LIVED EXPERIENCES OF RADICALISED INDIVIDUALS AND TERRORISM IN KENYA

BY

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DECLARATION

Declaration by the Candidate

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the Almighty God for according me wisdom and ability to complete my studies successfully. It is also dedicated to my beloved wife Tabitha for her prayers, moral support and encouragement that inspired my success. To Samuel, my son, I say thank you for your persistent encouragement to attain my academic goal. It is also unreservedly, dedicated to my late mother Lonah Nakhumicha, without her, I would not have seen the light of education in my life.

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ABSTRACT

In Kenya, terrorism especially the one perpetrated by home-grown citizens who have been radicalized remain a major societal concern. In reacting to this problem, the government has focused on structural factors that make individuals vulnerable to radicalization and terrorism, and have resorted to deterrence measures through enactment of anti-terrorism laws and policies. These strategies, however, lack causal mechanism that explain why only some individuals in the collectivity become radicalized in specific contextual environments. To investigate this, the study came up with the following three objectives; first, to investigate how the radicalized individuals make meaning of themselves; second, to analyze how the contextual factors influence the social meaning formation of themselves as radicals; and third, to assess how the social meaning of themselves influence their action towards violence and terrorism. Data for this study was collected from 20 purposively selected research participants legally convicted of terrorism related offences in prisons in Kenya namely, Kamiti, Langata women, Naivasha, Shimo la Tewa and Manyani. The study was guided by the social construction and the interpretative phenomenological analysis theories, as they were best suited in studying individuals' lived experiences. The study used in-depth and key informant interviews as methods of data collection, with in-depth and key informant interview guides as the preferred tools. The collected data was transcribed and thematically analyzed. The study found that the legally convicted radicalized individuals defined themselves as liberators, as self-empowered, as seekers of justice and as self-reconstructed individuals from humiliation. These self-definitions were influenced by their everyday lived experiences in their political, social and economic contexts. The study also found that they defined their social action of violence as moral action, as affirmation to group identity, as means of liberation and as a means of bringing change in society. The study concluded that individuals become radicalized/terrorist as a means of attaining the collectively defined expectations of a social group, within the constraints of certain structural factors in a particular contextual context. The study recommends that government counter-terrorism policies and actions (such as training programmes) should include aspects of understanding the contextual factors that make individuals resort to terrorism and the meanings that such individuals bestow on themselves.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APD	American Psychiatric Association
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CT	Counter Terrorism
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ETA	*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (separatist organization in Spain and France)
FA	Frustration aggression
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IPA	Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
LK	Laws of Kenya
NACOSTI	National Commission for Technology, Science and Technology and innovation
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VE	Violent extremism
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

<center>**CHAPTER ONE**</center>

<center>**INTRODUCTON**</center>

1.1 Background Information

Terrorism is a major security threat facing many countries worldwide. Unlike in the previous centuries where this threat was perceived as externally perpetuated by external actors, today, most governments, and the public spend most of their efforts looking for internal threats. This has drastically changed social interaction and relationships in everyday life through increased levels of social and material surveillance of private and public life as a means of creating social order and social control (Simon, 2005).

Though terrorism is perceived as a major security threat in the contemporary society, there is no common agreement on its definition among scholars and policy makers. This is because each definition is dependent on the actors and their specific interests with it. For example during the colonial period in Africa, the colonialists defined all freedom fighters as terrorists and their fight for political liberation as a form of terrorism. Accordingly, terrorism was defined as the use of violence, terror and psychological warfare by the "minority" as the best alternative of influencing change and upsetting the status quo (Bockestette, 2008).

A critical look at this definition of terrorism reveals that power relationship between the colonialists and the colonized was important in defining which actor and actions fall under the purview of terrorism (and terrorist act). This definition has, however, been downplayed by the African Union which argues that the struggle of a people in accordance with the principles of International law, for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces is not terrorism (OAU,1999).

Other stakeholders have defined terrorism in relation to the terms of developing strategies for curbing this phenomena and mobilization of resources. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2008:5) thus defined terrorism as, criminal acts aimed or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes and that such acts are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

The European Union (2002) also defines terrorism in terms of its outcome. To them, terrorism is a criminal act that aims at causing serious damage to a person/s, or country, or international organization with the sole aim of intimidating a population or unduly compelling government or international organization to perform or abstain from any act, while destabilizing or destroying fundamental political, economic, social structures of the country.

The government of Kenya has contributed to the discussion by defining a terrorist act as; " an act or threat of action which (i) involves the use of violence against a person; (ii) endangers the life of a person, other than the person committing the action; (iii) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; (iv) results in serious damage to property; (v) involves the use of firearms or explosives; (vi) involves the release of any dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance or microbial or other biological agent or toxin into the environment; (vii) interferes with an electronic system resulting in the disruption of the provision of communication, financial, transport or other essential services; (viii) interferes or disrupts the delivery of essential or emergency services; (ix) prejudices national security or public safety; and (b) which is carried out with the aim of — (i)

intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public" (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012:6).

As noted from these definitions, terrorism has been depicted as a serious threat justifying radical counter-terrorism measures such as mass surveillance. In addition, terrorism acts, mostly have been expressed in moral condemnation because they target innocent people and create fear in everyday life. This moral condemnation led to religious and geo-political profiling of some acts and actors in relation to terrorism. For example, on 11th December 2017 in USA, Akayed Ullah, a 27 year old man was accused of detonating a pipe bomb strapped to his body in New York subway injuring four people was labeled as a terrorist. This was same with Sayfullo Salpov who on 31st October 2017 killed eight people by driving a truck through a bicycle path. The two incidents were labeled as terrorist acts executed by Muslim immigrants. In contrast, Devin Kelly, an American citizen, who killed twenty six people in a church in Texas was not labeled a terrorist. Instead, his actions were attributed to rage to his ex-wife due to his long history of domestic violence (The Conversation, 2017).

The moral condemnation of some actions and actors of terrorism based on religious and geo-political profiling brought about social tension among social groups. Hellsten (2016) observes that terrorist attacks in Kenya by Al-Shabaab especially those targeting non-Muslims has increased religious tension. In addition, security initiatives in Kenyan Muslim and Somali dominated areas such as North Eastern and Coastal areas led to more prejudice against ethnic Somalis and Muslims, whether citizens, refugees or migrants. For example, on 18th November 2012, ten people were killed and 25 seriously injured when an explosive was detonated on mass transit mini-bus (popularly known as *Matatu*) in Eastleigh-Nairobi. This degenerated into looting and

destruction of Somali owned homes and shops by angry mobs of young Kenyans of non-Somali origin. The attack socially alienated the Somalis by the larger society, which in turn made some of their members to be more vulnerable or sympathetic to terrorist propaganda.

Implicit from these definitions of terrorism, it is clear that each government or agency involved in counter terrorism perceived terrorism differently according to how they understood the problem. However, in all the definitions of terrorism there are distinct cross cutting issues of interest. They include any action labeled as a terrorist act, politically or ideologically motivated with the intention of creating fear among the populace with the sole purpose of destabilizing the structure of the society through undermining basic sense of security as a means of influencing policy or change.

According to Muliru (2016), the way each government or counter-terrorism agency defines terrorism determines their counter–terrorism strategies especially on methodologies used. In Kenya, for example, the National Strategy on prevention of terrorism is anchored on the definition of what constitutes terrorist acts. This strategy aims at providing roadmap for the challenges of terrorism in the country and the prevention strategies (NCTC, 2016).

Terrorism has evolved over time and space. This has affected and determined the cause of action of those affected by terrorism, participation and involvement of primary perpetrators and the motivation (cause) and intended impact of terrorism acts to victims. In Kenya, before military incursion into Somalia in 2011 in what was dubbed "Operation *linda nchi*" (operation protect the country), terrorism was perceived as externally executed by external actors targeting western countries' interests especially those allied to Israel. According to Laing (2013), in 1980, for

example, a bomb destroyed the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on New Year's Eve killing 20 people and injuring 80 people. An Arab group claimed responsibility saying it was in retaliation for Kenya allowing Israel troops to refuel in Nairobi along the way to rescue 100 hostages held by pro-Palestinian hijackers at Entebbe Airport in Uganda.

Further, on the morning of August 7, 1998, suicide bombers in trucks loaded with explosives parked outside United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and almost simultaneously detonated their bombs. The attack planned by Al Qaeda to mark the eighth anniversary of US forces' arrival in Saudi Arabia (Bayman, 2015) killed about 212 people and wounded 4000 in Nairobi alone.

In addition, on November 28th 2002, there was a missile that missed an Israel plane taking off from Mombasa Airport. Another group using a car carrying explosives rammed into Paradise Hotel where 60 Israel tourists were checking in, killing ten Kenyans and three Israelis, two of them children. Al-Qaeda militant group was blamed for both attacks (Bayman, 2015).

These aforementioned terrorism acts took the form of suicide attack. Suicide attack is a violent, politically motivated attack, which is carried out in a deliberate state of awareness by a person who blows himself up along the chosen target (Schweitzer, 2001). The motivation of suicide terrorists are both economic and religious, however, most importantly is its self-fulfilling nature, that of being considered as a martyr.

According to the Quran, the benefits of suicide for the group include; forgiving the martyr's sins, redemption from the torments of the grave, security from the "fear of hell", a crown of glory featuring a ruby "worth more than the world and all that is in it", marriage to relatives (Rapoport 1998:178). In this regard, martyrdom offers these

individuals more in after-life than they could ever have while living (Juergensmeyer, 2000).

Consequently, suicide attacks should not be seen as insane attacks by desperate individuals seeking revenge because of structural violence. Instead, they should be constructed as social expression of self as mediated by structural factors in particular social, economic and political contexts. Regardless of this, most governments and counter-terrorism agencies' strategies and policies on terrorism prevention most often focus on structural factors, which make individuals vulnerable to terrorism recruitment. This assumption was given credence by Atran (2004:73), who observed that, "Numerous government leaders and journalists misjudge the cause of terrorism. A common believe in the U.S administration and view held by the media on the war against terrorism is that suicidal attackers are "evil, deluded, or homicidal misfits who thrive in poverty, ignorance and anarchy" Atran (2004:73). Atran (2004:75) argues against this assumption held by most governments and counter-terrorism agencies about the attackers being poor and uneducated by saying;

> …in reality most suicide attackers are more educated and economically better than their surrounding population. The majority of Palestinian suicide bombers have a college education and less than 15 per cent come from poor families.

This analysis refutes the current paradigm but simultaneously lacks a causal mechanism to establish root causes of becoming suicide terrorist. According to Atran (2006) this causal mechanism can, however, be established if people's lived experiences especially that linked to social integration and social regulation is taken into account. Using Durkheim's typologies of suicide (egoistic, altruistic, anomic and fatalistic) (Durkheim, 1979; Atran, 2006) observes that an individual experience of marginalization and failure to live up to the social expectations placed upon him/her

by the society increases his/her vulnerability to join a terrorist group. For example, according to Atran (2006), more than 80 per cent of known Jihadist lives in the diaspora communities, marginalized by the host society and physically disconnected from their homes. Thus, marginalized, well-educated and well –to –do, make them more vulnerable to recruitment as suicide terrorist. This is because the societal institutions have failed to provide prophylactic effect against individualistic desires that would lead someone to join a terrorist organization.

The initial construction of terrorism by most governments as externally executed by external agents also informed their strategies and policies to counter it. In this case, they came up with counter-terrorism strategies and policies aimed at external prevention of terrorism. Brigget *et al* (2006) and Laqueur (2004), note that the British government recruited fighters to travel abroad to join Muslim "armies" in places such as Afghanistan to protect her interests. Hansen (2016) also notes that in the effort to protect her people and tourists from frequent kidnapping from Somali insurgents, the Kenyan government engaged in the training of Somalis as security personnel to stabilize the country by ousting the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the Sharia law doctrine in 2008.

The focus by most governments and counter-terrorism agencies on external prevention of terrorism has been rejected with increase of terrorist attacks perpetuated by "home grown[1]" citizens (de Londras, 2013). For example, all the perpetrators of New York terrorist attack on 11th September 2011(9/11) were "home grown" American Citizens. In Kenya also, as Macharia (2014) observes, since late 2011 there has been significant increase of violent terrorist attacks mostly carried out by local

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[1] Home grown refer to those individuals who are born or raised from a young age within a specific country and become involved in supporting or participating in acts of terrorism against that country or her interests.

Kenyans, many of whom were recent converts of Islam. On 24th October 2011, for example, a grenade was hurled at Mwaura Bar along Nairobi's Mfangano Street, killing one person and about twenty people wounded. On the same day, a grenade was tossed from a moving vehicle at Machakos Bus terminus, killing five people and 69 wounded. Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, a recent Kenyan Muslim convert, was arrested in connection with the two blasts and was sentenced to life in prison after he pleaded guilty to all charges (Odulo, 2011).

On 29th April 2012, a grenade attack on worshippers at God's House of Miracles in Ngara Estate Nairobi, killing one person wounding 11. As reported in one daily newspaper, an attacker, a Kenyan named Amar, had entered the church and then left. He later returned and took a seat at the back before hurling the grenade at worshippers when they were called by the pastor to the pulpit (Ndonga, 2012; Ombati, 2012). On 15th May 2012, three hand grenades attacks at Bella Vista club in Mombasa, killing one person and injured two. Consequently, the police arrested a Kenyan suspect, Thabit Jamaldin yahya and charged him with the crime of terrorism (Wibisono, 2012).

In Kenya therefore, since 2011, these types of attacks have become a common feature. The most prominent of them is the Garissa University College attack, killing 148 people (mainly students) with more than 79 getting injured (Ariel, 2015; Edith, 2015). In this attack, gunmen including three Kenyan Somalis took over 700 Students hostage, freeing Muslims and killing those identified as Christians.

This new form of terrorism using "home grown" perpetrators has brought forth a new sociological question of citizenship, integration, and identity especially when examined in relation to radicalization, which is constructed as a forerunner of terrorism. In the context of counter radicalization policies, for example, there is

increased power of citizen deprivation against individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. This has seen radical changes in citizenship policies, broadening state powers and removing substantive and procedural safeguards, eroding equal citizenship by creating a hierarchy of citizens within a country (Choudhury, 2017). In addition, there is an increase in cases of discriminatory policies based on group identity, which problematizes integration of social groups in various communities.

Evidently, radicalization is not only a security threat but also a social problem affecting social groups in various communities. This construction of radicalization related to violent extremism, leads to violence and terrorism. In response to this new threat, most governments realized that pursuing terrorists alone was not sufficient in combating this contemporary threat. Thus, rather than focusing upon external threats, Kenya, for example, was compelled into turning its attention to those coming from its borders. This has given rise to "prevention" of radicalization as a major strategy and policy of counter-terrorism.

In Kenya, prevention of terrorism and specifically radicalization is constrained by inadequate legal framework. As noted by Mwazighe (2012), terrorism related offenses were primarily handled by the penal code, with the result that offenders received lenient sentences or were even acquitted, weakening the deterrence measures to curb terrorism. As a consequence, the government enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA, 2012) and amended in 2015 to address the complexities of the terrorism threat.

This Act (PTA) was in response to sporadic attacks by Al Shabaab terror group and to concerns raised by various stakeholders regarding the 2003 Bill especially on upholding of human rights in counter-terrorism efforts. For instance, security agencies were accused of brutality in interrogation of terror detainees, detaining of persons

without charges and harassment of families of people suspected of terrorism (Otiso, 2009). All these alienated and marginalized some social groups more specifically the Muslims from cooperating with counter-terrorism agencies in the fight against terrorism for they perceived their civil liberties and human rights were violated in the name of public safety and security. This, according to Weeks (2013), is counter-productive as some social groups or individuals will be vulnerable to radicalization on the grounds of perceived violations of their civil liberties and human rights in the guise of fighting terrorism.

In 2014, with increase in intensity of terrorist attacks, the government enacted Security Laws (Amendment) Bill 2014. The bill addressed some of the identified deficiencies in Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2012. For example, the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act (Article 21 of Laws of Kenya: 1680) includes a provision that criminalizes "acts carried out for the commission of a terrorist act in foreign states. In addition, a person who conspires to commit a terrorist act abroad while in Kenya or with a person in Kenya commits an offense and is, on conviction, subject to a maximum of 20 years of imprisonment.

The new law tightens existing provisions by even making training or instruction for the purpose of terrorism in or outside of Kenya an offense punishable by at least ten years in prison. The law also amended the PTA by adding a section that accords national security agencies broad, unchecked surveillance power. The law further amended the PTA by inserting new provision on radicalization. This provision criminalizes the adoption and promotion of extreme belief system aimed at facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious or social change. A person convicted under this charge is subject to a maximum of 30 years in prison.

As noted from the enactment of anti-terrorism bills, the government of Kenya resorted to legalism as means of preventing terrorism. The assumption in this approach is that legal requirement will be a solution to the structural factors that influence radicalization. This representation or problematization of radicalization as a legal entity has three interconnected effect: discursive effect (what is discussed and not discussed), the subjectification effect (how radicalized individuals are thought about and how they think about themselves) and the lived effect (the experiences of the perceived terrorists and how they see themselves).

However, the representation or problematization of radicalization in terms of legalism does not take into account these three interconnecting effects, which are key in understanding why individuals get radicalized even where there is legal deterrence mechanisms. This missing link can, however, be established by delving on everyday discourses which drive everyday life of those (radicals) who the legal mechanism aim to deter. This has the implications on uncovering the grounding precepts and that people take for granted and do not question and the meanings that drive everyday life in relation to radicalization in specific contextual frameworks (Bacchi, 2010; Foucault, 2006). Important to note is that focusing on lived experiences of radicalized individuals as a way of addressing the missing link between legalism and radicalization should not be constructed as a policy option. Rather, it represents a bottom-up understanding of radicalization by taking into account the lived experiences of those individuals who are legally constructed as radicalized.

Apart from legal approach, the Kenyan government embarked on addressing structural factors which make individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Such structural factors include; socio-economic and political marginalization of some social groups, high unemployment rates among the youth and tackling of religious extremism (see

Nzioki, 2016; Obaji, 2016; Onyulo, 2015; Mercy Corps, 2015; Kajilwa, 2016; Jameh, 2015; Gitau et al 2014; Gathu, 2014; ISS, 2014). ISS (2014), for example, believes that the Islamist militants have been exploiting high poverty and unemployment levels among the youth at the coast by positioning themselves as providers of assistance due to the government's inability to address their economic plight. This has seen many of them agitating that "*Pwani sio Kenya*" (Coast is not Kenya), a symptom of their vulnerability to radicalization. In addition, historical political marginalization of Muslims' – right from Kenya's negotiation of independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslims, used by radical Muslim preachers to depict any wars fought against Muslim abroad such as Kenya's incursion to Somali as part of "global campaign against Islam".

As an intervention measure, the government came up with programs and policies to address the structural factors from macro level such as social inclusion of socio-economic and political marginalized social groups and socio-economic empowerment programs targeting the youth. The assumption in these approaches is that once these structural factors are addressed at the community level (collective level), the individuals will be dissuaded from being lured into radicalization. This approach, however, is used by counter-terrorism agencies as a justification of carrying out "collective punishment based on perceptions" of social groups perceived as vulnerable to radicalization instead of targeting individuals. For example, counter-terrorism agencies carry out mass raids instead of targeted arrests in areas predominantly occupied by Muslims and Somali ethnic groups such as in Eastleigh in Nairobi, North Eastern and Coast regions. This has created a feeling of repression based on religion and ethnicity among members of these social groups, exacerbating the social problem of radicalization (IRN, 2016).

This collective approach of preventing radicalization is challenged by the fact that not every person facing this structural violence becomes radicalized (Clarke, 2012). According to a 2011 report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals and non-Muslims constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab. Sageman (2008) also notes that religion is less prominent factor in terrorism as many individuals who have been radicalized only appear to discover religion merely weeks before becoming involved in terrorism acts.

Theoretically, radicalization has also been linked to a person's deprivation (social, economic or culture) and the deviant group ideologies (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). This theory, however, does not explain how many people who feel deprived in society do not join terrorism. Other theoretical frameworks have also emphasized the importance of interpersonal bond as important in understanding radicalization (Stark and Brainbridge, 1980). The theory argues that strong social bond makes people go to great lengths to protect their interpersonal bond they so desire. However, this argument fails to account why specific individual in the social network became radicalized.

Implicit from the foregoing discussion, it is clear that radicalization is considered as individual behavior in collective environment. Therefore, for an individual to be radicalized there is interplay between individual predisposing factors that are attributes of the individual before affiliation with terrorist group, such demographic and structural factors and contextual factors which reinforces self-redefinition of self as a radical. This interplay is not universal but subjective because each individual constructs his/her/their own realities, which will guide his/her/them in everyday actions (Blurr, 2003). Consequently, guided by social construction ontology and

interpretative phenomenological analysis approach, this study seeks to understand the lived experiences of socially constructed radicalized people in Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Terrorism is one of the major security threats facing Kenya today. This has drastically changed the management of public and private life by the government as a way of enhancing public security and safety. This has raised both sociological and legal challenges to the management of everyday life especially with regard to people's human rights and civil liberties (Choudhury, 2017; Simon, 2005).

There are various actors and players in terrorist and terrorism process in general. One of the engines that keep the process continuously flourishing is the recruitment and maintenance of the flow of participants. This has posed a major security challenge to counter-terrorism agencies because most of those recruited to terrorism are homegrown. This has forced the governments and counter-terrorism agencies to focus on radicalization and recruitment as a strategy of preventing terrorism.

With focus now on radicalization and recruitment, various studies have focused on structural factors which make people vulnerable to radicalization (see for instance ISS, 2014; Halima, 2015; Francis, 2012; Crenshaw, 2012), on the processes and mechanisms of radicalization (see Lakhani, 2013; Gardham, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2007) and on prevention of radicalization (de Londras, 2013; Otiso, 2009). Most of these studies looked at the problem of radicalization from a macro level with the assumption that collective structural and contextual factors are important in dealing with the social problem of radicalization. As a consequence, they lack causal mechanism as to why only specific individuals in the collectivity become radicalized in specific contextual environments.

According to Bacchi (2010); Foucault (2006) and Atran (2006), this casual mechanism can be established by uncovering the "taken for granted" meanings that drive everyday life and actions in relation to radicalization in specific contextual environments. Consequently, this study seeks to understand how radicalized individuals define/ make meaning of themselves, how contextual factors influence meaning formation of themselves and how these meanings influence their action of radicalization to participate in violent terrorism.

In doing this, this study is cognizant of the fact that there is no absolute reality on how individuals construct radicalization in various contextual contexts. As noted by social constructionists (see Blurr, 2003 for instance), individuals construct their everyday reality as influenced by the prevailing social and historical contexts. This means that the way individuals construct radicalization or radicalism may or may not be congruent with how the government or counter-terrorism agencies construct it. However, this construction will nevertheless influence or guide the individual's everyday actions in relation to radicalization. This study will therefore target individuals who have been defined legally as radicals and are serving prison sentences in purposively selected prisons in Kenya. Consequently, this study will seek to answer the following questions:

1. How do radicalized individuals make social meanings of themselves?
2. How do contextual factors (social, cultural, economic and political) influence their social meaning formation of themselves as radicals?
3. How do these social meanings of themselves influence their action of violence and terrorism?

1.3 General Objective

The general objective of this study was to investigate the lived experiences of radicalized people in Kenya and its implication on violence and terrorism.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

1. To investigate how the radicalized individuals make meaning of themselves

2. To analyze how the contextual factors influence their social meaning formation of themselves as radicals.

3. To assess how the social meaning of themselves influence their action towards violence and terrorism.

1.4 Justification of the Study

The study on individual lived experiences was necessitated by the increased recent cases of terrorism in Kenya. More importantly, the perpetrators of terrorism are citizens of Kenya unlike in the past when foreign terrorists were involved in the attacks. Further, the recruits for radicalisation were or are shifting to targeting university students and non-Muslims unlike their traditional targets of the Muslims and the economically disadvantaged in society. Unlike the government looking at the legalism of terrorism, this study seeks to understand the push and pull factors to radicalism in order to recommend appropriate interventions to the problem of radicalization. The findings will therefore assist in policy formulation by governments and inform the intervention measures to address cases of radicalization and terrorism by the stakeholders.

1.5 Significance of the Study

Cases of youth radicalization have been rampant in Kenya, extending from the traditional Muslim dominated areas to other parts of the country (Wafula P, 2014).

Many grievances cited as the cause of radicalization remain as reason cited by researchers mainly the Kenya government involvement in the conflict in Somalia, the operation base of the Al Shabaab militias. The radicalization has instigated the homegrown fighters to participate in terrorist attacks in their home country. Consequently, this action has elicited reaction from different stakeholders among them the government crackdown on the instigators of violent extremism and their recruiters. Other stakeholders have carried out intervention strategies targeting the communities and victims of radicalization for rehabilitation and deterrence in participation. Despite the government actions and interventions by Non-Governmental Organizations, radicalization of the youth continue to extent to institutions of higher learning and among the non-Muslims.

This study therefore analyzed the construction of the lived experiences of the youth joining radicalization, the contextual influences in their meaning formation and the influencing factors for them to opt for violence and terrorism. The study therefore sought to understand the individual unlike the other studies, which considers the collectivity, to isolate different cases and the influencing contextual factors. The study also looked at the influencing factors in decision making to participate in violence both before joining and while in the group of violent extremists. The findings of this study aims at assisting the government and the NGOs in interventions to understand how the individuals joining radicalization define themselves as opposed to legal or society labeling on them. The study further sought to understand their lived experiences as influenced by the lived contexts on their meaning formation that appeal for violent extremism. These findings therefore may assist in the approaches of the government, legal institutions, social interventions, and understanding the contexts favorable for radicalization and terrorism for positive mitigation.

The study also bears theoretical significance. The study utilized two theories—IPA and social construction theory. The study will therefore demonstrate the versatility of social construction of the two theories in analyzing the studied social phenomena. IPA was useful in this study because the findings of the study will provide an in-depth of the individual cases for comparison with multiple studies to provide insights into universal patterns or mechanisms. While social construction theory illuminated the understanding of the thinking of individuals engaging in radicalism in the jurisdictions of legalism and policy formulation.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The study targets the radicalized people serving prison sentence in selected Kenyan prisons holding convicts of terrorism. Much emphasis was given to the inmates convicted on their own plea or legally found guilty that they were radicalized and working or promoting terrorist activities for the self-interest of a terrorist group. In investigating this target group, this study was limited to understanding their connection to radicalization in relation to their lived experience influences.

1.7 Definition of Variables

The study used the following terms, which were common and defined according to how they applied to the study.

Lived experiences: This is the experience that presents to the individual as what is real in everyday life in a particular socio-cultural context. This experience consists of commonsensical reality that is taken for granted and tends to be less accessible.

Radicalization: The process of changing the thinking of a person to violently rebel against the legally established system to the advantage of a sub-group.

Terrorism: The unlawful instigation of violence on people or destruction of property by a radicalized person or violent extremist group to revenge against a government or to gain publicity or advantage for the group.

Youth: Any person of age 18 years or less than 35 years

Islamophobia: Hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most of them.

Cell: A segment within a terrorist organization, comprising of terrorists who know one another but unknown to other terrorists with exception of their leader.

Caliphate: All Muslim dominions originally controlled by the caliph who succeeded Mohammed before the split of the Arab world.

Contextual factors: Contextual Factors are characteristics of the ecology/environment that are related to the effectiveness of collaboration. It is not limited to the physical and structural settings of the community and the social context (i.e., political atmosphere). The collaboration may be able to influence these characteristics, but the group does not have control over them.

Homegrown Terrorists: Individuals who are born or raised from a young age within a specific country and become involved in supporting or participating in acts of terrorism against that country or her interests.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of literature and the theoretical framework selected for this study. The literature examines the lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism in Kenya. The study is concerned with literature on radicalization and terrorism and how individuals get involved in violent extremism in different lived contexts. It highlights the origins of terrorism, strategies of terrorism, motivations and radicalization and the processes, major attacks in Kenya and the terrorism waves. The study also covers three thematic areas on radicalization of individuals in Kenya; how radicalized people make meaning of themselves, what contextual factors make them to perceive selves as so and how these meanings of themselves influence their action for violence and terrorism. Finally, it discusses a theoretical framework for this study that is the phenomenological interpretative analysis theory and the social construction theory.

2.2 Historical Background to Terrorism/Radicalization

Terrorism has evolved from a localized security problem to global problem. Across the world, terrorism actions are either, state against the population or a section of the population against authorities. In most colonized countries, liberation movements adopted systems of terrorism to force the colonies to allow the indigenous attain their freedom. Terrorism is therefore dependent on grievances and in most cases the antagonists and protagonists label each other as terrorists depending on their individual perceptions of their adversaries. Unlike in the mediaeval period, terrorism has shifted towards a common doctrine, process of recruitment and dynamic in nature across cultural, religious and political persuasions. Prior to its current global spread,

terrorism traditionally was mainly in the Middle East. The grievances for terrorism were based on religious extremism and sovereignty of the Israel state, transcending to recognition of the Palestinian state. The conflict has been compounded by the occupation of American military in some Arab states, remaining key causes of terrorism (Kepel, 2002).

The first demonstration of organized terrorist attacks in the world history was witnessed in the Middle East, Palestine in the first century. While the Zealot sect, was one of the first groups to practice systematic terror. Their actions were provoked by the Jewish rebellion against Rome over the census taken by the Roman authorities throughout the empire in the early years of the Common Era. The Jews reacted, because they felt humiliated by its clear reflection of their submission to a foreign power, compelling retaliation by the Zealots launching an organized campaign against the imperial authorities. The Zealots resorted to armed struggle in the form of guerrilla warfare, including urban fighting, while using a strategy of terror-based psychology. The conflict escalated and by the year 66, the Zealots assassinated a number of political and religious figures including attacking buildings used to store archives, including loan documents, with the aim of winning the support of the working class overburdened by debts (Chaliand, 2007). Similar techniques of terrorism are being employed by terrorist groups in the contemporary based on grievances by attacking strategic installations for publicity and attract sympathy.

The term 'terrorism' was first used during the French Revolution's Reign of terror, when the Jacobins, who ruled the revolutionary state, used violence that involved mass executions by guillotine, to compel obedience to the state and intimidate regime enemies near the end of the 19th century. In the 20th century, terrorism escalated to include a vast array of anarchist, socialist, fascist, and nationalist groups, many of

them engaged in third world anti-colonial struggles. With the changing means of violence, some scholars also considered the systematic internal violence and harassment by communist states such as Stalinist Soviet Union and Nazi Germany as terrorist activities (Chaliand 2007), which has escalated to lone wolves and source bombers in the modern terrorism.

Al Shabaab terrorist activities continue to dominate in Kenya and other East African states. The militant group thrived in Somalia with the assistance of Al Qaeda support led by some militants including Fazul who exacerbated terrorists' activities in the region with Somalia as their base. Al Shabaab continued to exploit the vulnerabilities of Somalia's government and pro-government forces, launching widespread attacks in the capital, Mogadishu and recapture of several settlements that were liberated and then abandoned by African Union, Kenyan, and/or Ethiopian forces. Al Shabaab recruitments mostly target the youth from among the Muslims. Hence the meaning of Al Shabaab in Arabic language as 'youth' a definition that has bearing with the militant group targeting the youth for recruitment (Otiso *et al,* 2007).

Despite the attacks in Somalia by the allied forces, the Militants persists in retaliatory attacks against regional countries that deployed their military in Somalia with more intensified attacks directed at Kenya. The intensified security operations by the Kenyan government in Nairobi, Mombasa and other towns repulsed the militants to North Eastern region with recent attacks at; Garissa, Dadaab, Wajir, and Mandera. The attacks escalated in Nairobi with an isolated case of a home grown suicide bomber involved in the Dusit D2 attack at Nairobi Westlands (Standard Newspaper, February 22, 2019).

Uganda and Ethiopia also suffered attacks for deploying their military forces and continues to face the threats. However, Tanzania remains unaffected for having not deployed their military to Somalia. Observations show that, should Tanzania bow to pressure by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to deploy the military to Somalia it may suffer attacks like other countries in the region. However, the military deployment to Somalia by Tanzania will weaken the Al Shabaab bases to the extent of retracting their external attacks (Wafula 2014).

2.2.1 Terrorism

Terrorism has a history longer than the modern nation-state, therefore the use of terror by governments and those that contest their power remains poorly understood. While the meaning of the word terror itself is clear, when applied to acts and actors in the real world it becomes confused (Schmid, and Jongman, 1988). Part of this is due to the use of terror tactics by actors at all levels in the social and political environment. The understanding of terrorism based on the distinctions of size and political legitimacy of the actors using terror, raise questions as to what is and is not terrorism. The concept of moral equivalency is commonly used as an argument to broaden and blur the definition of terrorism as well. This concept argues that the outcome of an action is what matters, not the intention. For instance, it is argued that collateral or unintended damage to civilians from an attack by uniformed military forces on a legitimate military target is the same as a terrorist bomb directed deliberately at the civilian target with the intention of creating that damage (The European Commission's Expert Group on Violent radicalization, 2008). The intention in both cases is different that distinguish the two actions as terrorism or conventional attack by the government security agencies.

Over the past 20 years, terrorists committed extremely violent acts for alleged political or religious reasons over the Middle East conflict and Western interests against the Arab world. The terrorists are motivated by Religious or Political ideologies that ranges from the far left to the far right. For example, the far left consist of groups such as Marxists and Leninists who propose a revolution of workers led by a revolutionary elite (Ganor, 2002). On the far right, are dictatorships that typically believe in a merging of state and business leadership.

Religious extremists often reject the authority of secular governments and view their legal systems based on their religious beliefs as illegitimate. They also often view modernization efforts as corrupting influences on traditional culture. Special interest groups include people facing many radical legitimate causes; e.g., people who use terrorism and extremism to uphold antiabortion views, animal rights, and radical environmentalism. These groups believe that violence is morally justifiable to achieve their goals (Ganor, 2002).

Arising from the contestation about the meaning of terrorism, in general terms, it has been viewed variously as a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination (Rosand, et al, 2009). This terrorism definition therefore depends on which organization/ state represented. Different countries and organizations also define terrorism according to how they perceive it in their own understanding of their living environment. In some environments, terrorism may be viewed in terms of the Palestine-Israelite conflict, or to a more generalized perceptive the Christians and Muslims conflict depending on the salient issues that drive them into the conflict.

In America for instance, different agencies define terrorism differently according to their strategies and approaches of terrorism (Ganor, 2002). The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as, "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. While The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as, "premeditated politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (Horgan, 2005).

The united nations in its 1992 definition, defined terrorism as; An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) terrorism was seen as criminal acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

The Kenyan definition of terrorism is seen in light of legal perspectives aimed at protecting life, property and safety of the state. According to Kenya's prevention of terrorism (Act NO. 30 of 2012), a terrorist act means an act or threat of action which involves use of violence, endangers life resulting to serious damage to property. This action therefore must involve use of firearms or explosives and to some extent perpetrated by dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance or biological

agent to the environment. The act generally spells out all actions that compromise national security with the aim of embarrassing the government or communicating a warning over some action by the government.

2.2.2 Scholarly and institutional definitions of terrorism

Despite efforts by various scholars' attempts to define terrorism, the term is so loaded with conceptual problems that a totally accepted definition does not exist. The concern is that the recurrent theme of terrorism has become the daily part of the political drama of modern times. Among the definitions of terrorism by some of the most distinguished scholars and institutions on the matter, include:

Laqueur (1999): "Terrorism is the use of or the threat to use violence, a method of combat, or a strategy to achieve certain targets, aimed to induce a state of fear in the victim, that is ruthless and does not conform with humanitarian rules, publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy,

Schmid and Jongman (1988): "Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.

Horgan (2005:1) defines terrorism as, "the use of violence to provoke consciousness, to evoke certain feelings of sympathy and dislike." However, he notes that, the distinguishing factor between terrorism and other crimes is the political dimension to the behavior of the terrorist. He further says that, in understanding terrorism, it is important to understand the immediate targets of violence and the overall target of terror. In this case, while violence target noncombatants and property, terror targets political impact to be achieved by the terror organization. To accomplish their

missions, the terrorists use military weapons, chemicals and suicide bombing to attack their targets through modern means of use technology and information systems.

While international organizations define terrorism differently which includes the following:

League of Nations Convention Definition of Terrorism (1937); terrorist acts are "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public.

U.S. Department of Defense: terrorism refers to "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat to use unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Horgan, 2005)."

Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: define terrorism as any act or threat to use violence, whatever it's motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources (Merali, 1998)

Laqueur (1999:4), a prominent terrorism expert, suggests that, there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution in the characteristics of terrorism. Laqueur compares old terrorism with new terrorism. Old terrorism is terrorism that strikes only selected targets. New terrorism is terrorism that is indiscriminate; it causes as many casualties as possible. Another major feature of new terrorism is the increasing

readiness to use extreme indiscriminate violence. Laqueur argues that "the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population" (p. 81). While Sloan (2006) states that the definition of terrorism has evolved over time, but its political, religious, and ideological goals have practically never changed.

Although various definitions of terrorism exist, most take into account what are widely regarded as the three defining features of terrorism: (a) use of violence; (b) aim of making people afraid; and (c) need for political, social, economic, and/or cultural change. A popular definition by political scientist, Gurr (1989:201) captures these features: "The use of unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in pursuit of political or social objectives."

2.2.3 Concept of terrorism and radicalization

Terrorism and radicalization are terms used together but have distinct meanings. This means that not all radicalized individuals participate in terrorism and some individuals join terrorism without undergoing radicalization depending on their grievances of joining terrorism. Such common cases include the lone wolves who attack in solidarity with certain violent extremist group. Radicalization just like extremism, not necessarily aim at participation in terrorism, but could be used to promote other objectives like religious, political activism or activities of any group deemed to engage in extra ordinary activities against the norms or extremist activities. Radicalization therefore can be viewed as a process towards extremism, while terrorism is a product of extremist behavior (Horgan 2005).

2.2.4 The Lone wolves terrorism

The term 'lone wolf' was introduced in the late 1990s by white supremacists Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis as an encouragement to fellow racists to act alone for tactical security reasons when committing violent crimes (Bates, 2012). A Lone wolf refers to a leaderless resistance', 'individual terrorism,' and 'freelance terrorism'. Burton and Stewart (2008) defines a Lone wolf as "a person who acts on his or her own without orders from or even connections to an organization. They are different from sleeper cells, arguing that sleepers are operatives who penetrate the targeted society or organization and then remain dormant until a group or organization orders them to take action. In contrast, "A lone wolf is a stand-alone operative who by his very nature is embedded in the targeted society and is capable of self-activation at any time. However, Burton and Stewart (2008) neglect the ideological connections individuals might have with other networks or organizations, either through personal contacts or through inspirational content on the Internet.

According to Pantucci (2011) lone terrorist are categorized in four typologies according to their characteristics as follows:

1. **Loners**: utilize the ideological cover of an Islamist ideology to provide an explanation for their actions. They do not appear to have any actual connection or contact with extremists – beyond what they are able to access through passive consumption on the Internet or from society.

2. **Lone wolves**: carry out their actions alone and without any physical outside instigation, but demonstrate some level of contact with operational extremists. These are troubled individuals who seek solace in the extremist ideology and also appears to be reinforced through online contacts with extremists.

3. **Lone wolf packs**: a group of individuals who self-radicalized using the Al Qaeda narrative.

4. **Lone attackers**: Individuals who operate alone, but demonstrate clear command and control links with actual Al Qaeda core or affiliated groups. These attackers are not truly lone wolf terrorists, and this fourth type was included by Pantucci for comparison purposes.

2.2.5 Terrorism waves

The comparison between old and new terrorism was further explained through the evolution of terrorism in four waves, the Fourth Wave being new terrorism (Rapoport, 2001). From a historical perspective, Rapoport (2004:46–61) identified four waves of modern terrorism as, the Anarchist, the Anti-colonial, New Left and Religious waves.

The First Wave (Anarchist) was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Second Wave (Anti-colonial) was the colonial wave, confined within national geographical boundaries from 1921 to the current era. The Third Wave (New left wave) was the contemporary wave; it introduced international terrorism, crossing national boundaries, which began in the 1960s. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks escalated to the Fourth Wave (Religious wave) of terrorism (for both the U.S. and nations worldwide). The Fourth Wave is symbolized by religious justification for killing, international scope, unparalleled tactics and weapons, and dependence on technologies of modernity. The latter consists of communications, ease of global travel (i.e., moving across borders), and availability of finances and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In the Fourth Wave, terrorism reaches global phase with transnational dimension becomes the war of all against all. The Fourth Wave suggests a Culture of Terror, which refers to a collapse (both physically and figuratively) of America and the West through massive killings, the constant availability and uses of WMDs weapons, and religious legitimation for terrorist attacks against civilians in any country that is considered Satan, infidel, or apostate (i.e., religious rebel). For instance, the intention of Aum Shinrikyo to kill people in Tokyo subways in 1995 (through sarin poison gas attacks) was to punish everyone: infidels and faithful alike (Brooks, 2002).

2.2.6 Terrorism perspectives

In the understanding of terrorism, different perspectives were identified. One such perspective is the social and behavioral perspective, which links terrorism to "social, economic, political and other contextual factors" (Moten 2010, p. 45). Despite limiting terrorism to a given religion or even region, this perspective associates terrorism with "root causes" such as social economic inequality and political deprivation. Terrorist groups with religious bearing like the Al Qaeda are seen basically, as offshoots of "internal and international forces". Such groups are believed to have been compelled by the perceived sense of injustice perpetrated against them by "others" revenge through terroristic means. This is explained by Marari (1985), revealing how "those Palestinian suicide bombers often have at least a relative or close friend who was killed or injured by Israelis" (cited in Moten 2010, p. 46).

