

**UAMSHO ASSOCIATION: THE POLITICS OF ISLAMISM, UNIFICATION
AND SECESSION IN ZANZIBAR**

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DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

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This thesis has been submitted with our approval as University Supervisors.

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Fatmah Said, and my children who gave me the necessary moral support throughout my studies in Kenya.

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I would like to thank all the people who willingly accepted to do interviews with me, which facilitated the writing of this thesis. Apparently, these people sacrificed their time to participate in the discussion of the various research questions thereby giving me a lot of information dealing with the subject of study.

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ABSTRACT

UAMSHO (Awakening) organization, which came into prominence in 2001 is one of the several registered Muslim associations in Zanzibar whose mission, initially, was focused on *da'wa* (propagation of Islam) and improving Muslims' welfare. Though registered as a socio-religious organization, gradually, the association has been taking clear political stance characterized by unrelenting demand for Zanzibar's secession from the political unification with Tanganyika. Because of their advocacy, the political tension and violence that rocked Zanzibar in recent past was to a certain extent associated with the organization. The study examined the genesis and ideological foundations of the UAMSHO organization in the country within the context of a secular state. In that respect the study explored the global situations that influenced the emergence of political Islam in Zanzibar taking UAMSHO as the focus of the study. Both the Social Conflict Theory and the qualitative research approach were applied, and the data collected thereby analyzed using the qualitative analysis tools of content, discourse, and phenomenological analysis. More so, observation techniques, written documents, and internet sources were significant in collecting both primary and secondary data. The informants considered were in the following categories: Officials and activists of UAMSHO, leaders from different Muslim associations, and government officials. All the collected and analysed data was presented in the form of thematic descriptions to illustrate UAMSHO as a religion-political movement, advancing Muslims' political consciousness in Zanzibar. The study concluded that the present political atmosphere that supports secession of Zanzibar from mainland Tanzania facilitates. It is expected that the findings of this study would provide the government with relevant information, which could be used in policy formulation that incorporates the views and the aspirations of the majority Muslims in Zanzibar.

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ACRONYMS

AD:	<i>Anno Domini.</i>
AFP:	Agence France-Presse
AIDS:	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.
AIMP:	The Association for Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation.
ASP:	Afro-Shirazi Party
BAKWATA:	<i>Baraza Kuu la Waislamu wa Tanzania</i> (The Muslim Council of Tanzania).
BALUKTA:	<i>Baraza la Uendelezaji wa Koran Tanzania</i> (Council for the Promotion of the Quran in Tanzania).
BAMITA:	<i>Baraza la Misikiti Tanzania</i> (The Council of Tanzania Mosques).
CA:	Constituent Assembly
CCM:	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi.</i>
CD:	Compact Disc.
CUF:	Civic United Front.
DVD:	Digital Video Disc.
FIFA:	Federation of the International Football Association.
GNU:	Government of National Unity
IPC:	Islamic Propagation Centre.
IPK:	Islamic Party of Kenya
JUMAZA:	<i>Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar.</i>
JUMIKI:	<i>Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislamu.</i>
KAMAHURU:	<i>Kamati ya Mageuzi Huru.</i>
MRC:	Mombasa Republican Council.
MUM:	Muslim University of Morogoro.
KANU:	Kenya African National Union.
MPs:	Members of Parliament.
MSAUD:	The Muslim Student Association of the University of Dar-es-Salaam.
NGO:	Non-Governmental Organization.

NRA:	National Reconstruction Alliance.
OIC:	Organization of Islamic Conference.
RPC:	Regional Police Commander.
SADC:	Southern African Development Community.
Saw:	<i>Sallallahu Alyhi Wasallam</i> (Peace be upon the Prophet Mohammad).
SUPKEM:	Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims.
SUZA:	The State University of Zanzibar.
SW:	<i>Sub-hanahu Wataala</i> (God is purified).
TANU:	Tanganyika African National Union.
TRA:	Tanzania Revenue Authority.
TV:	Television.
UKAWA:	<i>Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi</i> .
UN:	United Nations Organization.
US:	United States of America.
UWAMDI:	Umoja wa Wahadhiri wa Mihadhara ya Dini.
UWT:	Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania.
WTC:	Wakf and Trust Property Commission.
ZBC:	Zanzibar Broadcasting Corporation.
ZEC:	Zanzibar Electoral Commission.
ZIFYA:	Zanzibar Federation of Youth.
ZNP:	Zanzibar Nationalist Party.
ZPPP:	Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party.
ZRB:	Zanzibar Revenue Board.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Generally, this study explored a catalogue of events from the 2000 to 2016 that have alluded to the prospects of Islamism in Zanzibar. The concept of Islamism has been identified by some scholars to simply mean “political Islam” aimed at the attainment of social, political as well as personal needs of an individual Muslim based on Islamic principles.¹ It is this understanding of Islamism that would be applied in this study.

There are disparities among Islamist organizations, leading to Mehdi Mozaffari observing that among the criterion for differentiating them is the scope of their goals thereby categorizing the groups into national and global Islamism. On national Islamism, he posits:

National Islamism embraces movements whose claims are partly articulated by the modern concept of nation, especially in four geographical areas, Kashmir, Palestine, Lebanon and Chechnya. The geopolitical context of each area brings about different uses of nationalism by these Islamist groups. *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* (The Pure Army) wants Kashmir to be separated from India and integrated into Pakistan. The purpose of the Islamic Regiments who fight in Chechnya is to separate Chechnya from Russia in order for it to become an independent state. Hamas claims independence for Palestine, but also insists on the obliteration of an already existing nation, Israel. Hezbollah, while supporting the idea of obliterating Israel, for the time being concentrates on extending its political and military domination within an already existing state: Lebanon.²

On the second category of Islamism Mozaffari argues:

Global Islamism embraces movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in its various forms, Khomeinist movements in Iran, followers of Mawdudi in Pakistan and elsewhere, and of course the organisation al-Qaeda. They all pursue the same goal, although at

¹ Sheri Berman. 2003. “Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society.” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, England: Cambridge University Press, p. 258.

² Mehdi Mozaffari. 2007. “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept.” *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*. Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 21.

different paces and through different discourses. This goal is, in brief, the restoration of Islam's might and glory, to be achieved once all Muslim territories have been liberated from the yoke of non-Muslim occupants.³

It is apparent that national Islamism is focused on establishing Islamic system within local/national context, whereas global Islamism is interested with worldwide domination of Islam. This study pays particular attention to Uamsho (awakening), one of the prominent Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with strong political activism in the recent times. As a potential national Islamist group, the association has championed for the creation of an Islamic state in Zanzibar. Thus, the focus of the study is to examine the development of political Islam in Zanzibar through the prism of Uamsho association.

The militant Islamist group of al-Qaeda, which undoubtedly has sympathisers in Zanzibar, is an example of global Islamists that, has succeeded to usher Islamist jihadi to the international spotlight when it struck at the heart of the United States (US) in September 11.⁴ This has resulted to the United States and its allies mobilizing their resource against the threat posed by the Islamist jihadi.⁵ To the contrary, many Muslim majority states have faced growing Islamic opposition in the past decades affiliated to the Islamist groups leading to regime changes. These include the Islamic revolution of Iran (1979), the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (1981), and a wave of political violence and assassinations in Algeria, Kashmir Islamic mobilization, and the guerrilla war that has impacted on the domestic politics

³Mozaffari, "What is Islamism?", p. 28.

⁴ Shahaan Akbarzadeh, and Abdulla Saeed. 2003. *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, London: Routledge Curzon, p. 1.

⁵ Ibid.

of Pakistan and challenged India, and inter-communal violence in Indonesia (2000 – 2001).⁶

Previously, the whole of East African coast had seen the Portuguese power dominating the region for about two centuries before eventually defeated by the Omans.⁷ Following the Portuguese defeat, the Oman Arabs established their base in Zanzibar running from 1830s – 1963. With the Oman Arabs occupation, Zanzibar gradually developed into a predominantly Muslim and a multiracial society, with the Shirazi community as the majority followed by Black Africans, and Arabs among others.⁸

According to the religious demography in Zanzibar, Muslims account for 99% of the population compared to their Christian compatriots.⁹ However, this estimation contradicts to that provided by Abdulaziz Y. Lodhi (1994) in his article “*Muslims in Eastern Africa - Their Past and Present*” which indicates that the Muslim numerical strength is estimated at over 96%. Due to their overwhelming majority, several Muslim organizations both governmental and non-governmental are evident in the country. The government established Muslim institutions include offices such as the *Wakf* and Trust Property Commission, the *Mufti*, and the *Kadhi* court, while several Islamic NGOs like Uamsho, Imams Association, and Istiqama Association have branches throughout the country.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Mohammed Bakari, and Alexander Makulilo. 2012. “Beyond polarity in Zanzibar? The ‘Silent’ Referendum and the Government of National Unity,” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 196.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Department of State. 2004. “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom” submitted on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives p. 116. Accessed at: <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-108JPRT20429/pdf/CPRT-108JPRT20429.pdf>.

Despite being a secular state (given that Zanzibar is part of Tanzania), the government-based Islamic institutions were founded with the purpose of overseeing the affairs of the Muslims in the country. Like Uamsho, the country's Imam Association – JUMAZA (Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar) was officially registered in 2003 as an Islamic NGO dedicated to the unification of Zanzibari Muslims through the mosque space. The close relationship between the two associations makes it difficult to draw a line separating them since their leaders seem to work across the two organizations. However, since its inception in 2003, JUMAZA has remained committed to the following objectives:¹⁰

- a) To unite all Muslims in Zanzibar.
- b) To become the Muslim's voice in fighting for what is right in accordance to the rules and regulations.
- c) To raise awareness and understanding of the Islamic religion.
- d) To work together with the various Islamic and non-Islamic organizations for the betterment of the lives of the people of Zanzibar.
- e) To encourage Muslims to participate in the various developmental sectors in accordance with the Islamic principles.

On the other hand, the Istiqaama Islamic association was officially registered in 1995 and has been operating in different provinces of Tanzania including Zanzibar with the intention of addressing the welfare of the country's Muslims, particularly of the *Ibadhi* community.¹¹ The association's major aim is the Islamization of the society through Islamic education that if implemented would, arguably, succeed in producing

¹⁰ Zanzibar Imams Association Constitution, 2007, p.5.

¹¹ Muhammad Nasir al-Mahruqi. 1995. "Abu Muslim al-Bahlani Sha`iran." M.A. thesis, Sultan Qaboos University, p.72

a new generation of Muslims who staunchly adhere to God's rules and commandments.

In similar measure, Uamsho association was founded in 2001 with the view of re-awakening the Zanzibari Muslim society in upholding and implementing Islamic tenets. Nevertheless, today, this organization has embraced political activism and known to be the most vocal Muslim organisation in the country. The organization has well-structured network for the smooth running of its activities that included offering sermons and undertaking missionary work.¹² Of all the Islamic NGOs registered in the country, Uamsho is the only one that openly engages in political activities, leading to the arrest of some of its leaders in 2012 accused of being a threat to government security.¹³ Reported cases of religious intolerance and religio-political violence that took place between 2011 and 2012 have been associated with this organization,¹⁴ a claim that the Uamsho leadership has refuted.¹⁵

Therefore, it is against this background that the study examined the political reform discourse of Uamsho within the context of Zanzibar as a secular state. In particular, the study assessed the ideological foundation (whether it is religious or secular) of Uamsho, focusing on its social and political activism, as well as profiling the life and activities of its leading personalities.

In exploring the ideological basis of Uamsho, the study outlined the history and formation of the movement, which included its objectives and structure. In describing

¹² Constitution of Uamsho, (2009), Accessed at: <http://uamshozanzibar.wordpress.com/2009/05/20katiba-ya-jumuiya-ya-uamsho-na-mihadhara-ya-kiiislamu>.

¹³ "TANZANIA, International Religious Freedom Report for 2012." United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, p. 6. Accessed at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/208416.pdf>.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview with sheikh Msellem Ali Msellem, Amir (Chairman) Uamsho, Zanzibar, 11/03/2014

the formation of the association, the study outlined the founder members of Uamsho, its system of leadership and major goal, which is geared towards restoring the full autonomy of Zanzibar from the present status as a partner state with mainland Tanzania. The major issue of significance surrounding Uamsho's advocacy revolves around the question of secession of Zanzibar, yet it is not clear how this objective would be realized. Though the association has succeeded in compelling the government to make certain concessions in its favour such as banning of 'immoral' dancing in public grounds during religious holidays of Idel-Fitri and Idel-Haji,¹⁶ Uamsho has faced numerous challenges that included the proscription of its activities by the State and the arrest of several of its leaders and sympathizers.¹⁷

Due to the long history of Islam in the country, a brief review on the development of Islam from the colonial to the postcolonial era was explored to assist situate the current emergence of political Islam in the country. Both local and external factors were examined to assess if they could have played any relevant role in the development of Islamism in Zanzibar.

1.2 Subject of the Study

Zanzibar is a land of isles consisting of two major islands of Unguja and Pemba. As indicated above, historically, the population of Zanzibar is a multiracial and multi-ethnic in nature, with a Muslim majority. Though, there is no up-to-date statistics of racial distribution, the pre-independence statistics are still used by researchers indicating that about 56.2% of the population is Shirazi, 19.5% Africans, and Arabs 16.9%, while other races including the Asians and Comorians are estimated at 5.8%

¹⁶ Yussuf Issa. 2013. "Zanzibar: Uamsho leaders to remain in police custody," *Tanzania Daily News*. Accessed at: <http://dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

and 1% respectively.¹⁸ Such statistics are old and they do not give a true reflection of the present Zanzibari society. Nevertheless, the Muslim numerical strength is estimated at over 96% with the majority (90%) of them subscribing to Sunni Islam.¹⁹ As a result, Islam has played a crucial role in the cultural development of the Zanzibari society since the beginning of the last century.²⁰

The strong cultural and political influence of Islam in Zanzibar may be inference from the fact that all Islamic celebrations are recognized as national holidays.²¹ In particular, the month of Ramadhan is recognized by the State as a holy month. Although the state has the role of "guardian of religion" under the constitution,²² Zanzibar has no specific law banning eating in public during Ramadan where all restaurants and cafeterias are supposed to close until late afternoon. Similarly, smoking, eating and drinking on the streets is proscribed. In other occasion, nine people had been arrested and sentenced to one month in prison for eating in public during Ramadan in May 2018.²³ However, such regulations are not rigorously enforced because of the alleged increase of tourists from the West in the past few years.²⁴

Within the East Africa region, Tanzania is, arguably, considered to have the highest number of Muslim population.²⁵ However, this estimation is contested since the

¹⁸Bakari, and Makulilo. "Beyond polarity in Zanzibar?" p. 196, 215.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰Abdulaziz Y. Lodh. 1994. "Muslims in Eastern Africa - Their Past and Present." *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 3(1): 88–98.

²¹ The Public Holidays Ordinance (Amended) Act. No. 28 of 1966, p. 1.

²² Zanzibar Constitution, 1984, "Protection of Fundamental Rights and Individual Freedom" Sec. 12 (3), P. 7.

²³ Jerry Bambi, "Ramadan: nine people sentenced to prison for eating in Zanzibar" *Africanews*, 25/05/2018.

²⁴Abdulaziz Y. Lodh. Op.cit

²⁵Abdin, Chande. 2008. "Muslim-State Relations In East Africa Under Conditions Of Military And Civilian Or Oneparty Dictatorships", *Historia Actual Online*, Adelphi University, United States. P. 111.

country's national census has always not taken into account the religious factor when conducting its survey. Depending on the source of information, a Muslim source presents Muslim population to be in between 50% to 60%,²⁶ whereas non-Muslim source alleges Muslims to be not more than a third of the population of Tanzania.²⁷ Generally, some other sources describe the religious affiliation of the country "as one third Muslim, one third Christian and one third tribalist i.e. following traditional religions."²⁸ Such is the politics of numbers of religious affiliation in the country.

It is widely held that Islam arrived in Zanzibar even before the establishment of the Oman Arab sultanate under the leadership of Seyyid Said bin Sultan who made Zanzibar his administrative headquarters in 1832.²⁹ As an Islamic dominion, the sultanate introduced an Islamic judiciary system (Kadhi courts) that operated until 1890 when Zanzibar was declared a British protectorate, giving way for the introduction of the European common laws in the country. Under British rule, Kadhi courts were retained and mandated to address family law cases involving the local Muslims, whereas the secular law courts presided other aspects of the law involving both Muslims and non-Muslim members of the society.³⁰

Like other parts of Africa that witnessed the fall of colonialism, Zanzibar attained its independence from the British in December 1963, which was followed by the bloody revolution of January 1964, culminating to the overthrowing of the sultanate rule. This development paved the way for the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) forming a

²⁶Abdulaziz Y. Lodh. Op.cit.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹ Matthew Hettiger. 2010. "The Racialization of Politics in Revolutionary Zanzibar." A thesis submitted to the US Naval Academy for the Degree of Masters in History; Wesley Gilbert. 2011. "Our Man in Zanzibar: Richard Waters, American Consul,(1837-1845)." A thesis submitted to the faculty of Wesleyan University for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts in History, Wesleyan University. Middletown, Connecticut, United States.

³⁰ Hamudi I. Majamba. 2007. "Perspectives on the Kadhis Court in Zanzibar." *Orient Journal of Law and Social Sciences*, Vol. 1 issue No. 2. pp. 1-25.

Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, which ultimately joined the country to Tanganyika forming a new nation, Tanzania, in April 1964.³¹ The resultant union has been criticised by a section of Muslims in Zanzibar as an attempt by Tanganyika to check and control the influence of Islam in the region a view that the ASP leadership has rejected.

The first Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar under the leadership of President Abeid Amani Karume (1964 – 1972) ensured that no any form of antagonism was tolerated in the country. In its effort to curb Islamic opposition, Karume’s administration maintained the the *Kadhi* courts’ jurisdiction to family matters despite calls for expanding the mandates of the court.³² The emerging situation aroused sentiments among the populace that there is need for an Islamic revolution to restore the supremacy of the Islamic law in the society.³³

The foregoing scenario gave motivation to the formation of Uamsho. The movement has been vocal on political matters as evident in their unsuccessful attempt to capture the control of Zanzibar in around 2011 to 2012. In the ‘unsuccessful attempt’, the main political agenda of the association was to ensure that Zanzibar gets back its autonomy to enable it to decide its own affairs and ultimately implement the Islamic laws in the society.³⁴ Despite this clear Islamic agenda, the organization’s constitution does not categorically address this political concern. As a movement, Uamsho is openly committed to political activism in the country, since it is through political involvement that guarantees its leadership in initiating the desired changes and

³¹ Omar Mapuri. 1996. *The 1964 Revolution: Achievements and Prospects*. Dar es Salaam: Tema Publishers, 58.

³² Majamba. “Perspectives on the Kadhis Court in Zanzibar.” pp 1-25.

³³ Interview with Sheikh Msellem bin Ali Msellem, Chairman UAMSHO, Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/03/2014..

³⁴ Ibid..

reforms upon gaining power. Their goal is to dismantle and change the entire present political structure, and based on their approach there is no doubt the movement has an Islamist agenda.³⁵

Though Uamsho Islamist association claims to be non-violent in its approach, incidents associated with it clearly demonstrate the opposite. For instance, cases of confrontation between the State and sympathizers of the association have been reported as demonstrated May 2012 when sections of Muslim rioters, presumably supporters of the organization, set two churches afire in the country a day after the arrest of one of its leaders, Sheikh Farid Hadi Ahmed, for participating in an illegal demonstration.³⁶ Likewise the same year, witnessed the arrest of its other leader *Sheikh* Mussa Juma after weeks of Uamsho's demonstrations against the constitutional review process whereby rioters set fire the Kibweni Roman Catholic church, the Mpendae Roman Catholic church, and the Kariakoo Assemblies of God church. This raises the question: why target the churches every time the association is in confrontation with the State? Partly to the response is that most of the Christians living in Zanzibar are immigrant workers from the Tanzania mainland and thereby the presence of the churches symbolized mainland influence and domination in Zanzibar.³⁷

With regard to Tanzania constitutional review, Uamsho alleged that the process ignored the interests of Zanzibar in favour of the mainland (arguably viewed as non-Muslims). These and other incidents brought to fore the religio-political confrontation within the context of Zanzibar as epitomized in the activities of Uamsho. Through

³⁵ Ioannis Gatsiounis. 2012. "After Al-Shabab", *Current trends in Islamist Ideology*. vol. 14, p-81.

³⁶ Daniel Howden. 2012. "Trouble in Paradise as Radical Islam Grows in Zanzibar," *The Independent (UK)*.

³⁷ International Religious Freedom Report for 2012, United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, p. 6.

their slogan that called for Zanzibar autonomy, Uamsho has succeeded in rallying a section of Zanzibar Muslims behind their cause since they feel deprived and dominated by the mainland Tanzania.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Because of Uamsho's recent political stance, some commentators have argued that the association is no longer a religious body, but a movement with a political agenda. The organization is vocal in championing for Zanzibar's autonomy by demanding for its de-unification with Tanganyika through a referendum.³⁸ The organization's agitation has put it into a collision course with the State, which has criticized the association for overstepping its registered mandate by turning itself into a political vehicle. Under Zanzibar's statutes, Uamsho was registered with the understanding that it would adhere to all the government regulations, including refraining from turning the association into a political platform. Despite this government restriction, the association has supposedly through its various public meetings, supporting sectarian tensions and violence to advance a separatist agenda aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Zanzibar. This is one of the themes discussed in details in this dissertation.

Following the 2012 violence that erupted in the country between the government's security agents and a seeming coalition of the opposition political parties and Uamsho association, the State reacted by banning all Uamsho's planned public meetings and demonstrations.³⁹ More so, because of the violence, the police arrested several individuals associated with the organization's leadership. In response, confrontation escalated between the police and supporters of the association, culminating to destruction of property that included churches and bars, which in the view of the

³⁸ Elias Mhegera, Uamsho debate – Is it religion, politics or a disease?, *The Citizen, Tanzania*: Sunday, June 17th 2012.

