradigm to compensate for the researcher's deficiencies. Acceding to this approach, Mugenda (1999) noted that some investigators are only trained or specialized in one form of inquiry. I had to learn about multiple methods and approaches and understand how to mix them appropriately. Similarly, considering that not all researchers may be proficient in using both the two methods, this introduced another limitation which meant the two

researchers contracted had to be competent in either the quantitative or qualitative approach to ensure that the quality of the research was not compromised by the absence of either skill. Adopting the mixed methods approach also effectively addressed possible challenges relating to reliability and validity. The validity i.e. integrity of the conclusions (Bryman, 2003) is enhanced by triangulation, which enables the researcher to use several data collection methods to corroborate findings.

### **3.9 Conclusion**

Despite criticisms posed by advocates of the incompatibility argument, I argue that the mixed methods approach proved the most suitable for this study, based on the questions that the research aims to answer. The choice of mixed methods approach facilitated the answering of both the why and how of this research and offered the most comprehensive and complete picture on the subject of hate speech, its negative ethnicity derivative, and how/whether it influences youth violence during elections in Kenya. Although the study included a quantitative phase, due to the limited existing material on the definition of hate speech in the Kenyan context and the need to adopt a subjective approach in determining not just the speaker's intent, but also the social consequences of the hate speech expression, my analysis on this factor was primarily qualitative, rather than quantitative. Although more demanding, using mixed methods far outweighs its disadvantages in addressing the specific demands of this study so as to arrive at reliable and generalizable findings.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

#### 4.0 Introduction

This research was designed to utilize various research techniques in order to facilitate the collection of essential information to help determine to what extent hate speech has played a role in instigating youth violence within the dynamics of election campaigns over Kenya's multiparty era.


This chapter provides detailed information on the data analysis and findings of the research carried out in Nairobi County at the University of Nairobi (UoN), Technical University of Kenya (TU-K) and selected informal settlements, namely Mathare and Kibera, including on the Mungiki youth gang. I collected the data from a diverse sample of youth residing in the area of study through questionnaires, in-depth interviews, and FGDs. I consequently analyzed the collected data using SPSS and interpreted it with respect to the study objectives and hypothesis. I summarized and presented the data in graphs, tables, pie charts, frequencies, percentages, and proportions.

Overall, the data collection phase proceeded as envisaged, with only a single significant setback experienced over the proposed conducting of the internet FGDs with the UoN students, as anticipated in Chapter 3. After several attempts to seek clearance to carry out the research from the university authorities, the administrator of the ICT network at the institution declined for unclear reasons to allow students to participate in the internet FGDs using their university network, despite all the documentation and interview questions having been duly provided. The most probable reason for this could have been the sensitivity of the subject under discussion, given the prevailing political context, particularly in light of the perceived

traditional role of UoN students in politically instigated riots in the capital city. This resulted in inordinate delays, arising from the need for alternative arrangements to facilitate the conducting of the research at the university. The demographic characteristics were also examined and factors deemed significant to the study isolated for individual scrutiny as follows;

#### 4.2 Age of the Respondents

Since the study mainly focused on youth in university/college, most of the respondents (75.5%) were aged between 21-25 years, as shown in Figure 3. The respondents also comprised 19% aged between 16-20, with a few others between 26-30 and 31-35 years comprising 4.5% and 1%, respectively.




*Figure 3: Age of the respondents.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.3 Level of Education of the Respondents

As shown in Figure 4, most of the respondents (72%) sampled included the university students, while the rest (28%) of the respondents derived from the middle-level college.




*Figure 4: Level of education of the respondents.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.4 Religion of the Respondents**

In establishing the religious background of the respondents, I observed that the vast majority of the respondents (86.5%) were from a Christian background, followed by Muslims at 6.5%, atheists at 4%, and finally African tradition by 3%.




*Figure 5: Religion of the respondents.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.5 The Gender Factor**

The research incorporated the gender perspective, by ensuring that the views of both male and female respondents were integrated in the study. The results showed that 65% of the respondents were male, while 35% were female.



*Figure 6: Gender of the respondent.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

Given the different roles that are assigned to the two genders in the Kenyan culture, I considered it vital to isolate this variable in the study to determine whether this factor played any role in influencing perceptions on hate speech and youth violence within the Kenyan context. This section includes my findings.

#### **4.5.1 Differences in Gender Perception on Youth Involvement in Politically-Incited Campaigns**

An analysis of the differences in gender perception on youth involvement in political campaigns determined that 30% of both male and female respondents shared the view that youths participate in politically incited campaigns because of financial incentives; 25% of the male suggested that youths lack sufficient knowledge on politics; 20% attributed this to the availability of youths; 10% of them blamed idleness/unemployment/underemployment; while 5% of them view poverty as the motivating factor (see Table 4.1 to 4.3).



*Table 4.1 Differences in Gender Perception on Youth Involvement in Politically-Incited Campaigns*

Gender		Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns							Total
		Financial incentives	Poverty	Competition	Youth are pillars	Youth available	Poor knowledge of politics	Idleness	
Male	Count	6	3	0	1	4	5	2	12
	% of Total	30.0	15.0	.0	5.0	20.0	25.0	10.0	60.0
Female	Count	6	4	1	0	0	2	1	8
	% of Total	30.0	20.0	5.0	.0	.0	10.0	5.0	40.0
Total	Count	12	7	1	1	4	7	3	20
	% of Total	60.0	35.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	35.0	15.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.5.2 Difference in Gender Perception on Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech**

The following differences in opinion between the male and female respondents on the challenges to eliminating hate speech were noted. 41.2% of the male respondents highlighted bullying by politicians and elites; 17.6% cited lack of cooperation between the government and the youth as well as blamed no clearly defined terms of hate speech; 11.8% said lack of education among the youth was to blame; while 5.9% cited poor implementation of peace initiatives as well as lack of clearly defined terms of hate speech. The female respondents blamed corruption by politicians and the judiciary, lack of education among the youth and bullying by politicians, and the elite at 11.8%, while 5.9% of the female respondents cited the lack of clearly defined terms of hate speech as the fundamental challenge to eliminating hate speech.

*Table 4.2 Difference in Gender Perception on Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech*

		Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech								Total
Gender		Corruption	Bullying	Lack of aid	Poor Implementation/peace initiatives	Political stimulus	Ethnicism	No clearly defined terms of hate speech	Poorly educated youth	
Male	Count	0	7	3	1	1	3	1	2	10
	% of Total	.0	41.2	17.6	5.9	5.9	17.6	5.9	11.8	58.8
Female	Count	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	7
	% of Total	11.8	11.8	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.9	11.8	41.2
Total	Count	2	9	3	1	1	3	2	4	17
	% of Total	11.8	52.9	17.6	5.9	5.9	17.6	11.8	23.5	100

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.5.3 Difference in Gender Perception on Steps to Eliminating Hate Speech**

A comparison between the male and female perceptions on the steps to eliminating hate speech showed that 20% of the males were of the opinion that the views of the victims of hate speech should be sought on appropriate interventions; 20% that peace programs should be facilitated from the grassroots; while 20% suggested amending the laws and called for the arrest/conviction and equal treatment of perpetrators. On the contrary, 20% of the females proposed that wars between the youth should be eliminated, the masses should be educated, laws should be amended and perpetrators arrested, and administration officers should not foster enmity at 20%.

*Table 4.3 Difference in Gender Perception on Steps to Eliminating Hate Speech*

		Steps to eliminating hate speech							Total
Gender		Seek views of hate speech victims	Facilitate peace programs from grassroots	Eliminate wars among youth	Administration officers should not foster enmity	Educate masses	Amend laws & arrest those culpable	Equal treatment of perpetrators	
Male	Count	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	3
	% of Total	20.0	20.0	.0	.0	.0	20.0	20.0	60.0
Female	Count	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2
	% of Total	.0	.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	.0	.0	40.0
Total	Count	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
	% of Total	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

## **4.6 The Influence of Ethnicity on Perception**

Based on the prevailing trends, it was necessary to identify the role of ethnicity in electoral violence among communities within Nairobi County. The ethnic factor was therefore isolated for study to determine the extent to which a person's ethnicity would seem to influence his/her perception and hence level of participation in violence within the area under study. The findings were as follows:

### **4.6.1 Differences in Ethnic Perceptions on Reasons for Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns**

In examining whether any differences exist in ethnic group perception of the reasons for youth involvement in political campaigns, 20% from the Kikuyu ethnic community, 15% from the Luhya, 10% from the Kamba, and 5% from the Kalenjin claimed that their involvement in political campaigns is due to financial incentives. Of the participants, 15% from the Kikuyu, 10% from the Luo, 5% from the Luhya, and the Kamba said that the youth get involved in political campaigns due to poverty. On the other hand, 15% of the Luhya, and 5% of Kisii gave the reason that youth are available, while 10% Kisii, 15% of the Luhya, and 10% of the Maasai said youths do not have adequate knowledge in politics. Finally, 10% of the Luhya and 5% of the Kikuyu said the youth get involved in political campaigns because they are idle, unemployed, or underemployed (see Table 4.4).

*Table 4.4 Differences in Ethnic Perceptions on Reasons for Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns*

Ethnic group		Youth involvement in political campaigns							Total
		Financial incentives	Poverty	Competition	Youth are pillars	Availability	Poor knowledge of politics	Idleness/unemployment/underemployment	
Kalenjin	Count	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	% of Total	5.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.0
Kamba	Count	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
	% of Total	10.0	5.0	5.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	10.0
Kikuyu	Count	4	3	0	0	0	0	1	5
	% of Total	20.0	15.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.0	25.0
Kisii	Count	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2
	% of Total	.0	.0	.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	.0	10.0
Luhya	Count	3	1	0	0	3	3	2	5
	% of Total	15.0	5.0	.0	.0	15.0	15.0	10.0	25.0
Luo	Count	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	3
	% of Total	10.0	10.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	15.0
Maasai	Count	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
	% of Total	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	10.0	.0	10.0
Total	Count	12	7	1	1	4	7	3	20
	% of Total	60.0	35.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	35.0	15.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.6.2 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech by Ethnic Group**

I identified different challenges to eliminating hate speech by ethnic groups. Politicians and the judiciary were labeled as corrupt by the Kikuyu respondents at 11.8%. I also identified bullying by politicians and the elite as a challenge to eliminating hate speech with 17.6% respondents from the Luo, 11.8% from the Kisii and the Luhya, and 5.9% from the Maasai. Lack of education was also cited among the youth as a challenge to eliminating hate speech with a response of 11.8% from the Luhya and the Kamba. The view that politicians and the judiciary are corrupt was expressed by 11.8% from the Kikuyu. Lack of cooperation between the government and the youth is seen as a challenge to eliminating hate speech by 5.9% respondents from the Kisii, Luo, and Luhya. No clearly defined terms of hate speech, ethnicism, and political incitement were identified as challenges to eliminating hate speech by several ethnic groups, with 5.9% recorded for the Kisii, Maasai, Luhya and Luo respondents (see Table 4.5).



Table 4.5 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech by Ethnic Group

Ethnic group		Challenges to eliminating hate speech								Total
		Politicians and judiciary are corrupt	Bullying by politicians and elites	Lack of cooperation between the government and the youth	Poor implementation of set peace initiatives	Political incitement	Ethnicism	No clearly defined terms of hate speech	Lack of education among the youth	
Kalenjin	Count	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	% of Total	.0	5.9	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.9
Kamba	Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
	% of Total	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	11.8	11.8
Kikuyu	Count	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	% of Total	11.8	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	11.8
Kisii	Count	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
	% of Total	.0	11.8	5.9	.0	.0	.0	5.9	.0	11.8
Luhya	Count	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	2	5
	% of Total	.0	11.8	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9	.0	11.8	29.4
Luo	Count	0	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	3
	% of Total	.0	17.6	5.9	.0	.0	5.9	.0	.0	17.6
Maasai	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
	% of Total	.0	5.9	.0	.0	.0	5.9	5.9	.0	11.8
Total	Count	2	9	3	1	1	3	2	4	17
	% of Total	11.8	52.9	17.6	5.9	5.9	17.6	11.8	23.5	100.0


Source: Researcher, 2016

## **4.7 Considering the Influence of Neighbourhood on Violence**

Based on the persistence of violence in specific neighbourhoods in the Nairobi County, there is a general conception, that people from certain neighbourhoods are more prone to violence compared to those from others. Therefore, I highlighted this as a possible variable determining the propensity of youth involvement in politically instigated campaigns. This section includes my findings.

### **4.7.1 Neighbourhoods in Nairobi County**

Neighbourhoods within Nairobi County are associated with a specific social class. For instance, according to the Mitaa ya (2016) Nairobi blogspot, Mathare, Kibera and Mukuru are associated generally with informal settlements, while Bahati, Jericho, Kangemi, Eastleigh, Kayole, Dandora, Kahawa Wendani, Zimmerman and Githurai comprise the lower class neighbourhoods. South B, South C, Langata, Nairobi West, Buruburu, Ong'ata Rongai, Madaraka, Pangani, Kahawa Sukari, Greenfield, Umoja, Embakasi, Ngong, Kasarani, and Donholm fall within the middle class range, while Lavington, Kileleshwa, Karen, Muthaiga, Runda, Loresho, Kyuna, Riverside, Gigiri and Muthangari are considered upper class. As shown in Figure 7, it emerged that most of the respondents emanated from middle class neighbourhoods in Nairobi County, which made up for 71.9% of the respondents, followed by lower class by 14.8%, then 9.2% from upper class level, with the lowest group (4.1%) derived from the informal settlements.



*Figure 7: Neighbourhood in Nairobi County.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.7.2 Reasons for Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns by Neighbourhood**

In comparing the reasons for youth involvement in political campaigns according to neighbourhoods, 30% of the youth from the low class neighbourhoods involved in political campaigns, 25% from the middle class and 5% from the informal settlements attributed involvement to financial incentives. 15% participants from the middle class; 10% from the low class and the informal settlements said that the youth are involved in political campaigns because of poverty; and 10% from the low class and the informal settlements said that the youth are available. 15% participants from the middle class and the low class 5% from the informal settlements said the youth were idle, unemployed, or underemployed. 5% participants from the low class dwellings stated that the youth are pillars, youth are involved because of competition among the politicians, and thus the youth are vulnerable (see Table 4.6).

*Table 4.6 Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns by their Neighbourhoods*

Neighborhood in Nairobi	Youth involvement in political campaigns								Total
	Given financial incentives	Poverty	For competition	Youth are pillars	Youth are available	youth are not politically knowledgeable	idleness		
Middle class	Count	5	3	0	0	0	3	2	8
	% of Total	25.0	15.0	.0	.0	.0	15.0	10.0	40.0
Low Class	Count	6	2	1	1	2	3	0	8
	% of Total	30.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	15.0	.0	40.0
Informal settlements	Count	1	2	0	0	2	1	1	4
	% of Total	5.0	10.0	.0	.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	20.0
Total	Count	12	7	1	1	4	7	3	20
	% of Total	60.0	35.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	35.0	15.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.7.3 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech in Relation to One's Neighbourhood**

In seeking to establish the challenges facing attempts to eliminate hate speech, the findings were analyzed based on neighbourhood. The researcher found that 23.5% of the middle class, 11.8% of the low class, and 17.6% of those in informal settlements blamed bullying by politicians and the elite as a challenge to eliminating hate speech. 5.9% participants from the middle class, the low class, and the informal settlements blamed the absence of clearly defined terms of hate speech. 11.8% participants from the middle class, 5.9% from the low class and the informal settlements said the youth lacked sufficient knowledge in politics. 5.9% participants from the low class blamed political incitement and said that the politicians and judiciary are corrupt (see Table 4.7).

*Table 4.7 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech in Relation to One's Neighbourhood*

		Challenges to eliminating hate speech								Total
Neighborhood in Nairobi		Politicians and judiciary are corrupt	Bullying by politicians and elites	Lack of cooperation between the government and the youth	Poor implementation of set peace initiatives	Political incitement	Ethnicism	No clearly defined terms of hate speech	Lack of education among the youth	
Middle class	Count	1	4	1	0	0	2	1	2	7
	% of Total	5.9	23.5	5.9	.0	.0	11.8	5.9	11.8	41.2
Low Class	Count	1	2	2	1	1	0	1	1	6
	% of Total	5.9	11.8	11.8	5.9	5.9	.0	5.9	5.9	35.3
Informal settlements	Count	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	4
	% of Total	.0	17.6	.0	.0	.0	5.9	.0	5.9	23.5
Total	Count	2	9	3	1	1	3	2	4	17
	% of Total	11.8	52.9	17.6	5.9	5.9	17.6	11.8	23.5	100

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

## **4.8 Influence of Sampled Areas**

### **4.8.1 Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns by Area**

The comparison of youth involvement in political campaigns by area sampled showed that 20% of respondents from Mathare, 10% from Kibera, 10% from the UoN, and 10% from the TU-K shared the view that the youth are lured by financial incentives. Respondents also blamed poverty with 15% respondents from Mathare, 10% from the UoN and the TU-K, for involvement of the youth in political campaigns. 5% respondents from Kibera blamed competition among the politicians for youth involvement in political campaigns. Lack of sufficient political knowledge by youth was mentioned by 20% respondents from Kibera, 5% from the UoN and 10% from the TU-K. Youth availability was cited by 10% from Kibera, 5% from Mathare and UoN. Idleness, unemployment, or underemployment was stated as the reason for youth involvement in political campaigns by 10% from the TU-K and 5% from the UoN (see Table 4.8).

