

**KENYA - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ON
NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM**

BY

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DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

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DEDICATION

I hereby wish to dedicate this work to my beloved family members; Mother Emily, wife Vellician, daughter Gidionale, Phoebe, Rebbie and son Elvis, and Japheth for their unfailing moral support during the entire period.

May Almighty God bless you abundantly.

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ABSTRACT

Globally, terrorism attacks has affected over 163 out of 195 sovereign states with a total population of 99.6 percent of the world population lives being disrupted necessitating concerted partnership among states and other stakeholders to counter the menace. Kenya and the USA have had cordial and enduring partnership since Kenya attained her independence in 1963. In 2018, this relationship was elevated to strategic partnership with mutuality of interests on; defence, civilian security, multilateral and regional issues. The purpose of this study was to examine the Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism. The study was guided by the following specific objectives; to explore and to expound the nature of the Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership; to assess the effects of the Kenya- United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership on Kenya; and to find out the challenges faced by Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership. The study adopted a Retroductive research strategy, pragmatism philosophical paradigm, and a mixed research design. The study was informed by Social Constructivism theory of international relations. The research site was Nairobi where the target population was chosen purposively from diplomatic missions of the horn of Africa states, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Kenya. A sample size of 101 was derive from a population of 136 by use of Yamane (1967) formulae. Questionnaires and interview schedule was used to collect primary data while secondary data was derived from document analysis. Qualitative data was analysed thematically and presented through narration while quantitative data was analysed descriptively with the aid of Statistical Package of Social Sciences and presented through tables, frequencies, and percentages all of which were corroborated with secondary data to yield logical conclusions. This study found that; counterterrorism strategic partnerships are both bilateral and multilateral in nature which is achieved through reproduction of state power. The effects of the Kenya-USA Counterterrorism Partnership in the short run had a negative impact on Foreign Direct Investment, Tourism flow, Security expenditure, unemployment, and profiling of populations on religious grounds; in the long run, however, a positive impact was realized since the partners had contained the terrorist group. The challenges encountered in counterterrorism are; youth unemployment, political instabilities of Kenya's neighbours, use of improvised explosive devices, prolonged and severe inter and intra-state conflicts within the horn of Africa region, role of international community, challenges in balancing relations between East and Western interests in Kenya, and, western interests in Kenya. The study concludes that; the Kenya-United States of America strategic counterterrorism partnership on national counterterrorism was informed by cordial relations for mutuality of interest, the nature of partnership is both bilateral and multilateral, the effects on counterterrorism yielded positive outcome in the long run as there was increase in foreign direct investments, tourism, employment, and religious tolerance. However, there was increase in security expenditure as the partners engaged security apparatus to counter the menace. The study recommends that Kenya and the United States of America and all other stakeholders should forge an enduring partnership and an array of domestic and international institutions to successfully combat terrorism in Kenya.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | | |
|----------|---|---|
| AFRICOM | - | Africa Command |
| AGOA | - | African Growth and Opportunity Act |
| AMISOM | - | African Mission in Somalia |
| ANC | - | African National Congress |
| API/PNR | - | Advanced Passenger Information/ Passenger Name Record |
| APU | - | Afghan Partner Unit |
| AQIM | - | Al-Qaida Islamic Meghreb |
| AST | - | Acute Stress Disorder (AST) |
| ATA | - | Anti-Terrorism Agency |
| ATSG | - | Automated Targeted System-Global |
| ATPU | - | Anti-Terrorism Police Unit |
| BSD | - | Bilateral Strategic Dialogue |
| BDS | - | Bureau of Diplomatic Security |
| BOPA | - | Budget Outlook Paper |
| BSP | - | Budget Strategy Paper |
| CAR | - | Central Africa Republic |
| CFT | - | Countering the Financing of Terrorism |
| CIA | - | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CID | - | Central Intelligence Division |
| CSDP | - | Common Security Defence Policy |
| CT | - | Counter Terrorism |
| CTPF | - | Counterterrorism Partnership Fund |
| CRS | - | Congressional Research Service |
| CJTF-HOA | - | Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa |
| DOD | - | Department of Defence |

| | | |
|-------|---|---|
| DHS | - | Department of Homeland Security |
| DMI | - | Directorate of Military Intelligence |
| DPPA | - | Department of Political and Peace building Affairs |
| EAC | - | East Africa Community |
| EACTI | - | East African Counterterrorism Initiative |
| EUCAP | - | European Union Capacity building in Somalia |
| EUTM- | - | European Union Maritime Security |
| EIJM | - | Eritrean Islamic Jihadist Movement |
| EUCOM | - | European Command |
| FMF | - | Foreign Military Financing |
| FDI | - | Foreign Direct Investment |
| GCF | - | Global Counterterrorism Forum |
| GTI | - | Global Terrorist Index |
| GSPC | - | <i>Groupe sulphite la Predication et le combat</i> |
| GOK | - | Government of Kenya |
| GDP | - | Gross Domestic Product |
| HOA | - | Horn of Africa |
| HOAR | - | Horn of Africa Region |
| IGAD | - | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development |
| IMSI | - | International Mobile Subscriber Identity |
| IMSC | - | International Mobile Subscriber Catcher |
| ISB | - | Increase in Security Budget |
| IRGC | - | Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps |
| ISAF | - | International Security Assistance Force Mission |
| IGADD | - | Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development |

| | | |
|---------|---|---|
| IGO | - | Inter-Governmental Organizations |
| IMET | - | International Military Education Training |
| JSOC | - | Joint Special Operations Command |
| JTTF | - | Joint Terrorism Task Force |
| KDF | - | Kenya Defence Forces |
| KGWOT | - | Kenya Government War on Terror |
| KNBS | - | Kenya National Bureau of Statistics |
| LRA | - | Lord's Resistance Army |
| LOP | - | Level of Precision |
| ME | - | Middle East |
| MENA | - | Middle East and North Africa |
| MOE | - | Margin of Error |
| MFA&IT | - | Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
| NAVFOR- | - | Naval Force |
| NATO | - | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NCTC | - | National Counter-Terrorism Centre |
| NDAA | - | National Defence Authorization Act |
| NSAC | - | National Security Advisory Committee |
| NSA | - | Non-State Actors |
| OEF | - | Operation Enduring Freedom- Horn of Africa |
| OSA | - | Other State Actors |
| PISCES | - | Personal Identity Security Comparison System |
| PREACT | - | Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism |
| PSC | - | Peace and Security Council |
| PLO | - | Palestine Liberation Organization |

| | | |
|-------|---|---|
| PRC | - | Provincial Response Companies |
| PTST | - | Post-traumatic Stress-Disorder |
| RS&IO | - | Red Sea and Indian Ocean |
| RIT | - | Reduction in Tourism |
| ROFI | - | Reduction on Foreign Investment |
| SLTT | - | State, Local Tribal and Territorial |
| SOF | - | Special Operations Forces |
| TSWG | - | Technical Support Working Group |
| TIP | - | Terrorist Interdiction Program |
| TSIP | - | Terrorism Screening and Interdiction Programs |
| TSCTP | - | Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership |
| UAE | - | United Arab Emirates |
| UNAMA | - | United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan |
| USA | - | United States of America |
| USIP | - | United States Institute of Peace |
| UN | - | United Nations |
| WOT | - | War on Terror |

CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- Security:** Used by the author in the context of the UN Charter, security refers to the absence of war, armed conflict, any other threat to humanity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It is linked to state or national security, requiring the state to protect itself and interests through the use of economic, military and political power, and the exercise of diplomacy.
- Regional Security:** Regional security in this work means the security concerns resulting from the acts of terrorism (terrorist groups-Al-Shabab) and counterterrorism efforts by partnering states in this case Kenya and USA.
- Inter-State Partnership:** Herein used refers to collaboration between Kenya and the United States of America on counterterrorism efforts. This partnership is informed by the states need to protect its national interests.
- Impact:** Means the consequences that counterterrorism Partnership have on Kenya's economy.
- Terrorism:** The adopted definition of this term is the deliberate use of violence and intimidation directed at a large audience to coerce a community (government) into conceding politically or ideologically motivated demands.

Transnational Terrorism: These are terrorist groups which are both products of and challenges to key ideas associated with globalization- flows of people, weapons and information to further their cause, thereby giving terrorism a transnational character.

Counterterrorism: This is the practice, military tactics, techniques, and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business, and use of strategies of intelligence and associated agencies in combating and preventing the act of terrorism.

Strategic Partnership: This interstate partnership tailored towards solving issue specific and a systematic challenge facing the partnering states for mutuality of interest.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview

This chapter presents the background of the study highlighting the existing gaps in understanding Kenya-United States of America strategic Partnership on Counter-Terrorism in Kenya. Also presented include the background of the study, the statement of the problem of the study, the purpose of the study, the study objectives, research questions, justification of the study, significance of the study, and the scope of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

Inter-state strategic partnerships are a term which was coined by Czechowaska (2013) in the Post-Cold War era to explain a strategy to cope with systemic and issue-specific international challenges such as security, peace and development. This strategy can take the form of; inter-state, a state and a regional cooperation, between regional cooperations, and between a global organization vis a viz a regional organization. Furthermore, this term constitutes a novel form and feature of the evolving international relations system and represent a new principle for organizing international life.

To say one has a strategy implies a plan of action to achieve a specific goal or to solve a specific problem. According to Mackubin Thomas Owens in Stolberg (2012), development of a coherent strategy is absolutely essential to national security in times of both war and peace. The logic of strategy (Yarger, 2006) argues that the strategic concept answers the big question of “how” the objectives will be achieved by articulating clearly for subordinate levels on who does what, when, where, how, and why in such a manner that the subordinate strategist or planner can see with clarity

how the execution of the concept leads to the accomplishment of the objective and what he is required to do in order to support the strategy.

In this new age, while the consensus remains that states are still significant 'actors' (Prichard, 2010), the promise of the century to come is that we can and must make the most of this interregnum to rethink the political philosophy of order that gave us the states we are now trying to move beyond. As Held puts it: The transformation of politics which has followed in the wake of the growing interconnectedness of states and societies and the increasing intensity of international networks requires a re-examination of political theory as fundamental in form and scope as the shift which brought about the conceptual and institutional innovations of the modern state itself (Held, 1995). Political space for the development and pursuit of effective government and the accountability of power is no longer coterminous with a delimited political territory. Forms of political organization now involve a complex deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political authority (Held and McGrew, 2002).

Seen broadly, inter-state partnerships combining both bilateralism and multilateralism represent a type of special relationship concerning a strategic issue which has been referred to by (Czechowska and Tyushka, 2013) as strategic partnership. In addition, with the reconfiguration of the international relations system since the early 1990s, strategic partnerships have become the necessary key to forge a common front. This model has been praised for its flexibility in responding to global challenges than state alliances. Partnership is based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests' (Moscow Declaration, 1994).

In this study, the Kenya- United States of America strategic partnership is informed by acts of terrorism which have wretched havoc to human security in the entire globe.

In response to the al-Qaida 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States President George W. Bush launched a multifaceted global campaign on War on Terror. It first began with the Afghanistan War and the War in Iraq and later to everywhere in the globe where United States interests were at risk (Heidi, 2017). Since then, successive regimes of Barak Obama (2009-2017), Donald Trump (2017-2021), and to Joe Biden (2021) to date, the war on terror has witnessed the transfer of power from one president to another in bid to protect Americas interest globally (Dahl, 1971).The United States spending on war on terror has been on rise from 31 US billion dollars in 2001 Financial Year to 150.8 US billion dollars in 2019 financial year (<http://www.gao.gov>).

It is estimated that there are approximately more than 170,000 incidences of terrorism since 1970 globally. Its global economic impact by 2015 is estimated to have reached US\$89.6 billion (Global Terrorist Index, 2016), in 2015, four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths from terrorism: ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qaida. This magnitude of events poses a great challenge to international peace and security which requires global efforts to wrath it.

There are six basic types of tactics that terrorist groups use to attack and also a source of revenue: hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, and barricade-hostage incidents. It is estimated that terrorism has affected 163 out of 195 independent states which covers 99.8% of world's population. This implies that almost the entire global population is affected by terrorism. The vast majority of terrorism occurs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa regions. Collectively these regions account for 84 per cent of all attacks and 94 per cent of deaths. In contrast, Central America and the Caribbean

accounted for the lowest levels of terrorism with only 0.05 per cent of attacks and deaths (Global Terrorism index, 2017).

Global terrorism has been motivated by the following factors: economic deprivation, i.e., in poverty and within-country inequality (Gurr, 1970). Socio-economic and demographic strain (Robison et al. 2006), measures due to an obligation to civil liberties which are denied (Li, 2005), civilizational clash (Huntington, 1996), Instable or failed states (Campos and Gassebner, 2009).

To succeed in this endeavour, a comparable mobilization of national and international resources is required if the United States is to prevail. The war on terror is neither like World War II nor the Cold War, which had clearly defined combatants, “front lines,” and rules of engagement. The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks represent a transnational, highly dynamic, increasingly decentralized, religiously inspired movement propelled for the most part by a diverse collection of non-state actors Stares and Yocoubian (2018). As such, Islamist militancy has more in common with other so-called new security challenges that transcend national borders and are driven by non-state actors and processes calling for partnership beyond conventional warfare.

According to the African Union Algiers-based African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), between 2012 and 2020, terrorist attacks on the continent increased four-fold, while there were 508 terrorist strikes across the continent in 2012 that resulted in 2,563 casualties. The number of attacks increased to 2,034 in 2020 resulting in 8,631 deaths, thereby representing 400% and 237% rises in attacks and deaths respectively. Women, children and the youth often suffer the consequences of terrorist attacks, as victims and sometimes as perpetrators (AU,

2022). This marks the upscale of terrorism in Africa, however terrorism acts have been witnessed much earlier though to in small scale. For instance, the 1975 attacks of Hilton and 1980 Norfolk hotels in Kenya, the 1976 plane hijack in Entebbe Uganda are notable examples.

The war on terrorism in Africa on international scale could be said to have begun in Sudan in the 1990s, where Osama bin Laden operated and where an attack against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was organized (Congressional Research Service Report, 2009). Three years later, in 1998, al-Qaeda cells blew up the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2005). In retaliation for these attacks, the United States, in addition to an attack in Afghanistan, bombed a chemical plant in Sudan, claiming that it was producing elements for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda. Moreover, U.S. policy in Somalia became preoccupied with searching out, capturing, and killing the perpetrators of those attacks who were believed to have taken refuge there. The seeds of later U.S. policy and all that has followed in Somalia were planted then (Ted, 2015). Terrorist acts in Europe, particularly the train attack in Spain, have been linked to cells in Morocco and Algeria, which interact with North African residents in Europe, and both countries themselves have been victims of recent terrorist bombing attacks.

After 9/11, U.S. focus on terrorism in Africa became much more pronounced. For the first time since 1993, the United States and her allies deployed a sizeable contingent of American troops on the continent, with the establishment in late 2002 of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. This country is strategically located in the Horn of Africa, a key U.S. partner on security, regional stability, and humanitarian efforts across the region. In addition, it hosts the only enduring U.S. military presence in Africa at Camp Lemonier, established by formal agreement in

2003. A bilateral agreement with the government of Djibouti also provides the United States with access to Djibouti's port facilities and airport (US Department of States, 2022).

In addition, President Bush announced a \$100 million counterterrorism initiative for East and the Horn of Africa region in 2003. At the same time, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) spearheaded a series of training and military support operations in the Sahel, aimed at the Algeria-based terrorist group- *Groupe sulfite la Predication et le combat* (GLPF); the program later blossomed into the much larger Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative that now involves both North African and Sahelian states (<http://www.hoa.africom.mil.>). These efforts demonstrate a tri-partite arrangement between USA, EU and Africa partnership on counterterrorism.

Counterterrorism efforts became even more pronounced in U.S. Africa policy after the Islamic Court Movement took power in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2006, leading to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, with tacit U.S. support, to stabilize the situation (Malito, 2015). Most importantly, the Pentagon announcement in 2007 that it would establish a new unified Africa Command (AFRICOM) to bring together its varied programs on the continent was a sign of increasing U.S. focus on security in Africa (Congressional Research Service Report, 2009).

Generally, such explanations draw an understanding of the U.S. concern in Africa with a view to concluding it is more vulnerable to the threats from terrorism than any other continent. Its combination of; relatively weak states, ethnic and religious diversity, sometimes discrimination, its poverty, and in many places its “ungoverned space” all lend Africa a significant susceptibility to the growth of radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that employ terrorism. Some of these

gaps as observed in this citation are aimed specifically at African governments, for example, the radical Islamic Maitatsine and “Taliban” in Nigeria, or the pseudo-Christian Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda; clearly have a more international agenda, for example, the al-Qaeda cells along the east coast of Africa and presumably the North Africans and Sudanese who have returned to their home countries from training and participating in the insurgency in Iraq (International Crisis Group, 2006).

The Horn of Africa has had considerable strategic importance for the U.S global interests, as it is relevant to both the security of the West Asia, Physically, it is a key crossroad of air and sea routes to the east. In addition, the Horn guard access to the Red Sea, it protects the South West approaches of Arabia and sits astride the waters of the Nile on the Southern flank of Egypt (*Department of State Bulletin, 1986*).

Moreover, its geopolitical significance of the region lies in the fact that most of the oil that the industrial west needs passes through this region from the oil fields in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. According to some estimates, Japan gets about 85 per cent of its oil requirements through this area, while more than 60 per cent of oil to Western Europe and the U.S also passes through this area (Makinda, 1982). The Horn of Africa thus is central to the strategic configurations of the super powers, which try to control the dynamics of the region.

This fact explains much about the complex interrelationships between differing Islamic cultures within Africa, from east to west. It has a direct effect on the history of deepened terrorist activity first in Sudan and later along the east coast of the continent, the constant instability in Somalia, and the challenges facing counterterrorist efforts in the region. At the same time, the Horn is the object of the

most intense and the most militarized U.S. response to terrorism in Africa. Since 2002, the United States and its allies have stationed about 1,200 to 18,000 troops in Djibouti under the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA participates in a joint allied patrol of the Red Sea coastal area and carries out a series of civic action and military training programs throughout the Horn as well as gathering intelligence on possible terrorist infiltration (International Crisis Group, 2006).

U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in Eastern Africa and as critical partner in counterterrorism efforts in the region. In addition, it is one of only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to have a military access agreement with the U.S. Moreover, Carson (2005) asserts that in combating the regional threat posed by international terrorism, no other country in East Africa or the greater Horn of Africa is more important to the United States than Kenya. Although the United States currently has combat troops stationed at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and has developed increasingly close ties with the armed forces of Ethiopia and Uganda, Kenya remains a core partner and ally in tracking down Al Qaeda–affiliated terrorists in East Africa and preventing any future anti-Western terrorist attacks in Kenya and the region.

Kenya has repeatedly been a target of terrorist attacks, and, as the September 2013 attack on an upscale Nairobi shopping mall underscore, terrorist threats against international and domestic targets in Kenya remain a serious concern (Congressional Research Service, 2017). In addition, Kenya also ranks among the top U.S. foreign aid recipients not only in the continental Africa but globally, receiving significant development, humanitarian, and security assistance in recent years. The country, which is a top recipient of police and military counterterrorism assistance on the

continent, hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Africa. Nairobi is home to one of four major United Nations offices worldwide from which U.S. agencies manage both bilateral and regional programs.

The United States manages relations with the Somali government formally recognized by the United States in January for the first time in more than 20 years from the embassy in Nairobi, as the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu has been closed since 1991 attacks (Congressional Research Service, 2007). It is from this background that the researcher seeks to examine the Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya has suffered numerous terrorists attack in the recent past targeted to Kenyan citizens and Western interests within. Notable among them are; the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi, 2002 suicide bombing in a hotel in Mombasa, West-gate shopping mall attack in 2013, Garisa University attack in 2015, DusitD2 attack in 2019, among other small scale and sporadic attacks involving kidnapping, grenade attacks and indiscriminate shootings and bombing in various parts of the country resulting to hundreds of deaths, thousands of injuries and huge financial loses for Kenya. As a result, in 2011 Kenya launched its first ever military incursion to Somalia to fight Al Shabab militia group. In 2012, Kenya enacted the first legislation named the “terrorist prevention act, 2012”. Secondly, this legislation emboldened the countries formation of Anti-Terrorism Police Unit which led to massive arrests and detention of hundreds of terrorist’s suspects (Whiteker, 2014).

Further, to counter the terrorists menace Kenya forged strategic partnership with its allies to increase its power and for mutuality of interests. United States of America on

the other hand has been forging strategic partnership with its allies in different regions which are anchored on cooperation in defence and security so that to effectively respond to threats to peace and security emanating from terrorist's attacks through capacity building of the partners to gather, produce, and share information about current and emerging threats (USDS, 2020). Kenya like other US strategic partners on counterterrorism globally have suffered deadly retaliatory terrorist attacks as a result of their alignment with the American led global war on terror. For instance, in the South Asia Pakistan as an ally and a strategic partner of US has suffered numerous deadly attacks from the Talibanize terrorists' group from Afghanistan (Khan,2005).

Most studies relating on the subject seem not to have considered the element of interstate strategic partnership in counterterrorism. For instance, Peace and Security as Counterterrorism and interventions in Kenya (Bachman and Honk, 2009), Terrorism in HOA (USIP Special Report, 2004), and Counterterrorism in East Africa - US response (Ploch, 2010). The above-mentioned studies indicate an academic gap underpinning Kenya – USA strategic partnership in Counterterrorism and again the effect gap on the security of the Kenya arising from this relation. Due to silence of literature on Kenya – USA strategic partnership on national counterterrorism, it is necessary to undertake this study.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counter-terrorism.

1.4 Study Objectives

The study was guided by the following specific objectives;

1. To explore and to expound the nature of the Kenya -United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership.
2. To assess the impact of the Kenya- United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership on Kenya.
3. To analyse the challenges faced by the Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership.

1.5 Research Questions

In order to address the above objectives, the research was guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the identity and the nature of the Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership?
2. What are the impacts of the Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership on Kenya?
3. What are the challenges faced by the Kenya-United States of America strategic counter-terrorism partnership efforts?

1.6 Justification of the Study

Given the fact that terrorism is not a respecter of political or geographical boundaries, its effects transcend inter-state boundaries. Kenya's strategic location in the region compounded with it hosting the largest US embassy in the region, home of four UN offices, border porosity, neighbouring transitional Government of Somali, political instability in the larger Sudan, makes it an area of interest to study because it is targeted by terrorist despite its interdependence on internal and international security.

Many other related works have been studied by scholars on Kenya United States of America partnership on other aspects, for instance; Kenya-United States of America cooperation in countering international crimes, (Mutua, 2016), Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa, (Gatuiku,2016). But seemingly there is none done focusing on Kenya-USA strategic partnership on counter-terrorism which this study aimed at enriching the available studies with additional knowledge on counterterrorism efforts in Kenya.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The findings of the study have both theoretical and practical implications for the future of inter-state strategic partnership and counterterrorism strategies. It gives insights on states strategic partnerships on counterterrorism, the nature of strategic partnership on counterterrorism, and the challenges encountered by interstate partners in counterterrorism. The study is also useful in leading to the improvement of counterterrorism strategies and inter-state strategic partnership.

The study will be of significance to various government departments dealing with security such as the armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, among others, in the formulation of pertinent policies. It will also be useful to all other stakeholders in state, regional and global security. Significantly, again, this study is aimed at adding new insights and knowledge to the available body of literature on the issues surrounding strategic partnership, terrorism and counterterrorism strategies on both regional and global security.

1.8 Scope of the Study

The study focused on Kenya's-United States Partnership on counter-terrorism. The scope of the study took the following dimensions; geographical scope, content scope, and theoretical scope and methodological scope. These are discussed here below;

1.8.1 Geographic Scope

Geographically, this study was conducted within the geographical boundaries of Kenya. Kenya is a country which was a former colony of Britain and is located on the east coast of Africa, shares borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania. The natural landscape includes a coastal plain with sandy beaches, extensive semi-arid plateau, fertile highlands and the dramatic Rift Valley which cuts across Kenya from north to south.

1.8.2 Content Scope

The study focused on Kenya in the Horn of Africa. Between 1970 and 2012 there have been more than 250 terrorist attacks in Kenya. These attacks killed more than 1,000 and wounded more than 5,000 people. More than half of the terrorist attacks in Kenya were concentrated in six cities: Nairobi (61 attacks), Garissa (27 attacks), Mandera (19 attacks), Mombasa (12 attacks), Wajir (12 attacks), and Dadaab (11 attacks). The first terrorist attacks in Kenya recorded in the Global Terrorism Database took place in February, March, and April of 1975 when assailants from the Maskini Liberation Front bombed the Starlight Nightclub in Nairobi, a bus station in Nairobi, and the summer home of President Kenyatta in Mombasa (www.start.umd.edu).

There have been a number of terrorist attacks in Kenya in recent years: for instance, in June and July 2014 attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties on the Kenyan coast are

reported to have killed at least 85 people. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, several attacks took place in Garissa County in 2015, including an attack on Garissa University College on 2 April 2015 in which at least 148 people were killed, on 15 to 16 January 2019, there was an attack at the hotel and commercial complex at 14 Riverside in Nairobi, resulting in injuries and loss of life. One British national was killed. There are frequent attacks in the North-Eastern border regions, particularly in Garissa, Lamu and Mandera counties and other areas close to the Somali border, most of which were attributed to Al-Shabaab (<https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/kenya/terrorism>).

The U.S. government has long viewed Kenya as a strategic partner and an anchor state in East Africa. It is also regarded as an important partner in the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA) in Djibouti that seeks to check terrorism; this partnership has seen U.S. aid levels reaching to almost \$1 billion annually in some years. Kenya ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance globally. Also, United States has valued Kenya's role as a peacemaker among its neighbours and as a host to refugees from across the troubled region (Ploch, 2013). The terrorist assault in U.S embassy in Nairobi and Dar-es-salaam in 1998, September 2013 on a Nairobi shopping mall popular with Americans and other expatriates, claimed by Al-Shabaab, draws fresh attention to the U.S. strategic relationship with Kenya and other security partners in the region. In addition, Kenya hosts the largest U.S embassy in the region and two UN offices and one military base in Kenya -Manda Bay (*Global Security.org*). This features places Kenya at a vantage ground for this study.

1.8.3 Methodological Approach

This study adopted a qualitative methodology; and, a purposive sampling technique, an interview schedule was used to collect data, a qualitative data analysis was utilized.

1.8.4 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by a social constructivist theory of international relations which offers abroad social theory which in international relation its main concern is social construction of world politics. (Went, 1989) posits that international system is characterized by a dynamic and mutually constructive relationship between agents (principally states) and structures (the nature of international system and society). Further, constructivists are concerned with the processes through which the world has come to be as it is: the dynamics of interactions between the actors, the meaning that actors give their actions and the frameworks and the patterns of interactions between those actors. This theory in international relations was given impetus by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of cold war occurring as it did without any significant shift in the distribution of capabilities in the international system and largely through domestic political transformation enabled by strategic actors.

In this study the theory lends itself in counterterrorism as the rude end of the cold-war and the 9/11 terrorist attack could not be explained by traditional and Positivist theories of international relations of realism and liberalism (Krishaswamy, 2012). Since understanding of terrorism can socially be construed it lends itself to constructivists theory (Lynch, 2006). In illustrating this, Krishaswamy used insights from a metaphorical approach used in constructing Al-Qaida, the antagonizing terrorist group in Global War on Terror. In this case, counterterrorism finds itself in the of constructivist framework.

1.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter contains: - introduction, background of the study, statement of the problem, the purpose of the study, objectives of the study, research questions, justification of the study, and the scope of the study. The next chapter is on literature review.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Overview

Literature review is an integral part of the research process and makes a valuable contribution to almost every operational step. In global war on terror states need to reproduce their state power. This can be achieved through inter-state partnerships which include both bilateralism and multilateralism. This study focusses on the literature on the history of counterterrorism in Kenya, the nature of counter terrorism partnership, the effects of counterterrorism strategic partnerships and the challenges encountered by partners in counterterrorism efforts. The study endeavoured to show the existing gaps which it intends to fill by themes and sub themes objectively organized. This chapter organized these ideas towards this end.

2.1 Kenya-USA Counterterrorism Partnership

The history of terrorist's attacks in Kenya can be traced back to 1975 when there was a bomb blast in the Nairobi central business centre, this was followed by the 1980 terrorist attack when the Jewish owned Norfolk hotel was attacked by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The two incidences could be said to be of the low magnitude. However, since the August, 7 1998 when USA embassy attack in Nairobi, security concerns and domestic political factors increased making Kenyan government's resolve to fight militant extremists in the East African region, particularly Somalia's al-Shabaab (Carson, 2005).

Ironically, this shift came at a time when the United States relations with Kenya was frosty because of pending International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against the then leadership for human rights violations. Tension emerged between two major U.S. foreign policy goals in Africa. The way in which this tension was addressed in Kenya

had important implications for other transitional democracies in the region and elsewhere around the globe (Whitaker, 2010).

Since then, Kenya's security personnel officials participated actively in U.S. initiatives designed to improve its capacity to identify terrorist cells, investigate incidents, and coordinate law enforcement efforts within its borders. As a result Kenya became a major beneficiary of the United States' \$100 million East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) launched in 2003 (which later evolved to be the East African Regional Strategic Initiative), the Kenyan government moved swiftly to established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in the year 2003, the Joint Terrorism Task Force in 2004, though it was disbanded after a year, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (2004), and the National Security Advisory Committee (2004) (USDS, 2006). All the above initiatives were meant to increase Kenya's authorities' capacity to investigate terrorist incidents, identify cells, coordinate law enforcement, and prevent future attacks.

With additional training and financing from the United States, Kenyan officials also upgraded security measures at airports and border crossings. These initiatives were coordinated mainly out of the president's office with little opportunity for public scrutiny, though they were not without criticism from civil society groups (Whitaker, 2008). U.S.-Kenyan counterterrorism cooperation reportedly resulted in some successes, with officials claiming to have thwarted several terrorist plots.

In areas that were more visible, Kenyan collaboration was somehow less certain. There were several issues that emerged as key points of contention between the two countries. First and foremost, it emerged that there was a notable and lengthy debate over a proposed anti-terrorism bill. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States and its

allies actively took the lead and lobbied Kenya and other countries to pass legislation criminalizing terrorist activity and imposing stiff penalties for violations (Whitaker, 2007). In 2003, President Mwai Kibaki introduced an anti-terrorism bill that was strongly criticized by human rights activist and religious groups for violating civil liberties and targeting Muslim populations. The bill included a provision, for instance, that would have allowed police to arrest people for wearing certain types of clothing. Also, critics accused the government of bowing to U.S. pressure, and the measure was eventually withdrawn for further revision.

A new bill which was an improvement from the former was published in 2006 included better civil liberties protections, but it was equally blocked due in part to its association with the United States (Mogire and Agade, 2011). The controversial 2007 election and the subsequent creation of a power-sharing government eliminated any chance of parliament passing counter-terrorism legislation during Kibaki's remaining time in office.

Tensions between the United States and Kenya over anti-terrorism legislation were exacerbated by several other issues (Prestholdt, 2011). First, Kenyans criticized the U.S. for failing to adequately compensate victims of the 1998 embassy bombing, especially after seeing the comparatively huge sums of money paid to 9/11 victims. Secondly, many Kenyans were angered by a series of travel warnings issued by the U.S. Department of State starting in 2002. Although the wording fluctuated over time ranging from advising Americans to be vigilant to discouraging non-essential travel Kenyans saw any warning on travel to the country as undermining their vital tourism industry. As a result, it forced President Kibaki to breach the protocol by mentioning the issue at a White House state dinner in his honour in 2003.

Further, Whitaker (2007), posits that although U.S. officials denied any quid pro quo, Kenyans believed that the travel warning would only be lifted with the passage of anti-terrorism legislation. In addition, Kenyan leaders also were under U.S. pressure to sign an article 98 bilateral immunity agreement to protect American citizens from prosecution before the ICC. Although not directly related to the war on terror, Kenya's refusal was caught up in the other points of contention. Lastly, Kenya criticized U.S. policy in Somalia during the period, particularly its decision to back an alliance of warlords instead of the weak transitional government against the rise of an Islamist movement. Kenyan officials felt slighted when they were excluded from a U.S.-organized contact group on Somalia, though they were subsequently asked to join.