2.2.7 Root causes of terrorism

After looking at various definitions of terrorism, it is necessary to understand the root causes of terrorism before proceeding to the approaches of interventions of the problem. There have been different points of view in relation to root causes of terrorism. Rapoport (1998:129) looks at the root causes from the revolutionary point

perspective. He sees terrorism from the lens of revolutionary strategy and ideologies. He says the purpose of the revolutionary warfare through terrorism was a war against the political regimes (p.131). While, Horgan (2005:83) backed with the dynamic nature of terrorism, explains root causes from the cotemporary perspective. He therefore refers to the root causes as articulated by the Oslo conference on root causes of terrorism (p. 83) which were listed as follows:

a) lack of democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law

b) failed and weak states

c) rapid modernization

d) extremist ideologies of a secular or a religious nature

e) historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions, dictatorships or occupation

f) hegemony and inequality of power

g) illegitimate or corrupt governments

h) repression by foreign occupation or by colonial power

i) the experience of discrimination on religious or ethnic basis

j) government failure to integrate dissident group

k) experience of social injustice

l) charismatic ideological leaders

m) triggering events

However, there are various reasons for people becoming terrorists that include; family factors, the social environment, religion, being born in refugee camps, imprisonment, feeling a victim, desiring to be a hero, feeling hate and anger (Post, Sprinzak, Denny, 2003, pp. 171-177). This means that despite different contextual factors, there are

other factors that influence an individual into joining terrorism, leading to a popular belief that terrorists are made, not born (Stahelski, 2004).

2.2.8 Approaches to counter-terrorism

Due to the persisting problem of radicalization, the affected states under the umbrella of United Nations devised strategies of containing the rising problem (OHCHR, Fact Sheet No. 32, 2008).

America in a move to contain the problem endeavors to ensure democratic environment to accommodate all races including immigrants. The government policy ensures the Muslim community is accommodated to feel part of the entire American society, at the same time giving attention to de-radicalization and rehabilitation of those who were affected. While in Europe, each state embraced strategies for good practices according to the intensity of the problem. For instance, Britain adopted civic education to the communities affected. Most other European states incorporate civil studies in school curriculums to make students understand the dangers involved in radicalization. Like the case in Danish government, where employed Muslim imams talk to prisoners to curb cases of radicalization in prisons (OHCHR (2008).

Kenya among other African states has devised a strategy of countering radicalization by collaborating with other stakeholders to sensitize the affected communities and youth. The National Counter Terrorism Center for instance has come up with a budget for de radicalization by engaging counselors to the affected youth. Through NCTC, Kenya received donor support to promote counter terrorism strategies more so through civic education Wafula (2014).

To ensure the anti-radicalization measures among the affected, several state agencies, international organizations and Non-governmental organizations have made various

contributions in seeking a solution to the problem of radicalization. The European Union (2014) came up with various interventions to curb the radicalization of youth comprising;

a) Education – include school curricula, strategies of responding to radicalization, capacity and leadership development for key individuals and Community Based Organizations (CSO) from Muslims, or CBOs

b) Community empowerment – capacity building and intercultural competence development for public officials, particularly teachers, infrastructural and development support for CSOs

c) Safe spaces for critical engagement and dialogue – include spaces for political expression, arts and culture as well as interfaith dialogue,

d) Qualities, justice and political engagement – initiatives to address real concerns relating to economic and social discrimination, social justice and political voice are central to any effective response.

2.2.9 Terrorist attacks in Kenya

Most terrorist attacks in Kenya by the Al Shabaab took place after Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) carried out invasions into Somalia on October 14, 2011 in pursuit of abducted foreign aid workers and tourists from Kenya by the Al Shabaab into Somalia. The militants in retaliation intensified recruitments of youths, some from Kenya for radicalization, triggering a series of terrorist attacks targeting the Kenyan public and vital installations. The major violent attacks in Kenya are as tabulated in Table 2.1:

Table 2.1: List of major Al Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya after KDF incursion in Somalia

Place of attack	Date of attack	Victims killed
Nairobi - Westgate mall	21.09.2013	67
Lamu – Mpeketoni	17.06.2014	60
Mandera – Bus attack	22.11.2014	28
Mandera – Quarry workers	02.12.2014	36
Garissa University	02.04.2015	148
Dusit D2 Hotel	15.01.2019	21

Source: Standard Newspaper, February 22 2019

2.3 Social Meaning of Radicalization

Studies carried out on the meaning of radicalization show differences between the western understanding and those of the ideological beliefs due to its complex process with various interpretations. According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2009), radicalization is a process by which an individual or group adopt extreme political, social or religious morals and objectives that reject or undermine the status quo. While Precht (2007:16) defines radicalization as a process of embracing an extremist belief system and the resolve to use violence to instigate as a method of effecting changes in society.

Radicalization has also been looked at in terms of four stages which theorists argue that one can undergo the first three stages without causing terrorism (Precht (2007:16) and Silber & Bhatt (2007)). The four stages of radicalisation include; Pre-radicalization, Conversion, Conviction and lastly Violent Action.

To understand their way of life, the current study sought to understand the radicalization process and the perceived benefits arising from the process including; empowerment, self-identity, repair from humiliation and any social regrets arising from their encounter in life.

2.3.1 The radicalization process

Further, there is consensus on two factors that facilitate the radicalization process (B.M. Jenkins et al (2009) that include–spiritual mentor usually attached to a mosque and radicalization through the internet. The first strategy of a radicalizer to individual undergoing radicalization is to eradicate the radicalisee's self and social identity. This is to alienate the radicalism to feel distant from their existing lives, relationships and immediate social environments. This is done by exerting a push from mainstream society and their previous social relationships to create an environment of social isolation. The isolation in this regard, creates tension between the home world and the institutional world and this is used as a constant tension as a strategic advantage in the controlling targeted individuals (Goffman 1961: 23-24). In the process, the radicalizers confuse the radicalisee's perception of self and social identity by satisfying their needs like providing them with a dominant sense of identity and belonging which acts as a pull towards both the radicalizer and the in-group. This creates *us vs them* feeling, where the *us* is the extreme group, and the *them* are all who do not subscribe to their ideologies. Once an individual identifies with the extreme group, the radicalizer provokes an emotional reaction to the grievances discussed at the global level, widely viewed as *moral outrage* (Sageman, 2008), or *moral shoc*k (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

According to Wiktorowicz (2004, 2005), the radicalized individuals once recruited into the extremist group are categorised according to three career paths a potential radicalisee can engage. The first career path comprise of those categorised as the *seekers*. The seekers are conscious of what they are deliberately seeking in the extremist groups and networks. They usually hold grievances, which drive them to radicalization through—family influences, social injustice grievances, and individual

problems driven by the sense of fighting back to the aggressors. The second category consists of the *pretenders* who are affiliated to extremism not because they identify with extreme ideologies. This group also viewed as Pretenders or free-riders tend to enjoy the benefits of the group. The third category are called *drifters* or *wanderers* and are lured and pulled into extremism through various influences, pressures and a form of wrap around social control.

Liqueur (1999:4), a prominent terrorism expert, argues that there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism, which revolves around the prevailing ideology that influence the radicalized individuals way of belief in life. This perception informs what they engage in and their roles in life. He argues that their definition as radicalized individuals cannot be isolated from the contexts influencing them into joining radicalisation. One such viewpoint is the social and behavioral perspective, which associate terrorism to social, economic, political and other environmental factors (Moten 2010, p. 45). In this case the radicalized individuals definition of themselves are influenced by various factors, including the two themes from psychoanalytic theory (Freud 1923) that guide the understanding of a terrorist behavior—(1) hostility towards one's parents is an unconscious motivator for terrorism and (2) terrorism is a result of childhood abuse and trauma (Borum, 2004).

Studies have also shown that individuals tend to act independently in life by making their own choices, but recurrent patterned arrangements influence their choices according to the available opportunities. They undergo the process by imagining what other people think about them and interpret what their minds think of and likewise by the other people about them (Cooley, 1998). According to Bandura (1977),

individuals learn many of their behavioral tendencies by observing other people, obtaining rewards and punishments for particular behaviors.

Building on Cooley's work, Shaffer (2005), describes how individuals construct themselves in three ways: imagination of how individuals must appear to others in a social situation; perception of what others think of themselves and the response to the individual awareness about other people's perception judgments on the self. Despite various researches, it has not been ascertained the real causes of joining terrorism. This feeling has generated an argument among the psychologists accordingly, that there is no one terrorist mind-set, a view that is yet to be clarified (Taylor, 1988). However, researchers identified three vulnerabilities that may provide motivation to an individual to endorse violence (Borum, 2010), including— perceived Injustice or Humiliation, need for identity and need for belonging.

2.3.2 Radicalization as self-empowerment

Sociologically, power means the ability to exercise the will over others (Weber 1922). Power therefore enables ability to control others, events, or resources to make happen what one wants to happen irrespective of whether the other parties approve or not. In exercising control over others, an individual feels empowered. The self-empowerment therefore is a process of consolidating, maintaining, or changing the nature and distribution of power in a particular cultural context, ranging from acts of individual resistance to mass political mobilizations (Bookman and Morgen, 1988: 4). While women empowerment refers to the general process through, which women gain knowledge about the structures that oppress them and seek to alter the power imbalances in society (Bookman and Morgen (1988: 4). Researchers feel that unique traits found in women joining terrorism was that the women were mainly from places where terrorism organizations were based (Jacques and Taylor, 2013 pp. 41-42).

Previous studies explain that some women joined violent extremism because they were attracted by leaders of the VEO (Morgan, 2001). According to Bloom (2011:28), one of the motivations women face to become terrorists is a strong belief in a cause which would motivate them into joining a terrorist organization to achieve that cause, regardless of the consequences and the price of the goal. Some of the reasons for their joining terrorism is to achieve a political reform within a country (Cunningham, 2010 p. 186), intimate with the male leaders of the gang (Morgan, 2001:171), the search for vengeance, gain justice and loss of family members. This means they felt empowered by getting married to a militant and a fighter and simply the feeling of being unique from other women empowered them.

2.3.3 Radicalization as a means to self-identity

According to Tajfel (1979), Social identity manifests in four ways— (i) Social categorization: an individual's self-identification with a social group; (ii) In-group positivity: the positive emotions and self-esteem produced by group affiliation; (iii) Intergroup comparison: the comparison between different groups and the perceptions on group status this creates and (iv) Out-group hostility: hostility towards other groups that results from intergroup comparisons and perceptions about the illegitimacy of intergroup power relations in society.

In identity theory Burke et al (2009), when people have a moral identity, being (more or less) moral will influence their behavior in a situation. They define Self-worth as the degree to which individuals feel positive about themselves, that is, they feel that they are good and valuable (Rosenberg et al. 1995), leading to self-acceptance or self-respect. Therefore, Self-worth is rooted in the idea that individuals desire to see themselves favorably, and they act in a way that maintains and enhances their positive self-view of themselves (Leary 2007). While on the negative side, the radicalized

define themselves as having the negative feelings of low self-esteem when they believe that they are inadequate and less worthy than others (Rosenberg et al. 1995). While Maslow (1943), says that all people in society need or desire for a stable, firmly based, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. He adds that they desire to achieve; reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation. The achievement of self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability, and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world (p. 382). Most studies show that young people participate in terrorism as a means of identity seeking who have strong or even desperate needs to consolidate their identities (Olson 1988). Many of them became politically violent, seeking a sense of purpose and self-purpose and self-worth, '*a place in the sun*' (Taylor and Quayle, 1994).

2.3.4 Radicalization as self-repair from humiliation

Humiliation and the internal urge to revenge is a psychological factor that has been hypothesized to aggravate terrorist violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000). The feelings of humiliation or being taken advantage of leads to a passion for revenge is very familiar in forensic psychiatry and criminology and probably contributes to many nonpolitical murders (Borum et al., 2010) one of the vulnerabilities of people joining terrorism is perceived injustice or humiliation to the individual. Similarly, Stets and Burke (2012) in their cybernetics model of social interactions stated that humiliation caused to an individual provokes them to fight back or escape from the perceived humiliation.

In these cases they react by resisting their aggressors through participation in violence or evading the problem by moving away (Armstrong 2001). This action is aimed at hiding the shame on the affected person to rejuvenate the self in a new context. In the

devoted actor model, a radicalized person pursues sacred values which cannot be traded off with anything of whatever value (Atran 2007). According to Stets and Burke, (2012), emotions generated as a result of humiliation provoke an individual either to escape from shame or fight back. Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the late political leader of Hamas, confirmed this notion in a statement published three years before his death via targeted killing by the Israeli Defense Forces: "To die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" (Juergensmeyer 2000:187). The concept that feelings of humiliation or being taken advantage of gives rise to a passion for revenge is very familiar in forensic psychiatry and criminology and probably contributes to many nonpolitical murders (Miller 1993; Brooks, Thomas, and Droppleman 1996; Schlesinger 2000; Meloy 2001).

2.3.5 Radicalization as a social regret

Regret is defined as the negative emotion experienced by people when realizing or imagining that their present situation would have been better had they decided or acted differently (Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2007). This means, regrets is concerned with decisions made by an individual that elicited a negative feeling of blame to oneself for failing to do the right thing in life. Research has shown that people tend to regret their actions more than their inactions (Roese, 2005). Studies further show that, first, the experience of regret may produce a behavioral inclination to reverse one's decision or reverse the consequences. Second, decision makers may anticipate possible future regret when making decisions, and choose in such a way that this future regret will be minimal. By doing so, and an individual regrets serves as deterrence for future wrong decisions.

2.3.6 Contrarian Viewpoint to Mainstream thought

According to Silber (2007), young people are known to reject *status quo* or the preferences of the adults Extremists by holding contrary opinions from the mainstream group and as such provide ways for youth to express themselves for what is referred to as *civil rights* as opposed to the perceived *unjust system* wherever they live. In this respect, the youth would view learning institutions and social norms as status quo and ready to embrace a more radical establishment that conforms to contrarian. In this case, therefore participating in a contrarian elicits passion and a focal point of meeting with like-minded, other youths.

2.3.7 Terrorist personality

Psychoanalytical theory explains terrorism basing on the bottom-up approach. According to the theory, behavior is as a result of the interactions between the three components of the mind: the id, ego and superego (Freud, 1923). Personality develops during childhood through psychosexual stages of development and sexual fantasies are the main driver of personality development (Gabbard, 2000). Psychological distress is entrenched in the unconscious mind and occurs as a result of unconscious conflict regarding those sexual fantasies. There are two themes from this theory that explain terrorist behavior: (1) hostility towards one's parents is an unconscious motivator for terrorism and (2) terrorism is a result of childhood abuse and trauma (Borum, 2004). The assumption that terrorism is influenced by childhood abuse was first suggested by Feuer (1969) who construed terrorism in males as being rivalry with their fathers; a concept central to the Oedipus complex. However, as with most variants of the psychoanalytic theory, this theory is reinforced by non-scientific concepts such as the unconscious mind which are difficult to assess. An alternative theory of terrorism proposes that participants of terrorism tend to be young

individuals who lack self- esteem and are struggling to establish an identity (Fischer et al., 2010). The social identity theory first developed by Erikson (1959) suggests that social groups influence cognitive processes and perceptions of events, thereby influencing identity formation. Unlike the social learning theory which focuses on the environment of an individual or group, the social identity theory places more emphasis on the individual's sense of personal identity and joins the gap between the individual and the environment. Social identities represent the different social categories to which people belong such as religion, ethnicity and gender. According to Fischer et al., (2010) behavior is inspired by the beliefs and values held by these social categories and when a social identity is salient, the perception of a threat to that identity is more likely to cause reactive violence.

Researchers warn against the postulation that radicalization is a precursor to terrorism, as there has yet to be established a causal link between the two (Dzhekova et al., 2016). Due to this ambiguity, multiple theories and studies have been created to explain the participation of violence or desist from participating.

One of the reasons for participating in violence is the Frustration-Aggression hypothesis, which theorizes that an individual who is oppressed and therefore unable to reach his or her goals, can either respond with flight or fight. Terrorism in this theory can be tied with the fight response, resulting in an attack on the perceived source of oppression (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008:4). Critics argue, that the theory fails to understand why only a few individuals turn to terrorism when millions of people live under oppression. Similarly, research has shown that terrorism is not limited to any specific country or class, which is evident in the wide array of social conditions and nationalities of terrorist (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008:4). Though this theory seems reasonable in light of violent extremists' ideological belief system, it has not been

systematically tested and validated, due to difficulties such as small sample sizes and lack of cooperation from the terrorist respondents (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010:33; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008:6–7).

Criminological theories were used in the same way to investigate why people embrace violent radicalization. Perry & Hasisi (2015) used Rational Choice theory to compare terrorist bombers with criminals to see if there were similarities in their motivations. They argue that acts such as terrorism are not motivated by altruism, but rather it is an act based on a deliberation process where costs are weighed with anticipated benefits of the action. Therefore, they conclude that it is possible to compare suicide bombers to criminals, as criminals too are motivated by self-gratifying benefits. However, this explanation is challenged by a study concluding that though criminals and radicalized individuals share characteristics such as being predominantly males and acceptance of violence, one group is motivated by profit, while the other is motivated by ideology (Curry, 2011:102). The ideological influences on the youth forms the basis of radicalisation in Kenya by the Al Shabaab.

Research has also shown that the process of violent radicalization is often an intricate interplay of factors present on both micro-, meso-, and macro-level (Dzhekova et al., 2016). The micro-level consists of factors within the person, such as feelings which might support the process of radicalization. At meso-level the individual is influenced by social ties such as groups, friends and family. Lastly, the macro-level are larger societal factors, such as political, economic or cultural contexts which may influence the individual (Doosje et al., 2016).

While looking at the micro-level, the 12 factors influencing the radicalization process consist of feelings of insignificance and personal uncertainty. At the meso-level these

factors include discrimination, alienation, lack of close social ties and a sense of injustice. Whereas, factors influencing radicalization at the macro-level could be the view that Western cultural lifestyle prevents one from practicing one's religion to the fullest (Doosje et al., 2016). The process of radicalization is most often instigated and maintained by external influence, often stemming from friends or family members. With the advancements of modern technology, the internet's role in the radicalization process has also become a subject of concern. Neumann (2012:9) posits that the use of the internet to radicalize is the most dangerous innovation after the 9/11 attack.

Table 2.2: Pull and push factors for joining radicalization

Push factors	Pull factors
● Searching for identity or difficulties in self-identification	● Belonging
● Combining two different identities	● A sense of purpose
● Discrimination (of yourself or others)	● Significance, respect or status in the group
● Alienation (of yourself or others)	● Feeling of power and control
● Perceived global injustice	● Community and friendship
● Perceived oppression (of group, country or religion)	● Clear rule of life to adhere to Security
● Searching for purpose	● Attractive ideological arguments
● Difficult or destructive family relations	● Confidence that you stand for good and fight evil
● Fascination with violence and searching for thrills	● A sense of adventure
● A will to make a difference	

Source: Säkerhetspolisen (2010:34–35)

Some studies show that the internet helps overcome otherwise present barriers, but arguably also allows individuals to self-radicalize without direct contact with a so-called recruiter (von Behr et al, 2013:18). In addition, the process is often non-linear and can take place at varying paces, at times causing an individual to skip stages (Ranstorp & Hyllengren, 2013:80–81). Research based on radicalization processes in

Europe revealed the push and pull factors as an interaction between individual psychological traits, social and political factors, ideological and religious dimensions, cultural identity, traumatic experiences and group dynamics (Ranstorp & hyllengren, 2013:86).

Though it is important to focus on all levels of analysis to get a deeper understanding of radicalization, it is also essential to remember that macro-level factors affect a significant amount of the general population, of which only a small fraction turn to violent Islamist extremism (Denoeux & Carter, 2009). This fact takes into cognizance on the different grievances influencing their joining radicalization. In some instances, the recruits were being lured or simply influenced by misinterpretation of the Koran to fight the Jihad war for Muslims. This fact also informs the recruits who disengage from the group for failing to realize their expectations of joining the group.

Likewise, one should keep in mind that these underlying conditions of radicalization differ both across regions, countries and depending on time periods, thus what might be a relevant factor in Europe are not necessarily relevant in Asia. Violent extremism of any kind originates from radically different social, political and economic environments and from impoverished societies to advanced industrialized countries (Denoeux & Carter, 2009).

2.3.8 The sociological Dimensions of joining Terrorism

There has been a debate as to whether the characteristics of individuals joining terrorism can be traced. Several researchers have come out with hypotheses about the character of the terrorist based on different academic fields. More commonly, arguments on the character of individuals joining terrorism have featured in the fields of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, political science and criminology. Apart from a

drive for truth, political psychological theory advises that the more a target group understands the roots of the terrorist mind-set, the group develops policies to effectively manage the risk (Wardlaw 1989; Clayton, Barlow, and Ballif- Spanvill 1998). Arising from the confusion over the character of the terrorist, many scholars have not agreed on the definition of terrorism. For instance, Schmid (1983) compiled 109 academic definitions of terrorism, suggesting that there are roughly as many available definitions as there are published experts in the field. This problem is based on the understanding that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" (Jenkins 1982; Hoffman 1998).

In the endeavor to understand the motivations of the terrorists' participation in violent extremism, Schultz (1980) proposed seven such variables that distinguish the typologies of terrorists—causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization, and participation—that might be specified for revolutionary versus sub revolutionary terrorism. While, Post (2004) usefully divided political sub state terrorism into (1) social revolutionary terrorism, (2) Right-wing terrorism, (3) nationalist-separatist terrorism, (4) religious extremist terrorism, and (5) single-issue (e.g., animal rights) terrorism, proposing that each type tends to be associated with its own social-psychological dynamics. A more comprehensive typology is shown in Table 2.3, listing variables subject to analysis and classifications within those variables.

Table 2.3: Dimensions of Terrorism

Variable	Classification
● Perpetrator number	Individual vs group
● Sponsorship	● State vs substate vs individual
● Relation to authority	● Anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist/pro-establishment
● Setting	● Intrastate vs transnational
● Military status	● Secular vs religion
● Spiritual motivation	● Idealistic vs entrepreneurial
● Financial motivation	● Leftist/socialist vs rightist/fascist vs anarchist
● Political ideology	● Sponsor vs non-suicidal
● Hierarchical role	● Property (including data) vs individual vs masses of people
● Willingness to die	
Methodology	● Bombing, assassination, kidnapping/hostage taking, mass poisoning, rape, other (e.g., bioterrorism, cyberterrorism)

Source: Post (2004)

Attempts to account for the behavior of terrorists fall into two general categories: top-down approaches that seek the seeds of terrorism in political, social, economic, or even evolutionary circumstances and bottom-up approaches that explore the characteristics of individuals and groups that turn to terrorism (e.g. Wieviorka 1993, 2004). Popular opinion show that terrorists must be insane or psychopathic (Hacker 1976; Cooper 1977; Pearce 1977; Taylor 1988). Modern Western psychiatry identifies adult behavioral disorders according to a multi-axial classification scheme in which Axis I refers to the major clinical illnesses such as schizophrenia or major depression while Axis II refers to personality disorders such as antisocial personality disorder (APD) (American Psychiatric Association 2000). Hence, a psychotic or insane person is so mentally disordered as to not know right from wrong, while a sociopath knows right from wrong and chooses wrong for selfish reasons without pangs of conscience.

German psychiatrist Wilfred Rasch (1979) examined eleven terrorist suspects, including members of the Baader-Meinhof group, and reported on a Federal Police

study of another forty persons wanted as terrorists, finding no evidence of mental illness in any respondent. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny (2003; also see Post and Gold 2002) also found no Axis I disorders on psychiatric evaluations of twenty-one secular and fourteen radical Islamic Middle Eastern terrorists. As criminologist Franco Ferracuti (1982) suggested more than two decades ago, and as has been supported by subsequent reports (Reich 1998; Silke 1998; Horgan 2003), while terrorist groups are sometimes led by insane individuals, and while a few terrorists' actions could be attributed to insane persons and interestingly, terrorists rarely meet psychiatric criteria for insanity. Evidence suggest that a small number of individuals who rationally believe that terrorism may advance their cause ever become terrorists (Schbley 2000). This is related to the discovery that 85 percent of World War II infantrymen facing the enemy failed to pull the triggers of their weapons, despite the urgent rational benefits (Grossman 1995).

There has been much research, debate and theorizing on the motivations of becoming a terrorist. Extensive empirical research shows that there is no terrorist profile that is predictive of individual typology of person becoming a terrorist (Gartenstein, 2009). Alternatively, there is consensus among social scientists and law enforcement organizations that terrorists are the product of a dynamic process called radicalization. Researchers developed different theories and conceptual models to explain the process by which an individual undergoes radicalization, but these theories have not been empirically tested. Arising from the debate on the Terrorist profile, in the contemporary, the question of why some individuals faced with similar problems and living in the same contexts join radicalisation while others do not. This is the subject of this study to understand the lived experiences of those joining radicalisation to understand the underlying issues affecting them.

2.4 Contextual Factors to Radicalization

This section traces the behavioral trends of people joining radicalization by studying their lived contexts. In understanding the contextual influences, the researcher explored the influences to their motivation in joining radicalization and terrorism. Some of the areas of concern for this study under these sections include; family, religion, peer pressure, discrimination and places of residence of the radicalized individuals.

Previous studies show that most recruiters of individuals to radicalization capitalize on some contextual factors like economic, social and political factors affecting them (Schmid 2005). Common among them has been poverty and unemployment which have influenced people in being radicalized. Studies also show that most of the recruits to radicalization are youth mainly between the ages of 22 and 35 years. Therefore, recruitments to radicalization have mainly been influenced by contexts imbedded in cultural belief influences.

2.4.1 Family influences to Radicalization

According to Bandura (1969), individuals are socialized through modeling and social learning from the behavior as practiced by other members of the family or the surrounding environment. The first level of socialization of an individual is the family where an individual embraces culture, language and religion which then forms part of the self-identity. The individual interpretation of life encounters is therefore based on reflections of childhood experience, which remains imbedded in an individual until death (Freud, 1923).

The psychoanalytic theory argues that family exerts immense influence on an individual's entire life. The theory postulates that this happens during the various

stages of life and certain unresolved intrapsychic conflicts play itself in adulthood (Gabbard 2000). This is further explained by Wallerstein 1995 and Gabbard (2000), who intones that an individual is influenced at an early stage through parenting and interactions with others. Personality develops during childhood through psychosexual stages of development and argues that sexual fantasies are the main driver of personality development (Gabbard, 2000). Of interest to this study was therefore to examine family experience as one of the contextual factors.

According to Weinberg and Eubank (1994) in their discussion of the National Cultural Theory, it was proposed that terrorism expresses itself differently in "collectivist" versus "individualist" cultures. The theory further contents that, in collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system, dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and linking their personal well-being to the well-being of their group, while in individualist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals. This is one of the most common contextual factors the radicalized individuals encounter in life as it is learning through modelling (Bandura 1977).

2.4.2 Peer influences to Radicalization

Once recruited, they are sustained in the VEO through peer pressure, group solidarity, and the psychology of group dynamics (Post, 1986). The terrorists therefore tend to synergize their own identities into the group, resulting in a kind of "group mind" and group moral code that require undoubted obedience to the group (Crenshaw 1985). The interactions at that level influence their way of life, defining their livelihoods (Wallerstein 1995; Gabbard 2000). The discussion in this section affirms this observation.

2.4.3 Religion as a means to radicalization

Religion is another social aspect that needs to be considered. Modern terrorism has seen an enormous increase in religious extremism, the scale of violence has intensified, and the global reach has expanded (Martin 2010). Religious terrorism can be defined as political violence that is motivated by an absolute belief that another-worldly power has sanctioned, or sometimes commanded, terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith (Martin 2010). People who partake in religious terrorism believe that any acts they commit will be forgiven and perhaps rewarded in the afterlife (Martin 2010). Extremism is not limited to just one religion. There are many different forms of religious terrorism, but the most common is Islamic extremism (Martin 2010). Overall, there has been a dramatic increase recently in religious terrorism, making it one of the main contributors to terrorism globally. Therefore, the dominant religion of a country seems worthwhile to examine in order to see if religion plays a role in the number of terrorist attacks.

Religious terrorism has been defined as political violence that is motivated by an absolute belief that another-worldly power has sanctioned, or sometimes commanded, terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith (Martin 2010). Extremism is not limited to just one religion, as almost all the religions practice extreme behavior, believing that the extraordinary happenings will take place.

Religious perpetrated terrorism is the most dominant terrorism in the world as compared to secular terrorism (Rapoport 2004). Various religions have committed terrorism atrocities in the history of humankind. This includes; the Jewish zealots, Muslim Hashashins and Hindu thugs (Martin 2010). Terrorism attacks in Kenya have been committed by Muslim violent extremism Organisation, Al Shabaab. Therefore,

some radical elements in the Islamic religion recruit, radicalise and preach extremism to their followers. People who participate in religious terrorism believe that any acts they commit will be forgiven and perhaps rewarded in the afterlife (Martin 2010).

There are many different forms of religious terrorism, but the most common is Islamic extremism (Martin 2010). However, in Islam, killing a human being is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief' (Gulen, 2004:1). Considering the Islamic values, which define a way of worship and a way of a life, deviation from the teaching is the main concern in Islamisation of terrorism (Rahman, 1996).

2.4.4 Islamophobia and Radicalization

Islamophobia, defined by Abbas (2007) as the unfounded hostility towards Muslims, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims which is different from radicalization, but can be an aggravating factor in some of the vicious circles leading people into extremist movements. However, Radicalization and Islamophobia are closely interconnected. The focus on terrorism and extremism takes our attention away from the lives of ordinary Muslims, living as peaceful citizens throughout Europe. Abbas further states that, the European-born Muslims are very minimally involved in violent Jihadism considering that Muslims account for as much as 5 to 10 per cent of the population even in Western countries like Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.

Abbas (2007) from Istanbul explained that Islamophobia had emerged only in recent times. Previously there had been no real concept of a Muslim community in the United Kingdom, but rather of a community of Asian heritage, with little religious connotation. Today, however, Islamophobia is a real and concrete threat, in spite of efforts to counter it in the media and in politics. At a global level, the last few decades

have seen the emergence of a thesis on the clash of civilizations involving Western world and Muslim countries. Muslims generally, and migrants in particular, are welcomed by international terrorist movements given that they make yet more people receptive for extremist discourses.

The current refugee and migrant crisis in Europe faces endless violent conflicts in Syria and Iraq, is another development viewed by various European states as an upsurge of anti-immigrant sentiments and often anti-Muslim attitudes and acts, witnessed in Germany in February 2016, with refugee transports and camps attacked by small violent crowds protesting against their arrival. The continued rejection of local Europeans against immigrants is likely to fuel marginalization of young people, hardening their extremism stance. The Muslim immigrant alienation against the Muslim due to perception of islamophobia is taking root across the western countries including the US, which has implemented a policy to cancel immigrant visas for citizens of some known Arab countries in Asia and Africa (Abbas, 2007).

In Kenya some Muslim clerics at the coast use Muslim religion to recruit youth into radicalization. For instance in 2014, a police raid on the Musa Masjid Mosque in Mombasa netted at least 200 youngsters, some as young as 12 years undergoing radicalization training (standard newspaper, May 27, 2016). Similarly, some university students have been recruited to participate in terrorism in the country. This has been illustrated by the participation of Mohammed Abdirahim, a law student from University of Nairobi, Parklands campus in the Garissa University college attack who was killed by the recce squad during the attack after leading a group of Al Shabaab to massacre 148 students. He was also a son of Abdullahi Dagare, chief of Bulla Jamuhuri location in Mandera County (standard newspaper, May 27, 2016).

2.4.5 Islamization of Terrorism

Since the late 1960s and the advent of comprehensive, cross-national statistics on terrorist attacks, the casualty rate of individual terrorism has increased. Religious terrorist groups, while only committing the second largest number of attacks in the time period, have a higher average number of victims per attack (persons wounded or killed) than all three of the other types combined (Schmid 2003).

Scholars of terrorism generally point to four fundamental qualities of religiously-oriented terrorist groups that make them more prone to conduct attacks or to adopt tactics calculated to result in high casualty rates. First, scholars argue that religious terrorist groups are motivated by deep-set cultural identities and a desire to demonstrate cultural dignity in the face of an adversary that represents an alien and, to the terrorists, objectionable way of life. The natural inhibitions that would shape the tactical behavior of terrorists launching attacks against a population with whom they share some identification are absent when a religiously motivated terrorist attacks a target that represents an essential ''other.'' Victims of religious terrorism are more fully dehumanized both in the minds of the terrorist perpetrators, and sometimes in the minds of the constituent populations or target audience (all co-religionists) of the terrorists as well. Because of this, attacks on soft targets that are more likely to yield high numbers of victims, for example civilians in a crowded public place, are more tolerable for religious terrorists and may be judged by the perpetrator to be unlikely to result in a backlash from supporters (Hoffman 2009).

Second, compared to secular terrorist groups that commit acts to generate sympathy with their cause locally or internationally, religious terrorists are less constrained by the desire to win the hearts and minds'' of an audience (Hoffman 2009). They do not crave popular approval for their acts because they expect instead to obtain spiritual

reward, making them even less inhibited when it comes to committing acts likely to yield high casualty rates.

Third, religious terrorists declare war on entire societies, cultures, and political status-quos, not just on individual governments, as is the case with secular terrorist groups. For religious terrorists all members of the target society are legitimate, including those that are most vulnerable, and this often results in tactical decisions to commit acts that produce large numbers of casualties. Finally, religious terrorists tend to see violence as an end unto itself rather than a means to an end. For them violence is a ''purifying act,'' a means of communication and a public demonstration of their fervor, drive and determination and sincere adherence to their ideology. Of course this makes high casualty attacks acceptable and even desirable and explains why extreme tactics such as suicide attacks are more prevalent among religious terrorists than secular terrorists (Hoffman 2009).

Among the proponents of violence among the Islamic faith are some of those who use Islam as a means of causing violence. Shortly after the 9/11 attack in the US, some sympathizers of the attackers issued statements to support the violent act and went ahead to explain how the act was related to the teaching of the Quran. As recited by Omar Abdul Rahman (the blind sheik), a mentor of Osama bin Laden and one of the individuals charged with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, he criticized the split of Islam into factions. He called on the Islamic community to maintain Islam as one entity. He also opposed the emerging divisions among the Muslim followers who participate in deviations of the Koran (Rahman, 1996).

2.4.6 Islamism, Lethality, and Goal/Organizational Structure

Hoffman (2009) argues that the dramatic increase of radical Islamist terrorism starting in the 1980s and 1990s has significantly contributed to the lethality of terrorist attacks perpetrated by religiously oriented terrorist groups. There is also descriptive empirical evidence that Islamist terrorist groups are indeed more lethal than other types of terrorists. Over the period 1968 to 2005, Islamist groups were responsible for 93.6% of all terrorist attacks by religiously oriented groups and were responsible for 86.9% of all casualties inflicted by religiously oriented terrorist groups. On average, attacks by non Islamist groups produced 8.7 victims per incident while attacks by Islamist groups yielded 20.7 victims per attack. Scholars point to doctrine and practice within Islam such as the concept of lesser jihad, the practice of militant struggle to defend Islam, or the Muslim reverence for Istishhad, the practice of martyrdom, to explain the higher frequency and intensity of terrorist activity among radical Muslims as compared to terrorists of other religions.

This study subjects the assertion that the rise of Islamist terrorism is a significant reason for the growth of high-casualty terrorist attacks to quantitative and qualitative empirical scrutiny for the period 1998 to 2006. For the purposes of the study, Islamist terrorism is identified as terrorist attacks committed by groups that are primarily motivated by interpretations of Islamic political principles or by a Muslim religious and communal identity. These interpretations of principles and definitions of communal identities vary widely across Islamist groups.

According to DeTombe (2009) an Islamist terrorist group in Egypt might be motivated to replace a secular regime with one governed by Shariʾa law. On the other hand, an Islamist group in India might be motivated by a communitarian desire to

protect Muslims perceived by the group to be mistreated or oppressed. It is however important to note, that the term Islamism by itself refers generally to a whole constellation of political movements and actors world-wide, only a tiny highly radical subset of which engage in acts of violence. My employment of the signifier ''Islamist terrorism'' is therefore interchangeable with terms used by other authors such as ''Islamic terrorism'' or ''Islamic Fundamentalist terrorism.'' The study tests a controversial hypothesis: Islamist groups that are not affiliated with the al-Qaeda network are not any more likely to commit high casualty terrorist attacks than other types of terrorist groups, specifically leftist, rightist, and national-separatist groups. This is because al-Qaeda type of groups fit a typology defined as ''universal abstract'' while other Islamist terrorist groups are more properly categorized as ''strategic.'' These different group typologies are accompanied by critical organizational and goal structure differences that determine the tactical behavior of terrorist groups; whether or not they use suicide attacks, whether or not they attack soft targets, and whether or not they are inhibited about attacking members of their same national or religious community. These tactical behaviors, in turn, help to determine lethality (DeTombe, 2009).

In contrast, strategic groups have much more limited and discrete goals: the liberation of specific territory, the creation of an independent homeland for a specific ethnic group, or the overthrow of a specific government. Terrorist acts launched by national-liberation or regime change-motivated groups are a strategic tool employed to force opponents to concede to concrete demands. These types of groups also have coherent and narrowly defined constituent populations on whose behalf they carry out the struggle packaged as a tangible political good for their constituents and on whom they often depend for support, financial and otherwise. Most importantly, unlike universal

abstract groups, they regard ''winning the hearts and minds'' of a constituent public and maintaining that public's approval as critical to the success of the struggle. They also hope to eventually lure their opponents to the negotiating table. High-casualty attacks and other atrocities are risky and can always alienate constituents, generate a public backlash against the group, and prompt opponents to eschew negotiation and redouble efforts to confront the perpetrating group (DeTombe, 2009).

Islamist terrorism encompasses both universal abstract and strategic types of groups. The al-Qaeda terrorist network, a rather loose association of radical Salafist Islamist groups operating in many countries around the world that revere foundational members such as Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden, Egyptian-born Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Jordanian Palestinian figure Abdullah Azzam and led by a transnational coterie of veterans of Islamist struggles around the world, is a quintessential universal abstract terrorist movement DeTombe (2009).

It has a broad, ambitious, and highly ideological political agenda that includes unifying the Islamic world under a puritanical interpretation of Sunni Islam, the rejection of both secular rule and the institution of the nation-state in the Muslim world leading to the overthrow of all existing Muslim countries and the integration of all Muslim societies into a Caliphate, the liberation of Muslim territories from foreign occupation, and the use of holy war (lesser jihad) to bind Muslims together and lead them through a ''clash of civilizations'' that will rid the Muslim world of non-Muslim cultural and political influence. Al-Qaeda groups also tend to have a very narrow definition of what constitutes a proper Muslim, often rejecting Shi'is and Sufi Muslims as well as Sunnis who do not subscribe to the austere radical Salafist conception of Islamic practice and sources of authority. Many al-Qaeda affiliated groups do operate only in specific countries and do claim to represent the aspirations

of specific Muslim peoples there, for example Jemah Islamiya in Indonesia, but all groups subscribe to a global and unified vision of Muslims and see the entire Muslim Umma (global community) as the benefactors of their activities, and the entire world as the audience to their attacks (DeTombe, 2009).

In contrast, Hamas, an acronym for the ''Islamic Resistance Movement'' and the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is functionally a national liberation movement. It has a highly discrete and concrete objective: to create an independent Palestinian state out of Israel and the Palestinian territories it occupied in 1967. Its secondary objective is to ensure that an independent Palestinian state is governed by Islamic law (shari'a), but this is clearly subordinated to the more immediate goal of ending the Israeli occupation. It also has a discrete and limited constituent population, Palestinians and specifically those that live in the Occupied Territories, a specific opponent, the Israeli government, and a specific audience, Israeli society. It expresses nothing more than rhetorical affinity for Muslims and their struggles in other parts of the world (Abbas 2007).

Together with the organizational differences and goal structures, these ideological differences help to explain the different tactical behaviors of the Islamist groups in Iraq and also yield some indication of the chances of the success of counterterrorism efforts. Non-affiliated Sunni and Shi'i groups are capable of pragmatism, and this quality affects the lethality rates of their attacks. They are using political violence to leverage discrete concessions from political actors. Whether or not it is advisable, it is certainly conceivable that they could be encouraged to desist their terrorist attacks in exchange for a removal or significant draw-down of foreign troops or greater political access. However, the al-Qaeda affiliated groups are wedded to an inflexible political agenda one that is difficult to conceive of a rapprochement for ''To please [the radical

Salafis] any future government would need to be both viciously against the United States and rabidly for Taliban-style Islam. For them, political violence is a process of cleansing and is testimony to the purity of their belief. The immediate political objective is less important (Abbas, 2007).

2.4.7 Islamic extremists' recruitment

It should be understood that though this is one interpretation of Islam, it is in a sense widely frowned upon and utterly hated in the eyes of most Muslims. These terrorist have manipulated a deeply cultural, historically prominent and peaceful religion, with the use of false rhetoric seeking both political and religious power. This goes to the heart of the problem, since the principle of Islamic reform has all too often been approached and advanced through radical fanaticism. It is therefore clear why the political development of Islam has been hindered. According to Islamic scholar and prominent activist in interfaith dialogue M. Fethullah Gülen "In Islam, killing a human is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief" (Gulen, 2004:1). This seems to contradict the most basic principle of radical terrorists, but even this statement does not give sufficient gravity to true Islamic practices. For example, in an interview with M. Fethullah Gulen, he stated that: No person can kill a human being, No one can be a suicide bomber and No one can touch an innocent person even in a time of war. Islamic law and/or tradition even holds that children and/or people who worship in churches are to be unharmed. This has been repeated throughout history; Prophet Muhammad said it in the Quran. Abu Bakr the first Rightly Guided Caliph said it as well as the Sultan Mehmet II (an Ottoman Sultan). Gulen elaborated that in Islam an individual cannot declare war, nor can a group or organization declare war, only the state can declare war. While it is possible for a man to say that he declares war on someone, or to say that he should kill this man because he supports Christianity and

threatens to weaken Islam, a simple declaration does not initiate war. It is very difficult to declare war, a state must declare war or there is no war (Gulen, 2004:2-3).