*Table 4.8 Youth Involvement in Political Campaigns by Area*

		Youth involvement in political campaigns							
Area		Given financial incentives	Poverty	For competition	Youth are pillars	Youth are available	Youth are not politically knowledgeable	Idleness/unemployment/underemployed	Total
Mathare	Count	4	3	0	0	1	0	0	5
	% of Total	20.0	15.0	.0	.0	5.0	.0	.0	25.0
Kibera	Count	2	0	1	1	2	4	0	5
	% of Total	10.0	.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	20.0	.0	25.0
UoN	Count	3	2	0	0	1	1	1	5
	% of Total	15.0	10.0	.0	.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	25.0
TU-K	Count	3	2	0	0	0	2	2	5
	% of Total	15.0	10.0	.0	.0	.0	10.0	10.0	25.0
Total	Count	12	7	1	1	4	7	3	20
	% of Total	60.0	35.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	35.0	15.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.8.2 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech by Area**

In comparing the challenges to eliminating hate speech by area 5.9% of the respondents sampled from Mathare and Kibera stated that the politicians and judiciary are corrupt, while bullying by politicians and elite was mentioned by 11.8% from Mathare, UoN and the TU-K and 17.6% from Kibera. 5.9% respondents from both Mathare and Kibera cited lack of cooperation between the government and the youth as a challenge to eliminating hate speech, while poor implementation of set peace initiatives was mentioned by 5.9% from Mathare, political incitement 5.9% from Kibera, and ethnicism by 17.6% from the UON. The fact that hate speech has no defined terms was cited as a challenge to eliminating hate speech by 5.9% from Kibera, while lack of education among the youth was mentioned by 11.8% from the TU-K and 5.9% from both Kibera and the UoN (see Table 4.9).



*Table 4.9 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech by Area*

Area		Challenges to eliminating hate speech								Total
		Politicians and judiciary are corrupt	Bullying by politicians and elites	Lack of cooperation between the government and the youth	Poor implementation of set peace initiatives	Political incitement	Ethnicism	No clearly defined terms of hate speech	Lack of education among the youth	
Mathare	Count	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
	% of Total	5.9	11.8	5.9	5.9	.0	.0	.0	.0	23.5
Kibera	Count	0	3	1	0	1	0	1	1	5
	% of Total	.0	17.6	5.9	.0	5.9	.0	5.9	5.9	29.4
UoN	Count	0	2	1	0	0	3	0	1	3
	% of Total	.0	11.8	5.9	.0	.0	17.6	.0	5.9	17.6
TU-K	Count	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	5
	% of Total	5.9	11.8	.0	.0	.0	.0	5.9	11.8	29.4
Total	Count	2	9	3	1	1	3	2	4	17
	% of Total	11.8	52.9	17.6	5.9	5.9	17.6	11.8	23.5	100

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.8.3 Steps to Eliminating Hate Speech by Area**

The findings of the comparison of the steps towards eliminating hate speech within the area of study were as follows; 20% of the respondents from Mathare were of the opinion that the views of the victims of hate speech are critical to identifying any lasting solution. As such, to ensure that interventions effectively address the concerns related to hate speech, any entity at the helm of such initiative should integrate at every level dialogue with those who have suffered from the negative consequences of hate speech, or otherwise risk failure. Of the respondents, 20% from Mathare said that peace programs should be facilitated from the grassroots; 20% that wars among the

youth should be eliminated; while 20% said that the administration officers should be stopped from fostering enmity. 20% participants from Kibera, stated that educating the masses was a necessary step to eliminating hate speech, 20% from the UoN suggested amending the laws and arresting/convicting perpetrators as a step to eliminating hate speech, while 20% from the UoN urged that offenders are treated equally without favour. Hence, the consensus that any intervention should be initiated from the grassroots underscores the disadvantages of the top-down approach, which has to be discarded if the efforts to eliminate hate speech are to yield the desirable results.

*Table 4.10 Steps to Eliminating Hate Speech by Area*

Area		Steps to eliminating hate speech							Total
		Views of victims of hate speech should be sought	Peace programs facilitated from the grassroots	Eliminate wars among the youth	Administration officers should not foster enmity	Educating the masses	Amending the laws and arresting /convicting perpetrators	Treating perpetrators equally	
Mathare	Count	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	2
	% of Total	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	.0	.0	.0	40.0
Kibera	Count	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	% of Total	.0	.0	.0	.0	20.0	.0	.0	20.0
UON	Count	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
	% of Total	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	20.0	20.0	40.0
Total	Count	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5
	% of Total	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.9 Objective One: Link between Hate Speech, Negative Ethnicity and Youth Violence**

In conformance to the research questions guiding the study discussed under Chapter 1, the research sought to examine to what extent hate speech is responsible for entrenching negative ethnicity and a catalyst for the formation of youth gangs and youth violence during electoral periods in Kenya. In line with this objective, the following data was derived from the administered questionnaires.

##### **4.9.1 Opinion on whether Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity**

When asked their opinion on the impact of hate speech on negative ethnicity, a vast majority of the respondents (93%) expressed the view that hate speech contributes immensely in encouraging negative ethnicity, while only 7% dismissed that it had any effect (see Table 4.11).

*Table 4.11 Opinion on Whether Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	185	93.0
No	14	7.0
Total	199	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

##### **4.9.2 Peers, Ethnicity, and Voting Decisions**

The study additionally sought to establish whether voting decisions are peer-influenced based on ethnicity. Despite the fact that most leaders use hate speech as a tool for fighting their political adversaries that emanate from other ethnic communities, it is clear that this does not significantly influence the youth's decision on voting for a political candidate who does not emanate from their own ethnic group. An analysis of the relationship between having friends who are not from an

individual's own ethnic group and voting for a political candidate from a different ethnic group aided in testing the null hypothesis that having friends who are not from an individual's own ethnic group and voting for a political candidate from a different ethnic group are independent. Results showed that 91.5% of the respondents who had friends who did not derive from their own ethnic group would vote for a political candidate from a different ethnic group. The chi-square statistic with one degree of freedom equaled 0.329, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.566, which was greater than 0.05 (95% confidence level). Since  $p > 0.05$ , I did not reject the null hypothesis. I concluded that having friends who are not from one's own ethnic group and voting for a political candidate from a different ethnic group were independent.

*Table 4.12 Peers, Ethnicity, and Voting Decisions*

			Would you vote for a political candidate who is not from your ethnic group		Total
			Yes	No	
Do you have any friends who are not from your ethnic group	Yes	Count	182	12	194
		%	97.3	100.0	97.5
		% of Total	91.5	6.0	97.5
	No	Count	5	0	5
		%	2.7	.0	2.5
		% of Total	2.5	.0	2.5
Total		Count	187	12	199
		%	100.0	100.0	100.0
		% of Total	94.0	6.0	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 0.329,  $p = 0.566$

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

### **4.9.3 Relationship between Level of Education and Opinion that PEV Made**

#### **Ethnic Communities More Cohesive**

An assessment of the relationship between the respondent's level of education and opinion that the 2008 PEV made ethnic communities more cohesive showed that the

majority of the university students felt that the ethnic communities became more cohesive by 36.7% of the entire sample size, while only 19.9% of the college students agreed with this. The null hypothesis included that the opinion that 2008 PEV made ethnic communities more cohesive and level of education were independent. The chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom was 5.403 and the p-value was 0.020. Since  $0.020 < 0.05$ , I rejected the null hypothesis. I concluded that the relationship between level of education and opinion that the 2008 PEV made ethnic communities more cohesive are dependent (see Table 4.13).

*Table 4.13 Relationship between Level of Education and Opinion that PEV Made Ethnic Communities More Cohesive*

		2008 PEV made ethnic communities more cohesive		
		True	False	Total
College (TU-K)	Count	39	17	56
	%	35.1	20.0	28.6
	% of Total	19.9	8.7	28.6
University (UoN)	Count	72	68	140
	%	64.9	80.0	71.4
	% of Total	36.7	34.7	71.4
Total	Count	111	85	196
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0
	% of Total	56.6	43.4	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom =5.403,  $p = 0.020$ .

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.9.4 Relationship between Having Participated in Election Campaigns and the View that Hate Speech Encourages Violence**

In ascertaining the relationship between ever having participated in election campaigns and the view that hate speech encourages violence, the findings showed that 20.1% of those who had ever participated in election campaigns strongly agreed that hate speech encourages violence, 5.5% of them agreed, 0.5% of them were not sure while no one disagreed. The hypothesis posited was that having participated in

election campaigns and the opinion that hate speech encourages violence were independent. I observed the chi-square statistic as 2.160 at three degrees of freedom, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.540. Since the  $p$ -value was greater than 0.05, I did not reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, it is clear that having participated in election campaigns and the opinion that hate speech encourages violence are independent.

*Table 4.14 Relationship between Having Participated in Election Campaigns and the View that Hate Speech Encourages Violence*

Have you ever participated in election campaigns		Hate speech encourages violence				
		Strongly agree	Agree	Not sure	Disagree	Total
Yes	Count	40	11	1	0	52
	%	28.8	19.6	33.3	.0	26.1
	% of Total	20.1	5.5	.5	.0	26.1
No	Count	99	45	2	1	147
	%	71.2	80.4	66.7	100.0	73.9
	% of Total	49.7	22.6	1.0	.5	73.9
Total	Count	139	56	3	1	199
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	% of Total	69.8	28.1	1.5	.5	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with three degrees of freedom = 2.160,  $p = 0.540$ .

*Source:* Researcher, 2016

#### **4.9.5 Relationship between Being a Member of a Political Party and the Opinion that Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity**

I conducted these tests to determine the opinions of members of political parties on whether hate speech encourages negative ethnicity and carried out a cross-tabulation. Results showed that only 22.1% of those belonging to a political party are of the opinion that hate speech encourages negative ethnicity. The majority of respondents (70.9%) who believe hate speech encourages negative ethnicity did not belong to any political party. I used this to test the hypothesis that belonging to a political party and the opinion that hate speech encourages negative ethnicity are independent. Results

showed that the chi-square statistic equaled 2.060, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.151. Since  $0.151 > 0.05$  (95% confidence level), I did not reject the null hypothesis. I made the conclusion that belonging to a political party and the opinion that hate speech encourages negative ethnicity are independent (see Table 4.15).

*Table 4.15 Relationship between Being a Member of a Political Party and the Opinion that Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity*

Are you a member of any political party?		Do you think hate speech encourages negative ethnicity?		
		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Count	44	1	45
	%	23.8	7.1	22.6
	% of Total	22.1	.5	22.6
No	Count	141	13	154
	%	76.2	92.9	77.4
	% of Total	70.9	6.5	77.4
Total	Count	185	14	199
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0
	% of Total	93.0	7.0	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 2.060,  $p = 0.151$ .

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.9.6 Relationship between Having a Partner from Own Ethnic Group, Having Friends from a Different Ethnic Group and Voting for a Political Candidate from a Different Ethnic Group**

It was observed that 36.8% of those who had a partner (girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse) from their own ethnic group, had friends who belong to a different ethnic group and would vote for a political candidate from a different ethnic group. Nevertheless, the results showed that a majority of 66.7% who had a partner from their own ethnic group, but had friends from a different ethnic group, would not vote for a political candidate from another ethnic group. The chi-square statistic with one degree of freedom equaled 0.250, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.617. I used this to test the



hypothesis that having a partner from one's ethnic group, having friends from a different ethnic group, and voting for a political candidate from a different ethnic group are independent. Since 0.617 is greater than 0.05, I did not reject the null hypothesis. I made the conclusion that the three variables are independent (see Table 4.16).

*Table 4.16 Relationship between Having a Partner from One's Own Ethnic Group, Having Friends from a Different Ethnic Group and Voting for a Political Candidate from a Different Ethnic Group*

Would you vote for a political candidate who is not from your ethnic group?				Any friends of different ethnicity? group		
				Yes	No	Total
Yes	Is your partner/girlfriend/ boyfriend/spouse from your ethnic group	Yes	Count	63	2	65
			% of Total	36.8	1.2	38.0
		No	Count	104	2	106
			% of Total	60.8	1.2	62.0
Total			Count	167	4	171
			% of Total	97.7	2.3	100.0
No	Is your partner/girlfriend/ boyfriend/spouse from your ethnic group	Yes	Count	8		8
			% of Total	66.7		66.7
		No	Count	4		4
			% of Total	33.3		33.3
Total			Count	12		12
			% of Total	100.		100.0
			Total	0		

*Note.* The chi-square with one degree of freedom = 0.250 and  $p$ -value = 0.617.

#### **4.9.7 Relationship between Favourite Radio Station and the View that Radio Presenters Educate Listeners on Matters of Ethnicity**

I conducted an analysis to determine the relationship between the respondents' favourite radio station and the view that the radio presenters educate their listeners on matters of ethnicity. The results showed that a majority of the Classic FM station (18.8%) were of the opinion that the presenters educate their listeners on matters of ethnicity while 9.4% of Classic FM fans denied that the presenters educate their listeners on matters of ethnicity. The findings showed that Classic FM and Kiss 100 are the Radio stations that have presenters who educate youths on matters of ethnicity by 18.8% and 19.9% respectively.

#### **4.9.8 Extent Hate Speech Influences the Perceptions of the Youth on Ethnicity**

I used the Spearman (D'Agostino, Sullivan, & Beiser, 2006) rank correlation to determine the extent to which hate speech influences the perceptions of youth on ethnicity. Spearman (D'Agostino et al., 2006) correlation is a non-parametric measure of statistical dependence between two variables and is carried out on ordinal variables (csub.edu, 2012). The correlation coefficient quantifies the nature and strength of the linear association between two variables. However, as extreme values can have a substantial impact on the value of the sample correlation coefficient, when the data are subject to extremes an alternative measured of correlation between variables derived from ranks. It is this correlation based on ranks that one called the Spearman correlation (D'Agostino et al., 2006).

The analysis assumes that the variables are normally distributed. The null hypothesis included that as one variable capturing hate speech increases the corresponding variable capturing the perceptions of the youth on ethnicity also increases e.g., I

hypothesized that as the chances for having come across hate speech on the internet increase, the opinion that most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups also increases. I observed the correlation coefficient as 0.221 at 0.01 level of significance. This showed that chances of having encountered hate speech on the internet and the opinion that most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups are positively correlated. The relationship is quite weak given that there exist other ways of judging other ethnic groups and also due to the distribution of responses between strongly agree and agree. I obtained the correlation matrix to further give the probability of wrong occurrences. This is true, if the results derived from the assumption that the relationship found in the sample represented an accurate reflection of the relationship between having ever encountered hate speech on the internet and the opinion that most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups in the population from which the sample occurred. The probability equaled 0.002, which is less than the conventional threshold of  $p < 0.01$ ; hence, I supported the null hypothesis. Since a relationship exists (coefficient is not 0) and there exists a positive correlation, the results can be generalized to the population at  $p < 0.01$  (see Table 4.17)

*Table 4.17 Extent to which Hate Speech Influences the Perceptions of the Youth on Ethnicity*

Spearman correlation	Having encountered hate speech on the internet	Having received hate SMS text messages	GoK should act to curb hate crimes	Do you think hate speech encourages negative ethnicity	Negative ethnicity is rampant in Kenya	Not sharing ethnicity with those holding top leadership posts reduces your chances of success	Most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups	The use of hate speech is more rampant today than ten years ago	Hate speech encourages violence	Nepotism is entrenched in the civil service and other organizations
If hate speech encourages negative ethnicity			.191**							
not belonging to the ethnic group/s holding top leadership posts reduces your chances of success		.175*			.168*					
Most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups	.221**	.148*			.352**	.218**				
use of hate speech is more rampant today than ten years ago		.213**			.339**	.268**	.261**			
Hate speech encourages violence			.152*	.151*	.365**	.279**	.336**	.241**		
Nepotism is entrenched in the civil service and other organizations					.304**	.227**	.258**	.283**	.321**	
Unequal distribution of land has contributed to the poverty of some ethnic groups		.172*			.219**	.259**		.264**	.176*	.230**
2008 PEV could have been avoided if politicians did not incite the public					.154*		.312**		.395**	.146*

*Note.* \*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); \*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10 Objective Two: The Power of Hate Speech in Inciting Violence among Kenyan Youth

The second objective of the study involved investigating the relationship between hate speech and youth violence in Kenya to establish the predominant agents of hate speech that spur youth violence in Kenya. This section shows the findings.

##### 4.10.1 Media Contributes to the Spread of Hate Speech

One of the factors that was used to examine the role of hate speech in instigating youth violence in Kenya was an investigation of the predominant agents of hate speech. One of the agents under study includes the internet. The results showed that 61.1% of the respondents had encountered hate speech on the internet (see Table 4.18).

*Table 4.18 Hate Speech on the Internet*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	121	61.1
No	77	38.9
Total	198	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

An analysis to determine the internet's contribution to the spread of hate speech concluded that the majority of respondents who use the internet daily for studies (45.5%) have encountered hate speech on the internet. This analysis also included 40.5% of those who use it for social networking; 38.8% of those who use it for entertainment; and finally 27.3% of those who use internet daily for news. On the other hand, the results showed that the majority of the respondents who use the internet daily for studies (40.5%) have never come across hate speech on the internet; followed by 32.4% of those who use it for entertainment; 23% who use internet for social networking; and finally 16.2% those who use it for news. This shows that the

use of the internet, mainly for social networking through Facebook/Twitter, is more likely to facilitate the spread of hate speech than the use of computers for entertainment.

#### 4.10.2 Relationship between having encountered hate speech on the internet and owning a Facebook/Twitter account

I determined the relationship between encountering hate speech on the internet and having a Facebook/Twitter account by the use of cross tabulation. The results showed that the majority of the respondents (58%) who have encountered hate speech on the internet have a Facebook/Twitter account while only 30.6% of those with Facebook/Twitter account have encountered hate speech on the internet. The null hypothesis was that encountering hate speech on the internet and having a Facebook/Twitter account are independent. I observed that the chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom was 9.352 and the  $p$ -value was 0.002, which was less than 0.05 (95% confidence level). Since  $p < 0.05$ , I rejected the null hypothesis. I made the conclusion that the relationship between encountering hate speech on the internet and having a Facebook/Twitter account are dependent (see Tables 4.19 to 4.20).