³⁹ International Religious Freedom Report for 2012, Op. cit.

association were considered un-Islamic symbols.⁴⁰ With such views, there is no doubt that Uamsho exhibited extreme Islamism tendencies a theme explored in this dissertation.

So, from the foregoing presentation, the study was crucial in order to investigate the activities of Uamsho including its agenda, interactions with the government, and the situations, which led it to take part in politics.

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The main objective of this study is to investigate the situations that led and encouraged the emergence of Islamists movement in Zanzibar. In addition, the study aimed at attaining the following specific objectives:

1. To discuss the concept of secularism and its implications to Muslim societies.
2. To examine Zanzibari Muslims' political engagements in Zanzibar during both the colonial and postcolonial periods.
3. To explore the ideological foundations of the Uamsho organization and the nature of its interaction with the State in Zanzibar.
4. To examine the internal and external conditions that influenced the emergence of Islamism in the country and its socio-political consequences.

To realize the above objectives, the study raised the following crucial and significant questions:

1. What is the nature of secularism and how does it implicate Muslim societies?
2. How have Zanzibari Muslims engaged in the country's politics in both the colonial and postcolonial periods?

⁴⁰ Ibid.

3. If Uamsho's political ideological basis is derived from religious principles, how is it in harmony or in conflict with the secular principles of the Zanzibar government?
4. Why is the country witnessing heightened 'political Islam' activism at this particular historical period?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is significant to the society of Tanzania and Zanzibar in particular, for it explored the political reforms advocated by Uamsho and the way such reforms fit into the broader context of Zanzibar as a secular state. It brings for the fine and clear comprehension of the Uamsho association: The study fits into the broader subject of religion and politics, and by large Islamist political activism.

Without doubt, the study is timely as it explores the political activities of Uamsho movement, showing to what extent their agenda and activities fits or violates the broader aspirations of Zanzibar, and generally Tanzania, as a secular state. It brings forward an in-depth analysis of the Uamsho association: its ideological and social basis, the nature of its political interaction with the government, and the conditions crucial for its evolvement.

The study highlights the challenges posed by the Uamsho movements that are inimical to peaceful co-existence in Zanzibar. Likewise, it is significant to all the writers and readers who are interested with the issues of Islamism and its implications throughout the world and Tanzania in particular.

Consequently, the study could be used by the State in formulating policy guidelines that accommodate genuine aspirations of the Muslims in Zanzibar as channelled through Islamic NGOs.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

While a number of Islamic-based NGOs are operating in Zanzibar together with State owned Muslim agencies, the study concerned itself with the activities of the Uamsho association. Since this exploration was limited in examining the prospects of Islamism in Zanzibar in the contemporary period, the study was compelled to confine itself to the Urban West Region of Zanzibar where Uamsho movement seems to be vibrant.

While conducting the field study between the months of January 2014 to December 2014, it was unable to access some of the key respondents, particularly certain Uamsho officials who were either in police custody or in hiding fearing arrest by the State. Either, some informants refused to give their support to the researcher by providing deceived appointments, while others did not accept to be recorded when giving their information.

These challenges however, were mitigated by accessing their recorded public statements through different media resources including CDs, DVDs, and You Tube websites, which were later endorsed as authentic by their colleagues who had not been arrested.

1.7 Literature Review

This section of literature review is divided into sub titles whereby each title has studied an independent article. The section has studied articles dealing with topics on Islamism the meaning and definition, the nature, concept, and its ideological formation. Furthermore, the section has given out some details on Islamic view

towards politics, secularism and the Islamic states; and lastly, the topic on Islamism in East Africa was also studied.

Scholarly interests in the study of religion and politics have produced numerous volumes of literature on the subject of Islamism due to the social and political influences Islamists movements have presented in the various societies in the Muslim world. Since this study also deals with the issue of politics, it would be significant to indicate how scholars have defined the word politics.

1.7.1 Politics: A brief definition

According to Max Weber Politics is “striving for a share of power or for influence on the distribution of power.”⁴¹ Closer to Weber’s understanding of politics is that of *Rod Hague and Martin Harrop* who posit, “Politics refers to a set of activities associated with the governance of a country, or an area. It involves making decisions that apply to members of a group.”⁴² In addition, David Easton while explaining politics elucidated that the resultant government (reins of power) presents “organized authority” and “institutions of leadership and authoritative allocation of values.”⁴³ Clearly, all descriptions of politics are interrelating; they assert that politics is a phenomenon composed of four aspects namely: people, government/administration, state/nation, and control.

Abdul Rashid Moten, however, argues that the view of politics resulting from Western conception has no relevance to politics conceptualized in Islam. The essence of politics in Islam, in Moten’s view, is striving for a life focused in seeking the

⁴¹ Marcus Llangue. 2007. “Max Weber on the Relation between Power Politics and Political Ideals” *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory*, Vol, 14, No. 4. UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

⁴² Rod Hague; Martin Harrop. 2013. *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. London: Macmillan International Higher Education. pp. 1

⁴³ David Easton. 1971. *The Political System*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 135.

pleasure of God. As a result, politics in Islam could be interpreted as “the art of government based on the Qur’anic exhortations of enjoining good and forbidding evil along with its implications that require the participation of all members of society in the affairs of government.”⁴⁴ As demonstrated Islamic polity demands for the citizen participation (*shura*) in the affairs of the State and the upholding of high moral probity (*amr bil ma’ruf wa nahyi anil –Munkar*) by both those in leadership and the ruled, which are also the core values of the secular system. Moten also underscores the significance of ritual practices (*ibadah*) to the socio-economic and political significance of the Muslim State, arguing:

Four of the five fundamental pillars of Islam i.e. prayers, fasting, alms giving, and pilgrimage are perfectly suited to promoting ‘esprit de corps’ and group solidarity among its followers. These pillars of Islam are not meant for pure spiritual upliftment, but have socio-economic and political significance as well.⁴⁵

This raises the question: what is the nature of the so-called Islamic politics?

1.7.2 The Nature of Islamic politics

In answering the above question, in the Islamic political theory religion and politics are not two separate domains. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, articulately present this inseparability between the two spheres, arguing:

The challenge rests on the assumption that Islam and politics are inseparable, pointing to the early history of Islam when Prophet Muhammad acted as ruler and spiritual leader in Medina and the subsequent four Caliphs (*khulafa rashidun*) whose religious and political roles were entwined. This assumption is then incorporated in the political philosophy of just and Islamic government, which provides an ideological framework for political activism.⁴⁶

Nurullah Ardiç further expounds this concept of Islamic political model by arguing that Islam exemplifies the “organic model” of religio-political system where there is

⁴⁴ Abdul Rashid Moten. 1996. *Political Science: An Islamic Perspective*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, pp. 17-20

⁴⁵Ibid

⁴⁶Akbarzadeh and Saeed. *Islam and Political Legitimacy*, p. 2.

the fusion of religious and political functions in one single body. Unlike Islam, Christianity is characterized by the separation of Church and State, but a view that has not stopped the interaction of religion and politics as evident in predominantly Christian societies.⁴⁷ Ardıç argues that there are three interrelated arguments for the inseparability of religion and politics. First, it is the “meta-historical argument” based on the parallelism between theocentric ontology and politics. It holds that a clear separation between the realm of God and that of human beings prevents the emergence of any intermediary institution. For, even Prophet Muhammad, is only a human being who has no power to penetrate into the realm of God, unlike Jesus Christ in Christianity.⁴⁸

The second observation according to Ardıç is the “logical argument” based on an analogy between cosmology, micro-organism (the human body) and politics. He writes:

...this view holds that the organization of the polity in the “ideal state” is a reflection of the divine cosmic order ruled by the absolute justice of God. Also, just like the heart manages the operations of the human body, the just ruler (the Caliph) orchestrates the affairs of the Islamic *ummah*. This, together with protecting religion, is the main function of the ruler. Thus, the hierarchical organization of the universe based on the divine regulation is reflected in that of the “social body” as well as the human body.⁴⁹

It is clear that the Caliph who is the leader in Sunni Islam holds the responsibility of the society including political, economic and social. Therefore, Ardıç reference to Islam’s inseparability of religion and politics informs Uamsho’s plunging into the politics of Zanzibar.

⁴⁷ Nurullah Ardıç. 2012. *Islam and the Politics of Secularism: Accommodating politics and religion*, New York: Routledge. p. 6.

⁴⁸Ibid, p. 7.

⁴⁹Ibid.

The need for political leadership to adhere to divine provisions is significant in guaranteeing the political class legitimacy over the masses. Akbarzadeh and Saeed represent this viewpoint:

Accordingly political power is only just and legitimate if it operates on Divine Law (shari'a) and serves the cause of Islam. This is because temporal rule is not seen as possessing its own source of authority, independent of the Divine Law. Any attempt to rule independent of the shari'a is, therefore, considered illegitimate.⁵⁰

Arguably, Islam provides an ideological framework for political activism in which a political power is regarded legitimate only if operates within confines of the divine law. Apparently, it is this view attributed to Islam, which drew Uamsho into Zanzibar politics.

The foregoing perception that Islam is by nature a political ideology explains the nature and activities of Uamsho association in the context of demanding and influencing political reforms within the contemporary Zanzibar through Islamic principles. In that regard, the concept of Islamism identified as political Islam, is a guide towards attainment of social, political as well as personal needs of an individual based on Islamic principles.⁵¹ In recent period, the Zanzibari society has witnessed the appearing of Muslim bodies that are leaning towards what could be referred to as Islamists tendencies because they are vocal in political matters and critical of the present political leadership. This raises an important question: what is Islamism? Now it is a time to turn to show how scholars have answered this question.

⁵⁰ Akbarzadeh, and Saeed, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

⁵¹Berman, *op.cit.* p. 258.

1.7.3 Islamism: Concept, nature, and ideological formation

According to Mehd Mozaffari, Islamism “is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose aim is the conquest of the world by all means.”⁵² He elaborates that Islamism entails four interrelated elements, including a religious ideology, a holistic interpretation of Islam, a conquest of the world, and the use of all means to attain the third objective. In explaining the first element, “religious ideology”, Mozaffari clarifies that Islamism fulfils all requirements of an ideology thereby differing from other ideologies as it takes its legitimacy from religion. This explains why actions undertaken by Islamists are considered by their supporters as religious duties to be adhered.⁵³

By the element of “holistic interpretation of Islam”, Mozaffari makes clear that Islamists are convinced that ‘true Islam’ is holistic and embraces all aspects of Muslims’ life. He adds that the holism is based on the absolute indivisibility of the trinity - religion, way of life, and government, and that such indivisibility is supposed to be permanent and eternal.⁵⁴ On the third element, “conquest of the world”, Mozaffari gives details that according to Islamists, the existing world is both wrong and repressive. It is wrong because it does not correspond to Islamic principles, and consequently, repressive since non-Muslims occupy what the Islamists consider Muslim territory. This view resonates with the Uamsho leadership, particularly with the present influx of immigrant non-Muslim workers to Zanzibar, and with the country’s unification with formerly Tanganyika. Apart from domination by non-Muslims, there is also a concern of Zanzibari Muslims living in severe repression from their own government. Consequently, according to Mozaffari, the goal of the

⁵²Mozaffari, op.cit. p. 21.

⁵³Ibid, p. 22.

⁵⁴Ibid, p. 23.

Islamists is the restoration of the caliphate that will naturally ensure the Islamization of the society.⁵⁵

The last element of Islamism described by Mozaffari is, “by all means”, which he observed that the Islamists’ means to reach the above-mentioned goal is expanding through propagation, peaceful indoctrination, and political struggle to violent methods such as assassination, hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions, and even massacre of civil populations. However, Mozaffari confirms that not all Islamists use violence since there are various Islamist groups of different shades and with different affiliations and histories.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, Mozaffari’s work does not give a projection as to when a “peaceful indoctrination” turns into the use of “massacre” within the methodological frame of Islamist groups in the world. To fill this gap, the study endeavoured to show how Uamsho movement evolved from a peaceful indoctrination association to a violent political activist.

Anthony H. Johns and Nelly Lahoud while elucidating the current political consequences in the Muslim world, the two authors clarify that not all Islamists groups are violent, but rather Islamism is an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political field.⁵⁷ They posit:

It is important to stress that though ‘Islamism’ broadly refers to those who are committed to applying an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political sphere, its manifestations differ and not all Islamists engage in violence. Indeed, committed radical Islamists are fringe groups in the world of Islam. Moreover, it cannot be overemphasised that far from being a movement that concerns only the West, ‘Islamism’, as a political current and in all its forms, is also recognised as problematic by Muslims in general.⁵⁸

⁵⁵Ibid, p. 23.

⁵⁶Ibid, p. 24.

⁵⁷ Anthony Johns, and Nelly Lahoud. 2005. *Islam in World Politics* The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism, USA: Routledge 270 Madison Ave, p. 11.

⁵⁸ Johns, and Lahoud, (2005). *Islam in World Politics* The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism, USA: Routledge 270 Madison Ave, p. 11.

Though ‘Islamism’ is a term difficult to define, they further asserted that it is commonly used by Westerners to refer to politically active groups that invoke Islam in their political activism as Islamists, and not simply as Muslims. Significantly, Johns and Lahoud clarify the distinction between Islamism and fundamentalism noting:

Islamism then is a term engaging a range of significances. It is different in character to what is referred to by the equally ambiguous word, fundamentalism. Though the term ‘fundamentalists’ is at times used interchangeably with ‘Islamists’, there are Muslims who disapprove of the use of this word, noting that all observing Muslims are necessarily fundamentalists by virtue of accepting the Qur’an as the revealed word of God.⁵⁹

In their book, Johns and Lahoud depict Islamism as the elevation of a commitment to Islam to the level of an ideology, and refers to groups who use Islam as a referent to define their political identities.⁶⁰ Because of Islamism reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior commitment to the Islamic revelation, for many non-Muslims, Islam has come to be considered as synonymous with Islamism in its extreme manifestation.⁶¹

While exploring the activities and influences of Islamist groups among different Muslim societies, Robbert Woltering argues that the most well known of all Islamist groups is the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, which was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. His study concludes that while most Islamist groups are found in the Middle East, a small number of them are found outside the region with notable exceptions in Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Iran.⁶² Therefore, the study endeavoured to examine if Uamsho is an emerging thread of Islamist grouping in the East Africa region, and Zanzibar in particular.

⁵⁹Ibid , p. 15.

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 16.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 17.

⁶² Robbert Woltering. 2002. “The Roots of Islamist Popularity.” *Third World Quarterly*, 23:6, p.1135.

1.7.4 Islam and the challenge of Islamism

Anthony H. Johns and Nelly Lahoud in the book titled *Islam in World Politics* elucidate that the current political consequences in the Muslim world are due to the decline and final collapse of Mughal and Ottoman Empires. The situation led to the generation of the new currents of Islamic thought among Muslims, and a redefinition of their attitudes to the West, mentioning the so-called ‘reformist movement’ pioneered by the Indian Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and the Egyptian Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905). The emergence of the Islamic reforming movement is alleged to have had influence across the Islamic world, from Casablanca to Jakarta.⁶³

The two authors clarify that not all Islamists groups are violent, but rather Islamism is an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political field. They posit:

It is important to stress that though ‘Islamism’ broadly refers to those who are committed to applying an ideological vision of Islam in the socio-political sphere, its manifestations differ and not all Islamists engage in violence. Indeed, committed radical Islamists are fringe groups in the world of Islam. Moreover, it cannot be overemphasised that far from being a movement that concerns only the West, ‘Islamism’, as a political current and in all its forms, is also recognised as problematic by Muslims in general (Ibid.)

The two scholars assert that though ‘Islamism’ is a term difficult to define, it is commonly used by Westerners to refer to politically active groups that invoke Islam in their political activism as Islamists, not simply as Muslims. They add that the term Islamism is intended to emphasize that the notion that it goes beyond and is qualitatively dissimilar to works of devotion, social welfare and acts of piety that constitute the norms of Islamic praxis. Significantly, Johns and Lahoud clarify the distinction between Islamism and fundamentalism noting:

⁶³ Johns, Anthony, and Lahoud, Nelly, (2005). *Islam in World Politics* The world of Islam and the challenge of Islamism, USA: Routledge 270 Madison Ave, p. 11.

Islamism then is a term engaging a range of significances. It is different in character to what is referred to by the equally ambiguous word, fundamentalism. Though the term ‘fundamentalists’ is at times used interchangeably with ‘Islamists’, there are Muslims who disapprove of the use of this word, noting that all observing Muslims are necessarily fundamentalists by virtue of accepting the Qur’an as the revealed word of God.⁶⁴

In their book, Johns and Lahoud, depict Islamism as the elevation of a commitment to Islam to the level of an ideology, and refers to groups who use Islam as a referent to define their political identities. Yet, they admit that intense manifestation of radical Islamism is observed in the activities of those who view Islam as a universalistic ideology, which has the capabilities to put to rights what they consider as the imbalance and injustice in the world.⁶⁵

They further argue that because of Islamism reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior commitment to the Islamic revelation, for many non-Muslims, Islam has come to be considered as synonymous with Islamism in its radical manifestation and so with terrorism. Arguably, due to the global political configuration and usage of expressions like ‘Islam and the West’ has contributed “in the general use of the word ‘Islam’ as an abstract noun which phonetically is suggestive of Islamism”.⁶⁶

Robbert A F L Woltering in the article, "*The Roots of Islamist Popularity*" explores the Islamist group of Muslim Brotherhood analysing its activities and influences in a range of nations. He reveals that the most well-known of all Islamist groups is the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. It has been supported mainly by students, along with the educated professionals, yet the group established foreign branches in Jordan and Syria. In addition, Woltering clarifies that while most Islamist groups are found in the Middle East, a small number of them are

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 15

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 16

⁶⁶ Ibid. p.17

found outside the region with notable exceptions in Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia and Iran”.⁶⁷ And thereby explaining the possibility of the emergence of Islamism in Zanzibar. It is very important to study the context of Zanzibar in order to analyse not only the sources of Islamism but also its type to reveal whether a group of Uamsho experiences a global or a national Islamism in terms of its activities.

1.7.5 Secularism and the Islamic states

The introduction of secularism to Muslim societies is believed to have been the result of European contact.⁶⁸ As evident with the case of Turkey, which was the centre of political power for the Islamic world was the first of the Muslim countries to fall into the hands of the secularists, resulting from “the struggle between the Cross and the Crescent.”⁶⁹ In realizing their objective, the secularists were successful in establishing a secular state by employing a number of methods to assist them in spreading their ideas throughout the Turkish society, which included substituting Islamic values and mores, effecting social change by targeting women, and exploiting ethnic and religious minorities.⁷⁰ Consequently, how state secularity was introduced in Zanzibar is a theme examined in this study. An important question here is: How were the Islamic values and institutions of the Omani sultanate in Zanzibar became increasingly eroded and secularized by the British and the present postcolonial state. It is these evident changes that the study argues that were responsible for the rise of religious opposition, and particularly the Uamsho movement.

⁶⁷ Woltering, Robbert (2002). *The roots of Islamist popularity*, Third World Quarterly, 23:6, p.1135.

⁶⁸ Mahmood Monshipouri. 1998. *Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 11, 12.

⁶⁹ Al-Oadah, 2009. *Islam and Secularism*, online Islamic Library, New York: IslamicBasics.com

⁷⁰ Al-Oadah, 2009. *Islam and Secularism*, online Islamic Library, New York: IslamicBasics.com, p. 8.

It is believed that by the time of the arrival of the Portuguese (Vasco da Gama) in 1498, Islam was firmly established all along the coastal belt of East Africa including Zanzibar.⁷¹ Hence, the Islamic culture was dominant, and secularism was a strange phenomenon by that time. During Omani dominance of the coast in around 1840s, the spread of Islam intensified in the interior of East Africa that many chiefs converted to Islam and cooperated with the coastal Muslims. Trade served to spread not only Islam, but also the Swahili language and culture.⁷² Later on, during the British dominance, Arabic was removed as a literary language, replaced by English; even the Swahili-Arabic script was replaced by the Roman script in the 1920s. However, education and health services were offered by the state to various Muslim and non-Muslim communities without racial segregation, and both were given equal status.⁷³

During the time after the independence of Tanganyika in 1961, the first president Julius Kambarage Nyerere aimed at implementing a socialist ideology in the country. He assisted the Zanzibar revolutionists under Abeid Amani Karume leadership to overthrow the sultanate government in January 1964 and ultimately to build a socialist nation called Tanzania after the merging of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964.⁷⁴ On the one hand, leaders of the nationalist movement were indebted to Christian education but it seemed to acquire momentum from Muslim leadership.⁷⁵ Liviga informs that religion played a major role in Tanzania's quest to build a socialist society in the 1960s and 1970s. Together with Karume, Julius Nyerere applying

⁷¹ Lodhi, Abdulaziz Y. 1994. "Muslims in Eastern Africa - Their Past and Present", *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 3(1): p. 89.

⁷² Simeon Mesaki, 2011, Religion and the State in Tanzania, *Cross-cultural Communication*, Vol.7 No.2, p. 250.

⁷³ Lodhi, Abdulaziz Y. 1994. "Muslims in Eastern Africa - Their Past and Present", *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 3(1): p. 90.

⁷⁴ Mussa, 2005:11 Mussa, Ali Ubwa. 2005. "The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar Legality of Additional Matters outside the Articles of Union." Thesis presented to the Faculty of Law and Shariah of Zanzibar University, Zanzibar, p. 11.

⁷⁵ Liviga, A., 2006, Religion and governance in Tanzania: The pre-liberalisation period, Dar-es-salaam : p. 327. (In Mukandala et al (eds.)