Despite behind the scenes cooperation on security operations and intelligence sharing, the willingness of Kenyans to assist the United States was by no means finally assured (Barkan, 2004). Kenyan reluctance to cooperate more publicly was due in part to the country's shaky transition to democracy, which itself was promoted by the United States. Having finally emerged from authoritarian rule in 2002, Kenyans were wary of increasing government surveillance powers and strengthening security institutions. The democratic transition ushered in a new era of optimism in which Kenyans felt empowered to stand up to external pressure and determine their own interests.

Kenyans were reluctant to cooperate in the U.S. war on terror because they saw terrorism largely as an American (and Israeli) problem playing out on African soil. In a 2006 survey of 420 Kenyans, 73 percent of respondents said that Kenya had been a victim of terrorism because of its friendship with the United States (Whitaker, 2008). In addition, some senior government officials interviewed around that time expressed similar views that Kenya itself was not a terrorist target; instead, its citizens were

collateral damage in the struggle between the U.S. and al-Qaeda. By cooperating more closely with the United States, some urged, Kenya would even more likely to be targeted.

In criticizing the United States war on terror, of course, many Kenyans were not alone; they found allies in Europe and elsewhere in Africa (especially South Africa) who questioned the heavy-handed approach of the Bush administration.

Since the American embassy bombing in 1998 in Nairobi and Dar-salaam, and subsequent terrorism attack in its soil, Kenya's approach to terrorism has changed dramatically. Instead of being pushed largely from outside, counter-terrorism has emerged as a top priority of the Kenyan government, first under Kibaki and since 2013 under President Uhuru Kenyatta. The most obvious indication of this change was the decision in late 2011 to launch Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country). On October 16 of that year, the government sent Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) troops into Somalia to fight against al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group that had taken control over much of the country. U.S. officials knew Kenya had been considering such a move for a while, but they had been critical in the past and were not consulted at the time.

Mixed messages from members of the weak Somali government also raised questions about whether it was consulted (International Crisis Group, 2012). Regardless, international actors quickly got on board with the Kenyan operation and, in June 2012, the 4,000-strong KDF force was formally incorporated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which already included troops from Uganda and Burundi. By 2013, al-Shabaab was forced out of most major towns in Somalia, but continued to control many rural areas.

The invasion of Somalia was followed by other signs of increased Kenyan resolve to fight terrorism. After nearly a decade of heated debate, lawmakers finally passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 (Gok, 2012), which imposed stiff criminal penalties for participating in terrorist attacks or assisting others to do so, made it easier to disrupt terrorist financing, and allowed suspects to be turned over to other countries for trial. In contrast to earlier attempts, the government was more strategic about getting counter-terrorism legislation passed and Kenyan Muslims were more divided.

The Association of Muslim Organizations in Kenya came out in support of the bill soon after it was introduced in July 2012, while the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims and the Kenya Council of Imams called for a longer period of public debate. In response to concerns, the government allowed amendments to the bill in September, facilitating its passage in early October. In the context of a power-sharing government that was divided on many issues, the swift passage of this legislation was noteworthy.

In 2013, Kenyan authorities took a more aggressive approach of going after terrorism suspects within the country. The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) had been active in Muslim areas along the Kenyan coast, where have arrested hundreds of people. Some were released for lack of evidence, while others were detained and tried. In other circumstances, a number of terrorism suspects disappeared or killed while in custody, which human elicited criticism from human rights activists blaming the ATPU for such incidents (Horowitz, 2014). Since 2012, a number of high-profile Muslim clerics with alleged links to al-Shabaab were assassinated in Mombasa under questionable circumstances.

In early 2014, the Kenyan government ordered all urban refugees to go to camps in Dadaab and Kakuma and rounded up roughly 4,000 Somalis in Nairobi and Mombasa. As reports increased of police harassing ethnic Somalis, including many Kenyan citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2013) legitimate concerns emerged that the government's heavy-handed approach would "push its Muslim citizenry into the arms of the extremists" (Hidalgo, 2014:13), increasing the power of al-Shabaab instead of undermining it.

The immediate trigger for the 2011 intervention in Somalia was a series of kidnappings of tourists and aid workers in September and October that hit the tourism industry hard and undermined relief efforts in Dadaab refugee camp. Al-Shabaab promised retaliation. Since then, the September 2013 attacks on Nairobi's Westgate Mall and a wave of smaller bombings have killed hundreds of people (Dawnie, 2012).

Unlike earlier terrorist incidents in the country, which were widely seen as targeting western interests, these have shown that Kenya itself as a prime target. In 2011 and 2012, most attacks were in poor and/or remote areas, and many were on police posts, creating a false sense of security among the broader population. For middle class Kenyans, though, the brazen assault on the Westgate Mall was a wake-up call. Although the mall was frequented by expatriates, and foreigners were among the victims, its core clientele was the growing Kenyan middle class that drives the largest economy in East Africa. In this sense, 9/21 was Kenya's 9/11 (Seemann, 2015).

Government officials claimed that by sending its military to Somalia was driven by the need to protect Kenya's security, which is clearly threatened, though observers have noted other possible explanations (Miyandazi, 2012). This incident could be interpreted to have been motivated by Kenya's domestic political context. The 2011

invasion of Somalia came just a year before expected elections. At the time, the power-sharing government included a lame duck President Kibaki, who was seen as having rigged re-election in 2007, and a controversial Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who probably won that election and was the frontrunner for the next vote. The Somali invasion provided a divided government with the opportunity to show united resolve in addressing security problems in the northeast, including a Somali refugee population that had surged to nearly 500,000 people.

After the 2013 election, controversy continued given the ICC cases pending against both President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto for alleged involvement in earlier political violence, as discussed further below. In this context, especially after the Westgate Mall attack, Kenya's fight against terrorism diverted domestic and international attention away from the court cases and allowed Kenyatta to appear strong and rally support behind the cause of national security.

Interestingly, the 2011 invasion of Somalia in particular also reflected the growing political importance of a number of ethnic Somali Kenyans within the Kenyan government. Senior politicians and military and intelligence officials from that community were among those promoting the creation of a buffer zone, sometimes called "Jubaland," between al-Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia and Kenya. Kenyan officials pursued alliances with various armed groups in Somalia, drawing themselves into complicated clan and sub-clan rivalries, and divisions emerged among Somali Kenyan elites. As a result, Kenya's Somali partners "are as likely to fight one another as they are to take on Shabab" (Menkhaus, 2012). Critics also worried that an autonomous Juba land government dominated by the Ogaden clan would raise suspicions in Somalia and Ethiopia, and U.S. officials were concerned

that it would rally other clans behind al-Shabaab (International Crisis Group, 2012). Many Kenyans believed this plan was a central goal of the Somalia invasion.

Finally, there is speculation that Kenya's recent approach to counter-terrorism is an effort to project greater military power within the region. Despite the importance of its economy, Kenya's military has not been seen as a threat to neighbouring countries. Ethiopia's strong army flexed its muscle with the 2006 invasion and subsequent occupation of Somalia, prompting a backlash due to longstanding rivalries between those two countries.

By early 2014, there was growing debate within Kenya about the approach and effectiveness of government counter-terrorism policies. In addition to the concerns expressed by human rights activists and Muslim leaders over the harsh crackdown on ethnic Somalis and others, there were increasing calls for Kenya to pull its troops out of Somalia. Responding to public frustration over frequent al-Shabaab attacks, members of parliament became more vocal in their criticism. Among those requesting a timetable for withdrawal was the foreign affairs minister at the time of the 2011 invasion, Moses Wetangula, who was now minority leader in the new Kenyan Senate, but ruling party members were also among the critics (Warner, 2013).

Despite such calls, Kenyan cabinet officials staunchly defended government policies and argued that withdrawing troops from Somalia would give al-Shabaab a victory that could ultimately destabilize the entire region. Supporters agreed that pulling out before al-Shabaab was defeated would do little to increase Kenyan security (Salad, 2014). As a healthy domestic debate continued, the Kenyan government showed few signs of backing down from its recent approach to counter-terrorism. It is from the

above history on counterterrorism between this partners that this study sets to examine the Kenya-USA strategic partnership on Kenya's counterterrorism efforts.

2.2 The Nature of USA Counterterrorism Partnership

This subsection deals with the nature in which counterterrorism efforts among the states take. Interstate partnerships in most circumstances takes two forms; bilateralism and multilateralism depending on the issue which has necessitated the partnership. For the purpose of this study the researcher discusses the literature available on interstate partnership on counterterrorism starting from bilateralism then multilateralism, and multifaceted partnerships as follows;

2.2.1 The USA Bilateral Nature of Partnership on Counterterrorism

Inter-state partnership is a post-cold war concept in the study of international relations and a shift from alliance's formation which was synonymous with inter-and post war era. This concept as advanced by Czechowska (2013) states that states partner for strategic reason to solve a global challenge that threatens a countries interest in global milieu for partner's mutual benefit. This partnership encompasses both economic development, commerce and security concerns.

Since 2001, the United States has cooperated extensively with many state and non-state forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. The forms of cooperation have varied as have the mechanisms and components of the U.S. government used to train and support these forces globally. Since there is no state which is spared by the effects of terror, the counter-terrorism efforts have taken a nature of inter-regional, regional and global partnership. These forces, and the means to support them, have been important but not widely understood (McAlaan, 2019).

Yet gaining an accurate picture of U.S. involvement with partner and proxy forces is essential since these forces have trade-offs in terms of strengths and weaknesses. Some host nation forces are partners, who work for their own government and therefore may have interests that diverge from those of the United States. Others are proxies, paid directly by the United States and therefore working primarily for it. Yet proxies may lack the authority and legitimacy of host nation partner forces. Without a clear way to think about these trade-offs, policymakers will be unable to effectively compare and contrast forces to choose the best host nation force (or set of forces) for a particular counterterrorism challenge (Long, 2011). Counterterrorism cooperation can broadly be divided into three categories;

The first is intelligence sharing and legal coordination between the United States and other countries, which includes such efforts as thwarting terrorist financing through improved sharing of financial intelligence (Bayman, 2006).

Secondly is (Serafino, 2011) assistance from the United States, which includes the provision of equipment and training to military and security services of a host-nation. The exemplar here is the State Department's Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance, which assesses a state's needs for law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism and then provides appropriate training.

Thirdly is operational cooperation, where U.S. personnel work alongside forces from a host-nation in the actual conduct of counterterrorism operations. The third category, where U.S. personnel are present in at least a direct support role-at a minimum, providing intelligence and planning assistance alongside those forces if not actually accompanying them on missions. It further focuses on the subset of that category where the United States is substantially paying for the host nation forces in question

(in other words, a substantial assistance mission along with operational cooperation). This subset is still expansive, including crucial operations against al-Qaida and its affiliates in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Coll, 2004).

There are two principal types of forces within this subset of host nation forces that U.S. personnel directly support and for which the U.S. Treasury pays. The first is a partner force, which can be defined as a regular component of the host nation's military or security services that conducts combined operations with U.S. personnel (Byman, 2006). Partner forces for counterterrorism operations will likely be working with U.S. special operations forces (SOF), although non-SOF may be involved as well (such as intelligence specialists). While the operations of these units may be classified, their existence is generally acknowledged as they do represent a component of the host nation's military or security forces.

Partner forces are frequently paid directly out of Department of Defence (DoD) funds due to modifications to post-2001 defence appropriations bills. Most notable has been the so-called "1206 authority" named for Section 1206 of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 National Defence Authorization Act, which gave DoD the authority to train and equip foreign forces for counterterrorism operations (Congregational Research Service, 2011). For instance, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen there have been additional specific authorizations to fund security forces, some or all of which have been used to support counterterrorism partner forces (Section 1205 of the FY11 National Defence Authorization Act)

The second type is a proxy force, which is defined as an irregular force that is not a component of the host nation's regular security force and works principally (though perhaps not exclusively) for the United States. Proxy forces will likely be working

with either Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers or U.S. SOF. Unlike partner forces, the existence of proxy forces will seldom be acknowledged openly.

Until recently, such proxy forces would principally have been paid for with CIA funds under the authority of a presidential finding for covert action. The first finding supporting covert action for counterterrorism was signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1986 and has no doubt been modified and updated extensively since 2001. Since 2005, however, an additional source of funding has (at least potentially) been the Department of Defence under “1208 authority.” 1208 authority, also named for the relevant section of an authorization act, allows use of funds to support “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals” who work with SOF for counterterrorism purposes (Steve 2004). The limit of 1208 funding has risen from \$25 million annually to \$45 million annually in FY11 (Section 1201 of the FY11 National Defence Authorization Act).

The change in how partner and proxy forces are paid since 2001 is significant as it represents a shift of authority from the State Department and CIA to DoD. As Congressional Research Service analyst Nina Serafino notes, “DOD generally has trained and equipped foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs...Section 1206 is the first DOD global train-and-equip authority since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which placed oversight for military assistance with the Secretary of State.” In other words, DoD gained the ability to support partners directly rather than via a mechanism under State Department authority. Similarly, 1208 authority gives DoD an authority to support proxy forces that has previously been primarily under the CIA. Further, 1208 authority does not appear to acquire the high-level oversight involved in CIA covert action program, such as a presidential finding.

There are positives and negatives to both partner and proxy forces (Long, 2011). Partner forces have the advantage of being recognized elements of a host nation security apparatus, which gives them authorization to conduct approved operations in that host nation. Depending on the laws and policies of the host nation, this can provide them with broad powers of arrest, surveillance, and the use of lethal force. They can also call on other elements of the host nation government to support their operations.

Partner forces, however, have the drawback of being controlled by the host nation government. If there is substantial alignment in host nation and U.S. interests, this is not a major problem, but if the two diverge it can lead to serious difficulties. Moreover, the close association with U.S. personnel may make the host nation government suspicious of the partner force.

Iraq provides an unfortunate example of this drawback in the form of General Nomon Dakhil, the commander of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior's elite Emergency Response Brigade. General Dakhil's unit was a major partner force for U.S. SOF conducting counterterrorism operations in Iraq. They had a high opinion of the general, who one SOF commander noted was "an outstanding partner. The general, however, was arrested in 2011 on corruption charges, which some have deemed more political than actual, after his unit targeted Shi'a extremists in southern Iraq. After his arrest, targeting of Shi'a militias by his unit decreased while attacks on U.S. forces by those militias are reported to have increased (Durungo, 2011).

Proxy forces, conversely, owe loyalty not to the host nation government but to themselves and to the United States, in that order. This makes them potentially more responsive to U.S. direction if they are well managed, advised, and paid. The

negative, however, is that they lack the clear authorization to use force or collect intelligence that host nation security forces have. This can cause friction with the host nation. Indeed, there is potential for conflict between host nation security forces and the proxy force if the United States is unable to effectively manage that relationship.

Iraq presents examples of this drawback as well. Beginning in 2005, U.S. personnel began to support tribesmen and former Sunni insurgents against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). These irregulars came to be called the Sahwa (awakening), or Sons of Iraq. While they were effective in combating AQI in some instances, they were themselves targeted as terrorists by Iraqi security forces (Durango *at al*, 2007).

An additional advantage to proxy forces is plausible deniability if they are used for politically sensitive missions. An example of this would be cross-border action into a third country where terrorists have sought haven. If the proxy force is discovered, it at least does not have the direct overt ties to the United States of either U.S. personnel or a U.S. partner force.

In efforts to thwart terrorism in the globe United States of America through its agency- America Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) whose mandate is anchored in working to strengthen partnerships, civilian capacity, and information sharing around the world to counter evolving terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism (Mc Aleenan, 2019) has enumerated several dimensions through which this partnership assume.

This bureau is charged with the role of designing, managing, and overseeing foreign assistance to build the civilian capabilities of foreign government partners to counter terrorism and violent extremism in an effective and sustainable fashion. In addition, CT seeks to build law enforcement and judicial capabilities to mitigate attacks, disrupt

terrorist transit, and arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorists in accordance with the rule of law. To bolster these efforts, CT seeks to promote the leadership of other countries to build capacity in third countries in their regions. CT also seeks to strengthen partnerships and initiatives involving government and non-governmental actors to counter sources of violent extremist messaging, narratives, and recruitment.

In order to achieve the above stated objectives, U S Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism (2020) enumerates several programs, and interagency organizations which are bilateral or multilateral. This study starts by discussing the bilateral dimensions below:

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA): Since its creation in 1983, the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program has served as the primary provider of U.S. government antiterrorism training and equipment to law-enforcement agencies of partner nations throughout the world, and has delivered counterterrorism training to more than 90,000 law enforcement personnel from 154 countries. From prevention of terrorist attacks to responding to and mitigating terrorist attacks, ATA helps partner nations build critical capabilities across a wide spectrum of counterterrorism skills.

This program has been applauded by the United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime (2018) for having assisted several countries and regions come up with various instruments for counterterrorism and related crimes. For instance, Kenya has had the first document ever used as Training Manual on Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism produced in cooperation with Kenyan experts, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon have a manual on the use special investigation techniques in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law, and finally, South-Eastern Europe have a Manual for Judicial Training Institutes.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT): The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) uses a range of tools and programs (Mackintosh and Duplat, 2013) to isolate and weaken terrorist groups and their support networks. CT leads Department of State efforts to designate terrorist organizations and individuals, including freezing their financial assets, blocking their financial transactions, and preventing others from providing them with material or financial support. Terrorism designations expose and isolate organizations and individuals, impose serious sanctions on them, and enable coordinated action across the U.S. government and with our international partners to disrupt the activities of terrorists, including by denying them access to the U.S. financial system and enabling U.S. law enforcement actions.

Terrorist Screening and Interdiction Programs (TSI): TSI programs disrupt terrorist networks through initiatives that enhance U.S. and our foreign partners' ability to detect terrorists and secure borders. Bilateral terrorism screening information sharing agreements, negotiated pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), strengthen our screening capabilities, while the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) provides partner countries border security assistance to identify, disrupt, and deter terrorist travel (USDS, 2020).

2.2.2 The U.S Multilateralism Partnership in Counterterrorism

Multilateralism is an institutional arrangement that is generally acknowledged to embody the principle of collective security system. It rests on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that a war against one state is, ipso facto, considered a war against all. The community of states therefore is obliged to respond to threatened or actual aggression, first by diplomatic means, then through economic sanctions, and finally

by the collective use of force if necessary. Facing the prospect of such a community-wide response, any rational potential aggressor would be deterred (Ruggie, 1992).

United States of America traditional foreign policy of unilateralist and hyper-nationalist approach met with the real challenge with international terrorism threat to global peace and security. Although this orientation still commands immense support from the republicans (Patrick, 2023). This challenge rose during the reign of US president Donald Trump compelling the foreign policy makers to debate: which model of multilateralism is currently suited to advance US foreign policy and international peace and security?

This historical moment is defined by two countervailing trends, as described in the 2022 National Security Strategy issued by U.S. President Joe Biden's administration. The first is a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action, such as climate change and pandemic disease. The second is a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation (Kahl and Wright, 2021). The imperative for collective action has never been greater than the era of international terrorism as a threat of global peace, yet the world remains, as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bemoans, "gridlocked in colossal global dysfunction (www.un.org)."

Owing to the above, the U.S. foreign policy established four distinct models which assumes primacy and the administration's attention (Patrick, 2023). The first is a charter conception of multilateralism, focused on the UN's model of universal membership. The second is a club approach, which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order. The third is a concert model, which seeks comity and joint action among the world's major powers. The fourth is a

coalition approach, which would tailor ad hoc frameworks to each global contingency. Each of the so-called four Cs lays claim to a respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility.

The four USA multilateral trajectories are discussed below in detail;

The concert; According to Kupchans (1986), while referring to the concert of Europe (1815) multilateralism is characterized by the dominance of the great powers, decisions taken by informal negotiations and consensus, and no explicit specification of the mechanisms for implementing collective action. But-and this is what puts it in the class of collective security mechanisms-a concert nevertheless is "predicated on the notion of all against one." He further predicated on the indivisibility of peace among its members and on their nondiscretionary obligation to respond to acts of aggression. As much the circumstances prevailing then are quite different from the war on terror, the same concept could be applicable.

Multi-lateralism has worked during the post-world one era where the states in a coalition or alliance could assist whenever another state became an aggressor to the member of their alliance. In this case "terrorism" is a group which activities and organization transcends international borders calling for concerted efforts among several stakeholders beyond the traditional conventional warfare.

The charter:

The charter approach to multilateral cooperation gives pride of place to the UN and other encompassing, treaty-based organizations that reflect the principle of sovereign equality. Despite all its shortcomings, the UN continues to enjoy unequalled global legitimacy by virtue of its universal membership, binding charter, and sole authority under the auspices of the Security Council—to authorize the use of force. As then

deputy secretary of state Antony Blinken explained in 2016, “There remains no substitute for the work the UN does, the legitimacy it brings, the reach it allows (Blinken, 2016).”

While the terrorist threat remains serious, the United States Federal Government in conjunction with state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT), and private sector partners has had numerous successes in protecting the Homeland and preventing foreign terrorist attacks in the years since 9/11 (McAleenan, 2019). The argument being projected by McAleenan became a turning point in Global war on terror as United Nations Security Council convened and unanimously, for the first time ever, resolved that any act of international terrorism ought to be considered a threat to international peace and security. On this it expressed its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter on the day after September 11 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York. This determination laid the foundation for Security Council action to bring together the international community under a common set of obligations in the fight to end international terrorism (UN General Assembly, 2001).

During the meeting the Security Council adopted a more concrete and action-oriented resolution against acts of terror - United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373⁴. UNSC RES 1373 was passed unanimously on September 28, 2001, and focuses on areas of financing, intelligence sharing, and limiting terrorists' ability to travel. In terms of financing, UNSC RES1373 enjoins all states to criminalize Al Qaeda financial activities and to freeze the group's monetary assets. In addition, it mandates formalized routine exchanges of intelligence between states, including operational information and sharing of evidence for criminal prosecution through international

protocols and bilateral arrangements. Moreover, the resolution required states to take measures to prevent movement of terrorists via "effective border controls" and by denying refugee or asylum status, which are often claimed by terrorists.

Most important, UNSC RES1373 was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which makes it mandatory upon member-states and gives the Security Council wide latitude in seeking its enforcement. According to the charter, the Security Council can impose punitive measures against non-compliant states, ranging from non-military options (e.g., Article 41 authorization for "complete or partial interruption of economic relations" and/or diplomatic relations) to military operations (Article 42's authorization for "action by air, sea, or land forces").

The club: this is the second approach, which aims to revive and reconsolidate the Western community of advanced market democracies as the core of an open, rules-based international system. Consistent with the tenets of liberal internationalism, such a strategy focuses above all on strengthening the existing multilateral institutions that unite the world's free societies. The club model has recently elicited renewed interest thanks to the strategic challenges posed by a rising China seemingly bent on challenging existing norms and rules of state conduct and by a revisionist Russia intent on overturning the post-Cold War order in Europe

The coalition: this third version envisions a flexible, à la carte approach to cooperation. In contrast to the charter, club, and concert, no set configuration of states takes center stage in collective action. Rather, the identity and number of parties at the multilateral table in any given instance depends on the nature of the global challenge, the degree of interest among potential participants, and the relevant competencies each actor can bring to bear in resolving it (Patrick, 2023).

An example to this type of multilateralism in global war on terror is the regional dimension in Africa. For instance, in 2002, a “Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa” was developed (African Union, 2002). The Plan specifically references the obligations set out under UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

Furthermore, there have been several counterterrorism frameworks, resolutions and declarations, treaties, principles and guidelines initiated to contain extremism and terrorism on the African continent (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2017). The 1999 Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism acknowledges the scope and seriousness of terrorism, as well as affirming that terrorism ‘constitutes a serious violation of human rights and a threat to peace, security, development, and democracy’ in Africa (AHG/Decl.1 (XXXV) Algiers, Algeria). The obligations of state parties as provided by Article 3(1) (a–k) of the Convention are to implement fully the provisions of the Convention. Specific provisions of Article 3(1)(a–d) are thus to: take all necessary measures to protect the fundamental human rights of their populations against all acts of terrorism, Prevent the entry into and the training of terrorist groups on their territories, Identify, detect, confiscate and freeze or seize any funds and any other assets used or allocated for the purpose of committing a terrorist act, and to establish a mechanism to use such funds to compensate victims of terrorist acts or their families, and to establish national contact points in order to facilitate the timely exchange and sharing of information on terrorist groups and activities at the regional, continental and international levels, including the cooperation of states for suppressing the financing of terrorism.

The Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (14 September 2002) was initiated to further the implementations of the 1999 Algiers Convention. The Plan of Action aims at improving cross-border policing and surveillance on the continent. Its specific provisions, regarding border control, in Article 11 (a–g), state that member states should undertake to: Enhance border control and surveillance, as well as the necessary means to prevent the forgery and falsification of travel and identity documents, Ensure that identity documents contain advanced security features that protect them against forgery, Issue machine-readable travel documents that contain security features that protect them against forgery, Keep a passport stop list containing information of individuals whose applications would require special attention or who may not be issued with travel documents, Check applications against the passport stop list and the population register before the document is issued, Develop and upgrade the regulations governing border control and security procedures including land, sea and air exit and entry points so as to curb infiltration and promote cooperation among policy agencies having due regard for relevant provisions of relevant regional and continental agreements on the free movement of persons and goods, and finally to Computerize all points of entry in order to monitor the arrival and departure of all individuals.

Last is the 2011 African Model Anti-Terrorism Law that outlines concrete steps that state parties could take to protect themselves against terrorism. The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law provides in PART II, Offences of terrorism and Penalties for contravening the provision.

Chapter 3 of PART II defines the duties of the state party with respect to apprehending a terrorist member within their country. Articles 21 to 23 are thus about:

Offences relating to harboring or concealment of persons committing specified offences, duty to report presence of person suspected of intending to commit or having committed an offence and failure to so report, and threat, attempt, conspiracy and inducing another person to commit offence.

In addition, Part III (Chapter 2, pp. 33–37) enumerates duties of the state parties to detect money laundering and financing of terrorism. Article 33 requests state parties to establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to serve as a central, national agency responsible for receiving, requesting, analyzing and disseminating information concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing of terrorism, while Article 34 establishes the obligation to report suspicious activities of money laundering by setting up accountable institutions to stop transactions that they suspect to be related to money laundering or financing terrorism. On the extradition of offenders, Part IX makes provision for extradition and uses of anti-terrorism conventions as the basis for extradition in order to facilitate judicial processes of counterterrorism.

The Algiers Convention of 1999 makes no provision for enforcement of compliance by state parties, but the Plan of Action specifically sets out a monitoring and enforcement role for the newly established Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Commission of the AU. Article 7 of the Protocol, relating to the Establishment of the PSC, adopted at the AU Summit in Durban, July 2002, provides for ensuring the implementation of the Algiers Convention and other relevant international, regional and sub-regional instruments to combat terrorism. In addition to addressing the challenges of porous borders and reducing the laundering of illicit money that play

into the hands of terrorist organizations, the central objective of AU is to reduce to the barest minimum the activities of terrorism organizations in Africa.

In the horn of Africa, has had high impact and prevalence of violent extremism due to 'its geographical location, persistence of conflict, absence of state structures, despair from the loss of hope and the growth of extremism (Bashir, 2007). He further affirms that IGAD region is considered to be the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa.

USA multilateralism strategies as provided for by the United States Bureau for counterterrorism (Mc Aleenan, 2019) seemingly are mixed in their applicability and are as discussed below;

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF); This is a multilateral body which seeks to promote civilian cooperation and good practices to counter terrorism. The GCTF is composed of 30 countries and the EU. It consists of a strategic-level Coordinating Committee and five thematic and regional expert-driven working groups focusing on the criminal justice sector and rule of law; countering violent extremism; and capacity building in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia. The GCTF aims to strengthen the international architecture for addressing 21st century terrorism and promotes a strategic, long-term approach to dealing with the threat.

Since its launch in September 2011, the GCTF has mobilized over US \$200 million to strengthen counterterrorism-related rule of law institutions, in particular, for countries transitioning away from emergency law (USDS, 2021).

Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF); The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) is managing the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), which is designed to build a

network of partnerships from South Asia to the Sahel to develop more effective partnerships in countries and regions where terrorist networks seek to establish a foothold. CTPF funding seeks to strengthen civilian counterterrorism partnerships in key countries around the world. According to Department of Defense Budget (2017) Africa-US command received the funds as follows; Sahel Maghreb \$ 125 million, Lake Chad basin \$ 125 million, East Africa \$200 million. US-central command; greater Levant \$ 470 million, Arabian Peninsula \$ 50 million, Central Asia \$ 30 million.

In coordination with the Department of Defence's CTPF efforts, CT seeks to use State's funding to build the capacity of criminal justice sector actors who can respond to, arrest, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate terrorist suspects, recruiters, and financiers in accordance with due process and the rule of law. CT also seeks to use CTPF funding to expand partnerships with non-security and non-governmental actors to counter radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism, especially in regions threatened by ISIS.

Technical Support Working Group (TSWG); The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) is an interagency forum that coordinates U.S. government-wide technology prototyping under the National Combating Terrorism Research and Development (R&D) Program. The mission of the TSWG is to identify, prioritize, and coordinate interagency and international R&D requirements and to rapidly develop technologies and equipment to meet the high-priority needs of the combating terrorism community (USDS, 2019). The TSWG also addresses joint international operational requirements through cooperative R&D with select NATO members, major non-NATO allies, and other friendly foreign nations. The Bureau of Counterterrorism co-chairs the TSWG in partnership with the U.S. Department of Defence, Office of the Assistant Secretary

of Defence for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO/LIC). By leveraging common technical requirements and initiatives, the TSWG develops new products and capabilities for those on the front lines of the counterterrorism effort. The TSWG incorporates expertise from a variety of U.S. and international sources to deliver operational support to first responders, military forces, and to other federal, state, and local government security officials.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP); Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a multifaceted, multi-year strategy implemented jointly by the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defence to assist partners in West and North Africa increase their immediate and long-term capabilities to address terrorist threats and prevent the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia (<https://www.govinfo.gov>.)

Areas of support include: Enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries and law enforcement to conduct counterterrorism operations; Integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and law enforcement, and other supporting partners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; Enhancing border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; Strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement's ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; Monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and Reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

In addition to training and equipping security forces to more effectively combat terrorist threats, TSCTP targets groups in isolated or neglected regions who are most vulnerable to extremist ideologies by supporting youth employment, strengthening local governance capacity to provide development infrastructure, and improving health and educational services.

Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT); First established in 2009, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT), is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism in a comprehensive fashion. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including: Reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks; Developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations; Enhancing border security; Countering the financing of terrorism; and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.

Active PRACT partners include Djibouti, Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Burundi, Comoros, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan are also members of PRACT.

Despite significant number of studies dealing with multilateralism in counterterrorism in various regions discussed above, it is seemingly none has been done to specifically address the Kenya-USA multilateral partnership on counterterrorism which this study endeavours to fill the gap. It can therefore be argued that since terrorism is a threat to global peace and security counter-terrorism requires concerted effort among the states, state institutions and non-state actors to counter the menace.

2.2.3 USA Multifaceted Counterterrorism Partnership

This is a strategy that includes both bilateral and multilateral partnership in counterterrorism efforts. This strategy came up as a result of transnational terrorist's groups which are more dispersed, decentralized, and multifaceted in nature (Sautamato and Beumler, 2013). This strategy has been used by USA in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and in Africa as discussed below;

According to unclassified sources, the United States extensively used of both partners and proxies for counterterrorism in Afghanistan. In terms of partner forces, the first is known as the Afghan Partner Unit (APU) to U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Little has been publicly revealed about this unit, but in Senate testimony former JSOC commander Admiral William McRaven described it as an Afghan special operations unit "that went on target with the JSOC forces forward to ensure that we had an Afghan that was, if you will, going through the door first, that was making first contact with the locals, in order to make sure that we kind of protected the culturally sensitive issues or items that were on target" (2011:41).

While the capabilities of the APU are not known, Admiral McRaven rated them as "top notch." This is reinforced by the fact that operators from the APU were apparently aboard the helicopter carrying JSOC personnel that was shot down in Wardak Province in August 2011. This was alleged to be an immediate reaction force (IRF) responding to other JSOC personnel in an intense ground engagement. It is unlikely that APU personnel would be brought along on such a mission if they were not well regarded by JSOC (Oppel, 2011).

In addition to the APU, U.S. SOF has partnered with Afghan National Army Commandos and Ministry of Interior Provincial Response Companies (PRCs) to

conduct counterterrorism operations. These units are regionally or provincially focused and conduct operations other than just counterterrorism. Both are regarded as highly capable for counterterrorism operations (Richardson, 2010). Finally, the Afghan National Directorate of Security's Counterterrorism Department 90 (DET 90) is reported to partner with international special operations forces to conduct counterterrorism operations (United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan Report, October 2011).