*Table 4.19 Relationship between Encountering Hate Speech on the Internet and Owning a Facebook/Twitter Account*

Do you have a Facebook/Twitter account?		Have you ever encountered hate speech on the internet?		
		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Count	112	59	171
	%	94.1	79.7	88.6
	% of Total	58.0	30.6	88.6
No	Count	7	15	22
	%	5.9	20.3	11.4
	% of Total	3.6	7.8	11.4
	Count	119	74	193
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0
	% of Total	61.7	38.3	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 9.352,  $p = 0.002$ .

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

*Table 4.20 How Internet Contributes to the Spread of Hate Speech*

Have you ever encountered hate speech on the internet?				Use of computer				
				Studies	News	Social Networking	Entertainment	Total
Yes	How often do you use a computer?	Everyday	Count	55	33	49	47	66
			% of Total	45.5	27.3	40.5	38.8	54.5
		More than thrice a week	Count	22	3	18	17	29
			% of Total	18.2	2.5	14.9	14.0	24.0
		Less than thrice a week	Count	10	2	8	3	15
			% of Total	8.3	1.7	6.6	2.5	12.4
		Rarely	Count	7	0	2	2	11
			% of Total	5.8	.0	1.7	1.7	9.1
Total			Count	94	38	77	69	121
			% of Total	77.7	31.4	63.6	57.0	100.0
No	How often do you use a computer?	Everyday	Count	30	12	17	24	35
			% of Total	40.5	16.2	23.0	32.4	47.3
		More than thrice a week	Count	13	2	2	9	18
			% of Total	17.6	2.7	2.7	12.2	24.3
		Less than thrice a week	Count	8	1	2	2	9
			% of Total	10.8	1.4	2.7	2.7	12.2
		Rarely	Count	6	0	3	6	12
			% of Total	8.1	.0	4.1	8.1	16.2
Total			Count	57	15	24	41	74
			% of Total	77.0	20.3	32.4	55.4	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.3 The Impact of Violence Images on Television on Youth

Television was depicted as one of the communication media that instigates youth violence by airing violence images. A majority (65.1%) agreed that the violence images on television yield a negative impact on the youth, but 27.7% of the respondents indicated that images on television create a positive impact on youth violence. Only 7.2% of the respondents felt that images on television have no impact on youth violence (see Table 4.21).

*Table 4.21. The Impact of Violence Images on Television on the Youth*

	Frequency	Percent
Positive	54	27.7
Negative	127	65.1
No impact	14	7.2
Total	195	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.4 Relationship between the Favourite TV Station and the Impact of Television Violence Images on the Youth

An analysis of the relationship between favourite TV station and the impact of television violence images on the youth concluded that only 16.1% of those who watch Citizen TV channel the most feel that the violence images on television have a positive impact on the youth; 38.3% of them believe that the violence images on television impact negatively on the youth; while 3.9% of them felt that the violence images on television have no impact at all on the youth. The null hypothesis was that one's favourite local TV station and the opinion on the impact on the youth of violence images on Television were independent.

The chi-square statistic with fourteen degrees of freedom was 24.909 and the  $p$ -value was 0.035. Since the  $p$ -value was less than 0.05 (95% confidence interval), I rejected



the null hypothesis with the conclusion that the relationship between one's favorite local TV Station and opinion on the impact on the youth of violence images on Television are dependent. Table 4.22 carries this depiction.

Table 4.22 Relationship between Favourite TV Station and Impact of Violence Images on Youth

			Which is your favorite local TV Station								Total
			Citizen	Kiss TV	KTN	Nation	KBC	K24	Family	E-Africa	
What has been the impact on the youth of violence images on Television	Positive	Count	29	2	8	4	2	1	2	0	48
		%	60.4	4.2	16.7	8.3	4.2	2.1	4.2	.0	100.0
		% of Total	16.1	1.1	4.4	2.2	1.1	.6	1.1	.0	26.7
	Negative	Count	69	1	21	21	2	4	0	0	118
		%	58.5	.8	17.8	17.8	1.7	3.4	.0	.0	100.0
		of Total	38.3	.6	11.7	11.7	1.1	2.2	.0	.0	65.6
	No impact	Count	7	0	4	2	0	0	0	1	14
		%	50.0	.0	28.6	14.3	.0	.0	.0	7.1	100.0
		% of Total	3.9	.0	2.2	1.1	.0	.0	.0	.6	7.8
Total		Count	105	3	33	27	4	5	2	1	180
		%	58.3	1.7	18.3	15.0	2.2	2.8	1.1	.6	100.0
		% of Total	58.3	1.7	18.3	15.0	2.2	2.8	1.1	.6	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with fourteen degrees of freedom = 24.909,  $p = 0.035$ .

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.5 Relationship between Agitating for a Cause and Social Activities during Leisure Time

I sought to establish the relationship between the social activities that the youth engaged in and their involvement in agitating for any cause within the community. The results showed that 15.9% of those who had agitated for a cause engaged in sports during leisure time; 22.7% of them engaged in arts/music; 2.3% watched TV or movies; while 0.6% of them spent their leisure time socializing (see Table 4.24).

*Table 4.24 Relationship between Agitating for a Cause and Social Activities during Leisure Time*

			Social activities during leisure time				Total
			Sports	Arts/Music	Watching TV/movies	Socializing	
Have you ever agitated for any cause?	Yes	Count	28	40	4	1	67
		% of Total	15.9	22.7	2.3	.6	38.1
	No	Count	50	62	5	0	109
		% of Total	28.4	35.2	2.8	.0	61.9
Total	Count	78	102	9	1	176	
	% of Total	44.3	58.0	5.1	.6	100	

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.6 Relationship between Agitating for a Cause and Involvement in Peace Initiatives

An analysis of the relationship between involvement in peace initiatives and agitating for a cause shows that 14.1% of those who have agitated for a cause have been involved in a peace initiative, while 24.5% of them have never engaged in any peace initiative. The null hypothesis was that having agitated for a cause and having been involved in any peace initiative are independent. The chi-square statistic at one degree of freedom was 5.212 and the  $p$ -value was 0.022. Since  $p < 0.022$ , I rejected the null hypothesis, and I made a conclusion that having agitated for a cause and having involvement in any peace initiative are dependent.

*Table 4.25 Relationship between Agitating for a Cause and Involvement in Peace Initiatives*

			Have you ever been involved in any peace initiative?		Total
			Yes	No	
Have you ever agitated for any cause?	Yes	Count	26	45	71
		%	52.0	33.6	38.6
		% of Total	14.1	24.5	38.6
	No	Count	24	89	113
		%	48.0	66.4	61.4
		% of Total	13.0	48.4	61.4
Total		Count	50	134	184
		%	100.0	100.0	100.0
		% of Total	27.2	72.8	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square one degree of freedom = 5.212 and  $p = 0.022$ .

#### **4.10.7 Relationship between SMS Text Messaging use and Receiving Hate Texts**

The findings concluded that SMS text messages is an uncommon way of spreading hate speech, since a majority of 71.4% mobile phone subscribers had never in their lifetime received a hate SMS text message (see Table 4.26).

*Table 4.26 Have you Ever Received Hate SMS Text Messages?*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	57	28.6
No	142	71.4
Total	199	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

It was necessary to rule out that the fact that an individual had never received a text message was not linked to their inability/preference not to use their mobile phone for SMS texting. I established that not having received hate SMS text messages could be attributed to the preferred use of mobile phones for making phone calls rather than texting. The table below shows that the majority of those who have received hate

SMS text messages use their mobile phone for making calls (20.1% of the total), and only a small proportion of 11.6% and 9.5% use this means of communication for SMS messages texting and internet browsing, respectively (see Table 4.27).

*Table 4.27 Relationship between Receiving Hate SMS Text Messages and Type of Service used on Mobile Phone*

Have you ever received hate SMS text messages		Making calls	SMS texting	Internet browsing	Total
Yes	Count	40	23	19	57
	% of Total	20.1	11.6	9.5	28.6
No	Count	87	72	60	142
	% of Total	43.7	36.2	30.2	71.4
Total	Count	127	95	79	199
	% of Total	63.8	47.7	39.7	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.10.8 Monitoring/Filtering Internet and Mobile Texting for Hate Speech and Opinion that those Culpable should be Punished by Law and Mobile Phones Tracked for Security Purposes**

In an attempt to determine the predominant features of hate speech, I sought opinions from the respondents on tracking mobile phones. The relationship between monitoring/filtering internet and mobile texting for hate speech and the opinion that those culpable should be punished by law and mobile phones tracked for security purposes was established. The results indicated that 55.8% of those who agreed that mobile phones should be tracked for security purposes, further agreed that internet and mobile texting should be monitored/filtered for hate speech and those culpable punished by law. About 20.8% of those who were against tracking of mobile phones for security purposes agreed that internet and mobile texting should be monitored/filtered for hate speech and those responsible punished by law. The null hypothesis stated that mobile phone tracking for security purposes and monitoring/filtering mobile texting for hate speech and opinion that those culpable

should be punished by law were independent. The chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom was 19.828 and  $p$ -value was 0.000, which was less than 0.05 (95% confidence level). Since  $p < 0.05$ , I rejected the null hypothesis. I made the conclusion that the relationship between mobile phone tracking for security purposes and monitoring/filtering mobile texting for hate speech and opinion that those culpable should be punished by law are dependent (Table 4.28).

*Table 4.28 Monitoring/Filtering Mobile Texting for Hate Speech and Opinion that those Culpable should be Punished by Law and Mobile Phones Tracked for Security Purposes*

Do you think internet and mobile texting should be monitored/filtered for hate speech and those responsible punished by law?					
			Yes	No	Total
Should your mobile phone be tracked for security purposes?	Yes	Count	110	127	17
		%	72.8	64.5	37.0
		% of Total	55.8	64.5	37.0
	No	Count	41	70	29
		%	27.2	35.5	63.0
		% of Total	20.8	35.5	63.0
Total	Count	151	46	197	
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	
	% of Total	76.6	23.4	100.0	

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 19.828,  $p = 0.000$ .

#### **4.10.9 Hate SMS Text Messages and Government acting to curb hate crimes**

An investigation of the relationship between having received hate SMS text messages and the GoK acting to curb hate crimes established that 27.1% of those who had received hate SMS text messages agreed to the notion of the government taking action to curb hate crimes. Those who had never received hate SMS text messages who agreed that the government should act to curb hate crimes constituted 67.3%.

The null hypothesis assumed that having ever received hate SMS text messages and the view that the government should act to curb hate crimes are independent. The results concluded that chi-square statistic with one degree of freedom equaled 0.011, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.918, which was greater than 0.05 (95% confidence level). Since  $0.918 > 0.05$ , I determined that messages and government taking action to curb hate crimes were independent (see Table 4.29).

*Table 4.29 Hate SMS Text Messages and Government Acting to Curb Hate Crimes*

		GoK should take action to curb hate crimes			
			Yes	No	Total
Have you ever received hate SMS text messages?	Yes	Count	54	3	57
		%	28.7	27.3	28.6
		% of Total	27.1	1.5	28.6
	No	Count	134	8	142
		%	71.3	72.7	71.4
		% of Total	67.3	4.0	71.4
Total		Count	188	11	199
		%	100.0	100.0	100.0
		% of Total	94.5	5.5	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 0.011,  $p = 0.918$ .

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.10.10 Relationship between Government Acting to Curb Hate Crimes and Opinion that Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity**

I ran a cross-tabulation to establish the relationship between the government acting to curb hate crimes and opinions on whether hate speech encourages negative ethnicity. This was used to test the hypothesis that the government should act to curb hate crimes and opinion that hate speech encourages negative ethnicity are independent. I observed that the majority of the respondents who felt that the government should act to curb hate crimes also supported the view that hate speech encourages negative

ethnicity (88.9%). The chi-square statistic with one degree of freedom was 7.291 and the p-value was 0.007. Since  $p < 0.05$  (95% confidence level), I rejected the null hypothesis. I made a conclusion that government acting to curb hate crimes and opinions that hate speech encourages negative ethnicity are dependent (Table 4.30).

*Table 4.30 Relationship between Government Acting to Curb Hate Crimes and Opinions on if Hate Speech Encourages Negative Ethnicity*

			Do you think hate speech encourages negative ethnicity		Total
			Yes	No	
GoK should act to curb hate crimes	Yes	Count	177	11	188
		%	95.7	78.6	94.5
		% of Total	88.9	5.5	94.5
	No	Count	8	3	11
		%	4.3	21.4	5.5
		% of Total	4.0	1.5	5.5
Total		Count	185	14	199
		%	100.0	100.0	100.0
		% of Total	93.0	7.0	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with one degree of freedom = 7.291,  $p = 0.007$ .

*Source:* Researcher, 2016

#### **4.10.11. The Influence of National Heroes**

In my quest to establish whether the choice of national hero shapes youth ideology, I found that the vast majority of the respondents identify with politicians. The majority of the respondents identified national heroes (78%) from the multiparty era, 73.8% derived from the single party era, particularly those who fought to liberate Kenya from the colonialists; 4.8% were social activists; while 1.8% were religious leaders (see Table 4.31).



*Table 4.31 Kenyan Heroes of the Respondents*

Former Heroes	Responses		Percent of Cases
	N	%	
Single party era freedom fighters e.g., Jomo Kenyatta, Dedan Kimathi, Tom Mboya, J.M. Kariuki	124	46.6	73.8
Multiparty era politicians e.g., John Michuki, Njenga Karume, Wangari Maathai	131	49.2	78.0
Religious leaders	3	1.1	1.8
Social Activists such as sports/music stars	8	3.0	4.8
Total	266	100.0	158.3

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.10.12 Relationship between Role Model and Ethnic Group**

An analysis of the relationship between respondents' role models and ethnic group shows that there exists little ethnic disparity. Apart from Central and Nyanza regions, who identified with role models from their own ethnic groups, the rest of the respondents from other provinces identified with role models across diverse Kenyan ethnic groups (Table 4.32).

Table 4.32 Relationship between Role Model and Ethnic Group

Ethnic Group		Who is your role model in Kenya?										TTL
		Politician from Central	Politician from North Eastern	Politician from Eastern	Politician from Nyanza	Politician from Rift Valley	Politician from Western	Presenter	Religious leader	Politician from Coast Region	Politician from Nairobi	
From Central Region	Count	28	1	0	4	4	0	0	1	1	2	41
	%	47.5	50.0	.0	17.4	33.3	.0	.0	33.3	50.0	15.4	33.1
	% of Total	22.6	.8	.0	3.2	3.2	.0	.0	.8	.8	1.6	33.1
From North Eastern Region	Count	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	%	1.7	.0	.0	4.3	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	1.6
	% of Total	.8	.0	.0	.8	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	1.6
From Eastern Region	Count	15	0	2	3	1	0	1	0	0	1	23
	%	25.4	.0	66.7	13.0	8.3	.0	33.3	.0	.0	7.7	18.5
	% of Total	12.1	.0	1.6	2.4	.8	.0	.8	.0	.0	.8	18.5
From Nyanza Region	Count	6	0	0	11	2	4	1	1	1	6	32
	%	10.2	.0	.0	47.8	16.7	100.0	33.3	33.3	50.0	46.2	25.8
	% of Total	4.8	.0	.0	8.9	1.6	3.2	.8	.8	.8	4.8	25.8
Rift Valley Region	Count	5	1	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	3	14
	%	8.5	50.0	33.3	4.3	25.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	23.1	11.3%
	% of Total	4.0	.8	.8	.8	2.4	.0	.0	.0	.0	2.4	11.3
Western Region	Count	4	0	0	3	2	0	1	1	0	1	12
	%	6.8	.0	.0	13.0	16.7	.0	33.3	33.3	.0	7.7	9.7
	% of Total	3.2	.0	.0	2.4	1.6	.0	.8	.8	.0	.8	9.7
Total	Count	59	2	3	23	12	4	3	3	2	13	124
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
	% of Total	47.6	1.6	2.4	18.5	9.7	3.2	2.4	2.4	1.6	10.5	100

Source: Researcher, 2016

#### **4.10.13 link between introduction of competitive politics and rising incidence of youth violence**

Following the advent of multiparty elections in Kenya in 1992, elections were held after every successive five-year term until promulgation of a new constitution in 2012, which heralded the new devolved system of government with elections held in 2013. The analysis sought to determine whether the incidence of youth violence during elections was influenced by multiparty politics. I used Spearman's (D'Agostino et al., 2006) correlation to investigate this relationship due to the existence of ordinal variables. The analysis derived from the assumption that the variables under investigation have a normal distribution. I used the correlation to test the null hypothesis that when one variable, capturing politics/leaders, increases the other variable, capturing youth violence, also increases. For example, I hypothesized that as the opinion that the old guard in Kenyan politics should retire and allow the younger generation to lead increases the opinion that the system of governance has made jobless youth vulnerable to violence from hate speech also increases.

I observed the correlation coefficient as 0.213 at 0.01 level of significance. This indicated that the opinion that the old guard in Kenyan politics should retire and allow the younger generation to lead and the opinion that the system of governance has made jobless youth vulnerable to violence from hate speech were positively correlated; hence, this represented an increase in one, yet gives a corresponding increase to another. Their relationship was rather weak because other factors exist that make unemployed youths vulnerable to violence and due to the immense distribution of responses between strongly agree and agree.