Marxist theories started to invest secularism in Tanzania as he challenged religions to support or be involved in the country's socialist policies.⁷⁶ As a secularist who tried to separate religions from the state, Nyerere often criticised the Christians for being too preoccupied with life after death as quoted "...what about living today? The church should give us time to live longer, and then we can go to heaven at a later stage".⁷⁷

It is seen from the above expressions that secularism was unknown in Zanzibar during the time before the coming of foreigners. The coming of Oman Arabs among the things intensified Islam and the Arab culture such as the use of Islamic courts. Later, the coming of the British was the first point for the secular system to get the room, for instance the introduction of dual courts including Islamic and British (secular) courts. Soon after the revolution of Zanzibar in 1964, the only recognized courts were that inherited from the British; however, the Islamic courts were confined to cases dealing with marriages and divorce.⁷⁸ Moreover, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar paved the way for the flourishing of secularism by formulating a constitution, which declared vividly that Tanzania is a non-religious country though her people are believers of different religions. Tanzania adopted a socialism and self-reliance policy. Chapter one of the Tanzania constitution section three reads: "The United Republic is a democratic, secular and socialist state which adheres to multi-party democracy".⁷⁹ Due to that type of secularism whereby its main principle is to separate religion from the state and to give people high freedom of living, some people started opposing the

⁷⁶ Liviga, A. 2006, Religion and governance in Tanzania: The pre-liberalisation period, Dar-es-salaam : p. 329. (In Mukandala et al (eds.).

⁷⁷ Simeon Mesaki, 2011, Religion and the State in Tanzania, *Cross-cultural Communication*, Vol.7 No.2, p. 253.

⁷⁸Hamudi I. Majamba. 2007. "Perspectives on the Kadhis Court in Zanzibar," *Orient Journal of Law and Social Sciences*, Vol. 1 issue No. 2. Pp. 1-25.

⁷⁹ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 11.

system criticising that it contributes to the demolition of Islamic values and morale such as Uamsho.

Hereby the gap of knowledge came from the point that how the group of Uamsho views the Tanzania policy – socialism and self-reliance, is it in significance to Zanzibari Muslims towards the formation and continuation of the Islamic culture.

1.7.6 Islamism in East Africa

Within the context of East Africa, Angel M. Rabasa incribes on the radical Islamist groups by indicting al-Qaeda as the primary threat to security in the region. According to Rabasa, there are numerous indigenous Islamist jihadi groups with varying degrees of affinity to al-Qaeda's agenda. Though Rabasa accuses Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries for allegedly propagating a radical *Salafi* interpretation of Islam that function as a gateway to religious radicalization (read Islamist jihadi),⁸⁰ she also asserts that East Africa as an attractive conducive environment for the flourishing of Islamist jihadi groups.⁸¹ She argues:

Weak governance and collapsed states, alternative power centers, the prevalence of the informal economy, porous borders, widespread access to illegal weapons, proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, and operational access to attack venues...Somalia...has been in a condition of statelessness since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The large urban areas of Kenya and Tanzania, along with their somewhat functional infrastructures and reasonably ordered societies, give outsiders the anonymity and resources they need to build their networks.⁸²

Rabasa observes that a major factor of religious radicalization in Kenya is the dissatisfaction among some sectors of the Muslim community over discriminatory treatment by the central government. There are complaints of harassment against Muslims in connection with the war on terrorism following Kenya's terrorist attacks

⁸⁰ Angel Rabasa. 2009. *Radical Islam in East Africa*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, p 1.

⁸¹ Ibid , p. 7.

⁸²Ibid, p. 7.

evident in the 1990s to the present. In a seemingly dilemma, Muslim groups have demanded the disbandment of the Anti-Terror Police Unit—established in 2003—and the release of individuals deported to foreign countries on allegation of associating with terrorist groups.⁸³

The issue of religious radicalism attributed to Muslim groups in East Africa had earlier been explored by Abdin Chande. His study identified three factors for the emergence of the so-called radical Islamism in Kenya. They included the rise of a new *ulamaa* group (Muslim scholars) such as *Sheikh* Ali Shee (Nairobi) and *Sheikh* Nassor Khamis (Mombasa), the heightened awareness created by the success of the Islamic revolution of Iran; and the rising number of Muslims who are being exposed to secular education at Kenya's universities. According to Chande, a considerable number of Muslims who have been educated at Islamic centres of learning most notably the University of Medina have returned as reformers and as pan-Islamists, with a comprehensive understanding of global Islam. Chande added that these educated Muslims became uniquely qualified to relate to the sermons of the political Islamists they have studied to the problems facing their society, thus raising Muslim political consciousness.⁸⁴

In another study, Chande explored the Muslim-State relations in Tanzania demonstrating the factors that had contributed to Islamist activism in post-Nyerere period. In his analysis, the first factor is attributed to the collapse of the one-party system, which allowed Muslims to speak freely in the new multiparty environment of the 1990s, even though no party based on ethnic or religious affiliation was to be allowed to function. Other factors noted by Chande were the activities of external

⁸³Ibid, p. 36.

⁸⁴ Abdin Chande in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall Pouwels. 2000. *The History of Islam in Africa*. USA: Ohio University Press, pp. 349-65.

Islamic organizations such as the Muslim embassies in sympathy with Muslim aspirations in financing new mosques, scholarships, dispensaries, and so on, as well as the importance of the Islamic revolution in Iran at the end of the 1970s.

In his conclusion, both external (global Muslim network) as well as internal factors were responsible for the intensification of organizational activities by groups that were critical of the Muslim Council of Tanzania (*Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania* – BAKWATA) in 1980s and 1990s. Some of these groups included the young Muslim writers' workshop (*Warsha ya Waandishi wa Kiislam – Warsha*), the Council for the Promotion of the Quran in Tanzania (*Baraza la Uendelezaji wa Koran Tanzania* – BALUKTA) among others, but also the Public Interfaith Debates by Muslim Missionaries (*Umoja wa Wahubiri wa Kiislamu wa Mlingano wa Dini* – UWAMDI) who engaged Christians on Bible-based discussions.⁸⁵ Therefore, using Chande's study as a basis, this study has endeavoured to examine the possible factors that could have facilitated the appearance of Islamist activism in Zanzibar.

Arye Oded (2000) explored the political importance of the Muslims in Kenya, showing how the community had grown after the introduction of a multiparty system, culminating to the emergence of a vocal Muslim opposition, through the formation of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK), thereby increasing Muslim complaints about discrimination in Kenya. This scenario saw the leaders of independent Kenya striving to conciliate the Muslims by demonstrating that the government was not discriminating against them, but with limited success.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Abdin Chande. 2008. "Muslim-State Relations In East Africa Under Conditions of Military And Civilian or One party Dictatorships", *Historia Actual Online*, no. 17, Adelphi University, United States, p. 109.

⁸⁶ Arye Oded. 2000. *Islam and Politics in Kenya*. United States of America: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Like Oded, Hassan J. Ndzovu's study has also shown that IPK's political progress was persistently obstructed by the President Daniel Arap Moi's regime by refusing to grant the party registration claiming it was likely to stir inter-religious conflicts. Conversely, the IPK's officials interpreted that denial as part of a wider scheme by the Moi's government to subjugate Muslim voice.⁸⁷ In his study, Ndzovu argues that the activities of international terrorism in Kenya attributed to extremist Muslim groups such as Al-Qaeda pose a daunting political challenge to Kenya authorities. This development presents a strong challenge to the Kenya government on how best to counter violent extremism committed by militant Muslims without antagonizing the Muslim population.⁸⁸ What Ndzovu's study confirmed is that international terrorism network attributed to jihadi groups was active in Kenya, and undoubtedly the East Africa region.

In exploring the rise of militant Islamism in Tanzania, Hanno Brankamp opines that the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, similarly to the Kenyan case, paved the way for the arrival of Islamist activism in the country. Due to the state economic frustration and political paralysis, most urban Muslim youth experienced the appearance of political Islam provided an alternative that assured them emancipation.⁸⁹ This explains why in recent years Muslims in Zanzibar have been uniting behind the call of "liberating" the community. Though Muslims are the majority in Zanzibar, they have complained of systematic marginalisation as a result of the union with Tanganyika thereby demanding for the secession of the islands from the political unification, a theme explored in this study.

⁸⁷ Hassan Ndzovu. 2014. *Muslim in Kenyan Politics. Political Involvement, Marginalization, and Minority Status*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

⁸⁸ Hassan Ndzovu. 2009. "Religion and Politics: A Critical Study of the Politicization of Islam in Kenya." PhD Thesis, University of Kwazulu Natal, South Africa, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Hanno Brankamp. 2013. *Tanzania's Islamist militants: A Domestic Threat from a Domestic Context*. University of Oxford, United Kingdom: Thank Africa Press.

Generally, the study aimed at filling the gap of knowledge as shown in the literature reviewed from different scholars. The technical reasons for the rise of Islamism in Zanzibar are not yet worked out, as well as a study on the different Islamic groups practicing their activities in Zanzibar, thereby taking Uamsho group as a case of study to reveal the nature of Islamism in Zanzibar. On other hand, to find proper ways and techniques to dissolve the periodic conflicts arising between Islamic associations and the state in Zanzibar.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The study was strongly entrenched on the ideas emanating from various theories, including the social conflict theory, the deprivation theory and the political process theory. The social Conflict Theory is useful in understanding the war, wealth and poverty, the haves and the haves not, revolutions, political contention, exploitation, divorce, ghettos, discrimination and prejudice, domestic violence, rape, child abuse, slavery, and more conflict-related social phenomena. The Theory claims that society is in a state of perpetual conflict and competition for limited resources (Marx, 1971:20).⁹⁰

The Theory which is a Marxist-based Social Theory propounded in 1848 is significant to enable unpacking and comprehending issues of political competition, political violence, alleged discrimination and prejudice within the context of Zanzibar. The Social Conflict Theory posits that society is always in a state of perpetual conflict and

⁹⁰ Marx, Karl, (1971). Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Tr. S. W. Ryanzanskaya, edited by M. Dobb. London: Lawrence & Whishart.

competition for limited resources,⁹¹ which culminates into political tension and violence as evident in Zanzibar.

This scenario is aptly expressed by Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr who maintained that conflict behaviour is a situation employed by competing actors “against each other to attain incompatible goals and, or to express their hostility.”⁹² According to the two scholars as European governments established colonial empires in Africa they encouraged ethnic identity and racial superiority, a situation that has had a great complication on the newly African independent states. Thus, the conflicts, which develop in most African states, are the consequences of the arrangements of the European colonial powers,⁹³ a scenario which could be attested with the 1964 Zanzibar revolution.

The theory assumes that those who have, perpetually try to increase their wealth at the expense and suffering of those who have not, and that it is a power struggle, which is most often won by wealthy elite and lost by the underprivileged. Power is the ability to get what one wants even in the presence of opposition. He further states that the authority is the institutionalized legitimate power that the bourgeoisie or wealthy elite have the most power who often bully their wishes into outcomes in the society. On the other hand, the Proletariat is the common working class, lower class, and poor members of society. According to Marx, Hammond added that in order to offset the wealth and power of the bourgeoisie the proletariat often rise up and revolt against their oppressors taking examples from the revolutions taken place in French,

⁹¹ Karl Marx. 1971. *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, p. 20.

⁹² Otomar J. Bartos and Paul Wehr. 2002. *Using Conflict Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ Press, p. 13.

⁹³Ibid , p. 13.

Bolshevik, United States, and Mexico.⁹⁴ This situation is better used to explain the context of Zanzibar that the inferior people had risen up thinking that they are not enjoying the fruits of their country hence; they supported the opposing powers including the Islamist groups like Uamsho.

Moreover, in exploring the process of political reforms and the prospects of Islamism in Zanzibar, the study also employed the Deprivation Theory, which was first used by an American sociologist Robert King Merton and the Political Process Theory, which was developed by Sociologist Douglas McAdam. These are considered the core theories of social movements.⁹⁵ These theories generally seek to explain why social mobilisation occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences. According to the Deprivation Theory, social movements have their foundations among people who feel deprived of resources. It argues that individuals who are lacking some good, service, or comfort are more likely to organize a social movement in order to improve or defend their conditions.⁹⁶

Ted Robert Gurr while exploring why people engage in political violence (riots, rebellion, coups, etc.) and eventually regimes' responses expresses similar views. Gurr argues that a sense of deprivation or inequality propels people into joining movements, particularly in relation to others, or in relation to their expectations. Thus, people are most likely to rebel when an existing situation stops and makes their welfare unbearable.⁹⁷ According to Gurr, the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism in which when frustration is

⁹⁴ Hammond, Ronald, (2009). Introduction to Sociology: Social theories, USA: Utah Valley University.

⁹⁵ Kleidman, Robert. 1999. Review of Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Findings by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. (Cambridge University Press, 1996). *Social Forces*, 78(2), 838-840.

⁹⁶ Denton E. Morrison. 1978. "Some Notes toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change." In Louis E. Genevie, ed., *Collective Behavior and Social Movements*. Itasca, Ill.: Peacock. pp. 202-209.

⁹⁷ Ted Robert Gurr. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 416-420.

prolonged and sharply felt, often does result in anger and eventually violence.⁹⁸ The views expressed by Gurr resonate with the concerns raised by the Zanzibari Muslims through the agitation advanced by the Uamsho association.

To support further analysis and discussion of the data is the Political Process theory as advocated by Douglas McAdam.⁹⁹ The theory emphasizes different components of social structure that are important for social movement development. Political Process theory identifies three vital components for movement formation. The first component is the insurgent consciousness, which refers back to the ideas of deprivation and grievances that, certain members of society feel being mistreated or that somehow the system is unjust. When a collective sense of unfairness develops, it motivates the mass to become movement members. Movement activists do not indicate their aims at random, but the political situation stresses certain criticisms around which movements consolidate.¹⁰⁰

The second component is the organizational strength inferring that for a social movement to organize it must have strong leadership and sufficient resources. The argument here is that the social movement must have strong and well-organized leadership and adequate resources. The political opportunity theory has much in common with the related resource mobilisation theory, mostly when seen as focusing on utilization of resources external to the movement. Also associated and indigenous establishments play a major role in recruiting and motivating actors to participate within social movements. Regularly, the rise of a movement merges with other previous and highly organized alliances of individuals, who led the movement assets

⁹⁸ Ibid, pp 416-420.

⁹⁹ McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 36-59.

¹⁰⁰ David S. Meyer, *Protest and Political Opportunities*, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 30: 125-145 August 2004.

and support. The more seriously that individuals are combined into disconnected, the higher the likelihood of those individuals merging and offering support to causes that their affiliates are vigorous in.¹⁰¹

And the third component is the political opportunities, which suggest to the receptivity or vulnerability of the existing political system to challenge.¹⁰² It outlines that if the existing political system is vulnerable to a challenge, it creates an opportunity for others, like the movement members, to issue such a challenge and try to use this opportune time to push through a social change. Either, the vulnerability can be the result of increasing political pluralism, decline in repression, division within elites, and increased political enfranchisement.¹⁰³

The following diagram helps to demonstrate the three components of social structure that are important for social movement development and that all the three components are interconnected.




Fig. 1: Showing Structural Components in the development of a social-political movement under the Political Process Theory

Source: Prepared by the Researcher

¹⁰¹ Tarrow S. 1998. *Power in Movement*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press..

¹⁰² Kornhauser, William. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York: Free Press, p. 256.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

All the three components illustrated above are significant, and were used in explaining corresponding incidents emerging within the political development of Zanzibar, with a special focus on Uamsho as an Islamist movement.

Generally, the Social Conflict Theory together with the several ideas from the Social Movement Theory is reasonably relevant and applicable in examining the religio-political context of Zanzibar. Hence, on that base, the theories were applied to examine the ideological and social foundations of Uamsho along with its interactions with the government. In addition, the theories were applied to observe assorted situations conducive for the emergence of Islamism in the region, to the degree that Uamsho is concerned from 2001 to 2014.

1.9 Methodology

This study is primarily qualitative in nature. Thus, a descriptive approach was conducted involving the historical/archival and field survey methods that were subjected to analytical interpretation. Both primary and secondary data were used in this study to make it comprehensive. Newspaper articles or journalistic comments on current political debates involving Zanzibari Muslims were analyzed to provide the most recent debates on the subject.

Significant for the study were public and mosque sermons attributed to certain imams and officials of Muslim organizations. Similarly, the historical/archival method was vital in this study and was employed to collect secondary data especially on the historical Muslims' political development in Zanzibar, and Tanzania at large. Other documentary data was collected from different sources such as library and internet.

The study used a cross sectional design that involved the data collection once within a short period of about eight months. The non-participatory observation was also

applied, in order to accumulate information from various activities of Uamsho that was later analyzed in this report.

Information obtained through this method was supplemented by the primary data that was collected using semi-structured interview guide targeting key informants such as leaders of Uamsho, government officials, mosque leaders and selected activists.

With regard to the study locale, the research was conducted in Zanzibar, specifically in the Urban West Region, which is the capital city of Zanzibar, and a place of commercial, and political activities. The region is among the five regions of Zanzibar, it is also a part of The United Republic of Tanzania. As a centre of political and social activities, Uamsho, which emerged as the most outstanding Islamic association has its headquarters in this region.

The people who were consulted were Muslims – Zanzibar residents, including both sexes from the age of 18 and above. Thus, a number of about twenty-four informants were consulted from the respective region including the *Amir* (chairperson) of Uamsho along with four activists of Uamsho. Others were four leaders from different Muslim associations, eight Muslim scholars (*Sheikhs*) and *Imams* (mosque leaders). Consequently, the study was restricted to other key informants who were picked from certain government departments such as two officers from the *Mufti* (Islamic referee), a Deputy *Kadhi* (Islamic Judge), the Executive Secretary of *Wakf*, the Regional Police Commander (RPC), the Regional Magistrate, and the state Attorney office. These informants were approached in their respective homes and places of work after they had been identified and agreed to be interviewed.

During the fieldwork in Zanzibar for a period of about 12 months, a series of semi-structured interviews and informal discussions were conducted with these key

informants. These structured interviews revolved around certain specific questions (see Appendices B, C and D) pertinent in answering the key research questions.

The collected data obtained from the field study was recorded in both short notes and in a radio recorder, which was later analyzed to obtain emergent meaning. Since the study focuses on the qualitative approach, the recorded data collected was analyzed by using qualitative analysis methods, including content analysis, discourse analysis, and phenomenological analysis. More so, the historical method was also used in order to incorporate the present incidents with the past.

Lastly, the data analyzed, was presented in the form of thematic descriptions of Uamsho's historical development, biographic outlines of its leaders, ideological formulations and political engagement, significant in analyzing on the prospects of Islamism and subsequent response by the state.

1.10 Conclusion

Chapter one as the introductory section is covered with various sections including background of the study where it discussed the concept of Islamism and its forms. Implications of Islamism and the way a group of Uamsho is concerned to it. Under the section of the subject of the study, it delineated the context of Tanzania in general and specifically that of Zanzibar along with the political situations in different periods. It also made analysis on the religious features from pre-colonialism to post-colonialism periods and the scenarios responsible for the existence of Islamist activities in Zanzibar.

Statement of the problem was highlighted in this chapter explaining the need for discussing the topic of Islamism in Zanzibar, attached to it was the objectives and the questions of the study in which the thesis intended to work on them. Significance of

the study, and scope and limitations of the study were among the sections included in this chapter.

Moreover, in this chapter there was a review of different works relating to the topics discussed in this study. It clarified a brief definition of politics by providing various views of the scholars who wrote in politics. Nature of Islamic politics, concept of Islamism and its ideological formation together with the topics on secularism were discussed so as to draw a typical situation of Zanzibar taking Uamsho association as a case of study. The review was extended to the point of explaining the prospect of Islamism in East Africa particularly Tanzania and Kenya. It analysed miscellaneous factors for the existence of the political Islam ideology.

Later, the chapter went to draw a theoretical framework where it mentioned the Social Conflict Theory as the theory appropriately used to describe the topics, which the analysis made from the Zanzibar perspective. In addition, the chapter consisted of the methodology section where by different points on the methods applied to conduct the study were involved such as study area, sample size, data collection and its instruments, research design and data analysis.

CHAPTER TWO

SECULARISM, SECULAR STATES AND MUSLIM SOCIETIES

2.1 Introduction

It is important to include the topic of secularism in this study because it plays a vital role towards understanding the Tanzania's politics along with the Islamism tendencies emerging in the country. As indicated in the subsequent chapter, secularism is one among the various factors attributed to the emergence of Islamism in the country. This leads someone to ask: What is secularism? In the view of some scholars including Akeel Bilgrami, there has been two aspects related to secularism—one, the idea of the separation of Church and State, and the other that the state maintains a neutral equidistance from different religions within a plural society.¹⁰⁴

Despite this view, secularism is a complex concept that has differently been debated by scholars over the years. Though secularism is commonly understood as a concept that separates religion and politics (Church and State), it is possible to find in some secular states political parties founded on religious basis as evident in Germany with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),¹⁰⁵ and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt.¹⁰⁶ While this is the case, some countries like Kenya and Tanzania have denied the registration of political parties founded on religious grounds.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, the secular state of Zanzibar has officially recognized certain Islamic elements to be observed such as allowing the reduction of working hours on Fridays, and regarding the month of Ramadhan as sacred days for Muslims. In addition, among other things is the

¹⁰⁴ Akeel Bilgrami. 2011, *Secularism: Its Content and Context*, Columbia University, p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Szulc, Tad. July 1965, "Communists, Socialists and Christian Democrats.". *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 360, p. 102.

¹⁰⁶ Mura, Andrea. 2012. "A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan al-Banna." *Journal of Political Ideologies*. 17 (1): 61–85

¹⁰⁷ Hassan Ndzovu. 2009. "Muslims and Party Politics and Electoral Campaigns in Kenya." *Working Paper Series*, Northwestern University, No. 09-001, p. 1.

official inclusion of Islamic courts into the government machinery.¹⁰⁸ This scenario raises the question: what constitute a secular state? These and other questions will be answered in this chapter.

