

Chapter Ten

KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICA'S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Paul K. Kurgat

INTRODUCTION

African negotiations over conflict and co-operation have evolved with the attainment of political independence mainly because of inter-state, territorial disputes, inter-party or class struggle for power and foreign intervention because of ideological or economic interests coupled with racial, religious and inter-ethnic conflicts. It is, therefore, a developing practice with its own characteristics, patterns, strength and limitations. Facilitators of negotiations such as the regional organisations, for example, the organization of African Unity (OAU), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the European Union (EU) and great powers such as the United States of America (USA), Japan and Russia have emerged and taken leading roles in conflict resolution.

In terms of outcomes, bilateral negotiations and broad multilateral negotiations tend to be ineffective in dealing with conflict and mediation. However, among the conflicting parties, mediation is frequently needed to bring negotiations to fruition. In co-operation, multilateral negotiations have a high record of success, although the impact of the product of such negotiations has its own limitations and characteristics.

However, it is important to note that conflict is an inevitable and sometimes a functional or even desirable condition of inter-state relations and that negotiation is a means of limiting it, whereas co-operation - although desirable and sometimes functional - is by no means inevitable and negotiation is the means to conflict management. This chapter examines the extent to which different playing fields, imparting different types of difficulties, contribute towards conflict management. An examination of Kenya's foreign policy and African conflicts, reveals that the size of the negotiating teams has effect on conflict management. There are conflicts and co-operations that are centred on the executive arm of the state with less involvement by society and on the other hand are conflicts and co-operations that are national causes affecting every aspect in the society with deep popular sentiments.

Kenya's foreign relations have been the preserve of the executive and exercised through the foreign office channels under the supervision of the foreign minister as the chief diplomat. Conflict management has been practised through various regional and international forums.

THEORY, OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF KENYA'S FOREIGN POLICY

A student of international relations works "in a science which is concerned with observation and analysis and theorizing in order to explain and predict".¹ He observes "the nature, conduct of and influence upon relations among individuals of groups operating within the framework of anarchy, and... the nature of, and the change factors affecting, the interactions among them".²

Accordingly, international relations includes inter-state interactions - the politics of these interactions, their likely consequences, the effects on the international system, and vice versa. External policies and powers of the basic units in the international system, therefore, fall within the study of international relations, as do the politics of these interactions.³

Hans Morgenthau argues that 'International politics, like all politics is a struggle for power.' It is power which is dominant in the interactions of states.⁴ In the international system, the questions of 'war and peace, stability and change, freedom and tyranny' fall within the area of international politics and foreign policy.⁵

Foreign policy is a combination of aims and interests pursued and defended by a given state and its ruling class in its relations with other states, and the methods and means used for the achievement and defence of these purposes and interests. Thus foreign policy can be viewed as the range of actions taken by various sections of government of a state in its relations with other bodies or states similarly acting on the international arena in the hope of advancing their own interests. While international relations is general and all encompassing, foreign policy is specific.

From the above observation, international relations is broad and complex. This makes it hard to comprehend fully the dynamics of international system and all the interactions within the system. In an effort to deal with this situation, scholars in the field of international relations have formulated theories and made attempts to develop tools of analysis that facilitate a better understanding of the behaviour of states in the international system.

Theory brings organization and the capacity to accumulate knowledge to a field and it enables scholars to tie together the propositions they have developed at different levels. In the words of Stanley Hoffman, "Theory is understood as a set of inter-related questions capable of guiding research both of empirical and the normative variety".⁶

For the purpose of our study of Kenya's foreign policy and Africa's conflict management, I suggest that the mediation theory might offer insights into the nature of mediation itself and of successful strategies to be employed in specific cases of inter-national conflicts. However, an examination of Kenya's foreign policy and Africa's conflict management suggests that it can best be approached from the perspective of power and dependency theories as the guiding principles to the wider concept of national interest. These theories are guiding principles in the mediation process.

Power policy is a foreign policy which seeks a state of equilibrium in the international system in which no nation or group of nations is able to dominate others. It is out of Kenya's foreign policy desire that the Kenya government would like to see African conflicts managed to a favorable balance, yet maintaining the status quo. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia's challenge to both Kenyan and Ethiopian sovereignty has produced a military alliance between Kenya and Ethiopia.⁷ This alliance continued regardless of ideological differences between Kenya and Ethiopia.