In terms of proxy forces, the United States has not acknowledged the existence of any inside Afghanistan. The CIA, however, has been widely reported to operate proxy forces inside Afghanistan, allegedly known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (Bob, 2010). These teams have been described as "one of the best fighting forces in Afghanistan" and are alleged to be both well paid and well-motivated (Luis, 2010).

Yet the problems with both partner and proxy forces observed in Iraq and elsewhere appear to be present in Afghanistan. Partner forces face ongoing protests about their use in so-called "night raids," operations conducted at night to detain terrorist suspects. These raids are perceived by many Afghans as unjust or at least poorly informed, which results in needless civilian deaths and detentions. In the future, the Afghan government could reduce or suspend partner force cooperation with the United States as a result (Dion, 2010). Conversely, the United Nations has severely criticized DET 90 treatments of detainees, which may make it politically difficult for U.S. leaders to continue cooperation with it in the future.

Proxy force problems, such as friction with host nation security forces, have also apparently occurred. In 2009, a unit known as the Kandahar Strike Force—allegedly supported by the CIA—confronted the police in Kandahar city after one of the

brothers of a strike force member was arrested. The confrontation turned violent and the Kandahar provincial chief of police was killed (Dexter, Mark, and James, 2009).

In conclusion both partners and proxies are likely to be necessary in the continuing campaign against al-Qaida, particularly in troubled regions like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen. In Afghanistan particularly, the drawdown timeline laid out by President Barack Obama means that these forces will assume even greater importance. Policymakers must be cognizant of the strengths and weaknesses of these two different modes of operational cooperation. Overreliance on one at the expense of the other can mean that the U.S. government will lack options as situations rapidly evolve (such as the political landscape in a host nation). At the same time, coordination between these different forces (and their U.S. partners) must be vigorously maintained to prevent the emergence of friction and potentially fratricide between them.

USA partnership on CT has been global in nature because of its strategic interests. To begin with south Asian region, Afghanistan remains an important partner of the United States in the fight against al-Qaida, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) terrorism group. In order to strengthen Afghanistan's capabilities as a partner, and to improve the lives of the Afghan people, U.S. government assist with resources to improve its security, governance, institutions, and economy (USDS, 2021).

The United States military has been engaged in Afghanistan since shortly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the United Nations-mandated International Security Assistance Force Mission (ISAF). At its height, ISAF included more than 130,000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations. ISAF forces fought alongside the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) as the international community worked to improve ANDSF capabilities. U.S. force levels

peaked at roughly 100,000 in 2011, and began to decrease through 2014, as the ANDSF gained strength.

As a result, ISAF officially ended on December 31, 2014, with the ANDSF taking over full responsibility for security in Afghanistan on January 1, 2015, when the United States and NATO formally ended their combat role in Afghanistan and transitioned to a new mission. On January 1, 2015, NATO launched the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), a non-combat mission focused on providing training, advice, and assistance support to the ANDSF. This partnership depicts a success on partnership on counterterrorism. However, the marked success was also accompanied by casualties as there has been an estimated that more than 2,400 U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan since 2001, and over 20,000 U.S. service members have been wounded in action. U.S. casualties in Afghanistan peaked at 499 in 2010 and dropped sharply to an average of about 17 per year after January 2015, when Afghan forces assumed full responsibility for combat operations against the Taliban.

Iraq and Syria are yet other countries that have posed a great threat of terrorism. These countries are unique in that it sponsors international terrorist organizations. Along with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, in March, 2019 the United States completed the destruction of the so-called “caliphate” in Iraq and Syria. In October the same year, the United States launched a military operation that resulted in the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed “caliph” of ISIS. As part of the maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime – the world’s worst state sponsor of terrorism – the United States and its partners imposed new sanctions on Tehran and its proxies (USDS, 2019).

In its concerted effort to defeat terrorists, United States designated Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including its Qods Force, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) – the first time such a designation has been applied to part of another government. And as a result, a number of countries in Western Europe and South America joined the United States in designating Iran-backed Hizballah as a terrorist group in its entirety.

According to US country report on terrorism (2019), the United States and its partners started pursuing Al Quida around the world. The organization faced a significant setback with the elimination of Hamza bin Laden, Usama bin Laden's son and a rising AQ leader. Yet the group and its associated forces remained resilient and continued to pose a threat in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Al Shabab in the Horn of Africa, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam Wal Muslimin in the Sahel, and Hay 'at Tahrir al-Sham/Al-Nusrah Front in Syria are among the world's most active and dangerous terrorist groups.

Africa, historically, was considered to be a European sphere of influence (Ilo, 2015). The US refrained from forging a strong relationship with the continent until decolonization created both trade opportunities and political dangers. For Eisenhower and Kennedy, economic cooperation was a means of attracting African leaders into the Western camp.

However, the US engagement remained limited, because it had no direct strategic or economic interests in Africa (Lawson, 2007). Its Foreign policy under Johnson, Nixon and Ford focused on the competition with the Soviet Union. Africa was just “an adjunct of the West/East struggle” (Waters, 2009) with the only aim to contain the Soviet influence on the continent (Banjo, 2010). For quite a long period of time the

US–Africa policy was reactive, not proactive (Ilo, 2015). The United States only sent substantial economic and military assistance to key allies and anti-Communist rebel organizations with the main objective to create a system of friendly regional powers and to undermine the Soviet client states (Waters 2009).

For nearly two decades after the Cold War, United States foreign policy goals in sub-Saharan Africa have included counter-terrorism and democracy promotion. The assumption among many policymakers has been that these priorities complement one another. Fighting terrorism and similar threats creates the stability that is necessary for democracy to thrive, while establishing participatory institutions reduces the chances that dissidents will resort to violence. Thus, it is reasoned, the two goals go hand in hand. But recent experience around the globe shows that counter-terrorism and democracy promotion are often at odds with one another.

In places such as Egypt, Gaza, and Pakistan, democratic elections have empowered parties with ties to extremist groups. Meanwhile, aggressive counter-terrorism programs have undermined civil liberties and strengthened authoritarian leaders in countries such as Uganda, Malaysia, and Algeria, among others. Given the primacy of U.S. security concerns, counter-terrorism nearly always takes precedence over efforts to promote democracy.

However, with the emergence of and upsurge of global terrorism, USA policy on Africa somehow changed. The extent to which Islamist armed groups in Africa posed a threat to US national security interest (CRS report, 2019). The report further listed the locations of deadly attacks on Western civilians to include; the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013; an international hotel in Bamako, Mali, in 2015; a hotel and restaurant in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in 2016; a resort outside

Bamako in 2017; a resort in Grand Bassam, Côte d'Ivoire, in 2016; the French embassy in Ouagadougou in 2018; and the DusitD2 hotel and office complex in Nairobi. Islamist groups have also kidnapped Western civilians, often for ransom. In addition, Four U.S. soldiers were killed in an October 2017 attack by a local Islamic State affiliate in western Niger, and French military forces operating in Mali have regularly come under attack.

For the interest of this section, the USA partnership on counterterrorism in Africa was discussed in two dimensions, one is the US partnership in the West and Northern (Sahel) Africa while the second part deals with the eastern Africa region. The North and West Africa Counterterrorism Operation related to U.S. activities against violent extremist organizations in two regions of Africa: North Africa (primarily Libya) and West Africa (primarily countries in the Lake Chad region and the Sahel). In Libya, U.S. forces conducted lethal counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS-Libya.

In West Africa, the U.S. military does not have direct action authority to conduct unilateral counterterrorism operations. Instead, the U.S. military provides security assistance to partner nations as they work to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the region so as to reduce on costs in terms of human resource and finances. This included support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, an African-led and French-assisted force that consisted of approximately 4,500 troops from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The U.S. military also supported Multinational Joint Task Force, which was composed of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. According to the USAFRICOM Posture Statement, USAFRICOM and USAID worked with Multinational Joint Task Force to deliver humanitarian support

to West African nations (Townsend, 2020). Furthermore, U.S. forces conducted limited counterterrorism operations as a part of their support to partner nations in West Africa.

Another line of counterterrorism partnership in West African state is seen when Niger offered an Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger. This Agreement with the government of Niger permitted armed and unarmed missions USAFRICOM to respond to threats and other security issues in the region. The 6-year transition of operations from Niamey Air Base 101 to Agadez Air Base 201 cost the DoD an estimated \$110 million (Correll, 2019).

Capacity-building is another line of partnership efforts in West Africa. This partnership varies from country to country, depending on the level of government commitment and capabilities of local security forces. For instance, in Burkina Faso and Mali, two of the most unstable countries in the region, most advice and assist activities are conducted through civil-military elements. In Nigeria, a small contingent of U.S. personnel work with Nigerians in the Intelligence Fusion Centre from which some advice and assistance activities are conducted, according to USAFRICOM (2016).

In Niger, a U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment provided advice and assistance support during the quarter to the 51st Special Intervention Battalion in Diffa, Niger, a unit that conducts operations in the Lake Chad region. Additionally, a Special Forces Operational Detachment provided advise and assist support to the 11th Special Intervention Battalion, which is conducting operations in the tri-border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. A third Special Forces Operational

Detachment oversaw train, advice, and assist activities with a counterterrorism force in Arlit, Niger (*Department of Diplomatic Security Report*, 2019).

According to USAFRICOM, Special Operations Command (2019), Africa's engagements in Cameroon are limited to training with the Cameroonian Navy and the Rapid Intervention Battalion on maritime and riverine operations. Similarly, Special Operations Command Africa's engagements in Chad are limited to riverine operations. In Benin, according to USAFRICOM, U.S. Army Africa provided relief troop movement of Benin Armed Forces to a security detail assignment at the Multinational Joint Task Force headquarters in Chad. Additionally, U.S. Army Africa conducted initial planning for counter-improvised explosive device training scheduled for February 2020. It is from the above body of literature that this study sought to explore and expound the nature of strategic partnership on counterterrorism that this relationship takes in efforts to thwart the terrorists menace in Kenya for mutuality of interests.

2.4 Mechanisms and Outcomes of Kenya-USA Counter-Terrorism Partnership

The context is contextualized as a problem of unit homogeneity (Felleti & Lynch, 2009). Further they define context as the relevant aspects of a setting in which an array of initial conditions leads to an outcome of a defined scope and meaning via causal mechanisms. In this study, the context is terrorism which is the threat to human life in the contemporary society. Due to its effects in the aftermath of 9/11, which claimed 2,977 lives making it the deadliest attack in US history (Schmitte & shaker, 2005). 196 sovereign states rallied the support on USA global war on terror (USDS, 2002). In this war leaders in their individual capacity and collectively agreed to support each other in the counterterrorism efforts.

Counterterrorism is a military campaign led by United States of America and its allies through inter-state partnerships globally targeting militant Islamist and Salafi jihadist armed organizations such as al-Qaida, the Islamic state, and their international affiliates, which were waging insurgencies to overthrow governments of various Muslim majority countries (USDS,2022). In addition, this war is aimed at thwarting terrorists acts before executed.

Terrorist acts are targeted against the U.S. and its allies globally and are intended to limit U.S. engagement and influence in the terrorist's region of interest and throughout the world (Willie, *Undated*). The 9/11 terrorist attack though happened in USA, its magnitude is said to have been felt globally. It is estimated that (USDS,2001) the attack affected more than 86 nations, more than 3,000 people died or remain missing following the attacks who are from more than 80 different nations, from many different races and religions. More than 343 firefighters and paramedics perished at the World Trade Center, approximately 23 police officers and 37 Port Authority police officers lost their lives, and approximately 2,000 children lost a parent on September 11, including 146 children who lost a parent in the Pentagon attacks. Since the beginning of the global war on terror in 2001 to 2019, the war is estimated to have costed \$8 trillion and over 900,000 lives globally (<https://www.brown.edu/news/2021-09-01/costsofwar.>)

2.4.1 Causal Mechanism

Causal mechanism is important in understanding causation. Causal mechanism (Mohoney, 2001) is an entity that when activated generates an outcome of interest. Further, causal mechanisms are bases of deterministic lawlike statements distinct from variables attached to a practical case and operates in different contexts. In this political

science causal mechanism resides in the interaction between the context and the mechanism which they operate (Tilly, 2001) to influence the desired outcome.

In this study the causal mechanism is the reproduction of state power. This is a demonstration of how state power is transferred from one individual or a group to another over time in a state which is a consequence of both the ruled and the rulers (Dahl, 1971). Further he asserts that the nature and practice of the reproduction of power over succeeding regime is, in all polities, one of the hallmarks of the nature of political order. In this context, global war on terror started by the USA under the leadership of G.W Bush in 2001 has continued for over two decades by the successive regimes and its allies globally (USDS, 2002).

In its endeavor to succeed in this war, USA and its allies have forged a close partnership with its allies in various regions to counter this menace globally (Santamato and Beumler, 2001). Strategic partnerships (SPs) constitute a novel form and feature of the evolving international relations system and represent a new principle for organizing international life which are meant to cope with systemic and issue-specific international challenges (Tyushka & Czechowska, 2018). In the wake of terrorism attacks coupled with the its evolving environment of transnationalism in nature in the post-cold war era the leading states in attempt to cope with and respond adequately to this security challenge have resorted to this kind of partnership as a safeguard to their state interests (Santamato, 2012).

It is imperative to note that it is difficult for one to adopt an approach or attempt to make a distinction between national and international terrorism and still not be able to define a single framework to capture all aspects of the challenge (Shelley and Picarelli, 2002). As a direct consequence of al Qaeda's attacks on the United States,

NATO's involvement with countering terrorism has focused on its international dimension "over and above" national efforts and beyond national borders.

As scattered al Qaeda and its affiliates network have become more difficult to pin down. Its leadership decreases in influence but spreads in numbers. Front lines become more blurred and terrorist tactics diversify and blend. Terrorism becomes a principal tactic incorporated by states and nonstate actors within a "new" category of "hybrid" threats necessitating concerted efforts over successive regimes to counter it (Miklaucic, 2011).

In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attack the then USA President came up with a comprehensive and visionary foreign policy against international terrorism which was and has been to be supported by its allies through successive regimes globally. The following are the contents of its foreign policy;

- i) **The Military Campaign:** Operation *Enduring Freedom* began on October 7, 2001, and enjoys the support of countries from the United Kingdom to Australia to Japan. The Taliban were to be forced to surrender major cities. The military has destroyed 11 terrorist training camps and 39 Taliban command and control sites. And al-Qaeda terrorists were to be captured, killed or are on the run.
- ii) **Terrorist Finances:** The President fired the first shot in the war on terrorism with the stroke of his pen to seize terrorist financial assets and disrupt their fundraising pipelines. The world financial community moved to starve the terrorists of their financial support. 196 countries supported the financial war on terror; 142 countries froze terrorist assets; in the U.S. alone, the assets of 153 known terrorists, terrorist organizations, and

terrorist financial centers were frozen; and major terrorist financial networks closed down.

- iii) **Diplomacy:** President Bush built a worldwide coalition against terrorism. More than 80 countries suffered losses on September 11; 136 countries offered a diverse range of military assistance; 46 multilateral organizations declared their support; and with U.S. leadership and international support, Afghans are putting aside long-standing ethnic and political differences to form a new and representative government.
- iv) **Law Enforcement:** The U.S. led a global dragnet to help bring terrorists to justice and help prevent future terrorist acts, creating the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force to prevent terrorists from entering the U.S.; arresting and indicting known terrorists; increasing the global sharing of law enforcement information; and implementation tough new anti-terrorism laws.
- v) **Homeland Security:** President Bush took steps to help protect America against further terrorist attacks, providing \$20 billion for homeland security; strengthening intelligence efforts; creating the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council; implementing tough new airline security measures; and taking steps to protect America's mail.
- vi) **Respecting Islam:** Almost immediately after the attacks the President took steps to protect Muslim-Americans from hate crimes. The President also held a series of events, including hosting the first-ever White House Iftar and an Eid event at the end of Ramadan; the President visited the Islamic

Center; and the President created the "Friendship Through Education" initiative to bring American and Muslim children closer together.

- vii) Humanitarian: As Afghanistan's largest humanitarian donor, the U.S. increased its aid to the Afghan people by providing \$187 million in aid since October alone, including food, shelter, blankets, and medical supplies. The President also launched the America's Fund for Afghan Children that has already raised more than \$1.5 million for the children of Afghanistan. As the harsh Afghan winter approaches, the U.S. commitment to the Afghan people is saving lives.
- viii) Helping the Survivors of September 11: The American people have responded with overwhelming compassion for the families of the victims of September 11, donating at least \$1.3 billion to charities (<https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm>).

During the Bush administration two notable counterterrorism wars were fought; Afghanistan 2001-2014, Iraq 2003-2011. At the end came Barak Obama administration, who ascended to the power through repudiation of his predecessor approach on global war on terror (Guelke, 2010). However, with time he faced challenges with Karzai's weakness as a result of his regime's involvement in widespread electoral malpractice and the increased possibility that could succumb without external support to a resurgent Taliban pushed Obama into accepting the option of shoring up the regime through the dispatch of a further 30,000 American troops. The congress voted for the budget of \$ 33 billion \$33 billion mostly for the U.S. military in Afghanistan (Cornwell, 2008).

In addition, Obama war on terror was a continuation from his predecessor in Pakistan and Iraq which had started in 2001. By 2011, it is estimated that \$ 130 billion had been spend by the two regimes in counterterrorism in the said states.

During the Presidency of Joe bidden 2021- to date, the Americans have not relented on the global war on terror. The Biden administration although withdrawing USA military in Afghanistan (<https://www.whitehouse.gov>) it has continued to conduct lethal operations employing the euphemistic term “over the horizon” strikes and to prioritize and promote around the world a militarized approach to counterterrorism ([https://www.fcni.org/updates/2022-08/failures-war-terror.](https://www.fcni.org/updates/2022-08/failures-war-terror)) Since the beginning of the global war on terror by the then USA president W.G. Bush in 2001 to date, the war on terror has been on the forefront of the successive regimes.

Despite the policies aimed at counterterrorism in place through successive regimes the global war on terror has been criticized for gross violation of fundamental human right as enshrined in the international treaties and protocols. For instance, in Jordan following the terrorist attacks in Imam in 2005 the government blatantly infringed the enjoyment of the following fundamental rights and freedom on its citizens; women's rights, right to life, right to think, right to speak, and right to participate (Milton-Edward, 2017).

2.4.2 Enhancement of State Power

Enhancement of state power is the resilience of the state affected by terrorist’s attacks to bounce back to its former state of affairs and continue its social economic and political development. It is the outcome or benefits of counterterrorism efforts by the inter-State partnerships.

Terrorism not only undermines the smooth functioning of the rule of law and jeopardizes government's territorial integrity and safety, it also threatens the economic and social fabric of countries (<https://www.ohchr.org>). Hence, terrorism imposes significant economic and social costs on societies and leads not only to direct material damages, but also to long-term negative effects that hinder countries' economy and their capability to growth.

Terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. If a developing country loses enough FDI, which is an important source of savings, then it may also experience reduced economic growth. Just as capital may take flight from a country plagued by a civil war (Collier et al., 2003), a sufficiently intense terrorist campaign may greatly reduce capital inflows (Enders and Sandler, 1996). Terrorism, like civil conflicts, may cause spillover costs among neighboring countries as a terrorist campaign in a neighbor dissuades capital inflows, or a regional multiplier causes lost economic activity in the terrorism-ridden country to resonate throughout the region.

In some instances, terrorism may impact specific industries as 9/11 did on airlines and tourism (Drakos, 2004; Ito and Lee, 2004). Another cost is the expensive security measures that must be instituted following large attacks – e.g., the massive homeland security outlays since 9/11 (Enders and Sandler, 2006). Terrorism also raises the costs of doing business in terms of higher insurance premiums, expensive security precautions, and larger salaries to at-risk employees.

To conclude, this study seeks to look at the outcome of the interstate partnership on counterterrorism on the above economic variable which suffer as a result of terrorism

attacks on economic and productive resources which could have generated added value for the country. Combating terrorism often led to an increase of military spending in detriment of economic and social programs. This reallocation of resources, in favor of counterterrorism programs, seriously challenges states already lacking resources to address economic and social rights issues within their own country. In such case, counterterrorism measures can fuel the resentment and discontent among the general public, exacerbate the existing critical situation, and negatively impact on the enjoyment of economic and social rights.

2.5 The Effects of Strategic Counter-terrorism Partnership

The question of security has long since preoccupied the minds of International Relationists. The traditional concept of security with the state as the main referent has been up for extensive debate. According to Buzan (1991), Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the “security” label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept.

The concept of regional security is relational, because one cannot understand the national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of security interdependence in which it is embedded (Buzan, 1991). In his analysis of regional security and how it affects the concept of security as a whole, Buzan offers

several interesting and important concepts. The first is that of “amity and enmity among states”, in other words relationships between states that can represent a spectrum from friendship or alliances to those marked by fear. According to Buzan, the concepts of amity and enmity cannot be attributed solely to the balance of power.

The issues that can affect these feelings range from things such as ideology, territory, ethnic lines, and historical precedent. This is important to understand as the concept of amity/enmity leads to the idea of what Buzan refers to as “security complex” which is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.” This interpretation takes into consideration a security complex that is at odds as well as one that is unified under shared interests. Security complexes can be useful in terms of policy and they also provide a good framework to discuss issues that are endemic to any one region. If the solution can be found only from within the context of the complex, then the policy should be made from within this context as well. Some of the effects of counter-terrorism strategies are as below:

Psychological Effect

Southers (2014) explain that the major and direct impacts of terror are the psychological ramifications. The people are greatly affected psychologically either directly or indirectly when a terrorist event occurs. The stress level increases and people fear for their safety. Waxman (2011) writes “terrorism is a form of psychological warfare against a society.” He also adds that “the greater the number of attacks and the more lethal those attacks are, the more people will be psychologically affected by them.” As Grieger (2006) points out, people affected by a terrorist attack may experience acute stress disorder (AST) or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTST).

He also notes that, “Depression and bereavement may be more likely outcome than AST and PTST when individuals have lost loved ones.” (Grieger, 2006:1). The commonly identifiable symptom of PTST and AST is “avoiding people or situations that remind one of the traumatic experiences,” (Waxman, 2011).

Studies conducted on Israelis after several attacks indicated that terrorism is capable of inducing fear and worry for personal safety beyond the actual damage of the attack (Friedland & Merari, 1985). Terrorism aims to create an atmosphere of anxiety, worry and fear for personal safety because people are not able to control where it will happen next, simply because terrorists use random tactics which are hard to predict. According to studies conducted after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the USA, it indicated that terrorism has a psychological impact even on those people even those who had not directly been exposed to the attack (Waxman, 2011). The extensive media coverage of the terrorist attack can cause more psychological trauma on a population. Waxman (2011) also notes that terrorism affects people’s daily lives no matter if they were directly affected or not.

However, the result of the studies conducted by Friedland & Merari (1985) indicated that terrorism had failed to achieve its goal in the case of Israel. The result indicated that people instead favoured extreme counterterrorism measures instead of a peace agreement or a possible recognition of the Palestinian territory. Thus, it can be argued that terrorism succeeds in its aim of causing fear and concern of safety to the public and consequently putting a government under pressure but it fails in its goals of a government meeting their political demands.

Economic Effect

Terrorism has a great economic effect on a country. When the target of the attacks is on a developing country, then the effect is even greater. Some of the consequences that terrorism has had are with respect to “diverting foreign direct investment, destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security and limiting trade” (Sandler & Enders, 2008). Research indicates that terrorism that occurs in developing countries is likely to have more impact on the country’s economy than terrorism that occurs in a developed country (Sandler & Enders, 2008). The main reasoning for this argument is that, a developed nation has more resources and capabilities to survive prolonged attacks.

Effects on Tourism Industry

“When tourism ceases to be pleasurable due to actual or perceived risks, tourists exercise their freedom and power to avoid risky situations or destinations,” (Sonmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow, 1999). When terrorists target to affect the tourist venues of a country, then the country will be greatly affected because the tourists are likely to change their plans of visiting a country that has been affected by terrorism. This follows from the travel warnings issued by foreign countries whose citizens can be targeted in the attacks. Sandler & Enders (1992) conducted studies in three countries (Austria, Spain, and Italy) that were affected by terrorism between 1978 and 1988 indicated that there was a sizable amount of loss in revenue during this period.

Terrorism also has had an impact on foreign investment in a country, even if the companies themselves aren’t targeted. The risk of terrorism forces investors to implement more security measures and offer compensation to the personnel, thus

reducing their returns. For that reason, the investors would opt to redirect their business to safer countries even if the costs are higher (Sandler & Enders, 2008).

Social Effects

Society as a whole change when affected by terrorism. In the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks, for instance, the citizens of New York, and Americans as a whole, changed their way of thinking with respect to security and Muslims, becoming a lot more cautious and aware of their surroundings than before.

Security checks at airports have since become more stringent and Muslims/ Arabs have become victims of racial/religious profiling, oftentimes being suspected of being terrorists by fellow citizens or law enforcement for no other reason than their appearance. In the case of the 9/11 attack, there was a notable rise of Islamophobia in the US. In Israel during the second intifada, Waxman (2011) writes, that the Israelis viewed Palestinians as “dishonest, violent and having little regard for human life.” Stereotyping has resultantly been on the rise, leading people in society to have a negative feeling towards the group that the terrorists claim to represent. For example, when the terrorists separate Christians from Muslims and then kill Christians, this tends to create an image of Muslims as terrorists. Hostility and suspicion of those that the terrorist groups represented were also on the increase in society. In the case of Israel, for example, a study conducted by Arian (2003), Muslims were seen as a security threat to the Israelis.

As discussed earlier, terrorism aims to cause fear and concern for personal safety. That concern tends to create negative feelings towards the terrorists and their cause rather than solidarity with their demands. Waxman (2011) explains that “a sense of victimhood is common to a society experiencing terrorism.” The result may be a

hardening of attitudes and crystallization of opposition to the cause pursued by the terrorists (Friedland & Merari, 1985).

Finally, people fear socializing in areas which are prone to terrorist attacks. In Kenya, for instance, the once popular Westgate Mall was now but a shell of its former self. Following the terrorist attacks in 2013, efforts to rebuild the mall back to its former glory have largely been unsuccessful and painstakingly slow because people fear visiting a place that reminds them of the horrific act of terrorism that occurred therein. This restriction with respect to socializing freely lowers the quality of life as it prevents people from truly enjoying their life and limits where they can patronize, at what time, and so on.

Political Effects

Some scholars suggest that terrorism is a political tool used by a group to achieve political goals. As seen earlier, terrorism has psychological, economic and social impacts on a country. Due to this impact terrorism has on the people, the government is forced to find ways to regain public confidence and recover from the attacks. Pollack and Wood (2010) note that in cases where a situation after an attack seems to be mishandled, the citizens may lose confidence in the government and public institutions. In order to gain public trust and confidence, the government may take measures that may violate the civil liberties. A government may for example easily pass anti-terror laws that are contrary to human rights simply because they are supported by the public.

Friedland and Merari (1985) argues that there are times when terrorism becomes an effective tool to achieve political goals. They say that when a critical threshold is exceeded, people are likely to concede to the demands of the terrorists. For

Afghanistan as an example, the public demanded that the US forces be withdrawn from its soils. “Below this threshold, terrorism is not merely effective but appears to cause a hardening of attitudes and crystallization of opposition to the causes pursued by the terrorists.”

Military Threats

This is yet another impact that terrorist’s attacks pose to a State is military threats which can affect all components of the state. It can put into question the very basic duty of a state to be able to protect its citizens as well as have an adverse effect on the “layers of social and individual interest (Buzan, 1991). The level and objectives of military threat can take on different levels of importance, and the fact that they involve the use of force puts them in a special category when it comes to security.

Since the above effects on terrorism and counterterrorism takes different trajectories depending on social economic and political wellbeing of a states, this study endeavours to assess the effects of counterterrorism strategic partnership between Kenya and USA in Kenya.

2.6 Counterterrorism Challenges on Strategic Partnership

Regardless of the dimension counterterrorism partnership takes- bilateralism or multilateralism, global war on terror is still a security challenge in the contemporary society. In the aftermath of cold war USA was faced with terrorists threats whose nature was diverse ([www.http//brooking.edu](http://brooking.edu)). In response to this threats UAS assembled global coalition of friendly states and allies through the UN which is a supra-national organization to lead in the Global Counter Terrorism efforts. The USA war on terror took the following dimensions; diplomatic pressure, economic and political sanctions, intelligence, and, law enforcement cooperations among partners

globally (Daalder and lindsay, 2001). Due to the nature of terrorism, the war against it has been confronted by various challenges globally which are discussed below;

Ambiguity in its Definition

The first challenge is the lack of unanimously agreed upon definition of terrorism. No international legal definition of terrorism has been agreed upon. And although the United Nations documents provide operational definitions or interpretations of customary international law, and existing conventions against terrorism do provide a universal legal regime against terrorism, none is comprehensive. The UN General Assembly has not reached consensus on a definition of terrorism that would be adhered to by all countries. In turn, differences over the definition have been a major factor in the failure to pass a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism, which criminalizes all forms of international terrorism. However, till this consensus is attained, a person or a group who are viewed from a certain perspective as terrorist can be viewed from another perspective as a free fighter or a martyr.

UN-Institutional Challenge

The second challenge is at that institutional level of the United Nations, as much more needs to be done. The role of the UN General Assembly is limited by its inability to pass binding resolutions. In fact, the UN is a legislative body with no capacity to execute its legislations. It is even often viewed to lack of legitimacy because of the lack of full global demographic, and geographic representation in the five permanent members of the Security council, and the lack of democratic decision-making process because of the veto rights entitled to the five permanent members, which hinders UN capacity and credibility in implementing its Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.

Human Rights Pillar

This is the third challenge in counterterrorism globally. The fourth pillar of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy emphasizes on the respect for human rights for all, and the rule of law, as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. This pillar complements the first pillar of the Strategy that considers respect to human rights as a preventive measure. Yet, as the United Nations takes the lead on counterterrorism efforts, it faces challenges in this area. On human rights, the UN General Assembly, Security Council, and Human Rights Council have taken significant steps to emphasize the centrality of human rights protection to effective counterterrorism efforts. Increasingly, the UN approach to counterterrorism promotes a nonmilitary, rule of law–based model.

The United Nations has played an important role in galvanizing states around this approach. Yet, concern remains that even now there are weaknesses in the United Nations' integration of human rights and counterterrorism activities and in the efforts by states to implement their UN-backed counterterrorism obligations. Ongoing concerns that listing and delisting arrangements may still not measure up to judicial scrutiny and that the Security Council and General Assembly may still not be paying adequate attention to the human rights impact of national-level implementation of UN counterterrorism norms continue to undermine. In addition to the fact that Promoting and protecting human rights while pursuing counterterrorism efforts, continues to be a significant challenge. There is also reluctance of some states to incorporate the human rights agenda which overshadows the emerging consensus among UN member states that human rights are a fundamental part of counterterrorism. Furthermore, the primary framework, Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, obliges countries to implement legal measures to combat terrorism, yet fails to establish limits on what

these new laws should entail. Human rights were not mentioned in UNSCR 1373 beyond a reference regarding refugee status, to the extent that some governments took the mandate of UNSCR 1373 as an opportunity to squash internal dissent.

Monitoring and Enforcement UN Commitments

Monitoring and enforcement of commitments to UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy is the fourth challenge which remains spotty, because some countries lack of political will, or governance capacity, particularly when dealing with non-state actors. Moreover, terrorists increasingly resort to informal methods of financial support that are more difficult to curtail.

Lack of Capacity to Resolve Conflicts

There is a lack of capacity of the United Nations to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. In addition, its lack of capacity to resolve the unresolved inter and intra state conflicts, such as the Arab Israeli Conflict, since 1948, Afghanistan since 1978, Iraq since 2003, Turkish/Kurdish conflict since 1984, Somalia civil war since 1991, communal conflict in Nigeria since 1998, War in Sudan Darfur 2003, War in North West Pakistan since 2004, let alone new conflicts that developed in post 2010 in the Arab World, such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen further complicates the counterterrorism efforts (Guehenno, 2016).

Although the number of Security Council resolutions has increased tremendously in the post-cold war era, however, the impact of this increase has not resulted in eliminating terrorism. Security Council Resolutions has increased from zero in 1945 to 725 in 1991 (end of Cold war to be) to accumulate to 724 resolutions in 46 years. The number of resolutions has increased from 724 in 1991 to 2133 in 2016 to accumulate to the Security Council producing 1606 resolution in 25 years.