2.2 The Concept of Secularism: A Variety of Meaning and Understanding

Since this study is concerned with political Islam in Zanzibar, some discussion on the concept of secularism would be useful. Different scholars have tried to describe the term secularism. Mahmood Monshipouri argues: “secularism is generally known as an ideology that advocates the eradication of religious influence in political, social, and educational institutions.”¹⁰⁹ Despite Monshipouri’s view of secularism that describes a social order independent of religion, this understanding does not negate religion but ensures all religions are respected equally.¹¹⁰

While examining the roots of secularism, M. Balasubramanian looked at the concept from the viewpoints of Jawaharal Nehru of India as follows:

Nehru’s secularism stood against all discriminations based on religion, race or caste, spurned communal approach to human problem, afforded an equal place in society to members of minority communities to live a honourable life along with the members of the majority community and conceived India as a place for harmonious living for citizens, no matter to what religion or group they belong.¹¹¹

From the foregoing quotation, Balasubramanian asserts that secularism is an ideology, which is against all discriminations based on religion, race, or caste and that it enables people of different communities to live respectable lives irrespective of their beliefs.

¹⁰⁸ Zanzibar Constitution, 1984, Section 100, p.70.

¹⁰⁹ Mahmood Monshipouri. 1998. *Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p-11.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p-10, 11.

¹¹¹ M. Balasubramanian. 1980. *Nehru: A Study of Secularism*. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House.

The British writer George Jacob Holyoake first used the term secularism in 1851 to describe and promote a social order separate from religion, without criticizing religious belief. He argued:

Secularism is not an argument against Christianity, it is one independent of it. It does not question the pretensions of Christianity; it advances others. Secularism does not say there is no light or guidance elsewhere, but maintains that there is light and guidance in secular truth, whose conditions and sanctions exist independently, and act forever...¹¹²

In Holyoake's opinion secularism is seen as a code of duty pertaining to this life, founded on considerations purely human, and intended mainly for those who find theology indefinite or inadequate, unreliable or unbelievable.¹¹³ Despite this understanding of secularism, many Christians support a secular state, claiming that the conception has Biblical foundation: "Then give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's." However, some Christian fundamentalists oppose secularism, which they often see as a threat to "Christian rights."¹¹⁴

There is a variety of countries in the world that are constitutionally considered as secular, even though none of these nations have identical forms of governance.¹¹⁵ It is possible for countries to adopt a secular orientation without having identical forms of political systems. According to the forgoing descriptions, secularism does not favour any specific faith, or negate religion or spirituality as such. This non-interference policy advocated by secularism is adopted in several constitutions in the world today. As an ideology, secularism bestows to the State the freedom to deal with its affairs without interference from religious authorities.

¹¹² Holyoake, George Jacob. 1896. *The Origin and Nature of Secularism*. London: Watts and Co. p.51.

¹¹³ Ibid p. 51.

¹¹⁴ Bob Lewis. 2007. "Jerry's Kids' Urged to Challenge 'Radical Secularism.'" *The Christian Post*.

¹¹⁵ Denys Lawrence Munby. 1963. *The Idea of a Secular society*. London: Oxford University Press, 14-32; Holyoake, George Jacob. 1896. *The Origin and Nature of Secularism*. London: Watts and Co. p.51.

There are at least two models of what constitutes a secular regime, and both involved some kind of separation of Church and State. In the first model, the State cannot be officially linked to any religious confession, except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense, as in England or Scandinavia.¹¹⁶ In the second one, secularism involves a complex requirement, which can be classified in the categories of the French Revolution trinity: liberty, equality, and fraternity. First, no one must be forced in the domain of religion, or basic belief. This is what is often defined as religious liberty, including the freedom of not to believe. Second, there must be equality between people of different faiths; Third, all spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing process of determining what the society is about and how it is going to realize these goals. This is what corresponds to “fraternity.”¹¹⁷

In recent decades issues revolving around the concept of secularism seem to be evolving in various Western societies because the faiths represented in those societies are changing as demonstrated with the arrival of substantive communities of Muslims and the recent legislation in France against wearing the *hijab* in schools. This development demands negotiation among communities, which sometimes is not possible because certain basic laws have to be observed. Indeed, the point of state neutrality is precisely to avoid favouring or disfavouring not just religious positions, but any basic position, religious or nonreligious. One cannot favour Christianity over Islam, but also one cannot favour religion over non-belief in religion, or vice versa.¹¹⁸ Despite this understanding of secularism, the issue of displaying of religious symbols in public institutions has been interpreted differently in various secular states. For instance, in France, pupils in public schools are forbidden to wear the headscarf,

¹¹⁶ Charles Taylor. 2010. *The Meaning of Secularism*. McGill University, The Hedgehog Review, Montréal Canada: vol. 12, no. 3, p. 23.

¹¹⁷Ibid

¹¹⁸Ibid, p. 25.

which is seen as an ostentatious religious sign. In certain German states, however, pupils can wear it, but not the teachers, while in the United Kingdom and other countries, there is no general interdict, but the individual schools can decide.¹¹⁹ It seems, therefore, that the practical applications of secular realms are not only problematic, but also equally diverse with no singular consensus.

According to Abdullah Al-Naim secularism does not mean the exclusion of religion from the public life of a society, a misconception that has led to many Muslims to be hostile to the concept. In his view secularism is supposed to be a strict and systematic separation in all aspects of the relationship between religion and the state.¹²⁰ It is the principle of secularism, therefore, that matters such as dress style would normally remain in the realm of free choice that women could neither be forced to wear the veil nor be prevented from doing so. Similarly, religious education should normally be a matter of private choice for parents and should involve public-policy considerations regarding the need for comparative and critical religious education to improve religious tolerance and pluralism.¹²¹ Secularism has two major manifestations, which include the right to be free from religious rule and teachings, rejecting the imposition by government of religion or religious practices upon its people and the view that public activities and decisions, especially political ones, should be uninfluenced by religious beliefs and practices.¹²²

¹¹⁹Ibid, p. 28.

¹²⁰ Abdullah Ahmad An-Naim. 2008. *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia*. United States of America: Harvard University Press, p. 35.

¹²¹ Ibid , p. 37, 38.

¹²² Kosmin, Barry and Keysar, Ariela. 2007. “*Secularism & Secularity: Contemporary International Perspectives.*” Hartford USA: Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture (ISSSC), p. 11, 12.

2.3 Secularism in Muslim Societies: The Islamist and Secularist Views

Islam plays a significant role in shaping the lives of its adherents and presumably provides guidance in all spheres of their lives. In Islamic societies, public offices and institutions are established to serve Muslim needs, promote the welfare of the *ummah* (community) and to ensure the application of *sharia* (Islamic law). As a political ideology, studies have shown that secularism was introduced into Muslim societies through European contact and influence. This has reinforced the commonly-held perception among Muslims that secularism is an externally imposed ideology that reflects European imperial interests.¹²³ Owing to that, many Muslims reject secularism and dismiss it as insignificant and irrelevant to their societies.¹²⁴

However, there are some Muslim societies have adopted secularism as a system that affords them protection from tyranny, domination and intolerance to the extent that secular-minded Muslim leaders have ruled their respective countries emphasizing separation between Church and State thereby secularizing their legal and educational systems. Examples of such leaders included Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey (1881 – 1938), Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 – 1970) and Muhammad Anwar Sadat of Egypt (1918 – 1981), Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran (1919 – 1980), Muammar Mohammed Qaddafi of Libya (1942 – 2011), and Zulfaqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan (1928 – 1979).¹²⁵ These Muslim leaders did not consider secular norms and Islamic social ethics as incompatible, but rather both have a common concern for humanity.¹²⁶ According to Monshipouri, it is possible to find within Islam elements that are in agreement with certain values of secularism positing:

¹²³Monshipouri, op.cit., p. 11, 12.

¹²⁴Ibid, p. 11, 12

¹²⁵Ibid, p. 13.

¹²⁶Ibid, p. 13.

Whereas Islamic humanism emphasizes the interconnections among faith, social justice, and equality, secular humanism stresses the interlocking nature of reason, choice, and liberty and has regularly concerned itself with social justice and equality.¹²⁷

Though in the view of majority Muslims is that there is a thin line dividing Church and State in Islam, secularism has been adopted by some Muslim societies globally.

The historical relationship between Islam, state, and politics clearly reflects the permanent tension between claims of the conflation of Islam and the state and the need of religious leaders to maintain their autonomy from state institutions for the interest of their own moral authority over both state and society. The basic framework for the constant mediation of that tension was the expectation of Muslims that the state should uphold both Islamic principles in fulfilling its obligations and the inherently political and secular nature of the state.¹²⁸

But some Muslim scholars like Salman Al-Oadah insists that secularism is a contemporary manifestation of *Jâhiliyyah* (ignorance), and that the struggle between Islam and secularism is nothing new. It is just a long run struggle between Islam and *Jâhiliyyah* in a new guise. In their view, the *Jâhiliyyah* of old appealed to the pagan practices of the Arabian tribes, while secularists want Muslims to appeal to the constitutions and laws of other countries contrary to Islam. However, secularists in Muslim lands believe that the affairs of the society cannot be set right except by separating the institutions of the Church and State in society. But to the conservative Muslims, the seemingly conflict between Islam and secularism is interpreted as none other than the conflict between Islam and polytheism.¹²⁹

¹²⁷Ibid, p. 25.

¹²⁸An-Naim, op.cit., pp. 44-48.

¹²⁹Fahd Salman Al-Oadah, 2009. *Islam and Secularism*, online Islamic Library, New York: Islamic Basics.com, p. 2, 3.

In the assessment of the conservative Muslims, Islam represents an inseparable unity in a life ruled by God, the Lord of both the heavens and the earth, thereby concluding that secularism seeks to subordinate Islam and reduce its natural supremacy to one corner of life.¹³⁰ This is supposedly viewed as a Western agenda conspiracy theory that Muslim societies must refuse. It is this narrative of conspiracy that one would observe the Islamist writings.

According to Islamists, secularism has no place in Muslim societies because it is impossible for a Muslim to manage the political and economic affairs of the society to other than God. Their position is based on the Quranic stipulations: “We have neglected nothing in the Book”¹³¹ and “We have sent down to you the Book explaining all things”¹³² Ibn Kathir commenting on the last verse says:

“The Quran contains all kinds of beneficial knowledge, such as reports of what happened in the past, information about what is yet to come, what is lawful and unlawful, and what people need to know about their worldly affairs, their religion, their livelihood in this world, and their destiny in the Hereafter.”¹³³

It is against this background that John Esposito maintains that:

...most believers desire a system of government in which religious principles and democratic values coexist. In other words, most Muslims do not view religious authority and political authority as mutually exclusive and see a role for religious principles in the formulation of state legislation.¹³⁴

Thus, though majority of Muslims admire the idea of political freedom, it is not in the form of a total secular system. The separation of Church and State does not prevent Muslims from proposing policy or legislation stemming from their religions. This is

¹³⁰ Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, 1980. *The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam*. Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications, p. 104, 105.

¹³¹ Quran, 6:38.

¹³² Quran, 16:89.

¹³³ Ibnu Kathir. 2018. *Tafsir Ibnu Kathir*, sayyed1958@yahoo.com, P. 119.

¹³⁴ John Esposito. 2006. “Rethinking Islam and Secularism.” *Guiding Papers Series*, ARDA Georgetown University, p. 20.

because unlike Church and State, which are easier to separate, it very daunting task to separate religion and politics. Consequently, to the secularist in Muslim societies, the separation of Church and State do not necessarily mean the total relegation of Islam to the private domain and its exclusion from public policy.¹³⁵

This explains why independence movements of many parts of the Muslim world employed Islamic symbols, to legitimate their struggle (jihad), the secularist included. For example, the Algerian *'ulama'* declared jihad in denouncing French rule and reaffirming Algeria's Arab-Islamic heritage. However, many Islamists bitterly remember how the Algerian military, supported by secular elites, intervened and cancelled popular elections in 1992 when Islamist parties were successful.¹³⁶ This development demonstrates the power struggle between the secularists and Islamists in Muslim societies.

Therefore, it is significant for one to understand that the separation of Church and State in Muslim societies did not completely overshadow the interplay of religion and politics in these societies. This is because most secular inclined Muslim governments retained a modest Islamic facade incorporating some reference to Islam such as the ruler must be a Muslim or that Sharia was a source of law. The central government brought about Islamic institutions under State control such as mosques, religiously endowed properties (*awqaf*), and religious courts among others. In addition, Muslim family law of marriage, divorce, and inheritance remained in force. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the discrediting of secular paradigms has been particularly vivid in most Muslim societies. The emergence of new Islamic republics in Iran, Afghanistan and Sudan, and the use of Islam by Muslim governments, the

¹³⁵An-Naim, op.cit., p.6, 7.

¹³⁶Rachid Al-Ghannouchi. 2002. "Secularism in the Arab Maghreb." In Azzam Tamimi and John L. Esposito (eds.) *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, pp. 97-124.

participation and success of Islamic candidates and movements in local and national elections reaffirm the power of Islamic ideology and discourse in Muslim politics and societies.¹³⁷

Many Muslims, in particular Islamists, cast secularism as a foreign doctrine imposed by colonial powers. A section of Muslims in the world hold-up to the traditional Islamic society, particularly during the first century of Islam, as an ideal model reflecting religious principles guiding the community in all areas of life, including politics.¹³⁸ In their criticism of secularism, some Islamist scholars, including Al-Qaradawi, have argued that secularism, as it appears in the Muslim world, has betrayed its own principles and does not represent the will of the people as the democratic ideal demands.¹³⁹ Authoritarian governments take the worst of secularist doctrine and use it as a weapon against Islamists by equating Islam with ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’ and setting secularism as a prerequisite to democracy.¹⁴⁰

While many opposition parties in Zanzibar have critiqued the ruling party on some of their policies on secular principles, the emergence of groupings such as Uamsho have challenged the state ostensibly on Islamist ideals. Having explored the divergent understanding of secularism, I now would like to examine in the next section the underlying principles of a secular state.

¹³⁷ Azzam Tamimi and John L. Esposito. 2002. “Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century.” In Tamimi and Esposito (eds.), *op.cit.*, p. 2, 3.

¹³⁸ Al-Bishri, Tariq. 1996. *Al-Hiwar al-islami al-‘ilmani*. Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, p. 12.

¹³⁹ Al-Qaradawi, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁴⁰ Al-Ghannouchi, *op.cit.* p.110.

2.4 The Form of State Secularity in Tanzania

From the various descriptions conveyed by the different scholars, it is possible to identify a number of principles that constitute a secular state. One of the major principles of secular states is the one that asserts that people should be equal before the law, and that the state is the best guarantor of this equality. Though there is a variety of secular states that emerged in the world, are applying different forms of secularism, in essence a secular state demands a complete separation of Church and State and the abolition of all privileges granted to religious organisations. The secularist, basically calls for the separation of religion from politics claiming that religion is too sublime to become involved in politics. In other words, the secularists say that religion should make a retreat and leave the lives of the people to be governed by a Godless law.¹⁴¹

More so, a secular state affirms that freedom of expression and the free criticism of institutions and ideas are fundamental human rights essential to a civilised state.

Balasubramanian describes the US form of secular state in this way:

Here the objective was to give equal freedom to its citizens, in religious, political, economic and other aspects. It was not to promote one religion at the cost of other religions. Its primary objective was not to promote secular end but to avoid partisan attitude, but guaranteeing to its citizens the right to freedom of religion. So its position with regard to religion was strict neutrality.¹⁴²

The above quotation denotes that secularism is intended to give equal freedom to the citizens in all aspects of human life including religion, politics, and economics. It further indicates that though the religious institution is respected no religion is

¹⁴¹Al-Oadah, op.cit., p. 12.

¹⁴²Balasubramanian, op.cit., p. 69.

regarded superior to another; it is left to the citizens to decide whether they wish to adhere to a certain religion.¹⁴³

As indicated earlier Nehru's secularism had stood against all discriminations based on religion, race or caste. It afforded an equal place in society to members of minority communities to live an honourable life along with the members of the majority community and conceived India as a place for harmonious living for citizens.¹⁴⁴ Consequently, following distinctive features characterize India's secular state: First, it is committed to the idea of principled distance, poles apart from one-sided exclusion, mutual exclusion and strict neutrality or equidistance. Second, it admits a distinction between depublicization and depoliticization, because it is not hostile to the public presence of religion, it does aim to depublicize it. Third, because it is marked by a unique combination of active hostility to some aspects of religion, religious groups are officially recognized, state-aid is available non-preferentially to educational institutions run by religious communities, The Indian model accepts the view that critique is consistent with respect.¹⁴⁵

When Tanzania attained independence in 1961, it adopted a secular system political model that does not favour a specific religion. As illustrated in its constitution, the country is described: "The United Republic is a democratic, secular and socialist state which adheres to multi-party democracy."¹⁴⁶ Apart from Tanzania being known as a secular state, it is also popularly understood as one that embraced a policy of socialism and its principles. According to the country's constitution, this secular principle of socialism as below:

¹⁴³Ibid, p. 69.

¹⁴⁴Ibid, p. 65.

¹⁴⁵ Rajeev Bhargava. 2008. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory*. online publication, p. 16.

¹⁴⁶ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 11.

The objective of this Constitution is to facilitate the building of the United Republic as a nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom, justice, fraternity and concord, through the pursuit of the policy of Socialism and Self Reliance which emphasizes the application of socialist principles while taking into account the conditions prevailing in the United Republic.¹⁴⁷

Clearly, Tanzania is a socialist nation, which follows a policy of socialism and self-reliance. The Tanzania's state secularity allows its citizens to worship any religion or remain with no particular religious affiliation.¹⁴⁸ As a result of this policy Tanzania had experienced a tolerant and cordial religious climate throughout the first two decades after independence. Nevertheless, since the departure of President Nyerere in 1985, deepening religious tensions and strains between the state and major religions began to emerge in the country, but also inter and intra-religious strife became common.¹⁴⁹

Further, Tanzania's state secularity discourages political parties founded on religious basis. Through his political party CCM (*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* – Revolutionary Party), which was founded on the socialist secular principles, Nyerere's political philosophy was intended at controlling divisions that might have disrupted the political unity and integration in the country. Religion is not the basis for political participation in Tanzania, and the country gives a rather joyful picture of a harmonious relationship between various religions.¹⁵⁰ As a secular state Tanzania does not uphold any religion as a state religion. However, the country has embodied religious elements at both party and government levels as demonstrated in the national anthem, which starts by evoking God to bless Africa and Tanzania in particular. In

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 13.

¹⁴⁸ Mbiro, Michael. 2013. "Tanzania - a Secular State, Why All This Fight?" Tanzania Daily News, p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Mesaki, Simeon. 2011. "Religion and the State in Tanzania" *Cross-Cultural Communication*, vol. 7, no. 2. pp. 249-259.

¹⁵⁰ C. K. Omari. 1983. "Religion And Society In Tanzania." *Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs*, Issue 17, pp. 8-14.

addition, the national assembly (parliament) starts its sessions with prayers to God,¹⁵¹ demonstrating that secularism is not a complete rejection of religion.

Despite being a secular state, the contribution of religious groups to socio-economic development of the country is acknowledged by the State, which had appealed to the religious and non-governmental agencies to contribute towards the process of building equitable Tanzanian society. Ever since Tanzania decided to follow the Ujamaa – socialism path of socio-economic development in 1967, from the beginning almost all organised religious groups accepted the national ideology.¹⁵² At this juncture, It could be posed some important questions: when did secularism as a political ideology introduced in Zanzibar? How were the Islamic values and institutions of the Omani sultanate in Zanzibar became increasingly eroded and secularized by the British and the present postcolonial state? These evident changes the study argues were responsible for the rise of religious opposition, and particularly the Uamsho movement.

By the time of the arrival of the Portuguese in 1498, Islam was firmly established all along the coastal belt of East Africa including Zanzibar.¹⁵³ Hence, the Islamic culture was dominant, and secularism was arguably a strange phenomenon in the region by that time. During Omani dominance of the coast in around 1840s, the spread of Islam intensified in the interior of East Africa that many chiefs converted to Islam and cooperated with the coastal Muslims. Trade served to spread not only Islam, but also the Swahili language and culture.¹⁵⁴ Later on, during the British dominance, Arabic

¹⁵¹ Omari, op.cit; David Westerlund, 1980. *Ujamaa na Dini: A study of some aspects of society and religion in Tanzania, 1961–1977*. Stockholm: University of Stockholm, p. 183.

¹⁵² Bergen, Van. 1981. *Development and Religion in Tanzania*. Interuniversity Institute for Missiological and Ecumenical Research, pp. 254-255; Westerlund, op.cit. , p. 183.

¹⁵³ Lodhi, op.cit., p. 89.

¹⁵⁴ Mesaki, op.cit., p. 250.

was removed as a literary language, replaced by English language; the changes also included the replacing of the Swahili-Arabic script with the Roman script in the 1920s. However, education and health services were offered by the State to the various Muslim and non-Muslim communities without racial segregation and discrimination.¹⁵⁵

With establishment of the Oman sultanate in Zanzibar, the development intensified the presence of Islam through the establishment of various Islamic institutions including the Islamic courts, popularly known as Kadhi Courts. The resultant political system introduced by the Oman-Arab overlords seems to encourage to a certain extent the interaction of Church (read mosque) and State. However, the introduction of the British administration appeared to favour a system that leaned more towards secularism.