Economic dependence is a situation in which the economies of certain countries are conditioned by the expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected.⁸ In this situation the Kenyan economy has expanded over the years and maintained self-sustaining growth because East and Central African countries have served as peripheries to Kenya's economic base. The management of both internal and inter-African conflicts is paramount to Kenya's foreign policy makers.

Post-independence policy makers were concerned with defining a system and identifying policies that would meet our needs, solve our problems and further our ambitions.⁹ However, the principle objectives of Kenya's foreign policy are traceable to the two election manifestos prepared by KANU in 1961 and 1963. In the party's manifesto for the 1961 election, it was stated that Kenya would vigilantly safeguard national interest, maintain independence for the people of Kenya, join democratic movements in Africa to eradicate imperialism, racialism and all forms of oppression. It called for collaboration with African countries to foster and promote African "unity of action." The manifesto continued to state the need for Kenya to work for international peace and peaceful settlement of international disputes through the framework of the United Nations Organization.¹⁰

The 1963 KANU election manifesto reaffirmed these objectives. It promised to protect the security of the people, preserve the national integrity of Kenya, maintain military forces capable of protecting the people and state, foster East African co-operation, conclude defence arrangements

with regional states, give support to liberation movements in Africa, be non-aligned in global politics and international economics, and participate fully in international affairs.

These two early documents have been the guiding principles for independent Kenya since 1963. However, the nature of Kenya's foreign policy has been the subject of conflicting interpretations. John Howell¹¹ saw two distinct foreign policies in Kenya's international relations. The policy of realism (conservative) operates with respect to Kenya's objectives in Eastern Africa while continentally, Kenya is guided by idealism (radical). National variables are seen to affect Kenya's foreign policy in East Africa and systematic variables affect the country's posture on continental Africa and internationally.

John Okumu¹² saw the existing secessionist movements in Kenya having been central in the emergence and pursuit of Kenya's foreign policy. Timothy Shaw¹³ has used the dependency theory to analyze Kenya's foreign policy. Kenya is in this context seen in a dual role. First, it is a client of multinational co-operations, and second, it is able to exert dominance in its regional environment. However, Kenya plays a dominant economic role in East Africa, but Tanzania under Nyerere played a more influential political and ideological role than Kenya in all regions.

However, the exact nature of the national interest that must be preserved at all costs is open to various interpretations, but above all, it is the nation's territorial integrity, political independence, economic prosperity in a peaceful environment globally in general and at the continental level in particular. Kenya's foreign policy can be shown to have sought these basic goals.

Having taken the role of a mediator in most of Africa's conflict management, Kenya has acted as an activist, convenor, advocate, facilitator and/or enforcer. Each of these roles can be enacted by separate and distinct third parties and all contribute to the success of a mediation or conflict resolution process.

Analyzing the functions of a mediator, James Wall¹⁴ argues that there are more than fifty tasks that must be fulfilled during a mediation process. These would involve the major antagonists, their constituencies and patrons as well as other peripherally involved parties.

As a mediator to the many African conflicts, the Kenya government has used various regional and international forums to manage conflict. A mediatory process always began with a government, institution or an individual taking up the role of convenor, which would involve carrying out three or four specific functions, such as publicly calling for talks at an appropriate time, initiating contacts between adversaries to see if an acceptable agenda might be constructed, and providing a neutral forum for discussion.

For Kenya's foreign policy, some roles have been central to the mediation process, whether the conflict is continental or internal. The government has acted as a facilitator (or mediator) in many round table discussions. For protracted internal conflicts, the Kenya government has convinced the incumbents of the various regimes that some settlement is possible with intransigent rebels and the insurgents that some settlement is possible with tyrannical incumbents (the Congo-Kinshasa crisis of 1997 serves as an example). In Laue's¹⁵ terms an advocacy function seems essential for internal conflicts, in the sense of a third party being an advocate for the process of mediation or conflict resolution.

Kenya's foreign policy has and continues to enact a preparatory or explorer role which includes featuring adversaries' willingness to contemplate alternative, non-coercive methods and advocating particular forms of conflict - resolving processes. Foreign policy continues to play another specific role of a re-assuring function; incumbents and insurgents need high levels of reassurance of probable success before entering into formal discussions or negotiation. Burton¹⁶ argues that conflicting parties fear entering into negotiations without being reasonably certain that they will not emerge from it worse off than when they entered them.