The Number of Peace keeping missions deployed have increased from two in 1948 to twenty-four in 1991 (after the end of the cold war) while from 1991 to 2016 forty-six Peace Keeping missions were deployed (Peace Keeping Fact Sheet, 2016). However, this increases in activeness of the producing Security Council Resolutions, and deployment of Peace Keeping operations, did not result in effectiveness in attaint global peace and security. Same applies for the effectiveness of the UN Human Rights Council and Peace Building Committee that were established in 2005. In fact, pillar three in the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy is dependent on the efforts of UN agencies and institutions, which have proved often inefficiency due to budget deficiency or being affected by the double standardization that governs the UN in general and the Security Council in specific.

The UN millennium Development goals targeting poverty, human rights, and human security have attained a level of success but not enough due to various global obstacles worldwide. In fact, activeness of UN bodies was not reflected in effectiveness as conditions that lead to the spread of terrorism such as, poor education, health, lack of inclusion. This has resulted in weak capacity of the first pillar in the Global Counter Terrorism Strategy that focus on the addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.

Lack of Political Will from Member States

The UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy is dependent on the Member States political will to cooperate and coordinate in the implementation of the strategy. However, experience has proved that Member States can be sponsors of terrorism. In fact, terrorism has grown beyond extremist groups to also include radical states that sponsor or support terrorist activity as tools of their own foreign policy

(www.unodc.org). In addition to the fact that the international developments have resulted in failed states that has provided a safe haven impeding the efforts to combat terrorism.

Duplicity of Issues

Seventh, The United Nations' strategic leadership role is also undermined by duplication and lack of normative integration on issues closely related to counterterrorism, including transnational threats (fighting drug trafficking and organized crime and technical assistance on rule of law issues). There is a need of increased attention to the linkages between these issues and propose some architectural reforms that might foster this, such as, in the most ambitious form, consideration of the future creation of a position of Under Secretary-General for Transnational Threats.

Difficulty in Measurement of Success

Eighth, there has been no system-wide effort to assess the effectiveness of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. UN bodies involved in counterterrorism efforts have not systematically thought to measure their own impacts and performance, and are thus unable to reliably identify their comparative advantages in the international counterterrorism arena.

It should be noted that the United Nations so far lack of attention to performance measurement in its counterterrorism programming hampers the efforts by strategic decision-makers to deploy UN political, financial, and human resources in a cost-effective manner. To put the point most provocatively, it is difficult to argue, on the basis of current evidence as opposed to anecdote and supposition, whether the United Nations is an effective counterterrorism actor. In fact, Reshaping United Nations

Counterterrorism Efforts in the counterterrorism field, the measurement of outcomes and impacts is inherently difficult.

Limited Funding

Last but not least, the limited funds devoted to multilateral counterterrorism efforts have left little room for the United Nations to provide leadership in this field. Nonetheless, in this fiscal climate, it is timely to ask whether the United Nations can do more to ensure that is adding maximum value given its unique role in the global effort to suppress terrorism.

The above challenges to counterterrorism emanate from the general hindrances facing the global body in countering terrorist's activities. In this endeavour, the study focuses on the USA which is a hegemon in the current unipolar system. In the aftermath of 9/11 the USA declared a global war on terror which began with Afghanistan, Iraq, and thereafter to everywhere in the globe where USA interests were at stake (<https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/global-war-terror>).

Kenya being an anchor state and a USA strategic partner in the region has suffered major terrorists attack targeting US interests. For instance, the 1998 terrorists bombing on USA embassy in Nairobi and Dar-salaam, 2002 on Paradise hotel in Mombasa, the Westgate shopping mall in 2013, Dusit D2 hotel in 2019, among others. It is from the above foregoing that the study sought to analyse the challenges faced by the strategic partnership of these two states on counterterrorism in Kenya.

2.7 Social Constructivist Theory

Theories are beacons, lenses or filters that direct us to understanding some part of the world (True, 2005). In this study, the researcher utilizes the constructivism theory of international relations. This theory corroborates some of the salient tenets of both

realism theory and liberalism theory in attempt to explain the international relations in the past-cold war era which the traditional theories failed to account for (Onuf, 1989).

It should be noted that the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, traditional IR scholars have been finding it quite difficult to understand the War on Terror (WoT), the working of the largest terrorist group with world-wide network-al-Qaeda, or anything to do with its Islamic ideologies. Rationalist approaches such as Realism and Liberalism, hardly had anything to contribute to the understanding of 9/11 attacks motivated by religious convictions. 'Constructivism seemed best placed in evaluating terrorism,' though constructivist exploration into terrorism has been few and far between (Lynch, 2006).

The 9/11 attacks emphasized the importance of 'understanding culture, identity, religion, and ideas' through international relations theory. The failure of traditional IR scholars in predicting the end of the Cold War made space for Constructivism (Krishanswamy, 2015), the social theory of international politics.

This failure can be linked to some of their core tenets, such as the conviction that states are the main actors motivated by self-interest which leads to competition of power and unequal distribution of the same defines the balance of power between states. By having dominant focuses on the state, traditional theories have not opened much space to observe the agency of individuals. Actors (usually powerful ones, like leaders and influential citizens) continually shape – and sometimes reshape – the very nature of international relations through their actions and interactions.

Further, in the understanding of counterterrorism, constructivists go beyond the reality (Morgenthau, 1978) by including the effect of ideas and beliefs on world politics (Measheimer and Carr, 2005). This also entails that reality is always under

construction, which opens the prospect for change. In other words, meanings are not fixed but can change over time depending on the ideas and beliefs that actors hold.

Constructivism sees the world as socially constructed (Wendt, 1995), a feature which is absent in both realism and liberalism perspectives in global politics. Krishnaswamy (2015), points that in understanding terrorism and counterterrorism, constructivist theories are best suited to analyse how identities and interests can change over time. Further, this is essential in understanding the diverse and ever-changing state responses to transnational terrorism.

Constructivists also, argue that agency and structure are mutually constituted, which implies that structures influence agency and that agency influences structures (Wendt's, 1999). Agency can be understood as the ability of someone to act, whereas structure refers to the international system that consists of material and ideational elements.

Constructivists believe that 'states will act differently to friends and enemies,' based on their 'threat perceptions.' Their behaviours will be 'shaped by their shared understanding and collective knowledge of the self and the other.' They consider that 'shared identity decreases threat perception' (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007). This noticeably explains why USA insists on collaborations.


This theory will be of help in trying to understand the study; Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism; as the partnership is meant for mutually of both parties. For instance, the mutuality between Kenya and United States of America are shared identities of interests-citizens, infrastructures e.g., trade routes, military bases, businesses and regional dominance and hegemonic

interests. These interests bring about state, and non-states interactions on counterterrorism.

After the cold war, interest in regions as distinct features within international relations theory has fluctuated and has predominantly been focused on regionalism and the conceptualization of regions as imagined communities. Regionalism has emerged as a focal point for constructivists in the development of a ‘new world order’ and has dominated regional analysis with its belief in regional groupings being bound together by shared identities, values and cultures.

2.8 Conceptual Framework

This study adopts the constructivist theoretical Conceptual framework of Falleti & Lynch (2009) model of context and causal mechanisms in political analysis. In this study, the model focuses on; terrorism as a context, reproduction of state power (Kenya) as a causal mechanism, and enhancement of state power in counterterrorism as the outcome which are illustrated in the conceptual frame below.



From the diagram above, interstate strategic partnership (K-USA) is the independent variable while the counterterrorism is independent variable. The influence of independent variable on dependent variable is through reproduction of state power is expected to yield positive outcome on the variables under the study in Kenya counterterrorism efforts. The outcome's expected in this partnership are; increase in foreign direct investments, increase in tourism income, religious tolerance in Kenya's population, reduced security expenditure in counterterrorism efforts, and enhanced employment opportunities among the Kenya's population.

2.9 Literature Gap

The sets out to fill the literature gap on the following sub-themes in the study; The nature of partnership among states globally can be categorized as bilateral. This nature involves only sovereign states for mutuality of interests (Keohane, 2004). Terrorism and counterterrorism is a post-cold war phenomenon which is characterized with globalization and its effects which could be a catalyzed to both security and insecurity. In addition, the effects of terrorism on one part of the globe affects the well being of the population of the entire globe which makes this study interesting in bringing in new knowledge on interstate relations on strategic partnerships for mutuality of interests.

On multilateralism, the interstate relations are widening to include non-state actors, supra-national institutions and other stakeholders affected by global challenges for mutuality of interests. This study comes in to expound how these relations led by states and supported by other non-state actors in solving global problem.

Kenya's relations with the USA have been both cordial and conflictual in equal measure. In particular, this study would provide a clear trajectory that the relations

between the two strategic partners on counterterrorism considering that Kenya is considered as an anchor state by the USA (Cursons, 2015).

Finally, the gap on the challenges as expounded on literature review deals with those of the United Nations which is a supra- national institution. This study sets to find out the challenges facing counterterrorism in Kenya-USA strategic partnership emanating from the trajectory of the partnership the relations take on fighting terror in Kenya.

2.10 Chapter Summary

The above chapter contains extensive literature on the historical evolution of Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counter terrorism, the available literature on the nature and identity of Kenya USA partnership on counterterrorism, the effects of Kenya-USA strategic partnership on counterterrorism efforts in Kenya, and the challenges encountered by Kenya-USA strategic partnership on national counterterrorism. This section also highlights the gaps in literature which this study intends to fill and the end. In addition, the chapter has the conceptual framework and a theory that guides the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Overview

This chapter describes the research strategy, the philosophy guiding the study, research design, research site, target population, sample and sampling procedure, data collection methods, data analysis, data presentations, ethical considerations, limitation of the study, validity and reliability.

3.1 Research Strategy

Research strategy is an aspect within research methodology which is assumed as the “general plan of how the researcher goes about in answering the research questions” (Sunders *et al*, 2009). Sarantakos defines research methods as “the theory of methods (Sarantakos, 2012:465), or the way through which a researcher makes sense of inquiry or elementary questions which shapes the flow and structure of the study.

Therefore, the necessity of deploring a research strategy is based on the aims and objectives of the study. As Sunders et al. (2009), has emphasized that the choice of research strategy is guided by research questions and objectives. Similarly, the extent of existing knowledge, the availability of amount of time, as well as the philosophical underpinnings are also important. To arrive at the strategy that the study adopted, each strategy was evaluated on the basis of its strength and weaknesses as below; reliance on inductive strategy has serious limitations associated with it that has not been known by researches as it cannot be used to prove anything. Data may support, fail to support, or in some cases, and dis-credit a generalization (Rath, 1967). Whereas in deductive strategy is not self-sufficient methodology since it must make use of such notion as truth, meaning, and reality, which are taken over from the realms intrinsically more fundamental than formal science (Rath, 1967).

This study, adopted a retroductive research strategy since the study uses a model of context, causal mechanism and outcome- which is tested. In this study, the outcome to be explained are the results of counter terrorism partnerships, the context is counterterrorism, and the causal mechanism is the reproduction of the power of the Kenyan state. Power Reproduction as a causal mechanism-which is a portable concept used in explaining the three objectives has been discussed by Falleti & Lynch (2009). To this end, the research adopted a qualitative study to gain an in-depth insight of the research context.

3.2 Research Philosophy

The term philosophy in research has been defined differently by different scholars. According to Guba & Lincoln (1982), philosophy in research refers to the development of knowledge and its nature. Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, (2007), defines it as the development of research assumption, knowledge, and nature, where the assumptions are perceived as a preliminary statement of reasoning, based on the philosophizing person's knowledge and insights that are born as a product of intellectual activity. Hitchcock and Hughes, (1969) argues that research philosophy is a method which, when applied, allow the scientists to generate ideas into knowledge in the context of research. Considering the above definitions, it means that different researchers may have different assumptions about the nature of truth and knowledge and its acquisition.

3.2.1 Pragmatism

This study was guided by Pragmatism philosophy. This philosophy deals with the facts. In this research philosophy, the practical results are considered important (Lancaster, 2005). Researchers have freedom of choice. They are "free" to choose the methods, techniques, and procedures that best meet their needs and scientific research

aims. The truth is what is currently in action; it does not depend on the mind that is not subject to reality and the mind dualism.

3.3 Research Design

Research design is the “Glue” that holds all of the elements in a research project together, in short it is a plan of the proposed research work. According to Yin (2009), a research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collection and analysing the information needed. It is a science of analysis and how research is done systematically (Kothari, 2004). Jahoda, Deutch & Cook (1966) defines it as the arrangement of conditions for the collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy and procedure.

3.3.1 Research Methodology

At its most basic, mixed methods research refers to research in which investigators use both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a single study or program of inquiry (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007). Whereas the main goal of quantitative research is to test existing theories and understand connections among particular variables through a deductive research process, primary goals of qualitative research include comprehending multifaceted worlds of study participants and associated subjective meanings and processes using an inductive research process (Padgett, 2008; Rubin & Babbie, 2008). Hence, the goal of mixed methods research is to draw on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both types of research (Connelly, 2009).

This study preferred this research method as the sample was drawn from diplomatic missions from the wider Horn of Africa offices in Nairobi, UN-Habitat, UNICEF,

IGAD, the United States embassy in Nairobi, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Kenya. This sample size is the representative of the wider population for generalization. On the hand, Kenya's security personnel both in service and retired because of the sensitivity of the study were sought through the use of snowballing technique to so as to enable researcher learn about issue (terrorism and counterterrorism) central for the purposes of knowledge (Patton, 2002).

3.4 Research Site

Nairobi is the capital city of Kenya and one of Africa's key financial, business, transport, communications, nongovernmental organization, and diplomatic capital. The city lies between 1,600 and 1,850 meters above sea level on the southeast-ern edge of Kenya's agricultural heartland at 18 16'S latitude and 36 48'E longitude; its high elevation gives the city a temperate climate despite its close proximity to the equator (Commission of Revenue Allocation 2011). Nairobi prides in can be described as; a centre of diplomacy, a haven of education, a hotbed of physical infrastructure development, a political and judicial capital, and the Trendsetter of development in the region (Nairobi Annual Development Plan, 2020/21).

Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade describes Kenya as a regional hub providing easy connectivity to the Eastern/ Horn of Africa region. It is strategically located and a gateway to East and Central Africa with great regional and international connectivity. With its strategic location that borders the Indian Ocean, Kenya is considered as a strategic production and distribution base for Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and other Indian Ocean islands. Moreover, Kenya is also a home to UNEP and UN-HABITAT, the only two UN agencies headquartered in developing countries.

U.S. government views Kenya as a strategic partner and anchor state in Eastern Africa and as critical partner in counterterrorism efforts in the region. In addition, it is one of only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to have a military access agreement with the U.S. Moreover, Carson (2005) asserts that in combating the regional threat posed by international terrorism, no other country in East Africa or the greater Horn of Africa is more important to the United States than Kenya.

3.5 Study Population

To arrive at the target population the researcher ought to ask these questions; who are the population? What are the characteristics of the population and why that population is chosen? In answering these any researcher must go back to the topic and isolate this from the scope. From the geographical scope the population was derived from the Kenya-US partnership in counterterrorism in Kenya. Kenya is one of the countries in the horn of Africa region which has suffered most terrorist attack (Menkas, 2003), home of the largest number of western nationals and ambassadorial offices, host of two global UN headquarters in Nairobi, regional commercial and infrastructure (USDS, 2010).

In justifying how target population can be attained from a complex strategic geographic scope on the basis of security threat, Juma (2018) suggests that target populations need to adopt the basis of direct organizations/ institutions from which sample size can be drawn. Though many research aggregate populations tend to limit populations to geographic area, his argument is of the view that drawing statistics which have no meaning to a study in getting sample size justifies no empiricism. Due to such cases especially where the scope may be big, a researcher should purposively identify target populations from directly linked organizations and then calculate the

sample size scientifically. He intimates that target populations emanating from threats across states may work well through purposive isolation (Juma, 2019).

From the above the kind of the target population may not be equated to a definite population of a state(s) nor of some specific institutions working towards security. It therefore calls for a population that works to conclusively answer the research objectives. This population was purposively derived from institutions and organs such as; US missions, Horn of Africa regional states missions in Nairobi, IGAD secretariat in Nairobi, and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Kenya as shown below;

Table: 3.1 Category of the study Population

| S/N | States, regional and global organizations in the Horn of Africa | No of diplomatic mission's representatives (military attachee/political attaches and ambassadors) |
|-----|---|---|
| 1 | Djibouti | 5 |
| 2 | Eretria | 6 |
| 3 | Somalia | 3 |
| 4 | Ethiopia | 6 |
| 5 | Uganda | 11 |
| 6 | Sudan | 6 |
| 7 | S. Sudan | 22 |
| 8 | Kenya | 62 |
| | <u>Regional organizations and global organizations</u> | |
| 9 | UN-Habitat | 2 |
| 10 | UNEP | 2 |
| 11 | EAC | 6 |
| 12 | IGAD | 6 |
| | Total | 136 |

In the Ministry of Foreign affairs-Kenya, the researcher considered the personnel from the following directorates: UN and multilateral division (8), EU division (8), Americas division (4), Africa's division (6), security (16), Office of the Director General (4), Protocol and International Trade Directorate Division (8), Protocol Division (8) (Ministry of Foreign affairs-Kenya 2015/16 Report). This was because they were considered to be having the required information for the study.

The main reason for calculating a sample size in a study is to determine an adequate proportion of the population which can be used to attain data from the target population with a good precision. In other words, when data had been gathered, the researcher was able to draw inference or generalization on the basis of the outcome from the sample population.

3.6 Sample Size

Using the above target population in order to scientifically fine tune the likely research outcome, the application of sample size calculation formulae by Yamane became useful. Some scholars have indicated that, the sample size is an important feature of any empirical study in which the goal is to make inferences about a population from a sample. Determination of sample size depends on a number of factors including the purpose of the study, population size, sampling error permitted etc. The computation of the appropriate sample size is generally considered the most important step in statistical study. The sample size computation must be done appropriately because if the sample size is not appropriate for a particular study, then the inference drawn from the sample will not be authentic and it might lead to some wrong conclusions (Sarmah and Hazarika, 2012). The researcher calculated the sample size using the formulae developed by Yamane (1967) which is a simplified formula for calculation of sample size from a finite population and the population being known.

According to Yamane, for a 95% confidence level and $p = 0.05$, size of the sample should be represented by;

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where, N is the target population and e is the level of precision. When this formula is used for this study; $N = 136$ with $\pm 5\%$ precision. In other words, what Yamane's formulae implies is that n is at times called corrected sample/ or real sample population (sample size); N stands for target population; e for Margin of Error (*MoE*) or Level of Precision (*LoP*). Most often the *MoE* and *LoP* are equivalent. Assuming now then that 95% confidence level (neither too high nor too low) is used, where $p = 0.05$, the sample size is obtained by substitution as follows;

$$n = 311 / (1 + 311(0.05)^2)$$

$$n \text{ (Sample Size)} = 136 / (1 + 136(.0025))$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 136 / 1.34$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 136 / 1.34$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 101.45$$

Thus, on the basis of the calculation, the derived Sample size is 101 respondents. The application of Yamane as used herein applies when study techniques used are viewed to be pre-planned and an expected assumed response rate of near 100% is to be achieved, in this case purposive sampling technique was used.

3.7 Sampling Technique

A sample is the representative part of the whole population which it can be used to draw inferences about the entire population. This study used the following technique;

3.7.1 Purposive Sampling

Purposeful sampling is a technique widely used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources (Patton, 2002; Maxwell, 1996). This involves identifying and selecting individuals or groups of individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest (Cresswell & Clark, 2011). In addition to knowledge and experience, (Bernard, 2002) and (Spradley, 1979) note the importance of availability and willingness to participate, and the ability to communicate experiences and opinions in an articulate, expressive, and reflective manner. The research purposefully targeted personnel working at diplomatic mission of the Horn of Africa states in Nairobi, United States embassy and the Ministry of Foreign affairs in Kenya.

3.7.2 Snowball Technique

The researcher used Non exponential discriminative snowball sampling technique because of the nature and sensitivity of the study. The researcher visited the anti-terrorist police unit in Eldoret town where the officer in charge after responding to the interview schedule referred the researcher to his colleagues at the head quarters office in Nairobi (Ruaraka). In addition, the retired police and army officer's response was sought where the researcher found one of the retired officers of the rank of officer commanding police division (OCPD), whom in turn made referrals to his/he colleagues. This was replicated to other stakeholders in the security sectors in embassies where the primary data was collected. This was done until the point of saturation was reached. Through this technique a total of thirteen security personnel were interviewed.

3.8 Data Collection Instrument

This study used two methods of data collection for complementarity and to increase validity of the findings. The methods used are as follows;

3.8.1 Questionnaire

This study employed the use of both open ended and closed questionnaires as the main research tool for this data collection. The questionnaire was preferred because it provides a more comprehensive and in-depth information than any other research tool, relatively cheap compared to other methods and can be used to get large datasets through mail, direct contact or online Fife-Schaw, (2006).

Questionnaires were used to obtain primary data from the population under study; the diplomatic mission's employees, political attaches and diplomats from the Horn of Africa states in Nairobi. All the respondents were asked the same questions in the same order. The questionnaires were both open ended and closed ended questions. For close ended questionnaire was used to generate data for quantitative analysis, while open ended questionnaires were designed to generate qualitative data Hammersley (1996). The main advantage of the instrument was that it allowed the researcher to control and focus responses to the research objectives, thus enhancing relevance of the collected data.

3.8.2 Interview Schedule

The study also utilized the use of interview schedule to get data from security personnel and academia. The main qualities of this method of data collection are; The researcher can ask further questions to gain more in-depth information, Interviewees can be given a sample of questions to prepare for the interview, and finally it allows researcher to collect people's ideas, opinions, values and beliefs about the subject

under study (McMillan and Schumacher, 1993). Before starting, the researcher stated by introducing himself to the respondent and explaining the relevance of the study.

3.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data on this study was analysed by use of the following techniques; Quantitative data from questionnaires was analysed by use of Statistical Package for Social Sciences. The data was presented descriptively by frequencies, mean and percentages which were further summarized and presented using tables, graphs and charts.

Qualitative data from interviews were analysed thematically. Thematic analysis is a method for systematically identifying, organizing, and offering insight into patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2012). Further, it allows the researcher to see and make sense of collective or shared meaning and experiences. Qualitative data was presented by using themes denoted by narrations of responses in verbal form.

3.10 Validity

Kothari (2014) states that a tool is considered suitable and valid if it gives what the researcher wishes to assess. Borg and Gall (2013) add that content validity is confirmed by expert judgment. To determine and improve the validity of the data collection tools, a pilot study was carried out with 5 interview schedules administered to the anti-terrorism police unit (ATPU) in Eldoret divisional police headquarters. In addition, assistance was sought from lectures in the department of History, Political Science and Public Administration Moi University. This was done to ascertain the appropriateness of the instruments which allowed for the preparation of the final interview schedule.

3.11 Reliability

Since reliability is constructed (Geertz, 1973) and credibility is a construction on the part of the reporters and subsequent readers (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). The main objective of qualitative research is to develop confidence on the part of the reader on the written report (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This study determined the level of trustworthiness of the gathered data by use of informants to pursue credibility (e.g., ambassadorial missions of the horn of Africa states in Nairobi, Kenya's security personnel both active and retired, which were integrated with existing body of available literature.

3.12 Limitations to the Study

The study was met with several methodological challenges. First, the respondents who were meant for one-on-one interview were not possible due covid-19 pandemic and subsequent lock down which followed. However, the study received immense support from the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit who volunteered to respond to the interviews unreservedly. Secondly, Somalia embassy in Kenya was closed due to diplomatic misunderstanding between the two states. This was solved by the officers in the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade- the horn of Africa department whom they were handy with information concerning Somalia land.

The second limitation is the response rate on questionnaires where out of 101 questionnaires sent only sixty-four were responded. However, this did not pose limitation because (Baruch and Holtom, 2008) arguments that in social sciences a response rate of 52.7% is enough to draw conclusions in a study.

Thirdly, the researcher was not able to interview respondents from the USA Embassy due to the bureaucratic nature in the embassy. However, this challenge was addressed

by the assistance from the ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Kenya Americas Division, who became handy in providing necessary information for the study.

Finally, the United Nations offices in Nairobi (UN-Habitat and UNEP) redirected the researcher to Kenyan security personnel and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the above limitations, the study received immense support from other targeted population which made the study successful.

3.13 Ethical Considerations

The researcher obtained permission to carry out the study from the relevant authorities starting from the post-graduate department at Moi University, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation and finally from the relevant organizations, institutions and individual participants who participated in the study. The nature and the purpose of the research explained to the respondents by the researcher. The researcher respected the individuals' rights to safeguard their personal integrity. During the course of data collection, the respondents were assured of anonymity, and confidentiality. No names or personal identification numbers was reflected on the questionnaires except the numbering for questionnaires, which is for purposes of identification of data during data editing.

3.14 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the following in details; Research design, research site, target population, sampling technique, data collection instruments, methods of data analysis, validity and reliability, limitations of the study, and ethical considerations.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE KENYA- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA STRATEGIC COUNTER- TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP

4.0 Overview

This chapter sets to discuss the first question ‘what’ in this study which sought to explore the identity of the strategic partnership between Kenya and the United States on counterterrorism in Kenya. It also examines the second question ‘why’ which seeks to spotlight the context and causal mechanism explaining how power is reproduced in counter terrorism partnership between the two countries. To this study inter-state partnership means close cooperation between two or more state to solve a persisting problem for mutual benefit. Holland (1984) defines Partnership as a co-operation, i.e., “to work or act together” and in a public policy can be defined as co-operation between or organizations or states for mutual benefit. I explore the Kenya-US strategic counter-terrorism partnership, and then next is expounding of those relations; but first present the profile of the respondents.

4.1 Respondents Age Profile

It is commonly believed that experience might play important roles on the performance of individuals. In many cultures, the myth is that people get wiser due to more exposure and experience. For example, in African culture, experience is considered as a priority for leadership positions in different organizations. Bhargave and Anbazhagan (2014) viewed that performance of individual differs from culture to culture and country to country depending upon life patterns, beliefs and value system or otherwise on the knowledge and experience of the people. The findings shows that work experience-lead to positive influence on performance of employees indicate that

the performance of the employees gradually increases with their experience. The table below displays the respondent's answers on inquiry as follows;

Table 4.1: Respondent's Length of Service

| Age range | No. Respondents | Percentages |
|------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| 0-5 | 4 | 6.25% |
| 5-10 | 29 | 45.3% |
| 10-15 | 21 | 32.25 |
| 15 and above | 10 | 15.63% |
| Total | 64 | 100% |

Source: *Researcher, 2021*

The table above shows that the respondents had different number of years in their expertise areas. It became evident from the summary response outcome that majority at 45.3% had served their various organizations for 5-10 years while minority at 6.25% fell in the 0-5 years of service and 15 years and above. Despite the obvious two categories with majority and minority responses, this study uniquely finds most responses for this study who have served 5-10 years and 10-15 years and above to be almost at par demographically.

Security sector workings around the world have a unique working cycle unlike the normal traditional employment relationships. According ILO (2016), this has been conceptualized as Non-Standard Employment (NSE). This is described thus; Non-standard forms of employment (hereinafter "non-standard employment", or "NSE") have become a contemporary feature of Labour markets around the world. Their overall importance has increased over the past few decades in both industrialized and developing countries, as their use has become more widespread across occupations. NSE comprises four different employment arrangements that deviate from; the "standard employment relationship", understood as work that is full time, indefinite, as well as part of a subordinate relationship between an employee and an employer.

For some, working in NSE is an explicit choice and has positive outcomes. However, for most workers, employment in NSE is associated with insecurity. The four types of non-standard employment: (1) temporary employment; (2) part-time work; (3) temporary agency work and other forms of employment involving multiple parties; and (4) disguised employment relationships and dependent self-employment.

The ILO perspectives here highlight a trend in current employment but much more importantly the NSE which is a unique kind of work/Labour arrangement against permanency for some work categories in which security sector staff often find themselves in - “contractual basis”. Even though this study did not probe this, in two instances some respondents went beyond the question length of service and made this statement, *“in security sector we are normally hired on contract periods of nine (9) to twelve (12) years which are renewable on the basis of a number of reasons including the kind of work operation, expertise, and employers’ interest, etc.”* (Uaer, 2016)

4.2 Why Kenya-US Strategic Partnership on National Counter-Terrorism

The leading terrorist groups such as ISIS, al-Qa’ida, and Hizballah continue to plot attacks against the United States interests and our allies and partners globally. As the threats posed by these organizations continue to evolve, the USA Department of State works to build global consensus to degrade and defeat these adversaries (USDS, 2020). Furthermore, the Department works with foreign government partners to build the capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. This includes efforts to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capabilities, expand aviation and border security, deepen global information sharing, counter terrorist financing, improve crisis response, and counter violent extremism.

In addition, the department through its global engagement promotes greater burden sharing to address terrorist threats and encourages countries to build counterterrorism capacity in their own regions. The State Department also works closely with the Departments of Defence, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and the Intelligence Community to lead an integrated whole-of-government approach to international counterterrorism.

The table below displays the responder's response on the study;

Table 4.2: Showing Response as to Why USA Partners with Kenya on CT in the HOA

| | | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid | Kenya is a strategic partner to United States | 42 | 67.2 | 67.2 | 67.2 |
| | Kenya is peaceful in the region | 18.8 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 93.7 |
| | host of western national and UN offices | 4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 64 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Researcher, 2021

As shown on the table above, out of 64 respondents who took part in this study, the respondents by the majority 43 (67.2%) opined that Kenya partners with USA because of strategic reason, this was followed by 18 (26.4%) who responded that the partnership emanate from the peace in Kenya compared with other states in the horn, while the minority 4 (6.3%) opined that the partnership is because Kenya is a host of many western nationals and UN offices. The above responses imply that the respondents are aware of Kenya-United States of America partnership.

Kenya and USA have been having a long history of relations dating back to 1964 a year after Kenya gain its independence. In 2018, this relation was elevated to strategic partnership (USDS, 2018). In addition, Kenya compared with its neighbours in the horn of Africa has enjoyed relative peace (https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACP730.pdf). According to (USDS, 2022) Kenya is a home of over 30,000 United States of America and Western citizens and the only state hosting two UN headquarters offices in Nairobi; UN-Habitat and UNEP.

Counterterrorism in international relations can be understood through constructivism theory compared to the other two traditional theories of international relations; realism and liberalism. This is because of the fundamental nature of terrorism being a ‘social construct’ which lends itself to constructivist understanding. In illustrating this, Krishnaswamy (2012) used a metaphorical approach, in constructing al-Qaeda, the antagonist in the War on Terror (WoT). Taking the case of ‘al-Qaeda’s constructivist turns,’ the essay finds out how the transnational terrorist group fits into the constructivist framework. Counterterrorism depends on how different states through the lenses of culture, religion, and ideas treat particular groups as threats or benign. Wendts (1992) categorization of cultures of international anarchies into three, namely, friendly (Kantian), rivalry (Lockean) and enmity (Hobbesian), implies that friendly relations underpin the Kenya-US relations; the reason for the foregoing is that Kenya is a long-time Western ally and an anchor quasi-liberal state in the East and the horn of Africa region (Ploch, 2013; USDS, 2022). In an interview with an officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade revealed;

“Kenya and USA have had a cordial relationship despite some few instances where Kenya has experienced governance issues. This can be witnessed by their huge investments and precepts in the country.”

This response shows how USA and Kenya's relations has been over a long period of time. The above sentiments corroborate with USDS (2021) affirmation that the United States and Kenya have enjoyed cordial relations and an enduring partnership since Kenya's independence. Further the relations became more closer after Kenya's 2002 democratic transition and subsequent improvements in civil liberties.

Thus, the Kenya-US Counter terrorism partnership can be viewed as manifestation of this international culture of friendship that is becoming more relevant in the 21st century because of the presence of diffuse threats. The United Nation Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS, 2016), points out that today's world is an insecure place, full of human threats on many fronts; natural disasters, violent conflicts, chronic and persistent poverty, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns impose significant hardships and undercut prospects for sustainable development, peace and stability. Such crises are complex, entailing multiple forms of human insecurity and mostly these insecurities overlap, grow exponentially, and spill into all aspects of people's lives, destroying entire communities and crossing national borders. Such diffuse threats weaken the state power of affected states- and such states in the global south require international support from stronger friendly states.