Following Nyerere's assistance to the Zanzibar's revolutionary movement under Karume's leadership to overthrow the sultanate government, the two leaders ultimately embarked in building a socialist nation, Tanzania, after the merging of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964.¹⁵⁶ As part of Tanzania, Zanzibar found itself embracing the secular system observed throughout the union, but with some slight differences from the one practiced in mainland Tanzania due to their varied histories. Despite being a secular state as apparent in its form of judiciary system and the way it organises the parliament (House of Representatives), the Zanzibar government has allowed the existence of religious based institutions such as the Kadhi court, *Wakf* commission, and *Mufti* office to be maintained by the state.¹⁵⁷ This form of a secular

¹⁵⁵ Lodhi, op.cit., p. 90.

¹⁵⁶ Mussa, Ali Ubwa. 2005. "*The Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar Legality of Additional Matters outside the Articles of Union.*" LLB. Thesis, Zanzibar University, Zanzibar, p. 11.

¹⁵⁷ Zanzibar Constitution, 1984, p. 72.

state disapproves the popular understanding of secularism as a political ideology, which does not embrace spiritual thoughts from any religious traditions.

Though the leaders of the nationalist movement in Tanzania were indebted to Christian education, the liberation movement also seemed to have acquired momentum amongst the Muslim leadership.¹⁵⁸ There is no doubt that religion played a major role in Tanzania's quest to build a socialist society in the 1960s and 1970s. Together, the two leaders began applying the Marxist theories of secularism in Tanzania by appealing to the various religions to support or be involved in the country's socialist policies.¹⁵⁹ As a secularist who strived in separating the affairs of the Church and State, Nyerere often criticised the religious leaders for being too preoccupied with life after death, wondering "...what about living today? The church should give us time to live longer, and then we can go to heaven at a later stage."¹⁶⁰ Despite the Tanzania government's policy of secularism that does not favour a particular religion, a section of Muslims in Zanzibar have opposed it, claiming it has contributed to the disappearance of Islamic values and mores in the country.

2.5 Conclusion

Apart from dealing with the issue of meaning of secularism, the chapter has also shown that there are different forms of a secular state derived from individual country's understanding of the concept of secularism. It has been demonstrated that as a political ideology, secularism bestows to a state the freedom to deal with its affairs without interference from religious authorities, and vice versa. As a complex concept, secularism does not favour or negate any specific religion, which is

¹⁵⁸ Liviga, A., 2006. "Religion and Governance in Tanzania: The Pre-Liberalisation Period." Dar-es-salaam : p. 327. (In Mukandala et al (eds.).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Mesaki, op.cit., p. 253.

illustrated by the several countries' constitutions in the world today. The core of secularism policy is among other things advocating freedom and equality before the law regardless religious affiliation of anyone.

Within the Islamic context, secularism is considered alien political concept traced to European colonial era. Despite this understanding of secularism in Muslim societies, a number of Muslim states have adopted secular ideals with some admixture of Islamic ethos and institutions to appease their citizens in these countries. But even with this admixture, the efforts have not stopped conservative Muslims from perceiving secularism as a form of *Jâhiliyyah* (ignorance) in a new disguise. In their political rhetoric, most Islamists have accused some of their political leaders inclined to secular ideals for disabusing the core tenets of secularism to stifle freedom of association, equal representation, and equitable distribution of resources. Instead, these rulers have become despots, tyrants and non-observers of the principles of rule of law. It is as a result of this marginalization that Islamist leaders insist that Islam offers a lasting remedy to the political malaise witnessed in many majority Muslim countries of the world, including Zanzibar.

Like most contemporary secular states in the world, the chapter has also shown that the Tanzania state secularity, despite maintaining a clear separation of Church and State, the country's model has embodied certain religious elements in some of its policies as demonstrated in Zanzibar that officially recognises and finances the Islamic institutions of *Wakf*, *Mufti* and *Kadhi* court. As much as the Tanzanians themselves have religious elements, it affected the government organization. Religious clerics from different religions are playing very significant role as seem in various state activities such as parliamentary activities, national elections, and in the

emergence of disasters. However, Zanzibar is more likely to reject secularism compared to mainland Tanzania; this is perhaps due to its long Islamic historical roots.

Though a number of Muslim countries practice partial secular ideology, the Islamist stance saw secularism a foreign ideology from the Western countries and since Islam has its own ideology, it is impossible to accept secularism. Hence, to the countries with majority Muslims, secularism created a worse environment, which eventually acted as among the major factors for the emergence of Islamism as vividly shown in Zanzibar in the fore coming chapter of this study.

CHAPTER THREE
ISLAM, RACE, AND THE POLITICS OF MARGINALIZATION
IN ZANZIBAR

3.1 Introduction

Prior to and during the age of British colonialism, Zanzibar constituted one of the most significant intellectual and cultural centres of Islamic civilisation in East Africa under the Zanzibar Sultanate where Islam spread along the East African coast.¹⁶¹ In 1840, Sultan Said bin Sultan of Oman identified Zanzibar as the headquarters of his East African dominion. With the introduction of the Oman sultanate, Arabic became the official language.¹⁶² Though Islamic culture forms part of the daily scene, there is a small number of Christian population, mostly, from the mainland Tanzania and other parts of East Africa. This chapter provides us with the history of Islam in Zanzibar in different periods stretching from the pre-colonial period to contemporary era. It displays the prevailing situation before the coming of foreigners whereby indigenous Africans interacted with people from the Middle East and the Far East. The introduction of Islam from the Middle East closely followed existing trading patterns and influenced by other factors as will be discussed in the chapter.

Furthermore, the chapter explores the situation before the colonial era arguing that the east coast of Africa was occupied in varying periods by different foreigner powers, including the Portuguese, Oman Arabs, and the British. All these powers had differing influence on Islam and on the Muslim populace in the region. Moving away from the pre-independence period, the chapter also examines the status of Islam in post-independence era especially following the revolution of Zanzibar ushering the reigns

¹⁶¹ Lodhi, op.cit.

¹⁶²Bakari, and Makulilo, op.cit., p.88.

of Abeid Amani Karume (1964 – 1972) and other successive governments to the present time of Ali Mohamed Shein (2010 – 2020). Some of the questions that are answered in this chapter include the following two: one is ‘How did the Islamic intellectual and cultural condition of Zanzibar fair in the post-revolution era?’ and two is ‘Was Zanzibar to be a secular or Islamic state after the revolution and under the union?’

3.2 Pre-Colonial Zanzibar: Centre for Flourishing Islamic Intellectual

Historically speaking, the first permanent residents of Zanzibar seem to have been the ancestors of the Hadimu and Tumbatu, who began arriving from the African Great Lakes in mainland around 1000 AD. They belonged to the various Bantu ethnic groups from the mainland that traditionally lived in small villages that did not coalesce into larger political units. Archaeological evidence indicates that there existed ancient trade routes with Zanzibar as far back as the ancient Sumer and Assyria.¹⁶³ Traders from Arabia mostly Yemen, the Persian Gulf region of Iran especially Shiraz, and west India visited Zanzibar as early as the 1st century AD. They used the monsoon winds to sail across the Indian Ocean and landed in Zanzibar, which offered a good location for contacts and trades with the towns of the Swahili Coast.¹⁶⁴

Traders began to settle in small numbers in Zanzibar in the late 11th or 12th century, thereby intermarrying with the indigenous Africans. Gradually, over a period, a hereditary ruler known as the *Mwinyi Mkuu* or *Jumbe*, emerged among the Hadimu, and a similar ruler, called the *Sheha*, was set up among the Tumbatu. Neither of the

¹⁶³ William Harold Ingrams. 1967. *Zanzibar its History and its People*, London: Routledge. pp. 43–46.

¹⁶⁴Ibid, pp. 43–46.

two leaders wielded significant amount of power, but their existence assisted in solidifying the ethnic identity of their respective subjects.

There is a long historical contact of Islam and Zanzibar, which goes back to around the eighth century AD.¹⁶⁵ Archaeological evidence found in Shanga, on Pate Island indicates that Muslim settlements on the East African coast started as early as the 8th century. However, it is after 1100 A.D that the Muslim presence along the coast increased considerably stimulated by the expansion of trade in the Indian Ocean by the Omanis and the Persians followed by the immigrants from Yemen and Hadhramaut. The immigrants settled spread along the entire coast – from the Somali coast, Lamu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa, the Comoro Islands, and all the way south to Sofala (Mozambique).¹⁶⁶

In the 13th century, Ibn Battuta described Mogadishu as a large town that had a mosque and whose inhabitants were, mostly, merchants being ruled by a sultan who spoke Arabic, assisted by *wazirs* (ministers) and a *Kadhi* (Islamic judge). While describing Mombasa, Ibn Battuta observes it as a large island whose “inhabitants are pious, honourable, and upright, and they have well-built wooden mosques.”¹⁶⁷ Similarly, he described Kilwa as the land of the Zanj (Zanzibar), which by the time of his visit; it was headed by Sultan Abu’l-Muzaffar Hasan, who was noted for his gifts and generosity.¹⁶⁸ Ibn Battuta’s description confirms the existence of thriving Muslim city-states along the East Africa coast,

¹⁶⁵ Abdulaziz Y Lodhi. 1994. “Muslims in Eastern Africa - Their Past and Present,” *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 3(1): p 88.

¹⁶⁶ Ahmed Binsumeit. 2006. *Penetration of Islam In Eastern Africa*, Muscat: Qaboos University, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ Ibn Battuta. 1929. *Travels in Asia and Africa 1325-54*. H. A. R. Gibb (trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, p. 112.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, pp. 112-113.

Long tenure of Islam in Zanzibar is demonstrated with the presence of an earliest mosque in the country built by the Yemenis in Kizimkazi, in which the Kufic inscription on its *mihrab* (front part of the mosque) bears the date 500 AH (*AL-HIJRA* – Islamic date, which started from the day Prophet Muhamed, migrated from the city of Mecca to the city of Medina) as well as 1107 AD (*Anno Domino* – Christian date).¹⁶⁹ Studies show that the earliest Muslims communities in Zanzibar were vibrant and already applying Islamic laws in their judicial systems even before the establishment of the sultanate in the country. The presence of *Wakilis* (Islamic judge assistants) as well known personalities versed with pertinent issues related to Islamic law, confirms the existence of some sort of Islamic form of dispute settlement, even without the existence of formal religious courts. Absence of official courtrooms saw disputes being resolved in private homes and public open places.¹⁷⁰

The first European to establish contact with the East African coast were the Portuguese who were successful in bringing all the major coastal ports under their control. As a nation from the predominantly Christian West, their arrival signified conflict with the predominant Islamic coastal city-states in the region. Following their occupation, the Portuguese pursued a strong anti-Muslim policy that intended to reverse the gains of the Islamic faith in the region.¹⁷¹ The Portuguese intrusion led to the local rulers of East African coast inviting the Omani sultanate to assist them in driving out the European power, which in 1729 was successfully expelled, and pushed to Mozambique.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Ingrams, op.cit.. pp. 43–46.

¹⁷⁰ Majamba, Hamudi. 2007. “Perspectives on the Kadhis Court in Zanzibar.” *Orient Journal of Law and Social Sciences*, Vol. 1 issue No. 2. p. 4.

¹⁷¹ Abdalla Bujra. 2002. *Islam in Eastern Africa: Historical Legacy and Contemporary Challenges*. American International Conference in Addis Ababa, p. 7.

¹⁷² Lodhi, op.cit. p 89; Bujra, op.cit., p.8.

This development opened the coastal region to another foreign occupation in the form of Omani Arabs. The Omani Arab influence facilitated to the growth and expansion of Islam in the region especially in the interior following the establishment of trade caravan routes.¹⁷³ The Omani presence in the East African coast not only opened up a new wave of migration from Oman and Hadhramaut, but also considerably increased trade between the East African coast, Oman and India. However, the removal of the Portuguese did not imply independence for the coastal city-states as the Oman Arabs took over as overlord of the region. This eventually led to the Oman sultanate establishing its capital in Zanzibar in 1832, opening Arab political dominance in the region.¹⁷⁴ The sultan's sovereignty over Zanzibar extended from Kismayu in the North to Sofala in the South and from the Indian Ocean to Congo in the West.¹⁷⁵

The coastal city-states developed cultural unity with Islam and the Swahili language forming the foundation of what came to be popularly known as the Swahili culture. Over the centuries, the city-states had considerable economic, social and cultural interactions amongst them with Islam becoming deeply rooted in the area. Majority of the local Muslims were Sunni who followed the Shafii School of jurisprudence (*madh-hab*), even though the Omanis, the dominant power along the region, followed the *Ibadhi* School. With the entrenchment of Islam, Zanzibar was able to produce its own distinguished religious scholars recognised throughout the Islamic world thereby turning into a centre of Islamic learning and scholarship.¹⁷⁶

Among the prominent Islamic scholars from Zanzibar included Ahmad bin Abi Bakr bin Sumayt (*Shafii*) (1861-1925), born in Grande Comore to a Comorian mother and a

¹⁷³ Lodhi, op.cit. p 89.

¹⁷⁴ Bujra, op.cit., p.8.

¹⁷⁵ Mussa, op.cit., p. 15.

¹⁷⁶ Bujra, op.cit. p. 8.

father who had emigrated from Hadhramaut. He had served as *Kadhi* during the reign of *Seyyid Barghash* (1870-88) and *Seyyid Khalifa* (1888-90). The Sumayt clan had a history of piety and religious learning, a virtue attributed to their connection with the Prophet's family. During his academic journey, Sumayt travelled to far places like Istanbul, India, Egypt, and Java. As an established scholar, Ibn Sumayt was an influential teacher, who authored a number of books including his commentary on the *Minhaj al-twalibin* of al-Nawawi (Nawawi's learning methodology).¹⁷⁷ Ali bin Muhammad al-Mundhir (*Ibadhi*) (1866 – 1925) born in Zanzibar, but of Omani origin is remembered as the only chief *Kadhi* in early 1900s who carried a heavier workload, which saw him signing up to 300 or 400 verdicts a year. As a reputable Islamic scholar in his own measure, he authored several religious works including a *risala* (message) in defence of Islam.¹⁷⁸

Burhan bin Abdal-Aziz al-Amawi (1861 – 1935) maintained close relations with the BuSaid sultans, especially with *Sayyid Alı bin Hamud* (1902 – 1911). Because of the trust he had shown to the British administration, he served as an 'intelligence officer' during the First World War, providing the colonial officers with vital intelligence about the Germans. For this role, Sheikh Burhan was invested with the Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1919.¹⁷⁹ Another renowned Islamic scholar was Twahir bin Abi Bakr al-Amawi (1877-1938) though born in Zanzibar, his family originated from Lamu in Kenya. Due to his attainment in religious education, the British authorities appointed him as *Kadhi* of the Sultanic courts in 1907 until his resignation in 1933. Perhaps like other elite families in Zanzibar, al-Amawi could both read and speak

¹⁷⁷ Bang, Anne. 2000. "Sufis and Scholars of the Sea: The Sufi and Family Networks of Ahmad ibn Sumayt and the Tariqa Alawiyya in East Africa c. 1860-1925." Ph.D. thesis, University of Bergen, p. 47-52.

¹⁷⁸ Al-Khalili, Ahmad.1992. "Proceedings of the Literature Society." Muscat: Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, pp. 177-91

¹⁷⁹ Supplement to the Zanzibar Gazette, 8 September 1919, ZA-BA104/34.

fluent English thereby serving as interpreter, and examiners for the Swahili language competency for those who wanted to serve in the British colonial administration in Zanzibar.¹⁸⁰

Sheikh Abdullah Saleh Al-Farsy (1912 – 1982) is an interesting personality who due to his accomplishment in Islamic studies served as a government official in both Zanzibar and Kenya. As a young man, Al-Farsy combined both Islamic and secular education systems that eventually saw him training in a teacher's college. Due to his knowledge in religious education, he at one time in 1960 became a *Kadhi* in Zanzibar as well as a Chief *Kadhi* in Kenya in 1968.¹⁸¹ Before becoming a *Kadhi*, Al-Farsy travelled to various towns of Tanganyika and Nyasaland to disseminate his ideas on Islamic reforms. One of his striking features was his sincere call to his fellow Muslims to reside peacefully with followers of other religions as he continued upholding the banner of reviving proper understanding of Islam.¹⁸² Some of his scholarly religious publications included *Tafsiri ya Quran Takatifu* (Translation of the Holy Quran), *Maisha ya Nabii Muhammad* (Life of the Prophet Mohammed), and *Wanazuoni Wakubwa wa Afrika ya Mashariki* (East African Great Scholars).¹⁸³

Therefore, there is no doubt that Islam had not only cemented cultural unity amongst the Zanzibaris, but has also retained strong links with Hadhramaut – a region well known for exporting religious scholars throughout East Africa.¹⁸⁴ It is from among the local *ulama* class that *Kadhis*, imams and scholars served the Muslim society in Zanzibar under the patronage of the Sultan. But following the scramble and partition

¹⁸⁰ Bang, Anne K. and Viktor, Knut. 1999. "A Tale of Three Shambas Shafii-Ibadhii Legal Cooperation in the Zanzibar Protectorate." *Sudanic Africa*, vol. 10, p. 11.

¹⁸¹ Abdulkadir Hashim. 2006. *Qadhi's Intellectual Legacy in the East African Coast*, Istanbul: IRCICA, p. 210.

¹⁸² Said Mussa. 1986, *Maisha ya Al-Imam Abdullah Saleh Al-Farsy Katika Ulimwengu wa Kiislamu*, Dar es salaam: Simbon Centre, Ugweno, p. 43.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Bujra, op.cit., p. 8.

of Africa, the Berlin Conference of 1884 deprived the sultan of much of his former dominion, leaving only the Zanzibar islands along with the ten-mile coastal strip of Kenya and mainland Tanzania. With the new developments, in 1890 the British, ultimately, declared Zanzibar its Protectorate.¹⁸⁵

3.3 Colonial Zanzibar: Politics of Social Class, Racial Identity and Geographical Origin

Zanzibar became a protectorate of Britain from 1890 to 1963 when it eventually attained independence as a constitutional monarchy under the Sultan. The British dominion in Zanzibar brought about some modifications to peoples' social life such as language perspective and judiciary system. During the British protectorate, the Zanzibar's social daily norm became distorted to the extent that the prevailing Arabic language was substituted with English as well as the use of Roman script in Swahili writing instead of Arabic as Abdulaziz Y. Lodhi writes:

Arabic was removed as a literary language, and was replaced by English; even the Swahili-Arabic script was replaced by the Roman script in the 1920s. However, this resulted in greater expansion and development of the Swahili language and literature.¹⁸⁶

Also during their brief rule of Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania), the Germans used Swahili as an administrative language favouring Muslims in their administrations because of the international alliance with Ottoman Turkey. Despite the establishment of colonial rule, the period witnessed a great expansion of Swahili language, culture and Islam, which also became entrenched in Tanganyika.¹⁸⁷

More so, the judicial system was reformed during the British protectorate era in Zanzibar, where Islamic law was applied in tandem with the common law for

¹⁸⁵ Mussa, op.cit.

¹⁸⁶ Lodhi, op.cit,p. 90.

¹⁸⁷ Bujra, op.cit., p. 8.

different groups. A parallel court system gave the colonial administration authority to legislate for the British subjects, while the sultan on the other hand was in charge of his subjects. The British citizens appeared in their respective court where common law was applied, while at the same time the locals went before the Sultan's Court where Islamic and customary laws were applicable.¹⁸⁸ While clarifying the Zanzibar's judiciary system during the protectorate period, Anne Bang and Knut Vikor posit:

Zanzibar was placed under British protection in 1890. Shortly thereafter, the sultan agreed that British jurisdiction could be exercised by other than the consular officers. This paved the way for the formal establishment of Her Britannic Majesty's Court for Zanzibar in 1897. It exercised jurisdiction over any British subject (including Indians resident in Zanzibar) in all cases where such subjects appeared, as plaintiff or as defendant. After an exchange of diplomatic notes, other European and American nationals were placed under British jurisdiction. The rest of the population was defined as subjects of the sultan, and consequently under Sultan's jurisdiction.¹⁸⁹

This dual system was maintained until 1963 when Zanzibar attained its independence.¹⁹⁰ However, within a month after independence the Zanzibar uprising of 1964 led by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) overthrew the coalition government of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP).¹⁹¹

Zanzibar's history, from the early 19th century to the independence was characterised by divisions based on social classes and racial identities.¹⁹² The divisions were entrenched during the Arab rule when Zanzibar was a leading centre of the slave trade in East Africa after the Arabs introduced a plantation economy of clove and coconut

¹⁸⁸ Majamba, op.cit., p. 5.

¹⁸⁹ Bang, and Knut, op.cit., p. 2

¹⁹⁰ Majamba, op.cit., p. 5.

¹⁹¹ Suhonen, Riikka. 2009. "Mapinduzi Daima – Revolution Forever: Using the 1964 Revolution in Nationalistic Political Discourses in Zanzibar." Master's Thesis, African Studies Institute for Asian and African Studies, University of Helsinki.

¹⁹² Abdul Sheriff. 2001. "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar", *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 301-318.

trees that relied extensively on slave labour.¹⁹³ When Zanzibar became a protectorate from 1890, the socio-economic divisions were further cemented under the British colonial strategy of divide-and-rule. Because of socio-economic divisions, the nationalist struggles that began in the 1950s did not crystallize into a social movement for liberation. Instead, they widened the existing social polarisation, class, racial, regional and ideological orientations of the political parties on the islands.¹⁹⁴

Owing to the British policy of divide and rule in Zanzibar, on late 1920's up to early 1950's, there emerged racially based associations such as the African Association, the Shiraz Association, the Arab Association and the Comorian Association. Though these associations were formed for communal purposes, in the second half of 1950's they were changed into political parties. Similarly, Africans of mainland origin (Tanganyika) and the Shirazis who comprised mainly of the indigenous Africa population together with other ethnic groups strongly supported the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP).¹⁹⁵

Yet, to a large extent, the emerging political parties became associated with social classes, racial identities and geographical origins. The Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) founded in 1955 was largely considered a party of the upper class representing mostly Zanzibaris of Arab origin. However, the relative success of ZNP was due to its appeal to multiethnic Zanzibari nationalism rather than Arab nationalism. The earlier Arab Association demanded a non-racial common roll election hence abandoning ethnic politics all together. Consequently, they joined the ZNP, which had been formed by some Shirazi peasants in Unguja who were protesting against colonial regulations on politics and other social matters that privileged the British followed by

¹⁹³Bakari, and Makulilo, op.cit., p.196.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 197; Sheriff, op.cit. , p. 307.