The correlation matrix that I obtained indicates the probability of the occurrence of wrong answers. This would happen if the result includes an assumption that the relationship found in the sample represented an accurate reflection of the relationship. The relationship consisted between the older politicians in Kenyan politics, proceeding to retirement and allowing the younger generation to lead, and the system of governance, making jobless youths vulnerable to violence from hate speech in the population from which the sample was obtained. The probability equaled 0.003, which was less compared to the conventional threshold of  $p < 0.01$ ; thus, this answer supported the null hypothesis. Since a relationship exists (coefficient is greater than 0) and the correlation is positive, other researchers could generalize the results to the population at  $p < 0.01$ .

The negative correlation in all the variables, measuring the relationship between Kenyan politicians, is mindful of the welfare of the citizens. The various components, measuring youth involvement in violence, shows that an inverse relationship exists between them (as one increases, the other decreases). Existence of negative correlation coefficient in all the variables used to determine the relationship gave the impression that Kenyan politicians are not mindful of the welfare of citizens (see Table 4.33).

*Table 4.33 Link between Multiparty System of Politics and Incidence of Youth Violence*

Spearman's rank correlation	Kenyan politicians are mindful of the welfare of the citizens	The old guard in Kenyan politics should retire and allow the younger generation to lead	Most leaders in Kenya use hate speech during campaigns	The system of governance has made jobless youth vulnerable to violence from hate speech	Negative ethnicity is rampant in Kenya	If you do not belong to the ethnic group/s holding top leadership posts, your chances of success are slim	Most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups	The use of hate speech is more rampant today than ten years ago	Hate speech encourages violence	Youth unemployment and Economic difficulties contribute to youth violence	Nepotism is entrenched in the civil service and other organizations
Most leaders in Kenya use hate speech during campaigns	-.255**										
The system of governance has made jobless youth vulnerable to violence from hate speech	.213**	.255**									
Negative ethnicity is rampant in Kenya			.196**	.351**							
If you do not belong to the ethnic group/s holding top leadership posts, your chances of success are slim	-.196**		.220**	.368**	.168*						
Most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups	-.154*		.340**	.275**	.352**	.218**					

The use of hate speech is more rampant today than ten years ago			.256**	.190**	.339**	.268**	.261**				
Hate speech encourages violence		.224**	.274**	.359**	.365**	.279**	.336**	.241**			
Youth unemployment and Economic difficulties contribute to youth violence	-.143*	.153*	.189**	.238**	.312**		.245**	.226**	.439**		
Nepotism is entrenched in the civil service and other organization			.193**	.247**	.304**	.227**	.258**	.283**	.321**	.207**	
Unequal distribution of land has contributed to the poverty of some ethnic groups			.174*	.150*	.219**	.259**		.264**	.176*		.230**
The 2008 PEV could have been avoided if politicians did not incite the public		.144*	.276**	.285**	.154*		.312**		.395**	.287**	.146*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.14 Reasons Politicians Use Hate Speech during Campaign Rallies

I sought opinions from the respondents on the reasons politicians use hate speech during campaign rallies. 31% of the respondents stated that hate speech was used by politicians to gain political mileage and popularity, while 27.6% stated that the disunity among politicians provokes them into using hate speech. 24.1% of respondents stated in addition that hate speech is used for vote seeking; 6.9% said that it is used because it is an established trend; whereas, the rest of the respondents stated that it serves as a tool to discreetly pass information. Two other reasons mentioned were that politicians use hate speech because the common man likes it, and lastly because of tribalism (3.4% respondents in each case).

The observed high rate of the politicians using hate speech to gain political mileage and popularity may be associated with the disunity among politicians, and therefore the necessity to fend off competition from political rivals. The disunity among the politicians demonstrates their mistrust for each other, and shows that their liaison lasts only for as long as mutual gain exists. This also suggests that they are unlikely to unite on account of a noble cause (see Table 4.34).

*Table 4.34 Reasons Politicians Use Hate Speech in Campaign Rallies*

Reasons	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Political mileage and popularity	9	31.0
Vote seeking	7	24.1
An established trend	2	6.9
A tool for passing information	1	3.4
Disunity among politicians	8	27.6
Common man likes hate speech	1	3.4
Ethnicism	1	3.4
Total	29	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.16 Youth Participation in Politically-Incited Campaigns

I sought reasons for youth involvement in politically-incited campaigns from the sampled population, and 34.3% stated that they received financial incentives; 20% stated that it derived from poverty and ignorance of politics; 11.4 % that the youth are available; while 8.6% stated that the youth are idle. 2.9% of the répondants said that the youth serve as pillars for competition. I identified the financial incentives offered to youth as money, liquor, or other gifts in kind; hence, the researcher's contention that youth require education on politics so as to become politically responsible (see Table 4.35).

*Table 4.35 Reasons Youth are Prone to Involvement in Politically Incited Campaigns*

Factors	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Financial incentives	12	34.3
Poverty	7	20.0
Competition	1	2.9
Youth are pillars	1	2.9
Youth are available	4	11.4
Youth ignorance of politics	7	20.0
Idleness/unemployment/underemployment	3	8.6
Total	35	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### 4.10.15 Relationship between View that Politicians Should Give Incentives/Donations during Campaigns and Neighbourhood

In determining the relationship between the neighbourhood in Nairobi in which respondents reside and the opinion on politicians giving incentives/donations during campaigns, I executed a cross-tabulation. I observed that 4.6% of the respondents who agreed that politicians should give donations/incentives during campaigns were from the upper class; 27.8% derived from the middle class; 4.1% derived from low class; while 1% were from the informal settlements. The null hypothesis was that one's



neighbourhood in Nairobi and the opinion on politicians giving incentives/donations during campaigns are independent. I observed the chi-square statistic with three degrees of freedom was as 2.718, and the  $p$ -value equaled 0.437. Since  $p > 0.437$ , I did not reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, I concluded that one's neighbourhood in Nairobi and opinions on whether politicians should give incentives/donations during campaigns are independent (see Table 4.36).

*Table 4.36 Relationship between view that Politicians should give Incentives/Donations during Campaigns and Neighbourhood Class*

Neighborhood in Nairobi		Should politicians give incentives/donations during campaigns?		Total
		Yes	No	
Upper class	Count	9	9	18
	%	12.3	7.4	9.3
	% of Total	4.6	4.6	9.3
Middle class	Count	54	86	140
	%	74.0	71.1	72.2
	% of Total	27.8	44.3	72.2
Low class	Count	8	21	29
	%	11.0	17.4	14.9
	% of Total	4.1	10.8	14.9
Informal settlements	Count	2	5	7
	%	2.7	4.1	3.6
	% of Total	1.0	2.6	3.6
Total	Count	73	121	194
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0
	% of Total	37.6	62.4	100.0

*Note.* Chi-square with three degree of freedom=2.718 and  $p = 0.437$ .

#### **4.11 In-depth interviews in Kibera and Mathare Areas on Link between Hate Speech, Negative Ethnicity and Youth Violence**

In comparing the variables mentioned above, I observed that hate speech, negative ethnicity, and youth gangs are deep-rooted in the Mathare area by 62.5%. The table

and graph below shows that 60% of the respondents in Kibera agreed that hate speech, negative ethnicity and youth gangs played a critical role in instigating violence among the youth. About 37.5% of the respondents agreed that hate speech and ethnic animosity also contributed towards the high rate of youth violence in the country. This is evident from the resentment displayed for each other using phrases such as '*wale watu, hao watu*', which respondents frequently used (see Table 4.37).

Table 4.37 Kibera and Mathare Areas

Category	Frequency	Kibera		Mathare	
		Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency
Hate Speech and Ethnic Animosity	6	40	6	37.5	
Hate Speech, Negative Ethnicity and Youth Gangs	9	60	10	62.5	
Total	15	100	16	100	

Source: Researcher, 2016

Below figure includes a graph representation of these areas.




Figure 8: Kibera and Mathare areas.

Source: Researcher, 2016

#### 4.11.1 Hate Speech and Ethnic Animosity in Kibera and Mathare

In Kibera and Mathare areas, hate speech and ethnic animosity are evident from the clear boundaries segregating ethnic groups, with each community making every effort to confine themselves within their ethnic enclave. The differences are magnified through the unequal distribution of resources within neighbourhoods and ethnic communities' resentful reference to members of rival communities as '*wale watu, hao watu*' (those people). Many youth who are disillusioned and feel sidelined by their politicians resort to illegal activities such as drug trafficking and prostitution, and many eligible voters have vowed not to participate in future elections. This view is shared by many youth from ethnic communities whose leaders are in the opposition as expressed by one resident:

For us, there is no benefit of voting. Whether we vote or not, it does not make a difference to our lives. We still go without work, even without food. Even those politicians who we voted for last time, I have never seen him again since he won elections. Again he is waiting for the next election to come back and cheat us that we should fight for him so he can bring change but he will damp us again like before, so life goes on. There are those who are lucky enough to come from the right tribe, those ones who get the jobs and all the fruits of independence. Just look at that side, you will see a big difference. There is civilization on that end, but with us, we still live in the reserve and we have to take care of ourselves (28-year old, male, Kibera).

In Mathare, respondents identified negative ethnicity and hate speech through the media as a tool that was used to foster violence. Said one resident:

These people who allowed vernacular radios are the ones who made a mistake. You know they are talking about you and planning all sorts of bad things and yet you are right there and you cannot prove it because you do not speak the language. When their politicians come to address them, you know they have a secret plan by how they behave even if you can't understand what they are saying (33-year-old, male, Mathare).

Although Kariobangi South was not one of the hotspots of PEV, tension remained high and ethnic communities who felt under threat had to take turns to keep vigil in case violence spread into the neighbourhood. In apparent reference to the politicians, one resident observed:

They have spoilt this country. Things will never be the same again. Although it looks peaceful we are always tense and never sure what could happen next, especially now that elections are about to come again. You cannot trust anyone. We have to always be ready for anything (29-year-old, female, Kariobangi South).

Residents argued that the government has made little effort to empower the youth and criticized the '*Kazi kwa Vijana*' initiative as purely a public relations exercise. Violent ethnic conflict intensified due to heightened tensions between the major ethnic communities, leading to the displaced victims fleeing, many of whom lost their homes and have never returned because of fears that the area remains volatile.

It is claimed that generating income is a major challenge in the area, for the reason that only those commercial enterprises owned by the ethnic community predominantly resident in the area can be allowed to thrive. One ethnic community was forcefully evicted from the area during the PEV.

#### **4.11.2 Hate Speech and Negative Ethnicity through Youth Gangs as perceived by the 2008 PEV Victims**

The study found that Kibera still suffers tension long after the PEV with youth gangs founded on ethnic orientation. The area is characterized by high levels of poverty and illegal youth gangs offer protection to residents emanating from their own ethnic communities and their business interests, despite not being remunerated. The residents on the other hand appreciate this protection and feel indebted to the gangs. During the PEV there was widespread looting, murder, rape, and eviction resulting from ethnic hostilities and rivalry. Respondents also highlighted that the gangs are affiliated to certain politicians to further their agendas.

In Mathare, negative ethnicity is evidently still rife and is blamed as the main cause of violence. Respondents say that the PEV started with tension between the major ethnic communities in the area. In the wake of the PEV, socio-economic spaces became solidly defined through artificial boundaries demarcating ethnic residency zones and residents admit that the main ethnic communities who fought each other during the PEV still bear great animosity against each other. In Mathare, the Kikuyu are identified with Mlango Kubwa, Luo with Mathare No. 10, Kamba with Huruma and Somali with Eastleigh. Likewise, in Kibera, the Luo dominate Kianda, Raila Village, Kisumu Ndogo and Gatwekera, the Luhya reside mainly in Mashimoni and Lindi, the Kikuyu in Laini Saba and Soweto, while the Nubian community is confined to Makina. A resident from the Luo community stated:

I have been here for many years, but it is not good now. These people are taking everything. Kenya is for everyone, not for some few people only. I have to move away, it is bad. These people are bad (34-year-old, male, Mathare North).

Respondents give the main reason fuelling animosity as the unfair resource distribution including ethnic favoritism in employment and credit advancing by financial institutions. Negative ethnicity is evident with bad blood between ethnic communities affiliated to the major opposing political parties. It is alleged that private land previously owned by the Kenya Railways was sold at undervalued rates to senior personnel serving in the Kenya Air force. Respondents claim that youth gangs were hired by these owners to retaliate after their houses were looted and tenants displaced. Although no formal vigilante groups exist, youths yearning for economic empowerment usually fall prey to the machinations of politicians, who are eager to manipulate them for personal gain. There was consensus among respondents that politicians manipulate these groups for political gain. Youths in the area have vowed not to vote in the next general elections and are lobbying for other youths to follow suit.

#### **4.12 In-depth Interviews from Students' Ethnic Affiliated Associations**

I conducted interviews from randomly selected students at the UoN and TU-K to establish any diverse views on whether they have any deep-rooted biases resulting from negative ethnicity or its enhancement through the ethnic affiliated associations. I selected a study of four major ethnic communities to represent other ethnic communities. These included Kikuyu community, Luhya community, Kalenjin community, and Luo community.


The process of data analysis involved consolidating the views of the respondents into the identified categories. I completed this to accurately capture the individual interviewee's perception and avoid imposing the researcher's own meaning on participants. The results indicate that the students' association at the institutions are heavily involved in activities that propagate hate speech, youth violence, and ethnic animosity, as recorded by 62.5% of the responses. I attributed this to the secret meetings held between student leaders and the politicians, during which money is often offered as an incentive for students to campaign for certain candidates during elections. Results showed that hate speech and negative ethnicity is not as deep-rooted in these student associations, and I recorded it as 43% in one institution. I attributed this to the short period of election campaigns in which hate speech and negative ethnicity are eminent (see Table 4.38).

*Table 4.38 Percentages of these Areas*

Category	Kikuyu		Luhya		Kalenjin		Luo	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Hate speech, youth violence and ethnic animosity	5	62.5	3	60	3	60	4	57
Hate speech and negative ethnicity	3	37.5	2	40	2	40	3	43
Total	8	100	5	100	5	100	7	100

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

Below figure is a graph representation of these areas.



*Figure 9: Graph of Hate Speech.*

Source: Researcher, 2016

#### **4.12.1 Perceptions of Students' Ethnic Associations on Hate Speech and Negative Ethnicity**

On Hate Speech and Negative Ethnicity, it was noted that all the sampled four ethnic communities' leaders routinely hold meetings with their association members every week to deliberate on issues affecting their social lives, with politics often driving the

agenda. However, they all concede that hate speech and negative ethnicity distinctly emerge as predominant features over the electioneering period.

#### **4.12.2 Hate Speech, Ethnic Animosity and Youth Violence in Institutions of Higher Learning**

During in-depth interviews with student leaders from the Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, and Luo communities, I sought to establish the student leaders' views on the predominance of Hate Speech, Ethnic Animosity and Youth Violence in the institutions of higher learning. There was consensus that hate speech, ethnic animosity, and youth violence are predominant features of the student elections. The student leaders expressed resentment for the political leadership, and criticized them for lobbying purely for their individual community members, notably in the allocation of education bursaries. Additionally, the student leaders revealed that they are secretly recruited to campaign for certain political candidates during the general elections. The student leaders additionally decried the political leaders' reluctance to visit or address them at their institutions, inviting them instead to visit their offices at Continental House privately, where the politicians try to recruit them to support their political campaign bids by luring them with finances.

#### **4.13 In-Depth Interview on Mungiki Sect**

I conducted in-depth interviews using FGDs with up to five members of the Mungiki Sect to collect data on the group's operations within the Mathare neighbourhood. To corroborate these findings, I as well sought information on the Mungiki Sect on individual basis from randomly selected persons within the area of study who constituted three respondents each from within the Mathare area of study where



Mungiki's operations are pronounced, namely; Mathare North, Huruma, and Kariobangi South.

Mathare North is generally understood to be unsafe with hardly any security provided by the police. Residents warned us that getting home after 6pm is asking for trouble:

This place has its owners. Everyone here understands that. You can only trespass at your own risk. If darkness falls before you reach home, you better sleep wherever you are until the following day. Any valuables will be robbed from you, you will be raped if you are a woman and you will be lucky to live to tell your story. Many have left us that way (26-year-old, female, Mathare North).

We therefore had to plan interviews to terminate in the early afternoon, which made it difficult to secure interviews with residents who commute to work outside the neighbourhoods, thus often necessitating rescheduling, which resulted in inordinate delays. The interviews in the relatively safer Huruma and Kariobangi South areas however proceeded as planned.

Although the data collection technique employed (snow-balling) for the FGDs on Mungiki was the most appropriate given that the group is committed to safeguarding its members' identity, this in itself posed difficulties as they were unwilling to divulge the names of other members of the group due to fear of retribution by law enforcement agencies, despite my assurances of confidentiality. This meant that I had to invest extra time in several follow-up meetings to convince the leaders that mine did not involve a government mission. Another setback was the group's refusal to allow my planned audio recording of the interviews on grounds that they might be self-incriminating and could therefore be used as evidence against them. The group rejected appeals that these were purely for academic purposes, upon which a screening routine was established at the beginning of each session to ensure that no

recording was taking place. For the same reason, I had to dispense with some of the responses that I had previously anticipated.


The findings endorsed the view that the group has deep-rooted negative ethnicity by 41.2%. The reason for this could be the fact that the Mungiki sect membership is formed mainly of one ethnic group (Kikuyu). This is in itself not unique as other militant youth gangs that exist in the country mirror this policy. Ethnic animosity is also evident in the Mungiki sect (29.4%). This might be attributed to their focus on one ethnic group even in matters that they considered to represent public interest, such as empowering and providing security of businesses to the members (see Table 4.39).

*Table 4.39 Data Collected from Mungiki Members at Kariobangi, Huruma, and Mathare North*

	Mathare Area	
Category	Frequency	Percentage
Ethnic Animosity	5	29.4
Negative Ethnicity	7	41.2
Possible Solution on Negative Perspective on Mungiki	5	29.4
Total	17	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

Below figure is a graph representation of these areas.