Thus, the Kenya- US partnership to reproduce Kenya's state power in the context of terrorism can be interpreted as itself reproduced by the existing culture of amity between the two countries. Terrorist acts in Kenya became salient in 1998 when the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi was blown off by suspected Islamic fundamentalists; this was followed by the 2002 bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel near Mombasa; there was also the 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall, though there have been lower-profile attacks throughout this period as well (Ploch, 2013). But although the

Kenya-US partnership is an expression of friendly relations and identifications based on shared liberal values, this partnership has been complicated at best (Whitaker, 2008). Whitaker posits that from the beginning of the U.S. war on terror, Kenya was a reluctant strategic partner. It cooperated extensively with the United States behind the scenes, especially on border control and intelligence sharing, but resisted American pressure in more publicized areas, especially those involving domestic legislation (US Department of States, 2006).

Before the 1998 terrorist attacks in Kenya and her neighbour Tanzania, Kenya was a reluctant partner in counterterrorism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks, as the Bush administration pursued its global war on terror, Kenya's government took a cautious approach (Whitaker, 2008).

The US efforts of building collaboration to defeat terrorism is due to the realization that leading terrorist groups such as ISIS, al-Qaida, and Hizballah continue to plot attacks against the United States interests and allies and partners globally (USDS 2019)- thus weakening state power of both the United States and her allies- including Kenya. As the threats posed by these organizations continue to evolve, the USA Department of State works to build global consensus and partnerships to degrade and defeat these adversaries (USDS, 2020). Furthermore, the Department works with foreign government partners to build the capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. This includes efforts to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capabilities, expand aviation and border security, deepen global information sharing, counter terrorist financing, improve crisis response, and counter violent extremism.

In addition, the Department through its global engagement promotes greater burden sharing to address terrorist threats and encourages countries to build counterterrorism

capacity in their own regions. The State Department also works closely with the Departments of Defence, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and the Intelligence Community to lead an integrated whole-of-government approach to international counterterrorism. USA partners with Kenya flows from those anti-terror institutional arrangements in the United States.

Kinderis and Jucevicius (2013) defines strategic partnership as new type of bilateral relations, that combines a flexible and deep rapprochement between participating states. Strategic partnership has become a supplement for the multilateral negotiations on the pressing global issues which this thesis seeks to address. The majority of the respondents through their responses pointed out that USA partners with Kenya because of it being a strategic partner in the Horn of Africa region. An in-depth interview with one of the respondents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade- Kenya, the Americas division, pointed out that;

“Kenya is an indispensable partner of the United States of America in the region. Its importance lies on trade, regional stability, tourism and hospitality among other factors that benefit both states. This partnership is anchored on national interest of both states for mutual benefit.”

Another respondent in the same office added that;

“Kenya’s well developed infrastructural development, robust enterprising citizens, relative peace compared with the rest in the region gives it an upper hand in comparison to other neighbouring states in the region.”

This opinion corroborates with the earlier literature in this work (Congressional Research Service, 2013) which affirms that United States of America considers Kenya through one of the wendtian metaphors of international anarchy: Kenya is a friendly and anchor state for the USA in the Horn and the Eastern Africa region.

There is a longstanding mutual interest in the region and wide-ranging cooperation on economic and security issues which underpin a strong bilateral relationship between these two states. As one of East Africa's largest economies, Kenya is a growing business, financial, and transportation hub for the region and U.S. investment in Kenya and bilateral trade are important elements of the U.S.-Kenya relationship. Recently in August 2018, Presidents Trump and Kenyatta formally elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership and established a corresponding annual strategic dialogue. In May 2019, the United States hosted the inaugural U.S.–Kenya Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in Washington, DC. Further, in July 2020, the United States and Kenya launched negotiations for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement, the first in sub-Saharan Africa (*Bureau of African Affairs Report, 2020*).

Another group of respondents indicated that the bilateral partnership could be attributed to relative peace that Kenya enjoys in the region. This response corroborates with Khadiagala (2009) assertions which affirm that Kenya has played a central role in the economic and security architecture of Eastern African states, for most of the post-independence period remaining the principal beacon of political stability in the sea of weak states convulsed in civil wars and militarism. An interview with a retired security personnel indicated that;

“In my experience in the last twenty-five years of service, I have been privileged to be deployed in peace-keeping missions in most of African countries and in the Horn of Africa in particular. We are very safe and secure in Kenya despite some few incidences of insecurity but compared with our neighbouring states, Kenya is peaceful.”

This is a clear indication of the security situation in the entire horn of Africa region. In summary, Brookings (2022) affirms that the horn of Africa is facing multiple and complex challenges. Ethiopia, a challenging internal conflict and an alarming

humanitarian situation in the Tigray region that has dire consequences for the region has persisted since November 2020, while a negotiated settlement remains elusive. In Somalia, the elections process has been punctuated by a series of political crisis.

Sudan's Darfur region has been a subject to a flare-up in conflict and violence over pasture and water attributed to the Janjaweed militia. In October 2021, the military leadership dissolved the civilian led government disrupting the transition to civilian rule hence undermining international confidence in the country's democratic reform process. The pace of implementing the peace process in Southern Sudan has been inconstant and on a number of occasions in danger of stalling altogether.

The third group of respondents by minority in demographics (6.3%) indicated that USA partners with Kenya because it is a host-state to Western nationals and international organizations. This implies that the social economic and political environment in Kenya is attractive and important to the western states embassies and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) a discourse that gains support from *Congressional Research Service (2013)* which notes that, many international organizations base their continental headquarters in Nairobi, which is home to one of four major United Nations offices worldwide and serves as a base for regional humanitarian relief efforts. Kenya also hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in Africa, from which U.S. agencies manage both bilateral and regional programs. In responding to this question, an interview with one of the respondents in the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade- European division narrates;

“The number of foreign populations especially from western Europe and America in Kenya is large. Most of them being tourists and business investors, others have even acquired Kenya's residence. In addition, the almost all European states have full-fledged ambassadorial missions in Nairobi. This could be attributed to strategic location and relative peace in our country.”

The above narration corroborates with the International Organization for Migration (2018) report showing the total number of tourists' arrival at Jomo-Kenyatta International Airport and Moi International Airport in the year 2017 as shown blow;

Table 4.3: Number of Tourists in Kenya in the Year 2017

| Country of Origin by Region | Year 2017 Number of Tourists |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Asia | 137,031 |
| Middle East | 20,680 |
| Africa and Indian ocean | 166,225 |
| Americas | 140,131 |
| Oceanic | 21,203 |
| Europe | 241,003 |
| Total | 726,273 |

Source: Migration in Kenya: *Country profile, 2018*

From the above table, apart from Africa and Indian Ocean (116,225) Europe and Americas leads in the number of tourists visitors in Kenya in the stated year.

In this study, it is important to underscore the importance of past Kenya's relative peace in the region to USA partnership. This partnership has a historical lining dating back to the late 1970s. For instance, at the height of the Cold War, U.S. security cooperation with countries in the Horn of Africa took on heightened strategic priority amid contingency planning for possible U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf, and Kenya's port in Mombasa was viewed as a stable alternative to options in Somalia. A resulting base-access agreement accorded Kenya substantial military aid, which continued under the Reagan Administration's policy to "contain" Soviet influence in the region (Congressional Research Service, 2015). This partnership has been marked by both cordial and sour relationship nearly in equal measure. By the 1990s, with the Cold War over, the United States was increasingly sensitive to political and human rights abuses by the Moi government, although Kenya's strategic location and comparative stability ensured that relations remained cordial, aided by Kenya's role as

a hub for international humanitarian relief operations in Sudan and Somalia. Ties improved as the two countries increased their cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.

Moreover, Insecurity in neighbouring countries combined with concerns over terrorist movements across Kenya's porous border with Somalia and along its coastline and piracy off the coast has led Kenya to take an increasingly active role in regional security. Poaching, banditry, cattle rustling, and high urban crime, as well as periodic outbreaks of communal violence, place competing domestic demands on Kenya's national security resources. Kenya has repeatedly been a target of international terrorist attacks, and the concentration of potential international and domestic targets in Nairobi remains a serious concern for Kenyan and Western security officials. The September 2013 siege of the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, a popular shopping destination for tourists, expatriates, and the Kenyan elite, is the first successful high-profile terrorist attack in the country since the Al Qaeda attacks in Mombasa in 2002 (CRS,2013).

The nature of partnership according to Keohane (1990) takes two dimensions; the first one is bilateral partnership which is a relationship between two states to solve a common problem for mutual benefit. The second one is the relationship between a state and state institutions to solve a common issue for mutual benefit. The nature of USA partnership on counterterrorism as stated earlier (Long, 2010) points that whether it is bilateral or multilateral, there are three trajectories it assumes; The first one is the intelligence sharing and legal coordination between the USA and the partnering states, this strategy is meant to thwart terrorist financing through improved sharing of financial intelligence (Bayman, 2006).

Secondly is (Serafino, 2011) assistance from the United States, which includes the provision of equipment and training to military and security services of a host-nation. The exemplar here is the State Department's Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance, which assesses a state's needs for law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism and then provides appropriate training. Thirdly is operational cooperation, where U.S. personnel work alongside forces from a host-nation in the actual conduct of counterterrorism operations. The third category, where U.S. personnel are present in at least a direct support role-at a minimum, providing intelligence and planning assistance alongside those forces if not actually accompanying them on missions. It further focuses on the subset of that category where the United States is substantially paying for the host nation forces in question (in other words, a substantial assistance mission along with operational cooperation). This subset is still expansive, including crucial operations against al-Qaida and its affiliates in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Coll, 2004).

The research proceeded further to make the inquiry on the dimensions of bilateral strategic partnerships on national counterterrorism that exists between the two state which are shown on the table below;

Table 4.4: Showing the Bilateral Dimensions of Kenya-USA Counterterrorism Partnership

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Social economic | 14 | 23.6 | 23.6 | 23.6 |
| legal assistance | 16 | 24.7 | 24.7 | 48.3 |
| capacity building and equipment sharing | 19 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 74.7 |
| military assistance | 15 | 25.3 | 25.3 | 100.0 |
| Total | 64 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: *Research, 2021*

The findings on the table show the dimensions of bilateral security partnerships being close to one another in respondent's scores; social economic assistance 23.6%, capacity building and equipment sharing 26.4%, legal assistance 24.7% and finally military assistance 25.3%. The difference between the highest score –capacity building and equipment sharing 26.4%, and the lowest score- social economic score 23.6% is 1.1%. This implies that all variables under measurement are dimensions of

Table 4.4 summarizes the bilateral acts of the Kenya-US relations to enhance or reproduce Kenya's state power.

Table 4.5: Bi-lateral Nature of K-USA Partnership on CT in the HOA

| | <i>Type/ Dimension</i> | <i>Brief Description of details</i> |
|---|--|---|
| 1 | <i>Capacity building and equipment sharing</i> | <i>Training, equipment assistance</i> |
| 2 | <i>Social assistance</i> | <i>Provision of: water, health-care and education</i> |
| 3 | <i>Military assistance</i> | <i>Intelligence sharing and joint training and operations</i> |
| 4 | <i>Legal assistance</i> | <i>Capacity building</i> |

Source: *Researcher, 2023*

4.3 The Kenya- USA Bilateral Strategic Partnership on Counterterrorism

4.3.1 Terrorism as a context

While answering the question whether terrorism is a security threat in Kenya, there was an overwhelming response in agreement. One of the respondents from the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) indicated that:

“We are working around the clock to ensure that there is no chance left lest the terrorist find an opportunity to execute attacks on us and the members of the public at large. Security personnel are manning target areas like malls, churches, government buildings, borders, port of entries and even markets, we call upon the public to be vigilant and report anybody who looks suspicious”.

This sentiment corroborates with the United States Institute of Peace Report (2007) which considers Kenya in the Horn of Africa as a target of global terrorism. This report further points out that this could be attributed to the instability among the

neighbourhood states which are considered to be the source and training ground for terrorism. For instance, in 1989 when the National Islamic Front seized power in Sudan and set out to build an Islamist state and a home to radical Muslim groups from around the world. During the 1990s, Sudan openly provided a safe haven to terrorists including Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and acted as a gateway for these group to operate in the greater Horn of Africa region (USIP, 2007). This compounded with the fact that the Horn of Africa is characterized with weak, corrupt, and warring states for quite long has been seen as fertile ground for Islamic Fundamentalist.

On the recent statement issued by USA, Germany, Netherlands and France warning their citizens of terrorist's attack in Kenya;

The USA embassy reminds the public of the continued need for sustained vigilance in public locations such as; restaurants, shopping malls, hotels, transportation hubs, schools, places of worship, and other areas frequented by tourists. Public events such as celebratory events are also at a high risk of violence. The following actions should be taken; Exercise vigilance at events places of worship and, locations of large crowds, review your personal security plans, be aware of your surroundings, and monitor local media for updates (Jan 28, 2022. Kenya Terror alert by Ashly Mazrui).

Moreover, the Horn of African continent in general and Kenya in particular, have been suffering from terrorist threats (Memar & Gebru, 2014). Apart from this complex social, economic, political, and environmental problems there are other factors to Kenya and its environs security complex (Berouk, 2013). The threat of terrorism to peace and security of people in the region for more than two decades has concentrated its epicentre and safe-haven in Somalia, where Al-Shabaab are located (Nzau, 2010).

4.3.2 Bilateral Partnerships

This section seeks to explain partnership between Kenya and the United States of America in counterterrorism. Here terrorism is explained as a context in which Kenya reproduces her state power using different counter-terrorism partnership acts.

Power reproduction has been known to be a type of a causal mechanism that can be as a portable concept to explain causality (Falleti & Lynch 2009:1150). In this study the aspects of bilateral partnerships in counterterrorism discussed below can be understood as a causal mechanism to reproduce the institutional power of the Kenyan state in the context of terrorism.

4.3.2.1 Capacity Building and Equipment Assistance

Soon after the U.S. Embassy bombing, Kenya with the assistance of the USA government established the National Security Intelligence Service and was added to the U.S. Anti- Terrorism Assistance Program, which trained more than 500 Kenyan police. With U.S. training and financial assistance, primarily through the \$100 million East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) launched in 2003, the Kenyan government established the Antiterrorism Police Unit (2003), the Joint Terrorism Task Force (2004) (USDS, 2004). The National Counter-Terrorism Centre (2004), and the National Security Advisory Committee (2004). These initiatives were intended to improve Kenya's capacity to investigate terrorist incidents, identify cells, coordinate law enforcement, and prevent future attacks.

In addition, Kenya also is an active partner in Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) which provides technology to screen terrorist at the arrival in airports. With support from the Federal Aviation administration, Kenya has improved airport security and worked with Uganda and Tanzania to harmonize regional aviation security

regulations. The U.S. conduct periodic joint training exercises. As a result, these initiatives enabled Kenya and United States of America share information which led to disruption of planned attack on the New U.S embassy in Nairobi (Agency France Press, 2003).

The formation of Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 2003 is yet another dimension of counterterrorism bilateral partnership between USA and Kenya. This branch of police was formed in Kenya with the assistance of the United States government. In an interview with a respondent working in this organization he noted that;

“We have been trained by USA officials on how to detect, investigate terrorist incidents, identify cells, coordinate law enforcement efforts, and prevent future attacks”. In addition, we’ve been trained and given budgets to intercept information which we suspect are propagating terrorism. This training has really helped us in counterterrorism efforts and we have been able to prevent numerous attacks which could have been executed by terrorists.”

This response corroborates with U.S. Department of State (2010) which agrees that State Department’s counterterrorism program (Anti-Terrorism Assistance) in Kenya is the most extensive and longest running U.S. funded program– an undertaking by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security that promotes cooperation with foreign law enforcement through counterterrorism training and equipment grants. This program, although present globally since the 1980s [and in Kenya since 1998], gained operational momentum in 2005, when Kenya was “one of only five states to receive specialized training” (Lind & Howell 2010). By 2010, the ATA program in Kenya was the largest funded in Africa, maintaining an annual budget of roughly \$8 million (USAID 2010). The primary focus of the program was border security, including both maritime and land.

Continued bilateral partnership was witnessed again in 2019, where Kenya received U.S. Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G) software, which facilitates screening of air travellers using Advanced Passenger Identity (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR). If deployed, ATS-G would be integrated with Personal Identity Security Comparison System (PISCES), the U.S. government-provided front line border management system, enhancing the capabilities of both systems to target potential threats and counter terrorist travel. In the recent past ATPU has been working with National Counter-Terrorism Centre to deal with research and radicalization of youth to deter them from joining the Somali-based Al Shabab militants (*The Star*, 05.11.2023). Through USA capacity building and equipment sharing and multi-agency approach has seen dozens of planned terror attacks thwarted.

4.3.2.2 Legal Assistance

This assistance aimed at improving the capacity of security and legal personnel in investigation and prosecution of terrorist suspects. Kenya, in the region has a rapid expansion of mobile phones and mobile banking throughout the country which necessitates digital forensics. This advancement in technology has been used as a form of terrorist financing – giving one the capability to transfer money instantly to and from distant locations (Mas & Radcliffe 2010). To check on this, the ATA program donated equipment necessary for analysing digital data from mobile phones. Along with the equipment training by the American government was organized to cover topics related to digital and forensic evidence (Aronson, Undated). A response from a senior security personnel noted that;

“USA has been of great assistance on counterterrorism to us, personally I have undergone counterterrorism training both in Kenya and USA. Through such trainings I have been able to train my colleagues on the same. This has enabled us to be effective in the counterterrorism especially in the aspects of investigation.”

The above response is a clear indication of the security personnel which is an integral part in criminal justice system.

On the part of legal personnel USA has partnered with Kenya in training of legal personnel and drafting of counterterrorism legislations. Through a combination of diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance, (USDS, 2021) the Department works with foreign government partners to build the capabilities necessary to prevent, degrade, detect, and respond to terrorist threats. This includes efforts to strengthen law enforcement and judicial capabilities, through its global engagement the State Department promotes greater burden sharing to address terrorist threats and encourages countries to build counterterrorism capacity in their own regions. During an interview, the respondent at the Ministry of foreign affairs and international trade-Kenya noted that;

“Kenya as a country in the horn of Africa is the most preferred by United States of America because of its relative peace and strategic location. This partnership is driven by various reasons security being at the top of the priority especially after the August, 7.1998 bombing of USA embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam.”

To safeguard these interests, Blinken (2021) asserts that the United States supports Kenyan law enforcement to promote police accountability and reform and support anti-corruption efforts within Kenyan institutions. Other programs include support to counter violent extremism, security initiatives to build the capacity of civil society organizations, and justice sector reform.

Furthermore, as of 2021, the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism had 14 active projects funded at \$69 million over five years aimed at enhancing the counterterrorism capacity of Kenya’s civilian law enforcement in areas such as crisis response, investigations, border security, aviation security, and countering violent extremism. The Department of Defence provided \$24 million in assistance focused on building Kenya’s defence institutions, enhancing military sales, and counterterrorism

operations. Since 2017, the United States has provided \$19 million in counterterrorism assistance to Kenya. Additionally, between 2017 and 2020, the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had provided approximately \$7.6 million annually to promote police accountability and reform and support anti-corruption efforts within Kenyan institutions (Blinken, 2021).

4.3.2.3 Military Assistance

This response corroborates with U.S Department of State (2009) which affirms that in 2008 the USA military to military assistance program helped in the development of a new Kenyan army unit, the Ranger Strike Force, which U.S. government sources claimed would act as a frontline against “infiltrators and armed groups”. On the same note, the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance program provided the Kenyan Maritime Police Unit with equipment and constructed a training facility at Manda Bay, where American trainers would offer courses in maritime security. In 2008, the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa had already begun installing Maritime Security and Safety Information System along Kenya's coast, presumably in areas identified as key to countering terrorist incursions (U.S. Department of State 2009). On an interview with one of the respondents who is a retired military personnel points out that;

“The United States of America has been on the forefront in partnering with Kenya's military in counterterrorism, all the modern facilities, techniques and equipment we are having and using is through the courtesy of USA government.”

The above voice represents a clear partnership that exists between these two states in counterterrorism. The American military presence and assistance is not an altogether new phenomenon in Kenya. Through a series of agreements during the cold war the United States regularly utilized Kenyan naval and air facilities. Then, U.S. geopolitical concerns were largely beyond Kenya's borders. Since 2001, however,

U.S. military attention has taken an increasingly internal orientation, concentrating primarily on Kenya's Coast and North Eastern provinces (USDS, 2021).

The U.S. military presence is currently the greatest in the Lamu Archipelago, a mostly Swahili and Balun region, stretching along the northern coast to the Somalia border. American forces in Kenya are under the command of the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa, often simply called HOA. For instance, U.S. military advisors at Manda Bay initiated joint military exercises with the Kenyan navy in the northern coastal region (BBC News 2002) Dubbed “Noble Piper,” whose primary objective was to train Kenyan forces to conduct counterterrorism. Byman (2006), argue that the joint military operations and intelligence sharing at the Kenya's coast under overt and covert action has been handy in counterterrorism efforts at the Coastal region.

This training entailed joint U.S.-Kenyan searches of vessels traveling throughout the archipelago. The Marines initiated similar joint operations on land, but the sight of U.S. soldiers in combat fatigues boarding and searching vehicles traveling between Malindi and Lamu caused such consternation that the American trainers were forced to wear civilian clothes and scale back the manoeuvres. In addition, United States Department of Defence provided \$24 million in assistance focused on building Kenya's defence institutions, enhancing military sales, and counterterrorism operations. Since 2017, the United States has continually provided \$19 million in counterterrorism assistance to Kenya.

According to US Department of State (2021) on USA and Kenya strategic partnership on counterterrorism indicates that in the FY 2020, U.S. peace and security assistance totalled over \$560 million. Furthermore, by the year 2020 Kenya government has purchased over \$139 million worth of U.S.-made military, making Kenya a key strategic military

partner. The U.S. partnership with the Kenya Defence Force includes assistance related to counterterrorism, border security, aviation security, maritime security including to the newly established Kenyan Coast Guard, peacekeeping support, and broader professionalization efforts. This is an indication of bilateralism partnership on counterterrorism between Kenya and the United States of America.

4.3.2.4 Social Economic Assistance

It is imperative to note that social –economic deprivation is one the causes of terrorism in Africa (Feldman, 2009). Social-economic deprivation leads to object poverty which makes one vulnerable to radicalization (Shinn, 2016). United States of America have taken initiatives to uplift the social economic status of Kenyans to alleviate these evils in a variety of ways.

The history of these initiatives can be traced back to the late 1990's where the Kenya's large and thinly populated northeastern region bordering Somalia become a focus for US government efforts in Africa to counter terrorism, mitigate violent extremism and promote stability and governance (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010). Since terrorists attacked the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, Kenya, is perceived to be critical for the stability of the Horn of Africa, and East Africa more generally USDS (2020). Under the project “*winning hearts and minds*” US civilian affairs project designed to give humanitarian assistance and development to Africans with the aim of winning the minds and hearts of Muslim communities in the Horn of Africa as part of a regional counterterrorism and stabilization strategy (Africa Confidential, 2010). In an interview with one of the respondents from the anti-terrorist police unit revealed that;

“The trend in counterterrorism efforts has changed and the partner countries are now focusing on mitigating the underlying causes especially on empowering the youth from those areas perceived to

be breeding ground for recruitment. Some of the noted regions are along the Kenya Somali border and the entire coastal region.”

The above voices corroborate with Menkhas (2007) which agree that Social economic aid projects implemented by US Civil Affairs teams were deployed from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in the (Northern frontier districts of Kenya); Garissa, Wajir, and Lamu district in Coast province. These interventions have a new quality as hard security and general development interventions are supplemented by new security technologies of governing through empowerment, participation, and a new care for those parts of the population who are perceived by many donors to be susceptible to harbouring or recruiting terrorist. US Civilian Affairs has concentrated on three social economic aspects in counterterrorism efforts namely; health, water and education (Bradbury and Kleinman, 2010).

The United Nations Development Program (2006) affirms that the north eastern frontier and the coastal Kenya is vulnerability to terrorism because of the fact that 80% of the population of these areas lives below the poverty line, compared to 56% nationally, it has the lowest human development score, the highest rate of infant mortality rate and a ratio of one doctor to 120 thousand people.

Table 4.6: US Counterterrorism Funded Project in Kenya between 2014-2019.

| Province | District | Projects | Cost in US\$ |
|---------------|------------|------------|------------------|
| North Eastern | Garisa | 27 | 1,066,285 |
| | Wajir | 8 | 510,950 |
| | Mandera | 9 | 511,411 |
| Total | 3 | 44 | 2,088,644 |
| Coast | Lamu | 70 | 3,162,560 |
| | Tana-river | 5 | No data |
| | Kilifi | 2 | No data |
| | Malindi | 9 | 341,000 |
| Total | | 151 | 3,503,560 |

Source: *Hearts and minds project: 2020*

The link between the three variables under the social economic development; education, health and water make the community vulnerable to radicalization.

The Kenya-USA partnership on CT can be best understood through the lenses of constructivist theory which gives a productive and informative insights through which how war on terror shapes U.S foreign policy on its international relations which holds that states can benefit significantly from cooperating to thwart international terrorism. In this case, all signatories to the agreement can benefit from absolute gains (Meiser, 2018). The Kenya-USA partnership on counterterrorism like other countries which have also suffered from the same fate of terrorist attacks, have adopted nearly equal bilateralism nature of partnership. Intelligence sharing and legal coordination, (Bayman, 2006). The provision of equipment and training to military and security services of a host-nation (Serafino, 2011). The operational cooperation, where U.S. personnel work alongside forces from a host-nation in the actual conduct of counterterrorism operations.

However, the third category, where U.S. is substantially paying for the host nation forces in question (in other words, a substantial assistance mission along with operational cooperation) has not been witnessed in Kenya. This subset has been noted to be expensive, including crucial operations which was employed against al-Qaida and its affiliates in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Coll, 2004). Another component which is unique to bilateral partnership between Kenya-USA in counterterrorism is the social economic assistance. This component is significant in that it attempts to cushion the unemployed population and youth from radicalization and lures of terrorist groups.

In this case, Kenya's as a state benefit from USA assistance in securing their territory and citizen from terrorist's attacks while the USA benefit from securing their interest in the entire horn of Africa region which is the essence of strategic partnership (Tyushuka and Czechowska, 2019).

4.4 Kenya-USA Multilateral Partnerships and Counterterrorism

Here terrorism is explained as a context in which multilateral partnership acts are enacted to achieve the counterterrorism outcomes. Here multilateral acts are seen as acts of reproduction of Kenya's state power. Multilateralism (Keohane, 1990) is the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of more than three states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions. The only difference between bi- and multilateralism is the expanded sphere to include state institutions and supra-national bodies. Ruggie (1992), further posit that multilateralism premises on indivisibility of security which necessitate collectively of the same. Kapchans (1986) argue that for multilateralism to succeed, the great powers are to be on the forefront and the decisions should be taken informal negotiations and consensus.

In the aftermath of 9/11 USA federal government, local, tribal and territorial in bid to protect homeland security declared Global War on Terrorism. As a result, they used their veto power in the UN security council to act in bringing together international community under the common objective to end international terrorism (UN, General Assembly, 2001). With this influence, UN has passed several conventions on counterterrorism which has been ratified by its members. In addition, regional organizations also have passed several conventions on the same and ratified by its members in bid to thwart terrorism in the entire globe.

Table 4.7: Showing the Multilateral Dimensions of Kenya-USA Counterterrorism Partnership

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Charter | 19 | 32.8 | 32.8 | 23.6 |
| Club | 22 | 33.3 | 33.3 | 48.3 |
| Coalition | 23 | 33.9 | 33.9 | 100.0 |
| Total | 64 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: *Researcher, 2020*

From the response on the table above, respondents opined that multilateralism Partnership between Kenya and United States on Counterterrorism are; 32.8% Charter Club, 33.3% while 33.9% Coalition multilateralism. This response shows that counterterrorism effort between Kenya and United States of America in Kenya is a concerted effort among the trajectories that multilateralism takes. The three partnerships are discussed below in details;

Table 4.8 below shows the nature of multilateralism partnership between Kenya and the United States of America on counterterrorism in Kenya. It is imperative to note that all the four Cs lay claim to respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility (Patrick, 2021) which was explained earlier on in chapter two (2). After the table below what follows is the explanation of the dimension's multilateralism that Kenya-United states partnerships on counter-terrorism exists.

Table 4.8: Multi-lateral Nature of K-USA Partnership on CT

| <i>Nature of multilateral-partnership</i> | <i>Description</i> |
|---|-------------------------|
| Coalition | Ad hoc for contingency |
| Charter | Led by United Nations |
| Club | Established democracies |
| Concert | Comity and joint action |

Source: *Researcher, 2021*

This response shows that counterterrorism effort between Kenya and United States of America in Kenya is a concerted effort led by the charter (United Nation (UN), the

assistance of a club of developed democracies (European Union (EU)) African Union (coalition) through African Mission in Somali (AMISON). Again, like my sampling of context and causal mechanisms in discussing how bilateral partnerships were picked, I select power reproduction presented by Falleti & Lynch (2009:1150) as causal mechanism as a portable concept to explain choice of the multilateral partnerships. Thus, the multilateral partnerships in counterterrorism discussed below can be understood as a causal mechanism to reproduce the institutional power of the Kenyan state in the context of terrorism. This multilateral partnership is discussed below in details;

4.4.1 The Charter Multilateralism

This inquiry received 32.8% response. The Charter conception of world order treats the United Nations, on account of its binding Charter and universal membership, as the ultimate foundation for international peace and security and the first port of call for cooperation on global challenges (Patrick, 2021). Further, the UN remains the world's premier multilateral body and foundational bedrock for international cooperation, by virtue of its universality, legal status, multidimensional mandate, and authority over the use of force.

United Nations remains a relative bargain, allowing America to advance global goals it cannot accomplish on its own or only at prohibitive cost. In 2020, the United States provided some \$11.6 billion to the world body (Council on Foreign Relations, 2022) which was the highest than any other nation. The trajectory that multilateralism in counterterrorism takes in the Kenya-USA relations is the role played by the United Nations which is a supra-national organization consisting of 191 sovereign states who have accepted the obligation of the UN charter.

It should be noted that the USA is a Charter member of the United Nations and a host of the UN headquarters in New York City which includes a General Assembly seating place. On the other part Kenya is a host of the global headquarters for two programs: the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). In partnering with Kenya, the United States of America interests in Kenya on securing regional and global interest are great significance while United Nations interest as a supra-national organization with its two global headquarters in Nairobi converge (USDS, 2020). In an interview with one of the officers in Anti-Terrorism Police Unit noted;

“UN has assisted in counterterrorism to a greater extent in capacity building of security personnel and those in criminal justice system. In addition, the UN has helped the country to come with various instrument (legislation and training manuals) in efforts to help the capacity of the individuals in various government agencies deal with the terrorists and terrorism acts.”

In line with the above sentiments, Kenya through the multilateral partnership with the UN was able to develop Training Manual on Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (UNODC, undated). In July 2021, the United Nations concluded a three days capacity building workshop on Regional Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Eastern Africa (UN, 2021). This workshop is as a result of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 and represents an important milestone the collective pursuit towards strengthening the global response on terrorism, based on a common strategic and operational framework.

The above strategy is anchored on four pillars of action namely: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system and finally; Measures to ensure

respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. This Strategy calls on Member States to ensure its implementation at the national, regional, and international levels, and for enhanced coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation in countering terrorism.

In order to achieve the above stated objectives, the USA has had over 70 years defence framework cooperation with Kenya to advance its national interests in the region. The returns on this investment are readily visible through the participation in the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia by the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and in the KDF's proven value as a partner in the fight against al-Shabaab (USDS, 2022).

Furthermore, The United States has four security assistance objectives in Kenya namely: professionalize the Kenyan military forces; increase Kenyan counterterrorism and border security capabilities; increase maritime security awareness; and to improve peacekeeping capabilities (USDS, 2022).

In addition to Kenya's commitment to partnership on counterterrorism with USA, it has ratified 19 United Nations international legal instruments against terrorist activities (Singh, 2019) of which USA is also a signatory, and which can be broadly categorized in to the following sections;

Instruments regarding civil aviation

- i) The 1963 Convention on offenses and certain acts committed on board aircraft
- ii) The 1970 convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft

- iii) The 1971 convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation
- iv) 1988 protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts relating to international civil aviation
- v) 2010 convention on the suppression of unlawful acts relating to international civil aviation
- vi) 2010 protocol supplementing to convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft
- vii) 2014 protocol to amend the convention of offenses and certain acts committed on board aircraft

Instruments regarding the protection of international staff

- viii) 1973 convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against international instruments regarding the taking of hostages
- ix) 1979 international convention against the taking of hostages

Instruments regarding the nuclear materials

- x) 1980 convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials
- xi) 2005 amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

Instruments regarding maritime navigation

- xii) 1988 convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation
- xiii) 2005 protocol to the convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf.