¹⁹⁵Mussa, op.cit, p. 15.

the Arabs and lastly the Africans. However, ZNP failed miserably in the first election in 1957 to win even a single seat. Despite the party's initial failure, it eventually, over time, came to represent the interests of the majority of the people in Zanzibar, including landowners, peasants, shopkeepers, civil servants, and a section of the indigenous working class united in a broad nationalist coalition.¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, with the active encouragement of Tanganyika's Commanding officer *mwalimu* Nyerere, the African Association combined with the Shirazi Association to form the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in 1957.¹⁹⁷ ASP was considered a party of the lower classes, representing mostly Africans and poor sections among the Shirazis. Thus, its ideological disposition was African nationalism. Following internal squabbles within the ASP in 1959, a new party called the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) was founded representing largely the wealthy Shirazi community, and the peasant interests in Pemba. In 1961, the ZPPP and ZNP formed an electoral alliance that survived through two elections to form the first independence government in 1963. However, the radical youths of ZNP broke away on the eve of the 1963 election to form the Umma Party, headed by General Abdulrahman Babu.¹⁹⁸

The two major parties emerged almost equally balanced in the January 1961 election, the ASP winning 43 per cent of the total votes and 10 seats, and the ZNP collecting 39 per cent of the votes and nine seats. The ZPPP won 18 per cent of the votes and three seats, almost entirely based in Pemba. Later, the ZPPP split with one member joining the ASP and the other two joining the ZNP an event that created an interim caretaker

¹⁹⁶ Sheriff, *op.cit.*, p. 310.

¹⁹⁷ Bakari, & Makulilo, *op.cit.*, 195-218

¹⁹⁸ Ali Saleh. 1999. *Gender Balancing Initiatives in Zanzibar*. Dar-es-Salaam: Gender Resource Centre, p. 4.

government to organize another election in June in which a new seat was added. Meanwhile, the electoral alliance between ZNP and ZPPP enabled them to win a parliamentary majority to form an internal self-government in June 1961. The final pre-independence elections were held in 1963 where by the number of seats was increased to 31. The ZNP and ZPPP electoral alliance won 46% of the total votes in Zanzibar as whole and 18 parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the ASP won 54% of the votes as a whole but only 13 parliamentary seats.¹⁹⁹

What could be deduced from these developments is that there is no doubt that ethnic and racial identities were an important considerations in the country's politics. As people and parties coalesced around race and class, the dream for a united Zanzibari society was jeopardized by the politics of social division. Thus, the feeling of nationalism was not enough to overcome the deep social divide born of a long and intricate history of social division.²⁰⁰

During the second Lancaster House Conference held in September 1963 that deliberated on the Independence Constitution agreed that the sultan continues to hold his position as the constitutional head of the State of Zanzibar. The Independence Constitution was modelled on the Westminster model that had the sultan as a ceremonial head of State with a Prime Minister as the head of the government. The conference further agreed on December 10, 1963 as the date of Independence, which marked the end of British rule in Zanzibar.²⁰¹ Ironically, both the 1963 independence and the 1964 revolution, as examined in the subsequent chapters, were not able to successfully deal with the issue of the political polarisation of Zanzibar society.²⁰²

¹⁹⁹Sheriff, *op.cit.*, p. 312.

²⁰⁰ Sheriff, *op.cit.*, p. 313.

²⁰¹ Article II of the Independence Constitution, 1963, Sect 3-15.

²⁰²Bakari, & Makulilo, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

Clearly, secular instruments such as the constitution became the guiding framework governing the country and not the exclusive provisions of the sharia.

3.4 Post-Colonial Zanzibar: Politics of Revolutionary and Unification

With independence, a section of the population did not support the colonial government initiative that retained the office of the sultan as the head of state. This resulted in an uprising that culminated in the toppling of the earliest postcolonial administration with dire consequences on the racial minorities, the Arabs and the Asians.²⁰³ Within a month of independence on 11th January 1964, violent revolution took hold of the island under the leadership of “Field Marshal” John Okello – an Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) activist and a Christian mercenary from Uganda. During the uprising, landowners and merchants mostly Arabs and Asians were dragged from their houses and shops, and some were indiscriminately killed, leading to thousands fleeing the Islands.²⁰⁴

Following the coup, the leader of the ASP *Sheikh* Karume was appointed the President of the Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba, and immediately formed a coalition administration, the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (*Serikali ya Mapinduzi Zanzibar*).²⁰⁵ According to some analysts, the revolution took place due to the alleged exploitation and suppression of Africans by the Arabs who had been the overlords of the region for many years. It was, therefore, feared that the sultan’s hegemony domination of Zanzibar’s politics would continue through the ZNP thereby instigating their removal.²⁰⁶ After the revolution, the government of Afro-Shirazi Party adopted various measures to consolidate power, which included scrapping off the

²⁰³Mussa, op.cit., p. 17.

²⁰⁴ Mosaddeq Ahmed. 2002. “Suppressing Dissent the Crackdown on Muslims in Zanzibar”, England: Islamic Human Rights Commission, pp. 1-5

²⁰⁵Ibid

²⁰⁶ Mussa, op.cit., p. 17.

Independence Constitution and banning of all the political parties. These measures established the ASP as the only political party recognized by the country's constitution.²⁰⁷

Aware of his increasingly precarious position, Karume appealed to mainland Tanzania for help that ultimately culminated to a union between the two countries in 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania.²⁰⁸ Obviously, the decision of joining Zanzibar with Tanganyika was due to the fact that there was a very close historical relationship between the two sides along with bloody brotherhood and culture. According to Mervyn Hiskett, Nyerere and Okello imposed the Union of Tanzania on the Muslims of Zanzibar against their will, which was followed by a deliberate campaign to 'erase' the Islamic character of Zanzibar under a secular constitution.²⁰⁹ Amongst the Zanzibaris, there is a popular belief that the unification was intended to suppress popular unrest among sections of Muslim population in Zanzibar.²¹⁰

Karume and his ASP accused the ZNP of being Arab feudalists acting at the command of their masters in Oman, while the ZNP suspected Karume and the ASP of being trojan horses for the mainland. This rhetoric has continued, creating enmity that is even evident in contemporary Zanzibari politics. It is common to find Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) leaders characterize the leaders of the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) as agents of Arab colonialists aiming at re-colonizing of Zanzibar.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p. 17.

²⁰⁸ Ahmed, op.cit., p. 4.

²⁰⁹ Hiskett, Mervyn. 1994. *The Course of Islam in Africa*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press p. 170.

²¹⁰ Wilson, Amrit. 1989. *U.S. Foreign Policy and Revolution: The Creation of Tanzania*. London: Pluto Press.

²¹¹ Jenerali Ulimwengu. 2008. "The Travails of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union." *Africa Review of Books /Revue Africaine des Livres* Volume 4 No. 2 pp. 5-7.

Using the doctrine of party supremacy, Nyerere managed to impinge on Zanzibar's autonomy by gradually increasing the list of the "union matters" beyond the original eleven items as outlined by the Tanzania constitution of 1977:²¹²

1. The Constitution of Tanzania and the Government of the United Republic
2. Foreign Affairs
3. Defence and Security
4. Police
5. Emergency Powers
6. Citizenship
7. Immigration
8. External borrowing and trade
9. Service in the Government of the United Republic
10. Income tax payable by individuals and by corporations, customs duty and excise duty on goods manufactured in Tanzania collected by the Customs Department
11. Harbours, matters relating to air transport, posts and telecommunications

Generally, there seems to be three divergent views with regard to the debate on the issue of the union. Amongst the Zanzibari population, there are those who favour (i) maintaining the union as it currently appears, (ii) reforming it, (iii) abolishing it altogether. Most contemporary Zanzibaris seem to support the idea of a Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, but strictly under the original eleven articles as illustrated above.²¹³ There are several areas of co-dependency between Tanganyika and Zanzibar such as strong kinship ties existing between the two sides, the supply of electricity and food to the islands. More so, Zanzibar seems to gain a lot by remaining in the Union with mainland Tanganyika, particularly in the area of defence and security. With a small population, it is still feared that Zanzibar could become more vulnerable to attack from foreign countries.²¹⁴

²¹² Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 88.

²¹³ Interview with *Sheikh* Salum Sharif, UAMSHO activist, Mwanakwerekwe – Zanzibar, 19/02/2014; Kidawa Hassan, and Abdallah Rashid, Msumbiji Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.

²¹⁴ Oloka Joseph Onyango and Maria Nassali. 2003. *Constitutionalism And Political Stability In Zanzibar: The Search For A New Vision*, Tanzania: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 42

However, these arrangements were criticized by some of the leaders in Zanzibar who interpreted the situation as exploitative. The 1977 Permanent Constitution expressly provides for a separate government of Zanzibar, but does not provide for a separate government of Tanganyika. Nonetheless, according to section 34 (1), (2) and (3) of the constitution, the government of the United Republic has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with respect to all matters in and for Tanganyika.²¹⁵ This dual role of the Union government led to tensions and mistrust.

Among the gross loss to Zanzibaris in the union was the 11th Constitutional Amendment, which eliminated the special status to the President of Zanzibar to serve as a vice president in the union government. This amendment was considered as a gross violation of the union's Articles thereby resulting to tension between Zanzibar and Tanganyika.²¹⁶ However, the authority aimed at strengthening the union by allocating the vice president post to another person from Zanzibar, while on other hand, was to give relief to the president of Zanzibar to deal with Zanzibar affairs fully.

The two sovereign states, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, motivated by the extensive historical experience between the two countries including blood ties, trade, culture, common language, and a close political co-operation particularly between ASP and TANU signed a treaty to form the United Republic of Tanzania. It has been extolled as a significant effort in realization of the spirit of the Pan-Africanism,²¹⁷ a worldwide intellectual movement that aims at encouraging and strengthening bonds of solidarity

²¹⁵ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 23.

²¹⁶Mussa, op.cit., p. 41.

²¹⁷Mussa, op.cit., p. 10.

between all people of African descent.²¹⁸ It is based on the belief that unity is crucial to economic, social, and political development and aims to “unify and uplift” people of African descent.²¹⁹ Moreover, it has an ideology, which asserts that the fate of all African peoples and countries are intertwined, at its core; Pan-Africanism is “a belief that the Africans both on the continent and in the diasporas share not merely a common history, but a common destiny.”²²⁰

However, cracks in the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar have appeared especially with the increasing of the number of union matters from eleven to twenty-three.²²¹ The supposed increased union matters are documented in the Tanzania Constitution of 1977:²²²

1. All matters concerning coinage and currency for the purposes of legal tender (including notes), banks (including savings banks) and all banking business; foreign exchange and exchange control.
2. Industrial licensing and statistics
3. Higher education
4. Mineral oil resources, including crude oil other categories of oil or products and natural gas
5. The National Examinations Council of Tanzania and all matters connected with the functions of that Council.
6. Civil aviation
7. Research
8. Meteorology
9. Statistics
10. The Court of Appeal of the United Republic
11. Registration of political parties and other matters related to political parties

²¹⁸ Olorunoba-Oju, Omotayo. 2012. “Pan Africanism, Myth and History in African and Caribbean Drama.” *Journal of Pan African Studies*, vol. 5, (8), p. 190.

²¹⁹ Frick, Janari, et al. 2006. *History: Learner's Book*. South Africa: New Africa Books, p. 235

²²⁰ Minkah Makalani. 2011. “Pan Africanism.” *Africana Age*, New York: p. 52.

²²¹ Mussa, op.cit., p. 10.

²²² Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 88.

Undoubtedly, both countries shared the same historical experience of colonization, common cultural identity, and geographical proximity, along with common objective of African unity.²²³

The architects of the union, arguably, had different agendas. President Karume was concerned with the influence of the educated elites in his party, and the threat of counter-revolution from the ZNP and UMMA parties. Thus, it was feared that forces of the deposed government could re-organize themselves within the country and with external assistance, particularly, from the Arab countries stage a counter coup.²²⁴ On other hand Nyerere was worried that African socialism philosophy would be overshadowed by the communist views that were infiltrating mainland Tanzania through Zanzibar.²²⁵ This is why when the ASP took power after the 1964 revolution, it was viewed as a relief to the political leadership in Tanganyika.

Some of the merits attributed to the union include Tanzania being recognized as an island of peace in the turbulent great lake region, and the ability of the country to cement the social and cultural relation, which existed for many years even before the union. Politically, the union is credited for uniting the two countries enabling Zanzibaris to secure employment on the other side of the Republic. Economically, trade activities have increased in such a way that many residents of both countries have benefited. Despite its shortcomings, the union has successfully lived longer than other unions in Africa.²²⁶

²²³ Mussa, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

²²⁴ Romuald Haule. 2006. "Torturing the Union? An Examination of the Union of Tanzania and its Constitutionality." Heidelberg: Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, p. 222.

²²⁵ Onyango, and Nassali, *op.cit.*

²²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 42, 43.

The union's long tenure has nevertheless, been confronted with challenges and controversies. The structure of the union has been the source of friction to both citizens of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Of concern to the Zanzibaris is that their revolutionary government has been rendered powerless with the unification from the fact that the Zanzibar president and his cabinet cannot act within the union. For example, Zanzibar ministers are unable to represent Tanzania in international forums using their status as ministers; but instead, those who hold the mainland Tanzanian identity are the ones representing Tanzania as a country.²²⁷ The ambiguity of the unification is also evident in naming of certain organizations. An organization that includes the word 'Tanzania' in its name as a national outlook, does not suggest that their sphere of influence include both counties. For instance, organizations like *Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania* (BAKWATA) and *Baraza la Usomaji Kurani Tanzania* (BALUKTA) are restricted to operate within the confines of Tanzania mainland.

Another confusion is the uncertainty over union matters due to the seemingly unequal representation in the Union parliament, including amending the list of union matters. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 provides clearly that, the procedure for amending the list of union matters requires the concurrence of two thirds of the Members of Parliament hailing from mainland Tanzania and two thirds of the members from Zanzibar.²²⁸ According to section 98 (1)(a-b) of the constitution:

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- (1) Parliament may enact law for altering any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the following principles:
 - (a) A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of this Constitution, other than those relating to paragraph (b) of this sub article or any

²²⁷Mussa, op.cit., p. 25.

²²⁸ Sec. 98(1) (a) of Tanzania Constitution 1977, p. 55.

²²⁹ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 55, 56.

provisions of any law specified in List One of the Second Schedule to this Constitution shall be supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of all the Members of Parliament; and
 (b) A Bill for an Act to alter any provisions of this Constitution or any provisions of any law relating to any of the matters specified in List Two of the Second Schedule to this Constitution shall be passed only if it is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all Members of Parliament from Mainland Tanzania and not less than two-thirds of all Members of Parliament from Tanzania Zanzibar.

Significantly, according to this section of the constitution, all union matters are supposed to be endorsed by the consensus of two-thirds of members from each side of the union. Thus, the continuous expansion of the issues concerning the union have continuously been opposed by a section of Zanzibaris who felt that such developments eroded the autonomy of their country, thereby interfering with its internal affairs. Consequently, some Muslims in the country have tended to explain the union in religious terms, arguing that the unification was just a strategy of curbing the growth and spread of Islam in the country and East Africa in general. Such views about the union with mainland Tanzania expressed in religious language is a deliberate way of mustering support from sections of Muslims in the struggle to secede from the unification.

Although there was confirmation on ratification of the articles of the union by the administration in Tanganyika through the Parliament, it was not the case with Zanzibar. There is no record of the union's ratification in Zanzibar statutes. According to the country's former Attorney General, Wolfgang Dourado: "No law ratifying the Articles of the union of 1964 exists on the statute books of Zanzibar", adding that "the Principal Legal adviser to the Zanzibar government was not consulted."²³⁰ Dourado's claim was supported by Issa Gulam Hussein Shivji's study, which was unable to unearth any evidence of ratification. The formation of the Union of Tanzania and its

²³⁰Mussa, *op.cit.*, p.31.

ratification has remained a secret to many Tanzanians, including those at the realm of the leadership.²³¹

A former President of Zanzibar and Vice-President of Tanzania, Mwinyi, who at the time of the union was the Minister of State of Zanzibar, came to know of the Union four days before the official signing of the treaty maintaining:

It was morning of April 22, 1964, when Julius K. Nyerere arrived in Zanzibar. The President of Tanganyika came with a copy of the treaty proposal prepared in Tanganyika ... I was not at State House Zanzibar during the signing...I was in Pemba (that morning) on official duty, and when I came back I was informed for the first time about that Union. President Karume told me that Tanganyika and Zanzibar were united that morning and President Nyerere shall be the President of the Union Government and he, shall be the Vice-President and the Union shall be confirmed in Dar-es-Salaam on the April 26, 1964.²³²

Clearly, Mwinyi's assertions demonstrates that the people of Zanzibar were not consulted on the unification matter and that is why it is popularly known as a union between President Nyerere and President Karume since there is no evidence if it being ratified by the government of Zanzibar. However, the union has brought about a number of advantages to both sides of the union including harmony, solidarity peace and security.

The list of union matters had been a source of mistrust between the people of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Article IV of the Articles of union had specified the reserved union matters that read:

There shall be reserved to the Parliament and Executive of the United Republic the following matters: (i) The Constitution and Government of the United Republic, (ii) External affairs, (iii) Defence, (iv) Police, (v) Emergency powers, (vi) Citizenship, (vii) Immigration, (viii) External trade and borrowing, (ix) The public service of the United Republic, (x) Income tax, corporation tax,

²³¹ Onyango and Nassali, *op.cit.*, pp. 42, 45.

²³² Mussa, *op.cit.*, p.32.

customs and excise duties, (xi) Harbors, civil aviation, posts and telegraph.²³³

A blend of factors ranging from limited participation and involvement of people especially the Zanzibaris in the making and ratification of the union along with the expanding list of union matters, dissatisfaction over resource distribution, and the structure of the union have all presented challenges to the merger, confirming that the unification was founded on shaky foundation.²³⁴

Though it is provided in one of the article of the union that Zanzibar is a sovereign state united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania, the preamble to the Union Constitution ambiguously recognizes Zanzibar as a part of Tanzania.²³⁵ Such inconsistencies have been contested by politicians from Zanzibar including the former President Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi who later decided to resign in 1984. Subsequent politicians in the country have supported Mwinyi's initiative.²³⁶ Similarly, another former President of Zanzibar, Salmin Amour Juma (1990 – 2000), insisted on being sworn in by the Chief Justice of Tanzania, and not by the President of Tanzania, because his office was not subordinate to that in Tanganyika, maintaining that Zanzibar was a sovereign state.²³⁷

Emanating from the debate of the unification are two divergent views with regard to the system of government. There are those supporting for the unitary and others for a federal arrangement of governments. Most Zanzibaris seem not to support the idea of a unitary government, alleging that it deprives their country autonomy, and thereby

²³³ Article IV of the Articles of union in Tanzania constitution.

²³⁴ Japhace Poncian. 2014. "Fifty Years of the Union: the Relevance of Religion in the Union and Zanzibar Statehood Debate." *African Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 166.

²³⁵ Chapter 1, part 1, sec 1, 2 of Tanzania Constitution of 1977.

²³⁶ Mussa, op.cit., p.46.

²³⁷ Ibid, p.46.

advocate for a federal system of government.²³⁸ The supposedly declining of Zanzibar's autonomy clearly captured in the words of Haroub Othman who as quoted by Mwananchi Tanzania newspapers posits:

...the reason that made Zanzibar to fail in making autonomous decisions originated from the idea of uniting TANU and ASP. Before the union, Zanzibar enjoyed its autonomy where ASP was the solely party in the country. However, today, it is common knowledge that the CCM party governs Zanzibar and Tanganyika decides on all matters in a skewed arrangement of representation. Because of this reality many decision are passed without Zanzibaris' consent.²³⁹

Politicians from mainland Tanzania have rejected the above view, arguing that it is in fact Zanzibar that is over represented in the union's parliament, since it has a population of about one million people, but has over fifty representatives in the union parliament. Such views notwithstanding, the Zanzibaris insist that their country is a sovereign state, which is entitled to equal representation, irrespective of population size.²⁴⁰ However, as a matter of fact, Zanzibar has lost its sovereignty from the day it merged with Tanganyika forming the new sovereign state called Tanzania.

Another area of controversy is the public finance in which the constitution provides for a consolidate fund for the United Republic for running the affairs of the unification. Similarly, the Zanzibar constitution provides for consolidated fund for non-union matters.²⁴¹ There is, however, no provision or any formula for the distribution of the revenue from the union government to Zanzibar. The matter became more complicated for lack of a separate consolidated fund for mainland Tanzania. It is against this background that a section of Zanzibaris have supported the idea for a separate consolidated fund for a three tier government comprising of the

²³⁸ Kimboy, Frank. "Why Katiba Team has Proposed Three-Tier Union Again" *The Citizen: Tanzania*, 31/12/2013.

²³⁹ Haroub Othman. "The reason that made Zanzibar to fail in making autonomous decisions" *Mwananchi Tanzania*, 12 /01/05.

²⁴⁰ Mussa, op.cit., p. 53.