In Gulen's opinion, there is no longer an Islamic world. There are more Muslims in some places and fewer in others, but Islam has become a culture rather than a faith that is followed truly. Bin Laden replaced Islamic logic with his own feelings and desire" (Gulen, 2004:3). Osama bin Laden has indeed lied to his followers directly. His insistence that followers of Islam must kill infidels even at the expense of civilian life is a direct and obvious perversion of true Islam. He has many Islamic scholars back him up and created similar rhetoric, all in the name of Ali and calling for jihad. Jihad is the term for total effort, exertion, and endurance that each Muslim demonstrates in order to be bestowed with the pleasure of God. This also includes individual efforts to keep carnal desires at bay, and the effort to make Islam known to more people. Jihad can at times manifest in physical or violent struggle if Muslims are attacked or have clear intelligence that they will be attacked. The Prophet Muhammad himself commanded or sent selected followers to command more than 60 battles. In none of those battles were Gods messengers on the attack. All of the actions of Al Qaeda the killings of civilians, the suicide bombings, and airplane high-jacking must originate from a central authority if they do not the actions are simply the execution of personal wishes of the group or organizations who committed the actions. The Prophet Muhammad set clear rules for engagement in Jihad. Treating the enemy with mercy, the prophet has never intended to crush his enemy. The ban on torture and respecting the enemy dead were all very important to the prophet in a time of war. Muslims and others, who believe that Jihad was created solely for the protection of homelands and Muslims, are simplifying and minimizing the greatness of Islam and Jihad (Aktan, 2004:26-31). The Quran and the long and dynamic history of Islam

proves this to be false. Rather, this idea has been created with the coming of the modern age, and is truly alien to the Islamic consciousness. The land itself serves no value to Muslims other than it is where the authority of Allah was established and where faith is followed, earning the land the title "homeland of Islam" (Aktan, 2004:26-31). Clearly, that in the defense of the "homeland of Islam" is not the defense of land. It is the defense of the Muslim culture, its beliefs, and its very way of life.

However, a look within the parameters of jihad reveals this is not the ultimate goal of jihad. The ultimate goal of Jihad is establishing Divine authority within the region. Islam a Complex Tradition under Attack in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 the death of 3,000 innocent people forced the United States government to make very tough decisions for the country. Government leaders have attempted to make it clear that the responses to September 11 were not about attacking Islam, but that of terrorism. Within the confines of the global war on Islamic terrorism, it has become clear that Islam as a general religion has become under attack because of actions beyond the control of mainstream Muslims. This is a problem because the war on terrorism is not even really about terrorism any longer. As explained by Thomas Friedman, "in some circles, it is no longer about Osama bin Laden, Al Qeada, or any other terrorist faction. It is not a religious issue, and Islam's history, cultural, values, principles, and compatibility with modernity are under scrutiny" (cited in Patterson, 2001). The most obvious aspect of this quote shows that terrorism is not a religious issue, although it is couched in its terms. To say that terrorism is a religious issue within Islam is an attack on the religion as a whole instead of a sect of people.

To attack Islam is to dismiss an entire religious group of people that spans from white and black America, Indonesia, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Britain, and the Middle East. Terrorism includes tactics used by a small sect of religiously motivated

extremists, who claim to kill in the name of God, but in all reality, kill in the name of power. Understanding that a fight against terrorism is not one that will be won simply by destroying the enemy is imperative to the reality of this struggle.

The issue is whether the culture of the Middle Eastern region will allow modernity to set in and thereby allow its people to accept globalism. In the New York Times, Salman Rushdie "there is a need for Islam to become depoliticized and for it to presume secularist-humanist principles in the tradition of modernity" (cited in Patterson, 2001). The Middle East is in a position to allow modern Islam into its old ways, but the question still remains how to balance the two. Islam, as a religion, is undoubtedly capable of modernization. One must look only as far as the examples of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Eastern Europe. The religion itself is not the problem. The hindering factor is that of an extremely large and historically conscious people that do not want to lose their culture and history to modernity. Their concern has validity, but yet change must come from within the Islamic society.

Islam has tried modernity and failed in some places and succeeded in others. Turkey, Esposito says is the only Muslim country to pursue a completely secular path (Esposito, 2005:169). Turkey is a good of example of success, Turkey is a country trying to enter the European Union and it has implemented a law banning the wearing of head covers. In response, a debate emerged over whether it is any more democratic to ban the wearing of head covers, as it would be to enforce the wearing of head covers. This is a very democratic type of debate; show not only the versatility of Islam, but its adaptability to the West. The success of Turkey as it evolves should stand as a beacon towards both Westerns and Arabs who believe Islam is ill-compatible with Modernity. Turkey's progress contrast with countries like Afghanistan, which fell victim to outside forces like the Taliban; who desire to claim

the country and impress an extreme conservative Islamic way of life on its peoples. The Taliban is oppressive form of radical governance that halted the very rapid and independent democratization of Afghanistan. Religious faith that is depoliticized ceases to be what the terrorists claim it to be.

Most Western analysts see that the Islamic terrorists believe in and enforce the use a perverted sense of true Islam. These analysts understand both the history and peaceful nature of Islam and do not identify the terrorist actions with these peaceful, historic, and sought after religion. They understand that Muslims, as a whole, are a very peaceful and tolerant people, who seek to live without conflict, as do other educated and peaceful peoples. The importance of fighting the war against terrorism is obvious, though religious bigotry must be seen for what it is and should be avoided. It should be duly noted that both Christians and Jews have dark-cornered past, and these pasts help equalize these religions with Islam in that all three religions have regrettable part in their histories. It is only that the most recent dark blemish has been on Islam and neither of the other two religions. So regardless of ones feeling of Islam, it is pure bigotry to blame the religion of Islam as a whole for the acts of the terrorist (Shmuel, 2004).

Laqueur (1999), a prominent counter-terrorism expert, suggests that "there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorism" (p. 4). Laqueur compares old terrorism with new terrorism. Old terrorism is terrorism that strikes only selected targets. New terrorism is terrorism that is indiscriminate; it causes as many casualties as possible.

Another major feature of new terrorism is the increasing readiness to use extreme indiscriminate violence. Laqueur argues that "the new terrorism is different in

character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the population" (p. 81).

Terrorism has changed because of a paradigm shift. A paradigm is a pattern, worldview, or model that is logically established to represent a concept. A paradigm is a way of interpreting the world that has been accepted by a group of people and that can be useful for politicians and thinkers to design policy agendas. When a paradigm changes, the whole group experiences a paradigm shift. Many scholars argue that the paradigm shift from old to new terrorism occurred at some point in the 1990s, with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and the 1995 gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by Aum Shinrikyo (a deadly Japanese cult). Supporters of the concept of new terrorism identify the strict compliance with religion, predominantly radical Islam, as one of its main characteristics. While old terrorism was mainly secular in its focus and drive, new terrorism works hand-in-glove with religious fanaticism. New terrorism rejects all other ways of life and advocates a categorical and inflexible worldview consistent with the belief of the religion. New terrorism is also increasing. Gurr and Cole (2000) examined the sixty-four international terrorist organizations that existed in 1980; they found that only two of them were religious organizations (only 3% in total). By 1995, the number of religious terrorist organizations rose sharply to twenty-five out of fifty-eight (43% in total). It was an increase of 40% in just fifteen years (Gurr and Cole, 2000).

2.4.8 Poverty as a cause for Radicalization

When social inequality emerges in society, many of those affected become dissatisfied and angry because they are unable to achieve what others are easily able to achieve. These then creates internal conflict within certain geographic areas, and making it more likely for terrorism to occur (Newman, 2006). Similarly, other factors

causing social disaffection in society include unemployment that cause impact on social inequality (Laqueur 2014). The Human Development Index included per capita income, life expectancy, and education into account in regards to terrorism, and found that there is a correlation between terrorism and human development (Schmid 2005). Among the cases of human development, arise issues of poverty. Several researchers also claimed a sociological connection between poverty and terrorism (Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). They indicate that poverty drives individuals into joining radicalization in a move to improve their lives and address their social and economic needs.

2.4.9 Discrimination and social injustice as means to radicalization

Human rights violations, including dispossession and humiliation, result in those affected having severe grievances against the government (Newman, 2006). When the government is unable to provide basic standard of living, citizens become displeased and this is when terrorist organizations come in to recruit them.

The oppression theory explains that oppression provokes political violence (see Fanon 1965; Whitaker 1972; Schmid 1983), which is a key component of terrorism. Further, many grievances of discrimination and social injustice have been known to fuel cases of terrorism, such as those witnessed in the Palestine and Israel and the Al Shabaab attacks against Kenya. The researchers came up with innumerable scales and instruments for assessing perceived injustice and discrimination (e.g., McNeilly et al. 1996; Utsey and and Ponterotto 1996; Neto 2001; Loo et al. 2001; Murry et al. 2001; and Duckitt et al. 2002).

According to Atran (2006), this causal mechanism can, however, be established if people's lived experiences especially that linked to social integration and social

regulation is taken into account. Using Durkheim's typology of suicide (Durkheim, 1979), Atran (2006) observes that an individual experience of marginalization and failure to live up to the social expectations placed upon him/her by the society increases his/her vulnerability to join a terrorist group. For example, according to Atran (2006), more than 80 per cent of known Jihadist lives in the diaspora communities which are often marginalized from the host society and physically disconnected. Thus, marginalized, well-educated and well –to –do make them more vulnerable of being suicide terrorists. This is because the societal institutions have failed to provide prophylactic (preventive) effect against individualistic whims that would lead someone to join a terrorist group.

Kenya's sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 categorized the country into high and low potential areas thus discriminating areas into potentials and non-potential areas. Most of the areas under low potentials are found at the Coast, Northern and North Eastern part of the country. Apparently, the bulk of the areas are Muslim dominated. This raises concerns of religious discrimination.

2.4.10 Places of Residences as influencing factor in Radicalization

One's area of residence does influence one's behavior of individuals (Shaw, 1986:365). Psychologist Eric D. Shaw (1986:365) provides a strong case for what he calls "The Personal Pathway Model," by which terrorists enter their new profession. The components of this pathway include early socialization processes; narcissistic injuries; escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police; and personal connections to terrorist group members. Shaw further observed that the pathway model is domiciled in a locality where favorable conditions for recruitment to terrorism occur.

Bandura (1977) explains that:

> "Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if people had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to do. Fortunately, most human behavior is learned observationally through modeling: from observing others one forms an idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for action."- (p22).

The current scope of terrorism and especially after the September, 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, "national politicians and United Nations officials identified poverty, global income inequality, unemployment, and low levels of education as key causes of terrorism" (Gottlieb 38).

The recruiters use religious radicalization to recruit and radicalize the youth, which seems to be extending to non-Muslims as opposed to the recruitment of Muslims only (Njogu, 2015). Njogu adds that, some of the victims are kidnapped from refugee camps and colleges to be radicalized in Somalia.

The literature on lived contexts show that most studies focused on groups dynamics influencing people joining radicalisation. Therefore as much as the people under consideration live in the same contexts no individual concerns were considered in evaluating the impact of contextual factors to the individual. This study therefore, focus on the individual and how they are influenced into joining radicalisation.

2.5 Radicalisation and Social Construction of Violence

According to research, ones frustrations can sometimes lead to aggressiveness (Borum, 2004). Some studies show correlation between crime and terrorism although to some extent there is consensus as the latter being driven by doctrine rather than profit as in the case of crime (Curry, 2011:102). Psychological damage such as trauma during childhood sometimes triggers terrorists to "see the world in a grossly

unrealistic light," which ultimately pushes them to justify their extreme violence (Mahan 13).The decision to participate in violence is not automatic at joining radicalization or at any specific stage of radicalization. In this regard, theorists argue that one can undergo the first three stages of radicalization without causing terrorism (Precht (2007:16) and Silber & Bhatt (2007)). The four stages of radicalization include; Pre-radicalization, Conversion, Conviction and lastly Violent Action."

However, what distinguishes the Terrorist apart from the ordinary person, including the Muslim, is the radicalism of his commitment and the consequences effected by that radicalization (Peters, 1996:7). In some instances and places, islamisation of terrorism has been a common narrative leading to some extent of criminalizing Islam (Abbas, 2007). Similar occurrences have taken place in Kenya where arrests have been made in mosques and reported to be taking part in radicalization (standard newspaper, May 27, 2016).

2.5.1 Moral reasoning

In psychology and in philosophy it is widely accepted that both justice and care or solidarity are necessary components of morality (Habermas, 1990). This study discusses the tradition interpersonal feelings including sympathy, empathy and moral feelings such as guilt or shame claimed attention as topics of Empathy (Hoffman, 2000). Research on empathy and altruism (Eisenberg, 1982; Hoffman, 2000) has provided evidence that empathy and sympathy play a role in young children's moral reasoning. In this period, the self is closely embedded in the friendship relationship (Keller, 2004).

The new sociology of morality attempts to return sociology to the deeper existential meanings that people give their actions, to the question of "the moral" (e.g., Abend

2008, 2010; Hitlin and Vaisey 2010; Smith 2003). As Abend (2008) recently argued, the sociology of morality can be seen broadly as locked between two positions, which we can think about, to use meta-ethicist philosophers' jargon, as "realist" and "skeptical." This position, at least as it is spelled out in Durkheim's earlier writings (e.g., [1893] 1984, [1902] 1964; see also Abend 2008), can be thought of as a version of "structural realism." The Durkheimian position is realist in that there is a true morality for each kind of society; it is structural in that the structure of the society defines the shape of the moral. Yet this position also has its limitations. If we substitute "morality" for "the ways in which subjects define morality," we use morality as a category of practice (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

In developing such a perspective, this article joins other projects that have similarly tried to avoid both the pitfalls of realism and the limitations of descriptive-relativism. One such position within the sociology of morality, which I will draw on below, is that forwarded by Vaisey (2009). Based on emotivism and an intuitionist-emotivist strand in the psychology of morals (see, e.g., Haidt 2001), and using insights developed by Bourdieu, Vaisey seems to sidestep the problem of definition by arguing that it isn't about what people *say* about morality (see also Mills 1940), but about emotional reactions inculcated through people's social position.

Taking such an approach to meaning into the realm of group identification, the literature dealing with boundaries (Barth 1969; for overviews, see Lamont and Moln´ar 2002; Pachuki, Pendergrass, and Lamont 2007) leads the question of morality into concerns of membership. To be moral is to be a part of the group; to be immoral is to invade these boundaries into the realm of the other.

While Bourdieu argues that within a bounded field, actors use taste and the definition of the "good" to struggle for internally defined "symbolic capital," which is often not translatable into positions in the general social arena. Within a field, actors must share an appreciation, or a desire, for what Bourdieu calls the *illusion* of the field—the "good" in the dual sense of moral and economic objects of libidinal investment (Bourdieu 2000:164–68).

Finally, everyday beliefs are often inconsistent, and you get along with these inconsistencies in part because their detection is computationally intractable and in part because you tend to rely on separate sets of beliefs in separate contexts (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, & egrenzi, 2000).

2.5.2 Social Action as an Expression of Moral Action

In broader terms, morality denotes cultural codes specifying what is right and what is wrong, good or bad, or acceptable or unacceptable in society (Turner 2010, Turner and Stets 2006). Traditionally, morality is perceived as binding people together through a common system and rules of social engagements while in groups. Therefore, morality controls and integrates members of a society and therefore elicits social solidarity among the members (Durkheim 1965).

According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2009) and Precht (2007:16), in their discussion on radicalization, they argue that while radicalization is a process the end product is ideological beliefs leading to extremism. They also argue that it is this extremist behavior that undermine the status quo and motivate the individual to participate in violence. Likewise, studies carried out in Europe show that most people recruited into terrorism are influenced by members of the group the individual associates in life.

Therefore, she views violence as a duty and a holy calling to serve God (Rosand E., et al, 2009). The narratives of the respondent can also be further explained through Abu Ghaith, one of the followers of Osama Bin Laden, who calls on the fighters to fight their enemies with material and spiritual strength that they have through their faith in God. He appreciates the impact of the Jihad, saying it had granted them victory over their enemies (Ghaith, 2001).

According to Moten (2010:40), "Islam is at the heart of the new era wave although the Sikhs have sought religious state in Punjab." Besides, Christians and Jews were not exempt. This wave is essentially characterized by religious fundamentalism, whereby brutal violence, slaughter of *infidels*, and the violation of human rights were given a sacred character by those who considered themselves to be a "true believer" (Schmid 2004b). According to Islamic scholar and prominent activist in interfaith dialogue, M. Fethullah Gülen "In Islam, killing a human is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief" (Gulen, 2004:1). He further said that according to the first Caliph (Abu Bakr) and Sultan Mehmet II (Ottoman Sultan) that according to the Quran an individual, a group of people or organization cannot declare war but the state (Gulen, 2004:2-3). Therefore, the calls for jihad have been dismissed and some VEO leaders like Osama bin Laden blamed for replacing the Islamic logic with his own feeling and desire (Gulen, 2004:3). This sentiment is clear that the teaching of Jihad is misinterpreted to suit the needs of the radicalizers and violent extremist organizations. Some studies using moral justification show that terrorists may imagine themselves as the saviors of a constituency threatened by a great evil to partake in violence and terrorism (Bandura, 1995).

2.5.3 Social Action as Means to Identify with a Group

It has been argued that living underground, terrorists gradually become divorced from reality, engaging in what Ferracuti (1982) describes as fantasy war. Basing on biographical evidence, Sageman (2004) argues that violent radicalization of Muslim youth takes place through bonds of friendship, kinship, discipleship, and other social networks. On the other hand many differences were observed between cultures, a specific variable was claimed to be key by Weinberg and Eubank (1994), who proposed that terrorism expresses itself differently in "collectivist" versus "individualist" cultures. According to this theory, in collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system, dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and linking their personal well-being to the well-being of their group, while in individualist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals. Recent studies also show that cultures which hold a strictly traditional view of gender roles and believe their life and destiny is preordained tend to display higher rates of terrorism (Aycan et al. 2000; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Research has also found that terrorism rates are higher for cultures in which deviation from the norms, beliefs and values leads to punishment (Gelfand et al 2011).

2.5.4 Social Action as a Livelihood Necessity

Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad el Sarraj (2002) observes that humiliation is an important factor motivating young suicide bombers. The notion was confirmed by Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the late political leader of Hamas, in a statement published three years before his death via targeted killing by the Israeli Defense Forces: "To die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" (Juergensmeyer 2000, 187). It has also been perceived that humiliation, either by parents in early

childhood or by political oppressors later in life, can provoke terrorism, but no quantitative research has yet explored this hypothesis (Crayton 1983; Volkan 1997; Stern 2003). Researchers contend that it is highly probable that sensation-seekers are more likely to join an organization that uses violent tactics (Chomsky, 2006).

2.6 Other Social Problems Causing Terrorism

Terrorism attacks take place in both poor and rich countries, regardless of the type of government (Bjorgo 2005). What is most likely is that any certain form of terrorism is the result of a combination of factors, including political and economic modernization, deprivation, and class structure (Bjorgo 2005). The term used in social science studies to refer to these variables are "root causes", either direct or indirect factors that help us understand various incidents of terrorism (Newman 2006). Martha Crenshaw (1985) for example, suggests that there are at least four categories of motivation among terrorists: (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward. Post (1990) elaborated further on the works of Grenshaw that terrorism is an end unto itself, independent of any stated political or ideological objectives. He argued that, "*the cause is not the cause*, the cause, as codified in the group's ideology, according to this line of reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit acts of terrorism. The central argument of this position is that, "*individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism*" (p. 35). This study therefore, discusses three categories of root causes: economic factors, political factors, and social factors.

Many scholars who research terrorism hypothesize that socioeconomic conditions as well as psychological factors help explain why terrorists act the way they do. In the current scope of terrorism and especially after the September, 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks, "national politicians and United Nations officials were quick to identify poverty, global income inequality, unemployment, and low levels of education as key causes of terrorism" (Gottlieb 38).

2.6.1 Economic Factors

The most popular theory is that poverty causes terrorism. When people are deprived of certain resources and opportunities, poverty can create resentment and cause some to turn to terrorism in order to express their outrage (Newman 2006). The problem with the poverty variable is that it can encompass a large variety of other smaller variables that all contribute to what can define someone as being impoverished. One source used a variety of factors to measure poverty including social inequality, low GDP, and low literacy or education levels (Newman 2006; Gunaratna 2004; Pedahzur, Perliger and Weinburg 2003). Other sources included other factors such as population, unemployment rates, and inflation (Akhmat, et al. 2013).

One of the difficulties with poverty as an explanation is that it can be tricky to quantify (von Hippel 2014). In the Middle East, many societies have great potential yet there are many citizens left without jobs and this causes a lower standard of living (Mohammad 2005). When social inequality develops, many people become angry because they are unable to achieve what others are easily able to, thus creating internal conflict within certain geographic areas, and making it more likely for terrorism to occur as a result (Newman 2006). Many of these studies have concluded that there is an enormous significance between poverty and incidents of terrorism.

One interesting theory is that natural disasters create opportunities for terrorism (Berrebi and Ostwald 2011). However, this is another variation of the poverty theory. Berrebi and Ostwald argue that natural disasters create strain and hardship within

societies. For example, the floods that took place in Pakistan in 2010 weakened the government and its resources, therefore creating an environment in which the Taliban and other terrorist organizations were able to operate more freely (Hasan 2010; Shakir 2010; Waraich 2010). This shows that the presence of overwhelming poverty within an area can definitely incite further activity by terrorist organizations because of the government's inability to combat it due to their resources being used elsewhere in the natural disaster relief efforts. The conclusion of the natural disaster study found that countries who had a low to middle GNP per capita were affected the most by the natural disasters that occurred, which supports the idea that poverty allows more terrorist activity to take place (Berrebi and Ostwald 2011). A final argument consistent with the poverty theory says that economic sanctions increase the chance of terrorism (Choi and Luo, 2013). Choi and Luo argue that there is no evidence available to say that poverty alone will increase the presence of terrorism, but rather that other variables need to be included. When economic sanctions are placed on a nation, the economic conditions within that nation begin to decrease drastically. Therefore, those who are already in poverty, or right on the threshold of it, are pushed over the edge further and forced to make due with even worse conditions available. People who were placed into even worse conditions than what they were already in have to find other means to support themselves, which is where terrorist organizations truly thrive in their recruiting. They are looking for those who believe that their only option is to rebel against the government because the government let them down and led them into poverty. One study found that lack of economic opportunities and economies with slow GNP growth had strong ties with numerous terrorist activities (Bueno de Mesquita 2005).

Therefore, it is more the process of going into poverty, or increasing poverty that increases the chances of terrorism happening. Tied together with this, is the concept that modernization is to blame for complicating societies to the point of vulnerability, which in turn creates poverty situations (Crenshaw, 2011). Within this category of economic variables is also unemployment, and social inequality (Laqueur 2014). These variables can combine to produce a situation that is ideal for terrorist organizations to recruit. When the people of a given area are so dissatisfied with the state of their lives, they are more likely to turn to extreme measures, or are more likely to be persuaded to do so. All of this evidence shows that at least initially, economic factors may be an extremely strong predictor of terrorism.

2.6.2 Political Factors

An alternative factor says that political factors like government repression leads to terrorism. Unstable and according to some, undemocratic societies form weak governments causing the people to suffer. Human rights abuses would also fall into this category since this is a direct result of government action, and would then be considered a form of repression (Newman 2006). Human rights violations, including dispossession and humiliation, result in people having severe grievances against the government (Newman 2006). When the government is unable to provide basic standard of living, citizens become displeased and this is when terrorist organizations are able to recruit. Studies have found that political freedom does relate to terrorism, but in a way most would not expect. Countries that are in the middle of the spectrum are the ones most likely to have incidents of terrorism (Abadie 2004). Free countries and the countries with authoritarian regimes are not the nations with the most terrorism issues. It is the transition period from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones that experience more incidents (Abadie 2004). When tested, it shows those who

are in the middle have the most attacks (Abadie 2004). Social Factors are some other possible variables that may be related to social issues. Levels of education have been mentioned in a few different studies, but there has not been much evidence to validate it as an important variable. However, it is still a good indicator of a social issue within a country and is therefore worth testing in my study. The Human Development Index included per capita income, life expectancy, and education into account in regards to terrorism, and found that there is a correlation between terrorism and human development (Schmid 2005).

2.6.3 Social Connectedness

One practice the terrorist groups adopt is perfection of their art in touting the idea that to join them, youth's identity will improve by knowing important people, hence become important. Experts observe that one of the major attractions of the youth to terrorism is the promise of belonging to a significant collective. In being connected, members tell their stories of impact and the stories can be heard in schools, in communities and on-line. In communities youth forums of communication in locality like Kenya is limited, if there is any then is informal and lacking the establishments or societies' support.

2.6.4 Grievances against Society

Most Islamic Jihadists attract the youth who experience negative emotions and approach the disillusioned to draw their attention. Many causes of terrorism throughout history target the marginalized young person with the feeling of losing nothing whatever they do. In ordinary circumstances irrespective of the background of the youth cases of misunderstanding of their interests is misinterpreted by the society or the parents creating a vacuum for the terrorist to exploit (Otiso et al., 2007).

The radicalized youth decision to transit to terrorism is aimed at addressing a grievance to the understanding that a solution to the problem will be found. Mostly the youth consider choices and go for the perceived better options. Consideration of their social status in society or the family is of concern to the extent of transforming themselves into heroes and feared. They desire to look like their peers who lead them to be radicalized. They see heroes among people who are merciless, people who shock the world by engaging in the unexpected violent actions. Such characters, belief in status of coercion to stand out as a unique and memorable persons. They believe in impressing their peers to gain a position in their lives. On the overall, the youth cuts a niche among the acquaintances by earning a position of respect. This position attaches the youth social identity which, other group members admire. Consequently, the youth earn a social status admired by other members, translating it into a social identity. This can be further explained with a case of a Kenyan youth recruited to Al Shabaab in Somalia and because of his shrewdness, he was appointed to be in charge of executions for the rebels. The researcher will also attempt to evaluate the validity of the view of the terrorist individuals interacting with other terrorists in the belief that, main means of the deviant youth becoming even more deviant is through unrestricted interaction with deviant peers (Thornberry & Krohn, 1997). This view underscores the fact that opting to be a terrorist could be further enforced by interaction with other terrorists who recognize the heroic actions by making them even more ruthless. Being a ruthless executioner in the context of a terrorist is perceived as a social power admired by other terrorists making it a major component of social identity. This study in analyzing the behavior of the radicalized youth seeks to understand their lived experiences as constructed in the context of radicalized mind and how the constructions influence their actions in the day-to-day practices.

Abdirahim Abdullahi, son of a government official in the northern Mandera County bordering Somalia, was killed in the attack after leading three other gunmen in storming the college campus in northeastern town of Garissa on April 2, 2015, killing 147 students. He was a former University of Nairobi law student, who joined the militant group Al Shabaab after graduating in 2013.

The available literature gives a detailed account on causal factors of the people joining radicalisation and, how they engage in social action or violent extremism. This study therefore is concerned with why individuals engage in violence after joining radicalisation while others from the same lived contexts and conditions desist.

2.6.5 Cases of Violence in Kenya

Kenya has suffered major violent attacks since carrying out incursions into Somalia to wage war against the Al Shabaab militants operating in the country. In 1998, Kenya alongside her neighbouring country, Tanzania that suffered a simultaneous terrorist attack on United States embassies with 220 casualties in Kenyan alone. The attacks were masterminded by Fazul Abdullah Mohamed who was then the leader of the Al Qaeda's network in East Africa.

The recent terrorist attack on Dusit D2 Hotel in Kenya on 15th January 2019 exhibited new type of violent terrorism ever witnessed in the country with a 25-year homegrown suicide bomber, Mahir Khalid Riziki blowing himself outside the hotel killing unsuspecting hotel patrons in Dusit D2 hotel. He further showed courage by reciting his prayers prior to the attack, symbolic of envisaged heavenly rewards. Prior to the attack he had been in Somalia for about five years undergoing radicalization and was reported to have been using drugs. In 2014, Riziki was reported by the police to have killed a policeman using his local gang. They also reported that he had been

assigned to assassinate security personnel at the coast prompting the police putting a bounty of two million shillings. Unlike some previous attacks being led by foreigners, the Dusit D2 attack was led by a Kenyan, Ali Salim Gichunge alias Faruk (Standard Newspaper, 22nd February 2019).

2.7 The Triggers of Violence and Terrorism

Violent extremism thrives on grievances which the perpetrators tend to respond to as a means of vengeance. However, such actions tend to be specific issues which the terrorist attacks revenge. Usually, after the attack the terrorists claim responsibility and announce the reason for the action. It is therefore apparent that such terrorist action is based on the last action that provokes their attack.

2.7.1 Anger in violence

It has been hypothesized that one of the major causes of violent extremism is anger. Aggression scholars have questioned the traditional assumption that anger causes aggression (e.g., Berkowitz 1993, Geen 2001). Anger plays several causal roles in aggression (see Berkowitz 2001). First, anger reduces inhibitions against aggressing in at least two ways. Anger sometimes provides a justification for aggressive retaliation, being part of the decision rule in the aggression script. Anger may sometimes interfere with higher-level cognitive processes, including those normally used in moral reasoning and judgment, which are part of the reappraisal process.

Secondly, anger allows a person to maintain an aggressive intention over time. It increases attention to the provoking events, increases the depth of processing of those events, and therefore improves recall of those events. Thus, anger allows one to reinstate the state that was present in the originally provoking situation. Third, anger (like other emotions) is used as an information reminder. It informs people about

causes, culpability, and possible ways of responding (e.g., retaliation). If anger is triggered in an ambiguous social situation, the anger experience itself helps resolve the ambiguities, and does so in the direction of hostile interpretations. Fourth, anger primes aggressive thoughts, scripts, and associated expressive motor behaviors. Such anger-related knowledge structures are used to interpret the situation and to provide aggressive responses to the situation. One related consequence of the many links between anger and various knowledge structures is that people frequently pay more attention to anger-related stimuli than to similar neutral stimuli (Cohen et al. 1998). Fifth, anger rejuvenates behavior by increasing arousal levels. Given that aggression-related knowledge structures are also informed by anger, aggressive behavior is one likely form of behavior that is animated by anger.

The frustration aggression (FA) hypothesis—one outcome of an interdisciplinary collaboration by political and social scientists at Yale University to better understand the violence observed in early twentieth-century Europe has often been cited, attributing the final expression of the terrorist impulse to desperation in the face of oppression (Dollard et al. 1939; Friedland 1992). Political psychologist John Chowing Davies (1973P:251) has even stated, "Violence is *always* a response to frustration" (emphasis added). The FA hypothesis is included here as a sociological theory, although the original intent of Dollard et al. (1939) was also to account for individual behavior; thus, terrorist violence of either groups or individuals might be explained by this theory. However, the application of this theory to terrorism studies has been criticized on several grounds: millions of people live in frustrating circumstances but never turn to terrorism, many terrorists do not belong to the desperate classes whose frustration they claim to be expressing, and terrorism does not uniformly appear to be

an act of last resort by those who have exhausted alternate approaches (Billig 1976; Merari and Friedland 1985; Laqueur 1987; Friedland 1992; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

2.7.2 Psychological effects of confinement

Living underground, terrorists gradually become divorced from reality, engaging in what Ferracuti (1982) has described as an *imaginary war*. The stresses caused by their underground, covert lives as terrorists may also elicit adverse social and psychological consequences on them. According to Taylor (1988:93) "mental illness may not be a particularly helpful way of conceptualizing terrorism, the acts of terrorism and membership in a terrorist organization may well have implications for the terrorist's mental health."

While Albert Bandura (1990) described four techniques of moral disengagement that a terrorist group can use to insulate itself from the human consequences of its actions including using moral justification terrorists imagine themselves as the saviors of a constituency threatened by a great evil. Secondly, terrorists portray themselves as functionaries who are merely following their leader's orders. Thirdly, is to minimize or ignore the actual suffering of the victims. As Bonnie Cordes (1987) points out, terrorists are able to insulate themselves from moral anxieties provoked by the results of their hit-and-run attacks, such as the use of time bombs, by usually not having to witness first-hand the carnage resulting from them, and by concerning themselves with the reactions of the authorities rather than with civilian casualties. Fourthly, moral disengagement described by Bandura is to dehumanize victims or, in the case of Islamist groups, to refer to them as *the infidel* while referring to themselves as *freedom fighters*.

Building on this rationalization of guilt, Guttman (1979:525) argues that "The terrorist asserts that he loves only the socially abiding qualities of his murderous act, not the act itself." By this logic, the morality of the terrorist is directed against those who oppose his violent ways, not against himself. Thus, in Guttman's analysis, the terrorist has anticipated his guilt outward. In order to absolve his own guilt, the terrorist must claim that under the circumstances he has no choice but to do what he must do. Although other options actually are open to the terrorist, Guttman believes that the liberal audience legitimizes the terrorist by accepting this rationalization of murder. In some cases Psychological damage such as trauma during childhood sometimes triggers terrorists to "see the world in a grossly unrealistic light," which ultimately pushes them to justify their extreme violence (Mahan 13).

2.7.3 Martyrdom as means of violence

The martyr narrative is compelling in that it centres on the image of an otherwise ordinary person willing to accept death and extraordinary pain (Glucklich, 2001), giving his body as well as his life, for the strength of belief (Gossman, 1997; Smith, 1997). The martyr's death must attract public attention, and the martyr must choose to die (or at least be perceived as making the choice) for a belief structure, adding legitimacy to his or her cause. While soldiers might die in battle or widows self-immolate on their husbands' funeral pyres, their deaths result from their societies' normative codes rather than being the result of a conscious choice by enemies (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]). The focus on the corpse in the face of personal sacrifice elevates the martyr's body Memory and Sacrifice (DeSoucey et al, 105) to the level of the sacred (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]), further transforming the martyr from an ordinary person into an extraordinary symbol of a social institution or cause (Hoffman, 2000), and creating revulsion towards the institutional executioners. In Catholicism, for

example, both purposes are achieved by the same physical symbol; relics of martyrs'
bodies are preserved in ornate vessels and worshipped as objects of devotion
(Boyarin, 1999; Cormack, 2002).

Freud in his work analysed behaviour as existing in people forming negative trends by
stating that:

> "one has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are present in all
> men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, trends
> and that in a great number of people these are strong enough to
> determine their behavior in human society" (Freud, 1927:7).

Atran et al (2007) explains the radicalized individual path to attainment of the sacred
values is in the devoted actor model. The model states that, the devoted actor is a
moral agent markedly different from most notions of rational agent, who is fairly
immune to material tradeoffs. In devoted actor model, the individual pursues heavenly
gift, which is sacred. Atran further reiterates that sacred values are moral necessities
that seem to drive behavior devoid of influences of any concrete or material goal.
Often, their reasons is religion based on secular values as belief in the importance of
individual morality, fairness, reciprocity and collective identity seen as sacred values.
In Islam, killing a human is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief" (Gulen,
2004:1). Therefore, according to Gulen, the teaching in the Koran on fighting Jihad is
a negation of the Koran.

2.8 Motivations to Recruitment into Terrorism

Just as there is no single brand of terrorism, Stern says, there is no singular profile of
a terrorist and no set path to extreme violence. She has learned that people are
motivated to become terrorists by reasons that may have little to do with religious and
political grievances they claim. They may be driven by fear, love, hate, idealism,

trauma, a search for identity, a craving for adventure and glamour, or by greed for money, land, and power. Some people join terrorist groups because they want to be with their friends. For others, religious extremism offers the simplicity of living in a world defined by good and evil, with no confusing middle ground. In some places where jobs are scarce, terrorism puts food on the table at home. Early on in her work, she identified perceived humiliation—either of an entire group or of an individual—as a strong risk factor.

Some young Muslims adopt radical ideas in a bid to shift the blame for their inner suffering onto the society and others around them (Reitman, 2013). For instance, teenage brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, responsible for bombings of the Boston Marathon in 2013 claimed to be motivated by extremist Islamic ideology. However, Reitman (2013) claims that the marriage breakdown of the Tsarneav brothers' parents which left the brothers abandoned in Boston without any social support contributed to their terrorist behaviour. As such, the extremist Islamic ideology provided an exit for their resentment towards the society that failed them and triggered a series of events which ultimately led to the Boston bombings. Sageman (2004) further supported this proposition that young Muslim men living in foreign countries felt estranged and lacked profitable employment, as such joining terrorist groups provided them with an escape from their anger and humiliation.

2.9 Vulnerabilities for Joining Terrorism

2.9.1 Religion

Religious fanaticism is an extreme sense of ideological zeal complemented by a focused and unrelenting set of activities that express the high dedication of one or more people to their own belief system(s). Radical religious Islamism has been identified as a root cause of terrorism. The Islamist attacks against civilians from

Glasgow to Jakarta confirm that many Islamists are ideologically determined to engage in terrorism. In the early 1950s, Hizb ut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) advocated the collapsing of Arab regimes and the formation of an Islamic state.

2.9.2 Oppression

Terrorism can be the result of groups' portrayal of governments (and their actors) as oppressive. Terrorism, then, feeds on the desire to reduce the power of opponents. In autocratic societies, military-occupied areas, or even in the international arena where political expression is limited, groups opposing the current state of affairs may engage in terrorism as a principal method of expression and not as a last resort (Horgan, 2005).

2.9.3 Historical grievances

Terrorists target governments and groups they view as responsible for historical injustices. Chechen terrorists defended their terrorist attacks by alluding to Russia's long-lasting rejections of Chechen desire for independence, and the old and cruel history of Russian invasion of Chechnya dating back to the 17th century (Schaefer, 2010).

2.9.4 Relative deprivation

Multiple scholars found a strong link between poverty and terrorism. In view of the 70% adult unemployment rate in Gaza, the GDP of less than $1,000 throughout the Palestinian Territories, the very limited economic opportunities due to the unsettled Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the cultural prominence of the male wage earner role, it is easy to allude to the possibility that relative deprivation has helped trigger Palestinian terrorism. Sageman (2004) describes how the Core Arabs (from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait) sent abroad to study by

their rich families were rejected, underemployed, and possibly discriminated against. Hence, they found themselves in a state of relative deprivation in comparison with the natives of their host countries.

It has also been proposed that economic disparities cause terrorism. This claim underlies Gurr's (1970) theory of relative deprivation—that rebellions come to be when people cannot bear the misery of their lot. As Schmid (1983) observed, Gurr's theory derives more from psychoanalysis than from empirical sociology and is conceptually born of the FA hypothesis. Irrespective of these psychiatric roots, multiple writers have claimed a sociological connection between poverty and terrorism (Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). Krueger and Maleckova's (2002) previously cited important work with Palestinians does not support a simple poverty-causes-terrorism conclusion. However, their analysis is based on socio-economic background, not on socioeconomic *prospects*.

2.9.5 Hatred toward the global economic hegemony

Countries that express hatred toward the global economic hegemony will produce more terrorist groups. The background that gave birth to Al Qaeda, namely Afghanistan and Pakistan, symbolizes this notion.

2.9.6 Financial gain

Terrorism can be used for sheer financial gain. Generally, corporate hostage taking in Central and South America, and hostage taking by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, happens more out of a desire to earn a ransom than achieving political goals. In 1987, the Iran-Contra scandal concluded with an arms-for-hostage deal, even

when the Reagan administration initially refused to negotiate with terrorists (Byrne et al., 1990).

2.9.7 Racism

Racism can be a powerful method for dehumanizing adversaries and accomplishing moral disengagement. Gottschalk and Gottschalk (2004) found that both Palestinian and Israeli terrorists draw on stereotypes and racism to dehumanize the other group.

2.9.8 Guilt by association

For terrorists, you are the company that you keep. For example, the 2004 Madrid train bombings were executed by an Al Qaeda–inspired terrorist cell. One of the motives was Spain's involvement in the Iraq War, where the country had troops (Wright (2015).

2.9.9 Supporting sympathizers

Because terrorism is the weapon of the oppressed, an important goal is to push the stronger power (e.g., U.S.) into unleashing against the terrorists' perceived support base. Such acts of retaliation, cruelty, and counterterrorism often turn the stronger power into a support for sympathizers, like a recruiting driver for the terrorist cause. For example, a chief Al Qaeda objective would have been to trigger U.S. retaliation so that the U.S. was seen as violently repressive (Berger, 2018).

2.9.10 Mortality salience

Mortality salience refers to anxiety over one's own death. Research by Pyszczynski et al (2006) examined the effect of mortality salience on Iranian and U.S. students and their respective espousal of martyrdom (terrorism) or extreme military intervention (counterterrorism). When Iranian students answered questions about their own demise, they rated the student who advocated martyrdom as higher than the student

who opposed it. However, among politically conservative U.S. students, mortality salience increased advocacy for extreme military interventions by U.S. forces.

2.9.11 Narcissism

People with certain narcissistic dispositions are more prone to committing terrorist acts. Suellwold (1981) observed a high percentage of angry paranoids among members of the Baader-Meinhof Group, a German terrorist group active from the 1970s to the 1990s. A common characteristic among many of these terrorists is a propensity to externalize—to look for outside sources to blame for personal inadequacies. Without being bluntly paranoid, terrorists over-rely on the ego defense of projection. Crayton (1983), Eric Shaw (1986), and Pearlstein (1991), and others have invoked Kohut's *self-psychology* to explain the sequence that drives young people to terrorism. Psychoanalyst Heniz Kohut (1972, 1978; see also Wallerstein 1995; Gabbard 2000) developed self-psychology as a departure from the classical ego psychology of Freud. Self-psychology emphasizes the needs that an infant has for caring responses to develop normally. Failure of maternal empathy leads to damage to the self-image—so called narcissistic injury—that arrests development in one of two ways: persistent infantile grandiose fantasies or failure to internalize the idealized image of the parent. Either problem prevents the development of adult identity and morality. Crayton, for example, proposed that political experience, such as the humiliation of subordination, might produce an adult narcissistic injury that might reawaken the psychological trait of infantile narcissism. The result might be a pathological exaltation of self (the genesis of the leader), the abandonment of independence to merge with the archaic omnipotent figure (the genesis of the follower), or a combination of these impulses, as seen in the egotistical yearning for glory under the mask of selflessness. Both forms of infantile retreat are hypothesized

to mobilize the expression of the desire to destroy the source of the injury (i.e., narcissistic rage). This rage is, against the damaged self, projected onto the target of the terrorist's animus, as if the target were the source of the intolerable feelings the terrorist has about himself (Crayton 1983; Akhtar 1999). Similarly, individuals suffering from paranoia grown up with a damaged self-concept idealizes the good self and splits out the bad self in form of violence against the perceived aggressor (Robins and Post 1997, 146).

2.9.12 Sensation-seeking

Another variable suggested as a reason for being drawn to the path of terrorism is sensation-seeking. Here, sensation-seeking denotes the inherent risk and excitement that a terrorist career may provide. Researchers contend that it is highly plausible that sensation-seekers are more likely to join an organization that uses violent tactics (Chomsky, 2006).