- xiv) 1988 protocol for the suppression of acts against the safety fixed platforms of continental shelf.
- xv) 2005 protocol to the protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shelf

Instrument regarding terrorist bombing

- xvi) 1997 international convention for suppression of terrorist bombing

Instruments regarding explosive materials

- xvii) 1997 international community for the suppression of terrorist bombing

Instruments regarding the financing of terrorism

- xviii) 1999 international convention for the suppression of financing terrorism
- xix) 2005 international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.

Despite the above-mentioned instruments, United Nations played a critical role in AMISON by the creation of the United Nations office for AMISOM (UNSOA) which has been commented as the only field support operation of its kind in the world (www.unsoa.unmission.org). The UNSOA-authorized support package basically included vital life support such as food, water, health and sanitation, fuel, facilities and engineering, vehicles and other equipment, communications and IT, property management, capacity building, aviation and medical services. This was augmented by a Trust Fund through which member states could make voluntary contributions to AMISOM.

This move marked the first time the UNSC had ever funded a peace support operation led by a regional organization. It resulted in an unprecedented level of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union which led to marked complex and

often unwieldy network of international peace and security actors (<http://www.un.org>). In addition, USA has been instrumental in marshalling the support of EU, NATO and UN which has jointly held a coordinated efforts in anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa Sea shore support of the AMISOM by cutting terrorist main source of income (Dahl, 2021).

4.4.2 The Club Multilateralism

The Club approach to multilateralism posits that the most promising foundation for global order and cooperation is not UN universalism but a league of advanced market democracies committed to an open, liberal, and rules-based international system (Patrick, 2021). This inquiry received the second majority response as per the demography at 33.3 %. It assumes that established democracies constitute a distinctive “security community” dedicated to shared political and economic principles—namely, support for representative and accountable governance, open markets, and the rule of law at home and abroad—and among whom armed conflict has become inconceivable (Deutsch, 1957).

Multilateral partnership dimension between the Kenya-USA strategic partnership can be seen through the immense support from European Union through the African Peace Facility (APF) to AMISOM. This facility was created by EU in response to AU call for external support. With its focus on supporting the AU and African sub-regional organizations in their efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, the APF has become a central pillar of AU-EU peace and security cooperation.

USA government has also been very instrumental in assisting Africa to achieve internal peace and security. This could be attributed to the convergence of interest between EU and USA in Africa. For instance, in 2001 the USA President Joe Biden

articulated its continued periodization of support for Africa's peace initiative as his predecessors in the following areas; enhancing peace and security, promoting mutually beneficial economic growth, trade, investments, strengthening democracy, and building resilience to challenges related to climate change and international security (Congressional Research Service, 2001).

Both EU and USA are states considered as developed democracies with similar defence and security objective as espoused in the trans-Atlantic partnership which are threatened by global terrorism (Mix, 2015). Through the APF, the EU disbursed over € 2.7 billion between 2004 and 2019 to provide support in three critical areas under the umbrella of the AU. The first is African-led peace support operations. The second is the African Peace and Security Architecture – i.e., the continent's institutional framework for security. The third is the APF's Early Response Mechanism that mobilizes quick financial assistance for African conflict prevention and mediation initiatives (APF Report, 2019).

Further, APF covers mission costs such as troop transport, soldiers' living expenses, communication infrastructure and medical evacuation capabilities, but it cannot pay for soldiers' salaries, arms, ammunition or military equipment and training. From 2007 to 2019, it is estimated that more than €1.94 billion in APF funding was channelled through the AU into just one operation, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the lion's share of which has covered the cost of troop stipends (international Crisis Group, 2021).

It is imperative to note that Europe as a continent has most of its states being close allies to the United States of America especially Britain which has two military bases

in Kenya: Kenya Air Base in Nairobi and Laikipia Air base in Nanyuki (British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK)). The British government usually train over 10,000 military personnel annually in Kenya for joint deployment in Warton zones globally to protect British interests (<https://www.army.mod.uk/deployments/africa>).

In totality, EU in 2019 approved a total of €500.000 aid to Kenyan government National Counter Terrorism Centre to scale up country-wide public awareness efforts, in order to reach and mobilize the wider public to join government efforts to counter violent extremism by reducing misinformation, demystifying key actors, and increasing awareness about the threat and recruitment strategies (<https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica>).

These states also in their bid to protect their National interest in the Horn of Africa and the continental Africa at large assumes a collaborative approach which is multilateral in nature to thwart terrorism. African leaders in counterterrorism efforts established the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, but they were faced with serious financial constraints to thwart terrorist activities. An interview with an officer in the counterterrorism police unit revealed that;

“We’ve received a lot of counterterrorism support from our partner state in Europe, especially in areas of capacity building, joint military trainings, equipment, and preventing piracy off Kenya and Somali coast.”

From the above response it is worth to mention that terrorists have been using Somali and Kenya coast as a source of funding through piracy and armed robbery. Below is a table showing European Union funding to counterterrorism efforts in Kenya.

Table 4.9: EU Counterterrorism Funding to GOK

| Source of Grant | Donor commitment | | Amount received to date (30.06 2121) | | Unclaimed amount to date (30.06.2020) | |
|-----------------|------------------|-------------|---|-------------|--|-------------|
| | Euros. A | Ksh. A | Euros. B | Ksh. B | Euros. A-B | Ksh.A- B |
| EU | 4,800,000 | 557,586,270 | 1,839,367.50 | 213,704,710 | 2960,632.50 | 343,881,530 |
| Total | 4,800,000 | 557,586,270 | 1,839,367.50 | 213,704,710 | 2960,632.50 | 343,881,530 |

Source: GoK, 2020

The funding objective was to assist in operationalization of the Kenya National strategy to counter violent extremism with particular emphasis on preventive aspects. Seen broadly, European Union counterterrorism strategy has a broad dimension encompassing; government agencies, private sector, religious organizations, research institutions and regional organizations (IGAD and EAC) (Republic of Kenya, 2020). To complement the EU funding, USA department of defence provided \$24 million in counterterrorism assistance in 2015 meant to build the capacity of Kenya's defence institutions, enhance military sales, and counterterrorism operations. Since 2015, the United States has been providing \$ 20 million in counterterrorism efforts in Kenya (USDS, 2021).

Club Multilateralism nature of the Kenya-USA partnership in AMISOM in constructivist lenses can be seen as driven by identity motives of the club of democracies, these club of nations seek to reproduce their hegemony in the east and the Horn of Africa. This implies that multilateral efforts such as the Kenya-US partnership emanate from international political ideas on how to prevent anti-western

illiberal orders from taking root or gaining more momentum in jurisdictions considered close to western powers or are strategic to western powers. Kenya and the horn of Africa fits into the description of such a region where the club powers would want to reproduce their hegemonic and geopolitical power.

4.4.3 The Coalition Multilateralism

The response on this type of multilateralism received the highest in terms demography at 33.9%. This nature of multilateralism approach places its faith in flexible coalitions whose focus, size, and membership can be tailored to specific contingencies (Patrick, 2021). In trying to understand this nature of partnership in counterterrorism in Kenya, it is imperative to note that the US is still the world's most powerful country according to most measures, the United States has fewer short-term incentives than weaker nations to invest in formal multilateral organizations as well as greater opportunities to pick and choose among frameworks that promise to expand its freedom of action and policy autonomy in pursuing its interest.

United States has been cooperating with a several countries on different aspects of the war against terrorism, from cracking down on terrorist financing to mobilizing troop contributions in Afghanistan and other parts of the globe. Under this strategy the US determines the coalition (Patrick, 2009). Further, Patrick posits that rather than a true multilateral undertaking, the U.S. antiterrorism campaign by design was a hub and-spoke arrangement based on bilateral deals with a heterogeneous group of countries, in which an American sheriff largely determined the actions of its posse.

It should be noted that continental Africa is vulnerable to terrorism due to its inherent challenges of weak criminal justice, inadequacy law enforcement personnel, with state hard pressed to handle disengaging terrorists (<https://press.un.org/en/2020>

[/sc14140.doc.htm](#)). To understand the multilateral partnership on counterterrorism under the auspice of AMISOM, it is important to note that it is the creature of Africa Union which is a regional body of African state's composition of military and police personnel meant to address regional and international security and political interests (Boutellis and Williams, 2013). This body was mandated by The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when it adopted resolution 1772 in 2007 which authorized AMISOM to take "all necessary measures" to protect to inter alia protect the institutions of the Transitional Institutions of the Somali Government and "support dialogue and reconciliation" by providing protection and safe passage to personnel involved. In Resolution 2036 of 2012 the Security Council was more specific in authorizing AMISOM "to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia." (Coning and Freear, 2013).

This means that without coalition of developed nations and regional and supra-regional organization to salvage the continent, Africa would remain to be a safe haven for terrorism. In an interview with one of the senior officers in the security sector revealed that;

"Counterterrorism efforts in Kenya in particular and the horn of Africa at large has necessitated concerted efforts, AMISOM has been of great help in assisting Somalia security apparatus stabilize and take control of the most conflicted state in the horn of Africa."

Due to regular attacks on Kenya by al-Shabaab terrorists, for instance the attack of Garissa University and West Gate Mall prompted the Kenyan government to launch and adopt a counter insurgency strategy to guard and disrupt al-Shabaab militia from crossing its borders (Albrecht, 2015). Kenya defence forces were later included to Africa Mission in Somalia which is a multi-dimensional component of the African

Union Mission in Somalia charged with the responsibility of supporting the people of Somalia in their struggle to overcome the legacy of over 20 years of conflict and to build a stable and prosperous state.

For this mission to succeed, both financial and materiel support from members of the international community, particularly the US and other Western countries, has been critical to Kenya, and other neighbouring states in AMISOM's expansion and increased operational effectiveness (Badmas, 2015). This support was necessitated due to their reluctance to involve a substantial number of troops *in any peacekeeping* operation in Somalia, US has placed support for AMISOM's five Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) Burundi (5,432), Djibouti (2,000), Ethiopia (4,395), Kenya (3,664), and Uganda (6,223) at or near the top of their strategies for defeating al-Shabaab and stabilizing Somalia's security situation (Raghavan and Whitlock, 2016).

Kenya –United States of America partnership on counterterrorism could further be vividly espoused when the United States deployed its forces to Kenya to conduct counter-terrorism operations and to advise, assist, and accompany security forces in East Africa who are the major contributors of troops in AMISOM (Ngugi, 2021). This shows that the partnership between the two states has been widen to include the entire region.

4.5 Chapter Summary

The chapter has discussed in details the finding of the first objective of the study on the nature of partnership that exists between Kenya-USA on counterterrorism. The inquiry entails; the respondent's length of Service, terrorism as a security threat in Kenya, why USA partners with Kenya in counterterrorism, and finally, the nature bilateral and multilateral partnership of Kenya-United States of America on

counterterrorism in Kenya. The next chapter corroborates the findings in this chapter and available body of literature so that it can vividly espouse the impact of counterterrorism in light of the bilateral and multilateral partnership. Here terrorism that threatens Kenya and the Horn of Africa is the context; while the power reproduction of Kenya and the horn of Africa is the causal mechanism explaining the adoption of both bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

CHAPTER FIVE

KENYA-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PARTNERSHIP AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN KENYA

5.0 Overview

This chapter discusses the second objective under this study. It sets to examine the impact of partnership on counterterrorism efforts by Kenya and the United States of America. These effects are as a result of the dimensions of partnership-bilateral and multilateralism that have been discussed in the previous chapter. Effects as defined by Oxford Dictionary; means the action of one object coming forcibly into contact with one another causing a marked effect or influence.

Counter-terrorism partnerships are meant to reverse the negative effects caused by terrorism attacks in a given society. For instance, terrorism can cause disruption of social, economic and political variables within and without a state (Buzan et al. 1998). It is estimated that between the year 2000 to 2018, terrorism cost the world economy \$US 855 billion (Bardwell and Iqbal, 2021), the estimates are based on death, injury, property damage, and GDP losses.

In Counterterrorism in the larger eastern Africa (Carson's, 2015) there is no other US strategic partner than Kenya. Earlier on, in 2001, a number of US military operations in Somalia were coordinated from Kenya-Lamu County (www.journal.sfu.ca). The US military also delivered humanitarian and development projects within Lamu, for example building wells in hard-to-reach villages. These projects were aimed at winning the confidence of the local population so as to give vital intelligence information regarding the al-Shabaab terrorist group.

In November 2016, the US Ambassador announced the delivery of a further US\$ 14 million for counter-terrorism cooperation. Then, in January 2017, the US Government approved the sale of US\$ 418 million aircraft and arms to Kenya for use against al-Shabaab. In addition, Manda Bay in Lamu County hosts a joint Kenya- US military base at Simba camp where counterterrorism operations are organized and executed along the Kenya coast to camp Lemonier in Djibouti (Ngugi and Ondieki, 2022).

Due to counterterrorism Partnership (bilateralism and multilateralism) between Kenya and USA, the effects resulting in form of retaliatory attacks leads to disruptions to the broader economy that may only appear days, weeks or months after the terrorist incident (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). Depending on the scale of and the frequency of the terrorist attack within a country, there is a corresponding impact on economic growth and development of a country. The broader implications of terrorism also depend on the ability of the economy to reallocate resources from the affected sectors smoothly. However, in developing countries the impacts are so grate due to its inherent vulnerabilities.

In counterterrorism, the effects of terror activities is meted with equal or more counterterrorism force which both have impact on social, economic and political variables in a greater magnitude. Apart from the catastrophic human consequences of insecurity, the economic costs of are also enormous. Physical and human capital losses, infrastructure destruction, lower investment and trade disruptions are all examples of channels through which the economy is negatively affected (De Groot, 2010). What makes it worse is that seldom are the impacts of war on a country's economy confined within the national boundaries. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find out that on average a neighbour to a country in conflict suffers a loss of 43% of initial

GDP, and that the total economic costs to the neighbouring countries actually exceed the costs suffered by the country involved in the conflict.

This section is significant as it gives insights on social –economic and political effects resulting from the Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism. It is imperative to note that terrorism and terrorist’s attacks are non-discriminative in nature, its human cost has been felt in virtually every corner of the globe, which has resulted to devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism has destabilized Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. All of these also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The findings of this objective were discussed thematically in the following trajectory; first, the impact of terrorism on five variables namely; foreign direct investment, tourism, employment, religious profiling, and increase of security expenditure.




Figure 5.1: Bar Graph Showing the Impact of Counterterrorism in Kenya
Source: Researcher, 2021

The question being addressed by the chart from the instrument was a Likert based inquiry item concerned with the impact of terrorism on; reduction on foreign direct investment, reduction on terrorism, increase in security budget, increase on unemployment and religious profiling as it broadly answers the impact of Kenya – USA strategic partnership on national counterterrorism.

The impact of terrorism on the above said variables are hereby discussed in detail having been regrouped into two broad categories of partnership as discussed in the previous chapter; bilateral and multilateral dimensions;

5.1 Effect of Bilateral Partnership on Counterterrorism

Table 5.1 Showing Bilateral Impact of Counterterrorism in Kenya

| | Type/ Dimension | Situation Before intervention | Situation after intervention |
|---|---------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | Unemployment | High | Fairly stabilises |
| 2 | Religious profiling | Low | Heighten |

Source: Researcher, 2023

The counterterrorist effects can assume many forms including; stabilizing countries economy-political and economic stability, wooing foreign investors, and closer economic and political ties within the region. This section sets to unearth the effects of counterterrorism in Kenya on the following variables; foreign direct investment, tourism, employment, security budget and religious profiling.

The effects of counterterrorism on the above said variables are hereby discussed by starting from the bilateral impact of partnership; employment, and religious profiling. Thereafter, the multilateral nature which cuts across the three dimensions as discussed in the previous chapter; club, charter and coalition in which impact cuts across all of them. Similarly, like discussing the findings of the previous objective, I have applied the model of context, causal mechanisms and outcomes to discuss the outcomes in this objective; where counter terrorism as the context, reproduction of the Kenyan socio-economic power as the causal mechanism, and the positive changes as the outcome. I thus again rely on the concept of power reproduction by Falleti & Lynch (2009:1150) as causal mechanism and a portable concept to the outcomes on foreign direct investment, security and tourism which are discussed individually in details thereafter. These are presented below and the relevant periodization provided.

5.1.1 Counter-terrorism Effects on Employment

The above variable may not be discussed in isolation from the already mentioned: effects on foreign direct investment, and tourism because of the inter-connectedness nature. The effects of counterterrorism have on foreign direct investment and tourism ultimately leads to impact on employment. In a public statement issued by al-Shabaab terrorist group on 8th January 2012 ‘Kenya Must Take Heed’; this states Al Shabab intent to attack tourists, including those on safari trips. It also references government

institutions and military installations as potential attack targets. This statement could be as a result of Kenya's military incursion in Somalia in 2011 implying retaliatory attacks. In addition, an advisory statement issued by USA ambassador to its citizens in Kenya stated that;

“Attacks could be indiscriminate in places frequented by foreigners including hotels, bars, restaurants, sports bars and nightclubs, sporting events, supermarkets, shopping centres, commercial buildings, coastal areas including beaches, government buildings including Embassies, airports, buses, trains and other transport hubs” (USDS,2016).

It should be noted that the United States of America has a considerable number of its resident citizens of 36,000 (Blinken, 2021). For safety advisory statement denies the country foreign income which it should have been earned was it note of retaliatory attacks from counterterrorism efforts. An interview with a respondent from Anti-Terrorism Police Unit noted that;

“Counterterrorism had an immense impact on all sectors of the economy in the initial stage; there were increased terrorists attacks because of retaliatory attacks, disruption of social lives closure of hotel, businesses and restriction of movement of (foreigners) because of travel advisories to citizens from western countries. This in turn led to closure of hotels and businesses leading to unemployment. But as the counterterrorism efforts heightened the terrorists' groups were contained and tourism and other economic sectors picked once again.”

The above response clearly depicts the effects of terrorism on Kenya's economic stability. The disruption caused on tourism, businesses led to closure of businesses and re-location of investors to other safe states resulted to laying off employees.

Tourism sector as noted earlier (Kenya Economic Survey, 2017) employed over 500,000 Kenyans ranging from tour operators, tour guides, travel agencies, safari drivers, dancers, hoteliers, restaurateurs, small businesses operators to airports and airline personnel. Consequently, there was a significant increase in unemployment as

many Kenyans lost their jobs. Employees that were still employed received salary cuts. For instance, at the Carnivore restaurant; all the 330-staff had their salaries reduced, including Dunford the chairman (National Geographic, 2010).

Below is the graph showing the unemployment rates in Kenya from the years 2000 to 2021.




Figure 5.2: Unemployment rates in Kenya

Source: World Development Indicators, 2021

From the figure 5.2, it can be vividly seen that that the unemployment rate in Kenya is constantly on increase from the 2005, this could be attributed to other factor apart from counterterrorism. Jacob (2019), posit that unemployment in Africa is on rise because of high youthful population who lack meaningful employment. It is approximated that nearly 10 million youths are unemployed in Kenya (Munyao, 2019).

5.1.2 Counterterrorism Effects on Religious Profiling

It is evident that counterterrorism measures in Kenya had a religious profiling effect.

In an interview with a respondent who seek anonymity noted that;

“Bearing an Islamic name or attending mosque is equated to being a terrorist or an affiliate of terrorist group especially at the coastal region, most of us are in constant fear of being killed by the security personnel, most of our kins have been arrest by the police and their where about has become a mystery.”

It imperative to note that counterterrorism effort have led religious profiling globally, Scheinin (2007) affirms that religious profiling has been increasingly used in the fight against terrorism since nine eleven: from the German data-mining initiatives to identify so-called terrorist “sleepers”, to the United Kingdom’s stop and searches under the Terrorism Act 2000, and beyond to EU policy. The fear of further terrorist attacks is creating a new form of “terrorist” profiling globally, where Muslims or people who appear to be of Middle-Eastern decent are being discriminated against in the name of national security.

Below is a list of some of the terrorist attacks as a result of partnership in counterterrorism efforts in terrorists affected areas targeting Christians in Kenya since 2010;

- i) 13 June 2010 – during a "NO" campaign rally, a petrol bomb was thrown into the crowds as the meeting dispersed at dusk, sparking a stampede as people fled. Some witnesses reported that there had been two separate explosions, in Uhuru Park in the centre of the city. Five people were killed and as many as 75 were injured. The meeting was called by a church leader to campaign against a proposed new constitution in a referendum (Planz, 2010).
- ii) 30 September 2012 – the Sunday school of St Polycarp's church in Nairobi was attacked with grenades. According to newspaper reports, one child was killed. Kenyan police blamed the attack on Al-Shabaab sympathizers (*BBC News, 30 September, 2012*).
- iii) 2 December 2014 – Al-Shabaab militants attacked and killed 36 quarry workers, many of whom were non-Muslims, near the town of Mandera (*The Independent, 2 September, 2014*).

- iv) 21 December 2015 – two people were killed and three others injured when gunmen, believed to be part of Al-Shabaab, attacked a bus travelling from the town of Mandera to Nairobi, and a lorry, near the north-eastern village of El-Wak on the Somali border. Muslim passengers helped dress non-Muslims in Islamic headscarves so as to prevent the gunmen from identifying them; and refused to separate from non-Muslims when ordered to do so. A non-Muslim bus passenger who tried to run away was shot dead, as was a non-Muslim person in the lorry (*The Guardian. Associate Press, 22 December, 2015*).
- v) 3 January 2022, Six Christians Killed in a suspected Al-Shabaab Attack in Widhu village, Lamu West, Kenya (Persecution, 3 January, 2022).

These attacks could be associated with retaliatory by terrorists on the government efforts to thwart the terrorists menace in Kenya. Religious and ethnic has been used synonymously by police, security, immigration or customs officials of generalizations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin - rather than individual behaviour or objective evidence - as the basis for suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions. It is most often manifest in police officers' decisions about whom to stop for identity checks, questioning, and searches and sometimes arrest. Religious profiling can also be used to "mine" (or undertake computerized searches of) databases for potential terrorist suspects or in targeting surveillance and anti-radicalization policies.

Religious profiling violates the principle of equal treatment under the law and is a form of race discrimination that is prohibited under international law. Indeed, it is a form of discrimination that undermines the commitment to non-discrimination as a fundamental value of the both regional and municipal laws. It is also ineffective and

counter-productive in that it alienates the very communities whose support is necessary for fighting crime and terrorism.

In Kenya's counterterrorism efforts, religious profiling was and is practiced by law enforcement officials to target Islamist extremism and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) who according to security agents lure individuals to join al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014). Majority of Kenyans population are Christians 84%, Muslims 11% others 6% (*world fact book-Kenya*). Islamic religion and population of Arabic descent and terrorist groups/ organizations associated with them (Al Qaida, Al-Shabaab and associates) have claimed responsibility of terrorist's attacks in Kenya (Anderson, and McKnight, 2014).

Since 2013 Kenya's Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) (<https://www.aljazeera.com>) has led the government's response at home to al-Shabaab. It is alleged that the unit was responsible for extra-judicial killings and the disappearance of suspected militants as well as Islamic activists in Kenya. In addition, security forces are suspected of involvement in the killing of Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohamed, an extremist preacher in Mombasa who originated from Lamu and who was linked to al-Hijra. His death provoked riots at Kenya's coast (<https://www.un.org>).

Shortly thereafter, killings of suspected supporters of al-Shabaab and its Kenyan branches became most concentrated at the coastal towns and cities. One human rights organization estimated that at least 21 Muslim clerics were killed by security agencies between April 2012 and July 2014 (The New Humanitarian, 2014). In retaliation, militants have also been accused of killing moderate preachers and Imams seeking to counter radical ideology in tit-for-tat attacks (Anderson, and McKnight, 2014). By

the end of 2014, this cycle of murders and counter-murders, demonstrations and harsh policing, had generated a climate of widespread suspicion and tension at the coast.

5.2 Effect of Multilateral Partnership on Counterterrorism

Table 5.2: Showing the Effect of Counterterrorism

| | <i>Type/ Dimension</i> | <i>Situation Before intervention</i> | <i>Situation after intervention</i> |
|---|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1 | <i>Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)</i> | <i>Low</i> | <i>Steadily increased</i> |
| 2 | <i>Tourism income (TI)</i> | <i>Drop</i> | <i>Steady stabilizes</i> |
| 3 | <i>Security expenditure (SE)</i> | <i>On increase</i> | <i>On increase</i> |

Source: *Researcher, 2023*

5.2.1 Effects on Foreign Direct Investment

From the chart above it is evident that respondents were in agreement that counterterrorism impact foreign investment. This justification derives from direction taken by respondents where most of them leaned towards strongly agree and agree. As noted earlier, (Sandler & Enders, 2008) affirm that the effects of terrorism on developing states have more impact on the country's economy than terrorism that occurs in a developed country because of vulnerabilities associated with these states. Counterterrorism efforts are meant to reverse the negative impacts caused by terrorism.

Table 5.3: FDI inflows to Kenya in \$ US From 2010-2020

| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|-------------|-------|-------|-------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| 178,064,199 | 1.54B | 1.38B | 1.12B | 820,934,459 | 619,719,962 | 4669,534,249 | 1.35B | 767,761,507 | 469,940,267 | 426,305,189 |




Figure 5.3: Derived Table 5.1 FDI inflows to Kenya

Source: World Bank Data website www.data.worldbank.org

From the above table 5.1, it can be vividly deduced that in 2011 FDI inflow to Kenya stood at \$ 1.54 billion a year when Kenya launched the first ever military incursion in Somalia. The main reason was that Kenya's national security was threatened by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab (Olsen, 2018). The terrorist group had in fact carried out a number of cross-border raids during the months preceding the operation. From 2011 to 2016 there was a decrease of FDI inflows which could be attributed to retaliatory attacks from the al-Shabab militia group and their sympathizers. Below are a series of attacks on Kenya between the year 2000-2020 according to Global Terrorism Database.

Table 5.4: Terrorists Attacks per Year

| Year | 1997 | 2000 | 2003 | 2006 | 2008 | 2011 | 2013 | 2015 | 2018 | 2020 |
|---------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Attacks | 06 | 08 | 08 | 10 | 07 | 80 | 110 | 80 | 70 | 50 |

Source: Global Terrorism Database

From the table above, it seems since 2013, counterterrorism operations between Kenya and USA seem to have born fruits, as indicated on the figure 5.3, the scale of

Foreign Direct Investment rose steadily in 2015 unlike the proceeding years between the years 2007 to 2011. An interview with one of the respondents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade pointed out that;

“Counterterrorism efforts by Kenya and United States of America has won the confidence of not only foreign investors in Kenya but also internal investors, investors have resorted to re-invest in Kenya because of conducive environment and political stability. Some businesses have opened up especially on tourism sector, and some workers have regained their lost employment.”

The choice of an investment site free from security or relatively secure is paramount to international trade. It gives investors' confidence on returns upon their capital. In the case of insecurity, they stand to lose their property and at worst even endangering their lives. Where investors or foreign traders withdraw from a country due to terrorism, the State feels the real composite backlash in terms of economy to include; Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), local unemployment, effects on local suppliers, and loss of government budgetary demands.

Kenya historically, was a prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in not only East Africa but the entire HOA region during the 1960s and 1970s (Kinyanjui, 2014). Despite politically driven economic policies, rampant corruption, government malfeasance, poor infrastructure and substandard public services during the 1980s and 1990s, foreign direct investment (FDI) to Kenya decreased from the Western states including the USA. Kinyanjui further points that Net Foreign Direct Investment in US\$ in Kenya during the period 2010-2012 was affected as a result of terrorism activities. He observes a decline in the net FDI of 14% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In evaluating investment status, KNBS (2015) in a recent report indicates that about 70% of investors perceived security to have deteriorated in the past 2 years, however, since 2015 the FDI inflows picked again

because of positive impacts if counterterrorism until 2020 when the Covid 19 pandemic rocked the globe.

Despite Kenya's relative peace in the entire Horn of Africa and based on the above literature, terrorism impact on foreign investment has spillover effects in a region (Li and Schaub, 2004) among neighbouring countries. In an interview with the respondent in the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade revealed that;

“Kenya is a regional hub and relatively peaceful compared to other states in the region. This imply that we are the preferred destination for foreign investors due to favourable economic environment in the region, the effect of terrorism in Kenya automatically affects our neighbours.”

The above response corroborates with Sandler (2004) assertions that terrorism in a neighbouring state hampers capital inflows and losses of regional multiplier effects on economic activity.

5.2.2 Effects of Counterterrorism on Tourism

Counterterrorism effects through partnerships such as Kenya – USA relations draws an array of effects; band wagoning of/and coalition building of sympathetic States especially it may lead to terming some States as “Anti-Arabists” and “Anti-Islamists” to take connotation nationalism and religionism where terrorists emanate from the Middle East countries. Kenya in such a case would suffer the effect of loss whose reward is normally in form of military aid serving the US interests to a greater extent.

Tourism and tourism-related services such as aviation and transport, is one of the sectors of the economy that suffers the most from terrorism. Travel and tourism contributed US\$7.2 trillion to global GDP in 2015, or 9.8 per cent of the global total (Global Terrorism Index, 2 016). The adverse economic effects of terrorism on the tourism sector are felt by all countries that suffer terrorist attacks, regardless of

whether or not these incidents are targeted at tourists. Despite this the action against terrorists also leads to suffering by the tourist destination State. An interview with a respondent in the Ministry of foreign affairs and international trade- Kenya revealed that;

“Counterterrorism in the short run dealt a great blow to Kenya’s tourist sector, however, with time the efforts yielded fruits as the tourism which is one of the country’s top foreign earners sectors once again gained. Tourist sector especially the famous safaris have picked and tourists hotels and cites are once again full and operational.

Due to retaliatory attacks, Kenya’s tourist sector suffered the most. For instance, due to imminent terror alerts from intelligence, Western governments, led by the United States, Britain and a number of European countries, issued travel advisories to all their citizens against traveling to Kenya in 2003. The Kenya Tourism Federation stated that the suspension of British Airways regular and charter planes flying to Nairobi, coupled with travel advisories, closed down access to 90% of Kenya's overseas markets. The country was losing an estimated amount of over 1 billion Kenya shillings (\$128 million) per week. In addition to the revenue loss, at stake were over 500,000 direct jobs and another 2.5 million indirect jobs (Gitu, 2003).

Below is the graph showing the trends of tourism earnings in Kenya from the years 2005 to 2021.




Figure 5.4 Amount Earned from Tourism Sector in Kenya

Source: *Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Kenya, 2021*

From the graph above it is evident that the income from tourism sector in Kenya has been on rise till 2011 when Kenya launched its first ever military incursion to Somalia to fight the al-Shabab terrorist group an affiliate of Al-Qaida in the Horn of Africa region (www.accord.org). From 2015, tourism took a positive gain in income to US\$ 170 in 2019.

In 2017, the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations and other international organizations report on the state of the violation of human rights on war on terror read in part;

“...the abduction and killing of tourists in Kenyan coast and foreign aid workers in the North Eastern region has led to foreign countries issuing adverse travel advisories to their citizens thus affecting the tourism sector in the country... www.ohchr.org ”

This statement vividly shows the extent at which retaliatory attacks affected tourists’ sector which is one of the main foreign earners.

It should be noted that tourism sector is one of the six most significant sectors in Kenya’s development blue print (Kenya Vision, 2030). It provides huge employment and foreign exchange earnings. A study carried out by Buigut and Amendah (2015)

show that terrorism has indeed significantly affected tourist arrivals and earnings in Kenya. Their results show that a 1% increase in fatalities decreases the arrivals of tourists by about 0.132% which suggests an annual loss of about Ksh157.1 million in tourism revenues per unit increase in fatality for the country. In another study, Buigut (2015) used a dynamic panel model to compare the effect of terrorism on developed and emerging country demand for tourism in Kenya using quarterly data spanning 2010Q1 to 2013Q4. The estimated results showed that a 1% increase in fatality reduced arrivals from developed countries by 0.082%. This translated to 2,487 visitors per year, or roughly Ksh155.8 million lost annually from an increase of one fatality per quarter.

In a study by Masinde, et. al. (2016) which used Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL), Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) techniques and Granger causality tests to empirically determine whether terrorism has an adverse effect on tourism between 1994 and 2014; found that there is no long-run relationship between counterterrorism and tourism in Kenya and that terrorism did not Granger cause tourism and vice versa. However, short-run effects showed counterterrorism had negative and significant effects on tourism. The lack of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the two variables is a bit surprising although the authors explained their findings by arguing that terrorism activities have been less frequent in Kenya and have been a recent problem with a spike after 2011.