²⁴¹ Section 123(a) of Zanzibar Constitution, 1984

United Republic, and the two separate autonomous governments of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.²⁴²

In the opinion, politicians in Zanzibar demand that Zanzibar should be accorded 4.5% of total revenue collected for Tanzania, a view that has utterly been rejected by their counterpart in mainland Tanzania. According to politicians from mainland Tanzania, Zanzibar is a very small partner who cannot be given a lion's share of 4.5 % of the revenue. In their assessment Zanzibar is the size of Temeke District in Dar-es-Salaam, which unlike Zanzibar has a higher population, yet not receiving 4.5% of the national revenue.²⁴³ Such sentiments have made a section of mainland Tanzanians to complain that they are the ones meeting all the cost of maintaining the union as expressed in the Nyalali commission reports:

These complaints flow from the failure of Zanzibar government to meet fully its annual obligations for carrying out union matters, along with the opportunity of Zanzibaris to work in the government and parastatals in Tanzania Mainland whilst the nationals of the Tanzania mainland have no similar access of working in the government and parastatals in Zanzibar.²⁴⁴

More so, a considerable amount of dissatisfaction over economic issues relates to the question of taxation. Due, to the bureaucracy in the mainland Tanzania, it is suspected that Zanzibar's seaport was merely being used as a transit point for goods to the mainland without any benefits to the country. This is because goods that are imported through Zanzibar were not taxed, ending up being cheaper at the final destination market, mainland Tanzania. Wither Ironically, goods imported through the mainland

²⁴² Onyango and Nassali, op.cit., pp. 42, 45.

²⁴³ Ibid, p.46

²⁴⁴ Nyalali Commission, 1993. "Wither the Union of the United Republic of Tanzania" p. 23.

seaport but whose final destination was Zanzibar were always subjected to tax, a system considered to be discriminating.²⁴⁵

The supposed discrimination and marginalization expressed by the Zanzibaris is believed to have been extended also to the educational and political sectors. With regard to education, most Zanzibaris feel that they are deliberately discriminated in joining public institution in Tanzania, and wondering why all the institutions of higher learning are strategically situated in mainland Tanzania.²⁴⁶ However, at the time of conducting this study, there have been already founded some Universities in Zanzibar including Zanzibar University (1998) situated at Tunguu Zanzibar, the University College of Education (1998) at Chukwani Zanzibar, and the State University of Zanzibar (1999) at Tunguu Zanzibar. The main requirement for the admission to join Tanzania Universities according to the Tanzania Commission for Universities (TCU) is for the students to acquire a first or second class for the Advanced Certificate of Secondary Education Examinations (ACSEE) or Diploma levels. In addition, politically, despite being a legal partner of the unification, it is the concern of majority of the Zanzibaris that non-amongst them has ever been appointed Attorney General, Chief Justice, Central Bank Governor or Inspector General of Police in the union government.²⁴⁷ Clearly, despite the unification being herald as the right direction towards the realization of Pan-Africanism, there is no doubt that the union has been a thorny issue characterized with tension emanating from both sides of the amalgamation.

²⁴⁵Mussa, op.cit., p. 52.

²⁴⁶Onyango, and Nassali, op.cit., pp. 43-4.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

3.5 The Islamic Factor in Zanzibar in the Midst of the Unification

When outlining the history of Islam in Zanzibar from the past to the present, it is very important to give a brief analysis of the role of different government leaders to the development of Islam in the country. The first President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, Abeid Amani Karume (1964 – 1972), is credited for the enhancement of Islamic and Arabic classes in public schools by employing teachers in Islamic and Arabic subjects to teach students their religion of Islam. There was a one-year special class called Quran class where students were learning Islamic topics with Arabic language before getting into standard one after attaining age seven. As such, according to Sheikh Mussa Said, an Uamsho preacher, Karume is considered to have supported the development of Islamic culture through education by implementing Quran classes during pre-school period.²⁴⁸ However, Karume, generally, discouraged Zanzibaris from travelling outside the country searching for education.²⁴⁹ Among other reasons, he was apprehensive of his own colleagues within the revolutionary government, the leftist element as well as the intellectual elements.²⁵⁰

Following Karume's death, Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi (1972 – 1984) succeeded him, and continued the policy of advancing the 'Islamic factor' as demonstrated with the establishment of *Baraza la Misikiti Tanzania* (BAMITA) – 'the Council of Tanzania Mosques' to attract oil-rich Arab countries' money to Zanzibar. Unlike Karume, Mwinyi paved the way for some Zanzibaris to undertake both their Islamic and secular education in the Gulf region along with mainland Tanzania. However, Mwinyi

²⁴⁸ Sheikh Mussa Said, Uamsho rally, Mwanakwerekwe, Zanzibar, 13/03/2012.

²⁴⁹ Levtzion, and Pouwels, op.cit., p. 364.

²⁵⁰ Mussa, op.cit., p.23.

was, eventually, forced to resign due to his perceived failure to check separatist tendency in Zanzibar,²⁵¹ a view outright rejected by Uamsho leadership.²⁵²

With the resignation of Mwinyi, Ali Hassan Mwinyi took over the leadership of Zanzibar for only a year (1984 – 1985). Despite his short stay, Ali Mwinyi is regarded by Uamsho activists to have paved the way for successive flowing of foreigners, including mainlanders to Zanzibar who are blamed for the demise of Islamic values due to their non-Islamic practices. Without tangible evidence, the problem of alcohol and drug abuse, illicit sexual relations together with the so called “half-naked” style of dressing among women always linked with non-Muslims.²⁵³ Nevertheless, with the demise of *Ujamaa* during Ali Mwinyi’s leadership, Tanzania’s economy and society was gradually liberalised, paving the way for religion to appear in the public, culminating to the emergence of numerous Islamic activities as witnessed in a number of Islamic NGOs, bookshops, schools, universities, *da’wa* (propagation) groups.²⁵⁴

Furthermore, during a period of Ali Mwinyi’s presidency of Tanzania (1985 – 1995), religious activities flourished as the new political environment created conducive environment for their flourishing. On the other hand, the evident Islamic revival was part of ‘opening up’ and ‘reconnecting’ with the Muslim world after years of isolation. Through the funds of wealthy individuals from the Middle East and Gulf states, Muslim youth secured scholarships to study abroad. Through the assistance from wealthy Muslim countries, projects related to construction of mosques, *madrasahs*, health clinics, and academic institutions in Zanzibar were funded. The

²⁵¹ Levtzion, and Pouwels, op.cit., p. 364.

²⁵² *Sheikh* Mussa Said, Uamsho rally, Mwanakwerekwe Zanzibar, 13/03/2012.

²⁵³ UAMSHO public lecture delivered by Suleiman Juma Suleiman, at Makunduchi, 15/4/2012.

²⁵⁴ Simon Turner. 2008. “These Young Men Show No Respect For Local Customs’ Globalisation, Youth and Islamic Revival in Zanzibar.” Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies Copenhagen, p. 8.

emergent Islamic consciousness also created the ground for inter-religious and intra-religious tensions in the country.²⁵⁵

After Ali Mwinyi's tenure, Idrisa Abdulwakil took the reign of leadership for a period of five years (1985 – 1990). Increasingly, Islamic consciousness and political activism coined in religious language continued his era. The emerging Islamic activism on the island worried the political class, leading to Nyerere coming out of retirement to participate in public rallies in the country to emphasize the importance of national unity and the secular nature of Tanzania state. Their intervention did not stop the unrests evident in various parts of the country because there was strong resentment from the people that the unification did not favour them. The ensuing tension erupted into the May 1988 demonstrations in which two people were killed and eight injured.²⁵⁶ Allegedly, the demonstrations were sparked by remarks made by Sophia Kawawa, the wife of Rashid Kawawa, the former CCM national secretary general, who was the chairperson of the UWT (Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania - the Tanzanian Women's organisation).²⁵⁷ She had proposed, when it comes to matters of inheritance, which a woman should get similar share to the one given to their male counterpart. Mostly, the conservative considered this view to be against the Islamic law of heritance, which provides a ratio of two for man as to one for woman as indicated in the verse below:

Allah (thus) directs you as regards your Children's (Inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two females.²⁵⁸

But to the modernist, the above interpretation is not practical to the realities of the contemporary society. To ease the tension the government in Zanzibar publicly

²⁵⁵Ibid.

²⁵⁶Levtzion, and Pouwels, op.cit, p. 364.

²⁵⁷ Abdin Chande in Nehemia Levtzion, and Randall Pouwels. 2000. *The History of Islam in Africa*, Ohio: Ohio University Press, p. 364.

²⁵⁸ Quran, 4:11.

declared that Kawawa's views were personal and in no way reflected the position of the party and State.²⁵⁹

In the next decade, Salmin Amour Juma became the president of Zanzibar (1990 – 2000), but for the first time the office was not, automatically, accorded the Vice President of Tanzania position,²⁶⁰ an incident that was condemned by most Zanzibaris, the extremist included. The constitutional amendment that removed the President of Zanzibar to serve as a Vice President of the union government was fatal, for it eliminated the organic link between Zanzibar and the mainland Tanzania. The changes to the constitution were occasioned with the creation of the running mate principle as a result of the introduction of the multiparty system of government. According to the CCM leadership, Zanzibar had acquiesced to the amendment, citing the point that a Zanzibari was at that time of the changes the Vice President of the union.²⁶¹

However, to most Zanzibaris, with the changes they feel that their country is not effectively represented in the union's cabinet because their President is no longer recognized as one of the Vice Presidents of Tanzania, but instead a minister without portfolio in the within the union government. Similarly, due to the constitutional amendments, the previous rotation of the presidency between Zanzibar and Tanganyika, as well as between a Muslim and a Christian as radically been affected by the changes.²⁶²

²⁵⁹ Bulletin of Tanzanian Affairs issued by the British Tanzania Society, September 1988. <https://www.tzaffairs.org/1988/09/>

²⁶⁰ Jenerali Ulimwengu. 2008. "The Travails of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union." *Africa Review of Books /Revue Africaine des Livres*, Volume 4 N°2 .

²⁶¹ Onyango and Nassali, op.cit., p.52.

²⁶² Ibid, p.53.

Nevertheless, during Juma's leadership, he attempted to join Zanzibar to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1992 for economic interests as a way of ameliorating the prevailed poor economic situation, but, the effort was strongly condemned by the union government.²⁶³ The so-called G-55 motion by union parliamentarians sought the establishment of a government for Tanganyika following Zanzibar's decision to join the OIC. Due to the strong opposition, Zanzibar was eventually compelled to withdraw from the organization citing the reason that Zanzibar is not a sovereign state instead, but rather operate under a union government, which holds the authority of joining international organizations including the OIC.²⁶⁴

From 2000 to 2010, Amani Abeid Amani, the son of the former President Abeid Amani Karume, ascended to the leadership of the country. Thus during Amani's era, Islamic symbols were openly used for political mileage as evident in the 2010 referendum on government of national unity. The main aim of the referendum was to bring to an end political hostility by allowing the formation of a government of national unity.²⁶⁵

In the campaigns, both politicians and religious leaders frequently appealed to Islamic symbols to endear themselves as champions of the Islamic faith. Leaflets were distributed across the country with clear message, calling upon the Zanzibaris: "*Shikamaneni na dini ya ALLAH nyote wala musifarikiane* (And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah [stretches out for you], and be not divided among yourselves). This counsel as indicated in the political banner is a clear reference of the

²⁶³ Roman Loimeier. 2007. *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan NY, p. 149; Levtzion, and Pouwels, op.cit., p. 364.

²⁶⁴ Onyango and Nassali, op.cit., p.53.

²⁶⁵ Bakari and Makulilo, op.cit., p. 210.

Quranic verse, 3:103. Another slogan was, “*Piga ‘NDIYO’ kwa maslahi ya waislamu wa Zanzibar*” (Vote *YES* for the benefit of Zanzibar Muslims).²⁶⁶

Moreover, the Zanzibar Imams’ Association of (JUMAZA) conducted a prayer rally on 30 July 2010 with the purpose of seeking God’s favour to enable people realize the importance of forming the government of national unity. Consequently, the religious leaders called upon Muslims to put aside their political differences and vote ‘Yes’ for the sake of God.²⁶⁷ Accordingly, the referendum of July 2010 showed that the Zanzibaris had embraced a government of national unity (GNU) by 66.2 percent of voters against 33.6% percentage of those who rejected.²⁶⁸ Following his successful effort of uniting Zanzibaris regardless of their political and regional differences, Amani is highly respected by most Muslims in the country.

The GNU between two rival parties of CCM and CUF continued to the era of Ali Mohamed Shein (2010-2015). His presidency saw severe steps taken against the Uamsho leadership and their sympathizers due to the seemingly extremist and radical direction the movement was taking. Though Uamsho supported the creation of the GNU, it persistently advocated for the secession of Zanzibar from the unification with mainland Tanzania. On its part, the government used all the necessary machinery availed to it to scatter any criticism of the unification, a move that fortified the resolve to oppose the union from a cross section of the citizens.²⁶⁹

According to Deus Kibamba, the leader of the Tanzanian constitutional forum, *Jukwaa la Katiba*, apart from Uamsho becoming a venue for that had given the

²⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 210.

²⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 210.

²⁶⁸ Zanzibar. 2010. “Constitutional Referendum Results.” Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa

²⁶⁹ Danja Bergmann. 2013. “Threatened Paradise: Growing Religious and Political Violence on Zanzibar.” Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. p. 4.

Zanzibaris a voice in the constitutional reform process, it had also turned into a political machination employed to fill certain political ambitions, hence could no longer be seen as a purely religious movement. The public rallies organized by the movement, particularly in late 2011 and early 2012, became popular to a section of Muslims. Besides advancing for the establishment of independent state of Zanzibar, the leadership of the organization awkwardly suggested for separate identifiable dress code for ‘foreigners’ and severe restrictions in the consumption of alcohol.²⁷⁰

Allegedly, due to security concerns, several leaders of the organizations were arrested and arraigned before the court of law. Some of the leaders arrested and charged included *Sheikh* Msellem Ally Msellem (Uamsho’s Amir), *Sheikh* Farid Hadi Ahmed (Imams Association’s Amir), *Sheikh* Azzan Khalid Hamad (Uamsho’s Deputy Amir), and *Sheikh* Abdullah Said (Uamsho’s Secretary). Others were *Sheikh* Mussa Juma Issa, *Sheikh* Suleiman Juma Suleiman, *Sheikh* Khamis Ali Suleiman, *Sheikh* Ghalib Ahmad, *Sheikh* Hassan Bakar Suleiman, and *Sheikh* Fikirini.²⁷¹ The clerics were charged for incitement, and instigating disobedience in various parts of the country, contrary to sections 45 (1) (a) and (b), and 74 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, charges that they all denied.²⁷²

3.6 Conclusion

The chapter has explored the development of Islam in the pre-colonial period followed by the politics of race and class entrenched by the British policy of divide and rule. Significant also, the chapter has addressed the politics of unification and how it could be linked for instigating secession tendencies among sections of Muslims

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁷¹ Issa Yussuf. 2012. “Two Muslim Clerics Arrested in Isles.” *Daily News*, December 30.

in the country. Islam has a long tenure in the country even before the introduction of the Omani-Arab overlords in Zanzibar, hence explaining why the religion has influenced the people's culture and worldview, particularly on political matters.

Racial antagonism that characterized the history of Zanzibar was evident during the politics of nationalism where the Zanzibaris formed various political parties but along racial and ethnic lines as demonstrated with the cases of ASP, ZNP, ZPPP, and Umma party. In the ensuing political competition, ZNP and ZPPP, ultimately, formed the internal self-government in 1963. However, in 1964, an uprising overthrew the coalition government of ZNP and ZPPP that affected the minority communities of the Arabs and Asians accused of dominating the politics and economy of the country. Following the revolution, two sovereign states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar decided to enter into a unification to form the United Republic of Tanzania.

It is analysed in the chapter that some of the merits attributed to the unification of Tanzania including being Tanzania an island of peace and the ability of reinforcing the social and cultural relation existed even before the union. It enabled people from each side of the union to secure employment as well as increasing of trade activities. In addition, the union has successfully lived longer than other unions in Africa

Despite the benefits emanating from the unification, the union has been criticised for undermining the autonomy of Zanzibar. Of concern to a section of Zanzibaris is the expansion of union matters from the original eleven ones along with the issue of union ratification especially in the side of Zanzibar. This development has created a common platform for most Zanzibaris to demand for the revocation of the unification treaty, the Uamsho Movement included.

Moreover, the analysis showed that Zanzibar has passed through different leaderships since the occurrence of 1964 revolution. Abeid Amani Karume was the first president who is explained to play a good role to develop Islamic education as well as his successor Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi. It was followed by a period of Ali Hassan Mwinyi who served his Zanzibar presidency for only a year is said to influence the major flowing of mainlanders to Zanzibar; however, he is believed to build a conducive environment for economic growth and Islamic accomplishments. Idrisa Abdul Wakil in his tenure beheld a Muslim demonstration where by at least two Muslims were shot dead however, Zanzibaris saw Salmin Amour Juma's pilot of joining Zanzibar to the Organisation of Islamic conference (OIC), the decision, which was denied by the union government.

Additionally, the chapter revealed that a son of the first president of Zanzibar Amani Abeid Amani succeeded to join Zanzibaris by conducting the referendum, which enabled the construction of the new constitutional sections towards the formation of the Government of the National Unity (GNU). Hence, Ali Mohamed Shein led the new form of government, which was vividly supported by most Zanzibaris including Uamsho sympathizers; however, it witnessed a number of Uamsho public rallies that lasted with the arresting of a quantity of clerics from the Islamist groups including Uamsho.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GENESIS OF UAMSHO MOVEMENT: IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION AND POLITICAL AGENDA

4.1 Introduction

Uamsho has been in operation for thirteen years since its inception and recognition by the state (2001 – 2014). The association has succeeded to open branches in various parts of the country thereby making it visible. The association was founded on a foundation that finds basis in Islamic ideology where its main agenda is to make Zanzibar an Islamic state applying Islamic laws to the fullest.²⁷³ Initially, in the 1990s, Uamsho began as an NGO offering public lectures on Islam that dealt with spiritual and social concerns of the people in Zanzibar. The organization believed that it was fulfilling the Quranic commandment of inviting people into doing good and forbidding evil (*amr bil ma'ruf wa nahyi anil munkar*).²⁷⁴

Gradually, this earliest focus of the organization changed in early 2000 under the leadership of sheikh Msellem bin Ali and began engaging on political and economic issues that were dear to their supporters. As a forum for Muslim activities, the movement began organizing rallies opposing certain government regulations, including state permission for any religious meetings. Their opposition led to confrontations between the security agents and sympathizers of the movement.²⁷⁵ Therefore, the chapter examines the formation, structure, and activities of the association.

²⁷³ Interview with *Amir* Msellem bin Ali, Magogoni, Zanzibar, 11/03/2014.

²⁷⁴ Quran, 3:104.

²⁷⁵ Ioannis Gatsiounis. 2012. "After Al-Shabaab", *Current Trends In Islamist Ideology*, Washington: Hudson Institute Vol. 14, p.82.

4.2 Uamsho's Organizational Structure and Initial Focus

According to the constitution of Uamsho, 'awakening', the association holds the name *Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislamu* (JUMIKI) translated: The Association for Islamic Awakening and Public Lectures). It is a religious association founded in the early 1990s with the aims of mobilizing and propagating Islam in Zanzibar.²⁷⁶ Administratively, the organization has three main organs namely, the General Assembly, the Board of Trustees, and the Executive Committee.²⁷⁷ The General Assembly is the superior organ of the movement consisting of all members of Uamsho. Chaired by the *amir* (chairperson) of the association, the General Assembly is normally held at least once a year to choose the *amir* and his deputy, the treasurer, members of the board of trustees and the executive committee, to discuss the report presented by the executive committee, and to pass the budget, among other issues.²⁷⁸ The second administrative organ is the Board of Trustees formed by around 5 - 10 members who meet four times a year. Their responsibility among others is to supervise the activities and properties of the organization, not excluding interpreting the various sections of the constitution of the association.²⁷⁹

The last administrative organ is the Executive Committee that consists of ten delegates including the *amir*, the general secretary, and the treasurer. The committee, which meets once a month under the leadership of the *Amir* is responsible for the organization's daily activities. More so, it also makes rules and regulations for the association; and implements programs to ensure that the laid out objectives of the movement are achieved.²⁸⁰ Within the organization's hierarchy, the *amir* is the

²⁷⁶Uamsho Constitution, P. 2.

²⁷⁷ Ibid , P. 5.

²⁷⁸Ibid, P. 5.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, P. 6.

²⁸⁰ Uamsho Constitution, (2009), P. 7.

chairperson and the top leader of the organisation elected by votes of the General Assembly.²⁸¹ For one to be elected as an *Amir*, should be a practising Muslim with a good mastery of Quran and Hadith of the Prophet as well as not less than forty years of age.²⁸²

The organization's financial sources include admission fees, member contributions, donations, and grants from both local and international donors. However, the informants were reluctant to clarify the amount and the mention the nature of grants the organization receives from the donors. In addition to donations, the association also receives income through the selling of religious sermons recorded in cassettes, compact discs (CDs), and digital video discs (DVDs), as well as ephemeral booklets of lectures delivered by *sheikhs* associated with the movement.²⁸³ The collected funds assist in meeting the various running costs of the association, in addition to paying facilitation allowance for the officials, release bond for those arrested by the state, and supporting the families of Umasho leaders in custody.²⁸⁴

In terms of membership, every Muslim who has attained the age of eighteen irrespective of sect qualifies to be a member thereby giving them the right to participate in all the activities of the organization. For those interested the first step is to fill in an application form for Uamsho membership followed by payment of admission and subsequent monthly fees. Once one becomes a bona fide member, he is allowed to participate in all the functions organised by the association, including elections to either elect or be elected as an official.²⁸⁵ Normally, each application form

²⁸¹ Ibid, p. 8.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ibid. p.12.

²⁸⁴ Sheikh Fikirini clarified on the association's expenses while requesting the people to contribute money at Mwanakwerekwe rally on 9/4/2012.