*Figure 10: Mungiki members at Kariobangi, Huruma, and Mathare North.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.13.1 Ethnic Animosity and the Mungiki Factor**

My findings from the in-depth interviews with the Mungiki sect members revealed that in Mathare North, Huruma, and Kariobangi South, ethnic animosity by the members was evident, as exemplified by ongoing efforts to unify all the Kikuyu sub-tribes – Gikuyu, Embu and Meru - into a single ethnic community under one leadership. The sect is also keen on displaying the community's economic might through empowerment of members and as such it is alleged that members are spread all over the country, primarily engaging in protecting members' businesses and providing security. The sect members lament that the government perceives the group as a threat and portrays them as violent, failing to recognize the noble ideals for which the group stands. Mungiki has a strong cultural orientation in whose preservation they strongly believe. Media houses have published claims of meetings held between sect leaders and politicians, with the latter enjoying political support from Mungiki. However, the leaders were categorical that based on the group's constitution, their

support is strictly reserved for Mungiki members. A self-professed Mungiki member said:

What is wrong if we do our business by ourselves? We will work and grow stronger. We cannot die, because we are strong. We are the government here and the people want us. Even the politicians fear us. It is impossible to win the seat here without our support (24-year-old, male, Mathare North).

#### **4.13.2 Negative Ethnicity as Expressed by the Mungiki**

On negative ethnicity, the Mungiki sect has leaders in their hierarchy who are mandated to pass on critical information to members. These group leaders implement decisions and policies of the organization on behalf of the sect leader. The organization also offer their members leadership training, the transfer of entrepreneurship skills and knowledge on social lives particularly on the Kikuyu customary practice and are dedicated to improving the standards of living of their members, especially through education. Loyalty to the sect leader is of paramount importance.

The Mungiki sect members only vote as a block for a candidate who has been endorsed by the leadership command, to whom they give unequivocal support. Their engagement with the public is limited to business dealings, and members are bound by secrecy, sanctioned by an oath.

Mungiki members express concern that the government applies double standards in engaging with the group, occasionally warming up to members especially during political campaigns to mobilize votes only to turn around and use the same force against them when it has achieved what it wanted to secure a win. Sect members claimed that successive governments have been unfair by branding the organization as

a criminal gang and call for rapprochement and understanding the sect's grievances and intentions. A resident of Mathare North remarked:

To speak the truth, Mungiki is good. They help us sleep at night. It is better they stay here than police who are corrupt. My children go to school, I do good business, what is wrong if I give something like I give government for doing nothing? I have to think of my children (31-year-old, male, Mathare North).

#### **4.13.3 Is Mungiki Falsely Branded?**

Asked about the possible solutions on the negative perception that Mungiki has attracted, the members decried the government's attitude towards the group. Members suggest that the government should set up a fund to offer support to facilitate the group's continued pursuit of their noble goals and allow the group to operate freely. Emphasizing their role in community and youth development, the Mungiki insists that their group should be legalized and registered as a legitimate organization under the legal framework of other youth organizations.

#### **4.14 Secondary Data on Mungiki Sect**

To benefit from the rare resource of investigations done on this sensitive group, I previewed the available documentary material on the Ross Kemp videos, with a view the isolating any features that were consistent with the findings of my own research. This, in my view, would significantly enhance the validity of my findings as well as point to any inconsistencies or gaps in the existing material. The following sections include the significant elements of my findings.

##### **4.14.1 Secondary data on mungiki sect from Ross Kemp documentary**

I also collected secondary data, which aided in providing past information on the Mungiki sect. The information obtained from the Ross Kemp video recordings on the Mungiki Sect operations, corroborated my research findings on youth gangs


especially in the informal settlements. With a result of 71.4%, the investigative documentary by Ross Kemp revealed the shocking extent to which the residents have witnessed hate speech and negative ethnicity within the communities in which Mungiki operates. The government initially formed Mungiki with the aim of supporting community development, but this later changed purportedly for two reasons; first because of the negative perceptions of Mungiki by the government and secondly because the community violated an agreement on the payment on services offered to them by Mungiki. There was little opinion on hate speech and ethnic animosity contributing only 28.6% of the responses featured in the documentary. This factor might be because Mungiki represented initially a legal group, formed for a peaceful not-for-profit mission, and had expressed willingness to collaborate with the government if it grants the group official recognition (see Table 4.40).

*Table 4.40 Mungiki Sect by Ross Kemp*

Mungiki Sect by Ross Kemp		
Category	Frequency	Percentage
Hate Speech and Ethnic Animosity	4	28.6
Hate Speech, Negative Ethnicity and Youth Gangs	10	71.4
Total	14	100

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

Below figure is a graph representation of these areas.



*Figure 11: Mungiki sect by Ross Kemp.*

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.14.2 Hate Speech and Ethnic Animosity**

Secondary data on hate speech and ethnic animosity derived from Ross Kemp videos shows that Mungiki sect members are willing to pay the ultimate price in for their beliefs, which are anchored on the traditional customs of the Kikuyu ethnic community, focusing on unity, self-sacrifice, and power in numbers. The sect considers the Mau Mau movement as a source of inspiration and emulates their example.

#### **4.14.3 Hate Speech, Negative Ethnicity, and Youth Gangs**

Secondary data generated from the Ross Kemp videos reveals that most of the Mungiki members emanate from the Kikuyu community. Kemp further states that the original founders of Mungiki are of the view that the sect should go on a public offensive and expound on their noble ideals to avoid being vilified by the government. One of the leaders confesses that Kenya would suffer bloodshed if their leader is killed. She maintains that the government eliminates innocent members arguing that the group only counter-attacks when their rights are infringed upon and therefore they

have no qualms about retaliating. During the PEV, houses were burnt and thousands murdered. Respondents say that some people suspected that some Mungiki members were ferried to Eldoret in Lorries to wage war against the enemy.

According to the videos, members join the sect by taking an oath and leaving the group is punishable by death. Negative propaganda on the group was pronounced early in the millennium, following which the group was outlawed in 2003. It is claimed further that the income inequalities in Kenya played a critical role in the group's formation, which sought to bridge this gap. This might explain why most of its members emanate from humble backgrounds. Despite being criminalized and targeted by security agents, the recordings narrate that Mungiki mobilized the youth, controlled informal settlements and reduced violence and crime through social sensitization interventions targeting alcohol and drug dependency, thus giving the youth renewed hope. Among other positive qualities cited are the facts that when the group was first established in the informal settlements, they eliminated dangerous criminals who threatened the community's security and provided vital services to the communities including illegally tapping and distributing of electricity at subsidized rates and providing security. Mungiki helped to eliminate youth gangs in the Dandora neighbourhood in Nairobi through plastics collection, which reduced crime, however unfortunately, the proceeds often ended up being spent on drugs and alcohol. The group however proved dangerous when those who benefitted from their services failed to pay, because of which the culprits would be punished.

The Mungiki accuse the government of engaging in activities aimed at destroying the group, and claim that this is out of fears that the group's unity and increasing numbers could undermine and pose a threat to government authority. The sect members'



constant fear of retribution however, has not deterred them from their cause, and members have remained resilient in their pursuit of what they perceive to be justice.

#### 4.15 Secondary Data from Excerpts of CAPITAL TALK/ K24 TV Recordings

While the interviews from the excerpts were not formal or structured purposely to provide flexibility to capture diverse views and suit the unique environment in which the Mungiki sect operates, the overriding goal was to gather information from the leadership ranks. In this way, it was easier to access the Mungiki views on hate speech, causes of youth violence, and their link to elections. This gave rise to the variables under study that provided a basis for comparison; namely, this includes the cause of formation, main activity, role, and solution. The process of data analysis involved data clean-up, data reduction, and explanation. Data clean up involved editing and tabulation in order to detect any anomalies from the audio material, after which I edited the data for completeness and consistency.

*Table 4.41 Excerpts from Capital Talk/ K24 TV*

<i>Category</i>	
Cause of formation	Originated from a vigilante group in Molo in 1987, during the single party era. Was not designed to be Mungiki as known today, however after the Mau Mau war veterans hijacked it and made it a tribal outfit with the then government licensing it, it grew into a huge group attracting membership from the diaspora. Although poverty was the main reason for its formation it has since transformed into an umbrella of criminals after its original ideals were discarded.
Main activity	The movement's popularity has expanded given that it offers jobs, financing small businesses and the Dandora garbage dump that they control has become a source of livelihood for many. Offers education on social life including the Kikuyu customary way of life. The security it offers endears Mungiki to many who feel the government has failed in its social contract to provide security for citizens.
Role	Has no specific role because the wealthy use it to further personal gain. Pursue their normal activities of recruiting and business irrespective of whether it is illegal or not. Since Mungiki's influence continues to expand, its initial ideals have been hijacked by the wealthy political class who exploit the plight of the youth and use them to cause violence.
Solution	GoK should focus on the problems facing youths and dialogue with Mungiki leaders to agree on a solution to their problems instead of criminalizing the group. Economic inequalities should be addressed to stop formation of these gangs. System of political campaigns has to change so that political class stops misusing the youth for political mileage.

*Note: Adapted from [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v+JT\\_24jOWI0M](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v+JT_24jOWI0M).*

#### 4.16 Objective Three: Perspectives on Hate Speech Eradication

The third objective included assessing the challenges associated with eradicating hate speech and youth violence in the Kenya's elections. Information for data analysis was collated from the University of Nairobi, Technical University of Kenya and the various informal settlements in Nairobi County, which included Mathare and Kibera. I collected the data from the respondents by use of in-depth interviews. Some frequencies in the responses exceed the total sampled population who participated because the questions included multiple ones. However, poor participation with regards to some questions that have less answers compared to the sampled population occurred because of missing values, eliminated during analysis.

##### 4.16.1 Awareness of Peace Initiatives

The results showed that 84.2% of the respondents from the sampled areas knew of the peace initiatives, while 15.8% were unaware of any peace initiatives in the area (see Table 4.42).

*Table 4.42 Awareness of Peace Initiatives in the Area*

Peace initiative efforts	Frequency	Percent
Yes	16	84.2
No	3	15.8
Total	19	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

##### 4.16.2 Effectiveness of Peace Initiatives

The majority of respondents from the areas sampled were of the opinion that the existing peace initiatives were ineffective (57.1%), while 42.9% of the respondents stated that they seemed effective (see Table 4.43).

*Table 4.43 Effectiveness of Peace Initiatives*

Peace Initiatives Effective	Frequency	Percent
Yes	6	42.9
No	8	57.1
Total	14	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.3 NCIC Role in Enhancing National Cohesion**

The researcher further sought to establish the role of the NCIC in eliminating hate speech. 75% of the respondents stated that NCIC had not done enough, 16.7% underscored that NCIC must nurture other arms of the government, while 8.3% were of the view that the NCIC has met its objective. The missing responses included those who had heard of the NCIC, but were not fully aware of its role (see Table 4.44).

*Table 4.44 NCIC Role in Enhancement of National Cohesion in Light of Nationwide Hate Speech*

NCIC role	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Not doing enough	9	75.0
Needs to be nurtured by other arms of the government	2	16.7
It is meeting its objectives	1	8.3
Total	12	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.4 Sustainability of Ongoing Peace Initiatives**

Based on the research findings, a large proportion of the sample felt that the peace initiatives undertaken in the area were not sustainable. Most respondents abstained from this question, giving the reason that they did not feel the impact or effectiveness of any of the peace initiatives; hence overall, the respondents have little faith in the success or sustainability of the peace initiatives (see Table 4.45).

*Table 4.45 Sustainability of Ongoing Peace Initiatives*

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	No	3	100.0
Missing	System	17	
Total		20	

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.5 Sustainability of NCIC**

Based on the research findings, the role of NCIC is believed to be unsustainable at 83.3% against 16.7% who considered it sustainable. A few respondents did not answer the response to this question, the rest stating that were not fully aware of its role (see Table 4.46).

*Table 4.46 Sustainability of NCIC*

NCIC sustainability	Frequency	Percent
Yes	2	16.7
No	10	83.3
Total	12	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.6 Shortfalls of Peace Initiatives**

I identified the shortfalls of peace initiatives as inadequate resources at 40%, 20% named constant wars among the youth, and 10% stated that no formal programs existed among the youth with politics to blame (see Table 4.47).

*Table 4.47 Shortfalls of Peace Initiatives*

Short falls	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Inadequate resources	4	40.0
No formal programs for continuity	1	10.0
Constant wars among the youth	2	20.0
Politics	1	10.0
Ethnicism	2	20.0
Total	10	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.7 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech**

A number of challenges to eliminating hate speech among politicians were identified, namely; 36% felt that the youth are subject to the manipulation of politicians and the elite; 16% blamed poor knowledge of politics among the youth; 12% cited lack of cooperation between the GoK and the youth and ethnicism; 8% stated that there were no clearly defined terms of hate speech and that politicians and the judiciary are corrupt; while 4% of the respondents stated that there is poor implementation of the set peace initiatives and that political incitement is prevalent (see Table 4.48).

*Table 4.48 Challenges to Eliminating Hate Speech*

Challenges	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Politicians and judiciary are corrupt	2	8.0
Bullying by politicians and elite	9	36.0
Lack of cooperation between GoK and the youth	3	12.0
Poor implementation of set peace initiatives	1	4.0
Political incitement	1	4.0
Ethnicism	3	12.0
No clearly defined terms of hate speech	2	8.0
Lack of education among the youth	4	16.0
Total	25	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

Given the contextual differences involved in in-depth Interviews as explained under the Qualitative research methods in Chapter 4, I found it necessary to separate the following component during the analysis phase of this study, particularly given that different data collection instruments were used on the sampled population. In eliciting information from the residents who were victims of the 2007/8 PEV, interviews were conducted on individual basis from randomly selected persons sampled from different locations albeit within the scope. These comprised 18 youth from Kibera and 20 from Mathare North, most of whom have been involved in election violence. I also interviewed 7 youth from Kariobangi South to provide comparison between those neighbourhoods perceived to be violent and relatively peaceful neighbourhoods. The main variables under study that provided the basis of comparison were hate speech, ethnic animosity, negative ethnicity, and youth gangs. The process of data analysis involved several stages namely; data clean-up, data reduction, and explanation. Data clean up involved editing and tabulation in order to detect any anomalies in the responses and assigning specific numerical values to the responses according to the main variables under study to provide a further analysis. I edited completed questionnaires for completeness and consistency. I listed the responses from open-ended questions to obtain proportions appropriately; I then reported the responses by descriptive narrative. I used frequency tables, percentages, and charts to present the findings.

#### **4.16.8 Steps to eliminating hate speech**

The steps to eliminating hate speech enumerated included Students' Ethnic Associations the view that dialogue should be initiated with victims of hate speech for solutions; peace programs should be facilitated from the grassroots; wars among the youth should be eliminated; the administration officers should not foster enmity; mass

education is necessary; laws should be amended and perpetrators convicted; and equal treatment of perpetrators is necessary. I equally rated each response at 14.3% (see Table 4.49).

*Table 4.49 Steps to Eliminating Hate Speech*

Steps	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Seek views from victims of hate speech on possible solutions	1	14.3
Facilitate peace programs from the grassroots	1	14.3
Eliminate wars among the youth	1	14.3
Administration officers should not foster enmity	1	14.3
Educate the masses	1	14.3
Amend the law and arrest/convicting perpetrators	1	14.3
Treat perpetrators equally	1	14.3
Total	7	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.16.9 Changing Campaign Strategy to Exclude Ethnic Cleavages**

In seeking to establish from the respondents why the politicians found it difficult to change their campaign strategy to exclude ethnic cleavages, 52.4% of the respondents stated that the politicians and the electorate are accustomed to this style of politics; 19% view it as a good strategy for seeking votes; 14.3% stated that finances are required for change; 9.5% stated that the strategy has mass appeal and attracts large numbers to campaign rallies; and 4.8% stated that ethnic rivalry exists as a phenomenon and therefore the strategy is inevitable (see Table 4.50).

*Table 4.50 Reasons Politicians Cannot Change Campaign Strategy to Exclude Ethnic Cleavages*

Reasons	Responses	
	Frequency	Percent
Politicians and electorates are accustomed to this style of politics	11	52.4
Strategy to seek votes	4	19.0
Finances are required for change	3	14.3
Strategy attracts large numbers to campaign rallies	2	9.5
Ethnic rivalry	1	4.8
Total	21	100.0

*Source: Researcher, 2016*

#### **4.17 Conclusion**

The research findings validate the hypothesis that hate speech contributes immensely in entrenching negative ethnicity and point to the fact that discourse in competitive politics plays a key role in promoting the twin elements of hate speech and negative ethnicity, which have ultimately proved to be the springboard for youth violence in Kenya. Thus, the recurrent use of hate speech by politicians and those in authority has emerged a formidable tool for promoting negative ethnicity to advance personal goals over Kenya's multiparty era. Because Kenya's political class is so divided along ethnic lines, the use of hate speech to foment negative ethnicity during elections to mobilize voter support can quickly degenerate into violence. However, why is it that the instruments of this violence are the youth?

The interviews presented above reveal the many factors contributing to youth participation in election violence. Nevertheless, more importantly, they expose the drastic effect that hate speech by politicians has brought to bear on the common mwananchi (Kenyan citizen), which manifests itself well beyond the electoral period and has become the reality of present day Kenya.

Observed one youth leader in Kibera, "In the past, no one cared which tribe you come from, but today people must ask you first before engaging in any interaction. This has made people uneasy of revealing their surname to strangers or visiting areas considered to be of a different political following from that of your tribe". This demonstrates how negative ethnicity has given rise to self-censorship generated by fear of being vilified based on ethnicity.