2.9.13 Communication and publicity

 In essence, by killing adversaries or innocent civilians, terrorists seek to publicize their cause, communicate demands, air grievances to bulldoze authorities, sway the public policy agenda, or gain concessions (Jowett et al, 2006). Communication as a means of making public the terrorist attacks or expose the weakness of the adversary is used a tool to attack their targets. By so doing, the VEO gain support through financial support or recruitment to support their movement.

2.9.14 Women motivation for joining Terrorism

Galvin (1983) acknowledges that a common entry into terrorism for female terrorists is through political involvement and belief in a political reason. The Intifada for instance, radicalized many young Palestinians, who later joined terrorist

organizations. At least half of the Intifada protesters were young girls, some recruited into terrorist organizations by boyfriends. A significant feature that Galvin feels may characterize the involvement of the female terrorist is the "male or female lover/female accomplice ... scenario." The lover, a member of the terrorist group, recruits the female into the group. One ETA female member, "Begona," told Eileen MacDonald (1992) that was how she joined at age 25: "I got involved in ETA because a man I knew was a member."

2.10 Knowledge Gaps

Arising from the literature in this study all the stakeholders (state, civil society and scholars) recognizing that Radicalisation and terrorism is a global threat. However, the understanding of the threat varies from different perspectives by different actors. The point of divergent among them is the way they define the problem and the approaches of counter terrorism and counter radicalisation respectively. The studies in the literature mainly focus on the communities, groups, violent extremist groups, and their ideologies, meaning they focused on macro factors influencing the threat. The literature therefore did not focus on the individual (Micro) due to constraints of tracing the radicalized people for interview based on their secretive nature and sensitive nature of terrorism. This study therefore focuses on the Micro factors of joining Radicalisation by looking at the individual and the contextual influences.

2.11 Theoretical Framework

The study used two theories to explain the lived experiences of the radicalized individuals and terrorism in Kenya: Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) and social construction theories. The use of the two theories was necessary because, while the IPA analysis was used to analyze and interpret the lived experiences of the respondents, the social construction theory complemented in the understanding of the

processes involved by the individual to construct the self and the meaning formation as a radical and consequently participate or desist from participating in violence and terrorism.

2.11.1 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)

Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) has theoretical origins in Phenomenology by Edmund Husserl et al (1938). Smith et al (2009) further developed IPA's theoretical foundations and empirical practices for study of Psychology and philosophy in conducting qualitative research. IPA's theoretical underpinnings stem from phenomenology which originated with Husserl's attempts to construct a philosophical science of consciousness, with hermeneutics (the theory of interpretation), and with symbolic-interactionism.

IPA is strongly influenced by phenomenology. Phenomenology as a philosophy was developed by Husserl and later extended by philosophers such as Heidegger and Gadamer. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology focuses on the 'life world' of an individual and regards experience as the fundamental source of knowledge (Dowling 2007). It argues that the 'essence' of a phenomenon can be understood by revisiting a person's immediate conscious experience of it prior to any reflections or explanations being imposed.

Phenomenology concerns itself with a conscious experience from the subjective or first person point of view. It studies the structure of various types of experiences, ranging from perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action and social activity. Phenomenology is thus a philosophy of facticity, which investigates the world and human existence. It seeks to reflect on the conditions of possibility of experience and cognition and advocates a

life-world, insisting that since man is in the world, he only knows himself by means of inhabiting the world.

Phenomenology is thus concerned with the way we experience things and the meanings things have on our experience. The philosophy holds that the subject does not have a monopoly either on itself- understanding or on its understanding of the world, maintaining that these are aspects of the self and of the world that only become accessible and available through the other, Merleau-Ponty (1962). For phenomenologist, subjectivity is embodied in the social historical and natural contexts, so that existence is not simply a question of how the subject apprehends itself, but also how others apprehend it. It investigates the domain of ignored obviousness that impedes the subject's reflection of the world. It is a perpetual meditation, a critical self-reflection that does not take anything for granted. It is concerned with the production of meaning. It defines meaning as the individual signification of experience and interprets experience as a quest for meaning.

Although IPA is clearly influenced by Husserlian phenomenology in its aim of understanding the individual's experience, it does not seek to bracket the researcher's values and beliefs; instead, it views these as necessary in understanding and making sense of the person's experiences (Shaw 2001).

Another influence on IPA is Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology seen through the emphasis placed on interpretation and the role of both participant and researcher in a dynamic research process. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger emphasized that there is always an element of personal engagement that arises from being 'thrown into the world', where some events, objects and experiences have more meaning and purpose

than others, and that these form the basis for interpreting and making sense of our experiences (Wilding and Whiteford 2005).

IPA acknowledges that it is not possible to have direct access into someone's 'life world' because this is influenced by the researcher's own experiences, values and pre-understandings, which are considered necessary in interpreting and making sense of an individual's experiences. Smith and Osborn (2008:53) referred to this dual process as a double hermeneutic, whereby 'the participants are trying to make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world'. It is this emphasis on interpretation that moves the IPA researcher away from simply describing the individual's experience towards an understanding of the phenomenon that is context specific and inclusive of both the individual and the researcher.

The meanings an individual ascribes to events are of central concern but are only accessible through an interpretative process (Smith, Jarman and Osborn, 1999). Human beings are not passive perceivers of an objective reality, but rather they interpret and understand their world by formulating their own biographical stories into a form that makes sense to them.

IPA is therefore an inductive approach concerned with understanding an individual's personal account of a particular experience or phenomenon, rather than trying to find causal explanations for events or produce objective 'facts' (Smith and Osborn 2008). The aim of IPA is to explore in detail the processes through which participants make sense of their own experiences, by looking at the respondent's account of the processes they have been through and seeking to utilize an assumed existing universal inclination towards self-reflection (Chapman & Smith, 2002; Smith *et al,* 1997).

Thus, IPA research has tended to focus on the exploration of participants' experiences, understandings, perceptions and views (Brocki, and Wearden, A 2006). The participants do self-reflection, and interpret their experiences into some form that is understandable to them. IPA thus explores how people ascribe meaning to their experiences in their interactions with the environment (Smith, Jarman and Osborn, 1999).

For a researcher to understand a particular phenomenon affecting people and why they react to it the way they do, he or she has to understand that phenomena from the point of view of the participants. IPA thus offers the researcher the opportunity to develop an idiographic understanding of participants, and what it means to them, within their social reality, to live with a particular condition or be in a particular situation (Bryman, 1988). It thus facilitates an understanding of the complexity of bio-psycho-social phenomena. (Boyle, 1991). In IPA, a researcher tries to empathize with the participants' situation as much as possible, but acknowledges that access depends on and is complicated by the researcher's own conceptions required in order to make sense of that other personal world through a process of interpretative activity (Smith, Jarman & Osborn, 1999).

A researcher tries to get close to the participant's personal world or, (to take an insider's perspective according to Conrad's 1987), but this is almost impossible because of the researcher's own conceptions. Therefore, for the researcher to understand the personal world of the participant, he/she must undergo the process of interpretation. Thus, the participants are trying to make sense of their world through interpretation, and the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world, also through interpretation. IPA is therefore suitable for this study because it enables the Researcher make meaning of people's understanding

about being radicalized, their experiences of being radicalized and how these meanings influence their action towards terrorism.

2.11.2 Social construction theory

The term formally entered the sociological vocabulary through Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966), which attempts an innovative synthesis of the ideas of Émile Durkheim and George Herbert Mead. For Berger and Luckmann, the basic features of social order are captured in the principle that 'Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product'.

Social constructionism is rooted in "symbolic interactionism" and "phenomenology whose proponents were Berger and Luckmann's, *The Social Construction of Reality* published in 1966. The theory is concerned with individuals and groups participating in the construction of their perceived social reality in the ways their social phenomena are developed, institutionalized, known, and made into tradition by humans. Therefore, social construct or construction is concerned with meaning, notion, or connotation placed on an object or event by a society, and adopted by the inhabitants of that society with respect to how they view or deal with the object or event. In that respect, a social construct as an idea would be widely accepted as natural by the society. In the study of the lived experiences of the radicalized individuals and terrorism in Kenya, the theory looks at how the individuals construct themselves in their lived contexts. In understanding of their meaning formation, the theory guides the study to relate the society and cultural influences on the individual by identifying other factors to construct the individual. Therefore the theory is helpful in the identification of the meaning formation of the influences of the individual to undergo such constructs.

2.12 Conclusion

Radicalization for terrorism has grown from a domestic concern to a global crisis facing the entire mankind. The religious instigated terrorism in this era has taken the center stake with recruitment of mostly youth into violent extremism. Terrorism has not only affected the poor countries but is also a major threat to the developed world. This has attracted the interest of intergovernmental organizations among them the United Nations which has injected colossal amount of funds for interventions. Terrorism is visibly transforming from the traditional view of organized crime to a global warfare. This is due to the involvement of the conventional instruments of state warfare being engaged to quell terrorism. The focus on the terrorism structural factors rather than individual transformation leaves the stakeholders pursuing different goals of addressing terrorism. This study therefore is interested in the social dynamics influencing individual behavioral traits to harmonize their actions with the interventions. The next chapter therefore focuses on the methods used to engage the radicalized individuals in an exhaustive discussion to evaluate their meaning formations, contextual influences on their behavior and the driving factors to participate in violence.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The choice of a particular method for social research depends *inter alia* on the nature of the research problem, the data needed and political factors such as institutional and legal practices guiding research in a particular context. These issues determine who to study, how to study and which knowledge to use. In particular, this chapter explores the methodological processes and practices, which guided this study on the lived experiences of radicalized people and its implication on violence and terrorism. The research methodology used in this study was influenced by social construction ontology and interpretative phenomenological approach.

3.2 Research Site

This study was conducted in six (6) purposively selected prisons in Kenya, namely: Kamiti, Langata women, Shimo La Tewa men, Shimo La Tewa women, Naivasha and Manyani prisons. The rationale of selecting these prisons is for the reason that these are the only prisons in Kenya holding people who have been legally convicted or suspected of terrorism or radicalization in Kenya. The six (6) prisons holding the Terrorism convicts are also classified as Maximum Security prisons, meaning that they have the facilities to hold prisoners convicted for capital offences like Terrorism.

3.3 Research Design

This study aimed at understanding the lived experiences of radicalized people and its implication on violence and terrorism. To attain this, the study focused on understanding how radicalized individuals make social meanings of themselves, how certain contextual factors (social, cultural, economic and political) influence their social meanings (sense) formation of themselves (as radicals) and how these social

meanings of themselves was influenced by the stated. In reference to the literature review of this study, it is clear that the research topic on radicalization and terrorism was sensitive and dynamic. Therefore, a qualitative research method was more suitable than a quantitative method that curtails understanding of narratives, opinions and motivations affecting behavior (Creswell, 2013). This fact is further reinforced by Young and Findley (2011) by inferring that when a phenomenon like terrorism is not well defined or understood, a qualitative study is more suitable. The study also aimed at examining how the social meanings of themselves influenced their social action to violence and terrorism. This study therefore directly interviewed those who had legally been constructed as radicalized and were serving jail terms in the purposively selected prisons.

The main aim of this study was to have in-depth understanding on how radicalized individuals socially constructed themselves and how this construction influenced their social action to terrorism/ violence. In this regard, generalization of the study findings was thus secondary. As a consequence this study adopted a qualitative research design in order to have a detailed description and context dependent interpretation of all data collected on the lived experiences of radicalized people.

3.4 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for this study was an individual who had been legally convicted of terrorism related offenses and was serving a jail term.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Researchers (see Lee, 1993; McCosker & Gerber, 2001; Faugier & Sargeant, 1997) agree that sampling is quite challenging when the research topic is sensitive and/or controversial, as prospective participants will be more inclined to hide their

sentiments, or confuse their sentiments or simply refuse to participate in the research. Therefore, selection of research participants for any study, as was observed in this study, is usually influenced by the sensitive nature of the study. This was further influenced by the site for collecting the data. In the case of this study, it was on the sensitive subject of Terrorism, and the site for collecting data was various prisons (Maximum security prisons) spread across the country in which prisoners of capital offences (this includes Terrorism) were imprisoned. The sensitive nature arises from the fact that Radicalization or Terrorism has been outlawed by the Kenya penal code and those suspected or convicted of it are severely punished. The people involved in radicalization and terrorism also operate clandestinely, making it difficult to identify them for interview. This further meant that the research participants were themselves at risk by participating in this study. In addition, the site of research, legally classified as security protected areas prescribed stringent protocol to access. This makes the study particularly difficult in its execution. The only positive thing, if one can call it, is that since this was a qualitative study, one then had to rely on small samples. Fortunately (or perhaps unfortunately, depending on how one looks at it), those currently charged with terrorism related crimes are still few in number in Kenyan jails.

Since this study was qualitative in nature, it was thus more concerned with in depth understanding of the phenomena under study than making generalization for which quantitative studies are renowned for. In qualitative studies, the researcher is interested more in the richness of data, and in the depth of the data collected. Further, in qualitative studies, it is important to take into account the diversities that exist within the study population especially when one is deciding on the sample size (Schroder et al, 2003 and Smith et al, 2003). However, in this study diversities of

research participants did not form a major consideration in determining the sample size, for as earlier stated, those currently convicted of terrorism related crimes were few in number in the Kenyan jails. For this reason, the study adopted the census approach in sampling research participants. In this case, the researcher sought to collect data from all those who had been legally convicted as radical/ terrorists in purposively selected prisons because of their limited number (only twenty individuals were serving jail terms on terrorism related crimes). The eventual sample size was therefore to be determined at the end of the study. In the end, all the twenty individuals agreed to be interviewed, thus making the sample size for this study to stand at twenty.

It may be beneficial here to state how the sampling was managed. To begin with, to access and interview the participants, permission was first sought in advance from Prison authorities. Once at the respective Prisons, the researcher sought clearance from the respective prison commanders and thereafter allowed to meet with the respondents. In all the respective prisons, all the respondents were first collectively presented to the researcher to enable him address all of them as a group and seek for their collective approval to interview them individually. This was important because it saved time on explaining the purpose of the study to each respondent separately, explain to them the necessity of participating in the study and by so doing ensure respondent confidence as the study was free and flexible. The respondents were particularly weary of being interviewed clandestinely by the security forces posing as researchers. The researcher explained to the individuals the purpose of the research and informed them of their role in the research. After this introduction, each individual participant was allowed to meet the researcher and it was during this session that the researcher sought verbal consent from the participant to be

interviewed. It was only after this consent was received that the researcher proceeded to interview the participant. Should a participant decline, and indeed one did decline, then he/she was passed over and the next participant was called in. Of note, however, is that the said participant who initially declined later on his own volition agreed to be interviewed after realizing that there was no harm in participating from other participants.

Although only twenty people had been imprisoned in Kenya for terrorism related crimes, many more were in remand prisons awaiting trial. It was not possible to interview this second category for the simple reason that their cases were yet to be determined and interviewing them could raise litigation issues. This means they had not been legally labelled as terrorist convicts and therefore did not meet the selection criteria for this study. In any case, should the remandees be interviewed, they could very well in future appeal their cases citing the interview as the grounds through which their conviction was based, as per the law as clandestinely collecting evidence from unsuspecting remandees is outlawed under the Kenyan Evidence Act (CAP 80 LK). The action to interview such respond may attract litigation construed as clandestinely collecting evidence against the suspects of terrorism.

In addition, the fact that this study uses social construction ontology, in analyzing the findings of those legally convicted of radicalization may have a different definition as per their social network, it therefore demanded of the study to only pick those who had already been legally defined as terrorist, and then compare this with how they themselves socially construct themselves against this legal definition. The sampling process proved successful in all the prisons that the researcher visited, thus enabling him to interview all the convicted twenty legally defined terrorists. Section 3.6 below describes the actual sampling procedure that was used.

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

The focus of this study was to investigate the lived experiences of radicalized individuals and its implication on violence and terrorism. Therefore, the study sought to understand how people legally convicted of radicalization and terrorism make meaning of themselves, their social meanings formation in their contextual contexts and how these social definitions/meanings of themselves as radicals influence their actions to violence and terrorism. These actions therefore called for in depth understanding and not for generalization. Consequently, this study relied on qualitative research methods for data collection because these allowed the researcher to go into the depth of the participant's experiences, social processes and discourses (Mason, 2002).

The study therefore used several qualitative methods to collect data. The methods used were in-depth interviews (with its accompanying in-depth interview guide—see appendix 1) and key informant interviews (with its accompanying key informant interview guide—see Appendix II). According to (Whiting, 2008), in-depth semi-structured interviews allow the interviewees to express their opinions, interests and feelings. The responses generated from structured interviews lack detail as they rely on the use of closed-end questions which produces quantitative data, thereby limiting our understanding of why individuals act in a certain way. In contrast, a semi-structured interview enables the conversation to flow and gives the interviewer liberty to explore views and opinions in more detail than a questionnaire or structured interview (Bryman, 2008).

Further, it has been widely agreed by researchers that semi-structured interviews are the most suitable method when trying to get a deeper understanding of participants' views, opinions and experiences (Denscombe, 2007). They also possess better validity

as interviewees have the freedom to elaborate on their responses, clarify any uncertainties and steer the direction of the interview (McLeod, 2014).

Suffice to add, this study was carried from the ontological position which suggest that people's knowledge and experiences are best understood and interpreted through interactional process involving the researcher and the researched in a particular context. Subsequently, this study used in depth conversational interviews to generate knowledge. In this context the researcher interacted with research participants in a two way process whereby not only the researcher ask questions about their lived experiences but also allowed them to ask questions as a way of sharing life experiences (Merrill, 1999). By doing so, the researcher ensured equal power relationship with research participants in the generation of knowledge.

In depth conversational interviews was guided by broad guiding themes. These themes helped in creating a conducive environment for research participants to talk about their lived experiences in relation to radicalization and at the same time kept them on track on the main issues of the study.

Data from in depth conversational interviews were recorded by note taking. The decision on the method of data recording was solely determined by the research participant consent. All the respondents interviewed consented on condition that they were not tape-recorded. The other method that was adopted was Key informants' interviews. Based on their social roles in counter-terrorism, 12 key informants were selected and interviewed. The Key informants were identified and purposively selected and after the interview they were requested to introduce people doing similar work of interventions in Radicalizations and terrorism for interview. This means the method used in selecting key informants was through snowballing method. The

researcher therefore selected and interviewed 12 key informants from the following organizations: 2 officials from National counter-terrorism Centre (NCTC), 2 Prison officials, 2 counter terrorism Researchers (CT Researchers), 2 Muslim religious leaders, 2 Christian religious leaders and 2 Officials of Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These key informants were deemed to have specialized information about radicalization and terrorism because of their positions and roles in counter-terrorism (Corgin et al. 1998; Glaser et al. 1967).

3.7 Negotiating Access and Consent to the Research Participants

As stated above, the respondents in this study were prison convicts for offences related to terrorism. In Kenya, such convicts are confined in prisons classified as maximum security prisons where the respondents for this study were traced. To gain access to prisons, one therefore had to get permission from the courts or prisons headquarters in case of research. Therefore, the journey of the researcher started at the Prisons Headquarters at Magereza House in Nairobi.

At the headquarters, the researcher equipped with letters of authorization from Moi University and NACOSTI to carry out research on the stipulated topic, began with the reception desk where information on who could assist in facilitating research in prisons would be found. He was informed that only the commissioner general of prisons had the authority to allow research in prisons subject to prisons regulations and Kenyan laws. The researcher therefore was allowed to talk to the secretary of the Commissioner General who said that the Commissioner General was committed and could only arrange a meeting at a later date after perusing the researcher's proposal and the relevant research permits. Therefore, the researcher furnished copies of the required documents to the secretary and left her a contact in case an appointment for meeting with the Commissioner General was secured.

After about one week, the secretary called the researcher to meet the Commissioner General and gave the appointment and time. On the appointed date, the researcher availed himself but was again not allowed to meet the Commissioner General since he was committed with official engagements. Luckily, he referred the researcher to his deputy who was also the Director of operations in Kenyan Prisons to address the issue. While at his office, other senior officers were called in to join the director to understand the motive of wanting to interview the terrorism convicts. In the process the researcher was asked to explain his background and state the reasons of wanting to talk to the terrorism convicts. At the end of the discussion the researcher was asked to write a request to the prison authorities for consideration if he will be allowed to access the prison convicts of such sensitive crimes. Again, the researcher was told to wait for feedback from the prison authorities.

The following day the researcher was asked to report to prison headquarters again. On arrival the Director took the researcher through the regulations governing access to prison facilities and the conduct of visitors meeting with prison convicts. The researcher was warned that the prison convicts could be dangerous and may decline to talk as has been previously experienced by people visiting them. He announced that the researcher had been cleared to visit the facilities subject to clearance by the respective officers in charge of the prisons to be visited. Finally, the researcher was given the letter of authorization and told to adhere to the dates and time while visiting the prison facilities and was requested to furnish a copy of the research report to the prisons library on completion of the study.

Based on the interview schedule with the convicts, the researcher visited the first prison, and managed to meet the officer in charge. After perusing the documents and the authorizations to interview the terrorism convicts, he called the Commissioner

General to confirm whether the letter was authentic. Once cleared by headquarters, he explained how difficult it was interviewing the terrorism inmates because the last time a female student tried, she was unsuccessful. However, he conceded that he will allow the researcher to come the following day to meet the convicts. The following day, the researcher arrived early enough before the officer in charge, but shortly he entered a meeting which took him long to complete. Luckily among the participants of the meeting was one lecturer known to the researcher who prevailed upon the officer in charge to allow the researcher to carry out the study as the lecturer was aware that he was supposed to be doing research in Kenyan prisons. That intervention triggered some activity, prompting the officer in charge to summon the welfare officer to usher the researcher in the prison. However, he was cautioned not to try to persuade the prisoners to talk to the researcher but he should be allowed to *break the ice* himself. Before entering the Prison blocks housing the terrorism inmates, the researcher was asked to surrender his mobile phone, and any metallic objects to the officer manning the reception. He was only allowed in with questionnaires, a note book and a pen. He also warned the researcher against requesting respondents to be taped because previous requests had let to failed interviews even with human rights activists.

The welfare officer before meeting the respondents, sought to arrange a room where the respondents will meet with the researcher. In the room, there were communication gadgets and other electronic equipment, which the researcher thought would distract the interview. Therefore, the researcher requested if the meeting could be held in the open to ensure freedom of the respondent and he conceded. He also asked whether he will seek consent from each individual respondent or he avails them to the researcher to address them as a group. Due to constraint of time allocated to interview the respondents, the researcher opted for the respondents to be explained the details of the

research in a group and then seek consent if they can participate. At this point, all the terrorism convicts were invited and they assembled under a tree where the researcher had been given a seat. On arrival, the researcher in a move to develop rapport with the respondents, took the initiative of shaking hands with each one of them. The initiative seems to have got a positive approval from the convicts. The researcher further requested if they can be allowed to bring chairs for themselves so that they can be addressed while seated and the welfare officer accepted. This further made them freer to interact with the researcher. Once settled in their seats, in the presence of the welfare officer and other two prison warders, the researcher explained to them the gist of the research. The researcher emphasized that he was only interested in the lived experiences but not what made them to be convicted and that they were at liberty not to say anything they think is not necessary. After the explanation, they requested to look at the questionnaire which was availed to them and they unanimously accepted to participate in the interview.

During the interview, some of the respondents said that some security people pose as researchers only to get more evidence against them. They said the type of questions asked by investigators and researchers are different. They said that during the interview they try to disclose information which may be of interest to police and gauge the interest of the researcher to distinguish him from security investigators. They also claimed that a female student visited them with tapping gadgets and they refused to give her audience.

Therefore, the method used in the first prison was replicated in other prisons in interviewing the respondents. However, in Naivasha prison one prisoner declined to be interviewed, but on realizing that other respondents were positive about the

interview, he reconsidered his decision and was interviewed. In some instances, some respondents after consenting to be interviewed were overwhelmed over some issues of discussion and turned violent. For instance, one female respondent got agitated in the course of the interview and shouted that she hated men when an issue about her former husband came up in the discussion. This forced the interview to be discontinued. This means consent may be distracted with some emotive discussion to the respondent.

3.8 Data Analysis

The narratives from in-depth conversational interviews formed a large corpus of data analysis. These narratives were taken as discourses that not only transferred information on the lived experiences of radicalized people but how they make social meaning of themselves, how the contextual factors influence social meaning formation about themselves and how their social meanings influence action of violence and terrorism.

The written narratives from in-depth conversational and Key informant interviews was first transcribed verbatim to ensure that all the emerging issues are captured during analysis. Individual transcripts were read and read again, several times over, to identify key themes, which were then noted. Similar themes, together with their supporting verbal quotes, from all interviews were grouped together to facilitate easier analyses.

In order to understand the lived experiences of the respondents, narratives obtained from interviews were analyzed using hermeneutics methodological framework. In this case, individual parts were examined in relation to the whole and relating one research participant's lived experiences about radicalization to the study objectives. In

addition, these lived experiences were examined in relation to social meanings formation and action of violence and terrorism. Further, the analysis used Ricouer's (1980) notion of "symbolic senses" to examine symbolic use of language and the common metaphors that research participants used in reference to their lived experience with radicalization. In doing all these, the themes that emerged consistently in most interviews were noted, and in so doing, the unique themes were identified. After this, all these themes with their corresponding verbatim quotes were categorized and used to discuss the lived experiences of radicalized individuals. IPA was used to analyze the narratives. During the interview of respondents the researcher analyzed and interpreted the narratives by attaching meaning to the narratives of the respondents. In using IPA one collects data, analyses and interprets as the conversation is ongoing (see section 2.7.1 of literature review).

3.9 Trustworthiness of Data

While designing the research, issues of trustworthiness (otherwise referred to as validity and reliability in quantitative) was considered since the study findings could only be adjudged as good if they conform to characteristics of trustworthiness. According to Leung (2015:324-327), in qualitative research, trustworthiness means appropriateness of the tools, processes and data. This means the trustworthiness must address; appropriate choice of methodology, relevant research design, appropriate sampling and data analysis, results and conclusions relevant to the context. The design in this study therefore focused on the narratives of the participants based on the objectives of the study. It further guided the study to derive the narratives from the findings, which were consequently analyzed and interpreted according to themes emerging from the context of the study (LaBanca, 2010). By analyzing the data, the

literature review was used to compare with the current findings to arrive at logical inferences.

To ensure trustworthiness in the study, the researcher used the findings obtained through interviews with existing data to better understand the problem under study by comparing with the emerging facts. This fact support findings by Maree (2011) that trustworthiness was achieved through triangulation of methods (in this case the use of in-depth interview, Key informant interview and document review) and comparing findings with the emerging facts. The triangulation in this case assists the researcher to see the reality of the problem in the study by identifying the similarities and emerging issues. In this case, the study will be dependable because the findings derived from the study answer the research questions by yielding results appropriate to the study.

The researcher further ensured that the research design ensures credible results from the study findings. To achieve this, the study focused on the application of the research tools, creation of rapport with the participants and using the findings from the participants to get more findings from the consequent participants within the same study site and other sites in the study. The researcher's technique conforms to study findings by Shenton (2004), who defines credibility as use and application of relevant research instruments, familiarization with cultures of participants, using complementary research methods, comparing findings from participants in different research sites and economic environments respectively.

Finally, this study adopted the use of appropriate analytical tool. The researcher used IPA which allowed the respondents to explain their own life experiences and at the same time the research was interpreting their understanding of themselves. This

enabled the researcher to seek deeper understanding on how the respondents thought of themselves. At the same time, the researcher administered the interview guide during the discussion. The use of this analytical tool therefore complemented the findings which yielded a rich and credible account of the study findings (Blanche et al, 2006).

3.10 Ethical Considerations

Considering the sensitive nature of the study, the researcher took precautions to uphold the confidence of the participants by avoiding questions or clarifications that could otherwise incriminate them. Some of the ethical issues that were anticipated to emerge included; eliciting negative memories in their lives, questioning them on their culpabilities and negative labeling.

Before the start of the interviews, verbal consent to participate in the study was obtained from participants after they were briefed about the study and given the opportunity to ask questions. They were given the right to withdraw at any point prior or during the study without giving a reason. The participants were given pseudonyms to conceal their identity. The researcher also avoided any information that could expose the identity of the participants for their security and that of the researcher. The research topic of terrorism was sensitive therefore, it was essential to safeguard participants from psychological embarrassment by being sensitive to their reactions to questions posed to each individual.

3.11 Problems Experienced in the Field

Research on terrorism is a sensitive area of study, which exposes the researcher to both security and psychological challenges while planning to venture into the study during the interviews of the participants and even when writing the report. The

logistics involved in securing permission exerts anxiety and stress on the researcher as most of the officials involved in the processing exhibited pessimism in securing an interview with the respondents who were also terrorism convicts. Equipped with all the research permits, the researcher faced challenges of access to the first research site (Kamiti maximum security prisons). The researcher first faced thorough body and vehicular searches at the entrance. Once inside the prison compound, permission to enter the offices was communicated through an aperture at the door. To access the offices some further searches were carried out on the researcher before being allowed into the office of the officer in charge of the prison. Granting of permission to meet the respondents was also a hard task because despite having a written authority, a confirmation had to be made at the Prison headquarters. The first day was not possible, so the researcher had to try the second day to meet the respondents. The researcher experienced similar processes in all the six prisons visited in the course of the study.

After securing permission to interview the respondents, the researcher faced challenges in interviewing the respondents, as they were suspicious despite being shown documents and permits to carry out the study. In all the cases, the first respondent in all the sites were cautious in the answering of the questions. Meanwhile, once they gained confidence they were free and felt that it was a session for easing off their frustrations while in prison. Evidently, the subsequent respondents appeared more relaxed, an indication that showed that the first respondent alerted other respondents that all was well. This therefore showed that in interviewing respondents of sensitive nature, caution needed to be taken especially the first respondent who volunteers to be interviewed. The researcher's assumption is based on

the reactions of the subsequent respondents who positively responded to the interview after the first successful interview.

The researcher also learnt in the course of the encounter with the respondents that most of the respondents liked digressing on the interview especially on an area of interest to their lives to allow them to build rapport with the researcher. In some instances, serious discussions could derail the interview unless the researcher understands the reaction of the respondent and acts fast to shift to a friendlier question. Such emotive questions could be revisited later, may be at the end of the interview. Some distraction to the study was the presence of prison warders during the interviews, however, in some instances the discussion could attract their attention to laugh or smile thereby encouraging the discussion. The researcher also realized that most respondents reacted negatively whenever one noted down anything that sounded sensitive. This fact proved to the researcher the warning by the authorities that the respondents by mere intention of taping them would not be free in their interviews.

The researcher realized that some respondents were more heavily guarded during the interview by the prison warders a move that caused concerns of security during the interview. The researcher during the discussion with some respondents became apprehensive as they stressed their prowess in meting out violence, thus wanting deliberately to scare the researcher. Apparently, all the respondents expressed natural humor, expression of positive affection for their families and respect as opposed to the earlier perception of the researcher meeting violent and inhumane people. More importantly, they respected academics and felt privileged to be involved in the discussion of the study.

3.12 Conclusion

The designing of the research for a sensitive study by the researcher was faced with the uncertainty of the characteristics of the participants. This was compounded by the study sites where the prison authorities kept a close watch during the interview for security. For a start, the research grapples with creating rapport with the respondents to ensure the study succeeds. In this study, sampling of respondents was tricky considering the small sample size but the researcher faced uncertainty on the response of the participants. While preparing for such a sensitive study, one needed guidance of observation and innovativeness to sustain the interview. One may need to be tactical to understand the respondent especially in cases where taping of the interviews is disallowed. This means the essence of the design is in the practicability of the researcher that yielded the desired data. Finally, embracing of flexibility in the discussion was necessary to sustain rapport with the participants or else the discussion could be derailed. The next two chapters present the results of this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

NAVIGATING THE PATH TO RADICALISM: INDIVIDUAL

REFLECTIONS ON LIVED EXPERIENCES

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses how radicalized individuals socially define themselves. While acknowledging that radicalization is a security threat with devastating social, economic and political consequences, its legal definition does not take into account the lived experiences of those legally defined as radicals. Further, such legal definition does not show the causal mechanism that would explain why some individuals become radicalized (while others do not). Therefore, this chapter discusses how those who were legally defined as terrorists define themselves away from legalism. In particular, this chapter discusses how everyday experiences lived in specific social, economic and political contexts influences the self-definition of those legally constructed as radicals.

In presenting the above, this chapter first looks at the biographical data of the respondents in the study. This aims at understanding the various characteristics that describe the respondents. This characterization is then, later linked to the lived contexts of the respondents. The study thereafter explores the lived contexts of the respondents and how it impacts on their decision to be radicalized. The lived contexts therefore are discussed alongside the individual biographic data to better understand how the different contexts influence the behavior of the respondents.

In discussing the meaning formation and the contextual factors, the various narratives were studied and emerging themes were noted and highlighted. The first two objectives of this study would therefore be discussed within the themes that emerged

from the narratives collected. The third objective and its corresponding themes will be discussed in the next chapter (chapter five).

Upon analysis, five themes emerged on how the respondents perceived themselves. These were: self-empowerment, means to self-identity, self-repair (from humiliation), as a social regret and seeking justice. Data will therefore be presented along these five themes (which addresses research questions 1 and 2). To begin the discussion, demographic details of the study respondents will first be presented, before we then examine the contextual factors deemed as influencing factors to terrorism. Narratives from the respondents gathered from the interviews will be presented to support the data obtained. All narratives in chapters four and five have been numbered according to chapters at the end of the narrative alongside the date of the interview for ease of reference and cross referencing.

4.2 Socio-Demographic Variables of Research Participants

Laqueur (1999:4) argues that, "there has been a radical transformation, if not a revolution, in the character of terrorists." This transformation revolves around the prevailing ideology that guide the way radicalized individuals envisage themselves in life. This understanding of self-definition cannot be decontextualized. This section therefore discusses the socio-demographic variables of the research participants including; age, gender, marital status, education and occupation alongside the influencing contextual factors. While discussing the above demographic factors, the findings were guided by the two theories (IPA and Social construction theory) to understand what they view as strengths or weaknesses in their characteristics.

4.2.1 Age of the respondents

The study findings showed that the respondents were of different ages, which were grouped according to demographic age groups. Table 4.1 below revealed the following as the ages of the respondents:

Table 4.1: Distribution of respondents by age

Age (years)	Number	Per cent
20-24	2	10
25-29	5	30
30-34	4	20
35-39	5	20
40 and above	4	20
Total	**20**	**100**

Source: Field data, 2018

According to the findings, 60% of respondents were aged between 20 and 34 years, while 40% were 35 years and above. Majority of those interviewed were found to fall between the ages of 25-29 years. This finding therefore show that majority of the respondents were youth. This finding supports the alternative theory of terrorism, which proposes that partakers of terrorism tend to be young individuals. This finding concurs with Fischer et al (2010) that the youth were mostly vulnerable to radicalization and terrorism.

The finding that the youth are vulnerable to radicalization and terrorism was also observed by one Key informant from an NGO who is involved in de-radicalization:

> *During my encounter with the radicalized youth, I found out that children as young as 12 years of age were involved. I realized that the radicalizers also recruited children from unstable families by taking advantage of their age to radicalize and harden them into violent extremists. Therefore, due to their little understanding of life, they grew up believing that terrorism was a just war. I noted that most of them accepted to disengage when explained the facts about the motives of radicalization on discovery that they were misled at a young age into joining radicalization. However, majority of those who had accepted to disengage feared reprisals from the VEO and preferred staying in the group for protection rather than outside the group where they were vulnerable.* (Interview conducted, 16th August 2018[Narrative 4.1])

The radicalized individuals, who are mostly of youtful, viewed radicalization as the best option in life at the time they were being recruited. They were persuaded into believing that participating in terrorism was an ordinary obligation in life and as such, it was a normal way of living. Even after being discouraged from participating in terrorism and convinced that terrorism was not just another war of some kind, they still lived in fear of their safety from the VEO, going by what they witnessed in the group (those who apparently denounced terrorism were themselves killed in gruesome fashion). At this point therefore, the radicalized individuals see themselves as fighting for their survival since they no longer saw the justification for the fight. Given a strong opportunity, the radicals would disengage from violent extremism.

This vulnerability of the youth is evidenced by a narrative by one female respondent aged 43 years narrative of regretting her decision to drop out of school as a reaction to her father's advice as presented below:

> *Currently, I regret the decision I made to drop out of school at Form two as a result of being restrained to participate in Girl Guide function. By that time, I thought being a girl guide was an important position in my life. During my stay away from school I started teaching madrasa that changed my way of thinking in my life. My decision by that time was influenced by my young age and probably if it was today, I would have made a different decision.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.2]).

The respondent reflected on the denial to exercise her will after having been denied the opportunity to participate in Girl Guide function—according to her this remained as a negative reflection in her life. According to the respondent, the disruption in her life caused by her father's prohibiting decision, made her resort to taking up Islamic studies which would in turn enable her to pick up masculine roles such as that of teaching in madrassas. In the course of pursuing this resolve, she was arrested, charged and imprisoned for engaging in radicalization. While in prison, she reflects on the decision she took in response to her father's action and notes that it was

extreme. It is therefore noted that her decision to lean towards terrorism was taken whence she was still in her teens.

The study findings show that majority of the respondents were youths. The youth are vulnerable for recruitment as most were at that moment struggling to start life, and as such, were easy prey for the VEOs. Al Shabaab in Arabic means youth, this means essentially the VEO targets youths for their violent extremism activities. An incident reported about youth vulnerability in radicalization was in 2014, where a police raid on Masjid Musa Mosque in Mombasa netted at least 200 youngsters, some as young as 12 years who were undergoing radicalization training (see standard newspaper, May 27, 2016). This incident therefore demonstrated that the recruiters target the youth for radicalization as at this age they are pretty vulnerable. Among the common vulnerabilities for recruitment into radicalization are unemployment, poverty, peer pressure, family influence and religion (Liqueur, 2014). The youth are easily manipulated and/or brainwashed and confused to believe that they are martyrs or justice seekers or whatever other meaning that their handlers would wish them to attach to their engagement into terrorism.

4.2.2 Gender of respondents

Table 4.2 shows the gender of the respondents as follows:

Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by Gender

Gender	Male	Percent
Male	17	85
Female	3	15
Total	**20**	**100**

Source: Field data, 2018

The data reveals that those identified as radicalized were mostly men who comprised 85% of the total sampled. Women comprised of only 15% of the respondents. Female

terrorists are usually a rarity as most of those found engaging in acts of terrorism are usually men (Morgan, 2001:11-12). Females found engaging in acts of terrorism or found to have been radicalized, are usually found to exhibit male characteristics, and mostly demonstrated this by taking up male dominated occupations like engineering, Truck driving, engaging in the construction industry, or teaching in madrasas, as previously observed. A study by UNDP (2017) on drivers of extremism in African states, found that 71% of individual showed that they were driven into radicalization because of state abuse of law or human rights. The study further showed that women interviewed expressed similar grievances although cases of violence and marital difficulties arose (UNDP, 2017).

The following narratives from one female respondent aged 25 years offers a pointer to this:

> *While in Form two, I socialized mostly with male friends who used drugs and chewed miraa (Khat). I admired my father who engaged in drugs and other vices, and I wanted to do what my father used to do. In the process I found myself among men who engaged in drug taking and finally got married to one of them.* (Interview conducted, 10th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.3]).

The respondent since childhood admired her father and even after the father separated with the mother, she still viewed him as her model. In the process, she was involved in acts of deviant behavior while in the company of other deviant friends, leading to imprisonment in connection with terrorism. The respondent therefore defined herself according to the perceived virtues of her father, which was that of a deviant. However, according to her, this trait translated into strength as it empowered her by connecting her with people perceived to be as 'strong' as her father (see 4.3.1 on self-empowerment).

Another female respondent aged 43 years narrated as follows:

> *Since my childhood, I have wanted to be a madrassa teacher but due to Muslim bias against female Muslims I faced a lot of challenges. In my attempt to study a degree in Islamic studies, I was discontinued since I was the only woman in class. However, I persisted and attained my degree in Islamic studies. I have the passion to pursue my master's degree in Islamic studies despite restrictions on women. With a degree I managed to teach madrassa, earning the title of ustatha (female teacher).* (Interview conducted, 16th August 2018 [Narrative 4.4]).

The respondent viewed herself from the strength of masculinity by engaging in masculine tasks. She strived to do the extraordinary to accomplish the masculine roles as attached to the Islamic faith. Her masculine behavior therefore translated into her individual perception as being equal to men and as strong as men by virtue of performing socially viewed masculine tasks. Arising from her individual meaning of herself, she therefore excelled in the extraordinary roles of teaching madrassa and attaining university education in Islamic studies. Her understanding of the roles she performed, thereafter found her associated with radicalization of the youth (via the madrasa classes she was teaching) which led to her imprisonment on terrorism related charges.

Another respondent aged 33 years, narrates how his life was influenced as a result of being a male in the family:

> *My mother died when I was aged 3 years. My father was Imam and had married 2 wives who took care of me through assistance of my paternal grandmother and uncles. As a boy child, brought up to take after my father I therefore had the ambition of becoming an Imam. I therefore endeavor to study Islamic law and the Koran.* (Interview conducted, 1st August 2018 [Narrative 4.5]).

The respondent appreciated his masculine expectation of the family structure of inheriting his father's social role, that of being an Imam. To attain this, he extensively studied Islamic studies which earned him the expected role in society. The respondent therefore, right from childhood, perceived himself as an heir to his father's role, that of being a Muslim cleric. This understanding made him to strive to attain requisite

studies that made him a local leader and an Islamic preacher. In the course of executing the attained roles, he was imprisoned for participation in violent extremism. However, women get into radicalization as a way of overcoming structural violence which are perpetuated by patriarchal nature of society. Some seeking to be terrorism brides to exhibit masculine tendencies.

One Key Informant (CT Researcher) remarked as follows:

> *Generally, lesser women than men join terrorism mainly due to the cultural influences in different societies that give responsibility to males to provide for the family. Partly, this can be explained by the fact that society places more responsibility and leadership of the families to males. Some of the radicalized males say that they joined radicalization in a move to escape from being seen as a failure in their manly responsibility. While females entering radicalization tend to exhibit masculine characteristics mainly to proof that, they are equal to the task to males. Looking at the female radicalized into terrorism I have talked with, I found male characteristics who see aggressive males as their role models in life.*
> (Interview conducted, 27th August 2018[Narrative 4.6]).