The other preparatory roles contributing to an overall mediation process in Kenya's foreign policy is the decoupler role whereby intertwined interests and behaviours of internal parties

(incumbents and insurgents) and external patrons are disentangled from one another. However, it is important to note that a government carrying out a decoupling role may not necessarily be the best fitted for carrying on the mediation process to the level of the internal adversaries. After a successful decoupling, other states/governments need to undertake other roles.

The Somali example illustrates the frequent need for enactment of another key role, the unifier, in any mediation process, when protracted internal conflicts produce splits and divisions among the adversaries, for example amongst Somali war lords. Foreign policy observers of African affairs have noted that an important factor contributing to the continuation of the within - Somalia and the just concluded Liberian and Rwandan civil wars were the factional and divisive nature of the anti-Mogadishu, Monrovia and Kigali forces who were unable to form a unified organization and hence a coherent and agreed set of goals with which to replace the vacuums created by those regimes.

Other roles that are undertaken by the Kenya government both during and after the period of round table discussions include; the role of a fact finder, enacted by either Kenya or Kenya and other third parties (eg IGAD, OAU, EAC or EU etc). The mechanism of Kenya's foreign policy is directed towards finding reliable information for adversaries and presenting such data in a useful and acceptable format. This role is carried out mainly before a formal meeting takes place. Another function of mediators traditionally is to provide and interpret information and judgments (about possible results) during mediated discussions. This is one of the chief activities of third party panels in such procedures.¹⁷

A second aspect of this involves Kenya's foreign policy makers envisioning and developing options and alternatives for parties that cannot visualize alternative course of action other than win - lose solutions. Kenya's foreign policy in Africa's conflict management has been used for the role of an envisionor. This includes provision of information, ideas, and alternatives - crucial tools for success in mediation process. It is one of the roles open to mediators like Kenya, but with little in the way of conventional muscle that is to say, it lacks command of material, large and powerful army, necessary for foreign policy implementation.

In the enhanced role, Kenya's foreign policy has enabled the Kenya government to acquire supply of expertise, food, investment, and assistance with rehabilitation and reconstruction and open markets to the countries of the great lakes region in general and Burundi and Rwanda in particular.¹⁸ Taking the stage of a third party in Africa's conflict management, Kenya has acted the role of a mediator and/or guarantor; for instance, following Zimbabwe's and Namibia's transition to independence, 1964 Congo and 1980's Chad conflicts. Kenya has acted too as an enforcer by contributing troops, and civilian observers to the United Nations peace keeping missions.

Kenya has opted to act as a reconciler by pursuing long term commitment, consistency, and patience rather than credibility, impartiality and diplomatic skills. (The IGAD talks on the Sudanese Crisis illustrates this point). These are qualities conventionally associated with third parties mediation process during the stage of discussion and agreement seeking.

SELECTED CASES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

In the field of inter-African affairs Kenya has come to play the role of a prestigious neutral between the radical and moderate states. In East Africa, Kenya's foreign policy has often been governed by conservative and legitimized thinking. Where foreign policy issue touches directly on primary Kenyan interests-national security and national development, Kenya's broad international policy is subject to restrain.

The 1964 Congo Crisis found Kenya indignant and much involved. Joseph Murumbi¹⁹, minister for external affairs, launched a bitter attack on Africa's western policy. He summed up the military intervention as an unwarranted influence in African affairs, a flagrant violation of United Nations charter, a threat to the peace and security of the African continent, and a calculated attempt

to undermine African unity. Kenya was concerned because the Congo Crisis was an African problem and in September 1964, at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference²⁰ in Addis Ababa, President Kenyatta immediately issued an appeal for the cessation of hostilities, and convened a meeting of the commission in Nairobi on September 18, 1964²¹. The Kenyatta commission decided that it would go to the Congo to hold talks with the rebel leaders as well as with the government and that a delegation be sent to Washington to urge the Americans to withdraw their military aid as a prerequisite to ending external intervention, which was believed to be a serious factor in encouraging the conflict.²² Kenyatta's mediation efforts were frustrated by the USA, and Kenya joined other African countries in criticizing the USA - Belgian military intervention in the Congo, and welcomed Lumumba's disciples to Kenya's independence anniversary ceremonies of December, 1964²³.