Based on my findings, electoral violence is more pronounced in opposition strongholds. As well, the hate speech discourse is less prevalent in areas where ethnic identity is less entrenched and common practice in areas with one dominant ethnic group, encouraging intra-ethnic interaction. Ethnic violence was as such worst in Kibera and among other ODM strongholds during the PEV, which changed the ethnic composition not just in the countryside but as well of many neighbourhoods in the capital Nairobi. There was consensus among youths that many youth gangs are “sponsored by politicians.” Many of the youth gangs have formidable networks and are hired by politicians to mobilize ‘supporters’ to attend their rallies so as to give the impression that they have a huge following. The youth in the informal settlements admit that they are recruited using money from politicians to engage in mobilization of the youth during political campaigns. In addition, several respondents claimed that Mungiki’s dominance in the transport sector was ‘sponsored’ by rich businesspersons, with whom they share a decisive proportion of their financial proceeds from the lucrative transport industry.

As opposed to other informal settlement gangs, such as the predominantly Luo Siafu gang in Kibera, “Mungiki are the most expensive to hire because they are the most effective...they deliver what they promise and therefore have greater bargaining power”, said a respondent in Kibera. The lavish lifestyle of some Mungiki members has been a point of discussion by many analysts.

Due to disillusionment with the current crop of politicians, the vast majority of youth interviewed were of the view that the old guard should retire and pave way for the new generation of youth to lead. For youth, it would appear that ethnicity on its own is not a major concern but manifests itself more among the older generation. When

asked whether intermarriage and social interaction occurs between ethnic communities, most respondents agreed that in present day Kenya, intermarriage between different ethnic groups is common. This provides evidence that external influence has played a part in inciting negative ethnicity among the youth. Said one respondent, “I am a Kisii, my wife is Kikuyu and my sister is married to a Kalenjin and this has never been a problem. My best friend who is like a brother to me is a Luo and he too is married to a Kikuyu.” Another respondent remarks, “My son calls all our friends ‘Uncle’ and ‘Aunty’ and I doubt that he is even aware that many are not our own tribe!”

However, another respondent underlined that the view among the older generation is quite different,

There were silent rules within tribes on which tribes one could intermarry and which you could not. My forefathers were very strict on this. Those who disobeyed were ostracized by their families and tribe and often had to migrate to urban areas where they would hide their shame. as a Luo, marrying a Kikuyu was taboo and was considered a curse to your family.

Based on these findings, it would appear that whereas the youth might themselves harbour no ethnic hatred, the older generation who constitute the political elite, have exploited their authority to indoctrinate the youth and hand down the culture of negative ethnicity.

In an attempt to investigate hate speech, I considered several variables, providing a number of significant findings. Poverty, unemployment, and idleness have led youths to desperation, where they will do just about anything to earn them enough money to see them through the day. Because jobs are hard to find, youth are often forced to be innovative by forming organizations that ‘sell’ certain services such as washing cars at strategic locations in the Nairobi County, such as markets, bars and car parks. Some

in the informal settlements also engage in theatre and music production to generate income. Nevertheless, not all are strong enough not to succumb to the criminal path.

“Youth here in Kibera have fallen prey to drugs, alcohol and crime out of desperation because of lack of jobs,” one respondent said as we passed by a teenager lying motionless by the roadside. The sight of youth lying unconscious and in drunken stupors is not uncommon here. Many youths will spend their day drunk and nighttime carrying out any activities that will earn them money for drugs and alcohol - a vicious cycle.

Although hate speech finds expression through numerous channels in the rapidly expanding media environment in Kenya, the results demonstrate that its prominence among the Kenyan youth is most pronounced through choice media such as social media platforms on the internet. As such, popular social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter today play a critical role in the spread of hate speech among the youths. The findings however reveal that in the Kenyan scenario, mobile phones were hitherto hardly used for spreading hate speech; hence, most respondents in the research had no objection to mobile phone tracking as a security precaution. However, with the debut of the smartphone in Kenya and the subsequent popularizing of its WhatsApp facility particularly given its cost-effectiveness, this definitely becomes a new channel for scrutiny. Whereas evidence pointed to the use of selected vernacular radio station to foster ethnic animosity during the PEV, more recently established radio stations also emerged as a potential source of hate speech, particularly channels perceived as popular by the youth such as those playing pop music. Music also plays an essential role in communication and a link was established between avid music fans and those agitating for a cause, a fact that could favour those inciting youth

violence by encouraging the spread of hate speech through music. On the contrary, the link between avid music fans and the desire for maintaining peace and order was weak.

Second, whereas the use of print media and television was determined to be insignificant, possibly because these are better established and stand to make huge losses should they be charged in court, the results however showed that television plays a significant role on youth violence through violence images. Third, I established that hate speech contributes immensely in spreading negative ethnicity. However, despite the negative picture painted by leaders from different ethnic backgrounds, there was insignificant evidence to support the notion that the relationships between friends/partners from a different ethnic group positively influence the voting patterns, with many respondents asserting that they would vote for a politician from a different ethnic group. I attributed this partly to the education that has been provided since the PEV through the radio stations on matters of ethnicity.

Fourth, youth unemployment emerged as a key concern contributing to the motivation for politicians to 'employ' youths as tools by to incite violence. The youth feel sidelined by politicians, and support the view that the old guard should retire and allow young people to lead. However, the youths expressed resentment for the current crop of politicians in Kenya claiming that the current system of governance has rendered youths jobless and vulnerable to violence. In addition, the youth claim that nepotism is rampant in the public service due to favouritism in job recruitment. There is consensus among the youth that those members of the ethnic group/s holding top

leadership posts have an undue advantage over the rest and enjoy unfettered access to employment and other public resources.

The study aimed at understanding Kenyan youth's life experience of their perception of conflict through the dominance of the political elite. Ways of manipulating the youth voting bloc during elections by using the youth gangs to mobilize voters, particularly by use of hate speech, thus formed a key concern of this study. Various youth expressed the view that politicians recruit them to support their political bids during elections, only to sideline them once in office. This aspect is critical to the study because of the notably increasing presence of militant youth gangs during Kenyan elections. The findings suggest that the youth's frustration has given rise to gangs, which entice them with the promise of a better future. The use of relevant benchmarks on the international platform formed a central part of the research; mass student movements and youth gangs being of particular interest in view of prevailing economic concerns encumbering youth in Kenya, which expose youth as an easy target for political manipulation.

The NCRC (2012) acknowledges that unless immediate steps are taken, Kenya may soon be overwhelmed by gangs and cites one of the factors blamed by respondents for lack of the arrest of criminal gang members as political influence. Support by some members in government and interference by some politicians feature under factors blamed for the unsatisfactory prosecution of members of the gangs (NCRC, 2012). Significantly, political antagonism and ethnic politics are highlighted as some of the factors that provide a conducive environment for the gangs to thrive.

Researchers argue that the frustrations visited on youth arising from unemployment and economic difficulties that they experience despite relatively high levels of education, and lack of representation in the country's political space, and corruption to name a few, are contributing to youth violence and the increasing number of youth gangs in Kenya. It is noteworthy that virtually every low-income neighbourhood in the Nairobi capital is identified with its own youth gang, wielding immense power in their enclave albeit informally.

Government authorities have variously identified hate speech used during political campaigns and elections as a trigger for the proliferation of youth gangs; and youth gangs are a manifestation of youth violence. Given that they have "nothing to lose," youth in Kenya form an attractive constituency for politicians in the run up to elections. The Mungiki is one such gang that boasts a following in almost all parts of the country. Despite the founders of the group claim that it is driven by noble ideals based on the traditional values of their ethnic community, the misdeeds propagated by the members have incriminated the group. Recurrent cases of violence, robbery, and murder committed by the members have led to loss of trust in the group and necessitated the government's (police) intervention and severe punishment by law. Interviewees attribute the members' inexplicable allegiance to the group to the taking of an oath. Hence the view expressed by a decisive number of respondents that Mungiki has evolved into an organization whose sole objective would appear to be to undermine the existing government structures and take over governance of certain areas by instilling fear among residents particularly those from communities other than their own. The government was hence blamed for failure in its duty to provide security to its citizens with the informal settlements and lower class areas suffering the most from the consequences. Thus the argument that the respective communities

have been forced to similarly engage their own youth gangs, for guarding of their properties and businesses, a factor that has made these groups' role eminent in the informal settlements.

Fifth, I determined that the youth's involvement in political campaigns was due to varied reasons; namely, the availability of financial incentives, poverty, and poor knowledge of politics, lack of employment and idleness and competition. This would attest to the fact that the youth who engage in politically incited campaigns do so merely out of desperation rather than willingness.

“Youth here in Kibera have fallen prey to drugs, alcohol and crime out of desperation because of lack of jobs,” one respondent said as we passed by a teenager lying motionless by the roadside. The sight of youth lying unconscious and in drunken stupors is not uncommon here. Many youths will spend their day drunk and nighttime carrying out any activities that will earn them money for drugs and alcohol - a vicious cycle. In the circumstance, for years on end, the leaders have used incentives and donations during campaigns to control the youths, thus encouraging them to engage in acts of hooliganism. However, some community initiatives were identified in the informal settlements that seek to provide hope for the youth, notably the community radio station Pamoja FM in Kibera, which educates youth on such topics as avoiding drugs, teenage pregnancy, HIV/AIDs and advises against becoming members of gangs.

In the institutions of higher learning, the research revealed that violence is usually eminent during student leaders' elections and like their political mentors, students at the helm of leadership promote ethnic animosity by practicing politics of exclusion by

displaying ethnic bias in bursary allocations and encouraging academic competition based on ethnicity.

Notwithstanding the strong evidence that negative ethnicity exists in the institutions of higher learning, a notable element emerged highlighting the level of exposure as a predominant factor when considering the extent to which negative ethnicity influences their actions. Thus, a distinction could be traced between students emanating from the rural background and those from urban settings in that students from the rural set up tend to be more inclined to associate with their colleagues from the same ethnic community.

The findings reveal additionally that political leaders' campus visits are not necessarily motivated by an interest in the students, but rather are driven by selfish interest in anticipation of serving as a launching pad for their campaigns. The aftermath is typically a private meeting between students, leaders, and the politician at the latter's offices, where money exchanges hands to induce students to support their campaign bids. I established that political leaders are seldom invited to higher learning institutions to address students on topical issues relating to academics, the social welfare of the students and political and economic affairs. This points to an existing gap between the political leadership and the youth.

Sixth, I observed that the high incidence of politicians using hate speech for purposes of gaining political mileage could be associated with the cut-throat competition and rivalry among politicians arising from the numerous parties that are ethnically oriented, which have emerged over the multiparty era. The reasons suggested for this are that the politicians are accustomed to this campaign style, will use any method to



secure as many votes as possible, the justification that the use of hate speech is liked by many politicians, and because of ethnic rivalry.

Finally, according to the findings, the NCIC has proved largely ineffective, and respondents saw its role in eliminating hate speech as inconsequential, with little impact at the grassroots. The NCIC is considered unsustainable and the impact of the peace initiatives negligible. The challenges impeding the progress of the peace initiatives include a lack of adequate resources, constant wars among the youth, no formal programs among the youth, and political interference.

The reasons given for the failure to eliminate hate speech are poor knowledge of politics among the youth, ethnicism, lack of cooperation between the government and the youth, no clearly defined terms of hate speech, corruption of politicians, and the judiciary, no implementation of set peace initiatives and political interference. Differences were noted between gender perspectives in that the female respondents exclusively identified corruption by politicians and the judiciary and lack of education as concerns, while only the male respondents identified the lack of cooperation between the government and the youth and poor implementation of peace initiatives as concerns. Respondents also felt that peace programs facilitated from the grassroots stand a better chance of being successfully implemented as opposed to the current practice where initiatives are domiciled in the Nairobi capital. Other factors seen as decisive to the success of peace initiatives include incorporating the views of the victims of hate speech, elimination of wars among the youth, ensuring that the administration officers do not foster enmity, educating the masses, equal treatment of those found culpable and the need to amend the laws and ensure that perpetrators are charged and convicted.

There have been many attempts mainly by non-state organizations to educate youth. Faith based organizations have featured as a credible channel through which messages are disseminated to the youth. Virtually every church in Kenya has a youth group which participates in certain activities besides social activities such as choir and theatre and through which youth leadership training is offered. Although these provide hope, notably, most respondents underscored that politicians should be in the forefront of fostering healing among ethnic communities in light of the fact that they are the main agents provoking the spread of negative ethnicity in Kenya.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the key research questions, highlights the key findings of this study, focuses on the critical issues emanating from the research and provides the relevance of these findings as well as the contributions to the field of communication and its related policy streams within Kenya's political context. I propose direction for further research for those emerging areas perceived to be crucial for which literature is inconclusive.

The thesis provides insights into the ways in which various Kenyan leaders' ideologies expressed through hate speech, coupled with the society's own beliefs and values, have served to promote the youth's propensity to violence.

Based on the research questions, the study set out to fulfil three main objectives. It aimed at investigating the relationship between hate speech and ethnic animosity in Kenya and establish the predominant features of hate speech in Kenya; examining to what extent hate speech is responsible for entrenching negative ethnicity and a catalyst for the formation of youth gangs and youth violence during electoral periods in Kenya; and assessing the challenges associated with eradicating hate speech and instigation of the youth violence in Kenya's elections. The study associates with post-modernism and was conducted using mixed methods, with the quantitative phase taking precedence to generate baseline data, after which the qualitative phase followed to derive meaning through in-depth interviews and FGDs. My sample included a total of 200 students from the UoN and the TU-K, two purposively sampled ethnic affiliated students' associations. 17 residents from Kibera, 20 from

Mathare North and 7 from Kariobangi South neighbourhoods in Nairobi County. Five members of the Mungiki Sect were also identified through snowball sampling.

The thesis was presented in the following format. Chapter 1 included a background context, details of the problem statement, objectives, and justification of the study. Then, the second chapter included the literature review, setting the context of the study and underlining the core associated theories and gaps. Chapter 3 included the research methodology details and sampling methods. Based on the data findings presented in Chapter 4, the chapter included the potential harms of hate speech. I examined the direct and indirect effects of hate speech, and I considered how these significantly influence the Kenyan political scene, with the focus shifting to the possibility that hate speech is intrinsically harmful. The final part of Chapter 4 included a focus on establishing narrative evidence as importantly relevant to the issue of justifying hate speech legislation through qualitative analysis. Thus, Chapter 4 included providing evidence that the use of qualitative research is an essential ingredient in determining that individuals had surpassed the threshold of harm within specific expressions of hate speech.

## **5.2 Summary**

There is consensus that Kenyan communities generally get along across ethnic lines except during election campaigns when hate speech and ethnic animosity become dominant features of the of the campaign rhetoric; to the extent that it is seen as an essential feature of campaigns.

The thesis determines that a clash existed between the right to freedom of speech and other rights belonging to the community (e.g., personal security, dignity, or equality).

Although recognized as both a human right and civil liberty, communication that takes the form of hate speech can prove harmful in a number of ways. It can stir up emotions of hatred and legitimize acts of revenge. In addition, it can heighten feelings of insecurity or injustice, warranting the listener's direct intervention. It can further aggravate those already wary of a situation, albeit in relative dormancy, and convert them into active agents of retaliation. A case in point is the 2008 PEV in Kenya, during which the uniformed forces were also accused of being partisan along ethnic lines.

As attested through the in-depth interviews, many of the victims of the 2008 PEV will carry the scars of hate speech and negative ethnicity for a lifetime, a constant reminder being their displacement and other crimes that their ethnic communities were subjected to, including rape and murder. Fear still reigns over the prospect of a repeat over each successive election, aggravating ethnic hatred and animosity between warring communities based on political affiliation. Jenkins (2012) supports these study findings by highlighting the role of the political class in inciting the 2008 PEV. Jenkins (2012) identifies 'the autochthonous discourses of belonging and exclusion that engendered an understanding of ethnic others as 'immigrants' and 'guests', as the narratives of territorialized identity that both reinforced elite manipulation and operated independently of it', and notes that, 'the durability of these narratives, as well as their inherent plasticity, has significant implications for the potential for further violence and the prospects for democratization'. Thus, anyone who is perceived as non-indigenous is endangered within the environment where other ethnic communities are resident, making them prime targets. Of relevance to this study, within the prevailing political climate, the border territories where ethnic communities overlap are viewed as highly volatile and an easy target for political incitement through hate speech.

Indeed, many analysts have argued that the only reason that violence did not erupt as feared during the 2013 elections was that contrary to the history of Kenya's multiparty elections as introduced in 1992, the two of the larger tribes of Kikuyu and Kalenjin collaborated and vied for leadership under one umbrella. Hence, changes in the political party (read ethnic community) configuration of future elections could leave the country vulnerable and generate drastically different outcomes, for in Kenya, history has proved that there are no permanent friends or enemies in politics. The content of party manifestos is often strikingly similar across the political divide and therefore as long as the ethnic requirement is satisfied, any party can work with the next with each coalition being a near replica of the next. The reconfigured political coalitions would then determine on which side of the divide other ethnic communities position themselves.

The interviews on the 2008 PEV victims provide evidence that areas with a clear ethnic majority have higher potential for violence than those that are more ethnically diverse, where greater tolerance was experienced during the 2008 PEV. As Kenyan political parties tend to be ethnically driven, this also means that opposition strongholds have higher potential for the electoral violence. As such, Kibera and Mathare North which are dominated by the Luo and Kikuyu ethnic communities affiliated to opposing political parties, were hotbeds of political incitement through hate speech and suffered greater violence than the more ethnically diverse Kariobangi South. It is hence suggested that although the cases at the ICC may have faltered, they may have been useful in serving their purpose as a deterrent to forestall violence in the traditional hotspots during the 2013 elections, in light of which, precautions remain urgent if Kenya is to avert violence during future elections.