Kenya lost a quarter of its visitors in the first five months of 2015 – 284,313 down from 381,278 in 2014 (KTB, 2015). This was followed by a fall of 4.3% the year before. This resulted in a decline in tourist receipts of 16.7% in 2013, with about 10% decrease specifically in hotels and restaurants in Kenya, which continued in 2014 (CBK, 2015).

5.2.3 Counterterrorism Effects on Security

The effects of counterterrorism on security can take overt and covert forms. Whichever the form, the impacts are great. Each form taken calls for similar response or a different strategy (counterterrorism). Such an impact is shapeless since it is not easy to know the targets and much more the timings. This creates constraints on available security financially and capacity wise. This extends from security apparatus to the whole security infrastructure.

Table 5.5: Generated from Graph 5.1 Responses Specifically Addressing Effects of Kenya – USA Strategic Partnership on CT on Kenya’s Security

| Impacts | Response Types | Multiple Responses | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| | | F | F in % |
| Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) | i. Scaring foreign investors from USA leaning states (allies). | 165 | 94.8% |
| | ii. Scaring foreign investors from terrorists’ tagged states. | 112 | 64.3% |
| | iii. Stringent clearance at Ports of Entry in Kenya. | 100 | 57.4% |
| Tourism | i. Fewer movements to Coastal tourists’ sites. | 168 | 96.5% |
| | ii. USA Government Travel Advisory to their citizens & allied states. | 90 | 51.7% |
| Employment | i. Closure of many tourists related hotels. | 150 | 86.2% |
| | ii. Flight cancellations. | 148 | 85% |
| | iii. Drastic reduction of foreign investors. | 118 | 67.8% |
| Increased in security budget (IISB) | Reference was made to existing government security budgets | 80 | 45.9% |
| Religious profiling | Raiding of mosques | 70 | 40.2% |

Source: *Researcher, 2022*

This table 5.1 above captures the multiple specific responses that were observed by responses on the effects of Kenya-USA partnership in CT on Kenya’s security. The

following security variables were under inquiry; Foreign Direct Investment, Tourism, Employment, Increased in security budget and religious profiling.

The findings observed on responses specifically addressing effects of Kenya – USA Partnership on CT in Kenya’s security that highly recorded multiple responses indicate that there was reduction on foreign investment (94.8%), reduction in tourism (96.5%), and unemployment (86.2%). This is an indication of an existence of correlation among the impact variables (Scaring foreign investors from USA leaning states /allies, Fewer movements to Coastal tourists’ sites, and Closure of many tourists related hotels) on Kenya-USA partnership on CT which from the Likert scale analysis on each impact variable a great leaning to “strongly agree” and “agree” was evidenced.

The other effects variables (increase in security budget and religious profiling) received fewer multiple responses yet significant to the bilateral partnership because they tend towards the 50% mark. Key to lower response on increase of security budget is their secrecy to the public. In as much as security budgets in Kenya may be scanty, the available data point towards increased budgets in some specific periods when terrorist activities heightened. In the table below, there is an increase in Kenya government Defence/National Security Intelligence Services (NSIS) budget 2008/09-2009/10 an indication that there were activities related to terrorism and in this instance, there was a preparation for military incursion into Somalia.

It is good to note according Republic of Kenya (ROK) 2010 that the set of policies outlined in this Budget Outlook Paper (BOPA) are consistent with the national strategic objectives in Budget Strategic Paper (BSP) pursued by the Government as a basis of allocation of public resources. This therefore means BSP and BOPA

represent projection and the actual expenditure respectively. In the table, both the BSP'10 and BOPA'11 represent when the estimates were done. It will be realized that the Defence/NSIS budget increased overtime (BOPA'11) except slight decrease by trend in 2011/12, the interpretation would generally imply that Kenya Government War on Terror (KGWT) kept on increasing by support of partners due to incessant terrorism within her territories. The percentages somehow indicate an inverse relation to the rise in expenditure since they were calculated on the basis of the aggregate total national revenue.

Table 5.6: Central Government Operations 2008/09 - 2013/14 (in billions of Kenya Shillings)

| | 2008/09 | 2009/10 | 2010/11 | 2011/12 | | 2012/13 | | 2013/14 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
| | | | Budget | BOPA'11 | BSP'10 | BOPA'11 | BSP'10 | BOPA'11 |
| Defence/NSIS Expenditure | 48.5 | 56.9 | 56.7 | 63.7 | 55.9 | 57.7 | 54.5 | 58.8 |
| Defence/NSIS Expenditure in Percentage (%) | 2.2% | 2.4% | 2.0% | 2.3% | 1.8% | 1.9% | 1.6% | 1.7% |

Source: ROK, 2010

The budgeting trends towards CT by single states and interstate relations expose existence of partnership. Aronson (Undated) affirm that the FBI and the Kenya Criminal Investigation Division (CID) worked in cohesion and exchanged expertise to mark an extensive operation that continues into present day, serving as a prime example for international law enforcement cooperation. In an interview session with an Anti-terrorism security personnel at ATPU headquarters in Ruaraka revealed that;

“Security expenditure not only in Kenya but to all countries affected by terrorist’s attack has been on increase and will continue to increase till the situation is contained. Kenya in particular has been receiving security assistance in terms of equipment’s and training from friendly states especially the USA to fight against terrorist’s groups.”

This response implies that Kenya security expenditure alone is inadequate necessitating foreign assistance in terms of financial, equipment and trainings to

effectively deal with counterterrorism efforts not only within its borders but without. In support of this (Whitaker 2008), observes that in a matter of months following the 1998 attack, The National Security Intelligence Service was established by the Kenyan government and the country was formally added to the U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program. The American government also contributed \$42 million towards health care for injured victims, building reconstruction, and business recovery. This money was a necessary humanitarian step to mitigate the anger and hardship felt by many Kenyan people at that time. Aside from this emergency relief, little changed in the monetary assistance Kenya received from the United States. The addition to the ATA program was largely a formality, intended to make a statement that America would amplify its security abroad.

This research would quickly point that in the partnership between Kenya and USA in the CT there were symbiotic relations in form of technical/financial support and action implementation agency/state (that is for USA and Kenya respectively). The financiers' fiscal supports normally are channelled as grants hence may not appear in government budget projections.

The United States (Lind & Howell 2010), after the War on Terror began, exponentially increased its resources and presence around the world, especially in countries deemed critical to the success of the mission. The role of international development assistance quickly became “an instrument by which [America] pursued [its] political and security interests to defeat terrorist networks...”. On this aspect a respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Kenya revealed that;

“The Americans through its Civilian Authority (CA) wing has since the 9/11 concentrated in undertaking development projects in the Northern Frontier Counties of Kenya where poverty level is high and

borders the conflicted state of Somalia. The population is deemed vulnerable to terrorists' recruitment due to poverty, geography, harshness of the climate, and absence of government machinery due to marginalization and vastness of the area."

The existence of humanitarian aid often had security undertones. For example, it became a presumed belief that several main factors affecting Islamic radicalization are under development, poverty, and high levels of youth unemployment. Kenya possesses all of the above characteristics to a large degree.

The changes in American intelligence and law enforcement practices (Franken, 2003) also had profound effects overseas. The creation of task forces and an expansion of the Intelligence Community thinned the line between law enforcement and military entities. For example, the U.S. Defence Department began considerably closer relationships with non-military actors. As a result, the fight against terrorism became a joint battle by all government agencies. The program offers (Aronson, Undated) free education at military institutions in the United States, giving foreign countries [in this case, Kenya] access to valuable and comprehensive training.

The largest increase in military assistance was part of the Foreign Military Financing program (FMF), which directed most of its funding towards counterterrorism. In the year immediately following 9/11, the FMF aid package to Kenya increased roughly 15 times its previous value. The country was also added as a beneficiary to the Regional Defence Counterterrorism Fellowship, which according to the Defence Department, is an initiative targeted towards "key countries in the war on terrorism" (Franken, 2003).

Aside from the fellowship creation and FMF increase in 2003, the East African Counterterrorism Initiative was also put into effect, giving a grant of \$100 million dollars to Kenya and other surrounding countries. The specific distribution of the

funds is not publicly available; however, multiple governmental entities were formed immediately following the grant (Whitaker, 2008).

Retrogressively, criticisms exist that corroborate earlier discussion about impact of CT arising from Kenya-USA strategic partnership on national counterterrorism. On this Aronson (Undated) posits that a significant population in Kenya resents the United States for its involvement in counterterrorism and security. Many dissenting Kenyans believe that their terrorism woes are due largely to the extended presence of the United States within their country and not a result of any inherent problems created by Kenya. A common perception is that they are “caught up in the crossfire” and are “collateral damage” in America’s War on Terror. Besides the overt actions taken by the U.S. in the fight against terrorism, a number of Kenyans accuse the American government of whether arbitrarily or not, inhibiting the largest service industry in Kenya. Tourism in Kenya is a huge part of the national economy and Americans have historically comprised much of the clientele. The U.S. State Department has issued numerous travel warnings about Kenya since 2002 that expose possible dangers within the country. In addition, it has had effects on foreign investment, affecting tourism, and creating unemployment in the end.

Discussing terrorism in Kenya dates back to sporadic deadly incidences in the years up to 1998 (Norfolk 1980 Hotel bombing and USA Embassy bombing in 1998). However, the escalation of terrorism in the post 2000 became immense thus necessitating counterterrorism partnerships to secure Kenya as a strategic partner in the HOA and by the extension the interests of the partner states.

The actual terrorism incidences include; 2002 Kikambala Hotel bombing where 13 were killed and 80 injured. The hotel blast occurred after 60 visitors from Israel had

checked in (BBC News, 2002). In October 2011 (MFA, 2013), Kenya's Defence Force entry into Somalia through a coordinated operation with the Somali military was launched against the al-Shabaab insurgents in Southern Somalia.

Sustained terrorism (Mutiga, 2013) attacks led to an incident of 21st September 2013 when al-Shabaab associated gunmen targeted Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall where at least 67 people were killed. According to Kashmira Gander in 2014 about 50 masked gunmen hijacked a van on 15 June 2014 and raided a police station in the predominantly Christian town of Mpeketoni. Another incident that followed closely was in April 2015, where gun wielding men stormed the Garissa University College in the wee hours, killing almost 150 people and wounding several others (BBC News, 2015).

Other numerous several incidences making counterterrorism possible as in Kenya-USA partnership arose from such attacks as in the table below;

Table 5.7: Lesser Terrorism Incidences in Kenya

| Date | Incident | Location | Source |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------|
| 30th Sep. 2012 | Grenade attack | Nairobi, Juja road | BBC News |
| 14th Dec 2013 | Bus Park attack | Nairobi, Eastleigh | Aljazeera |
| 14th Mar 2014 | Arrest of 2 Terrorists | Mombasa | BBC News |
| 23rd Apr 2014 | Police Station bombing | Nairobi, Pangani | BBC News |
| 3rd May 2014 | Twin Bus Park bombing | Nairobi, Thika Highway | BBC News |
| 28th Nov 2014 | Bus attack | Mandera-Nairobi Road | Sunday Nation |
| 2nd Dec 2014 | Kenya Bus attack | Mandera Quarry | BBC News |

Source: *Researcher, 2022*

5.3 Chapter Summary

The chapter has analysed and discussed in details the findings of the second objective under the study on the effects of Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism. The variables that were under inquiry were; tourism, religious profiling, foreign direct investment, unemployment, and security.

Smith (*undated*) posits that countless men and women both in uniform or civilians are on the beat every day all over the world, determined to prevent terrorists and other criminals from carrying out their plans. Further, security personnel are patrolling along the border and remote frontiers in inhospitable terrain, police officers following leads that span multiple countries, prosecutors combing through endless piles of evidence. This shows the magnitude that counterterrorism has taken globally. From the study, it has been found that terrorism has negative effects on all the variables in the short run but after a short while from 2015 it seems that counterterrorism efforts by partners had yielded positive results as terrorist groups attacks subsided meaning that Partners had contained the menace. The summary of the study findings is as discussed as follows;

On Foreign Direct Investment; it was found that counterterrorism in the short run (between 2011 and 2015) scared away foreign investors especially from the USA and its Western allies. This was due to retaliatory attack targeted on Kenya's government and its citizens, on the other hand USA citizens were targeted by terrorist by attacking west gate malls, and tourist hotels places frequented by foreigners (Compbell, 2020). However, since 2015 onwards the counterterrorism efforts seemed to have been able to contain terrorism and the Foreign Direct Investment inflows started to increase in volume till 2020 when the global pandemic of Covid 19 struck.

On Tourism, it was found that this variable is closely linked to the counterterrorism effects on Foreign Direct Investment. The negative effects on foreign direct investment leads to low number of tourists visiting the country during the initial stages of the years 2011 to 2015. This period realized there was less revenue to the government and private investors as the number of tourists from the United States and its allies refrained from visiting Kenya leading to closure of hotel industry and tourism sector in general hence workers layoffs and subsequent unemployment. However, from 2015 the tourism sector showed improvement in both the number of tourists visiting the country and the revenue also increased. This is attributed to the success of counterterrorism efforts by Partners in containing the menace hence improving the security of tourists and tourism sector in general.

On unemployment, the study reveals that this variable also shows to have been negatively affected by counterterrorism efforts between the partners. This is in line with the effects of the counterterrorism on the FDI and Tourism sector which were affected negatively in the short run but later in the long run stabilized. However, in relation to the statistics from the World Indicator (2021) which shows that unemployment rates in Kenya have been on increase from the years 2005-2021. This could be attributed to other economic variables within the state which do not provide employment opportunities to the growing youthful population.

On security, counterterrorism led to lose of not only manpower but increased expenditure on security on both countries in partnership. It is estimated that USA contributed \$42 million in 2010 alone towards Anti-terrorist Assistance to Kenya (Lind and Howel, 2010). Kenya in 2016 is said to have suffered the worst military lose in the battle of El Adde in the region of Gedo in Somalia (IPI, 2017). On the side of Americans, the Manda attack killed one U.S. Army Soldier, Specialist Henry J.

Mayfield, and two U.S. contract personnel, Bruce Triplett and Dustin Harrison. The attack also wounded three additional U.S. personnel and one Kenyan soldier, and destroyed \$71.5 million of U.S. government resources (USDD, 2022). However, despite the loss of manpower and increase in security expenditure the positive side is that there has been close collaboration and partnership not only among the security personnel but also among the states in partnership on counterterrorism.

This study findings agree with the constructivist theory of international relations which Wendt (1999) posit that it should be construed and understood from a social perspective. In counterterrorism efforts, Spenser (2012) content that the metaphorical analysis constructs terrorism as a war, a crime, an uncivilized evil and a disease. These are what contributed to the formulation of certain counter-terrorism policies, such as ‘military reaction, judicial measures, and immigration policies, while excluding responses such as negotiations. Identities (Wendt, 1992) tells who are the actors in counterterrorism which in this case are Kenya and United States whereas the interests among the partners is security which is threatened by terrorists.

Constructivism is often identified through Wendt’s central thought where anarchy is what states make of it. Wendt believes that anarchy is socially constructed by individual states, based on their ‘identities’ and how they create their own security dilemmas. While Wendt’s claim mainly related to inter-state ‘interactions’, the idea extends to the interaction between state and non-state (terrorist) actor as well. Counter-terrorism lends itself to Wendt’s understanding of the three cultures of anarchy, which also depend on how identities are defined.

The study concludes that the counterterrorism effects on both partners in the short run affected the country’s economic variables under the study negatively but in the long

run, the economic variables under the study recovered meaning that counterterrorism partnership had contained the menace and helped Kenya to reproduce her power to counter fragility brought by terrorism.

The next chapter endeavours to find out the challenges faced by Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on counterterrorism. These challenges are discussed based on the earlier findings of the dimensions that the two partners (Kenya and USA) adopt in counterterrorism. These partnerships are Bilateral and multilateral in nature.

CHAPTER SIX
CHALLENGES FACING KENYA-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PARTNERSHIP ON COUNTERTERRORISM

6.0 Overview

This chapter discussed the third objective of the study. It sets therefore to unearth the challenges faced in counterterrorism by the partnership between Kenya and United States America. The trajectory that counterterrorism takes in this partnership are; bilateral and multilateral in nature. On bilateralism, Kenya and the United States of America who have enjoyed cordial relation for a long time elevated their partnership to strategic partnership in 2018 (USDS, 2021) with the central focus on national defence, civilian security, multi and regional security.

On multilateralism, Kenya on one hand partners with states, regional and supra-National institutions while USA partners with the same institutions. Multilateralism is anchored on collective security and on the premise of indivisibility of peace and security (Ruggie, 1992). For multilateralism to succeed, there is need of a great power (USA) to influence the decisions of the Supra-National organizations (UN) to a desired course (counterterrorism) (Kapchans, 1986) through informal negotiations and consensus building. This influence led to the unanimous resolution by the UN security council declaration that terrorism is a threat to global peace hence call for international community cooperation under a common obligation to end international terrorism (United Nations General Assembly, 2001).

Global war on terror was declared on 11 October 2001 by the then USA president George W. Bush led by America and its partners globally (<https://www.georgewbush.library.gov/research/topic-guides/global-war-terror>). In addition, Carson (2015)

affirmed that in counterterrorism efforts no country in the horn of Africa region that is more strategic than Kenya.

This discourse is significant as it helps to understand the dynamism on the challenges of counterterrorism as a security threat not only in the region but globally. The data obtained from respondents was coded for the purposes of finding and marking the underlying ideas in the data; grouping similar kinds of information together in categories and relating different ideas and themes to one another (Rubin and Rubin, 1995).

It should be noted that the definition of terrorism forms the base of a challenge which hinders analysis of terrorism and makes the conceptualization of terrorism controversial world over (Gibbs, 1989), there are many varying definitions due to political reasons usually in form of propaganda calling terrorist freedom fighters or vis-vasa (Weinberg et al 2004). In addition, the UN Policies on counterterrorism has been hampered by member's lack of political will to implement.

From the respondents, the following table was derived showing their views on the inquiry.

Table 6.1: Showing Respondents Response on the Challenges Encountered by K-USA Counterterrorism Efforts in the Kenya

| | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|---|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
| Valid Political instabilities of neighbours | 8 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 7.5 |
| Use of IED's | 8 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 19.0 |
| Prolonged and Severe inter-intra state Conflict | 10 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 34.5 |
| Western interest in Kenya | 9 | 14.1 | 14.1 | 48.9 |
| US-perceived favouritism of Kenya | 6 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 63.8 |
| Youth Unemployment | 13 | 20.3 | 20.3 | 77.0 |
| Role of International Community | 10 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 100.0 |
| Total | 64 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |

Source: Researcher, 2022

On the table above, the majority respondents by demographic (20.3%) opined that the main challenge in combating terrorism in Kenya is youth unemployment, followed by 15.6% who held the view that role of international community and severe and prolonged inter-state conflict has posed a challenge in CT, use of IED's and political instabilities tied at 12.5%. 14.1 of the respondents were of the opinion that western interests are a challenge, while US perceived favouritism of Kenya received the lowest response at 9.3%. This response implies that the responses are aware of the challenges posed by Kenya as a state in counterterrorism.

A number of challenges were identified in this context of counterterrorism and in reproducing Kenyan state power through bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism partnerships. The challenges included in summary economic, political and social with grave consequences which are discussed and backed by periodization their occurrence. In as much as the affected State bears much brunt of such, the nature of terrorism makes this security vice a universal misdemeanour hence having effects extending beyond the intended. Apart from the challenges on terrorism itself, there are myriad of challenges associated with counterterrorism efforts in the HOA which the field study was able to capture.

To understand the challenges of Kenya-USA partnership on counterterrorism, the researcher re-grouped the challenges from the previous discussed dimensions/ types of bilateral and multilateral impacts which are shown in the following tables;

6.1 Challenges facing the Kenya-USA in Counterterrorism

A number of challenges were identified in this context of counterterrorism as the two states- Kenya and the USA- strived to reproduce their state power to mitigate on the

adverse effects of terrorist activities. The challenges are grouped into the following dimensions; bilateral and multilateral impacts. Each of these is examined next.

6.1.1 Kenya-USA Bilateral Partnership Challenges on Counterterrorism

These are the challenges- as shown in table 6.1- which directly affected the Kenya-US bilateral Counterterrorism strategic partnership efforts. These are elaborated below as youth unemployment, Political Instabilities of Kenya's neighbouring States, and Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's).

Table 6.2: Challenges of Kenya-US Bilateral partnership on counterterrorism

| | <i>Type/ Dimension</i> | <i>Types of Challenges</i> |
|----------|------------------------|---|
| <i>1</i> | <i>Partners</i> | <i>1. Youth unemployment 2. Political Instabilities of Kenya's neighbouring States 3. Use of Improvised Explosive Devices</i> |

Source: *Researcher, 2023*

6.1.2 Youth Unemployment

Youth unemployment, according to ILO, has been defined as the proportion of the labour force that has not worked more than one hour during the short reference period and is actively looking for work (ILO, 2008). Thus, unemployed youths are those people aged between 15 and 24 who have not worked or are underutilized in work; these people are available and actively seek for absorption into work- an activity that is at best elusive. Barrie Anthony (2003) asserts that in Kenya, there are about 2.6 million unemployed youth who are graduates from high school, middle-level collages, and universities. Every year, this number swells up by an approximated 600,000 persons. Alluding to this, an officer in the Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit noted that;

“Unemployment is a great challenge in counterterrorism- not only in Kenya- but in the entire region. The unemployment makes the youth vulnerable to terrorist recruiters; the youth are promised lucrative pay that lures some of them to join Al-Shabab terrorist group. This youth- because of their knowledge of the Kenya geography- become

instrumental in organizing and executing terrorist activities within Kenya.

The above response is consistent with the sentiments of Lin (2012) who stated that youth unemployment is a common phenomenon in many countries in the global south. Many countries in this region have persistently high fertility rates- where such fertility rates lead to high youth unemployment (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). Furthermore, it leads to despair, nonproductive labour-market trajectories, and stunted economic growth. This aforementioned condition afflicts Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2011). In IGAD countries where Kenya is a member, despite the recent economic growth rates and positive activities recorded in education and in the health sector, higher rates of youth unemployment -and the slow pace with which new jobs are created- remain critical challenges in the region; thus, counterterrorism efforts suffer (Ahmed, 2017; Daily Nation, 27.3.2019.13).

West (2005) agrees that unemployment rate is greatest in the Horn of Africa as well as in the continent. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan that constitute the Horn of Africa sub-region have become potential hostages to terrorism that may affect the security of the whole continent. Their largely unsecured territories (Matui, 2019) provide a platform for terrorists, and their internal conflicts and weaknesses create potential breeding grounds for current and future terrorism.

According to Collier (2003), the general weakness of African governments as well as the civil strife, which exists in several countries, makes parts of the continent highly susceptible to terrorist activity. In the region, Somalia and Sudan are considered the epicentre of regional terrorism. Kenya and Uganda are seen to be most at risk because of the 'spillover effect. While recruitment and radicalization occur across the region, violent extremism can be a precursor to larger forms of violent conflict (IGAD, 2021).

This phenomenon has been made worse by social-economic and political instabilities in the region characterized by mass influx of refugees, harsh climatic conditions, regional rivalries, and inter-communal conflicts that are exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In addition, the presence of failed state of Somalia, political instabilities in Southern Sudan, Sudan, Somali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo makes the region a safer haven for terrorist activities.

For counterterrorism efforts to succeed, the issue of youth unemployment should be given a priority. A climate conducive for both local and international foreign investors should be created to tap on the youthful population in Kenya and the entire Horn of Africa. Interestingly recent discourses on Kenya- and generally on Africa- have painted optimism for development because of the youth bulge in these countries: the youth are innovative, ICT savvy and energetic- attributes if well harnessed could transform the economies and give a positive outlook (Kariba (2020)).

6.1.3 Political Instabilities in Kenya's Neighbouring States

The terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil are connected to individuals that are both domestic and from neighbouring countries- the Kenya-USA bilateral partnerships thus respond to these threats or are challenged by these threats. The states within the Horn of Africa region are characterized by weak, ungoverned and failed states- states in transition, poverty stricken, and with persistent conflicts: these create a safe haven and context for recruitment and engaging in terrorist activities (Daily Nation, 6.15.2019.11). The Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) notes that;

“Due to its geographical location, persistence of conflict, absence of state structures, despair from the loss of hope and the growth of extremism, the IGAD region is considered to be the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub- Saharan Africa.” (Bashir, 2007).

USIP (2020) affirms that almost all countries in the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Southern, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia) have been victimized by terrorist acts- whether perpetrated by and against a country's nationals or focused on "extra-national or extra-regional targets (USIP, 2020). Most casualties from terrorism in the Horn of Africa are not linked to international terrorism but to domestic insurgencies in the sub-region. These domestic insurgents have targeted Westerners or Western-related assets in Kenya and the region- they appear to abhor westerners whom in constructivist terms possibly they consider as enemies to wage war against (Shin, 2003; Daily Nation, 9.2.2023; <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke>). This has been conceptualized as part of the Post-Cold War phenomenon where some Islamic fundamentalists resisting the emerging globalization order in which the USA existed as the preeminent power.

Felter *et al*, (2021) describe Somalia as 'one of the most impoverished countries in the world; it is the bastion and incubator of al-Shabab, and al-Ittihad al-Islam (AIAI, or "Unity of Islam") insurgents: the former is a militant Salafi group that peaked in the 1990s; this happened after the fall of Said Barre's 1969–1991 regime and the ensuing outbreak of the civil war in the country. AIAI's core was 'a band of Middle East–educated Somali extremists that were partly funded and armed by al-Qaeda's chief, Osama bin Laden' (<https://www.cfr.org>; Daily Nation 26.6.2023). This shows the interconnectedness between the failed state of Somalia and the extremist terrorist group in the Horn of Africa region.

6.1.4 Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's)

The IEDs that terrorist's militia use in Kenya are prevalent in the Middle East (The East African 22.6.2023). The combination of state collapse, proximity to the Middle East and emerging political Islam makes Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa a

predictable target (Menkhaus, 2004). There are some indicators that the Horn of African and Middle Eastern terrorism are interconnected. According to Mazrui (2002), international terrorism is one more area where the policies of the Middle East and the politics of Africa are interwoven. Since 1991 there were protracted terrorist operations in the Horn of Africa region. Middle East states especially Yemen (Raghavan, 2010) has become a source for IED detonators and detonating cords. It is estimated that Al-Shabaab IED attacks have claimed over 5,000 casualties and approximately 2,177 fatalities between 2017 and 2019 (www.un.org).

In Kenya, there are several incidences where these devices have been employed. For instance, On June 15, an IED planted by Al-Shabab destroyed a police vehicle, killing 11 police officers and injuring one in Wajir County. The attackers also abducted three Kenya Police Reservists, according to Government and media reporting. On October 26, media reported that Al-Shabaab used an IED to kill 11 General Service Unit (GSU) officers in Garissa County (USDS, 2021). In an interview with an officer in the Kenya Anti-terrorism police Unit revealed that;

“The terrorists have changed tactics and several roads especially in the Northern District Frontier areas are not safe because of IED’s implanted by al-Shabab terrorists’ group. This has claimed several lives especially for security personnel on duty.”

In the same vein, the al-Shabab militia made their first ever attack on USA military camp in Manda Bay Kenya on 5th January, 2020 (<https://www.npr.org>) where U.S. service member and two Defence Department contractors were killed. In addition, two Defence Department members were also injured in the attack. The site of the attack, Manda Bay Airfield, is used by U.S. forces to provide training and counterterrorism support to partners in East Africa, as well as to protect U.S. interests in the area.

6.2 Kenya-USA Multilateral Partnership Challenges on Counterterrorism

Multilateralism means that there is a relationship of more than two states; it could also mean the existence of a relation between a state and a supra-national organization (Keohane, 1954). In this study, the multilateral challenges in counterterrorism efforts of the Kenya - United States of America partnership means that the challenges therein examined transcend the bilateral relations. The study findings are discussed below;

Table 6.3: Challenges of Kenya-US Multilateral partnership on counterterrorism

| | <i>Type/ Dimension</i> | <i>Types of challenges</i> |
|---|------------------------|--|
| 1 | <i>Coalition</i> | 1. <i>Severe and prolonged intra-state conflicts</i> |
| 2 | <i>Charter</i> | 1. <i>Role of international community</i> |
| 3 | <i>Club</i> | 1. <i>Balancing relations between east and western interests in Kenya</i> 2. <i>Western Interest in Kenya</i> |

Source: *Researcher, 2023*

6.2.1 Prolonged and Severe Intra- and Interstate Conflict

The above challenge is linked to coalition multilateralism which is premised on the faith in flexible coalitions whose focus, size, and membership can be tailored to specific contingencies (Allan, 2010). For instance, from a U.S. perspective, which is still the world's most powerful country according to most measures, has fewer short-term incentives than weaker nations to invest in formal multilateral organizations—as well as greater opportunities to pick and choose among frameworks that promise to expand its freedom of action and policy autonomy in pursuing its preferences. Rather than accept the constraints of the UN or even formal alliances, the United States can sometimes enjoy greater manoeuvring room and control over outcomes by working through issue-specific coalitions. An interview with one of the respondents in the South Sudan Embassy in Nairobi narrated the following;

“Nearly all countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced prolonged intra-state conflicts. Those of us in Sudan have been experiencing conflicts since independence. It is only Kenya and Uganda that have enjoyed relative peace in comparison to the rest of the countries in the Horn of Africa”.

From the interview with one of the interviewees in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade-Kenya the Horn of Africa Division said;

“The Horn of Africa is the most conflicted zone in the continent resulting to refugees, proliferation of small and light weapons arms (SALW) which further destabilizes peace in the host country. These conflicts have been catalysed by harsh climatic conditions and unstable governments.”

The arguments by the South Sudanese respondent about Kenya and Uganda being relatively peaceful would be correct when used from the perspective of the respondent. However, in a more critical observation, all these states are facing security fragilities with varying intensities (<https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1138087>). In a marked agreement with the respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade – Kenya, the issue of SALW proliferation and refugee menace is made more real with the kind of insecurity in the HOA which is partly contributed to by terrorism. Counterterrorism hence becomes a strategy and a method to deal with such insecurity.

A telephone interview with IGAD official narrates;

“The conflicts in the horn of Africa are unique in that its transverses the international boundaries due to the fact that the borders are pores, several communities at the borders are of the same nation, and poor governance.”

This sentiment corroborates with Kentark (2018) who asserts that the Horn of Africa sub-region is one of the most conflicted regions in the sub-Saharan Africa; in addition, the region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and interstate conflict, leading to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. For instance, the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) -

which cantered on a border dispute, and in which Ethiopia charged that Eritrea was providing support to religious extremist groups with links to al-Qaida- led to the deaths of thousands; the repression of opposition movements; significant numbers of reported human rights violations; and Eritrea's withdrawal from IGAD (Mclure, 2007).

Insurgent groups in Uganda, such as the Lord's Resistance Army and the Alliance of Democratic Forces, have employed brutal tactics, which have reportedly led to the deaths of over 5,000 people across that country; this in turn has helped to increase public tolerance of measures against others under suspicion (Long, 2007).

Moreover, the prolonged instability in Somalia, which has been without a fully functioning national government since 1991 has been a catalysed and an important factor fuelling the spread of radicalism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa region.

Thomas Dempsey, an Africa expert at the US Army War College, notes that,

“Various terrorist groups have operated in Somalia since it experienced state collapse in the early 1990s. The most prominent of these include Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah (AIAI), Al-Qaeda itself, and a small, recently emerged, extremely violent jihadist cell led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro. AIAI seems to have acted as a terrorist hub for other groups active in Ethiopia, while the ‘Ayro group has operated as a terrorist node in the evolved two-cell network model. Al-Qaeda has demonstrated and suspected links to AIAI and ‘Ayro, and appears to have developed Somalia as a key hub for attacks throughout East Africa” (Dampsay, 2006).

In the last two decades, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated even further with the growth of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC); this group believed to have terrorist ties, defeated a coalition of US-backed warlords in 2006. The subsequent US-backed Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia briefly dislodged the UIC, but a festering insurgency has complicated efforts by Ethiopia, the Transitional Federal Government, and the African Union (AU) to bring stability to the country; this may

have in some ways strengthened the hand of hard-liner Islamists fighting for control of the country (Bloomfield, 2007).