Following the crisis, refugees fled from Congo Kinshasa to Congo Brazzaville, thereby necessitating the holding of extra-ordinary consultations between Kenyatta's Commission, Congo Kinshasa and its neighbours, particularly Congo Brazzaville and Burundi.²⁴ Problems that faced liberation movements were part of the agenda in Kenya's foreign policy implementation. Concerning the Zimbabwe problem - rivalry between Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) - the OAU appointed Kenya and other African countries to form a sub-committee to mediate between the conflicting parties, so as to form a common front against Ian Smith's threats of Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI).²⁴

The Council held its fifth extra-ordinary session for this purpose in Lagos in June 1965. The six nation sub-committee was made up of foreign ministers of Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania. The Kenyan foreign Minister Joseph Murumbi who was made the Chairman of the sub-committee invited the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU to a meeting of the sub-committee in Nairobi on 20 July, 1965. The ZANU delegates said they were ready to negotiate but ZAPU refused, insisting ZANU members join ZAPU individually. The Kenyan Minister took the two groups to President Jomo Kenyatta who according to the Minister, spoke to them for a whole one hour and appealed to them to settle their differences and put up a united front against the common enemy, the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. This ended up without success.

However, the OAU empowered the African group at the UN to ensure that in the event that Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence, the UN would take steps that the situation required - establishment of majority government in Southern Rhodesia.²⁵ The General Assembly appointed on 25th October, 1965, an action committee of the countries, namely Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Zambia, to examine and take all measures for the immediate and effective implementation of the resolution.

On the Egyptian - Israeli problem, Kenya condemned the Israeli occupation of the Egyptian territory after the six days war of June, 1967. The eighth ordinary session of OAU Assembly of Heads of State praised Egypt's "constructive efforts aimed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace."²⁶ The OAU General Assembly appointed from among its members a committee of ten, entrusting it with the task of seeking the best ways and means of reaching a peaceful, equitable and honourable solution to the Middle East crisis. Members of the committee were Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Presidents Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, Ahmadou Ahijo of Cameroon, William Tolbert of Liberia, Yakobo Gowon of Nigeria and Moukhtar' Dadda of Mauritania.²⁷ The October 1973 war during which Israeli troops crossed the Suez Canal and occupied more of Egypt's territory was the last straw that broke relationship with the rest of African friends. Seventeen countries broke diplomatic ties with Israel on 5 November, 1973 and these included Ethiopia, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Gabon, Gambia, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone²⁸. Kenya's conflict management efforts were also directed to the unity of Angola's liberation movements. The OAU requested Jomo Kenyatta to bring the three Angolan leaders together; Holden Roberto - FNLA, Agostino Neto - MPLA, and Jones Savimbi - UNITA, to work out a strategy for their impending negotiation with the

Portuguese government. Thanks to the Mombasa (Kenyan town) agreement, the Alvov meeting had no difficulty agreeing on the date for the independence of Angola, which was fixed for 11 November, 1975, and on the format of a tripartite coalition government in which all the three movements would be represented under the supervision of a Portuguese - appointed high commissioner with effect from 31st January 1975. However, infighting continued in spite of the agreement. The delegates of the twenty-fifth ordinary session of the liberation committee in Rabat, Morocco June 1975 appealed to all states to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Angola and respect the territorial integrity of the country. The committee further appealed to President Kenyatta once more to use his good offices to urgently get Angolan leaders together to persuade them to stop the bloodshed and agree to form a government of national unity.²⁹ President Kenyatta called the Angolan leaders to a meeting in Nakuru (Kenya), but this time he did not make much headway with the leaders.

However, due to ideological disparities between the OAU and member states, Kenya took a low profile in the 1970s, unlike Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra-Leone, Zambia and Botswana in the 1970's. The Kenyan government went even further and rejected the budget allocation discussed for the commission of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. It was then argued that a permanent bureau was not necessary because all countries with disputes preferred to have eminent personalities in whom they had confidence to handle their disputes.³⁰