I aimed to provide a high standard of proof to establish whether a speech hate act is sufficiently harmful to justify legislation. This decision should derive from the corrosiveness of the expressions; however, it should also derive from the potential harm it may cause, whether or not the individual has the capacity to elicit a violent response. I argue that hate speech needs to be highlighted within the existing local laws and re-examined in isolation for a clearer definition. Article 33 of The Constitution of Kenya (2010) protects freedom of expression except pertaining to hate speech or the incitement of violence. In addition, the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008), criminalizes the use of speech that is “threatening, abusive or insulting” and where this behaviour intends to “stir up ethnic hatred” (p. 13). In addition, the Act states that media houses which incite “hatred” or “hostility” against a person or a group can be held liable (p. 27). These definitions are at best ambiguous and the application of these provisions therefore often tends to be discretionary.

Thus, a need exists to establish a clear demarcation, determining where free speech bridges into hate speech. I argued further that not all hate speech is equal. Without context, local definitions of hate speech might appear irrational. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the level of constitutional protection should vary depending on the nature of speech or context in which it occurs. This element seems fundamental to any emerging legal framework, particularly as it facilitates a more targeted approach to deal only with hate speech that is potentially more harmful, rather than adopting an inappropriate one-size-fits-all approach. I highlighted this link between context and legislation, as core to further research and study on the subject of hate speech.

The Waki Commission judicial report into Kenya's 2008 PEV stated, "Political rallies, vernacular radio stations, leaflets and mobile phone texting services had all been used by political and even religious leaders to transmit messages that contributed to the violence" (IRIN, 2012, para. 2). However, based on the research findings, little doubt exists that with the prevailing unfettered access to the social media, where speech is far less inhibited, this platform has become the most popular and secure medium for spreading hate speech. Expressions that people considered demeaning to sections of the population are used with reckless abandon on Kenyan social media platforms. Both Britain and France citizens have experienced prosecution Twitter users, using abusive language online, but enacting legislation outlawing online harassment, raises significant questions for countries, such as Kenya. This is especially true, given the capacity challenges associated with regulating and monitoring online speech. Hence, presently, this role remains the prerogative of individual administrators of the existing companies dominating social media.

Screening the internet for hate speech can only be possible with a clearer definition of hate speech. The definition needs to address two distinct but related aspects; first, the speaker's intent and second, the social consequences of their speech as determined by a number of complex factors including the historical, cultural and political context within which it is expressed. In this regard, the recent attempts by some internet companies exploring the possibility of deploying an algorithm to predict how likely a piece of content is to provoke violence in a specific region based on previous patterns (Rosen, 2013), is a mood in the right direction.

Overall, Kenyan politicians on both ends of the divide (government and opposition) have proved to be susceptible to hate speech. Furthermore, whereas elected Kenyan



politicians appear to favour more freedom of speech, unelected leaders in other arms of government, such as the judiciary and human rights advocates want it curtailed to address the potential negative effects associated with the hate speech vice. I argued that this lack of consensus between the different arms of government brought to naught the ongoing efforts to deal decisively with hate speech.

Ethnicity is a fraught issue in Kenya, given the numerous cases of hate speech increasingly dominating the country's political scene; however, as long as the government authorities fail to hold the perpetrators accountable by demonstrating that hate speech bears serious consequences, such as imprisonment, I can justifiably conclude that it will continue unabated. Hate speech allegations have led to an administrative response, but no corrective action. Kenya's acceptability of the ethnic prejudice and culture of ethnic violence is mirrored by Harris' (2003) reference to a particular form of social silence about racism in South Africa. Many consider the performance of the NCIC a waste of public resources, given the small number of cases going to court and no convictions. The only real fear inhibiting Kenyan politicians at present is limited to feeling shamed in the public domain. Many can handle this shame, particularly if they feel assured of simultaneously gaining popularity within their voter constituencies for ostensibly advocating for their community's rights above others. In this way, the politician adeptly attacks and scores in the name of the shared interests of his/her community. Hence, ultimately, it is the speaker, using the listeners to fulfil his/her own selfish gains.

These findings are consistent with the NCRC's (2013) revelation that some politicians support and receive support from organized criminal gangs. The NCRC also argues that since the structure of organized crime in Kenya appears ethnic in character, ethnic

support is crucial for it to thrive. As such, policy makers would be naively optimistic in providing solutions that do not hold politicians accountable.

Whereas the impact of other independent peace initiatives goes beyond the scope of this study, it is generally acknowledged that the youth should be the core target audience, of any peace initiatives in Kenya's case and that the digital platform promises the most success given its mass appeal at present time. Acknowledging this power of influence through the mobile, the Afroes Transformational Multi-Media and Consulting firm (AFROES) developed the HAKI digital game in partnership with selected development partners and government support after their research conducted after the 2008 PEV in Kenya revealed that experiential learning, simulation and games can influence mindsets and mental models (Githuku-Shongwe, 2012). Anne Githuku-Shongwe, founder and CEO of AFROES, says that the choice to use digital games to promote national cohesion in Kenya after the PEV was influenced by the fact that the mobile has surpassed radio use in much of Africa, and therefore mobile games are seen as a powerful tool for reaching masses. The HAKI mobile games seek to address stereotypes and misinformation that ultimately lead to youth violence. The goal is to change the belief systems of the youth by shaping their mindsets and change the way they perceive their context. Such initiatives affirm the growing influence of the digital platform and its power therefore as a tool for intervention, particularly among the youth who emerge under the Kenyan scenario as a key target group for peace initiatives.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

The findings of this study corroborate my theory that a number of fundamental interlinkages exist between hate speech, ethnic cleavages and youth violence that have remained indiscernible, either due to conceptual constructs or due to lack of sufficient

research on the relationship between these phenomena. The study determines that the Critical Race Theory (Derrick Bell, 1980s) holds in the Kenyan context by virtue of the fact that ethnicity is a dominant factor in the country's political and social discourse, making it easy for hate speech to thrive and encouraging repression of those ethnic groups perceived to be inferior. Further, the findings support the conclusion that interventions addressing hate speech are likely to be ineffective if they fail to comprehend the attendant contextual factors.

First, the study determines a causal link between hate speech and youth violence during political campaigns and elections. In Kenya, hate speech is the result of ethnic cleavages and has been used to influence youth perceptions on ethnicity. There is evidence that a cycle of violence has erupted persistently during multiparty system electoral periods in Kenya, over which time hate speech becomes a predominant feature of the political discourse. Whereas negative ethnicity tends to consistently prevail, its expression through hate speech is most pronounced over the electoral period, heightening tensions and often inciting youth violence. Notably, based on the research findings, ethnicity would appear not to significantly influence the personal relationships of the youth, few are members of any political party and as such their participation in political violence is seen as financially motivated. Many youths hold the view that hate speech encourages ethnic cleavages.

Second, the findings of the research also confirm that youth gangs have gained prominence over electoral periods, during which they become popular agents of politicians sharing their ethnic orientation, who intent on gaining political mileage promote negative ethnicity through hate speech. The research identifies the key channels of hate speech as radio whose pop music Kapuka is popular with the youth,

television through violence images, and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which enjoy mass appeal among the Kenyan youth. The findings however isolate politicians as key agents of hate speech and negative ethnicity as elections draw nearer, although through snowballing, the discourse extends its effects far beyond politics, adopting a life of its own by drawing in regular citizens and impinging on their daily lives. Hence in this scenario, hate speech cuts across all ethnic communities in Kenya and impacts virtually every citizen who is a subject of ethnic cleavages as evidenced by the research findings. In addition to the communication component, this research is important for those in the field of conflict prevention and peace building, as these conflicts are destabilizing to the goals of peace and stability. The findings point to the emergence of the burgeoning youth bulge as a critical concern on which the country's leadership must turn its focus. Many have witnessed the dire consequences of ignoring this phenomenon in other countries, which despite exhibiting a relatively satisfactory economic performance, still experience unexplained internal civil strife. Heinsohn (2007) contended that irrelevant of the cause, when 15 to 29 year olds make up over 30% of the population, violence tends to happen, the situation worsening, as larger proportions are under 15. He noted that of 67 countries with youth bulges, 60 of them underwent civil war or mass killings, highlighting that of the 27 biggest youth-bulge nations, 13 derive of Muslims. For instance, analysts could not explain why in Pakistan, civil conflict remains a problem in spite of a steady growth in per capita income in 1979 to 2007 from PPP600 to 2,600. However, many failed to recognize that the growth did not match the rapid demographic growth over preceding years. This was especially true since 1950, resulting in a youth bulge, which meant cut-throat competition for the fewer jobs and opportunities available. Despite the fact that youth have a higher

propensity for violence, this factor visited anger and frustration on the young populace, meaning they could easily join radical groups and terror organizations.

I provide evidence that the youth bulge alternative provides a plausible explanation for the increasing incidence of youth violence, contrary to views that only poverty has played a significant role. The NCRC (2012) acknowledges the prevailing poverty levels and unemployment amongst the youth to be the principal underlying cause of the proliferation of organized criminal gangs. Idleness provides the impulse for delinquency. This points to the vulnerability of youth influencing their ease of recruitment by the political elite in the context of Kenya's political campaigns. Given Kenya's youth bulge, this underscores the scale of the problem and therefore the urgency for policy interventions. Through violence, the youth vent out frustrations visited on them by a myriad of other factors, including historical injustices in the distribution of resources, lack of jobs, opportunity, inheritance, political marginalization, recognition, social standing, and prestige, among others. The findings of the research suggest that in using hate speech, these factors serve as a pretext for politicians to incite youth to violence. Poverty does not satisfactorily explain youth violence, as some of the wealthy nations experience youth violence, as evidenced in the Muslim World. Neither does the Malthusian scramble for scarce resources theory make sense when one considers El Salvador's political killings of the 70s and 80s, which happened despite increasing economic prosperity. A fertile breeding ground for ethnic mobilization arose out of the discovery of crude oil in Turkana County in March 2012, notwithstanding the potential geopolitical and economic benefits. Potential conflicts related to the distribution of the Turkana County oil resource exploitation proceeds seem reminiscent of the paradox of the 'Resource Curse' (Le Billon, 2005) experienced by a number of African countries including Algeria, Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan.

Thirdly, the study identifies key challenges associated with eradicating hate speech in Kenya and highlights a number of imperatives to constitute the reform agenda if hate speech is to be eradicated. It emerges that although free speech is embedded in the Kenya constitution's Bill of Rights, the government would do well to address a number of critical factors that curtail other rights of citizens, such as those associated with hate speech. Notwithstanding the challenge that hate speech legislation poses for constitutionalists, in my view, this would effectively pave way for the protection of other fundamental rights and freedoms that are guaranteed to citizens by the Kenya constitution. This is consistent with the view of Heyman (2008), who demonstrated that "the rights-based theory provides a useful framework for debating difficult issues such as hate speech" (p. 20).

Kenya is a signatory to many international agreements that advocate against hate speech, among them, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which demands that nations prohibit, "advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence" (United Nations Human Rights, 1976, para. 3). Hate speech violates the most fundamental right human beings have of equality. In the wake of concerns that imminent flaws in Burundi's selection process threatened the future stability of the nation, Pablo de Greiff (2012) commented on these issues. The UN Special Rapporteur warned, "The governing political party and its youth militia use violence, threats, gross limitations of press freedoms and hate speech to deliberately intimidate people and to obtain a particular electoral outcome" (Greiff, 2012, p. 31). This supports Heyman's (2008) assertion, "The controversy over hate speech cannot be resolved purely on the level of legal theory or doctrine but must play out in the political arena" (p. 21). In a democracy, such as Kenya, besides denouncing hate speech consistently, a public

debate involving politicians from across the divide could serve as a critical first step to assessing the community's needs. Therefore, it should precede the enactment of any hate speech laws, so that leadership uses citizens' views to determine the adopted legislation. Besides inclusivity and ownership, this consensus is necessary for building traction for the implementation of any new hate speech laws.

Further, the definition of hate speech, as it stands in the Kenyan law, is too broad, making prosecution difficult. Based on the evidence provided by this research, prosecution appears discretionary at present, as proving that an expression is hate speech is a frustratingly difficult endeavour for the complainants – the targeted individuals – given the unique contextual intricacies and accompanying interpretations in each instance. Although the 2010 Constitution specifically highlighted that the freedom of speech did not extend to hate speech, its shortfall included that it failed to define the term (Orago, 2013). Based on the public debate in Kenya over hate speech and the authorities' inability to convict any of the perpetrators, it is improbable that politicians will temper their language; in regard to which the outcome of the case involving eight lawmakers from both the ruling party and opposition ranks popularly dubbed 'the hate speech eight' who were arrested in June 2016 over accusations of incitement to violence seemed unlikely to lead to conviction. Jubilee MPs Moses Kuria, Ferdinand Waititu, Kimani Ngunjiri and ODM's Johnson Muthama, Junet Mohamed, Aisha Jumwa, Timothy Bosire and Florence Mutua argued misinterpretation of the law as grounds for dismissal of their case. Therefore, a clearer definition of hate speech will be key to the success of any legislation aimed at curbing the vice. This definition will be useful in providing a high standard of proof to determine whether the speech in question is harmful. One may see this solution as necessary, particularly given the impending 2017 elections. Jorgic (Reuters, 2015) says that despite a rise in ethnically

charged hate speech threatens the electoral process in Kenya, the country still plans to hold the 2017 presidential and parliamentary elections on Aug. 8. States Jorgic:

Kenyan parliament has passed strict laws banning hate speech to prevent a repeat of the 2008 PEV, but politicians are often blamed for stirring animosity in a nation where tribal loyalties trump political ideology.

The findings of this study underscore the urgency of new legislation sufficiently effective to halt this disturbing trend. Commenting on the 2008 PEV, KNCHR Chief Human Rights Officer Ms. Linda Ochiel (Quoted in Quist-Arcton, 2008) stated:

MPs and campaigners used a lot of hate speech. We are saying that hate speech is one of the things that has terrorized communities in Kenya along ethnic lines and led in one way or another to the violence that is happening in the country...if we had top state speech legislation that prohibits hate speech in Kenya, then this sort of infighting and inflammatory messages would not have happened.

Hence for as long as ethnically inspired inflammatory speech by Kenyan politicians continues unabated, it poses a serious threat to the country's peace and stability.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

This research makes a number of important contributions in the fields of communication and development. First, it validates an existing body of research, which advances the need for new policy imperatives to deal with the threat that hate speech poses to national cohesion and prevailing ethnic polarization in Kenya and provides sufficient proof that the existing tools are in themselves insufficient to decisively address the problem. Indeed, past efforts to curb hate speech and negative ethnicity have not yielded the desired outcomes, as evidenced by the increasing cases that are highlighted in the media. The hate-speech policy needs to determine concrete guidelines to determining and categorizing hate speech along with simple action steps to pursue thereafter.



Second, from a policy viewpoint, these findings are deemed a useful addition to the body of literature for researchers and practitioners in the development field; in light of the inherent link between peace and development. Some analysts have voiced opposition to the regulation of hate speech, arguing instead for its preservation as a valuable pre-warning of escalation of conflict before the eruption of violence, without which ethnic hatred might be manifested directly into violence. Another opposing view would suggest that eradicating hate speech might conversely serve as acknowledgement that certain communities are in fact inferior to others. I however hold the view that Kenya's national capacity to meet its social contract with its citizen's remains compromised as long as hate speech by the political class, a prime cause of conflict, is not effectively addressed. Chuma (2012) identify political manipulation as one of the key reasons why many developing countries are unable to manage intra-state conflicts effectively, the results which could be private or group justice undermining national development efforts. This link between conflict and development is all the more important given the contradiction that development in and of itself generates conflict by impacting dynamics relating to the equitable distribution of resources and power, resulting in conflict thus reversing development gains. This view is consistent with the findings of this research, which highlight the fact that the participants' views on hate speech are shaped by ethnic tensions emanating from historical burdens and cultural considerations, which together influence their social constructs. Thus, context emerges as central for policy makers seeking to unravel the recurrent cycle of ethnic violence in Kenya's scenario. From a postmodern perspective, the bureaucratic top-down approach is obsolete, as is the one-size-fits-all standard. I argue that Kenya's case is unique, demanding a unique prescription. As exemplified by the PEV, the dominant top-down perspective oversimplifies the dynamics of ethnocentric politics that have obscured the local level agency and the complexity and ambiguity of identity con-

struction. To the extent that postmodernism in and of itself suggests that any solution should be tailored to a certain point in time rather than permanent, Kenya's government will need to take cognizance of the diverse range of competing demands within the prevailing environment in present time Kenya, in its quest to curb hate speech. Broad support at the grassroots will be a priority in this regard, negating the normative top-down approaches that have been preferred in the past.

Thirdly, the findings as well underscore the role of communication and the media as principle agents of the peace derivative in Kenya. The study reinforces media, as a highly trusted source in Kenya and to effectively deal with hate speech without engaging with the media would be foolhardy, in light of which peace journalism has emerged as a priority. Notwithstanding the risk to objective reporting associated with self-censorship (ICG, 2013, p.10), more resources need to be expended on media training in Kenya to shape reporting practices and empower them to raise awareness on matters of hate speech and negative ethnicity. Says Myer (2008) of young broadcasters on commercial radio stations:

The lack of training of broadcasters' means that they are often unaware of the power their words have - what may seem like a light-hearted remark in the studio can be taken by some groups to be highly offensive and provocative. Furthermore, because they are often inexperienced, they are unable to properly question, contextualize and balance the views of partisan politicians, particularly when live on-air.