The Key informant in addition to the narratives from the respondents saw the meaning of the women joining terrorism from the lens of masculinity. He underscored their admiration for men and what they do and tend to practice is what men do in real life. This means that for women joining terrorism, significant attachment is bestowed to masculine roles and capabilities as the measure for their achievement in life. They therefore perceive themselves from the context of men.

Findings from respondents show that women were traditionally viewed as passive, sensitive and submissive, which was also in line with Islamic teachings. On the other hand, masculinity is regarded in terms of strength, assertiveness and dominance, virtues that appeal for recruitment for radicalization. Derry (2008) described maternal ethics by women as mothers and as peacemakers, a proposition that is contested by feminists (Moore, 2008:283). The participation of women in terrorism has culturally been viewed as unique considering their supplementary role in families as compared

to males who provide for their respective families. This cultural perception among many communities in Kenya therefore limit the participation of females joining terrorism as fighting was believed to be a role of males. However, findings from this study show that women joining violent extremism tend to fight for equality and they do this by taking up masculine roles. Just like in other professions viewed as being masculine in nature, women are increasingly taking up the roles of men, a move which is likely to see escalation of women joining terrorism as they take up this perceived role that is seemingly masculine and the preserve for men. This view of masculinity could thus be used as an excuse by some radicalized elements to engage in violent extremism.

4.2.3 Marital status of respondents

Table 4.3 shows the data with regard to the marital status of the respondents:

Table 4.3: Distribution of respondents by marital status

Marital status	Male	Percent	Female	Percent	Accumulated Percent
Married	12	60	2	10	**70**
Single	3	15	0	0	**15**
Divorced	2	10	1	5	**15**
Total	**17**	**85**	**3**	**15**	**100**

Source: Field data, 2018

Table 4.3 shows that 70% were married, while 15% were single or divorced. According to Jacques and Taylor (2013: 41-42) previous studies have shown that female terrorists were usually not married at the time they joined a terrorist group. Many were also found to have suffered spousal loss (were widows) or if not, were found to be divorced individuals—this sets them apart from their respective male counterparts, who were largely found to be married individuals.

Marriage in Islam religion is important because it is a tradition as espoused by Prophet Muhammad. The Holy Quran says,

> *And marry those among you who are single and those who are fit among your male slaves and your female slaves; if they are needy, Allah will make them free from want out of His grace; and Allah is Ample-giving, knowing."* *(Surah an-Nur, 24:32)*

The Quran further states that prophet Muhammad encouraged people to marry according to the tradition by the prophet Muhammad. This means all Islamic followers endeavor to marry as an Islamic tradition. This is in line with Islam as a religion and as a way of life. Since the Quran forbids celibacy, people are encouraged as a tradition to marry, as it is one of the traditions. Islam also explains the benefits of marriage as a way of achieving spiritual perfection and remain healthier, physically and mentally. In the Islamic faith therefore, married people are more respected, an identity the Islamic followers strive to achieve.

Among the three women interviewed in this study, one was widowed, one was divorced while the other was married and suffered from marital conflicts. Therefore, the lived experiences of the female respondents in the study explains the common trend espoused by Jacques and Taylor (2013).

A male respondent aged 33 narrates how he perceived marriage;

> *Inspired by the role my father played in the mosque and community, I managed to become a Muslim preacher and an arbitrator in inter-clan conflicts, a role that influenced me to marry two wives in line with my status as a leader.* (Interview conducted, 1st August 2018 [Narrative 4.7]).

In the endeavor to actualize his self-identity (see 4.3.2 on radicalization as self-identity), the respondent, taking his father as a role model, married two wives within a short spell of time. His decision elevated him to elder status, privileging him to preside over inter-clan conflicts. Despite having secured a job away from home, the

attained role forced him to travel home frequently so that he could participate in community and religious matters; it was during one such visit that he was arrested and convicted over terrorism related charges. To be respected in the world of extremism, for men it was necessary to have an elevated social status that marriage provides.

The study findings show that female respondents were few as compared to their male counterparts. It appears that for the few who join terrorism, their affiliation was influenced by some special needs/circumstances. For instance, according to one female respondent, she faced challenges of being allowed to study and teach in madrassa. This challenge (where women are frowned upon when they take up this role as this is presumed to be a preserve for men) made her more determined to succeed in this role. In most communities in Kenya, women are culturally considered as the weaker sex, and as such, some roles are viewed as a preserve of men (Olson, 2015), and this includes the role of being a madrasa teacher. Another reason advanced as to why female numbers in terrorism are usually low is that provided by Blook (2011) for instance, who suggests that women are not capable of becoming suicide bombers or being sadistic killers as easily as men can, for women are not known to have this type of violent nature. They are therefore unlikely to engage in terrorist acts. Unlike men, some women join these groups to find 'freedom' and in the process seek to gain independence as exercised in the group (see section 4.4.1 for discussion on this).

They (women) also seek perceived individual equality as an individual human being (Cunningham, 2010:186) and this they seem to find in these extremist groups. Morgan (2001:171) on the other hand argues that the reason that persuades women to participate in terror activities was influenced by their attraction and intimacy with the male leaders of the gang. The findings of this study and previous research therefore

show that women role in terrorism is taken as support role rather than that of fighters. However, Women joining terrorism tend to exhibit uniqueness by proving equality with their male counterparts and that they are independent to make their own life choices without coercion from men. Therefore, the fewer women partaking in VE can be attributed to their allocated role in society and the perception by the male dominated society of women as incapable of participating in violent extremism. This offers them the perfect opportunity to be unsuspected terrorists.

4.2.4 Education of respondents

Table 4.4 shows the data with regard to the education attainment of the respondents:

Table 4.4: Distribution of Respondents by Education

Education status	No. of Respondents	Percent
No education	2	10
Primary	3	15
Secondary	5	25
Madrasa	5	25
College/ Tertiary	3	15
University	2	10
Total	**20**	**100**

Source: Field data, 2018

Findings show that most of the respondents had attained post form four level of education, with few falling below secondary level of education. Findings show that 75% of the respondents possess secondary education and above, while only 25% had primary education or no education at all. The distribution of the respondents therefore shows that most radicalized people were fairly educated. This is in contrast with the findings of Olsson (1988) and Taylor and Quayle (1994), who apart from proposing that candidates for terrorism are young people lacking self-esteem who have strong or

even desperate needs to consolidate their identities., and who, in becoming politically violent, seek a sense of purpose and self-worth—"*a place in the sun*", argued that these youth were found to be largely unemployed, were ravaged by poverty and largely lacking in education (which would have otherwise secured them the necessary employment that would have ensured they don't involve themselves in terrorist acts). However, in some situations, education has assisted some individuals to venture out of their homes and end up in radicalization. In this study, it was found that the respondents were fairly educated (see Table 4.4 above).

Studies show that there is a relationship between education and joining of terrorism in relation with the educated who fail to secure employment. Studies carried out by combating terrorism centre (CTC), West Point (2016) show that records of fighters in ISIS available showed that there are more educated fighters than the uneducated according to their countries of origin. However, there are divergent views on correlation of education and joining terrorism between Maleckova (2003) who support the notion and Azam and Thelen (2008) who opposed it. However, both cases support the proposition that lack of unemployment among the educated encouraged them in joining terrorism. In much of Africa, unemployment remains a challenge with even those with education not securing jobs. This is mainly because of the depressed economies of many states in the continent. However, the educated may still face life with confidence with the hope that they will secure employment later on in life, unlike their less educated counterparts, whose self-esteem will continue to be low.

One Key Informant (CT Researcher) said:

> *In some situations, some youth with potential to acquire higher education chose to join radicalization simply to follow their friends or relatives who had earlier joined VE. This is a determination for the radicalized individuals to fight for the comrades and sacred values (Atran et al, 2007). This means*

> *their perception of life goals is dependent on what they expect to derive from violent extremism.* (Interview conducted, 27th August 2018 [Narrative 4.8]).

The youth joining radicalization have different reasons for joining—education (or better put, lack of it) being just but one of these reasons. Contextual environment is also a major factor in this influence, coupled with the grievances that some of them harbor. This means that irrespective of the level of one's education, radicalization can override this particular attribute as other factors also assert themselves on the individual. Similarly, education to some extent has been used as an avenue for radicalization as the radicalizers target higher learning institutions for recruiting combatants. Education in the contemporary world is seen as an avenue for securing employment. Education therefore is a means of empowering oneself in life. According to Crenshaw (1985), she suggests that there are at least four categories of motivation among terrorists: (1) the opportunity for action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of material reward. Education as an empowerment enables individuals position themselves appropriately in society, enables rise in status and is used to acquire material rewards like wealth creation among other necessities in life (see section 4.4.1, which explains radicalization as an alternative means of empowerment).

One Respondent aged 30 years stated that although he dropped out of the university while in Goma, DR Congo, he was still hopeful that one day he will be able to resume and complete his university studies. On education, he says:

> *I committed myself to studies up to university level but dropped out due to lack of fees. I never wanted to witness my parents and siblings suffer due to poverty, so I left to search for a living. In the process, found myself here. I know one day I will be free and finish my studies. I will free my people from poor leadership and poverty* (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.9]).

The respondent after failing to realize his dream of attaining university education (which shows that some terrorists seek to attain higher education) sought alternative empowerment through radicalization and participation in violent extremism. He blamed his failure in life on weak governance structures in his country and looked forward to a time when he would further his studies by getting support from the VEO, and returning to the DRC to set matters right. The respondent therefore perceived recruitment into radicalization as a substitute to higher education and as a way of empowerment and 'repair' for his past failures (see 4.3.3 for more discussion on self-repair from humiliation).

Another respondent went ahead to study aviation and Islamic studies and says:

> *After completion of my diploma in Aviation, I still wanted to understand Islam more since I wanted to become an imam like my father. I therefore travelled to Middle East to study the Koran and Islamic law. On return, I participated in preaching and conflict resolutions for my community.*
> (Interview conducted, 1st August, 2018 [Narrative 4.10]).

The respondent viewed education as an empowerment tool one that cements one's feeling of self-esteem (see 4.3.2 on radicalization as self-identity). Despite having attained college qualifications, he still travelled outside the country to study Islamic studies, which in his view, would enable him be like his father and thus realize his dream of inheriting his father's legacy. The changing of the lived contexts to attain education exposed the respondent to diversity of knowledge that changed his perception of religion and society. This academic empowerment endowed him to the community and enabled him participate in different roles. Ultimately, the respondent perceived himself as a community leader, as a spiritual leader and more importantly, as the custodian of the community interests. In executing these functions, he got involved in terrorism and was convicted.

Others however, saw little value on education. One Respondent aged 36 years says,

> *On completion of my high school, I decided to get a job instead of joining university. I did not see the reason for my further studies because at the end I will still seek for a job. I nonetheless took my high school studies seriously because I knew one time I will be able to get a job and help the needy. I had the desire to fight for justice for the marginalized in society. I admired Nelson Mandela who is my role model. I'm generous and the little I got I assisted the underprivileged. In addition, that was the purpose for my work.*
> (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.11]).

After undergoing racial and religious discrimination in the host country where he lived with his parents as immigrants, he developed the urge to discontinue his education and instead fight for justice for the marginalized (more insights can be obtained from 4.3.5 which discusses radicalization as an act of seeking justice). The ultimate goal of the respondent was not in attaining education but rather in securing another form of engagement that would allow him fight for justice for those marginalized in one way or another.

Findings show that only 25% had no education and primary education, while 75% were well educated. This means that low education was not the dominant reason for joining terrorism. In unstable or failed states, education may even serve as schools of international terrorism, where in phases of domestic instability (e.g., civil war) individuals gain an 'education' in violence that they can also use for internationalized terrorist campaigns (Campos and Gassebner, 2009).

4.2.5 Occupation of respondents

In criminology studies, it is often theorized that at times one's occupation offers one an opportunity to engage in criminal activities (Sutherland and Cressey, 1978:44). This study therefore examined this factor among the respondents as to assess whether the maxim would apply in this case. Table 4.5 shows the findings with regard to occupation of respondents:

Table 4.5: Distribution of respondents by occupation

Type of occupation	Number of respondents	Percent
Formal Employment	6	30
Informal employment*	5	25
Business	9	45
Total	**20**	**100**

*Includes part time employment or engaging in unreliable employment for a livelihood.

Source: Field data, 2018

Findings show that 45% of the respondents engaged in business, 30% were in formal employment, while 25% were in informal employment. Majority (45%) of the respondents charged with terrorism offenses were found to be engaged in various business enterprises. The smallest group of respondents engaged in informal employment (25%).

On occupation, one respondent aged 36 years said:

> *After completion of my Automobile engineering course, I worked as a part time employee in Nairobi prior to travelling to Uganda and South Sudan, working as a mechanic and driver. My job enabled my travels to Dubai and Somalia and eventually joining the Jihadists. I can therefore say that it is employment that enabled me to reach the place where I met with the people who introduced me to this problem.* (Interview conducted, 15th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.12]).

Another respondent aged 43 years said:

> *Together with my late husband, we started a Madrassa School at the coast where I continued teaching, earning the tittle, Ustatha (female teacher). In the process, we were accused of radicalizing youth. My husband was killed and later I was arrested and imprisoned with involvement in terrorism.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.13]).

The respondent associates her predicament to her previous occupation which she managed with her husband. She sees her involvement in teaching in madrassa as the cause for her present predicament (of being associated with terrorism). She said that it was because of her involvement in madrassa teaching that led to her being accused of

radicalizing the youth in the madrassa. She finally regrets working so hard in life only to end up in jail (see 4.3.4 on radicalization as a social regret).

One Key Informant working with an NGO said:

> *Previously, the recruiters to radicalization targeted the marginalized group for recruitment. This shifted to recruitment of even youth from well to do families who cite reasons other than poverty to join radicalization. However, several cases encountered said that they were recruited using employment as a trap both for the jobless and the employed for the promise of better paying jobs.* (Interview conducted, 17th August 2018 [Narrative 4.14]).

Several respondents cited employment as bait to radicalization. As has been narrated by one Key Informant who interviewed returnees, some of the cases involved close relatives and friends luring some unemployed youth to travel to Somalia with promise for well-paying jobs. Some were coerced to join VE and radicalized to become violent extremists. However, some with pressing grievances treat radicalization as an occupation where they rise through the hierarchy of the VEO.

According to Relative Deprivation theory (see Gurr, 1970), rebellions arise when groups of people are overwhelmed with the grievances they harbored. One grievance is unemployment and poverty, and as research shows, that there is a connection between poverty and terrorism (see Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002 for instance). Drawing from these previous studies, this study found that some respondents joined VE as a means of seeking occupation or as an end in itself. This was exemplified by travelling to places of envisaged opportunity. In addition, the poverty levels in their respective families drove many to seek a means of income, explained the Key Informant interviewed. This section therefore by discussing occupation as a means of joining radicalization considered alongside poverty, as lack of occupation, which to some extent aggravates poverty as means of deprivation to individuals joining radicalization. Having looked

at the characteristics of the respondents, we now turn our attention to the contextual factors affecting the respondents.

4.3 Contextual Factors Affecting Respondents

This section discusses contextual factors of the research participants. This discussion is borne from social construction theory, which argues that meanings emanate from contextual context (Blurr, 2003). These were identified from the narratives obtained from the participants as they described their lived experiences and their everyday meaning of life. In understanding the influences of the contextual factors, the grievances cited in the narratives were linked to the causal factors in different environments and different lived experiences. In discussing the grievances to joining radicalization, the dominant grievances were analyzed to understand the specific influences to radicalization. This section also analyzes the correlation between the contextual factors and the respondents' characteristics to understand their corresponding effect on the radicalized individuals. In understanding the contextual factors affecting individual participant in this study, the theories in this study were used to guide the findings on their lived experiences and influences to their individual characteristics in their lived contexts. This was important because, it was only through interpreting their contextual factors and their influences to the lives of the participants that one is able to identify the impact on their lives.

In section 4.2 above, various characteristics of the respondents were discussed comprising of age, gender, marital status and occupation respectively. The contextual factors identified from the interviews are provided in Table 4.6 below.

Table 4.6: Respondents and contextual factors affecting them

Respondent Number	Contextual factors					
Respondents' Pseudonyms	Family	Peers	Religion	Poverty	Discrimination	Residences
Respondent 1	-	✓	✓	-	-	Other African countries
Respondent 2	✓	-	-	✓	✓	Other African countries
Respondent 3	-	✓	✓	-	-	Kenya (North Eastern)
Respondent 4	-	✓	✓	-	-	Kenya (North Eastern)
Respondent 5	✓	-	-	✓	-	Kenya (Coast)
Respondent.6	✓	✓	-	-	-	Kenya (Coast)
Respondent 7	✓	-	-	✓	-	Kenya (North Eastern)
Respondent 8	-	-	✓		✓	Europe
Respondent 9	✓	-	-	✓	-	Kenya (Coast)
Respondent 10	✓	-	✓	-	-	Kenya (Coast)
Respondent 11	✓	-	-	✓	-	Kenya (Coast)
Respondent 12	✓	✓	-	-	-	Kenya (Other Regions)
Respondent 13	-	-	✓	--	✓	Kenya (Other Regions)
Respondent 14	✓	-	-	✓	-	Kenya (Other Regions)
Respondent 15	-	-	✓	✓	-	Middle East
Respondent 16	-	✓	✓	-	-	Kenya (North Eastern)
Respondent 17	-	✓	✓	-	-	Kenya (North Eastern)
Respondent 18	-	✓	-	✓	-	Other African countries
Respondent 19	✓	✓	-	-	-	Kenya (Other Regions)
Respondent 20	-	✓	✓	-	-	Kenya (Coast)
Total	10	10	10	8	3	-

Source: Field data, 2018

The study discusses these contextual factors from section 4.3.1 to 4.3.6.

4.3.1 Family

According to Bandura (1969), individuals are socialized through modeling and social learning from the behavior as practiced by other members of the family or the surrounding environment. The first level of socialization of an individual is the family where an individual embraces culture, language and religion, which then forms part of one's self-identity. The individual interpretation of one's life encounters was therefore

based on reflections of childhood experience, which remains imbedded in an individual until death (Freud, 1923; as quoted by Borum, 2004:18).

The psychoanalytic theory argues that family exerts immense influence on an individuals entire life. The theory postulates that this happens during the various stages of life and certain unresolved intra psychic conflicts play itself in adulthood (Gabbard 2000). This is further explained by Wallerstein (1995) and Gabbard (2000), who intones that an individual is influenced at an early stage through parenting and interactions with others. Personality develops during childhood through psychosexual stages of development and argues that sexual fantasies are the main drivers of personality development (Gabbard, 2000). Of interest to this study was therefore to examine family experience as one of the contextual factors.

According to Weinberg and Eubank (1994) in their discussion of the National Cultural Theory, it was proposed that terrorism expresses itself differently in "collectivist" versus "individualist" cultures. The theory further contents that, in collectivist cultures, a person's identity is primarily derived from the social system, dividing the world strictly according to in-groups and out-groups and linking their personal well-being to the well-being of their group, while in individualist cultures, identity is derived from personal goals.

It was noted that majority of the respondents interviewed had experienced problems at family level. Among the problems experienced were broken families, orphaned at childhood, marital problems, and issues revolving around polygamous families, family conflicts, inadequate subsistence, and other negative influences emanating from the family. The current study observed that out of the 20 respondents interviewed, 10 respondents faced family problems. This is one of the most common

contextual factors the radicalized individuals were found to have encountered, and this contributed to their learning through modelling (as explained by Bandura 1977). The cases under this study were affected by broken families, orphaned early in life and polygamous families with inadequate subsistence. For instance, one female respondent narrated that:

> *I missed my father in life because when I was 5 years my father left home, separating with our mother. Prior to the separation, there were frequent fights which affected me as I did not know the cause of the fights. The rest of my life, I tried to get a man who could fill the position of my father in life but got more frustrated when I married a man that would fill the gap of my father in my life.* (Interview conducted, 10th August 2018 [Narrative 4.15])

Another respondent aged 34 years, on the influences by the family to an individual narrates about his life:

> *In my life, I have grown up with my father encouraging me to make decisions on my own. Sometimes I could make mistakes and when my mother tried to punish me she would be told to leave me alone as to learn how to do the right things in life. Occasionally, my father would tell me that I would grow up into a strong person and encouraged. Due to my father's protection, my mother left me alone even if I overslept not to go to school, she would leave me alone.* (Interview conducted, 31st July 2018 [Narrative 4.16])

Another respondent aged 30 years narrated that:

> *My father had two wives with my mother as second wife. He was involved in fights with our stepmother and favored our mother and her children leading to hatred with other siblings. The conflicts also led to witchcraft and family disharmony. Finally, our father divorced his first wife and her children were taken care of by our mother. Life became miserable to the family as our father became a drunkard, leaving family responsibility to our mother. This situation forced me to drop out of university and seek for a livelihood.* (Interview conducted, 31st July 2018 [Narrative 4.17]).

One respondent aged 34 years demonstrated how family views influenced his life. He said he hated Jews from the discussion with his family and the community which creates an impression that all Jews were evil persons and were their enemies (see Narrative 4.47 for interview conducted on 28th August 2018)

One Key informant working for an NGO narrated that some returnees cited influence from families as the factor that influenced their decision to venture into extremism explained:

> *Some of the returnees I have met tend to see VE as a family problem. One of the returnees claimed that his brother was killed on claims that he had joined VEO and since that time decided to join to revenge against the authorities. Another case said that some relatives in the family had joined and seemed successful. He therefore joined to assist his family*. (Interview conducted, 16th August 2018 [Narrative 4.18]).

Findings show that ten respondents were directly influenced by their respective families to join radicalization. This arises from the belief that being radicalized would improve their lives and that of their family. Others joined so as to gain power to revenge for some perceived injustices committed against their family by the authorities. In some instances, they lived in contexts that believed that they were disadvantaged in life as a family or community. This means the parents and other family members exposed the youth to the values and behaviors of their ethnic culture that tend to address their current grievances or perceived historical injustices through violent means. In all the cases of family influence, the behavior of the radicalized individuals was found to have been influenced by the family. Umaña-Taylor et al. (2009) notes that the family can exert intense influence over one's future life. The current study therefore show that family modeling to a large extent does influence one's behavioral trends.

4.3.2 Peer influence

The study noted from the narratives that individuals joining radicalization were mainly introduced into the in-group of the VEO through proxies using different approaches. One of the commonly used means of recruitment to radicalization is using persons close to the targeted individual. Usually, recruitment is based on the

grievances harbored by the targeted subject - it is this grievance that is then exploited. Once recruited, they are sustained in the VEO through peer pressure, group solidarity, and through the psychology of group dynamics (Post, 1986). The terrorists therefore tend to synergize their own identities into the group, resulting in a kind of "group mind" and group moral code that require undoubted obedience to the group (Crenshaw 1985).

Peer influence is also a well-documented phenomenon that influence one's socialization (Post, 1986). With regard to this, it was noted in the study that most respondents interviewed said that they joined radicalization through friends or close relatives. They were mostly lured by their peers to travel to Somalia for well-paying jobs and ended up being convinced or coerced into joining radicalization. One male respondent aged 40 years explained:

> *After suffering frustration of being expelled from a seminary for priesthood and remaining jobless after completing teacher training college, I was approached by a friend to travel to Dadaab for a teaching job of teaching in a refugee camp. I was happy when I got the job on contract and on lapse of the contract, another friend convinced me to go to Kismayu for a better job only to undergo radicalization and join the militants in fighting the Somalia government.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.19])

Similarly, another respondent aged 28 years narrated his frustrations that led him into joining radicalization as influenced by close friends:

> *The death of my parents in a ferry tragedy at Likoni compelled me to drop out of school leading to participation in doing menial jobs for a living. In the process I was influenced by friends to participate in criminal activities and eventually lured into radicalization and terrorism by the same friends.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.20])

Some of the foreign respondents interviewed also echoed similar influences in their way towards finding themselves in radicalized groups. A respondent aged 34 years who lived in an Arabic city in Israel described the influences of the Arabic thinking

against the Jews in the context of the protracted Israel and Palestine conflict. He said that:

> *I am an Arab Israelite and grew up in the Arab city, as a tradition in Israel where the Jew and Arab settlements are distinct. I grew up informed that the Jews are our enemies by citing the attacks on our fellow Arabs (Palestinians). One time, I saw a Jewish policeman batter an Arab and I got affected. From that moment, I got interested in war and started watching war videos and even downloading them on my cell phone. One day, I was convinced by a friend to travel to Oman for a job to pass through East Africa and while on the way I was arrested in Northern Kenya.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.21]).

Another foreign respondent aged 34 years recounted how his popularity among his friends influenced his behavior and actions in his lived experience. He says:

> *My father had confidence in me and discouraged my mother from disciplining me saying I will learn on my own to be a successful person. In school, teachers liked me because I performed well in class attracting most of them to befriend me. I also played football in the school team that made most students like me. Therefore, encouragement from my father, teachers and friends gave me the confidence, making me feel as a hero. I therefore never wanted to let them down in my entire endeavor. My efforts to please my friends influenced me to indulge in drinking alcohol, smoking, having many girlfriends and generous to needy people.. Consequently, I developed a strong urge of agitating for social justice with Nelson Mandela as my role model in life.* (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.22])

Another respondent aged 40 years narrated the following on peer pressure:

> *After I was expelled from the catholic seminary, I was desperate for a job even after completing my teachers training course I remained jobless. A friend assisted me to travel to Somalia where I realized that I was teaching in the school for violent extremists. Gradually, I converted to Islam and joined the group to fight the Somalia government.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.23]).

According to one Key Informant working for an NGO on the influence of peers, he said:

> *In my interaction with some of the terrorists who had disengaged (formers), they said that when they left the country for radicalization they were accompanied by their known friends and others with close relatives. Some of them said the travelling to Somalia with people known to them gave them confidence until they learnt that they had been duped into joining radicalization.* (Interview conducted, 17th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.24])

According to Olsson (1988), candidates for terrorism are young people lacking self-esteem who have strong or even desperate needs to consolidate their identities. Therefore, in an attempt to make meaning in life, they easily got swayed by their peers—in this case, they were easily influenced by their peers to join radical groups. As advanced by Wallerstein (1995) and Gabbard (2000), peer influence can exert a significant degree of influence that can change the trajectory of one's life. This appears to be the case in this study.

4.3.3 Religion

Religious terrorism has been defined as political violence that is motivated by an absolute belief that another-worldly power has sanctioned, or sometimes commanded, terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith (Martin, 2010). Extremism is not limited to just one religion, as almost all the religions practice a certain degree of extreme behavior (Martin, 2010).

Religious perpetrated terrorism is the most dominant type of terrorism in the world as compared to secular terrorism (Rapoport 2004). Various religions have committed terrorism atrocities in the history of humankind. This includes; the Jewish zealots, Muslim Hashashins and Hindu religious zealots (Martin 2010). Terrorism attacks in Kenya have been committed by a Muslim violent extremism organization, the Al Shabaab. Therefore, some radical elements in the Islamic religion recruit, radicalize and preach extremism to their followers. People who participate in religious terrorism believe that any act they commit will be forgiven and perhaps rewarded in the afterlife (Martin 2010).

The respondents interviewed indicated that at the time they were associated with radicalisation, they were practicing Muslims (or converted after recruitment into

radicalization). They narrated that Islam had a strong influence on how they viewed the world.

One respondent aged 28 years narrated that:

> *When we were in the camp, we were taught that we were fighting a holy war according to the Koran. I committed myself to that cause so that I can get spiritual blessings. When I was brought here (alluding to prison) I took time to read the Koran and found that we were misled about Jihad. I learnt that Jihad is a personal war with evil but not with other people. I realised that were misled into believing that were fighting a just war.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.25]).

According to the respondent, by the time of joining radicalization, he was naïve about the Koran and Islam, and as such, the radicalizers took advantage of his naivety to recruit him. He added that it was while in prison that he realized that he had been misled and the Koran misinterpreted to lure him into radicalization.

Another respondent aged 34 years having not been a dedicated Muslim in life narrates his encounter with Islam and narrates:

> *When we relocated from the apartment we lived for the early part of my life, we moved into the house of our grandfather, which was vacant. While in the new place, I lost touch with my friends and remained lonely. I used that time to read the Islamic literature kept by my father and rediscovered myself. I got interested in Islamic preaching and my interpretation was different from my past perception of Islam religion. Is that what is called radicalization?* (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.26])

It is clear that moving to a new place interrupted the respondent's social network. He resorted to reading Islamic literature that he found in his father's house. This, he says, influenced him to join radicalization. His way of interpreting the Koran changed and eventually he became a radical.

Another respondent, aged 33 years, also extensively immersed himself in studying Islamic law and the Koran, prior to being associated with radicalization. In his lived experience, he narrates:

> *My father was a madrasa teacher and imam as such I was interested to take after my father. Despite studying diploma in aviation, I travelled to*

several Middle East countries to study Islamic law, Koran and Hadith before returning in the country. On return, I engaged in public preaching and conflict resolution in inter-clan conflicts. Eventually I got employed during which i was implicated with violent extremism. (Interview conducted, 1ˢᵗ August, 2018 [Narrative 4.27]).

Findings from respondents show that the recruiters to radicalization used the Koran to radicalize and harden them into radicals. Some of the respondents attended further Islamic studies in the country and the Middle East after which they indulged in preaching Islam. The study therefore confirmed that one of the major contextual factors associated with terrorism was religion. Findings show that all the 20 terrorism inmates interviewed were currently practicing Muslims. Among them, only one converted on recruitment to Al Shabaab. The respondents said that most of them believed that Jihad was the main driver to violent extremism. This would most likely have a bearing on how they viewed themselves as opposed to the edicts of terrorism.

As mentioned earlier, there are many different forms of religious terrorism, but the most common is Islamic extremism (Martin 2010). However, in Islam, killing a human being is considered as an act that is equal in gravity to "unbelief" (Gulen, 2004:1). Considering the Islamic values, which define a way of worship and a way of a life, deviation from the teaching is the main concern in Islamisation of terrorism (Rahman, 1996).

A Key Informant (Muslim cleric) criticized some radical Muslim clerics for using Islam for radicalization. He said:

Jihad has been misinterpreted to suit the interests of the radicalizers. The Quran has deliberately been misinterpreted to confuse people into participating in violent extremism. The radicalizers are aware that they are not teaching the right message to their followers because most of them have studied the Koran and the Islamic law. They are deliberately confusing people to incite them against other people. (Interview conducted, 31ˢᵗ July, 2018 [Narrative 4.28]).

The key informant having been involved with preaching to prison convicts identified cases of misunderstanding of the Koran among the terrorism convicts which according to his understanding, was deliberate misinterpretation to lure them into violent extremism.

Another Key informant (Christian cleric) argues:

> *As a Christian preacher in prisons, our ultimate goal is correctional service to the prisoners. We therefore regularly discuss a lot about our experiences in our work with our counterparts in Islam. My understanding of Islam is that, it is a religion with the objective to nurture spiritual needs of people with only deviation with Christianity on marriage and as a legal entity to regulate life. I must say that every religion has radicals including Christianity where some preachers discourage their followers from going to hospital for treatment and sending their children to school.* (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.29]).

The respondent having interacted with Muslim clerics who they preach with together in the prisons, echoes the discussions they share and in the process realize that misinterpretation is common even in Christianity where radical preachers choose to mislead their followers for their personal gain.

While another Key Informant, (CT Researcher) said:

> *Use of religion to cause discontent in society is a common occurrence in the history of humankind. However, in any religion there are the moderates and the radicals. Radicalism in Islamic religion is evident with some groups misinterpreting Jihad and Hadith to suit their group whims. The most abused part of Islam is the undocumented Hadith which radical clerics have taken advantage of distorting to promote violence. The radicalized people I have talked to seems to ego similar message of distortion they were told. Those who approach the Koran with an open mind end up defecting on realization that they were misled into fighting unjustified war. That is why in the group individuals are supposed to think as a group but not to reflect on their divergent ideas. While in the group also, their leaders are cautious to spot independent thinkers to eliminate them or else they poison others.* (Interview conducted, 17th September, 2018 [Narrative 4.30]).

All the participants interviewed had converted to Islam with only one converting shortly after joining radicalization. Their false understanding of the Koran was found

to be premised on two things: one, fight for Jihad and second, restoration of the Islamic dignity in the world by reclaiming the Islamic caliphate which would be distinct from western influences. Majority of the respondents made discoveries about realities of the Koran while in prison because their independence of which had previously been arrested, was now exposed to the right teaching.

4.3.4 Poverty

When social inequality emerges in society, many of those affected become dissatisfied and angry because they are unable to achieve what others are easily able to achieve. This then creates internal conflict within certain geographic areas, and making it more likely for terrorism to occur as a result (Newman, 2006). Similarly, other factors causing social disaffection in society include unemployment that has caused impact on social inequality (Laqueur 2014). The Human Development Index includes per capita income, life expectancy, and education into account in regards to terrorism, and found that there is a correlation between terrorism and human development (Schmid, 2005).

Several researchers have also claimed a sociological connection between poverty and terrorism (see Schmid 1983; Harmon 2000; Hasisi and Pedahzur 2000; Krueger and Maleckova 2002). This is due to the perception that the government's priority is usually different from that of its citizen, which often brings about feelings of marginalization. The people therefore seek alternative means of survival, which at times includes joining terrorism. These variables can combine to produce a situation that is ideal for terrorist organizations to recruit.

Several respondents said that at the time they got involved with radicalization, they faced challenges with poverty. One male respondent, aged 24 years, born outside the

country revealed that he lived a life of abject poverty and tried to sustain a living

through engagement in various, at times illegal, activities that involved travelling in

and outside his country. He narrates,

> *I was born where I faced political instability. My family was impoverished to the extent that I never went to school. I travelled to Nairobi, Kenya several times to stay with my uncle but I did not succeed. Finally, I accompanied my mother to Nairobi to sell clothes and during that period is when I was arrested and imprisoned for terrorism.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018[Narrative 4.31]).

Another Respondent aged 28 years also said:

> *Most of my life I lived on my own as my mother was a single mother and my father rejected me. My uncles rejected me after the death of my mother and paternal grandfather. I travelled to Kibera in Nairobi to live with one of my maternal uncles working as a security guard but found life unbearable. At one time, I was employed to sell water but the wages were inadequate forcing me to occasionally steal from my employer. I found Kibera untenable and relocated to Biafra in Nairobi to stay with a friend. It was during my stay at Biafra Estate that I was convinced to travel to Somalia for a well-paying job which drove me into the trap of the Jihadists.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.32]).

The respondent, after the loss of his mother, says he led a life of isolation where his

close relatives disowned him. He reached out for moral support and association with

friends, which ended up with him landing into the hands of the radicalizers.

Similarly, one respondent aged 26 years having been affected by poverty narrates:

> *I was compelled by circumstances to drop out of school at Primary level and travelled to Mombasa to look for employment. I was employed in several homes as a house help and in several cafeterias in Mombasa. Finally, I got married and started our own food business during which I was arrested and charged for terrorism.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.33])

One Key Informant (NCTC) said:

> *While assessing interventions of the radicalized individuals, I found that homes with no person with employment or income faced high risks of being recruited by the radicalizers. In some homes where individuals had been recruited, other siblings end up being recruited or close relatives, meaning, there exist communication between the recruits and the family members even while staying in the group.* (Interview conducted, 10th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.34])

Several respondents in this study said that they came from families with poor backgrounds. They narrated how they struggled in life to make a living and engaged in numerous mundane activities to eke out a living. In trying to earn a living, some of them said that they travelled to places away from their homes in search of income for survival. This finding therefore shows that poverty is one of the main influences to radicalization. To mitigate the problem of poverty, most people (mainly the youth) tend to travel from their home residences to foreign lands where they hope to get favorable opportunities of earning a living. In the course of seeking employment, some bumped into extremist persons who recruited and radicalized them into joining terrorism. This is exemplified by male respondents aged 40 years and 28 years promised teaching job in Kismayu and a well-paying job in Somalia, respectively—they ended up being recruited into VE. Poverty is therefore discussed together with the context of occupation as they are mutually dependent on each other. However there is a dilemma as to why some people ravaged with poverty join terrorism and others faced with same condition fail to join. Probably, the adage that proclaims that "terrorists are made not born" (see Silke, 1998:51-59) may be true. What this reveals is that from what has been discussed in this section and in the preceding sections, is that both psychological and social factors contribute to the construction of a terrorist. Several sociological explanations have been given about the reasons some individuals decide to join radicalization or desist.

4.3.5 Discrimination and social injustice

Human rights violations, including dispossession and humiliation, often result in those affected harboring severe grievances against the government (Newman, 2006). Newman also added that when a government is unable to provide basic standard of

living to its citizens, citizens become displeased and it is at this point that terrorist organizations take advantage and come in to recruit them.

Findings from the present study show that some of the respondents cited discrimination and social injustice as having influenced their decision to join radicalization and their eventual participation in violent extremism. They cited discrimination on religious grounds where Muslims are perceived to be dominated by the majority Christians. They also cited marginalization by dominant communities over minority communities especially in the distribution of resources, mainly at the coast, as another reason for their decision. One respondent, aged 37 years, who came from the minority Nubian community in Kenya, said that he was influenced to radicalization over acts of discrimination exhibited by the authorities and by other major/dominant ethnic communities. He narrates:

> *I lived in Kibera most part of my early life with my parents whose ancestors had migrated to Kenya from Southern Sudan. Being a migrant community, we were seen as foreigners by the government and the dominant communities in Kibera. In my life, I therefore suffered discrimination in school and in social life. We were treated as second-class citizens. Kibera being a slum, life was miserable and we lacked necessary facilities like electricity, roads and water. The police harassed the Nubians for brewing illicit brews and engaging in crime. Therefore, the Nubian youth were treated as criminals and occasionally harassed.* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.35]).

The respondent was aggrieved with the mistreatment meted to his community and once exposed to life outside his village, he realized that his community was marginalized. This feeling drove him into violent extremism where he wanted to push for the rights of his community.

Another respondent aged 36 years added that,

> *I was born of Caribbean parents but grew up in a European capital. During my learning life, I experienced racial discrimination from my white friends in some instances although I was very social that it never affected me. I learnt that discrimination in that country was minimized by the high number of foreigners in the country although the whites had a feeling that*

they were superior than the immigrant society. (Interview conducted, 15th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.36])

One respondent aged 28 years on his part suffered religious prejudice,

> *As a Muslim, I feel the Muslims are harassed on account of their faith. One incident that annoyed me, was when the police raided a mosque in Mombasa with dogs and without removing their boots to arrest and harass worshippers. I feel that as Muslims we are discriminated against unlike the majority Christians.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.37])

The respondent explained that witnessing the police raid a mosque devastated his life to the extent that he readily accepted and internalized the preaching of radical preachers, agreeing with them that there was indeed the need to defend Islam, justifiable through violent means. This feeling drove him into radicalism.

Another respondent aged 34 years, cited racial discrimination and said,

> *We lived in a city of Arabs in Israel and witnessed hostile discrimination from the majority Jews who ruthlessly attacked Arabs. The Israel-Palestine conflict fuelled the discrimination with both the Arab and Jewish youth growing up knowing that they were enemies. The discrimination witnessed in public places, schools and even in the work place. The discrimination influenced my thinking about the Jews.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.38]).

This study reveals that the respondents cited discrimination as one of the factors that changed their perception about life and persuaded them to join Violet extremist groups. Influenced by discrimination in their lives they sought mitigations through joining violent extremism to address their grievances.

Cases of discrimination in this study included discrimination along; racial, ethnicity, religion, nationality and social class. 1The oppression theory explains that oppression provokes political violence (see Fanon 1965; Whitaker 1972; Schmid, 1983), which is a key component of terrorism. Further, many grievances of discrimination and social injustice have been known to fuel cases of terrorism, such as those witnessed in the Palestine and Israel and the Al Shabaab attacks against Kenya. Some researchers have

even come up with innumerable scales and instruments for assessing perceived injustice and discrimination (e.g., McNeilly et al. 1996; Utsey and Ponterotto 1996; Neto 2001; Loo et al. 2001; Murry et al. 2001; and Duckitt et al. 2002).

To back up the theory (the oppression theory), one key informant working for an NGO stated that most youth joining radicalization from the Kenyan coast cite social injustice and discrimination by the majority 'wabara' (upcountry) people[2]. He therefore narrates:

> *Most of the returnees I have talked with blame their joining violent extremism as a result of being dominated by the upcountry people in employment. They say upcountry people are preferred to the locals on the stereotype that they are lazy. However, they hail the county government of Mombasa for insisting that employment in the county be preserved for locals. Other grievances include disappearances of the youth and land ownership at the Coast. They cite cases of discrimination in employment by accusing the upcountry people for taking up local jobs.* (Interview conducted, 27th September, 2018 [Narrative 4.39]).

Issues of discrimination and social injustice form a key component of the grievances of the individuals joining radicalization. This was brought about by Kenya's sessional paper No. 10 of 1965 categorizing the country into high and low potential areas, thus discriminating areas into potentials and non-potential areas. Most of the areas under low potentials are found at the Coast, Northern and North Eastern part of the country. Apparently, the bulk of the areas are Muslim dominated. This raises concerns of religious discrimination.

4.3.6 Residences of respondents

One's area of residence does influence the behavior of individuals (Shaw, 1986:365). Family units in a locality influence the general society behavior. Therefore, people are influenced by the environment in which they find themselves, which in turn impacts

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[2] Wabara is a term used by Kenyans living at the Coast of Indian Ocean to refer to Kenyans from the upcountry. The term is used to demean the non-coastal by implying that they are primitive as considered to the coastal.

on their lives. People living in some localities tend to be influenced by the contexts in that area which make them benefit or feel marginalized or disadvantaged in some way.

Psychologist Eric D. Shaw (1986:365) provides a strong case for what he calls "The Personal Pathway Model," by which terrorists enter their new profession. The components of this pathway include early socialization processes; narcissistic injuries; escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police; and personal connections to terrorist group members, as follows: The pathway model domiciled in a locality where favorable conditions for recruitment to terrorism occur.