Kenya's position since then has been proved right by the Secretary General's submission to the fifth ordinary session of the Assembly in Algiers September, 1968. Reviewing the organization's activities between 1963 and 1968, he noted that not a single member state paid its assessed commission to the commission set up in Addis Ababa.³¹ In the long run, the general secretariat was obliged to finance the commission on a loan basis from the working capital fund. All that time, no dispute, had been submitted to the commission for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. The disputes that emerged were submitted to the political settlement rather than to the procedure provided by the commission of the OAU. Finally the commission was wound up and its services availed only when it became necessary at the request of one or more states to deal with specific issues.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Upon assuming statehood, Kenya sought to adhere to the classical balance of power practice as a means of managing regional conflicts. Policy makers, realized that national interest lay in East Africa (Tanzania, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and Congo-Kinshasa). Kenya declared itself committed to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Regional integration was viewed as a means of ensuring continued closer cooperation and stability that had to be pursued.³² Kenya's conservativeness in these regions found direct expression in the policy of good neighborliness. This policy was dictated upon by boundary problems. Historically, western Kenya up to Nakuru belonged to Uganda, and North Eastern province and much of Eastern province stood claimed by Somalia. The border with Ethiopia and Sudan equally remained unclear.³³ Thus the policy of good neighborliness was a policy of respect for the existing boundaries, a call for the observance of the status quo as the only sure way to maintain the pre-independence equilibrium.

The concern of maintaining power equilibrium to enhance national security introduced in East Africa, particularly in Kenya, the military aspect of balance of power. From independence until 1971 when Idi Amin took over in Uganda, relations between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania remained warm.³⁴ However, the second half of the 1960s saw the emergence of serious ideological divisions among the three East African states. In 1967 Tanzania opted for a socialist economy based on self-reliance. Kenya published in 1965 its sessional paper No. 10,³⁵ which purported to be a blue print on African socialism in Kenya. The paper was a re-statement of Kenya's commitment to capitalism, the only approach that could enable Kenya's domination of the horn of Africa and to a greater extent the great lakes market. Kenya was not threatened by Uganda's move because Uganda was a viable

trading partner.³⁶ In 1969, Obote announced Uganda's Common Man's Charter, Uganda's brand of socialism and in the North-East, Somalia had gone socialist. The events were disturbing to Kenyan authorities. It was aggravated by the fact that in April 1963 Uganda and Tanzania had signed a military pact by which the two countries agreed to closely co-ordinate their defences.

Kenya managed to keep its army small in the 1960s in spite of the threatening aggression from Somalia. Between 1963 and 1968, Somalia had an army of 4,000 men against Kenya's estimated 5,000 men.³⁷ However, Kenya's other neighbours did not present the country with immediate security concern. Finally, military agreements with Ethiopia and Britain gave minimal security quarantine. Ethiopia counter balanced Somalias military power while Britain guaranteed internal security in addition to probable understanding that it would come to Kenya's aid if the latter was attacked.³⁸ Kenya's expenditure on defence compared favourably with other regional states.

1966/1967 Regional Military Expenditure

Country	Year	Exp.	Year	Exp.
Kenya	1966	5.1	1967	6.3
Ethiopia	"	20.3	"	21.0
Somalia	"	18.2	"	19.7
Tanzania	"	5.1	"	7.1
Uganda	"	11.5	"	9.4

Source: USAID, 1968; Arkhust, 1972

From the end of 1972, Kenya's relations with the other two East African Community states had become hostile. Uganda had fraternized the Communist Soviet Union and Tanzania had become ideologically hostile. Kenya turned to Ethiopia and Sudan. In 1973 the three countries agreed to solve their border disputes by negotiation.⁴⁰ It was also resolved that future talks would be held on matters relating to inter-state co-operation and security. Throughout the 1970s, Kenya maintained diplomatic and economic links with Uganda. It remained silent on the internal affairs of Uganda except when Kenyan citizens were involved. On the issue of Kenya's security and territorial integrity, it made it clear that all means would be used to defend the territorial integrity of Kenya. However, when Tanzanian troops entered Uganda, Kenya stood aloof for such a neutrality enhanced Kenya's security. Kenya feared that Tanzania intended to establish a socialist regime in Uganda. When Obote II regime took over power, in 1980, Kenya extended its policy of good neighbourliness. The 1974 coup in Ethiopia that removed Kenya's most trusted ally (Haile Selassie) in East Africa was watched quite crucially. However, the two countries maintained the 1963 military agreement by tolerating their divergent ideologies to maintain alliance against Somalia.⁴²

In 1977, under the coordination of Tanzania, two economic organizations emerged in the region. The Kagera Basin Development Organization (KBDO) exists in the East African region, grouping Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa). In the south, Tanzania initiated the Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC), consisting of all frontline states except Malawi. Kenya's regional trade was threatened and it forcefully supported the East African Community (EAC) and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). Kenya opted for the PTA terms because its policy makers believed that the PTA would neutralize the effectiveness of both organizations.⁴³ Kenyatta's foreign policy was designed to preserve the economic and political system that the ruling elite believed in, and sustain Kenya's special economic position in East Africa. It underscored the necessity for African states to adhere to international commitments regarding territorial integrity and sovereignty, by ensuring that Kenya restrained from

claiming neighbours territories or interfering in their internal affairs and supporting collective African and UN objectives. This is the scenario which Moi found when he assumed the presidency of Kenya in 1978.