According to Oriare and others (2010, p.55), almost 81 per cent of Kenyan audiences trust the media as fair and accurate. Given this influence of the media on Kenyan audiences, the media's potential as a driver of change cannot be underestimated, thus underscoring the value of Peace Journalism as interventionist i.e., media can be used for evil or for constructive social purposes (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 31). However, caution should be taken to ensure objective reporting, notwithstanding pursuit of responsible reporting as research has demonstrated that a free press is one of the most

effective drivers of peace (GPI, 2009). Investigations conducted by the Kenya Independent Review Commission after the PEV found the Kenyan media culpable of fanning ethnic hatred (Final Consolidated Report, 2008, p. 99-100). Among interventions that resulted, include the National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008) which states that media houses which incite “hatred” or “hostility” against a person or a group can be held liable (p. 27) and in the wake of elections the Media Code of Conduct which urges for caution and restraint in a manner which is conducive to the creation of an atmosphere congenial to national harmony, amity and peace (Media Council Act, 2013, p.14).

Fourth, given that unprecedented developments in information exchange have given rise to a new global culture and the reality of the explosion of its influence on the Kenyan youth, this study highlights this dimension as core to any emerging policy on hate speech. The increasing role of mobile and digital technologies as tools for spreading hate speech in Kenya's case highlights this aspect as key to any lasting solution. With reference to the role of the internet and mobile phones in promoting viral hatred during Kenya's 2008 PEV, Goldstein & Rotich (2008) state, “while digital tools can help promote transparency and keep perpetrators from facing impunity, they can also increase the ease of promoting hate speech and ethnic divisions” (p. 2).

A few companies today wield an alarming amount of power over free speech on the internet. In reference to Google, Twitter and Facebook, Rosen (2013) underscores that the positions young tech executives of these companies hold have given them the power over who gets heard around the globe “than any politician or bureaucrat-more power, in fact, than any president or judge”. Facebook alone has over one billion users. Whereas a hands-off approach to hate speech on the internet may appear legally

sound, caution is advisable in Kenya's case where extreme liberties could have ramifications that severely undermine sustainable peace and stability efforts, not only within its borders but in the regional context as well. Notwithstanding the temptation of abuse by authoritarian regimes seeking longevity, unless the online communication giants such as Google, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube can be persuaded to negotiate standard enforcement guidelines for online hate speech including blocking local access to content wherever necessary, it could be a while before any other lasting solution is found. The positive attributes for establishment of robust regulatory mechanisms notwithstanding, one has to be conscious particularly in cases of autocratic and repressive regimes of the risk of undue censorship.

Fifthly, the study determines that the existing strategies aimed at curbing hate speech in Kenya fail to integrate other critical contextual factors that underpin youth participation in violence during elections, in light of which the need to explore opportunities unique to Kenya's context emerges paramount. Establishing a nexus between the youth bulge and youth violence, the study affirms that unless checked, Kenya's bludgeoning population is a looming threat to the country's stability, not merely on the economic, social, or political fronts, but also from a security perspective. Nevertheless, even if the youth bulge might be a transitional phenomenon, as some analysts have claimed, appropriate interventions must be sought to counter the potential consequences in the interim, concurrently with efforts to curb the high population growth rate.

Sixthly, the reconciliation initiatives have failed to effectively curb negative stereotypes and reconstitute new mental concepts of other ethnic communities as expressed through hate speech toward target groups. Specifically, the question of the PEV vic-

tims continues to haunt the Kenyan populace. Overall, the reconciliation process following the PEV has seemed unsuccessful in burying inter-ethnic hostilities in Kenya, despite the multitude of initiatives and funding extended by development partners. Pursuant to the 2008 PEV, a great proportion of the population still emotionally carries the burden, carries a grudge, and carries hatred against other ethnic communities. The findings of this research remain important, particularly as researchers continue to expend numerous resources in their quest for understanding the cause of youth violence in many of the world's troubled areas.

In light of these concluding reflections, a multidimensional strategy that addresses not just hate speech, but rather a variety of other factors, is thus considered a prerequisite for effectively addressing the youth violence problem of in Kenya. The study underscores that Kenya must seize this moment to secure the destiny of its next generation.

### **5.5 Remaining Questions and Suggestions for Further Research**

Although this research has answered some key questions with regard to hate speech and its propensity to stir negative ethnicity and youth violence, it has provided direction for areas requiring further research by raising some important questions.

This study establishes that a fine line exists between what is considered hate speech and what is not, with a myriad of contextual factors contributing to the subject's mental constructs that then uniquely influence their perception. There is limited existing material on the definition of hate speech in the Kenyan context and as such, a detailed analysis on this intricate aspect is thus recommended for future study. More empirical research required at the local level on the mental constructs of identity and ethnic cleavages that lend hate speech currency. As Featherstone (1988) stated:

While learned references to the characteristic experiences of postmodernity are important, we need to work for more systematic data and should not rely on readings of intellectuals. In effect we should focus upon the actual cultural practices and changing power balances of those groups engaged in the production, classification, circulation and consumption of postmodern cultural goods (p.5).

As hate speech is a culturally based discourse, my study calls for a non-normative approach in determining the catalytic role that hate speech plays in inciting violence within Kenyan politics. Kenyans themselves are best placed to devise solutions and any external researcher has to contend with a more inclusive approach by working in collaboration with locals, who are more familiar with the context. As Myers (2008) notes, “the obscure and metaphorical language used makes monitoring and control much more difficult” (p. 8).

As well, the explosive scenario arising from the convergence of the two phenomena of hate speech and youth violence and the solutions as purveyed by this study, warrants deeper interrogation by scholars to further validate the suitability of the proposed policy interventions.

Kenya would benefit from wider discussions on the shortcomings in its jurisprudence to curb infringements on free speech. I share Waldron’s (2012) view that the legislature, rather than the courts, should spearhead public policy formulation on hate speech, but disagree to the extent that his arguments exclude the internet, where most hate communication is encountered, and where therefore unfettered regulation could most significantly undermine the democratic principles of free speech that are guaranteed by the constitution. However, although this approach promises some result, it is limited in scope given that it fails to address online media content which is the most challenging, yet most influential within the prevailing Kenyan context. The solution lies in Kenya’s democratic government’s capacity to embrace policies to monitor and

regulate free online speech, while still upholding the rights guaranteed by the constitution. This equally applies to the proposed establishment of a media code of conduct for local journalists. Hence, the government has to provide the burden of proof that regulating speech that appears to invoke hatred is not tantamount to suppressing free speech but rather promoting democracy. Conversely, this policy has long been used by repressive governments for muzzling its critics and the opposition to ensure regime longevity. In the specific context of this study, the link between the speech and the potential violence has to be clear, providing proof that it is inflammatory.

To conclude, this study on hate speech has significant implications for the potential for further violence during elections in Kenya vis-à-vis the establishment of democratic processes. Political exclusion can reinforce violence as a normal feature of the electoral process (Birbir 2007) but equally, unless the phenomena of hate speech during elections is squarely addressed, Kenya's government will find it difficult to check the increasing power of politicians to incite youth violence over the coming election years. This becomes all the more important because ensuring peace and stability will be critical to Kenya's ability to attain sustainable development as articulated in the Kenya Vision 2030 and meet other globally agreed goals such as the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.

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
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### Appendix I. Map of Nairobi County



## Appendix II. Ethnic Groups in Kenya

### Kenya Ethnic Group 2009 Census

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>2009 Population</b>
1	KIKUYU	6622576
<b>2</b>	<b>LUHYA</b>	<b>5338666</b>
3	KALENJIN	4967328
<b>4</b>	<b>LUO</b>	<b>4044440</b>
5	KAMBA	3893157
<b>6</b>	<b>KENYAN SOMALI</b>	<b>2385572</b>
7	KISII	2205669
<b>8</b>	<b>MIJIKENDA</b>	<b>1960574</b>
9	MERU	1658108
<b>10</b>	<b>TURKANA</b>	<b>988592</b>
11	MAASAI	841622
<b>12</b>	<b>TESO</b>	<b>338833</b>
13	EMBU	324092
<b>14</b>	<b>TAITA</b>	<b>273519</b>
15	KURIA	260401
-	<b>OTHER AFRCAN</b>	<b>244866</b>
16	SAMBURU	237179
<b>17</b>	<b>THARAKA</b>	<b>175905</b>
18	MBEERE	168155
<b>19</b>	<b>BORAN</b>	<b>161399</b>
20	BASUBA	139271
<b>21</b>	<b>SWAHILI</b>	<b>110614</b>
22	GABBRA	89515
<b>23</b>	<b>ORMA</b>	<b>66275</b>
24	RENDILE	60437
<b>25</b>	<b>KENYAN ASIAN</b>	<b>46782</b>
26	KENYAN ARAB	40760
-	<b>ASIANS</b>	<b>35009</b>
-	TANZANIA	34511
-	<b>UGANDA</b>	<b>33022</b>
27	ILCHAMUS	27288



-	<b>EUROPEAN</b>	<b>27172</b>
28	SAKUYE	26784
<b>29</b>	<b>BURJI</b>	<b>23735</b>
30	GOSHA	21864
<b>31</b>	<b>TAVETA</b>	<b>20828</b>
32	WALWANA	16803
<b>33</b>	<b>NUBI</b>	<b>15463</b>
34	DASENACH	12530
<b>35</b>	<b>GALLA</b>	<b>8146</b>
36	GALJEEL	7553
<b>37</b>	<b>WAAT</b>	<b>6900</b>
-	AMERICAN	6014
<b>38</b>	<b>LEYSAN</b>	<b>5941</b>
39	NJEMPS	5228
<b>40</b>	<b>KENYAN EUROPEAN</b>	<b>5166</b>
	RWANDA	3805
	<b>BURUNDI</b>	<b>3755</b>
41	ISAAK	3160
<b>42</b>	<b>KENYAN AMERICAN</b>	<b>2422</b>
43	KONSO	1758
	<b>AUSTRALIAN</b>	<b>719</b>
	CARIBBEAN	112
	<b>TOTAL-54</b>	<b>37999995</b>

(\*None Kenyan Ethnic Groups NOT Ranked) Source: KNBS, 2009

## Appendix III. Research Authorization Letter

REPUBLIC OF KENYA



### NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Telephone: 254-020-2213471, 2241349  
254-020-310571, 2213123, 2219420  
Fax: 254-020-318245, 318249  
When replying please quote  
secretary@ncst.go.ke

P.O. Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI-KENYA  
Website: www.ncst.go.ke

Our Ref: **NCST/RCD/14/012/725**

Date: **20<sup>th</sup> June 2012**

Sophie Akola Mukula  
Moi University  
P.O.Box 3900-30100  
Eldoret.

#### RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Hate speech and its role in instigating youth violence during Kenya's multiparty era,*" I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi Province** for a period ending **31<sup>st</sup> December, 2013.**

You are advised to report to **the Provincial Commissioner and the Provincial Director of Education, Nairobi Province** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

  
**DR. M. K. RUGUTT, PhD-HSC**  
**DEPUTY COUNCIL SECRETARY**

Copy to:

The Provincial Commissioner  
The Provincial Director of Education  
Nairobi Province.



## Appendix IV. Questionnaire Sample

Please tick the correct answer:

### Personal Background

- 1) Gender                      Male ( )                      Female ( )
- 2) Age                              16-20 ( )      21-25 ( )              26-30 ( )      31-35 ( )
- 3) Level of Education  
     Basic ( )    Secondary/High School ( )    College ( )    University ( )
- 4) Religion: Christian ( )    Muslim ( )    African Traditional ( )  
                   Atheist ( )    Other ( ) Specify
- 5) Neighborhood in Nairobi County (Specify)  
                   Upper Class ( )                      Middle Class ( )  
                   Lower Class ( )                      Informal Settlement ( )
- 6) Ethnic group (Specify)

### Social Interactions

- 7) What sort of social activities do you engage in during your leisure time?  
     1. Sports ( )  
     2. Arts/Music ( )  
     3. Other ( ) Specify
- 8) Are you a member of any youth association?  
                   Yes ( )                      No ( )
- 9) Are you a member of any student association?  
                   Yes ( )                      No ( )
- 10) Do you have any friends who are not from your ethnic group?  
                   Yes ( )                      No ( )
- 11) Is your partner/girlfriend/boyfriend/spouse from your ethnic group?  
                   Yes ( )                      No ( )

### Politics

- 12) Are you a member of any political party?  
                   Yes ( )    No ( )
- 13) Have you ever participated in election campaigns?  
                   Yes ( )    No ( )
- 14) Have you ever agitated for any cause?  
                   Yes ( )    No ( )

15) Would you vote for a political candidate who is not from your ethnic group?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

16) Should politicians give incentives/donations during campaigns?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

### **Entertainment**

17) Name three of your favorite local musicians

18) Which is your favorite local TV Station?

19) Which are your two favorite Kenyan radio channels?

20) Which local daily newspaper do you read (if any)?

21) Name three of your heroes in Kenya

### **Social Media**

22) How often do you use a computer?

1. Everyday ( )
2. More than thrice a week ( )
3. Less than thrice a week ( )
4. Rarely ( )

23) What do you use a computer for?

1. Studies ( )
2. News ( )
3. Social networking – Facebook/Twitter ( )
4. Entertainment ( )

24) Do you have a Facebook/Twitter account?

25) What service do you use your mobile phone for most?

1. Making calls ( )
2. SMS texting ( )
3. Internet Browsing ( )

### **Hate Speech and Violence**

26) Should your mobile phone be tracked for security purposes?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

27) Have you ever come across hate speech on the internet?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

28) Have you ever received hate SMS text messages?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

29) Do you think internet and mobile texting should be monitored/filtered for hate speech and those responsible punished by law?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

30) GoK should act to curb hate crimes.

Yes ( )                      No ( )

31) Have you ever been involved in any peace initiative? If yes, specify.

Yes ( )                      No ( )

32) Do radio presenters educate on matters of ethnicity?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

33) What has been the impact on the youth of violence images on Television?

1. Positive                      2. Negative                      3. No impact

34) Do you think hate speech encourages ethnicism (tribalism)?

Yes ( )                      No ( )

Pick one of the following options for the next questions:

1. Strongly Agree (SA)
2. Agree (A)
3. Not Sure (NS)
4. Disagree (D)
5. Strongly Disagree (SD)

### **Politicians/Leaders**

35) Kenyan politicians are mindful of the welfare of the citizens.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

36) The old guard in Kenyan politics should retire and allow the younger generation to lead.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

37) Most leaders in Kenya use hate speech during campaigns.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

38) The system of governance has made jobless youth vulnerable to violence from hate speech.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

39) The chosen leaders do not have to be of my choice.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

### Impact of Ethnic Cleavages

40) Negative ethnicity (tribalism) is rampant in Kenya.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

41) If you do not belong to the ethnic group/s holding top leadership posts, your chances of success are slim.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

42) Most Kenyans use stereotypes to judge other ethnic groups.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

43) The use of hate speech is more rampant today than ten years ago.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

44) Hate speech encourages violence.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

45) Youth unemployment and economic difficulties contribute to youth violence.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

46) Unequal distribution of land has contributed to the poverty of some ethnic groups.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

47) The more educated one is, the less likely it is that they will be involved in violence.

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

48) The 2008 Post-election violence could have been avoided if politicians did not incite the public?

1. SA                      2. A                      3. NS                      4. D                      5. SD

49) The 2008 Post-election violence made ethnic communities more cohesive.

True ( )

False ( ) Link

### Appendix V. In-depth Interviews Schedule

#### A. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR LIVED EXPERIENCE OF 2008 PEV VICTIMS

1. Is the violence during the past elections due to poor governance, or because of negative ethnicity?
2. Do you think the distribution of the national cake is a contributing factor to election violence? *Explore: Land, Water, Social amenities, Opportunity, Jobs*

1. In your opinion, have politicians contributed to inciting violence?

If yes, explain how. *Explore: Hate speech, financing violence, ethnic cleansing to gain political mileage*

.....  
.....

2. Between hate speech and negative ethnicity, which do you consider the main cause of the violence?

Please give reasons.....  
.....  
.....

3. Do you still experience ethnic hatred or animosity?
4. Is there fairness in the resettlement of PEV IDPs? Explain.
5. Do you think devolution will serve to create cohesion between warring ethnic communities?
6. Do you think the coming elections might be violent?

Please give reasons for your answer.....  
.....  
.....

7. Please state areas that you believe the GoK should improve before the elections are held to ensure peace?.....  
.....  
.....

8. Please mention all the national cohesion initiatives that you are aware of and comment on why they have either been effective or not.

.....  
.....

9. Have these national cohesion efforts addressed pertinent issues concerning ethnicity?.....

Give reasons for your answer.....  
.....

10. Please mention anything else that you think the GoK should do to promote national cohesion? Explain.....

.....  
.....



**B. INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STUDENT LEADERS OF ETHNIC  
AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS**

1. What benefits have you realized from this association?
2. Does your association engage with politicians?
  - a) Do you enjoy patronage from any politician?
  - b) Do you invite politicians from your ethnic community to address students' forums? If yes, on what subject?
3. Have you either hate speech or negative ethnicity in this institution?
4. How about nepotism? If yes, please state where and how it should be addressed.
5. What is your opinion on the granting/issuance of students' bursaries/loans:
  - a) Is it fair?
  - b) Granted on the basis of politics?
  - c) Granted on the basis of ethnicity?
  - d) Any other (please state)
4. Are the association members registered voters?
5. Does the association participate in politics/elections? How?

c) **FIELD INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE MUNGIKI SECT**

1. What are the ideals of the Mungiki sect? Does the group
  - a) Protect the rights of citizens?
  - b) Advocate for equitable distribution of resources?
2. What type of activities is Mungiki engaged in?
3. Do you think the Mungiki sect should be allowed to be involved in politics? Why?
4. Does Mungiki subscribe to male youth alone? Any specific age group?
5. Does the Mungiki sect comprise of only one ethnic group? If yes, why?
6. Is the Mungiki sect affiliated to any politicians or political party?
7. Has the group ever received any assistance/donations from politicians?
8. Has Mungiki sect been involved in violence during politics?
9. Do you think GoK should recognize Mungiki? Why?