Despite the ongoing conflict in Somalia, states neighbouring Somalia- with better developed communications, transportation, and financial infrastructures- but weak institutions and long stretches of unsecured border territory may in fact be considered by terrorists to have a more conducive environment for their operations (<http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp>).

6.2.2 Role of International Community

This challenge arises out of the charter multilateralism where the world is conceived as all states are equal under the United Nations charter. On this account and due to its binding charter and universal membership, it is assumed that it is the ultimate foundation for international peace and security and the first port of call for cooperation on global challenges (Patrick, 2023). In this arrangement, all member states participate in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which makes decisions on a one-state, one-vote basis, but ultimate authority over peace and security, particularly enforcement action, is vested in a Security Council dominated by five veto-wielding permanent members, which can pass resolutions creating legal obligations for all member states. This bargain recognizes that the world's major powers must inevitably play a custodial role in safeguarding world order—and that the price of their acquiescence to the UN is a guarantee that the council can never act against their perceived vital national interests (Clark, 1989).

This challenge received the highest response from respondents - at 23%. Somali is one of the unique countries in the globe for its lack of government in charge of its affairs (Mulugeta, 2009). Bado (2011) defines international community as a group of sovereign

states coming together to address a particular international problem. This research uses this term to mean international state organization, which takes the form of regional, extra-regional and supra-national organizations. One of the interviewees working at the Somalia Embassy in Kenya narrated how Somalia has been neglected in the following words;

“We are only depending on God and ourselves, nobody even the neighbouring states come to help us, it is survival for the fittest for the young and the adult alike, food, clothing, shelter etc are not available”.

Another interviewee added that;

“Our neighbours see us as if we are lesser beings, being harassed and detained by security personnel. We only hear of neighbours but we don't see their importance in stabilizing our country.”

From the two voices, it is evident that some segment of Somali publics felt neglected by the international community. The sentiments also corroborate with Moller (2009) who states that international community- both at the regional level (AU) and the global level (UN)- have neglected to address the Somali conflict problem. For instance, the first ever UNOSOM-1 (United Nations Operation in Somalia-1) deployed in 1991 was seen to have failed because of delays and logistical issues (<https://peacekeeping.un.org>). The AU on his part is said to lack a clear-cut definition separating a peace support operation from counterterrorism and counter-insurgency operations (Pratt, 2010). In practice, the AU and regional actors have used these concepts in an ambiguous manner, without clear differentiation between them. This has led to the absence of a multilaterally accepted definition of terrorism (ISS, 2019).

Furthermore, the UN- which is a supra-national organization- has not been able to agree on a definition. The AU, guided by the 1999 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, provides a definition of ‘terrorist acts. However, this convention is focused on preserving state

security because it assumes that terrorism is limited to violations of criminal laws as defined by a state party.

6.2.3 Challenge in Balancing Relations between East and Western interests in Kenya

Here the club refers to democratic countries that are trying to democratize the region and Kenya is a favorite. Kenya is a pivot state in democratization, a host of the largest number of diplomatic missions, and enjoys relative. Kenya is considered as an anchor state by United States, regional economic hub, and hosts the largest number of foreign nations from the west (USDS, 2022).

This response received the third majority of response- at 14.9%. This response may imply that due to insecurity in the region, the United States of America and its partners coordinates their Horn regional affairs from Nairobi. The United States Department of State (2022), affirms that United States of America closed its Embassy in Somalia in 1991, however, in December 2018, the US reopened a permanent diplomatic mission in Mogadishu but it is not a fully operational; it relies on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi's consular section which has been providing coverage for Somalia (USDS, 2022). During an interview session, one of the Somalia Embassy representatives in Nairobi noted that;

We have been isolated by the globe especially developed nations. For instance, anything we need in Somalia from them has to originate from United States of America and be requested from Nairobi. This does not only apply to America but also the Western State's presence in Somalia is lacking, one may wonder if we do exist or we are of no value to the globe.

Such response depicts the Somali feeling of abandonment. The American policy of "limited foot print" on counterterrorism further complicates the counterterrorism efforts in the region (www.fpri.org). Another challenge that repeatedly emerged in the

study, on Kenya- United States of America partnership on counterterrorism is low level of U.S. diplomatic support in the Horn of Africa. The USA only has consulates, rather than full-scale missions, inadequate numbers of embassy personnel (for example, in Djibouti and in Somalia). It appears the absence of strong American representation in these places greatly hinders the U.S. ability to assess terrorist threats. Another key respondent in this study revealed that;

“The terrorist target us (Kenya) majorly because we host majority of western nationals especially the Americans, the international organizations/institutions and seemed favouritism from the west. This war could not be ours”.

6.2.4 Western Interests in Kenya

This challenge closely ties with the above under club multilateralism. Kenya has enjoyed relative economic and political stability (Widner, 1993), as a result, it attracted foreign (western) investors, organizations and international attention. Some 350 multinational companies in Africa are based in Nairobi, Kenya's capital, which has also become an international conference centre. Indeed, Kenya remains the only Third World country hosting the headquarters of a United Nations agency, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). In addition, 15 other UN bodies use Nairobi as their regional centre. Multilateral donor agencies also use Nairobi as their base for regional operations (Nying'uro, 1997).

This response received the fourth score by majority with 14.4%. This implies that there are international political variables which pose a challenge in counterterrorism efforts.

Kenyan in the entire region has had strong historical ties with the western states. Historically, the relations have been cordial and conflictual at equal measure depending on states interests. For instance, during the Cold War years Western

interests paid very little attention to the human rights situation, it focused on the containment of socialism. However, after the Cold War era the cooperation between the Kenyan Security Service and the FBI and Mossad has given rise to some misgivings among sections of the Kenyan intelligentsia (Banie and Anthony, 2006).

An interview with one of the scholars pointed out that;

“The war on terror is for western interests, we are being used as proxies to safeguard the interests of western states. Terrorist attacks are targeted towards the west but since they are hardly found, the citizens and the government become the target.

This situation among the Kenyan intelligentsia in general- and among some Kenyan Muslims in particular- may create a supporting environment for the radicalization of individuals into terrorist groups. Kenya support of US initiatives to eliminate Libya's Muammer Gaddafi, then a strong opponent of Zionism and its cooperation with Israeli attacks on the Entebbe Airport might have pitted the country against anti-western terrorists (Freedland (2016), Muendo (2016). Otenyo (2004) has argued that Kenya also found itself out of Favor with those who came to be known as religious fundamentalist on the basis of the Kenyan closer relations with some countries in the West.

In the same vein, during the Cold War period, Kenya's entered into a military agreement with the then USA President Jimmy Carter- for the US exclusive use of Mombasa Seaport in the Kenyan coast. The presence of the US military in Mombasa may well have been perceived by the local residents (Muslim majority) as reoccupation of their territory and indirect colonization of their country by foreigners (Otenyo, 2004). Although the use of international diplomacy to help create an international coalition against terror is one aspect of the way states respond to

international terrorism, the US-Kenya relations, unfortunately, provided clear targets for anti- American terrorists in Kenya.

The large contingent of American citizens at the US Embassy in Nairobi may well have been one factor that made the Embassy a target priority (Pkalya and Brendon, 2017). Another consideration in relation to Kenya's vulnerability to international terrorism is that other sections of the Kenyan elite have often tried to defend Kenya's image as a western-style democracy and this has placed the elite at variance with the Kenyan Muslims in particular. In recent international relations, Kenya is perceived to be a close ally of Israel and it is known (Otenyo, 2004) that powerful members of the government of Kenya have had business connections with Israeli nationals. Kenya continued to maintain an open-door policy towards Israel when African countries shut their doors in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In brief Kenya-Israeli relations has been cordial at government level thereby causing considerable discomfort to local Muslim groups. For example, the influential Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims, in September 2001, issued a statement calling for an end to diplomatic links between Kenya and Israel. Pkalya and Brendon (2017) warned that Kenya's inclination towards the West could be some of the reasons fuelling terrorist acts in the country.

Another dimension of Kenya's international politics is on refugees. According to Otenyo (2004), Kenya hosts a huge number of refugees originating from neighbouring countries- like Somalia and Sudan. As Barrie and Anthony (2006) documented, in the 1990s, Somalis were ordered by the Kenyan Government to carry special identity cards. Human Rights Watch were aggrieved by this act; although a number of Somalis in the camps were suspected of being agents of Islamic fundamentalist groups. The

reports suggest that the Dadaab refugee camp hosted close to 120,000 Somalis. Kenyan government security briefings were concerned that illegal firearms, other weapons, and a variety of telecommunications equipment were sold in refugee camps. Obviously, terrorists seek to recruit refugees where government with lax border immigration control exists. Thus, this situation may be one reason for Kenya's vulnerability to international terrorism.

6.3 Chapter Summary

The above discussed challenges in CT efforts by Kenya-United States of America partnership largely contributed by internal variables prevailing in Kenya which are both bilateral and multilateral in nature. For instance, youth unemployment, political instabilities of Kenya's neighbours, and Use of improvised explosive devices are the three challenges which are bilateral in nature. While the severe and prolonged inter-state and intra-state conflicts, role of international community, USA perceived favouritism, and western interests in Kenya are challenges which emanate from the multilateral partnership between Kenya and USA in counterterrorism. The aforementioned challenges can be understood through the lenses social constructivist theory whose proponents are Wendt and Onuf (1992). The aforementioned theorists hold that human consciousness is important in interpretation of international affairs. The interpretation of terrorism as a security threat is underpinned by ideas which inform international relations (Wendt, 1992). The shared understanding of terrorism and its impacts leads to mutual interests amongst states to counter it.

This study concludes that for counterterrorism challenges facing the Kenya-USA partnership are largely multilateral than bilateral in nature. For these efforts to succeed there is need for all stakeholders especially the neighbouring states in the horn of Africa to have a unity of purpose to thwart terrorist groups in the region.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Overview

This chapter presents a summary of the key findings of the study, conclusion, and recommendations by linking the study findings and the theoretical framework of the study. The chapter is organized in line with the research questions and the main results of each research question. First, it presents a detailed summary and conclusions of the first research question on examination of the nature of Kenya - United States of America partnership on counterterrorism in Kenya. Secondly, it unearths the impact of counterterrorism partnership on Kenya-United States Partnership. Thirdly, it configures the challenges faced by Kenya-United States of America partnership in counterterrorism efforts. Finally, it outlines the recommendations of the study with a focus on policy and proposes areas for further studies.

7.1 The Nature of Kenya-United States of America Partnership on CT

The first research question focused on examining the nature of partnership between Kenya and United States of America on counterterrorism. The findings were as follows; first the research started by inquiring on the length Service of the Respondents. This theme aimed at examining the length of the respondents in service. The findings reveal that majority of the respondents 58.6% had served for 5-10 years, 37.9% had served for a period of 10-15 years while 1.75 had served for 15 years and above. This implied that the majority of the respondents had lengthy work experience which was of great importance to the study as the length of service meant more experience and knowledge on matters security.

Secondly, all respondents unanimously agreed that terrorism is a security threat not only in Kenya but in the entire horn of Africa region. These findings are significant in that they help the policy makers and security agents to counter the menace for any development to be undertaken. Several factors make Kenya the most vulnerable state to terrorist's attacks. Large presence of USA and its western interests in Kenya, Prolonged political instability in Somalia which is one of the Kenya's neighbours making it a fertile ground for recruitment and training of both local and international terrorism, a lack of a functioning central government in Somalia and Sudan, prolonged state of instability and violence a long coast line, porous borders, and proximity to the Middle East.

Thirdly, the Kenya-United States of America partnership is both bilateral and multilateral in nature. Under bilateral dimension of partnership, the two states collaborations were witnessed in the following areas; Capacity building & equipment sharing-capacity where USA supplied Kenya with Automated Targeting System-Global (ATS-G) software, which facilitates screening of air travellers, the ATA program donated equipment necessary for analysing digital data from mobile phones; the USA through its civilian authority in bid to alleviate poverty in the Northern counties partnered with Kenya in the provision of water, health care and education through a project dubbed "*winning hearts & minds*" designed to give humanitarian and development aid to Muslim communities in the HOA region as part of CT & stabilization; another trajectory that this partnership took was on legal assistance, this was seen vividly when the USA government trained Kenya's legal personnel on drafting of counterterrorism legislations and the security personnel on enhancing their capacity in; investigation, border security, aviation security, & counter extremism; On Military assistance the USA government was of great help in

the establishment of Ranger Strike Force in 2008 would act as a frontline against “infiltrators and armed groups. This kind of partnership between two states assisted to a greater extent in solving a common problem for mutual benefit. Through successive regimes since the declaration of global war on terror in 2001 by the then USA president G.W Bush to date there has been sustained reproduction of state power on counterterrorism menace by the leaders of both states in Kenya.

On multilateralism, Kenya and the United States of America have had a long and enduring bilateral relation since Kenya attained her independence and in 2016 the relationship was uplifted to strategic partnership (USDS, 2016).

On multilateralism of the partnership on counterterrorism, USA and its allies have partnered with Kenya to thwart terrorism attacks. The study found that the multilateralism dimensions that exist in this partnership are; the club, the coalition and the charter multilateralism. Charter multilateralism rests on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that a war against one state is, ipso facto, considered a war against all. The community of states therefore is obliged to respond to threatened or actual aggression, first by diplomatic means, then through economic sanctions, and finally by the collective use of force if necessary. Facing the prospect of such a community-wide response, any rational potential aggressor would be deterred. As a result, Kenya and USA are both members of the UN, USA hosting the United Nations headquarters in New York, it also remains the major financial contributor toward its budget, while Kenya on the other hand is the home of the two United Nations organs- UN Habitat and UNEP. The two countries are signatory to 14 (fourteen) United Nations Instrument on counterterrorism.

The second dimension of multilateralism between the two states is the club multilateralism which posits that the most promising foundation for global order and cooperation is not UN universalism but a league of advanced market democracies committed to an open, liberal, and rules-based international system. It assumes that established democracies constitute a distinctive “security community” dedicated to shared political and economic principles—namely, support for representative and accountable governance, open markets, and the rule of law at home and abroad—and among whom armed conflict has become inconceivable. Multilateral partnership dimension between the Kenya-USA strategic partnership can be seen through the immense support from European Union through the African Peace Facility (APF) to AMISOM. This facility was created by EU in response to AU call for external support. This can be further seen through the convergence of interest between Europe and USA in Kenya where leading states like Britain having military bases in Kenya which USA also have.

Coalition multilateral partnership is the third dimension found between these two states. This nature of multilateralism approach places its faith in flexible coalitions whose focus, size, and membership can be tailored to specific contingencies. This strategic partnership could be better understood through the analogy of Hub & spoke analogy which is based on bilateral deals with a heterogeneous group of countries, where American sheriff largely determined the actions of its posse. To understand the MPCT under the auspice of AMISOM, it is important to note that it is the creature of AU which is a regional body of African state’s composition of military and police personnel meant to address regional and international security and political interests.

The unique aspect is that the counterterrorism partnership between Kenya and the USA is that the concert aspect of multilateralism is missing. This could be attributed

to the inherent challenges of applying the old school type of collision in the contemporary challenge which needs an all-encompassing strategy as opposed to few global leaders.

7.2 The Impact of Kenya- USA Partnership on Counterterrorism

The impact in this study is the outcome of the partnership on counterterrorism between Kenya and United States of America. It was also found that counterterrorism partnership had an immense negative impact in the short run (2011-2015) on the measured economic variable namely; foreign direct investment, security expenditure, tourism, unemployment, and religious profiling whose findings are discussed below;

Foreign direct investment; From the study, it can be vividly deduced that in 2011 FDI inflow to Kenya stood at \$ 1.54 billion a year before Kenya launched the first ever military incursion in Somalia. The main reason was that Kenya's national security was threatened by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, Al-Shabaab (Olsen, 2018). The terrorist group had in fact carried out a number of cross-border raids during the months preceding the operation. From 2011 to 2016 there was a decrease of FDI inflows which could be attributed to retaliatory attacks from the al-Shabab militia group and their sympathizers. This resulted in both economic and political instability instilling fear on investors.

However, after 2016 there was increase in FDI meaning that the partners had registered some success in counterterrorism winning back the confidence of foreign and local investors.

Tourism; the study found out that tourism and tourism-related services such as aviation and transport, as one of the sectors of the economy that suffers the most from terrorism. Kenya in the entire eastern Africa has been the prime destination of

tourists. The period preceding and shortly after Kenya's military incursion to Somalia, there were several retaliatory attacks prompting USA and its western allies issued travel advisories and the subsequent suspension British airways to Nairobi worsened the situation further.

However, from 2016 the income from tourism sector in Kenya registered some progress which showed that in 2019 the industry earned Ksh. 150 billion indicating a recovery of the sector which could be attributed to success in counterterrorism efforts by the partners.

Unemployment; from the study it was found that unemployment as a variable could not be discussed in isolation from the already mentioned: impact on foreign direct investment, and tourism because of the inter-connectedness nature. The impact of counterterrorism has on foreign direct investment and tourism ultimately leads to impact on employment. However, the unemployment rate in Kenya is constantly on increase from the 2005, this could be attributed to the fact that Africa's youth population is on rise while the economy growth is on constant or decline lack meaningful employment.

Religious profiling; The study found that counterterrorism effort not only in Kenya but globally have led religious profiling. The fear of further terrorist attacks is creating a new form of "terrorist" profiling globally, where Muslims or people who appear to be of Middle-Eastern decent are being discriminated against in the name of national security. In Kenya's counterterrorism efforts, religious profiling was and is practiced by law enforcement official to target Islamist extremism and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) who according to security agents lure individuals to join terrorism.

Security expenditure; Though the response on this variable was low it is imperative to note that security budget is treated by the governments as secret to the public. In as much as security budgets in Kenya may be scanty, the available data point towards increased budgets in some specific periods when terrorist activities heightened.

7.3 Challenges of Counterterrorism in Kenya

Counterterrorism challenge largely emanates from the difficulty in its definition which has proved a challenge to all stakeholders ranging from the UN security council, the academia and the legal practitioners. The challenges discussed below are as per the finding of this study which are re-grouped into two; bilateral and multilateral challenges.

7.3.1 The Multilateral Challenges

Multilateral challenges faced by Kenya-USA strategic partnership on National counterterrorism are those challenges that emanates from the two states partners with their partnership from other friendly states, non-governmental organizations and supranational organizations for mutuality of interests. The summary of the findings on this dimension are as follows;

Prolonged severe intra- and interstate conflict; Kenya as a state in the horn of Africa which it has been described as he most conflicted region in the globe faces a lot of security challenge. For instance, Insurgent groups in Uganda, such as the Lord's Resistance Army and the Alliance of Democratic Forces, have employed brutal tactics, which have reportedly led to the deaths and suffering among the population, the ongoing political instability in the larger Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, the prolonged instability in Somalia, which has been without a fully functioning national government since 1991 has been a catalysed and an important factor fuelling

the spread of radicalism and terrorism in the Horn of Africa region. In addition, the internal displacement of population and refugee's influx has led to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation.

US perceived Favouritism of Kenya is yet another challenge that emanates from this strategic partnership. This response implies that due to insecurity in the region the United States of America and its partners coordinates their Horn regional affair from Nairobi. United States of America closed its embassy in Somalia in 1991, however, in December 2018, the USA reopened a permanent diplomatic mission in Mogadishu but it is not fully operational relaying on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi's consular section which has been providing coverage for Somalia (USDS, 2022).

In addition, American representation in these places greatly hinders the U.S. ability to assess terrorist threats and to understand the inner workings of complicated groups and important ethnic factions, let alone the international networks that are so important to terrorist financing and recruitment. This may imply that Kenya and Djibouti due to their geographical location have attracted USA interest in the region. USA residents in Kenya are estimated at 36,000 persons, host of the US largest embassy in the region, signed joint military trainings on counterterrorism. On the other hand, Djibouti is a United States Naval Expeditionary Base and home to the combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) of the U.S Africa Command (USAFRICOM).

Another challenge from this dimension of strategic partnership on national counterterrorism was Western states interests in Kenya. Kenyan in the entire region has had strong historical ties with the western states. Historically, the relations have been cordial and conflictual at equal measure depending on states interests. For

instance, during the Cold War years Western interests paid very little attention to the human rights situation, it focused on the containment of socialism. In addition, the country's decision to enter into military agreement with the then USA President Carter for the exclusive use of Mombasa in its Indian Ocean-Gulf region strategic endeavours and the presence of US military in Mombasa may have been perceived by the local residents (Muslim majority) as reoccupation of their territory and indirect colonization of their country by foreigners.

7.3.2 The Bilateral Challenges

The Bilateral challenges facing Kenya-United States strategic Partnership on national counterterrorism are those challenges which emanates from purely from the two state and their state institution. The study found out the following as challenges;

Youth unemployment; first and foremost, the dire situation of youth unemployment in Kenya like most of less-developed countries (LDCs) is particularly troubling especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which faces the highest of nearly level (70%). Moreover, it is estimated that on average, of the 10 to 12 million youth entering the workforce, only 3.1 million jobs are created annually, leaving the vast majority unemployed either in informal employment or unemployed (ILO, 2022). With such a large section of unemployed population in the region compounded with regional instability makes the horn of Africa sub-region become potential hostages and potential breeding grounds for current and future terrorism.

Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's); This study found out that the IEDs that terrorist's militia use in Kenya are prevalent in the Middle East which find their way to Kenya through the conflicted state of Somalia and the border porosity between the two bordering states. Kenya and its strategic partner have been at the receiving end of

this devices. For instance, several Kenya security personnel have been killed by the IED's devices planted on the roads. The USA security personnel at Manda-bay camp have suffered similar attacks from the terrorist's groups who have been claiming the responsibility.

Political Instabilities in Kenya's Neighbouring States; the terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil are connected to individuals that are both domestic and from neighbouring countries- the Kenya-USA bilateral partnerships thus respond to these threats or are challenged by these threats. The states within the Horn of Africa region are characterized by weak, ungoverned and failed states- states in transition, poverty stricken, and with persistent conflicts: these create a safe haven and context for recruitment and engaging in terrorist activities. Most casualties from terrorism in the Horn of Africa are not linked to international terrorism but to domestic insurgencies in the sub-region. These domestic insurgents have targeted Westerners or Western-related assets in Kenya and the region- they appear to abhor westerners.

Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's); This study found out that the IEDs that terrorist's militia use in Kenya are prevalent in the Middle East which find their way to Kenya through the conflicted state of Somalia and the border porosity between the two bordering states. Kenya and its strategic partner have been at the receiving end of this devices. For instance, several Kenya security personnel have been killed by the IED's devices planted on the roads. The USA security personnel at Manda-bay camp have suffered similar attacks from the terrorist's groups who have been claiming the responsibility.

7.4 Conclusion

Based on the study the following conclusions were made;

The study concludes that Kenya-United States of America strategic partnership on national counterterrorism is largely informed by the mutuality of state interest. The national interests according to Morgenthau (1951) are dire needs of a state which it seeks to protect from encroachments by other nation-states. National interests between different countries are often complementary and common international interests emerge from them. In this case the common interest between these states is Security, and trade in Kenya. The USA in this partnership not only seek to secure its citizen security but also property and citizens of its western allies in Kenya.

The nature of partnership in counterterrorism is both bi-lateral and multi-lateral (Multifaceted). Bi-lateral in that the partnership is between the two nations; Kenya and United States of America.

The cordial relationship between Kenya and United States of America can be traced back to 1964 just a year after Kenya's independence and elevated to strategic partnership in 2016 to cope with systematic and issue specific challenge which in this study is counterterrorism. The nature of partnership forged by these states are both bilateralism and multilateralism which fits to USA counterterrorism strategy which is multifaceted in Nature.

The strategic counterterrorism on national counterterrorism between the partners can be said to have succeeded to a larger extent due to reversal of the adverse effects of terrorism attacks on Kenya. This can be vividly seen through the outcome of the counterterrorism efforts on measured variables under the study. However, though on variables like unemployment still became a thorn in the flesh among the parts it could

be attributed to the Africa's youthful population which is on constant increase not commensurate to the economic growth and the adverse effects of global pandemic (Covid-19) which negatively affected the economic growth of not only Africa but the entire globe.

On the challenges, the study concludes that Kenya and USA and other stakeholders on war on terror should work together to ameliorate on the conditions which lures the population join terrorist's groups for political and social stability not only in Kenya but in the entire region.

7.5 Recommendations

This study proposes policy recommendations as well as recommendations for further research as presented in the subsections below.

7.5.1 Policy Recommendations

This section presents policy recommendations based on the study. Kenya and the United States of America have had a cordial and enduring partnership since Kenya attained her independence in 1963. The study policy recommendations below;

First and foremost, the government and other stakeholders in counterterrorism should come up with a clear policy to address youth unemployment. It is evident that Africa and Kenya in particular have a big population of unemployed youth. This population if not offered an opportunity to spend their energy can easily be lured by terrorists' groups which promise the employment hence prone to recruiters.

Secondly, the government of Kenya and USA should strengthen the partnership and have a shared intelligence on terrorism and counterterrorism so that to avoid unnecessary travel advisory which affects inflows of foreign direct investments to

Kenya. The intelligence gathered should enable partners to jointly thwart terrorist attack on time and avoid public fear which is the main objective of the terrorists.

Thirdly, the international community both regional and supra-national organizations should join hands to stabilize the horn of Africa which has been considered the most conflicted region in the globe. The situation in Somalia, the larger Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Northern Uganda, and the resultant refugee's influx become the conducive environment for terrorist groups to flourish.

Fourthly, since America is the current hegemon in a unipolar system with global interests its presence should be felt not only in Nairobi and Djibouti in the horn of Africa but its presence should be in all states so that to effectively have intelligence report on terrorism rather than responding after the damage has already been realized. In addition, USA should assist its partners with Explosives-detection dogs, trained to detect and locate chemical explosives and electrospray ionization (ESI) and atmospheric pressure chemical ionization (APCI) equivalence of what they are using back at their home.

7.5.2 Recommendation for Further Research

This study provides a starting point of future studies in terrorism and counterterrorism partnerships and wishes to make the following recommendations for further inquiry by academia in the following areas;

- a) The influence of the Gulf states on terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
- b) The nexus between refugee proliferation and terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
- c) The role of religion on terrorism and global war on terror in the Horn of Africa.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Researchers Introduction

Dear Respondent,

I am Shadrack Kipkoech Sitienei a PhD candidate from Moi University, Registration number SAAS/PHD/POL/03/2018 undertaking a study, *'Kenya-United States of America Partnership on Counterterrorism.'* The purpose of this study is to secure information on counterterrorism impact on security in the Horn of Africa. All information submitted will be used for the purpose of this study and for the benefit of all stakeholders in security sector. Due to research ethical reasons, at no time will the respondents name appear on the questionnaire unless consented by specific persons.

Yours faithfully

Shadrack K. Sitienei

(PhD Candidate/Researcher)

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Name (**Optional**):..... Designation:.....

Bio-data

1. How long have you served in the current position?

- a) 0-5 years (b) 5-10 years (c) 10-15 years (d) 15 and above

Objective One: The Nature of Kenya United States of America Partnership on Counterterrorism

2. What is the nature and identity of Kenya-USA strategic partnership on Counterterrorism?

Kindly, explain your answer above;

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3. What could be reasons why USA- Kenya Partner on Counterterrorism in Kenya?

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4. In your opinion, why do you think USA partners with Kenya in counterterrorism efforts?

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5. Whom do you think terrorists' targets in Kenya?

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Why?.....

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6. What is the Nature of Kenya-USA Partnership on Counterterrorism?

a) Bilateralism Yes () No () explain your answer

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b) Multilateralism Yes () No () Explain your Answer

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Objective Two: Finding out the Effects of Kenya-USA Strategic partnership on national Counterterrorism

7. What effects does Kenya’s – USA strategic partnership Counterterrorism have on Kenya’s security on the following variables?

Please tick your response (√)

| Impacts | Strongly agree | Agree | Disagree |
|--|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Reduction on Foreign Investment (ROFI) | | | |
| Reduction in Tourism (RIT) | | | |
| Unemployment | | | |
| Increased Security Budget (ISB) | | | |
| Religious Profiling | | | |

a) Specifically, how has the Kenya-USA Partnership effect of CT led to reduction of foreign investment?

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b) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership effects of CT on Security led to reduction tourists?

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c) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership effects led to unemployment?

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d) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership effects of CT led to increase in security budget?

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e) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership effects of CT led to religious profiling?

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Objective Three: Challenges Facing Kenya USA partnership on Counterterrorism

9. What do you think are the challenges facing Kenya United States of America in Counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa? **You can give multiple** answers

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.....

Thank You for your Time in responding to this questionnaire.

Be Blessed

Appendix III: Interview Schedule

Name (**Optional**):..... Designation:.....

Bio-data

1. How long have you served in the current position?

- b) 0-5 years
- (b) 5-10 years
- (c) 10-15 years
- (d) 15 and above

Objective One: The Nature of Kenya United States of America Partnership on Counterterrorism

2. What is the nature and identity of Kenya-USA partnership on counterterrorism in Kenya?

Kindly, explain your answer above;

.....

.....

.....

.....

3. What could be reasons why USA Partner with Kenya on Counterterrorism?

.....

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4. What is the Nature of Kenya-USA Partnership on Counterterrorism?

- c) Bilateralism Yes () No () explain your answer

.....

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d) Multilateralism Yes () No () Explain your Answer

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Objective Two: Finding out the Impact of Counterterrorism

5. What effects does Kenya's – USA partnership Counterterrorism on Kenya on the following variables?

f) Specifically, how has the Kenya-USA strategic Partnership effect on CT Security led to affected foreign direct investment inflow?

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g) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership impact on CT Security affected to tourism sector?

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h) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership impact on CT on Security led to unemployment?

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.....

i) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership impact on CT on Security led to increase in security budget?

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.....

j) Specifically, how has Kenya-USA Partnership impact on CT on Security led to religious profiling?

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Objective Three: Challenges Facing Kenya USA partnership on Counterterrorism

9. What do you think are the challenges facing Kenya United States of America in Counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa? **You can give multiple** answers

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Thank You for your Time in responding to this interview.

Be Blessed

Appendix IV: Authorization by Postgraduate Directorate to Conduct Research


MOI UNIVERSITY
 (ISO 9001:2015 CERTIFIED INSTITUTION)
THE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY POLITICAL SCIENCE & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Telephone (053) 43001-8/43620 P.O. BOX 3900
 Fax No. (053) 43047 Eldoret,
 Telex No. MOIUNIVERSITY 35047 KENYA

27th October 2020

MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
P.O. BOX 30623-00100
NAIROBI

REF: SHADRACK KIPKOECH SITIENEL-SASS/PHD/POL/03/18

This is to confirm that the above named is a student in the School of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of History, Political Science and Public Administration pursuing Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science & Public Administration. He has successfully completed his coursework and defended his thesis proposal titled: **“Kenya-United States of America Partnership on Counter Terrorism and Its Impacts on Security in the Horn of Africa”**. He is now allowed to collect research permit in order to collect data in the field.

Any assistance given to him will be highly appreciated.


Prof. Ken Oluoch, PhD
Chairman, Department of History Political Science and Public Administration
 P.O. Box 3900, ELDORET

Appendix V: Authorization by NACOSTI


REPUBLIC OF KENYA


**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

RefNo: **200775** Date of Issue: **06/November/2020**

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Mr. shadrack kipkoech sitienei of Moi University, has been licensed to conduct research in Nairobi on the topic: KENYA-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PARTNERSHIP ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA for the period ending : 06/November/2021.

License No: **BAHAMAS ABS/P/20/7460**

200775 

Applicant Identification Number **Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION**

Verification QR Code



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Appendix VII: Budget

| Activity | Unit | Quantity | Rate in KShs | Amount in KShs |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Transport | - | - | | 80,000 |
| Meetings | Day | 2 | @2000x2 | 4,000 |
| Printing papers | Ream | 6 | @500x20 | 10,000 |
| Photocopying services | Pages | 1500 | @10x1500 | 15,000 |
| Internet services | Browsing/min | 2hrs/day/8month | @1x120x30x8 | 28,800 |
| Communication | Airtime | Per week for 8month | @500x4x8 | 16,000 |
| Editing services | Page | - | - | 2,000 |
| Binding | Copy | 6 | @ 1000x6 | 6,000 |
| Data coding | - | 2 | @10000x2 | 2,0000 |
| Research assistants | | 20 | @1000x3x20day | 60,000 |
| Meals & accommodation | Day | 30 | @1600x30days | 48,000 |
| Stationary | - | - | - | 15,000 |
| Sub-total | | | | 286,800 |
| Miscellaneous expenses | 10% total budget | | | 28,840 |
| TOTAL | | | | 315,640 |