Guided by the principle of good neighbourliness, non-alignment and non-interference, President Moi mediated the civil war between General Basilio Okello and Yoweri Museveni in 1985. However, relations between Kenya and Uganda have been full of conflict. There were times when the Uganda government alleged that Kenya was supporting armed Ugandan dissidents bent to overthrow Museveni. Kenya on its part has frequently since 1986 claimed that Uganda, in collusion with Libya is harbouring Kenyan dissidents to overthrow the Moi government. These accusations and counter accusations have contributed to an atmosphere of distrust between the two countries.⁴⁵

Despite these difficulties, Kenya opted to become a signatory of the conflict prevention committee together with the other nations of the great lakes region on 19th December, 1995.⁴⁶ Kenya firmly insisted that its priority in Rwanda was peace and it would not take sides in the Hutu - Tutsi ethnic divide.

Concerning the idea of the formation of an African military intervention force for conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, Kenya remained firmly opposed to it. Kenya has cited suspicion and lack of political will among member states, difficulty on logistical arrangements, training and funding as major obstacles.⁴⁷ Kenya has nevertheless contributed more frequently forces to peace keeping operations in African countries like Chad, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola. Maintaining that regional stability is the key to continental stability and in line with its economic strength, it decided to build an ammunition plant in Eldoret. Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso and Nigeria are known to have small arms and combination - making capacities.⁴⁸

CONCLUSION

The influence of external factors merged with local elements to chart a course for Kenya's foreign policy. From the outset, this course was influenced by the need to secure territorial integrity, national security and national development. These have been key determinants of Kenya's foreign policy. These policies are consistent with the policy of good neighbourliness and conforms to the provisions of the OAU charter on non-interference in the internal affairs and territorial integrity of member states. Successive Kenyan regimes have taken action to defend them.

On the other hand, Kenya is becoming more experienced in Africa's conflict management. On several instances, it has been able to broker many deals despite limited resources. Kenya was fully involved in the independence negotiations for countries like Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and the attainment of majority rule in South Africa.

Kenya's prestige and importance in African diplomatic circles are due to the following factors. First, Kenyatta's long and impeccable nationalist record, and Moi's vast experience in Africa's conflict management and being an elder statesman, made Kenya a respectable country the world over. Second, Nairobi, being centrally placed and offering excellent diplomatic facilities, is a natural nerve centre for a good deal, of inter-African diplomatic activities. Third, Kenya's apparent government stability means that other nations have confidence in it, something which does not exist with vulnerable regimes. The challenge is for Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, and institutions of higher learning to carefully strategize the future interests and place in the various regional and international organizations. This is urgent if Kenya has to progress economically, socially and politically.