This study therefore sought to assess the respondent's area of residence and to examine how this could have influenced their path to radicalization. Table 4.7 below illustrates their areas of residences:

Table 4.7: Distribution of respondents by their residences

Residences	Number	Per cent
Kenya (coast)	6	30
Kenya (North Eastern)	5	25
Kenya (other areas)	4	20
Other African countries	3	15
Europe	1	5
Middle East	1	5
Total	**20**	**100**

Source: Field data, 2018

The study findings show that majority of the respondents were citizens of Kenya (75%) with only 25% being foreigners. Findings show that, majority (30%) of the respondents interviewed lived at the Kenyan coast, 25% from North Eastern region, and 15% from other parts of Kenya. The Kenya Government through Sessional paper No. 10 (1965) categorized the country into high potential and low potential areas

according to productivity. Most of the high potential areas are in the upcountry but low potential areas were listed as coast, North Eastern and parts of Northern Kenya. From the study findings, out of the 15 Kenyan convicts interviewed, 11 were from the Coast and North Eastern, translating to 73.3% of the Kenyan respondents coming from the so-called low potential areas. In effect, these are considered as marginalized areas. It can therefore be said that most of the radicalization is concentrated at the Coastal and North Eastern Regions respectively. Apparently, the areas under reference were also dominated by Islamic religion, which is used by recruiters to radicalize the youth (see section 4.3.3 above).

On whether their area of residence had an influence on their lives, this is how some respondents put it. One respondent aged 37 years, who had lived most of his life in Kibera among his Nubian[3] ethnic members, viewed life as marginalized due to the living conditions found in the slum. Commenting on the characteristic of residences he grew up, he said:

> *Kibera lacked major infrastructure like toilets, roads, electricity and clean water. The congestion of houses denied the residents space for recreation or open spaces for children to play. Some residents engaged in illegal activities for a living attracting police crackdown on illicit brews (chang'aa). This portrayed an image of differential treatment of the residents from other formal settlements in Nairobi. The running battles between the police chasing the perceived criminals provided the sense of insecurity as compared to other formal settlements* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.40]).

He added that:

> *By staying in Kibera, one is exposed to poor living conditions, temporary schools, and no decent services like those living in decent estates. This feeling made me bitter and made me to harbor hatred against rich people as I felt that they are the cause for our suffering in the slums* (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.41]).

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[3] Nubians are an immigrant community living in Nairobi's expansive slum, Kibera. They migrated to Kenya from Southern Sudan during the First World War (1914-1918).

Similarly, one respondent aged 26 years described the characteristics of his lived life at Mandera:

> *Mandera where I lived was a conflict zone between feuding clans. The cross border crime was rampant with smuggling of goods a normal practice on a daily basis. People freely crossed the border and the Kenyan Somalis and those from Somalia recognized their ethnic connection as such movement was not restricted.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.42]).

The respondent's reference to "cross-border feuds" is in reference to the perennial inter-ethnic clashes between the Somali clans across the Kenya-Somalia border over water and pasture. Due to the arid nature of the land in this environment, the communities living in this place are exposed to hardship prompting inter-clan clashes. Compared to other Kenyans living in high potential areas, they see themselves as marginalized as they are deprived of basic needs, essential services and infrastructure.

One Key Informant working for an NGO supported the above observation and said:

> *In Kenya, most of the radicalized youth are found in Muslim dominated areas; Coast, North Eastern and Nairobi regions. The affected areas also harbor grievances of marginalization and agitation for land rights. However, lately, radicalization seems to extent to other parts of the country targeting learning institutions* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.43])

Another Key Informant (CT Researcher) said that:

> *Mombasa is the hub of Islam in East and Central Africa with the concentration of divergent groups of Islam that occasionally fuel conflicts among the radical and moderate Muslim clerics. Additionally, my encounters with most radicalized individuals mostly provide links to Nairobi's Eastleigh, once described by the Washington Post as the incubator of Jihad (Raghavan 2010) renowned for Religious violent extremist recruiters based in Mosques and schools (Botha 2014b, 8).* (Interview conducted, 17th September, 2018 [Narrative 4.44])

The key informant's reference to Eastleigh and Mombasa as Places where cases of radicalisation were common, pointed at the strong concentration of Islamic extremism and some other grievances. Mainly, Eastleigh in Nairobi is cited as the incubator of radicalisation because of the high concentration of residences of Somali nationals,

where Terrorism conveniently thrive with its direct links with Somalia, the Al Shabaab base.

Another respondent aged 35 years, born in Dandora and then grew up in the slums of Kariobangi did not recognize deviance as negative behavior and states:

> *I grew up witnessing some of my friends I played with participate in crime but I did not see it as unusual. In Kariobangi, cases of theft or participation in crime was a normal action by the residents. One would hear people discuss in hushed tones about the son of so and so were the masterminds of some major crime that took place in the city. Some of my friends who engaged in crime continued being my friends, although I did not participate in crime since my parents provided the family with all the necessities.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.45]).

Another respondent aged 28 years explained how the activities derived from his area of residence (a slum in Nanyuki) shaped his life:

> *I and my siblings lived with our maternal grandmother at Shauri Moyo in Nairobi while our parents worked in Mombasa. When our parents died in a ferry tragedy, we moved to Nanyuki with our grandmother. We were unable to proceed with education, as such I tried working as a barber but was unsuccessful. My friends in Nanyuki persuaded me to engage in crime and eventually radicalized to participate in terrorism.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.46]).

One respondent aged 34 years, a foreigner convicted in Kenya narrated how his home context influenced his negative attitude towards Jews. He narrates thus:

> *I grew up in the Arab city in Israel with understanding that the Jews are enemies of the Arabs. One day I saw a Jewish police officer ruthlessly beat a Palestinian and I felt annoyed with the action. My parents continued reminding me that the Jews are enemies of the Arabs and I grew up persuaded that the Jews are our enemies. I developed strong negative feelings against the Jews and started watching videos on war.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.47])

The respondent was born in the area with existing Arabs and Jews hostilities and i got involved in these hostilities due to community influence. His perception of the Jews was exacerbated by an incident he witnessed in which a Jew police mercilessly battered an Arab—an act that annoyed him to the extent that he decided that from that day henceforth he will fight the Jews anywhere and everywhere that the

opportunity presents itself. This feeling prompted him into joining radicalization. His action to join radicalization therefore was not caused by the attack of the police on the Arab per se, but was a precipitation of lived experiences of repeatedly being told that the Jews were enemies of his community. The police beating of the Arab was only a trigger to his joining radicalization—he had for long harbored the feeling of revenge against the Jews.

Another respondent aged 26 years explained how living in an environment characterized by cross border conflicts shaped his later life:

> *I lived most of my life in Mandera, where I witnessed inter-clan conflicts, war in Somalia and cross border smuggling of goods. Later on in life, I also participated in cross border smuggling and occasionally sided with the relatives in the inter-clan conflicts. I grew up knowing that inter-clan conflicts and cross border smuggling was a way of life.* (Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.48])

Others felt disadvantaged by living in unstable residences like conflict prone areas, unstable countries and environs where communal influences to participate in deviant behaviors were over-bearing. One respondent aged 37 years narrates;

> *Having lived in Kibera with my uncle and shifted to Biafra to stay with a friend. I found life unbearable and one friend approached me to accompany him to Somalia to get a well-paying job. I later regretted leaving the country as on arrival I was forced to join jihadists and to convert to Islam. I knew my predicament was caused by my father rejecting me and letting me to live a deplorable life that led to my joining the jihadists that led to my current problems.* (Interview conducted, 15th September, 2018 [Narrative 4.49]).

According to the respondent, as if his desolate life was not enough, he encountered further life challenges while living in the slums of Kibera and Biafra estates of Nairobi. While searching for a purpose in life, he interacted with friends in these two slum areas who eventually introduced him to radicalization. He admired the life style of his friends and wanted to be like them.

Bandura (1977:22) explains that:

> *Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if people had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to do. Fortunately, most human behavior is learned observationally through modeling: from observing others, one forms an idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for action.*

People therefore tend to learn from parents and from other people that they interact with and later practice what they have learnt later on in life. The youth therefore, tend to reconstruct themselves through learned behavior acquired from interacting with the people around them. In this case, some of the respondents were influenced by the living conditions of the people in his environs. The behavior influencing them are contextualized in the residences where they live and grew up.

One Key informant working for an NGO said that:

> *In dealing with the returnees for rehabilitation, they learnt that most of them were influenced by the common trend in the respective localities where they lived. It was found that in one area, there could be several youth who had been radicalized. Interaction with some of the returnees show common grievances of mainly poverty, unemployment, and marginalization, which are contextualized in their common place of residence.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.50])

The current scope of terrorism and especially after the September, 11, 2001 terrorist attacks changed the perception of terrorism, with national politicians and United Nations officials identifying poverty, global income inequality, unemployment, and low levels of education as key causes of terrorism (Gottlieb 38 as quoted by Reyes N., 2016:119).

One Key Informant stated that most radicalizers view Kenya as predominantly Christian state, therefore its deployment of a peacekeeping force in Somalia is viewed as an invasion by Christians on an Islamic state. This understanding of the perceived

action of Christians against Muslims is used as a reason to recruit Muslim followers to wage a Jihad war to protect Islam. Further, Kenya is viewed as a protector of Western interests and this is why it has deployed its military in Somalia to fight against the violent extremists. This has been often used by extremists for recruitment of members into Al Shabaab (Wafula, 2014). Further, the attackers in the country are increasingly becoming localized, as witnessed by the suicide bomber who participated in Riverside (Dusit D2 Hotel) attack in Nairobi on 15th January, 2019. The recruiters use religious radicalization to recruit and radicalize the youth, and it now seems that this recruitment is extending to non-Muslims who have grievances against the government of one nature or another. This is a new trend and a far cry from the usual recruitment of Muslims (Njogu, 2015). Njogu adds that this phenomenon can also be attributed to acts of kidnapping of non-Muslim persons from refugee camps and colleges and transported to Somalia to be radicalized. The targeting of non-Muslims also covers higher institutions of learning (vis, Universities) where recruitment based on peer influence is used to radicalize students to participate in terrorism.

Having discussed the characteristics and their influencing contexts, it is necessary to understand how the radicalized individuals define themselves after being radicalized. The next section therefore delves into the thinking of the respondents about themselves and how this settles with their justification for joining radicalization.

4.4 Social Meaning of Radicalization and Lived Experiences

Individuals tend to act independently in life by making their own choices, but recurrent patterned arrangements influence their choices according to the available opportunities. They imagine what other people think about them and interpret what their minds think of their mind and likewise to by other people about them (Cooley, 1998). According to Bandura (1977), individuals learn many of their behavioral

tendencies by observing other people, obtaining rewards and punishments for particular behaviors. However, the level of cognition varies among the individuals according to the environmental orientations of their lived experiences. Therefore, individual meaning show individual self-image through individual self-reflection and from what others think of them. Using the 'social mirror' as a measurement of the self, an individual positive reaction creates a positive self-concept, while a negative reaction creates a negative self-concept.

Building on Cooley's work, Shaffer (2005), describes how individuals construct themselves in three dimensions: imagination of how individuals must appear to others in a social situation; perception of what others think of themselves and the response to the individual awareness about other people's perception judgments on the self (this echoes the seminal work of Cooley on the *looking glass mirror).* Therefore, construction of social meanings of an individual includes inter-subjectivity among individuals and any personal meanings shaped through such interactions as affected by the inter-subjectivity of the community to which the affected people belong.

The radicalized individual's interactions in the group construct the "self" through group members from which they derive the self-meaning according to how the group members perceive them. Meanwhile, the self-meaning depends on the resilience of the individual according to the capacity of the individual to act independently (Agency) and the recurrent patterned arrangements which influence or limit the choices and opportunities available to the individual (structure). This influence is dependent on the most salient factors that appeals to the individual. This is aimed at the desire to achieve development in life by focusing on issues perceived to contribute to their life goals. In some instances, the individual get embedded in political, economic, cultural, religious or family influences according to the lived environment.

The result of this construction manifests to individual alignment to life roles based on vulnerability of the individual in their lived contexts.

Researches carried out have not identified the actual causes of joining terrorism. According to Taylor (1988), there is a general disagreement among psychologists about people joining terrorism, that there is no one terrorist mindset, a view that is yet to be clarified. However, they identified three vulnerabilities that may provide sources of motivation or make one more likely to endorse violence (Borum, 2010). The vulnerabilities are; Perceived Injustice or Humiliation, need for identity and need for belonging. These are some of the themes that have emerged on studies on terrorism.

Several themes emerged from the present study, and the themes that emerged were: Self-empowerment, Self-Identity, Self-Repair from humiliation, Social-Regret and Seeking justice. In analyzing the themes in this study, much emphasis was put on how the respondents constructed themselves under each theme. Therefore, the social construction theory was useful in understanding the construction of the respondents. These findings were interpreted according to the world view of the respondents by use of IPA. The use of both theories was necessary and important because all the themes in this section were concerned about the respondents' lived experiences that could only be interpreted by IPA through interpretations of how they constructed themselves in each of the themes. The significance of IPA therefore was to interpret the meanings as presented by respondent as influenced by their lived contexts.

4.4.1 Radicalization as self-empowerment

Sociologically, power has been defined as the ability to exercise the will over others (Weber 1922). This means power enables the ability to control others, events, or a resource; to make happen what one wants to happen in spite of obstacles, resistance,

or opposition. An individual therefore gets self-empowerment in order to exercise the envisaged power. In attaining self-empowerment, one undergoes a process of consolidating, maintaining, or changing the nature and distribution of power in a particular cultural context, ranging from acts of individual resistance to mass political mobilizations (Bookman and Morgen, 1988: 4). Women empowerment refers to the general process through which, women gain knowledge about the structures that oppress them and seek to alter the power imbalances in society (Bookman and Morgen, 1988: 4). Researchers posit that distinct traits found in women joining terrorism was that the women were mainly from places where terrorist organizations were based (Jacques and Taylor, 2013: 41-42).

One of the underlying sub-themes that emerged (under the general theme of empowerment) from the findings was radicalization as a means of gender empowerment. The study discusses gender empowerment specifically on female and male experiences alongside their roles in their respective contexts. It further focuses on the meaning of their lives and how they were perceived in their living environments.

One of the participants aged 34 years demonstrated how his gender empowerment was instilled in his life. He alluded that his father gave him freedom and warned other family members to let him choose his own way of life. He therefore felt his decisions were right in all instances but in the end, they became extreme. His extreme approach led him into radicalization and violent extremism (see narrative 4.22 for interview conducted on 31st July 2018 above)

Another respondent aged 30 years said,

> *I was born in Goma, DR Congo, in a polygamous family with 16 children.*
> *We lived in poverty and our mother worked hard to support the family*

while our father engaged in drinking alcohol. This situation encouraged me to be committed in my studies that enabled me to join university. Due to poverty I was unable to complete my university education. I therefore left home looking for a living and on return home transiting through Kenya I was arrested and convicted of terrorism (Interview conduct o on 31st July, 218 [Narrative 4.51]).

The respondent said that after dropping out of university was unable to get employment to support his parents and community. To empower himself therefore, he decided to leave for a foreign country, getting involved in radicalization, which eventually led to his imprisonment.

A female respondent aged 43 years said,

My father was involved in Madrassa teaching when I was young and I got interested in teaching. At one time, I dropped out of school for some time, I started teaching madrassa in our home. When I resumed school, I joined a madrassa university where I found myself alone as a female student. I was forced to drop out due to gender, which Muslim religion valued in favor of males. However, I later resumed my studies and completed my degree in Islamic studies, which is rare among Muslim women. (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.52]).

In her endeavor to teach in the madrassa and give Muslim women a chance to learn madrassa alongside the male Muslim, she fulfilled her dream of empowering herself and other female Muslims in Islamic worship. This realization was because of her struggle as a woman alone pursuing further studies in Islamic studies despite the barriers she experienced in the course of pursuing her studies.

She added that,

In the Muslim religion, teaching in the Madrassa is a preserve of males. However in 2009 I completed my degree programme. I went ahead to open a Madrasa in 2011. By that time, I had seven children. The Madrasa was for girls boarding to ensure that the Muslim girls get chance of learning Islamic studies. I became popular among my students and the locals who respected me, giving me the title "ustatha" (female teacher). (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.53]).

Another female respondent aged 26 years said that,

I experienced hardship in life when both of my parents died while I was in primary school. As a girl I did not see much potential in life other than

seeking for means of livelihood before I matured to get married. In an effort to stabilize, I left home to stay with my elder sister in Mombasa and eventually got a job as a house maid. I worked in six homesteads but I was harassed by the males, eventually getting employment in a food kiosk. I liked food business to the extent of opening my own kiosk earning a title of "Mama Zima". I felt insecure without a husband in my business as such I got married. We promoted the food business and later started business of vitenge and clothes. (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.53]).

Another Key Informant working for an NGO said that,

Some female Jihadists had expressed different reasons from their male counterparts for joining violent extremism. Some said that they were attracted into joining with the aim of getting married to some of their friends who had already joined. Asked further, they said, they felt more privileged and sense of heroism by getting married to fighters. (Interview conducted, 16th September, 2018 [Narrative 4.54).

Previous studies show that some women joined violent extremism because they were attracted by leaders of the VEO (Morgan, 2001). This means they felt empowered by getting married to a militant and a fighter.

The other sub-theme that emerged under the general theme of empowerment is spiritual empowerment as a means of self-empowerment. This is attained through embracing the sacred values which is highly coveted and regarded for attainment of heavenly gifts. The path to attainment of the sacred values was clarified by Atran et al (2007) in the devoted actor model. The model states that, the devoted actor is a moral agent markedly different from most notions of rational agent, who is immune to material trade-offs. In devoted actor model, the individual pursues heavenly gift, which is sacred. The sacred gift is so holy that one cannot exchange it with anything else. This means, one is supposed to die to get the sacred gift, motivating militants who have such characteristics to kill and die for each other. They are motivated by sacred values in all their actions. Atran further reiterates that sacred values are moral necessities that seem to drive behavior devoid of influences of any concrete or material goal. Often, their reasons are religious based, founded on secular values as

belief in the importance of individual morality, fairness, reciprocity, and collective identity seen as sacred values. The sacred values in this case could only be attained through commitment and conviction, which is process of spirituality, which the individuals pursuing such a course feel empowered spiritually.

One respondent aged 33 years while talking about spiritual model, narrates:

> *Many people in the community consulted me on matters of Islamic law and participated in discussions on the Koran. There were high expectations of me becoming an Islamic preacher, which I had demonstrated through preaching in the mosques and to the public. Occasionally people see me succeed my father in preaching and some even say I could do better.* (Interview conducted on 1st August 2018 [Narrative 4.55]).

The respondent in this case sought several ways of getting self-empowerment. First, he wanted to be an Islamic spiritual leader like his father. This he attained by studying Islamic studies in the Middle East. Secondly, he wanted to be a community leader where he participated in inter-ethnic conflicts. Lastly, he wanted to empower himself in society by getting a means of livelihood by acquiring education and securing a job where he became a manager to get empowered by winning respect from the community. On the overall, he commanded respect and was relied upon for Islamic religion interpretations and communal matters. This was the role that he cherished the most. This influence in the community led to the predicament of participation in terrorist activities.

Another respondent aged 34 years recounts his experience with spiritual empowerment:

> *I thought about returning to where we had left but the bond for family was too strong to break away. I thought about embarking on business but the environment was new and I did not know where to start. I decided to resume going to the mosque. I felt a strong commitment to religion than I have ever felt in my life. I decided to play alone in the compound and kept to myself. I had a girlfriend where we had migrated and we kept communicating on cell phone* (Interview conducted on 31st July 2018[Narrative 4.56]).

He added that,

> *At one point, I decided to block her cell phone number and kept to myself.*
> *During the day for about three months, I remained indoors and discovered*
> *that there were many books on Islamic religion in the house belonging to*
> *my father. During the period, I read the books and delved in detail what*
> *Islamism means. One day I discovered myself and realized that life is not*
> *what I had been pursuing. Is that what you call radicalization? I went on*
> *like that and changed my life. I would see all the preaching in the mosques*
> *from the understanding of the books I had read.* (Interview conducted on
> 31st July 2018 [Narrative 4.57]).

Findings show that the respondent read falsified Islamic literature in detail, and by doing so, self-indoctrinated himself, an act that changed his life. After reading the literature, he said that he re-discovered himself meaning he understood the Koran differently from the way he initially understood it. At one point, he posed a question; *is that what you call radicalization?* Then he laughed! He mentioned that from that moment going forward, his life was never the same again. He opted to pursue heavenly gifts, which eventually led him into radicalization (and eventually imprisoned for terrorism related offence).

The above respondent acknowledged that he read Islamic literature in his father's house which influenced his joining radicalization. Therefore he went through spiritual transformation realizing more of his potentials than before. He was later arrested and charged for plotting terrorism.

One respondent aged 34 years narrates about his encounter with religion:

> *While staying in Ethiopia with my grandmother, she made me attend*
> *madrassa. I also learnt the Koran and Islamic studies. This assisted me to*
> *read the Koran when I returned home in Kenya. I became committed to*
> *Islamic religion and I was a committed Muslim. I travelled a lot while doing*
> *business and went to the mosque anywhere I did business. I was arrested*
> *and charged for participating in VEO and imprisoned* (Interview conducted,
> 14th August 2018 [Narrative 4.58]).

Having left home at a tender age to stay with his grandmother in Ethiopia, he returned home to engage in business since he was past the school-going age. While engaging

in business, he was arrested in connection with terrorism and convicted. This implies that, most of his life was influenced by the lived experience in Ethiopia. He obtained spiritual empowerment while in Ethiopia.

Another respondent aged 37 years on his spiritual empowerment narrates:

> *In 2001, my mother moved with me to Mombasa where she did business. She asked me if I could join madrassa and I accepted. She took me to Kilifi where I learnt the Quran for three years. Upon completion, I learnt Quran translation for four and a half years. This included studying six volumes of the Islamic books including the hadith. In 2009 after completion of the Islamic studies, I developed the desire to meet my father. (*Interview conducted, 28th August, 2018[Narrative 4.59]).

The respondent dropped out of school in lower primary before relocating to Mombasa with the mother. While in Mombasa he got interested in Islamic studies and the Quran thus attaining spiritual empowerment. When he relocated to Eastleigh in Nairobi, he was arrested and imprisoned for terrorism. According to one female respondent aged 43 years, terrorists and other criminals should be treated the same because they all engage in violent crimes. Being a madrassa teacher, was accused of radicalizing the youth and imprisoned. *She* possessed vast knowledge of the *Quran* and Islamic studies, a fete that she cherishes (see Narrative 5.3).

Another respondent narrates how he became so religious prior to being associated with terrorism:

> *These difficulties pushed me to become more religious. I committed myself to Islam. This earned a tittle in the village of musomi wa dini (ardent believer of Islam). Throughout this period after I discontinued my learning, my father remained very close to me and guided me on how to lead a Muslim life.* (Interview conducted, 15th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.60]).

The respondent commitment to religion earned him respect (something that delights him) in addition to his personal development. He got involved in community development related activities and assisting the needy. He was later to be convicted and imprisoned for terrorism.

One key informant (Muslim Imam) narrates how religion is used to radicalize the recruits:

> *People recruited into radicalism, are usually not knowledgeable about the Islamic teaching and the Quran. The recruiters target them once they know they have problems to exploit. Recruiters tend to use Islam because of the misunderstood concept of Jihad and the undocumented Hadith. In radicalizing, the radicalizers tend to promise the recruits unrealistic rewards like the 72 virgins and being rewarded with life in heaven. There is widespread condemnation of Islam as supporting terrorism. The truth is that we have the Salafi-Wahhabism who advocate for violence. However, majority of the Muslims are affected by terrorism like other people in the world. In essence the group radicalizing youths is simply for their selfish aims but not for the good of Islam as a religion* (Interview conducted, 31st July 2018 [Narrative 4.61]).

All the respondents interviewed in this study said that they were taken through the indoctrination process where the Islamic doctrines and practices were imparted in them. They said to ensure they maintain the spirit of comradeship; they were encouraged to discuss and share ideas. Most importantly they made certain that the group was protected from their individual interests that they derive meanings about themselves. The respondents therefore share a common vision in the group by identifying themselves as units of the whole group. In their understanding, each individual's purpose of life is dependent on the other members of the group.

Findings in this study show that the respondents' perception of empowerment is the usurping of roles in life, which to their meaning of life, are empowered in their social life. Contrary to roles in society according to cultural practices, the radicalized individual feels empowered as a militant or a fighter for a cause in life. This study therefore examines empowerment as perceived by the respondents in relation with joining of the VEO. In actual sense, empowerment in this case is comparative and meant to improve personal esteem and confidence in life. The respondents joining radicalization as a means of empowerment see the world as devoid of the right

structures to accommodate them. They therefore seek alternative means to make meaning of themselves in their lives.

According to Bloom (2011:28), one of the motivations women face to become terrorists is a strong belief in a cause and thus they join terrorist groups to achieve that cause, regardless of the consequences and the price of the goal. Some of the reasons for their joining terrorism is to achieve a political reform within a country (Cunningham, 2010:186), get intimate with the male leaders of the gang (Morgan, 2001:171), the search for vengeance, gain justice and loss of family members.

The majority of the respondents indicated that it is from their encounter with challenges in their lived experiences that they were compelled to change their living conditions. The move was aimed at improving their lives or realizing their goals in life. The ultimate goal for their actions was to solve their pressing needs which included addressing their grievances, and it is from this that they were cajoled into participating in violent extremism. The respondents in striving to be empowered aimed at concretizing their self-identity and to maintain their image in the right perspective. The satisfaction and confidence achieved from empowerment at individual level cemented their identity within the group. Traditional gender roles in society give the male more responsibility in the world, and especially at family level. In some instances, the male joined radicalization as a means of actualizing their roles when confronted with life challenges. On the other hand, female respondents benchmarked success with performing male roles which to them was (gender) empowerment. The next section dwells in detail or is a detailed explanation on the respondents' definitions of their meanings of self-identity by joining violent extremism.

4.4.2 Radicalization as a means to self-identity

Social Identity articulates the experiences of the individual in the in-group and how they compare their actions with the out-group (Tajfel, 1979). The basis of social identity was originally developed to understand the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination. Identity is therefore viewed as a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others (see Kashima, 2001)

According to Tajfel (1979), Social identity manifests in four ways: (i) Social categorization: an individual's self-identification with a social group; (ii) In-group positivity: the positive emotions and self-esteem produced by group affiliation; (iii) Intergroup comparison: the comparison between different groups and the perceptions on group status this creates and (iv) Out-group hostility: hostility towards other groups that results from intergroup comparisons and perceptions about the illegitimacy of intergroup power relations in society.

In identity theory (see Burke and Stets 2009; Stryker 1980, 2002 for instance), when people have a moral identity, being (more or less) moral will influence their behavior in a situation. Other individuals will then react to their behavior. When individuals think others interpret their behavior in the same way they intended, they feel good. When individuals think others interpret their behavior differently, they get disappointed.

The current study identified several cases of individuals striving to gain social identity by becoming violent extremists. Below are some of their narratives that shed light to this.

One respondent aged 37 years on his struggle to attain self-identity narrates:

> *I am a Kenyan from Nubian community and I grew up in Kibera, Nairobi. I was angered by the frustrations experienced by our people and lack of vital facilities like clean water and good roads. I was bitter at the rich when I joined form one in Karen. I purposely joined violent extremism to fight the western hatred for Muslims and marginalization of our people. In the VEO I realized that they revered merciless people. To attain the position in the VEO I practiced shrewdness and mercilessness to get promoted to become head of the Amnyat (head of spies). I continued impressing more bosses because I aimed at being the Amir (commander). (*Interview conducted, 15th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.62]).

The respondent having failed to achieve his desired goals in life, after joining violent extremism, he showed commitment in actualizing his goals lest he fails again. To achieve this, he identified pertinent characteristics to attain social identity in the group. The areas he exploited were shrewdness and impressing his seniors in the group which propelled him to head a unit in the VEO.

Another respondent aged 43 years struggled in life to actualize her identity and she narrates,

> *I got married to an imam and we taught madrassa with him and I was respected. When he was alive we worked hard to promote our business and bring up children. When I leave here I intend to study masters in Islamic studies to be the first woman in Kenya to hold such qualifications.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.63]).

The respondent, as observed in her narrative, strived to shape her social identity through getting married to an Imam and striving to excel in her academics. She struggled to beat the odds by being a unique Muslim woman to attain qualifying standards in Islamic studies where ordinarily, Muslim women were constrained. This earned her prestige and honor and elevated her social status. In the course of striving in life, she got associated with radicalization.

Another respondent aged 40 years in the struggle to realize his dreams in life narrates:

> *I grew up with the dream of becoming a catholic priest after serving as an altar boy in church. After my high school, I joined catholic seminary to*

study priesthood but my hopes were dashed when I was expelled for befriending a student nun. Determined not to fail in life, I joined a teachers training college to hide the shame of expulsion from seminary. On completion I remained jobless until a friend assisted me to travel to Dadaab where I secured a teaching job and consequently to Kismayo in Somalia where I joined violent extremism. All my efforts were aimed at realizing my life dream and to live to the belief by the people in the village that I was hardworking and promising in life. (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.64]).

The respondent, since childhood as an altar boy experienced prestige and status in church among his peers and the elderly members of the church. His decision to join the seminary to become a priest was an effort to improve his identity/standing in society, since to him catholic priests were held in high regard. His decision to join Islamic teaching was therefore to sanitize the shame (Stets and Carter, 2012) of expulsion from the seminary. He therefore sought an alternative means to attain his envisioned social identity. Failure to attain his ambitions by remaining jobless after graduating from college compelled him to escape from shame by leaving home to Dadaab and Somalia and eventually was recruited into radicalism.

A respondent aged 33 years in an effort to ascribe to a reputable position in his community narrates that:

My father was a madrassa teacher and Muslim cleric. I wanted to be an imam when I grew up. To realize my dream, after my college studies in aviation, I travelled to Middle East to study Islamic studies. On return, I was recognized by the community and allowed to preach in open meetings. I also participated in community conflict resolutions. Luckily, I got a job where I became manager of a tour firm but occasionally participated in community activities whenever I went home. My involvement in the community matters made me to be associated with violent extremism. (Interview conducted, 1st August, 2018 [Narrative 4.65]).

As a male child he strived to ascribe to the position of his father. After completion of his studies, he took up roles of preaching, community leader and engaged in inter-clan conflict resolutions. This was the self-identity that he had envisioned.

One respondent aged 30 years therefore narrates his predicaments,

> *My childhood life faced a lot of challenges. In school, I learned with a lot of difficulties and occasionally was sent away for lack of fees. I committed myself to learn because I saw that was the only way of assisting my parents and my siblings to improve their lives. I also felt that our country faced bad leadership and when I complete my studies, I will join politics and improve the lives of my fellow citizens. Therefore, while in search of a living, I was convicted and imprisoned.* (Interview conducted on 31st July 218 [Narrative 4.66]).

After failing to complete university education he left home as a means to seeking livelihood to actualize his dreams of helping the family and the community. His envisioned self-identity was therefore to be a savior to his community. This he could obtain through radicalization.

One respondent aged 40 years on esteem issues narrates,

> *In the village I was known to be honest, hardworking and promising. After expulsion from the seminary, I felt ashamed to the extent of not wanting to stay in the village. I persuaded my father to take me to a primary teachers college. After graduation and failed to secure a job, I accompanied a friend to Dadaab to seek for a job and eventually ended up in Somalia where I became a jihadist. After imprisonment, I decided to keep it to myself and I would not like them to know including my two wives due to the shame of suffering a double tragedy after the expulsion from the seminary. (*Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.67]).

After failing to realize his dream of becoming a priest, the respondent sought alternative means of realizing his envisaged self-esteem through joining teachers college and eventually seeking employment in Dadaab and Kismayu in Somalia, and eventually being recruited into radicalization. On the other hand, the achievement of self-esteem is a factor in the search for identity because through it enhances one's feelings of *self-worth*. Self-worth is the degree to which individuals feel positive about themselves, that is, they feel that they are good and valuable (Rosenberg et al. 1995), leading to self-acceptance or self-respect. Self-worth is rooted in the idea that individuals desire to see themselves favorably, and they act in a way that maintains

and enhances their positive self-view of themselves (Leary 2007). In this case, the respondents considering their cultural roles in society, they strived to fulfill them by seeking means of survival to uphold their status. They therefore endeavor to seek all available means to fulfill their assigned roles including joining radicalization to remain relevant in the society.

Another Key Informant working for an NGO dealing with interventions to the radicalized individuals narrates,

> *It is out of the desire for the youth to improve their living standards that they were easily trapped for a promise of a job. Some said that they wanted to be away from home because their peers had left their places of residence for gainful employment which had improved their image in the community. They also wanted to improve their appeal in society so that they can command respect like their peers. They said that, staying away from home was one way of enabling them be respected unlike remaining a suspect of any evil happening in the village. By remaining away and supporting their families, they commanded respect in the community (self-worth).*
> (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.68])

In the endeavor to attain fulfillment in their stipulated roles in society, the respondents tried all means to save themselves from community ridicule for failing in life by seeking other means to maintain self-esteem. Self-esteem in this case refers to the positive (high self-esteem) or negative (low self-esteem) feelings that individuals have about themselves (Stet and Burke 200). In this case they pursue positive feelings where they believe that they are good and worthy and that others view them positively. On the negative feelings, the radicalized define themselves as having the negative feelings low self-esteem when they believe that they are inadequate and less worthy than others (Rosenberg, et al. 1995). This is a situation when they suffer humiliation and harbor revenge that also serves as a motivating factor to joining radicalization.

The respondent aged 43 years, on her self-esteem narrates,

> *I enjoyed being a girl guide to the extent of wearing the uniform at home. When my father denied me permission to participate in a Girl Guide function, I was annoyed to the point of dropping out of school in form two. I felt I was more privileged than other students and even neighbors respected me as a girl guide. Probably if it was now I would not have taken the decision I took to leave school. (*Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.69]).

According to the respondent, her life was disrupted when she was restrained from participation in Girl Guide functions. According to her, Girl Guide was a prestige she enjoyed to the extent of wearing the uniform at home. She later discovered herself while in prison that the disruption was not warranted the action she took. This disruption took a toll on her life, hardening her to aggressive activities leading to her present predicament.

According to Maslow (1943) all people in our society need or desire a stable, firmly based, high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. They desire to achieve; reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation. Satisfaction of the self-esteem need leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability, and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world (p. 382). Several respondents despite seeking self-identity, they also looked for self-esteem to protect them to actualize their desires. Most studies have shown that young people participate in terrorism as a means of identity seeking who have strong or even desperate needs to consolidate their identities (Olson 1988). Many of them became politically violent, seeking a sense of purpose and self-purpose and self-worth, '*a place in the sun'* (Taylor and Quayle, 1994)

Both identity and esteem issues contribute to individual confidence and self-identification in society. On the contrary, failure to achieve one's desired goal(s), may

lead to grievance creation, followed by extreme decision and actions to overcome the current predicament. The respondents therefore tended to engage in actions that will bring honor to their lives. This is meant to portray them in a positive light to society so that they can get approval from their respective contexts. Such individuals therefore tend to move to places and into groups where they can find this positive approval. This is one of the major factors that drives the respondents in joining radicalization as they yearn for this approval (from the group).

4.4.3 Radicalization as self-repair from humiliation

Humiliation and the internal urge to revenge is a psychological factor that has been hypothesized to provoke terrorist violence (Juergensmeye, 2000). The feelings of humiliation or being taken advantage of gives rise to a passion for revenge is very familiar in forensic psychiatry and criminology and this phenomenon is said to probably contribute to many nonpolitical murders (see Miller 1993; Brooks, Thomas, and Droppleman 1996; Schlesinger 2000; and, Meloy 2001). According to Borum (2010) one of the vulnerabilities of people joining terrorism is perceived injustice or humiliation to the individual. Similarly, Stets and Burke (2012) in their cybernetics model of social interactions stated that humiliation caused to an individual provokes them to fight back or escape from the perceived humiliation.

Several respondents interviewed in this study cited humiliation at some point in their life, that made them join violent extremism. Their joining the VEO was a means of mitigating/ repairing their grievances occasioned by that specific humiliation.

One respondent aged 25 years recounted frustrations and humiliations meted on her by her husband and said:

> *After I returned from Dubai, my husband had married another wife and taken my child under her care. I got frustrated and got involved in fighting*

> *with him. I persisted and at one time he beat me in public and decided that I will not give up until I got my child. I tried all efforts to get my child and vowed to teach him a lesson. Next time he tried to attack me I beat him squarely and from that time I got involved with Jihadists and got imprisoned.* (Interview conducted, 10th August 2018 [Narrative 4.70]).

The respondent, by being attacked in public by her husband and her child taken away from her custody and placed under the care of another woman was the ultimate form of humiliation. She felt demeaned and humiliated. Joining the VEO was her way of fighting back the humiliation that had been meted on her by her husband.

One foreign respondent aged 34 years lived in an Arabic city of Israel and was frustrated by the Jewish police harassment of Arabs. He explains:

> *I lived in the Arabic city of Umm al Fahm where arabs viewed the jews as enemies due to the Israel and Palestine conflict. I used to be told about the Jew brutality to Arabs and that they hated Arabs. At one time I witnessed a Jewish police brutalize an Arab youth in public, I got affected as an Arab. That action was perceived as open humiliation and hostility to the Arab community. I personally felt so much humiliated by the action our Arab brothers were mistreated by the Jews. Since that time, I started watching war movies and even downloaded them on my phone. Later, I was arrested with the movies on my phone on my way to Qatar through Kenya and convicted and imprisoned for terrorism* (Interview contacted, 28th August 2018 [Narrative 4.71]).

At that point in life, the respondent found the hostility from their perceived enemies and the public humiliation that was meted on Arabs by the Jews, was unbearable, and as such, he opted to join the fighters against the perceived Jewish brutality by leaving the country to join Jihadism.

Another respondent aged 28 years, while talking about experiences with humiliation, narrates:

> *Having been born of a single mother who died while I was at the age of two years, I faced more frustrations in life including being rejected by my maternal uncles and my biological father. I was forced to drop out of school at primary. Anytime l returned to my late mother's home I was humiliated by being referred to as a bastard and chased away by my uncles and their children. When I briefly stayed in Kibera and Biafra estate in Nairobi, I found some friends who had regarded me as a human being. I*

*joined them to Somalia and ended up in the group of jihadists. (*Interview conducted, 10th August 2018 [Narrative 4.72]).

The respondent suffered humiliation in life through parental rejection and suffered rebuke from peers. The respondent was labeled as a person without roots and occasionally called a bastard. In life, he felt disadvantaged due to lack of parents and missing a home exposing him to further societal ridicule. Unable to settle in life, he chose to leave the country for Somalia where he was radicalized and joined other jihadists as a fighter. This was the way he was able to put aside the humiliation he suffered in his past life.

Another respondent aged 30 years narrated how he reacted to frustrations by travelling out of his country:

> *Our family of 16 children lived in poverty in Goma, DRC with our father who was polygamous engaging in drinking of alcohol. With support of my mother, I went to university but due to lack of fees, I dropped out. I was disappointed because I wanted to support my family and assist my country out of bad governance. People at home respected me I was ashamed to remain in the village with some of my friends who failed in examinations. I therefore left my country to look for a means of survival. When I was returning home passing through Kenya I was arrested and imprisoned for terrorism.* (lnterview conducted, 31stJuly 2018 [Narrative 4.73]).

The respondent dropped out of university due to fees constraint and felt ashamed to remain at home despite passing his previous examinations well. As a means of evading the shame, he left the country and joined terrorism. He therefore joined terrorism to erase the previous shame of dropping out of the university and consequently not being able to take care of his family.

One Key informant (CT Researcher) recounted his experiences with the returnees and those disengaging from violent extremism by narrating:

> *In dealing with the returnees and those undergoing rehabilitation, I realized that most of them suffered from low esteem due to low education or felt unfairly treated in society. Some of them picked minor grievances*

> *like harassment by the police or chiefs to seek for alternative means of protecting themselves. Some of them claimed that they suffered humiliation through frequent arrests simply because their friends or relatives had joined violent extremism. As mitigation, they said they escaped the country to join their friends in Somalia and eventually became radicalized.*
> (Interview conducted, 27th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.74]).

The current study findings show that respondents with different grievances engaged in ways of covering their negative experiences by employing counter measures to sanitize themselves. In these cases they reacted by resisting their aggressors through participation in violence or evading the problem by moving away (Armstrong 2001). This action was aimed at hiding the shame on the affected person to rejuvenate the self in a new context. This action therefore provides remedy to the victim and the process to get reprieve (self-repair). In the devoted actor model, a radicalized person pursues sacred values, which cannot be traded off with anything of whatever value (Atran, 2007). Therefore, in the process of repairing themselves, the radicalized individuals accomplished their revenge to attain the envisaged sacred values whatever the price, even if it means losing their lives. According to Stets and Burke (2012), emotions generated as a result of humiliation provoke an individual to either escape from shame or fight back. In this case, those affected would join radicalization and terrorism to overcome this humiliation and shame. In the next section, narratives by the respondents and key informants on social regrets of lived experiences of joining radicalization will be discussed in detail.

4.4.4 Radicalization as a social regret

Regret has been defined as the negative emotion experienced by people when realizing or imagining that their present situation would have been better had they decided or acted differently (Zeelenberg et al, 2007). This means, regrets is concerned with decisions made by an individual that elicited a negative feeling of blame to oneself for failing to do the right thing in life. Research has shown that people tend to

regret their actions more than their inactions (Roese, 2005). Studies further show that, first, the experience of regret may produce a behavioral inclination to reverse one's decision or reverse the consequences. Second, decision makers may anticipate possible future regret when making decisions, and choose in such a way that this future regret will be minimal. By doing so, and an individual regrets serves as deterrence for future wrong decisions. This section therefore analyses the narratives by the respondents on their regrets of joining radicalization and the decisions which they view as having elicited negative emotions in their lived experiences.