NOTES

- 1 J.W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967.
- 2 P.A. Reynolds, *Introduction to International Relations*, Cambridge, Schenkman Publishing Co; 1971.
- 3 S. Hoffman, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, New York, Prentice - Hall, 1960.
- 4 H. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Calcutta, scientific book urgency, 1961.
- 5 N.J. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, New York: The Free Press 1961.
- 6 Sees. Hoffman, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*.
- 7 D.K. Orwa "Theories of International Relations in African" . In O.C.Ojo, et al, *International Relations*, UK, 1985, pp.1 - 15.
- 8 T. Dosantos, The Structure of Dependence: *The American Economic Review*, LX 1970.
- 9 T. Mboya, *The Challenge of Nationhood: A Collection of Speeches and Writings by Tom Mboya*. London: Andre Deutsch, 1970.
- 10 C. Gertzel, *The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-1968*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968, pp. 32 - 72.
- 11 J. Howell, "Analysis of Kenya's Foreign Policy" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 6 (1), 1968.
- 12 J.J. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign policy" *In The African Review*, Vol. 3(2) 1973.
- 13 T.M. Shaw, "International Stratification in Africa: Sub-Imperialism in Southern and Eastern Africa," *Journal of Southern Africa Affairs*, Vol. 2(2) April, 1977.
- 14 J.A. Wall, "Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and proposed Research." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No. 1, March, 1981, pp. 157 - 180.
- 15 J.H. Laue, *The Functions of the Intermediary in their Party Process*, Fair Fax, VA, Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1991.
- 16 J.W. Burton, "*Conflict and Communication*." London: Macmillan, 1969.
- 17 B. Karashi, "Tanzania - Kenya Dispute on Burundi Flights", Nairobi, *The East African*, September, 8 - 14, 1997, p.5.
- 18 *Pan Africa*, Nairobi, 5 March, 1965.
- 19 C.O.C. Amate, *Inside the OAU*, New York: St. Martins, 1986, Pg. 364
- 20 C. Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*. New York: New York Times, Praeger, 1965, pp. 142-143.
- 21 P.G. Okoth, *United States of America's Foreign Policy Towards Kenya*. Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Press, 1992.
- 22 *Ibid*, 92-93.
- 23 *Ibid*.
- 24 OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 25 (11) of 25 October, 1965.
- 25 OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 66 (VII) of June 1967.
- 26 *Ibid*.
- 27 C.O.C. Amate, *Inside the OAU*. New York: St. Martins 1986, p. 364.
- 28 *Ibid* . p 156.
- 29 *Ibid* .p 157.
- 30 *Ibid* .pp. 251-253.
- 31 OAU Proceedings, 5th Ordinary Session, Algiers 1968.
- 32 J.J. Okumu "Kenya's Foreign policy". In *Foreign Polices of African States*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977, p 143.
- 33 *Ibid*. pp. 143 - 144.
- 34 *Ibid*. p 144.
- 35 *Africa Contemporary Records*, 1972: B/61.
- 36 *African Diary*, May, 1963.
- 37 *Africa Diary*, December, 7-13, 1963, p 1487; *Weekly Review*, July 12, 1976, pp 3 - 5.
- 38 D.K. Orwa "Balance of Power Theory and Kenya's Foreign Policy in East Africa." *Unpublished Historical Association of Kenya Paper*; August, 1981, p.9.
- 39 *USAID Report*, 1968; Arkhust 1972
- 40 Orwa " *Balance of Power Theory*" p 12.
- 41 *Ibid*; pp 12 - 13.
- 42 *Sessional Paper No. 10*, Nairobi, Government printer, 1965, p.1.
- 43 D.K. Orwa " *Balance of Power Theory*", p.15.
- 44 *Weekly Review*, February, 23, 1976, p. 5; *Weekly Review* , July 1976, pp. 4 - 5,

- 45 For details, see P.G.Okoth, "Intermittent Tensions in Uganda-Kenya Relations: Historical Perspectives." *TransAfrican Journal of History*, Vol.22,1992.
 - 46 *Daily Nation*, December 19, 1995.
 - 47 OAU/CO/C staff/Rec. 1(1), Addis Ababa, 3 - 5 June 1996,p 2.
 - 48 *The East African*, May 20 - 26, 1996, pp 1, 6 - 7; *Sunday Standard*, May 26, 1996, p.2.
- 1 W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Introduction*, London, 1970, p. 143-144.
- 2 P. A. Okoth, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 3 J. K. O. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 4 H. N. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 5 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 6 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 7 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 8 T. D. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 9 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 10 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 11 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 12 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 13 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 14 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 15 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 16 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 17 B. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 18 P. A. Okoth, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 19 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 20 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 21 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 22 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 23 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 24 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 25 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 26 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 27 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 28 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 29 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 30 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 31 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 32 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 33 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 34 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 35 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 36 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 37 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 38 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 39 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 40 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 41 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 42 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 43 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.
- 44 J. K. Ochieng, *Kenya's Foreign Policy: A Study of its Evolution and Impact*, Nairobi, 1997, p. 143-144.

Source: Kurgat, Paul K., "Kenya's Foreign Policy and Africa's Conflict Management" in (ed.) P.G. Okoth and B.A. Okoth *Conflict in Contemporary Africa*, Published Conference Proceedings, Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, Nairobi, (2002), pp. 117-126, (ISBN:9966-22-178-6).