One respondent, aged 30 years stated that his family lived in poverty and struggled in life to fend for the family. His father had 21 children who depended on the small family farm. After school he also married 2 wives and had 16 children. He engaged in part time employment and finally got in the business of selling clothes rising to prominence in his home area. He also played a key role in the mosque management and worship. Narrates:

> *I worked so hard in life but the lowest moment of my life got me by surprise one day when I was woken up early in the morning by the police and told me that they had recovered firearms and explosives in my house. My hopes of becoming a prominent businessman stopped and I regret why I worked so hard in life to end up like this.* (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.75]).

Another respondent struggled to realize his status in the community but his involvement with terrorism dashed this prospect. He regretted and states that he should have concentrated on his business other than engaged in other side shows that eventually led to his present predicament.

One respondent aged 40 years narrated how he was humiliated in life,

> *I wanted to be a catholic priest in my life, as such I became an altar boy after working for the jihadists in Kismayu, I decided to return to Dadaab to start my own school in the refugee camp. By that time I had married a*

> *Somali lady in the VEO group and left her in Kismayu. At Dadaab I*
> *married another wife who assisted me in running the school. At one time*
> *met with some of the Jihadists from Kismayu in the refugee camp which*
> *exposed me to security people and I was arrested and convicted. I got*
> *frustrated for suffering for a second time in life. During that time my father*
> *died when I was in Kismayu. I decided not to inform my two wives, my*
> *brothers and other relatives due to the humiliation I suffered at the*
> *seminary. I felt that, the information of my involvement with Jihadists will*
> *further expose me to more contempt and humiliation. In fact, you are the*
> *first person to visit me since I was imprisoned!* (Interview contacted, 30th
> August 2018 [Narrative 4.76]).

This respondent thus regrets ever having been radicalized as the action only led to

further humiliation.

One foreign respondent aged 34 years narrates his regrets:

> *After being arrested in Kenya on my way to Qatar, I regretted why I left my*
> *country to meet the predicament I am currently facing. My parents*
> *occasionally visit me but not frequently because of distance. They told me*
> *that the Israel government was negotiating with Kenyan government to*
> *relocate me to Israel where I will complete my prison term. I wish I never*
> *left my country and if I return home I will never travel again (*Interview
> contacted, 28th August 2018 [Narrative 4.77]).

While in prison, the respondent came to the realization that the decision to leave his

country to join fighters was ill informed and wishes he had remained in his country

irrespective of the grievances against the Jews.

She added that:

> *After the death of my husband, the police occasionally warned me that I*
> *was involved in the radicalization of the youth in my madrassas. Severally*
> *I was questioned whenever there was any incident in Mombasa saying that*
> *I was involved. Eventually I was arrested and imprisoned but my sons*
> *continue to manage the madrassas. "Tangu serikali inithulumu sijapata*
> *Amani maishani mwangu" (since the government unfairly punished me I*
> *have never seen peace in my life)* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018
> [Narrative 4.78]).

Another respondent aged 28 years narrates on his regrets:

> *While living in the group of the VEO, I realized that they did not like*
> *people asking questions. They also encourage people to think as a group*
> *but not as an individual. People are continuously monitored and if they*
> *discover that you are an independent thinker, you are executed by others.*
> *After I was imprisoned, I took time to read the quran and think on my own*
> *and I realized that I was misled into thinking that I was fighting a just war.*
> *Nilipata kujua kwamba Jihad ni vita kwa nafsi yangu wala si kupigana na*

wengine (I came to realize that Jihad is a war unto thy own self but not to fight others). Then I realized that I was cheated to participate in a war which is not just. I also learnt that once a member of VEO is arrested and imprisoned, the VEO is unconcerned. When I leave here I intend to go back to school and learn to become a doctor. (Interview conducted, 30th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.79]).

The respondent after suffering imprisonment, he learnt that he was misled into joining the VEO and that the Muslim teaching was misleading. He regretted that he was confused to belief that he was fighting a just war.

One key informant (Muslim cleric) narrates about the regrets of convicts for having been misled:

All the terrorism convicts in Kenyan prisons are Muslims because before radicalization it is a requirement for the recruits to convert. During their stay in the prisons, we preach to them right teachings of the Koran. We also engage them in Islamic discussions about the Koran and the hadith. The majority of them confess that they had been misled in understanding the Koran differently. They regret that they made their decisions in haste leading to their current problems. They also admit that by the time of being recruited into radicalism, they were naïve in Islamic doctrine and had not read the Koran extensively. (Interview conducted, 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 4.80])

The key informant contents that cases of misinterpretation of the Koran according to the understanding of the convicts was common. In fact, he says his main task is to realign their understanding of the Quran in the right way and discard their beliefs of Jihad for personal glorification to spiritual gains.

Mainly the respondents in this study are young people with little experience about Islam. Most of the respondents said that they were sponsored to study the Koran and Islamic studies either in the country or travelled to some countries in the Middle East. It is during the teaching that they were radicalized into violent extremism by misinterpreting the Koran. Once the recruits were exposed to the misinterpreted doctrine, they understand the grievances differently to pursue justice according to the teaching in the group. Therefore, before the social regret, the damage had already

happened or lives lost. The next section therefore discusses the perception of the radicalized individuals of justice in the quest for constructing the meaning of the self in seeking the perceived justice.

4.4.5 Radicalization as seeking justice

One of the vulnerabilities by the people joining terrorism is social injustice (Borum, 2010).

Under the bill of rights, Article 19(2) of the constitution of Kenya (2010) it is stipulated that:

> *The purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realization of the potential of all human beings.*

In the understanding of Habermas (2004) in his critical social theory, social injustice is a means of addressing entrapment in systems of domination or dependence, obeying the emancipatory interest in expanding the scope of autonomy and reducing the scope of domination.

In the current study, several respondents cited cases of injustice in their lived experience. These instances of injustice led them into joining terrorism so as to seek revenge. One of the respondents aged 38 years said:

> *Both my parents died in a ferry accident at Likoni. My mother's employer paid compensation to my uncles and they squandered the money. I tried to settle in my father's home at Likoni, but my uncles and my father's last wife and her children threatened to kill me if I claimed my father's land. I lost all the heritage from father and compensation for my mother's ferry accident. I was bitter in life for what happened to my parents and what befell me in life afterwards. I watched my maternal grandmother struggle to take care of me and my young siblings. Finally, I decided to undertake informal employment to support my siblings and the aged grandmother. In the struggle to raise money, I ended up in Somalia among the violent extremist fighting jihad war* (Interview contacted, 28th August 2018 [Narrative 4.81]).

Following the demise of the parents in a ferry tragedy, the respondent met frustrations from both paternal and maternal uncles. He also dropped out of school despite compensation for his mother having been paid by her employer. He was threatened with death from his stepmother and uncles when land inheritance matters came. Finally, he felt that his father and mother's relative had done him and his siblings injustice. Unable to sustain life, he finally decided to be radicalized with the eventual aim of revenging against his stepmother and uncles for past injustices meted out to him.

Another foreign respondent aged 36 years narrates of his perception of injustice:

> *I lived with my parents in a town in Europe and experienced cases of racial injustice although [European country] has high numbers of immigrants. Both at our residence and in school I witnessed injustice against the immigrants especially non-whites. I believe in freedom and justice to all and that is why Nelson Mandela is my model in life. (*Interview contacted, 15th August 2018 [Narrative 4.82]).

While living with parents as immigrants in Europe, the respondent experienced injustice by the whites who openly racially discriminated against him. The experience developed in him a feeling for injustice and a desire to seek justice for the downtrodden. He wanted to act in the protection of humankind. He became generous and agitated for people's rights, acts that eventually landed him in jail over terrorism charges.

One respondent aged 37 years, born of Nubian immigrants to Kenya he narrates that he witnessed injustices meted several times on his Nubian community:

> *I suffered frustrations in life by witnessing my fellow Nubian youth treated as criminals and chased around by the police. They are also arrested and prosecuted for brewing illicit brews. It is not their mistake to brew and sell illicit brews but it is due to high levels of poverty. Kibera, the home of the Nubians has been neglected by the local leaders as such it lacks roads, clean water and good houses. We have lived in the ghetto the rest of our lives under dehumanizing conditions. (*Interview contacted, 30th August 2018 [Narrative 4.83]).

The respondent having lived in the slum, experienced life outside the slum when he attended secondary school in an affluent estate of Karen. During this time, he realized that life was worse in his home village. He does not consider illicit brew drinking as a crime but as a means of livelihood by blaming the police arresting his tribesmen brewing and selling the illicit brew. He has also grown up with the feeling of being an emigrant, a feeling that hounded him and blamed it to the deplorable state of their livelihood. As a reaction to the feelings of marginalization, he joined the VEO to seek justice for his community.

One key informant for an NGO states;

> *While carrying out interventions to radicalized families, most of those interviewed at the Coast claimed that, they suffered injustice from the government. While in Kwale, some affected families with radicalized youth cited land injustice where the upcountry people have taken prime land making the locals squatters on their land. Some families claim that their children have been unfairly convicted of terrorism when they agitated for land rights.* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.84])

Another Key Informant (CT Researcher) on social injustice narrates:

> *Most of the returnees had many different grievances like harassment, discrimination, unfairly targeted for criminalization and participation in terrorism. Personally, i see unemployment as a social injustice in the sense that the youth have a right to decent lives by being provided opportunities. My understanding of radicalization is that they target where there is social injustice and people have raised a voice. For instance, nobody tries to recruit the Ogiek living in the forest and yet they are exposed to inhuman lifestyle simply because they have not raised any voice against their lives.* (Interview conducted, 27th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.85])

Another respondent aged 35 years narrates:

> *According to me, injustice is the main problem in Kenya, dividing the poor and rich and people of different ethnic groups. The main causes of injustice in Kenya are the divisions between the rich and the poor. Sometimes resistance to injustice is inevitable for example; what would you do if someone attacked your family? Sometimes we fight for survival in the unfavorable environment. This is what differentiates between happiness and sadness. Cases of sadness arise from marginalization of the poor other than the rich* (Interview contacted, 28th August 2018 [Narrative 4.86]).

Grievances of social injustice have been the cause of many conflicts pitting the states and the people. Their root causes of the injustice cited, based on the lived contexts. Some of the contentious areas of conflict in Kenya is religion, employment, land and political conflicts. The individuals advancing grievances usually harbor individual or community grievances which they use as a pretext for joining radicalization.

One respondent aged 37 years narrates:

> *My life in Kibera showed that government leaders applied the law selectively to people living in Kibera. The Nubians suffered because they are immigrants while the other residents are treated well by the leaders. For instance the Nubians supported the government unlike the majority Luos who are always in opposition enjoy more favors unlike the Nubians. The Nubians have no senior person in the government who can defend them. I found it necessary to defend my people because nobody defends them when they are harassed by the authorities.* (Interview contacted, 30th August 2018 [Narrative 4.87]).

According to the respondent, the Nubian community faced injustice from the authorities through criminalization of the community. He said, the community also was denied representation in the government by failing to appoint anyone from the community to a senior government position. His joining VEO was a means of seeking justice for the community.

Another foreign respondent aged 30 years narrates:

> *Since my childhood, my country (DRC) has never seen peace. Due to poor governance, there was inter-clan conflicts which impoverished our people. When I joined university I wanted to ensure the country get democracy and peace, as people have never seen peace since the era of President Mobutu Sese Seko. I wanted to ensure there is no injustice in my country where the government used conflicts to divide people. For the period I have been here, l hear news on devolution in Kenya, a system I will push to be introduced in DRC* (Interview contacted, 31st July 2018 [Narrative 4.88]).

The respondent blamed the inter-tribal clashes suffered by his community as having been instigated by government against his community. He also blames the government for the poverty affecting his community. His dropping out of university due to lack of fees was blamed on the poverty blamed on the government instability.

He therefore left his country a bitter person, hoping to return to his country to fight for justice. He ended up joining violent extremism.

One key informant (Muslim Imam) in his experiences with the radicalized narrates:

> *A number of convicts of terrorism in prisons talked to, claim that they felt a sense of responsibility to defend their communities from the injustices meted on their communities by leaders or the government. Their understanding of injustice is based on the long held grievances by their families or communities respectively. Some of them disclosed that, their close relatives had been killed by the police for involvement in terrorism. Apparently, they say, although their relatives had disappeared from home for several years they did not believe that they had been recruited into violent extremist. Some of the convicts harboring feeling of injustice against them or their communities harbored hatred for the authorities and the government. Based on their belief, they are prepared at any cost to confront the systems to address the problem. Those with personal grievances tend to flex while those with community grievances are difficult to advice* (Interview conducted, 16th August, 2018 [Narrative 4.89]).

The current study findings exemplify these perceptions about injustice suffered by individuals in their respective contexts. As already stated by a key informant, the holding on the grievance of injustice could not be a dominant grievance but a precipitant to the other grievances.

This argument therefore leads us to the question; why some respondents chose to be radicalized as a means to fighting social injustice? Therefore, the individual meaning of the respondents by fighting for social injustice is discussed in the following section. According to Cohen (2008), demands for justice are primarily applied to distributions of whatever burden and benefit relevant in different living conditions. The interpretation of injustice therefore dependents on legal institutions, social norms and individual actions, which are assessed as just or unjust. The individual perception in this case depends on whether they promote disruptions or distributions.

4.5 Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to evaluate the influences affecting the radicalized individuals in the process of radicalization and in their lived lives. The study discussed the meaning formation of the respondents in their contextual environment by first understanding their characteristics based on age, gender, marital status, education, and occupation. Contextual factors of the respondents were analyzed according to family, peers, religion, poverty, discrimination and their residences respectively. Finally, the study analyzed the meaning formation of the respondents for joining radicalization as; self-empowerment, self-identity, repair from humiliation, social regret and seeking justice. Therefore having analyzed the respondents' characteristics, contextual factors and their meaning formation, an understanding of the practice and action leading to violent extremism will assist in clarifying the radicalized individuals lived experiences and their reasons to participate in violence or their desistance. The next chapter therefore delves into the matter of the influence of 'radicalization and social construction of violence' to explain the practice and action as constructed by the lived contexts and meaning formations of the respondents.

CHAPTER FIVE

RADICALISATION AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE

5.1 Introduction

Kenya has suffered major violent attacks since carrying out incursions into Somalia to wage war against the Al Shabaab militants operating in that country. In 1998, Kenya alongside her neighboring country, Tanzania suffered a simultaneous terrorist attack on United States embassies with 220 casualties in Kenya alone. The attacks were masterminded by Fazul Abdullah Mohamed who by then was the leader of the Al Qaeda's network in East Africa (Adan, 2005).

The recent attack at Dusit D2 hotel by terrorist attack in Kenya on 15th January 2019 exhibited a new type of violent terrorism that is emerging: that is homegrown terrorists. Unlike other previous attacks which were led by foreigners, the Dusit D2 attack was led by a Kenyan, Ali Salim Gichunge alias Faruk. In this incident, another Kenyan, a 25-year Mahir Khalid Riziki blew himself outside the hotel killing unsuspecting hotel patrons in the Dusit D2 hotel. Before he blew himself up, he recited a prayer, a pointer on the extent to which he had been radicalized and his acceptance of violence. Investigative reports (see Ombati, 2019) show that prior to the attack, he had been in Somalia for about five years undergoing radicalization and was reported to have been using drugs. In 2014 Riziki was reported by the police to have killed a policeman using his local gang. The police also reported that he had been assigned to assassinate security personnel at the coast prompting the police to place a bounty of two million shillings on his head.

On another earlier occasion (see Standard Newspaper 22nd January 2019), Abdirahim Abdullahi, son of a government official in the northern Mandera County bordering Somalia, was killed in an attack when extremist stormed the Garissa University

College. Abdirahim, in the company of three other men, led the attack that took place in April 2, 2015, in which 147 students died. Abdirahim was a former University of Nairobi law student, who joined the militant group Al Shabaab after graduating in 2013. The above cited instances point that radicalization leading to violence by homegrown youths has shifted from the less privileged in society to the educated. Through social media, University students are now targets for recruitment by radicalizers for terrorism.

Discussion of findings in this chapter focuses on factors influencing the radicalized individuals to engage in violence. The study looks at the factors that make them believe that the social action (violence) taken is justified. This is discussed in connection with their lived experiences that explain how they perceived their actions as acclimatized from their lived contexts. The study explores their understanding of violence away from legalism.

The study focuses on what precisely influences the radicalized individual to take the fateful step and participate in violence. In this case, various lived experiences were explored to understand their perception of violence according to their own individual understanding. The study also looks at the motivations towards their partaking of violence.

This chapter is guided by objective three, (how they are influenced to participate in violence and terrorism—see section 1.3.2 on specific objectives) and it is discussed under different themes explaining the respondents' reasons for participating in violence. The respondents' discussions were aligned according to the themes that emerged from this study. The narratives outline the grievances or the reasons for their

participation in violence. The findings of the study was compared with the existing data for interpretations.

Four themes emerged from the narratives of the respondents on what, so to speak, broke the camel's back and saw them indulge in violence. These were: violence as a moral obligation, violence as a necessity, violence as a means to liberation, violence as attaining group affiliation. Some studies show correlation between crime and terrorism although to some extent there is consensus as the latter being driven by doctrine rather than profit—as in the case of crime (Curry, 2011:102). Joining an extremist group does not automatically imply that one will engage in violence. Theorists argue that one can undergo the first three stages of radicalization without resorting to violent acts of terrorism (Precht 2007:16 and Silber & Bhatt 2007). The four stages of radicalization include; Pre-radicalization, Conversion, conviction and lastly violent action (see Section 2.3 on radicalization)

However, what distinguishes a Terrorist from an ordinary person, is the extent to which the individual has been radicalized and commitment to the cause as well as willingness to accept the consequences of own actions (Peters, 1996: 7). In some instances Islamisation of terrorism has become a common narrative in explaining why members of these groups indulge in acts of violence, leading to some extent to the criminalization of Islam (Abbas, 2007). Similar occurrences have taken place in Kenya where arrests took pace in mosques that had been reported to be taking part in radicalization of the youth (see standard newspaper, May 27, 2016 for one such report).

As mentioned earlier, four themes emerged from the narratives, and these were violence as; moral action, social necessity, liberator and group belonging. All

narratives in this chapter, like in chapter four, have been numbered at the end of the narrative alongside the date of the interview for ease of reference and cross-referencing to related findings in the study.

Table 5.1 Illustrate the factors that influenced each respondent in participating in violence.

Table 5.1: Respondents by their reasons for participating in violence

S/NO	Respondents' Pseudonyms	Moral Obligation	Necessity	Liberator	Group affiliation or Identity
1.	Respondent 1	✓	-	✓	-
2.	Respondent 2	-	✓	✓	-
3.	Respondent 3	✓	-	-	-
4.	Respondent 4	-	-	-	✓
5.	Respondent 5	-	✓	✓	-
6.	Respondent 6	-	-	-	-
7.	Respondent 7	-	-	-	✓
8.	Respondent 8	✓	-	✓	-
9.	Respondent 9	-	-		✓
10.	Respondent 10	✓	-	✓	-
11.	Respondent 11	✓	-		✓
12.	Respondent 12	✓	-		-
13.	Respondent 13	✓	-	✓	-
14.	Respondent 14	-	✓		-
15.	Respondent 15	✓		✓	-
16.	Respondent 16	-	-	-	✓
17.	Respondent 17	-	✓		✓
18.	Respondent 18	✓	-	-	✓
19.	Respondent 19	✓	-	✓	-
20.	Respondent 20	-	✓	-	✓
TOTAL		**10**	**5**	**8**	**8**

Source: Field data 2018

The identified themes will now be discussed in detail. We start by examining the moral obligations.

5.2 Violence as an Expression of Moral Obligation

Scanlon (1998:4) in his theory of right and wrong called *contractualism* offers a moral theory of right and wrong in relation to our obligation to one another. The theory argues that an act is perceived to be right or wrong if it can be justified to others on grounds that they could not reasonably reject. He further argues that our thinking about right and wrong is structured by the motivation of finding principles to others with the belief that they could not reasonably reject the wrong although it was not their aim (p. 191). He adds that people with such motivation could be many of them (p.201). Arising from the understanding of Scanlon, the radicalized individual informed decisions were influenced by the thinking of the group, depending on the dominant beliefs running in the group. The group which the radicalized individual interacts in therefore dictates their choices in life. The influence from the group therefore makes the individual make the popular decisions expected in the group irrespective of whether they are favorable to the individual or not. Therefore, a matter of morality is defined differently from one group to another. This thinking thus informs the decision for one to participate in violence (Scanlon 1998:191). Generally, the theory explains the social indebtedness of an individual to others in the group as explained by Scanlon (pg. 191) '*What we owe to each other.'*

The study will first analyze moral action and show how this is related to one deciding to participate in violence. In broader terms, morality denotes cultural codes specifying what is right and what is wrong, good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable, in society (Turner 2010; Turner and Stets, 2006). Traditionally, morality was perceived as binding people together through an intertwined series of common system and rules of

social engagements while in groups. Therefore, morality controls and integrates members of a society and therefore elicits social solidarity among the members (Durkheim, 1965).

According to Wilner and Dubouloz (2009) and Precht (2007:16), in their discussion on radicalization, they argue that while radicalization is a process, the end product however, is an ideological stage in which believers eventually decide whether or not to indulge in act of violent extremism. They also argue that it is this extremist behavior that undermine the status quo and motivate the individual to participate in violence. Likewise, studies carried out (see Diani, 2004; Diani and Mcdam, 2003) show that most people recruited into terrorism are influenced by the group they mostly interact in. This crystalizes to the individual seeing himself as a protector of his group, thus inculcating in him a sense of defender and thus a potential extremist fighter.

One respondent aged 34 years narrates this about his participation in violence:

> *I grew up in a life of freedom with my father encouraging me to make strong decisions in life. He did not allow anyone to interfere with my decisions as such I learnt to be independent in my thinking. This freedom allowed me to develop strong* morals *about life. I extended my free-thinking to religion where I realized change in my life to see things differently from the* way i *perceived in my life. In my life I therefore learnt that free will guided my way of life in a way that my father guided me to follow. Influenced by believe and the way I made decisions in life, at one point, I felt a strong urge (shahwa) to fight for Islamic freedom. This feeling transformed my life prompting me to leave my country seeking to understand myself better.* (Interview conducted on 31st July, 2018 [Narrative 5.1]).

The respondent character was persistently encouraged by his father who seemingly wanted to produce a strong model out of his son—a son who was strong, independent and decisive. Out of this encouragement and overprotection, he emerged an independent thinker who later shaped his own thinking and became an extremist. The respondent therefore having immersed himself in religious extremism, was recruited

into radicalization leading to him participating in violent extremism. This means, the context (family) in which he was nurtured into adulthood, provided a strong foundation and provided him with the freedom to make his own decisions.

Another respondent aged 33 years influenced by religious beliefs and community narrates:

> *After completion of my Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, I participated in preaching the Koran, advising the community on Islamic law and sometimes I participated in inter-clan conflict resolutions. My father having been an imam and a madrassa teacher taught us to be strong in Islamic faith and to defend it at any cost wherever we go in life. This made me to look at life along Islamic teaching. Any attack on Islam therefore hurt me a lot. In my teaching of Islam to people, I emphasized that Islam being a way of life and religion ensures ones happiness on earth and in paradise. Therefore, whenever there was any opportunity I always defended Islam even if it means costing my life.* (Interview conducted on 1st August 2018 [Narrative 5.2]).

The respondent clearly states that his resolve to defend Islamic religion included his readiness to lose his life. He was also actively involved in the teaching of the Koran as such he earned trust from the community. According to his understanding of the Koran, fighting Jihad was a personal decision, which once made, one must defend the religion. He was therefore morally obligated to defend his religion (in this case Islam) at whatever cost. In the lived experience of the respondent, he internalized that fighting for one's religion as an obligation in one's life that one learns from his family and the community. Due to group influence, he views violence not as a wrong but as a moral obligation (see Scanlon, 1998 above on moral obligation). His moral reasoning was influenced by the community he lived therefore, while they approved his preaching, the other moderate Muslims interpreted him as radical leading to his predicament.

Another respondent aged 36 years, said that he suffered racial discrimination among the majority whites with who he interacted. He narrates:

> *Being an immigrant in a European Country, the way the majority whites treated us non-whites made us develop a feeling of alienation. This discrimination persisted from primary to high school. As a Muslim, majority of the people looked at us as if we are not righteous in our deeds, the country being predominantly Christian state, regards the majority of Muslims as suspects of terrorism. Due to dehumanizing treatment of foreigners more so the Muslims, I decided in life to agitate for fairness for all humankind. I have lived admiring Nelson Mandela as my role model in the fight against racial discrimination like it is happening in that European country* (Interview conducted on 15th August, 2018 [Narrative 5.2]).

Having grown up as an immigrant, he identified himself with other immigrants who perceived themselves as being discriminated against on the basis of color and race. He therefore grew up influenced by the immigrant group and by his parents to the extent of being convinced that they were socially alienated. By admiring Mandela, he clearly showed that he believed in liberation and hence looked forward to liberating his fellow immigrants from the discrimination so experienced in this foreign land. In his understanding therefore, resistance to discrimination and the unfair labelling of Muslims as terrorists convinced him that he had a moral and ultimate decision to protect his kind as he owed them a service in the group as much as they are owed to him (see Scanlon, 1998:19).

The respondent said he suffered discrimination in his life, which made him believe that he was discriminated against because he was a Muslim rather than because of his skin color. Along the way, he consequently resolved to defend his Islamic faith. He was angered that Muslim adherents were being referred to as criminals—this made him view the whites as enemies of Islam.

One female respondent aged 43 years recounted how the Muslims are punished by the authorities: She narrates,

> *"Mimi, marehemu bwanangu na watoto wangu tumethulumiwa na serikali kwa sababu ya kufunza madrassa" (myself, my husband and my children have been unfairly punished the Government for teaching in madrassa).I was targeted for standing with my husband whenever he was accused of being a radical preacher. In all circumstances, I have always wondered*

why Muslims accused of participating in terrorism referred to as magaidi (terrorists), while other serious criminals predominantly non Muslim's referred to as ordinary criminals. I wonder if terrorism is committed by only Muslims. Me and my family we protested the killing of innocent youths on accusation of participating in terrorism (Interview conducted, 10th August 2018 [Narrative 5.3]).

The respondents viewed the frustration meted to her and her family as reason enough to hate the system and gave her the desire to protect her. She thus defended all the actions of the family including the perceived radical preaching by her husband. In her understanding, participating in demonstrations was justified since this was a protest against the killing of innocent youth by the security agencies. She also protested against the labelling of Muslims as terrorists. This belief therefore influenced her thinking about the justified demonstrations and the protection of the youth and religion which has been unfairly labelled as supporting terrorism. Therefore, due to the popular group believe of participation in demonstrations, she was morally obligated to stand with other group members (see Diani, 2004; Diani and McDam, 2003 on how individuals feel morally obligated to support their groups).

The gist of the narratives of the respondent can also be further explained through Abu Ghaith, one of the followers of Osama Bin Laden who stated that:

> "God says fight, for the sake of God and to uphold the name of God," exclaims one of bin Laden's lieutenants, Abu Ghaith. We will fight them with the material and the spiritual strength that we have, and our faith in God . . . The nation must take up its response and in the end I thank God for allowing us to start this jihad. This battle is a decisive battle between faithlessness and faith. And I ask God to give us victory in the face of our enemy and return them defeated. (Ghaith, 2001).

One respondent aged 26 years, who dropped out of school, went on to study the Koran and Islamic law narrates that:

> *When I relocated from Sio port to Mombasa with my mother, she took me to madrassa where I learnt extensively the Koran and Islamic studies for three years. When I completed I was given capital to start my own business at Likoni. While at likoni, I noticed that the police hated Muslim youth*

some which were my friends. We occasionally clashed with the police for being accused of participating in radicalization. However, any time one of us was arrested we protested to the police. I realized that the police had marked me and relocated to Nairobi where they traced me and got arrested. (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.4]).

Despite being committed to Islam, the respondent was associated with suspect groups at Likoni. Engaging in business made him make many friends, some of whom were being pursued by the police. In his lived experience, he felt that Muslims were unfairly targeted. This made him form groups to resist the police. Though he relocated to Nairobi when things became too hot for him in Likoni, the police pursued him and after some clashes, arrested and prosecuted him for terrorism related offenses.

Another respondent aged 35 years blames his life predicament to social injustice and narrates:

One thing that annoyed me in life is where injustice is done by the authorities against innocent people and they expect no reaction from the aggrieved. How do you feel when someone attacks a family member? Do you just watch? Obviously, you will fight back even if it means dying in defense of one of your own. Sometimes violence is necessary as a way of defending yourself or seeking your rights. The rich have exploited the poor who continue to suffer at the mercy of the rich. The same poor people are harassed by the government. What do you expect them to do? They will fight back for justice. (Interview conducted, 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.5]).

The respondent feels that the only means of mitigating police harassment and injustice was through deterrent violent resistance. He believed that it is the right of the poor to use violence as a means of responding to grievances, especially those involving the government and those exercised by the rich against the poor. He perceived violence as an effective tool of communicating the sentiments of the marginalized.

The respondent aged 34 years lived in a city in Israel of Arabs with locals, hold the view that Jews were enemies of Arabs. He narrates:

During my entire life I was made to believe that Jews are our enemies as such we should treat them as such. This was provoked by witnessing a Jewish police batter a Palestinian. This provoked in me a lot of anger proving what I had been told. I decided to revenge against the Jews just like my fellow Arabs do. I decided to leave Israel to go to Oman to undergo military training to equip myself fight the Jews. I was ready to join the fighters against Israel but unfortunately, I was arrested on my way to Oman through Kenya. (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.6]).

His decision and participation in violence against the Jews was a culturally held responsibility as was popularly believed by the Arab population in the Middle East. In his view, this was not an act of revenge but a service to his community as a collective responsibility against their long held enemy; the Jews. The participation in violence according to the respondent was not a wrong but a moral obligation to his community. He does not see the illegality of the act of the attack because he lived among a group of people that believed that violence was not a wrong so long as it was understood that it was an act of serving justice to the community. Fighting the Jews was akin to waging a conventional war against one's long standing enemy.

Another respondent aged 24 years lived along the Kenya and Somalia border engaging in the smuggling of goods across the border. He also witnessed inter-ethnic clashes which in time became a normal way of life to him.

While in Mandera, I interacted with the militants in Somalia who I bribed to be allowed to smuggle goods across to Kenya. I believe the militants fight to reclaim our country and that is why i don't see anything unusual with their fight. Before coming to Nairobi I worked for them to allow me to carry on my smuggling without problems. During that time, I felt that I was serving my people were suffering in the hands of foreigners. Interview conducted on 30th August 2019 [Narrative 5.7]).

According to the respondent, fighting was a normal way of life as this was something that he witnessed and lived with on a day to day basis. This in turn made him serve with ease in the VEO as a violent extremist. He therefore took violence (especially against the people fighting militants in Somalia) as a duty. He viewed the forces

fighting the militants in Somalia as foreigners, while he embraced the militants as his brothers.

Another respondent aged 37 years, an immigrant living in Kibera harbored bitter feelings against those who discriminated against his community in this sprawling slum in Nairobi, Kenya and narrates,

> *My people live in poverty and are always arrested by the police for selling chang'aa (illicit distilled brew). I'm very disturbed when I see police arrest Nubian youths for committing petty crimes. The Nubians in Kibera are seen as criminals and yet they support the government unlike other communities who enjoy government services. This action provoked me to look for means of fighting back to protect my people* (Interview conducted on 30th August 2019 [Narrative 5.8]).

The life experiences while engaging in transnational transport through Uganda, Southern Sudan and Somalia influenced his earlier experience in an up market secondary school about violence in his life. According to him, it is his responsibility to fight alongside the VEO as they fight to reclaim the rights of the Nubians in Kibera. He believes that it is a duty to serve his ethnic group by way of fighting the oppressors.

The current global terrorism is characterized by religious fundamentalism, whereby brutal violence, slaughter of *infidels*, and the violation of human rights were given a sacred character by those who considered themselves to be a "true believer" (Schmid, 2004b). This new era wave is at the heart of Islamic concern, where different groups agitating for autonomy use Islamic doctrines to influence violent extremism (Moten 2010: 40). Moten further explains that such groups seek for religious states like, Palestine, Syria, Somalia, Nigeria and Punjab state in India by the Sikhs. Besides, Christians and Jews were not exempt from such agitations by use of violence. According to Islamic scholar and prominent activist in interfaith dialogue, Gülen, "In Islam, killing a human is an act that is equal in gravity to unbelief" (Gulen, 2004: 1).

He further said that according to the first Caliph (Abu Bakr) and Sultan Mehmet II (Ottoman Sultan) and as per the Quran, an individual, a group of people or organization cannot declare war—only a state can (Gulen, 2004, 2-3). As a consequence, he and others have dismissed the calls for jihad by various VEO leaders such as Osama bin Laden, who were blamed for replacing the Islamic logic with his own twisted logic filled with hate and emotion (Gulen, 2004:3). The explanation here is that the teaching of Jihad has been misinterpreted to suit the needs of the radicalizers and the various violent extremist organizations. Some studies using moral justification show that terrorists may imagine themselves as the saviors of a constituency threatened by a great evil and hence are obliged to partake in violence and terrorism (Bandura, 1995).

The moral obligations gained by an individual are driven by a purpose for such morality. The moral obligation to members is only functional in a designated location with boundaries. The inhabitants of the designated area of morality are the members of the practiced morals. The next section therefore looks at what groups together the morally influenced individuals and their functions as a group. It also explores the existing relationships and their value systems making them to remain a solid unit with aims popularly seen by society as evil.

5.3 Violence as a Means to Identity with a Group

It has been argued that, by living underground, terrorists gradually become divorced from reality, engaging in what Ferracuti (1982) describes as fantasy war. In-group identification, individuals tend to set boundaries of their interaction with others because integrating with other groups will bring to the fore other issues of moralities arise which would then shape the acts of individuals in these groups (Lamont 2007). To understand the processes of group formation and their membership, this study

applies the social construction theory to understand the different contexts of individual construction to become a violent extremist. The meanings derived from the social construction were interpreted by IPA to better understand how the respondents constructed themselves in different lived contexts. This section therefore bases the understanding of group identity as embedded in groups that practice violence as a product of self-construction.

One respondent aged 28 years who lived with his maternal grandmother in Ethiopia on return to his home was assisted by parents to start business and along the way was entangled in radicalization. He narrates as follows:

> *When I returned home from Ethiopia where I stayed with my maternal grandmother I was 20 years. Since I had not attended formal learning, my father assisted me to start business to keep abreast with my twin brother who was then undergoing university studies. In the course of doing business, I joined other businessmen selling camels who I accompanied in Somalia, Tanzania, and many parts of Kenya. Since I was still new in the country, I made efforts to create more friends engaged in similar business, and in the course of that I was influenced to join radicalization* (Interview conducted on 14th August 2018 [Narrative 5.9]*).*

The respondent joined a group of businessmen who travelled widely, and was influenced by some into ascribing to radicalism. Similarly, while living in Ethiopia, he interacted with some of the youth who were fighters in the Ethiopia- Eritrea war. Alarmed by his association with these youth, his father compelled him to return to Kenya as he seemed to be on the verge of joining the fighters. This therefore implies that his perception of violence was founded on both group influences while in Ethiopia and Kenya while engaging in business.

One Respondent aged 28 years who was born out to a single mother recounts how his father and maternal uncles rejected him, an act, which made him depend on friends for survival. He narrates:

> *I felt lonely in life when my father rejected me after the death of my mother while young. My maternal grandfather cared for me but when he died my uncles and their families never wanted to see me, fearing that I will claim land. I was forced out of my mother's home to seek employment. While in Nairobi I found a friend who showed that he cared for me. He asked to accompany him to Somalia for a job and then I reached there I learnt that I had been lured into joining the Al Shabaab militants. While in the group, I learnt that to survive, one needed to be merciless and to follow orders including executing other people seen to be weak or sympathetic to the out-group. I also learnt that while in the group one was not supposed to think as an individual but think along the thinking of other group members. So I was compelled to be keen on what the group wanted and exactly that. I also learnt that an individual in the group is given more recognition and status by displaying atrocity and merciless actions against the enemies* (Interview conducted on 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.10]).

He added that:

> *While in prison, I realized that I was only a victim of being misled by a friend simply because I did not have anyone to confide with before proceeding to Somalia to join the militants. I also reflected my life in the group and realized that I was extreme in my actions whenever I was given tasks to execute the enemies of the group. Further, I learnt that everybody in the group except senior militants lived in fear of being executed if they expressed themselves, forcing them to be merciless and commit inhumane acts against other people perceived to be enemies. From the group experience, I realized that one does not exhaustively reason and sometimes reason is not basis of doing things but fear of reprisals and group acceptance. Some members were even isolated by other members when they tried to suggest logical issues about their lives. The mere expression of such sentiments by some individuals made other members to take advantage of reporting them to their seniors for action. Due to fear it was found that such action was reported by members to exonerate themselves from sharing such sentiments rather than wanting to fix the culprit* (Interview conducted on 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.11]).

This means living in the group is a life of fear and suspicion and the need to protect oneself. In other words, he qualifies the notion that extreme behavior was out of fear, fear of being casted out of the group. So violent behavior guaranteed one inclusion in the in-group

He continued:

> *During my stay in prison, i shared with my fellow convicts and realized that majority of the radicalized people lived in regret but never tried to show lest they are mercilessly executed. We agreed in our discussions that due to spying on one another in the group, people tended to portray false behavior for protection and recognition. Sometimes the mere suspicion that one was stressed was enough reason to subject such individual to execution lest he poisons the thinking of others. To hide the feeling of frustration, I would recite verses in the Koran and be joined by others which make one feel rejuvenated* (Interview conducted on 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.12]).

The respondent trusted his friends who went on to instill a sense of belonging to a group and which then offered him protection. It is this trust that duped him into joining violent extremism. While in the group, he discovered that most members had little choice but to perform the various tasks allocated to them by their leaders—because failing to comply would mean instant death. Secondly, since most members were driven by the conviction that the violence was a justified action, refusing to comply would make one be the odd man out and he would be suspected of being a spy and would instantly be killed.

One female respondent aged 25 years narrated how group influence affected her life:

> *I was frustrated by my employers while working as a house help in several homes. This made me to stop working and started my own food kiosk where I became so popular that I was nicknamed 'mama zima' (woman who sells ugali). With the type of food I prepared in my kiosk, I later opened a clothes shop with my husband and continued running the food kiosk. I realized that to succeed I needed people as such I befriended many people to succeed in my businesses. Consequently, I got involved in their activities among them demonstrations against the police over killing of innocent youth. I felt safe in the group due to my businesses and to dispel suspicion that I was sympathetic with the police. Most members believed that demonstrations against the security personnel will assist in stopping the killings. On my part as much I did not know the victims, I had no choice but to team up with the majority to be accepted as a member of the group* (Interview conducted on 16th August 2018 [Narrative 5.13]).

The respondent move to be affiliated with certain groups was a way of seeking acceptance from her in-group and obtaining social solidarity with the people she lived

with. This move progressed to the point where she became entangled with matters terrorism, demonstrated by her participation in numerous demonstrations. As a businesswoman, this earned her respect for many admired her courage. The downside to this was that this endangered her life and put her business at risk, as these activities placed her in direct confrontation with the authorities. She eventually lost and was imprisonment.

Another respondent aged 26 years engaged in cross border business with his friends and these friends later influenced him into engaging in violent extremism. He states that:

> *I never went to school, as such, I engaged in cross border trade at an early age. I worked with my friends to buy goods for our parents to sell in Kenya. Among the group members I did business together included relatives and friends who were also age mates. Therefore we were very intimate to one another. Eventually, some of our friends joined the Jihadists and we continued working with them in business. As we continued with business more of my friends continued joining the fighters. At one point I was compelled to join since they had started treating me with suspicion and I feared losing business because across in Somalia the militia controlled movement of people and could even stop me from doing business. Inside the group, things became tough because I was supposed to participate in the tasks performed by others including fighting alongside the jihadists.. Therefore, in the course of working for the militia I was convicted for being a Jihadist.* (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.14]).

The respondent received pleasure when he joined violent extremism (while engaging in illegal business). The infiltration of the group by the militias led to a chain of recruitment into the VEO. The same networks were used inside the group to encourage participation in violent actions including fighting with security agencies deployed in Somalia. The respondent engaged in violent extremism fueled by his desire to maintain ties with his peer group, who operated the illegal smuggling business along the Kenya – Somalia border.

Basing his arguments on biographical evidence, Sageman (2004) argues that violent radicalization of Muslim youth takes place through bonds of friendship, kinship, discipleship and other social networks. Therefore, one participates in group activities to retain membership in the in-group. Violence, as evidenced in the present case, is one form of action that guarantees one's continued membership in that group.

One Key informant (NGO) stated that radicalization entails a complex and psychologically influencing process. He therefor narrates:

> *My experience with the radicalized people, show that on completion of radicalization, the recruits are placed in groups called cells. Within the groups, they bond and develop a sense of brotherhood where they are told the enemy is the out-group, meaning non-Muslims. The out-group are therefore enemies and must be destroyed to guarantee the security of their members. Within the in-group, they create a sense of competition in the perfection of the tasks, which will earn them advantage of elevation to group leadership. In the process of competition, they lose empathy and find that killing is normal practice in life. This practice explains the empathy erosion model by A.J. Barker and the devoted actor model by Scott Atran. Atran explained the war of the physical Vs the spiritual war. In his argument, he said that the physical war has lesser strength as compared to the spiritual war which is more superior* (16th August, 2018 [Narrative 5.15]).

Another Key informant (CT researcher) explains what ties the radicalized people in the group. He states:

> *Radicalized individuals always talk positively about the people they lived with within the in-group. They fanatically believe in the brotherhood of the in-group, and as members, they stand opposed to the existence of the out group, who are often viewed as enemies; even if it means that their enemies are immediate family members. They see the out group as wanting to destroy them and as such utilize any opportunity to destroy them as a measure to protect themselves and their in-group members. This belief therefore informs their push for engaging in violence, which they see as a collective cause of action for the group* (27th August, 2018 [Narrative 5.16]).

Most of the respondents influenced by the groups did not approve of violence but had to engage in it so as to please the group members. Alternatively, they did so for the sake of social solidarity with the group. They lacked the courage to raise their voice against the violence advocated by the group since they were outnumbered by the

support by the majority for violent actions. In such case, reason to justify a wrong action was not necessary because the perceived wrong was interpreted as a right for the group. To approve their membership to a group, the individuals fighting for a group identifies oneself as a liberator in the realization of the objectives of the group. The next section discusses the influences of liberation in cajoling one into violent extremism.

5.4 Violence as a Means of Liberation

One foreign respondent aged 36 years, a Caribbean immigrant in a European country recounts his frustration when he was racially and religiously discriminated against, prompting him to engage in violence as a resistance to these injustices. He narrates:

> *I lived in a European capital City with my parents of Caribbean dissent, but during my school life I experienced racial and religious discrimination from the majority whites. This motivated me to fight against such discrimination by helping people and being considerate about others. I admire Nelson Mandela and live according to his ideals. In my quest, I believe in freedom of humankind and that is what I fight for.* (15th August, 2018 [Narrative 5.17]).

The respondent postulates that he was at war with racial and religious bigots in a European City. This feeling epitomizes how the grievances he holds against a section of the population influenced him to perceive himself as a freedom fighter (like Mandela, his idol). It is this belief in social movement that drove him towards participation in violent extremism. In so doing, the respondent believed that he was fighting to liberate the racially and religiously discriminated minority living in that European country.

One female respondent aged 43 years recounts how she joined her male counterparts in the quest of participating in an Islamic Jihad. She narrates:

> *My husband who was an imam was accused of being a radical Muslim preacher. In all cases I remained together with my husband. Therefore, my family and I were subjected to frustrations by the authorities. Since we had*

a madrassa school, I was particularly accused of radicalizing the youth by the authorities. As a result we were subjected to close monitoring by the police who occasionally harassed me and my children. When my husband was killed we felt a great loss to a head of the family. We could not understand what they referred to as radical preaching leading to the killing of my husband (Interview conducted on 16th August 2018 [Narrative 5.18]).

The respondent involved herself in taking up masculine roles, which later set her on the road to violence and radicalization. This particularly was reinforced after the murder of her husband who had been labeled as a radical Muslim preacher. The violent protests that followed his death and the subsequent arrest in which she found herself among the accused, eventually led to her conviction on terrorism related charges.

Another respondent aged 35 years, was influenced by friends to join radicalisation and engage in violent extremism. He narrates:

I grew up in the slums of Dandora and Kariobangi, both areas being slums in Nairiobi. Despite my Christian background, at one time I was persuaded by some neighbors who were my friends to join Islam. After joining, I was introduced to some imams who taught us Jihadism and how to liberate Islam from the western domination. At first I was reluctant but since most of my friends were interested I joined them to avoid being isolated from the group. While in the group I was arrested and convicted of terrorism related offences. Fearing not to be isolated by my friends eventually I joined violent extremism and I was prepared to fight alongside other fighters (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.19]).

Life in the slums of Nairobi, where the respondent grew up, is characterized by crime, poverty, and juvenile delinquency. This group used their friendship to persuade the respondent to become radicalized and consequently participated in violent extremism.

Another respondent aged 37 years was protective of his Nubian community whom he felt were being unfairly treated by the authorities. He narrates:

After witnessing injustice and discrimination of my community, I found that the community lacked any senior person in the government to address the problems affecting the community. Despite the community supporting the government, they were treated like foreigners unlike other Kenyans resident in the area. My people are also Muslims which are blamed for participation in radicalization and terrorism. Frustrated by the

predicaments of my community I joined the Jihadists to fight for fairness and inclusivity in government. My commitment in the violent extremist group saw me elevated to head of the spy unit (Amnyat). My determination was to become an Amir (commander), a dream that was cut short by my arrest and imprisonment. I know this is the will of Allah (Interview conducted, 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.20]).

He added that:

During my stay in the group, I experienced very tough moments especially on executions of some people seen as betrayers or cowards. I distinguished myself in this work by taking the most daring actions in the executions. My superiors liked me for the courage and elevated me in the group. Mimi sina uoga kabisa (I have no fear at all). Nikiletewa hata baba yangu nimchinge, nitamchinja bila huruma! (Given my father to slaughter I will slaughter him without sympathy). Hata wewe nikiamurishwa nikuchinje takika haiwezi pita! (Even you (alluding to the researcher), if ordered to kill you I cannot take a minute to kill you). I am ready to do anything to make my people free! (Shouts) (Interview conducted on 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.21]).

He further added that:

As the chief spy among the fighters, I made sure that all the required information is availed to the attackers to execute. I think I am well trained to ensure freedom for my people. However, I suspect some senior people in the group set me up so as to stop me from climbing the hierarchical ladder. Those are some of the people fighting for their individual interests but not for the group. Such people are enemies of the group inside us (Interview conducted on 30th August 2018 [Narrative 5.22]).

The respondent clearly displayed erosion of empathy through the vicious executions that he ordered or seemingly participated in while in the extremist group. He indicated that such atrocious fight is driven by hatred for the oppressors. While in the group he proved his aggressiveness and brutality which earned him an elevated status in the group. This however, made others uncomfortable as they viewed him as being too ambitious. This thus revealed the power struggle inside the group. It was evident that the respondent was dreaded, going by the heavy presence of prison warders during the interview.

Another respondent aged 34 years saw himself as a fighter for his Arab community in Israel. He narrates:

> *We Arabs in Israel harbor hatred for the Jews especially the way they treat the Palestinians by attacking them. An incident in my life where I witnessed the beating of a Palestinian by a Jewish police changed my life. I started thinking of how I can contribute to the freedom of our fellow Arabs. This made me to embark on a journey to Oman where I was arrested before reaching the country* (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.23]).

The respondent was agitated by the Jews police brutality against the Palestinian-Arab making him resolve to undertake military training so as to fight for the liberation of the Palestinians. He felt alienated from the Jews by the action of the police officer.

Another foreign respondent aged 30 years having dropped out of university for reasons related to poverty (which he blames on the perennial inter-ethnic conflicts in DR Congo), chose to participate in violent extremism to free his people entangled in the conflict (see Narrative 4.88). He chose to use violence as a means to address his personal problems and also those of his community. He believes that violence will change policies in his country which will in turn benefit his people and the country at large.

Another respondent aged 57 years struggled in life to start business, was involved in community development. The community recognized his efforts and appointed him to leadership roles in various community undertakings including roles in the local mosque. These roles eventually had him associated with radicalization and violent activities leading to his arrest and imprisonment. In his words he says:

> *I struggled in life to start my business of selling clothes despite my poor background. On realizing that I was a focused person, the community bestowed upon me with various roles in community development including leadership in mosque committee. I was respected by the people and government officials who consulted me on various matters of the community. At one time my mosque where I was the chairman was accused of involvement in radical preaching and radicalization of the youth. Because of the trust my people had in me I was accused of fighting for Jihad and promoting radicalization of the youth and I was imprisoned here* (Interview conducted on 15th August 2018 [Narrative 5.24]).

The respondent commanded respect among the locals for his participation in local development and in the mosque. This exposed him to both political and government interaction in his position as an ascribed community leader. The community therefore looked up to him as their leader in addressing community problems. This fact was also recognized by government officials in the area by consulting him on an array of issues about the community.

The joining of radicalization as a means to liberation was also echoed by one key informant (CT Researcher), who stated that the in-group and the out-group exhibit conflict to the extent that each group try to destroy the other in a move to minimize risks upon themselves in the in-group. He therefore narrates:

> *The spiritual model therefore encourages the radicalized individual to be more willing to fight as they do not subject their decision to cost benefit consideration. They are driven by sacred values and aim at making costly sacrifices including dying for the cause they are fighting for. The stay in the in-group is encouraged by the continuous nurturing of shared values and motivation of protecting one another. According to* Risto Fried (1982), who says that the target or victim is treated as a "*discardable object.*" *Therefore, they perceive the group as one entity as such any attack on any member is an attack on the group. For instance, the radicalized individuals see toppling of Libya's Muamar Quaddafi as the fall of an Islamic caliphate. This notion justifies the radicalized to pursue violence as a means of reclaiming the Libyan caliphate (Interview conducted, 27th August 2018* [Narrative 5.25]).

One female respondent aged 25 years fought to liberate herself from the conflict inflicted on her by her husband. She states:

> *Due to difficulties in life, I left the country for Dubai for three years leaving behind my daughter under the care of my husband to seek for employment. On return I found my husband married to another woman who my daughter had been put under her care. Serious conflict ensued when I demanded my child, leading to being battered in public. From that time, many issues were raised against me through instigation of my husband. The situation became worse and I saw that there is no meaning in life. I decided to do anything to die. I felt betrayed in life. I did not see any better moment in my life after the betrayal and the fight for my own child. I decided to die that is how I found myself here (blank gaze). Even if am given another chance in life, I must die (she cried and bowed down in dejection).* (Interview conducted, 10th August, 2018[Narrative 5.26])

The respondent in this case felt exploited as a weaker gender, and as such she felt it was necessary that she resists the move by fighting back. Fighting back included joining radicalization.

Unlike liberation as a means of partaking violence, some situations dictate that one engages in violence as one deems necessary. The next section therefore analyses narratives on necessity as a means of engaging in violent extremism.

5.5 Violence as a Livelihood Necessity

The doctrine of necessity postulates that certain conduct, though it violates the law and causes harm, is justified on the basis that it averts the actions of a greater evil and leads to social gain or benefit to society (Stem, 2003). Palestinian psychiatrist Eyad el Sarraj (2002) observed that humiliation is an important factor motivating young suicide bombers. The notion was confirmed by Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the late political leader of Hamas, in a statement published three years before his death via targeted killing by the Israeli Defense Forces: "To die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" (Juergensmeyer 2000:187). It has also been perceived that humiliation, either by parents in early childhood or by political oppressors later in life, can provoke terrorism, but no quantitative research has yet explored this hypothesis (Crayton 1983; Volkan 1997; Stern 2003). The necessity in this sense is not an end in itself but a means towards one's aspirations. This means, it is the process whose frequency cause the individual to find no other option but to react as a way of solving a problem or addressing a grievance. Such reactions may be a way of avoiding greater evil in life, resist exploitation or criminalization of religion and as a means of benefitting the community. In some countries, namely; US and UK, the doctrine of civil necessity is applied but Kenya where this study was carried it is

illegal (Waudo, 2013). This means, there is no acceptance to the justification of participation of individuals in any criminal activity on the basis of civil necessity.

One respondent aged 30 years was compelled by circumstances to protect his image to the community by entering radicalization. He narrates:

> *I found it necessary to leave the country to seek alternative means of making my life successful by avoiding to hang around home after failing to meet fees for university education. When I joined university the community developed an interest in me considering my humble nature. I was mostly compelled by the bad governance In DRC where communities are set against one another for political expediency. I wanted to assist my people to fight their way out of the perennial conflict which affects the lives of our people.* (Interview conducted on 31st July 2018 [Narrative 5.27]).

The respondent in his calculation found it necessary to leave the country to avoid embarrassment of witnessing the conflict and watching helplessly his family ravaged by poverty. Also living in a conflict zone, he wanted to construct himself as a peace maker by finding means of challenging the authorities in his claim of the government being involved in antagonistic schemes between the warring parties in DRC. Finally, the respondent found it vital to hide the shame of being seen as a failure considering the confidence the community had invested in him as one of the few people in the area who joined university. As a result, all the above factors compounded his consequent necessity of joining of violent extremism and terrorism.

One respondent aged 28 years, having lost compensation to his parents who died in a ferry tragedy and his land heritage by his father, entered radicalization for violence as a remedy. He therefore states:

> *My both parents perished in a ferry tragedy at Likoni leaving me with my siblings under the care of our maternal grandmother. Due to old age, she was unable to fend for us, prompting me to seek for means of survival. Compensation paid for the ferry accident were squandered by maternal uncles and land for our father in Likoni were taken over by step mother and her children. Left with no option in life, I joined the Jihadists where I participated in violent extremism. I joined the Jihadists after exhausting all avenues of survival, making it absolutely necessary to fight for my father's*

land as a means of income to support my siblings and my old grandmother
(Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.28]).

The respondent found himself in a sudden difficult situation after the death of their parents in a ferry tragedy. This obtaining situation put the respondent in a vulnerable position, making him to try many options of survival finally being trapped into violent extremism. According to the respondent, the decision was necessary to free himself from joblessness and to get the means of fighting his step mother and her children over the heritage of his father.

Another respondent aged 37 years, born of Nubian immigrant to Kenya spend most part of his life pondering over the improvement of the living conditions of his kinsmen living in Kibera. He therefore states:

> *I first realized that life was not the same for people when I joined a secondary school in Karen, Nairobi, where life is characterized by affluence as compared to the life in Kibera with makeshift residences. I also learnt that in Karen, there are no arrests to youth which are common scenes in Kibera. I was amazed with the tarmac of the roads, street lights, modern toilets and plenty of water even used for watering gardens among other good things in the area. I reflected on how people in Kibera use paper bags for their toilets dubbed as 'flying toilets', meaning they are thrown over houses and it is the duty of the person where it landed to clear the mess. I remembered with pain when one morning while going to school, I was hit by a flying toilet and splashed over my back. I had to return to the house to change and bath after which I reported to school late for the mess caused on me. This thought of extreme and distinct life encouraged me to face the truth on how people can be treated and enjoy equally in life. Whatever I did in life, I always experience a push to confront the problem suffered by my people. My joining the jihadists appeared to me a solution to the woes of my people because I did not see any other way of addressing it* (Interview conducted on 28th August 2018 [Narrative 5.29]).

According to the thinking of the respondent, he feels his community have a right to such services and amenities a privilege he believed could only be attained through violent engagement with the authorities. His reasoning of attaining their rights is dependent on the notion that freedom is dependent on struggle. According to him, the Nubians are not given adequate recognition as citizens, hence use of illegal and

unstructured methods of compelling the government to accord them the right treatment, which he sees as a necessity as much as it is a right. Researchers contend that it is highly probable that sensation-seekers are more likely to join an organization that uses violent tactics (Chomsky, 2006). The individuals seeing violence as a favorable option to peace, view violence in the light of their individual way of thinking. In the partitioned enclave, where moral reasoning is based on the learnt morals, the individuals therefore tend to practice the learnt culture to form their everyday practice of life.

5.6 Conclusion

The present study analyzes the social actions by respondents by partaking into violence and terrorism. The study discussed the moral action influences, driving the respondents' participation in violence by critically seeking to understand reasons for their participation and desistance. It evaluated the participation in violence as a result of reasons of necessity to indulge in violent extremism. The study also looked at the influences caused by the respondents need to identify themselves with a group identity. Finally, the study analyzed the partaking of violence as a means for liberating a certain group. The next chapter therefore discusses findings and makes conclusions from the study. After, which it will make recommendations and suggest areas for further study.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the study findings, followed by a discussion of these findings, and finally suggests recommendations arising therefrom. The discussion presented herein is as per the objectives outlined in chapter one of this thesis. These said objectives were achieved.

6.2 Summary of the Study Findings

This section provides a summary of the findings of the study as per the objectives outlined in chapter one of this thesis. The first summary is on the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

The demographic characteristics examined were age, gender, marital status, education and occupation of the respondents in the study. These were crucial in understanding the contextual factors of terrorism. The researcher found that majority of the respondents aged 20-34 years comprised 60% of the respondents. Those aged above 34 years comprised 40% of the total sample population. Male respondents formed the majority (85%) of the respondents. Females comprised of 15% of the respondents. Married respondents comprised of 70% of the sample, while those who were single and divorced comprised of 15% each. With regard to the respondents' education level, majority of the respondents were of secondary education and above (85%). The rest (15%) were below secondary education. At the time of imprisonment, majority engaged in business (45%), with 30% being in formal employment, and those with informal employment comprised of 25% of the respondents. From this, the study

summarizes that those engaged in terrorism are more likely to be young men and women, more likely to be males, more likely to be married and more likely to be fairly educated. They were also likely to be involved in some sort of meaningful occupation.

On the respondents self-meaning in radicalism, the following themes emerged from the study; self-empowerment, self-identity, self-repair from humiliation, social regret and seeking justice respectively. On self-empowerment, respondents were found to be socially deprived and for this reason, they sought alternative means of gaining power. Joining radicalized groups offered this opportunity. This assisted them gain status and attain improved social identity, traits that they aspired in life. This attained self-identity improved their social standing in the group as well as in the community that they lived in. Some respondents were found to have suffered some humiliation in their life, and as a result, they went about to 'self-repair' themselves, as a way of overcoming this humiliation. Involvement in terrorism offered this opportunity. Other respondents were found to now live a life of regret as their involvement in terrorism did not end up well for them. Finally, the research findings showed that some of the respondents joined radicalization as a reaction to social injustice suffered as an individual or as a member of a community. This category of respondents suffered bitterness over the grievances of perceived injustice that they had over the 'oppressors'—engaging in acts of terrorism offered them the opportunity to avenge for the ills meted to them as individuals or to their community in general.

On contextual factors in as far as they influenced one to be radicalized, the following were identified as having influence on the respondents; family, peer pressure, religion, poverty, discrimination and residences of the respondents. Family modeling asserted influence as the respondents respective families' way of life, practices or situation

influenced their behavior. Their behaviors were therefore influenced through social learning and modelling. Peer pressure also asserted immense influence as most respondents were persuaded by their friends (peers) to join radicalized groups. Religion on the other hand was found to have influenced their decision to join extremist groups. It is through misinterpreted Islamic ideology that they were radicalized. The study found that poverty played an insignificant role in persuading one to join extremist groups. Family and peer pressure asserted the greatest influence. The residences of the respondents also inferred some influence as most were found to have origins in Muslim dominated regions in Kenya. These regions were also the most marginalized in terms of development. Such respondents were thus drawn to terrorism as they perceived that their communities were neglected by the government and as such, they had to join Jihadism as a means to avenge for this 'disrespect.'

On motivation to violence, the study identified the following factors as playing a critical role in driving one towards Jihadism; violence as a moral obligation, violence as a necessity, violence as a quest for liberation and violence as a means of attaining group affiliation. Some respondents joined radicalization (and committed acts of violence) as they held on to the belief that it was their duty to do so hence it was their moral obligation to protect those they considered their own. Joining radicalization therefore was a step towards group affiliation, which approved of violence as a positive act. Group affiliation was achieved by members through the fulfilment of acts of violence as demanded by the group. Other respondents who harbored grievances against an external entity (such as the government) also engaged in violent extremism as through this they believed they would be able to liberate their people from oppression. Findings showed that such respondents mostly believed in Jihadism and martyrdom as in their view, this was a means through which they could liberate

themselves and others, from 'external' aggressors. In pursuing martyrdom, the respondents argued that through this they would achieve certain sacred values which included heavenly rewards. The sacred values could only be achieved through participating in violent activities, most of which required them to eliminate empathy so as to participate effectively. Finally, findings showed that some respondents participated in violence as a means to livelihood. In pursuing sacred values, they fought the war as a necessity to get greater gain from conquering the greater evil at any cost irrespective of whether their actions violated the law or social norms.

6.3 Discussion of Key Findings

This study analyzed radicalization of individuals as a process which culminated into actual participation in violence and in acts of terrorism. The research findings showed that prior to undergoing radicalization, individuals had already been influenced by other factors. These influencing factors included the way they socially constructed their world and the meaning they attached to their lived experiences.

The findings on how individuals constructed their lived lives prior to joining radicalization showed that they learnt the behavior by observing and practicing what other people did (with their lives). This finding agrees with Cooley (1998) on how people perceive themselves through the mirror reflections of their actions. In understanding the behavior of individuals joining radicalization, interpretative phenomenological theory (IPA) was used to guide the study. It was also used in the analysis of the lived experiences of the respondents. IPA identified the layered past of the respondents and analyzed the perceived grievances that the respondents harbored against their perceived aggressors. The participants' narratives showed that what they had experienced in life were natural events in life as this was how they experienced

life. Smith and Osborn (2008) argue that one's life experiences shapes how one perceives life.

IPA enabled the exploration of participants' experiences, enabled understanding of the participants themselves, and in the understanding of their perceptions and views (Brocki et al., 2006). Social construction theory on the other hand illuminated how individuals constructed their lives and how they perceived their own identity through their lived contexts, and how this led one into radicalization and violent extremism. The respondents argued variedly on how they defined themselves in radicalism. Unlike the legal labeling as terrorists, participants at individual level attached different meanings and justifications for joining radicalization (see Luckmann (1966) on how people socially construct their lived worlds). Findings showed that their perception of themselves included; self-empowerment, self-repair from humiliation, social regret and seeking justice.

Contextual factors were also considered in this study. The contexts that emerged in this study as influencing respondents decisions towards radicalism and terrorism were; family, peer pressure, religion, poverty, discrimination and residences of the respondents. Residence of the respondents was found to influence their participation in radicalization and terrorism mainly among those coming from the Muslim dominated areas of Coast and North Eastern regions of Kenya. The study findings in this regard concur with the research findings by Post et al., (2003:171-177), which espoused that the reasons that push individuals into terrorism included factors the family, including— the social environment, influence of religion, being born in refugee camps, imprisonment, perception of being a/the victim, desiring to be a hero and feelings of hate and anger.

This study also looked at the triggers that ignited individuals into actual acts of violence. Findings showed that most of the radicalized individuals participated in violence with the belief that violence was a moral obligation, or a tool for liberation, or was a strategy to gain group identity/affiliation, among others. However, some respondents said that they participated in violence as a necessity in life because the community they lived was located in a violent environment, such as Somalia and Israel. On this, the respondents argued that participation in violence was actually a means to harm those who have persisted in persecuting and subjugating their community. This is irrespective of committing or deviating from the social norms. Their argument in participating in violence and terrorism is based on 'moral reasoning' as derived from how they socially constructed their lived lives. In understanding the respondent's participation in violence, the study was again guided by IPA, which interpreted their lived experiences as influenced by their respective lived contexts. This understanding clarifies their moral reasoning acquired from the group beliefs and practices that justify their violent action. In this argument, it was argued that it was morally necessary to engage in violence in doing so, one will be acting in the best interest of the group/community. Arising from this understanding, it can therefore be argued that people participate in violence because of the different ways in which they perceived themselves; and this was done away from legalism and the social norms of society. This understanding is reinforced by their belief in the supernatural, which agrees with Atran et al, (2007) argument that terrorists engaged in extremism as a way of acquiring some sacred values (as opposed to material gains).

6.3.1 Deductions from the findings and contributions to knowledge

From this study, the following deductions can be made:

a) That radicalized individuals are a product of a deviant culture constructed consciously to counter what is seen as accepted norms and codes by the structured society. Their participation in radicalization and terrorism is informed by their moral reasoning that one finds appealing. According to the respondents, they understand radicalization as a means of fighting the holy Jihad, a far contrast from the perception held by society about them, and far from the legalism definition that identified them as social deviants and criminals.

b) That the lived contexts of the radicalized individuals played a key role in influencing them to join radicalization and eventually participate in violent terrorism. Findings showed that the family, one's religion and peer pressure are key influencers of radicalization in Kenya.

c) That the radicalized individuals cited different reasons of participating in violence. Some participated in violence as a moral obligation whereby their participation in violence was seen as a service to the community. In such lived contexts also, some respondents said that they indulged in violence as a necessity, which was also approved by the group. As for those who suffered grievances of social injustice or discrimination, used violence as a tool of liberation of themselves or the group. Others said that they participated in violence to get group approval and as a result be affiliated to the group

6.4 Conclusion

From the above findings, discussion and deductions, it is concluded that relying on legal frameworks to understand terrorists will only continue to attract recruits into

radicalism and terrorism. What is critical is the understanding of the various influences that tilts radicalized individual into acts of violence. Understanding their lived contexts and how they define themselves in radicalism would assist in the fight against radicalization and terrorism.

6.5 Recommendations

Arising from the above study findings and conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations:

a) **Government policy:** Policy formulation to regulate common contextual factors influencing radicalization and terrorism should be considered with relevant legal provisions for deterrence measures. The government should enhance its counter terrorism strategies by involving families of radicalized individuals in the de-radicalization campaign. More research funding should be directed towards understanding individual radicalization as opposed to concentrating on them as groups. More concern should be directed to the so-called low potential areas so that the youth can be empowered. This will address their getting radicalized and joining extremist groups.

a) **Multi-Agency Interventions:** Interventions by civil society and NGOs to address vulnerabilities causing radicalization for violence and terrorism should be considered. The government should also facilitate interventions by collaborating with international organizations to benchmark with them, and train locally based civil societies to carry out interventions by de-radicalization, anti-radicalization, rehabilitation and counselling services to those affected by radicalization and terrorism.

a) **Training:** Efforts should be made towards introducing into the school curriculum counter radicalization studies in order to sensitize the youth against recruiters of

radicalization. Radicalization and terrorism should be taught in schools to sensitize the youth from being recruited. The Government should also step in and moderate the teachings going on in the madrassa. The madrasas should be integrated into the formal educational system. Need to entrench positive culture among the youth through school curriculum to create a dominant culture that will curtail exploitation of the youth recruitment into radicalization and terrorism. Syllabus for training institutions dealing with security issues should also include topics that appreciate that learners should understand the motivations that lead individuals in joining radicalization.

6.6 Recommendations for Further Research

The following areas are recommended for further research;

a) That research should look into the ideological influences that attract the youth into violent extremism. This will assist in identifying the strategies used by the radicalizers in recruitment and retaining of youth for terrorism. The identification of the ideologies employed in recruitments will be used in the campaign against radicalization and training of youth in to counter recruitment into violent extremism.

b) That research should look into the critical analysis of the contexts influencing radicalization and terrorism in Kenya. This study will analyze the influences of some contextual factors that appeal to radicalization with a view of identifying salient issues contributing to radicalization. The findings will be used to focus the counter terrorism efforts in such contexts for anti-radicalization efforts.

c) That research should seek to understand the youth and the deviant culture as a means of participating in terrorism. The study will endeavor to understand the

emerging trend of youth being vulnerable to recruitment into radicalization. The findings will assist in understanding the moral reasoning of the youth to devise the anti-radicalization strategies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview Guide - Respondents

Thank you so much for accepting to participate in this interview. I believe that your life experience makes you an expert of your life as such only you can tell your own story. I thank you for taking the time to share your insight on your personal lived experience of your life.

Background

Age…………………………………………………………………..

Marital status………………………………………………………..

Level of education…………...

Occupation…………………………………………………………..

Residence**…………………………………………………………..**

Questions

1. Biographic data:
   a) Can you kindly talk about the following in your life;
      i.   Life history
      ii. Childhood experience
      iii. Adulthood experience
2. What shaped your experience?
   b) How did this experience influence your perception about yourself in relation to:
      i.   Individual life
      ii. Community
      iii. Role models in life
      iv. Shaping of best life about yourself
   c) Do you think your past experience have defined what you are today?
   d) How has it shaped your life and the community members?
3. How do you define yourself today in relation to the current situation?
   a) Why do you define yourself so?
   b) How did you find yourself in this situation?
   c) Do you think the current situation you are in is a true reflection of yourself of whom you are?

d) Do you think the current self-definition is in line with your social networks expects of you? (how the community has influenced the person to be the way he is as a radical)

4. For you as an individual, who is the major social problem? (individual level or community)

a) Why do you think this problem persists?

b) How best have you tried to solve the problem at either individual or community level?

c) What influences you as an individual to think this is the best way of solving your problem?

5. What can you remember about the following life experiences in your lived life?

a) high point in your life

b) low point in your life

c) turning point in your life,

d) Action that initiated the change in life

6. What does peace mean to you?

7. What does violence mean to you?

Thank you for participating.

Appendix 2: Interview Guide – Key Informants

Date: …………………………………………………………………

Place:…………………………………………………………………

Organization:………………………………………………………………..

Occupation: …………………………………………………………

Background information of the interviewee

Sex …………………………………………………………….

Marital status ………………………………………….

Level of education………………………………..

Questions

1. In your understanding, what do you think makes individuals in deciding to join radicalization?

   Prop – frustration, revenge, religious, family, peer pressure, social status

2. How does the joining of radicalization influence their lives?

   Prop – social status, source of happiness, heavenly gains

3. How are the radicalized individuals perceived by society?

   Prop – criminals, religious fanatics, extremists, mentally ill

4. In your view, what factors in one's life influences individuals to join radicalization?

   Prop –poverty levels, unemployment, inequality, marginalization

5. Have you had an encounter with radicalized persons in Kenya? if yes, can you recount what they say is the grievances causing their joining radicalization?

   Prop - politics, neighborhoods, family, culture, religion

6. In your encounter with radicalized people, have you ever come across cases of individuals joining radicalization but opt not to engage in violence and terrorism? if yes, how do they explain their reasons of desisting from engaging in violence and terrorism despite having undergone radicalization?

7. In your view what explains variation of decisions for the radicalized individuals in making choices of engaging in violence and terrorism and from desisting despite undergoing radicalization? Prop – ideology and practice

   Thank you for participating.

Appendix 3: Map of Kenya Showing Regions

Appendix 4: Moi University Research Permit

MOI UNIVERSITY
(ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED INSTITUTION)
SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENES

INTERNAL MEMO

FROM: Head, Department of Sociology & Psychology   **DATE:** 19th JUNE, 2018

TO: Mr John Wakhungu Masinde   **REF:**   SASS/DPHIL/112/16

SUBJECT: **POST GRADUATE ORAL PROPOSAL EXAMINATION**

Reference is made to the postgraduate oral presentation that was held on the 12th of June, 2018. After careful scrutiny of your presentation ranging from the Title, Background of the study, Study Objectives, Justification, Literature and Methodology including the Abstract, the verdict of the four Internal Examiners was unanimous. You were successful. On behalf of the department I extend our Congratulations.

You are therefore required to proceed to the field to collect data and work on your study to its final conclusion. Ensure that you collect all the necessary letters of authority from NACOSTI to enable you collect data without legal challenges.

You are expected to work with speed and complete your work within the set schedule.

Thank you

DR FRANCIS BARASA PhD
HEAD, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY & PSYCHOLOGY

Appendix 5: NACOSTI letter of Authorization

**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone:+254-20-2213471,
2241349,3310571,2219420
Fax:+254-20-318245,318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website : www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref: No. **NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792**   Date: **10th July, 2018**

John Wakhungu Masinde
Moi University
P.O. Box 3900-30100
ELDORET.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism"* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **all Counties** for the period ending **10th July, 2019.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

DR. STEPHEN K. KIBIRU, PhD.
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioners
All Counties.

The County Directors of Education
All Counties.

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO9001:2008 Certified

Appendix 6: NACOSTI Research Permit

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, research site specified period.
2. Both the Licence and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
3. Upon request of the Commission, the Licensee shall submit a progress report.
4. The Licensee shall report to the County Director of Education and County Governor in the area of research before commencement of the research.
5. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further permissions from relevant Government agencies.
6. This Licence does not give authority to transfer research materials.
7. The Licensee shall submit two (2) hard copies and upload a soft copy of their final report.
8. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of this Licence including its cancellation without prior notice.

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NACOSTI

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

RESEARCH CLEARANCE PERMIT

Serial No.A 19254

CONDITIONS: see back page

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. JOHN WAKHUNGU MASINDE
of MOI UNIVERSITY, 0-200 NAIROBI, has been permitted to conduct research in *All Counties*

on the topic: *LIVED EXPERIENCES OF RADICALIZED INDIVIDUALS AND TERRORISM*

for the period ending:
10th July,2019

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792
Date Of Issue : 10th July,2018
Fee Recieved :Ksh 2000

....
Applicant's
Signature

....
Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation

Appendix 7: Research Authorization from Prisons - Kenya Prisons Service

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

Telegrams: "COMPRISONS", Nairobi
Telephone: +254022722900-6.
Email: proprisons@gmail.com
When replying please quote

PRIS 1/21/VOL.V/02

PRISONS HEADQUARTERS
P.O. BOX 30175-00100
NAIROBI

24th July, 2018

John W.Masinde
Moi University
PO BOX 3900-30100
ELDORET

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH IN PRISONS

Your above application request refers.
This is to notify you that your request has been approved and that you shall be accorded research attachment to the following stations as tabulated here below:

KAMITI MAXIMUM PRISON PERIOD 30TH JULY-3RD AUGUST

S/NO.	DATE	VENUE	TIME	RESPONDENTS
1.	MONDAY 30.07.2018	KAMITI	1000-1300HRS / 1400-1600 HRS	2 / 2
2.	TUESDAY 31.07.2018	KAMITI	1000-1300HRS / 1400-1600HRS	2 / 2
3.	WEDNESDAY 01.08.2018	KAMITI	1000-1300HRS / 1400-1600HRS	2 / 2
4.	THURSDAY 0208.2018	KAMITI	1000-1300HRS / 1400-1600HRS	2 / 2
5.	FRIDAY 03.08.2018	KAMITI	1000-1300HRS / 1400-1600HRS	2 / 2
SAMPLE POPULATION				20

LANGATA WOMEN MAXIMUM PRISON PERIOD 8TH-10TH AUGUST 2018

S/NO.	DATE	VENUE	TIME	RESPONDENT
1.	WEDNESDAY 08.08.2018	LANGATA WOMEN MAX	1000-1200HRS / 1400-1600HRS	1 / 1
2.	THURSDAY 09.08.2018	LANGATA WOMEN MAX	100-1200HRS / 1400-1600HRS	1 / 1
3.	FRIDAY 10.08.2018	LANGATA WOMEN MAX	1000-1200HRS / 1400-1600HRS	1 / 1
SAMPLE POPULATION				6

SHIMO LA TEWA MAXIMUM AND WOMEN PRISONS PERIOD 13ᵀᴴ -17ᵀᴴ AUGUST 2018

S/NO	DATE	VENUE	TIME	RESPONDENT
1.	MONDAY	SHIMO LA	1000-1200HRS	2
	13.08.2018	TEWA MAX	14001700HRS	2
2.	TUESDAY	SHIMO LA	1000-1300HRS	2
	14.08.2018	TEWA MAX	1400-1700HRS	2
3.	WEDNESDAY	SHIMO LA	1000-1300HRS	2
	15.08.2018	TEWA MAX	1400-1700HRS	2
4.	THURSDAY	SHIMO LA	1000-1300HRS	2
	16.08.2018	TEWA MAX	1400-1700HRS	2
5.	FRIDAY	SHIMO LA	1000-1300HRS	2
	17.08.2018	TEWA MAX	1400-1700HRS	2
SAMPLE POPULATION				20

You are expected to adhere to prisons rules and regulations during your attachment period.

You are also required to provide prisons headquarters training section with a copy of your research.

By copy of this letter, officers in charge of the aforementioned stations are advised to accord you necessary assistance.

J.M.K'ODIENY, SDCP, OGW
FRO: COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF PRISONS

CC

RC NBI

RC COAST

OIC Kamiti Maximum Prison

OIC Langata Women Maximum Prison

OIC Shimo LA Tewa Maximum Prison

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
KENYA PRISONS SERVICE

Telegrams: "COMPRISONS", Nairobi
Telephone: +254022722900-6.
Email: proprisons@gmail.com
When replying please quote

PRISONS HEADQUARTERS
P.O. BOX 30175-00100
NAIROBI

PRIS 1/21/VOL.V/02

24th August, 2018

John W.Masinde
Moi University
PO BOX 3900-30100
ELDORET

APPLICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH IN PRISONS

Your above application request refers.

This is to notify you that your request has been approved and that you shall be accorded research attachment to the following stations as tabulated here below:

NAVASHA MAXIMUM PRISON PERIOD 28TH AUGUST, 2018

S/NO.	DATE	VENUE	TIME	RESPONDENTS
1.	28.08.2018	NAIVASHA MAX	0900-1200HRS	4
			1400-1600 HRS	3

MANYANI MAXIMUM PRISON PERIOD 30TH AUGUST, 2018

S/NO.	DATE	VENUE	TIME	RESPONDENTS
1.	30.08.2018	MANYANI MAX	0900-1200HRS	3
			1400-1600HRS	3

You are expected to adhere to prisons rules and regulations during your attachment period.

You are also required to provide prisons headquarters training section with a copy of your research.

By copy of this letter, officers in charge of the aforementioned stations are advised to accord you necessary assistance.

J.M.K'ODIENY, SDCP, OGW
FRO: COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF PRISONS

CC

RC RV

RC COAST

OIC Manyani Maximum Prison

OIC Naivasha Maximum Prison

Appendix 8: Research Authorization-Nairobi Regional Coordinator of Education

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Republic of Kenya
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING AND BASIC EDUCATION

Telegrams: "SCHOOLING", Nairobi
Telephone; Nairobi 020 2453699
Email: rcenairobi@gmail.com
cdenairobi@gmail.com

When replying please quote

Ref: RCE/NRB/GEN/VOL.1

REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION
NAIROBI REGION
NYAYO HOUSE
P.O. Box 74629 – 00200
NAIROBI

Date: 26th September, 2018

John Wakhungu Masinde
Moi University
P. O. Box 3900 - 30100
ELDORET

RE: **RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

We are in receipt of a letter from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation regarding research authorization in Nairobi County on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism"*.

This office has no objection and authority is hereby granted for a period ending 10th **July, 2019** as indicated in the request letter.

Kindly inform the Sub County Director of Education of the Sub County you intend to visit.

DAISY IRERI
FOR: REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION
NAIROBI

Copy to: Director General/CEO
             National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
             NAIROBI

Appendix 9: Research Authorization - County Commissioner, Mombasa

THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telephone: Mombasa 2311201
Tel. 0715 040444

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
P.O. BOX 90424-80100
MOMBASA

Email: *msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com*
When Replying please quote:

Ref. no. **MCC/ADM.25 VOL.1/ (216)**   **13TH AUGUST, 2018**

Deputy County Commissioner
KISAUNI SUB COUNTY

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – JOHN WAKHUNGU
MASINDE
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792**

This is to authorize the above named student from Moi University, Eldoret to
carry out research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals
and terrorism in Shimo La Tewa Prisons"* in Mombasa County for a
period ending **10th July, 2019.**

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

**EVANS M. ACHOKI
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MOMBASA COUNTY**

C.C.

County Director of Education
MOMBASA

Appendix 10: Research Authorization – County Director of Education – Mombasa

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REPUBLIC OF KENYA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING & BASIC EDUCATION

Telegrams: "SCHOOLING",
Mombasa
Telephone: Mombasa 2315327 /
2230052

COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION,
MOMBASA COUNTY,
P. O. BOX 90204-80100
MOMBASA

Ref.No.MC/ED/GEN/23

13TH AUGUST, 2018

To Whom It May Concern

RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION
JOHN WAKHUNGU MASINDE PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792

This is to authorize **John Wakhungu Masinde Permit NO. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792** from Moi University to carry out Research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism".* For the period ending 11th July, 2019.

Please give him the necessary assistance.

Clara W. Mwakazi
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
MOMBASA

Appendix 11: Research Authorization – County Commissioner, Taita/Taveta

County

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

THE PRESIDENCY

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

County Commissioner's Office
Taita Taveta County
P.O. Box 1 - 80305
MWATATE

Email Address: cc.taitataveta@interior.go.ke
When replying please quote:
REF: CC/TVT/ADM.5/VOL.I (122)

29th August, 2018

All Deputy County Commissioners
TAITA TAVETA

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION - MR. JOHN WAKHUNGU MASINDE

Reference is made to a letter Ref. No. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792 dated 10th July, 2018 from the Director General/CEO, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation on the above subject matter.

The above named person from Moi University, Eldoret has been authorized by this office to carry out research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism" in Taita Taveta County* for a period ending **10th July, 2019.**

Kindly accord him the necessary assistance.

RHODA ONYANCHA
for: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
TAITA TAVETA

Cc

The Director General/CEO
National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
P.O BOX 30623 - 00100
NAIROBI. - **Your letter Ref. No. NACASTI/P/18/11202/23792 dated 10th July, 2018 refers.**

The County Director of Education
TAITA TAVETA

Mr. John Wakhungu Masinde

Appendix 12: Research Authorization – Director of Education, Taita/Taveta County

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
State Department of Early Learning and Basic Education

Telephone: 0724592378
Email: cdetaitataveta@gmail.com
cdetaitataveta@yahoo.com

When replying please Quote:
Ref No. TTC/EDU/R.2/VOL.1/108

COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION,
TAITA TAVETA,
P.O BOX 130 - 80305,
MWATATE.

29th August, 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – MR JOHN WAKHUNGU MASINDE

Circular Ref. No. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792 by National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation dated 29th August, 2018 refers.

Authority has been granted to carry out research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism"* in Taita Taveta County for the period ending 10th July, 2019.

On completion of the research, you are requested to submit a hard copy of the research report/thesis to our office within one year.

PHILIP K. WAMBUA
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
TAITA TAVETA.

C.c.
County Commissioner,
TAITA TAVETA

Appendix 13: Research Authorization – County Commissioner, Nakuru County

THE PRESIDENCY
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND
CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Telegrams:" DISTRICTER", Nakuru
Telephone: Nakuru 051-2212515
When replying please quote

COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAKURU COUNTY
P.O. BOX 81
NAKURU

Ref. No. *CC.SR.EDU 12/1/2 VOL.III/ (163)*

30th July, 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION –JOHN WAKHUNGU MASINDE

The above named person has been given permission to carry out research on "*Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism in Nakuru County*" in Nakuru County for the period ending 10th July, 2019.

Please accord him all the necessary support to facilitate the success of his research.

**JUDITH ONYANGO
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAKURU COUNTY**

Appendix 14: Research Authorization – Director of Education, Nakuru County

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EARLY LEARNING OF BASIC EDUCATION

Telegrams: "EDUCATION",
Telephone: 051-2216917
When replying please quote

Ref.CDE/NKU/GEN/4/21/VOL.VIII/33

COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
NAKURU COUNTY
P. O. BOX 259,
NAKURU.

5th October, 2018

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION –JOHN WADHUNGU MASINDE
PERMIT NO. NACOSTI/P/18/11202/23792**

Reference is made to letter NACOSTI/P/18/77180/22035 dated 10th July, 2018.

Authority is hereby granted to the above named to carry out research on *"Lived experiences of radicalized individuals and terrorism in Nakuru County - Kenya,"* for a period ending 10th July, 2019.

Kindly accord him the necessary assistance.

**G.N. KIMANI
FOR: COUNTY DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION
NAKURU COUNTY**

Copy to:

- Moi University
  P. O. Box 3900-30100
  ELDORET