²⁸⁵ Uamsho Constitution, p. 4.

costs one thousand Tanzania shillings (TSH 1,000/-), while a monthly contribution of five hundred shillings deserves to every member of the group.

Since its inception, the movement has been striving to establish cordial working relation with diverse people, associations, along with both government and private institutions across the divide. This desire is clearly outline in constitution of organization, positing:

AIMP (Association of Islamic Mobilisation and Propagation) will introduce and develop good relationship with individual people, government institutions, associations, companies, and any other private institutions operating from inside or outside the country regarding that they have the goals relating to the association.²⁸⁶

Conspicuously, there seem to be mutual relation between the Uamsho leadership and *Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar – (JUMAZA) – Zanzibar Imams Association*. This could be evident with either JUMAZA or Uamsho leadership attending each other's rallies.²⁸⁷

The initial founders of the organization, *Sheikh Msellem Ali, Sheikh Azzan Khalid, Sheikh Fikirini and Sheikh Mussa Juma* among others, saw the need to form an organization that would strive into uniting Muslims to confront the alleged run away 'evil' and destruction of values in the society. They were concerned that the society has plunged into immorality like adultery, deceitful dressing especially among women, and social discriminations among others. It is against this background that Uamsho was established and tasked with the responsibility of reviving Islam in the Zanzibari society.²⁸⁸ The Islamic principles outlined in the Quran and *Hadith* of the Prophet guided the aspiration of the movement, particularly chapter 14 verse 1:

²⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 12

²⁸⁷ An interview with commander Mkaddam, Mwembe Madema, Zanzibar, 18/08/2014.

²⁸⁸ UAMSHO Constitution, , p. 2.

A. L. R. A Book which We have revealed unto thee, in order that thou mightest lead mankind out of the depths of darkness into light - by the leave of their Lord - to the Way of (Him) the Exalted in power, worthy of all praise!²⁸⁹

This above verse, in their interpretation, confirms that the purpose of God of sending messengers (prophets) was to lead humankind out of darkness into light. Consequently, the Uamsho leadership view their activities as that of revitalizing the faith of the Muslims in the country by providing appropriate religious guidance.²⁹⁰

According to the Uamsho constitution, the association has numerous objectives, which addresses the social, cultural, and religious interests of the Muslims in Zanzibar as shown below:²⁹¹

- a) To bring about love, unity, and development among Muslim believers
- b) To maintain the respect, heritage, and history of Islam
- c) To mobilize Muslims to cope with their Islamic affairs including education, culture, and the prosperity of Islam
- d) To participate in any superior and constructive event in improving and spreading of Islam
- e) To protect and support aspects of human rights, which are recognized by Islam along with aiding a Muslim when he is in distress
- f) To protect and support the Islamic ethics and culture
- g) To assist in resolving the problems emerging in society including disputes and disasters, along with combating the different calamities and diseases such AIDS, drug abuse, among others.

²⁸⁹Quran, 14:1.

²⁹⁰ Interview with Sheikh Msellem Ali Magogoni, Zanzibar, 11/03/2014.

²⁹¹ Uamsho Constitution, p. 2.

In addition, the organization also desires at returning Zanzibar to being a centre of Islamic learning and society that applies Islamic law, an objective that can only be realized attaining complete autonomy from the unification.²⁹² As a result, the organization's leadership has emphasized on this additional objective during their public sermons. The association has widely succeeded in funnelling social and political tensions into support for political Islam.²⁹³ In April 19, 2004, the association proclaimed 'victory' when the Zanzibar government passed a law outlawing homosexuality in the country. A severe penalty would be provided to anyone contravening the law.²⁹⁴ The Zanzibar Penal Code of 1934, as amended in 2004, provides as follows:

Any person who:

- (a) enter[s] or arrange[s] a union, whether amounting to marriage or not, of the person of the same sex;
 - (b) celebrate[s] a union with another person of the same sex, whether amounting to marriage or not; [or]
 - (c) lives as husband and wife [with] another person of the same sex;
- shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.²⁹⁵

More so, Uamsho activists view the operation of bars in Zanzibar as an affront to Islamic values. Through their efforts, the organization has encouraged the local Muslims to seek legal redress to censure the opening of bars in their areas. This approach has been successful in the western district of the country where around fourteen bars in 2011 were denied license to operate.²⁹⁶

The present *Amir* of the Uamsho movement, *Sheikh* Msellem Ali Msellem, is regarded to be among the radical clerics in Zanzibar due to his persistent advocacy for

²⁹² Marie-Aude Fouéré. 2012. "Zanzibar Independent in 2015? Constitutional Revision, Politicized Islam and Separatist Claims." Nairobi: *French Institute for Research in Africa*, Volume X n° 2, p. 4.

²⁹³ Bergmann, op.cit.. p. 3.

²⁹⁴ Moshe Terdman. 2006. *Factors Facilitating the Rise of Radical Islamism and Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, p. 10.

²⁹⁵ Zanzibar Penal Decree, Section 158, Act No. 6 of 2004

²⁹⁶ Azzan Khalid addressing a rally at Bububu, Zanzibar, 06/04/2012.

the establishment of an Islamic state in Zanzibar. In his assessment, the present government of Zanzibar is non-Islamic state since it does not recognize and apply the Islamic law in its statutes.²⁹⁷ Due to his supposedly radical stance on various issues, the security agents of the state have several times arrested Msellem.²⁹⁸ As a strong advocate of the interaction of religion and politics, while quoting the Quranic verses 2:246 – 249 he said:

Prophet Moses was a political leader of his society that had military force and a clear international relation. As prophet of God, he was sent to meet the political leader – Pharaoh of Egypt. Despite this clear interaction of religion and politics, our leaders today warn not to mix the two thereby running counter to the practice of Moses. This shows that religion is broader and all encompassing, including politics. Despite loving our religion, as Muslims we have been compelled not to follow it. As religious leaders continuing the prophetic work in society, we are confronted with lack of freedom and marginalization. There is need to liberate our country.²⁹⁹

Clearly, *Sheikh* Msellem seem to support the idea that in Islam, religion and politics are inseparable, and as a result of that religion should assertively control the politics of the country, a view supported by other leaders of the movement. Despite being articulating in political matters, the movement does not have official working relation with any political party in the country, be it the ruling party or the opposition.³⁰⁰

4.3 Secession, Self-Autonomy and Establishment of an Islamic State in Zanzibar

Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous country, which since its amalgamation with the Tanganyika lost its independence to decide on its own affairs. During the Tanzanian Constitutional Review process held in 2011, a number of Tanzanians wanted the issue of unification revised.³⁰¹ Through various platforms, including the opposition parties,

²⁹⁷ Interview with sheikh Msellem bin Ali Msellem, Chairman UAMSHO Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/03/2014.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ *Sheikh* Msellem bin Ali Msellem, addressing a rally at Mfenesini Zanzibar in 15/4/2012.

³⁰⁰ Uamsho Constitution, p. 5.

³⁰¹ Gatsiounis, op.cit. , p. 82.

people called for a union that would allow both Tanganyika and Zanzibar to have their own governments, a view supported by Uamsho leaders and sympathizers. Within the Uamsho fraternity, there is strong conviction that Zanzibar has lost its political autonomy to mainland Tanzania giving an impression that the country is under the overlord of Tanganyika.³⁰² The lack of full autonomy sentiments are clearly expressed by *Sheikh* Suleiman Juma Suleiman positing: “We want a country that possesses its own authority thereby able to make decisions on national and international affairs.”³⁰³

This political dominance by mainland Tanzania is exemplified by section 54 of the 1977 Tanzania Constitution, which presents the Zanzibar’s President within the unification in the following hierarchical order: the President of Tanzania, the Vice President of Tanzania, the Prime Minister of Tanzania, the President of Zanzibar, and all Ministers of the union government.³⁰⁴ According to Uamsho leaders, such arrangement creates the notion that the President of Zanzibar is an insignificant office confined to only internal matters within Zanzibar. *Sheikh* Msellem expressly shares these views, lamenting:

Now we have no country, it is already taken; for the sake of our political leaders, we have insisted that the special honour and status of our president is no longer there; there is need for changes (reforms) to return the country’s eminence. Members of Parliament and ministers seem to have a more respectable position than the president. .³⁰⁵

The highest political position in Tanzania is the President who serves as the head of state, government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.³⁰⁶ This is followed by the position of the Vice president who serves as the principal assistant to

³⁰² *Sheikh* Suleiman Juma Suleiman, addressing Uamsho rally at Makunduchi, 15/4/2012.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ Tanzania Constitution, 1977:36.

³⁰⁵ *Sheikh* Msellem bin Ali Msellem, addressing Uamsho rally at Makunduchi, 15/4/2012.

³⁰⁶ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, sect 33, p. 23.

the president in respect of all matters concerning union's administration.³⁰⁷ The next office is that of the Prime Minister who holds the authority over the control, supervision and execution of the day-to-day functions and affairs of the union's government. Thus, he works as the leader of government business in the national assembly.³⁰⁸ But ironically, the jurisdiction of the President of Zanzibar is limited to the affairs concerning the islands of Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba only, while the other three officials named above have mandates that covers both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. This scenario led Khalid Gwiji, Uamsho's lawyer to suggest that:

The enacted union's law should be in harmony with those stipulated in the Zanzibar's constitution. In reality, there is no unification because it did not incorporate the views of the people of Zanzibar through the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. Instead, we want neither the union nor the constitution, but we want referendum to free ourselves and secure our autonomy. We want our own education, our currency, our police, our seat in the United Nations; we also want our republic, the People's Republic of Zanzibar.³⁰⁹

While commenting on the union, an Uamsho activist Salum Sharif Ali lamented that, the problem is not the unification, but the arrangement of the two forms of government that appear to be detrimental to the aspiration of the Zanzibaris. To him, the only option available is to quit the union for Zanzibar to gain its autonomy, a view unanimously reiterated by my respondents.

Though not a political party, the leaders of the association have not been shy in charting the political cause of the Muslims in the country, despite the government's opposition. According to *Sheikh* Msellem, the group finds it relevant to speak on political matters given that Islam addresses all facets of life.³¹⁰ The government's high handedness had not stopped the movement's officials of being critical of the state

³⁰⁷ Ibid, sect 47, p 32.

³⁰⁸ Ibid, sect 52, p 35.

³⁰⁹ Said Gwiji, addressing Uamsho rally, Bububu Zanzibar in 6/4/12.

³¹⁰ Interview with Sheikh Msellem bin Ali at Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/03/2014.

through supporting the opposition's, Civic United Front (CUF), demand for secession and restoration of the historic status of Zanzibar as an autonomous state.³¹¹ Some of the CUF legislators such as Ismail Jussa (Mji mkongwe), and Omar Ali Shehe (Chake-chake) as well as the popular Uamsho group advocated for an economic union similar to that of Europe, which will politically allow Zanzibar to become fully independent. According to CUF leadership, the current union set up denies the Isles certain rights thereby insisting that reforms are inevitable to strengthen the union and to give both the Zanzibaris and the Tanganyikans equal opportunities.³¹² Clearly, the issue of the union appears to be a common front for both CUF politicians and Uamsho activists.

Even though both CUF and Uamsho seem to advocate for political reforms in the country, the later has consistently demanded for reforms that will see Zanzibar transforming into an Islamic state with full application of *sharia*. This raises the question: does the association have a clear Islamist agenda? The desire of establishing an Islamic state is strongly articulated by the Uamsho leadership, claiming that *sharia* is the foundation of all laws since it is based on God's law, which in their opinion is the only way that would guarantee the Zanzibaris a respectable life. Arguably, to them the best solution for the problems ailing Zanzibar is the implementation of Islamic law.³¹³ According to the organization's constitution is the desire of protecting and supporting the Islamic way of life throughout the country.³¹⁴ And to realize this goal,

Faridi Hadi, an official of the organization opines:

God willing, a day will come that He will bestow us victory; the perpetrators of evil have seen our spirit, it is indeed high. Muslims are ready to die to defend their religion and their land. Their banner

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Salma Said, "Partisan Politics 'Impeding Process'" *The Citizen: Tanzania, Sunday, August 19, 2012*.

³¹³ Gatsiounis, op.cit., p. 82.

³¹⁴ Uamsho Constitution, p. 2, 3.

is “There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is His Messenger.” We Muslims in our unity and our faith will prevail.³¹⁵

The movement’s aspiration is reckoned by some of their sympathizers as demonstrated by the response of Amina Salim Khalfan who during the interview recited the following Quranic edict to make her point:

Allah has promised, to those among you who believe and work righteous deeds, that He will, of a surety, grant them in the land, inheritance (of power), as He granted it to those before them; that He will establish in authority their religion - the one which He has chosen for them; and that He will change (their state), after the fearing which they (lived), to one of security and peace: They will worship Me (alone) and not associate aught with Me. If any do reject Faith after this, they are rebellious and wicked.³¹⁶

According to respondent, the above verse is God’s promise to Muslims that He would grant them political power if they strongly believe in Him and follow His commandments as outlined in the Islamic faith. It is this ‘re-Islamization’ of the Zanzibari society that forms the basis of the Uamsho struggle. Such Muslims’ political consciousness is attributed to the efforts of Uamsho’s persistent articulation of the community’s grievances.

Among the issues that have made the Zanzibaris to be disillusioned with the unification is the failure of Zanzibar to join the international bodies like the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the popular Federation of the International Football Association (FIFA) among others. Though earlier the government of Zanzibar had OIC, the decision was rescinded after strong opposition that insisted that it was unconstitutional for Zanzibar to do so since Tanzania is a secular state. After much hesitation, the Zanzibar government opted to leave the OIC

³¹⁵ Sheikh Farid Hadi, addressing UAMSHO rally, Pwani Mchangani, Zanzibar, 8/4/2012.

³¹⁶ Quran, 24:55.

in August 1993 to avoid a constitutional crisis.³¹⁷ According to the Tanzania Constitution of 1977, Zanzibar has no sovereign power, stipulating:

Tanzania is one State and is a sovereign United Republic. The territory of the United Republic consists of the whole of the area of mainland Tanzania and the whole of the area of Tanzania Zanzibar, and includes the territorial waters.³¹⁸

Arguably, it is possible that due to such control, another pro-secession supporter, Mussa Juma, Uamsho clerk, expresses what could be summed as majority view concerning the union, complaining:

...we are so much tired with the union, now, we do not want it any more, and we want our independent country. The only thing we want is to have power of decision over our country of Zanzibar, lest it be like a dump for everyone to come to do whatever he wants. Zanzibar should have its own security arrangement. We do not want the union, 48 years of the union are sufficient; just we wish to be left to breathe.³¹⁹

According to the leaders of the movement, the Tanzanian leadership has violated the tenets of the unification and as a result, there is no point for Zanzibaris to continue remaining in the union since even the Quran supports the peoples' call for secession and annihilation of any obstacle on their society.³²⁰ Despite the fact the unification is between two sovereign states hence expected to share all the accruing privileges equally, most Zanzibaris are concerned that since the amalgamation there is no single person from the island who has occupied the highest position in the police, armed forces and even the speaker of the Tanzania parliament.³²¹

The mission of the movement is to 'liberate' the Zanzibari Muslims from the current political arrangement, which is secular oriented and thereby deemed inimical to their faith. Consequently, the organization is to replace the current political system with an

³¹⁷ Lodhi, *op.cit.* p. 92.

³¹⁸ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, Chapter 1, sections 1, 2.

³¹⁹ Mussa Juma, addressing Uamsho rally, Jangombe Zanzibar, 7/4/2012.

³²⁰ Uamsho public lecture delivered by Sheikh Khalfan at Mwanakwerekwe ground on 9/4/2012.

³²¹ Sheikh Abdurrahman Salum, addressing Uamsho rally, Mwanakwerekwe Zanzibar, 10/3/12.

Islamic one governed by sharia, a view supported by other Islamist groups in the country such as the *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*, which likewise aims at restoring the Caliphate nonetheless, rejects the use of violence to bring about political change. Despite the denial of violence, it is illegal in nearly every Muslim country with the exceptions of Malaysia, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Yemen among others.³²²

Taqiuddin Al-Nabhani, who was educated in Egypt and served as a religious court judge in Palestine, founded *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* in 1953 as a political organization in Jordan. He developed draft constitution for the caliphate. Since then, it has spread to more than 50 countries, and has a membership estimated to be about one million". Despite being banned by some governments, it is active in Western countries, including England. The group members normally meet in small private study circles; however, they engage with the media and organize rallies and conferences in countries where the group is not prohibited.³²³ *Hizbu-Ut-Tahrir* is seen to have established its activities in East Africa particularly in Kenya and Tanzania. Hence, both Uamsho and *Hizbu-Ut-Tahrir* have got the same general objective – establishment of the Islamic state.

However, the difference between the two organizations is that, *Huzb-ut-Tahrir* holds that the establishment of an Islamic state and subsequent application of the Islamic law is a global effort of all Muslims rather than a nationalist aspiration. As a result, their opponent faulted them for failing to make this cause a global agenda, thereby denouncing their efforts not being a religious one.³²⁴

³²² Karagiannis, Emmanuel, 2010. Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb- Ut-Tahrir

³²³ "Question and Answers" BBC News. 10 August 2007.

³²⁴ Interview with Masoud Msellem, deputy media representative of Hizb-ut-tahrir East Africa, Magogoni Zanzibar, 23/02/2014.

There is concern among sections of Muslims that the ‘Islamic’ ethics and values are fast deteriorating in the country as evident with the opening of numerous alcohol bars in virtually every part of the country, and the increasing number of women dressed in a ‘provocating’ way. The immodesty dressing by women is attributed to the proliferation of the Western culture to the Zanzibari society.³²⁵ This development is linked to the fact that Zanzibar adopted a non-Islamic political system whose genesis is the unification between Zanzibar and Tanganyika. Many people from mainland Tanzania transfer to the islands for different purposes most of them are Christians. Without tangible evidence and facts, some Muslims, mostly sympathizers of Uamsho, seem to blame on non-Muslims, majority from mainland Tanzania and international tourists, for the supposed deterioration of ‘Islamic’ values.³²⁶ In their judgment, the various problems confronting the society are due to lack of implementation of Islamic laws. Moreover, even without demonstrating with a clear blue print, sharia is proposed to be the magical solution to all these challenges.³²⁷

There is a sense of self-pride in the articulation for autonomy, asserting the region was chosen by the *Sultan* Said bin Sultan (1832) to be his headquarters out of the entire East African coastal city-states.³²⁸ Arguably, the selection of Zanzibar signified the importance of the country within the region. To the supporters of secession, during the pre-colonial period Zanzibar was characterized with a high economic prosperity and an existing civilization. On this assertion, one Uamsho official, Bashir Hussein romanticized:

³²⁵Turner, op.cit.pp. 7, 8.

³²⁶Bergmann, op.cit,p. 4.

³²⁷ Interview with *Sheikh* Salum Sharif, Uamsho activist, Mwanakwerekwe – Zanzibar, 19/02/2014; Kidawa Hassan, and Abdallah Rashid, Msumbiji Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.

³²⁸ Bang, Anne. 2005. *Textual Sources on an Islamic African Past: Arabic Material in Zanzibar’s National Archives*, London: Rutledge Curzon.

The earlier foreigners used to call the isles *Zeinj bar* because of the beauty its surroundings and the sincerity of its people. People from different places as far as Mecca, Yemen and India came to Zanzibar seeking financial assistance. During that time, Zanzibar was highly advanced as opposed to the present situation. It was a *Daulat Zeinjibar*, which was able assist the present rich nations. It was a headquarters of the *Daulat Zeinjibar*, which extended to such regions like Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and Mombasa. As a centre of the Islamic knowledge, it came to be known as the sub-Mecca. Zanzibar was the first country to introduce electricity, telephone, and television in the entire East African coast region. It was the colonial administration that divided the dominion, leaving the *Daulat* with only the isles of Unguja and Pemba. Eventually, things became worse after the creation of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar.³²⁹

It is this nostalgia for a glorified past that the officials of the movement are championing to re-create an era of Muslims' supremacy and prestige. There is no doubt that the appearance of Uamsho in the political scene is viewed as playing a 'prophetic' role of saving Zanzibar from the wrath of God for having gone astray.³³⁰

Allegedly, according to some Uamsho officials, the union was designed to last for a period of ten years – 1964 to 1974. However, there is no proof to support this claim. Apparently, among the agenda of Uamsho is to pressurize both governments to revise union's articles to ensure that there are no ambiguities leading to one party being discriminated. Its leadership, categorically, preferred a unification that safeguards the rights of all citizens irrespective of their background as well as calling upon a referendum in order to give the Zanzibaris a chance to decide on the unification with Tanganyika.

³²⁹ *Sheikh* Bashir Hussein, addressing Uamsho rally, Mwanakwerekwe, 10/3/2012.

³³⁰ Interview with Salum Sharif Ali, Uamsho activist, Madrasatul-tarbiatul-Islamiyyat, Mwanakwerekwe – Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.

4.4 Uamsho's Political Approach: Violent and Radical Stance

In an attempt to realize its political goal and becoming relevant in the country, Uamsho activists and sympathizers have sometimes embraced violence as a political tool. Until the appearance of Uamsho on the political scene, the country's Muslims hardly engaged in violent political opposition indicating that they had accepted the secular model of Zanzibar's politics. With the emergence of Uamsho, the country has witnessed violent conflicts between the supporters of the movement and security agents of the State, leading to widespread destruction of property, mass arrests and street fighting. During the May 2012 'peace march', it acquired a sectarian dimension that saw the burning and destruction of about three churches in the country.³³¹ This raises the question: why are the country's Christians all of sudden the target of Uamsho's backlash?

Due the silence of the Uamsho leadership on the churches' attacks, it confirmed the country's police theory that the leaders of the movement supported the shameless onslaughts.³³² The seemingly 'moderate' Muslims condemned the violence maintaining it is wrong to attack places of worship. In their views, Islam does not advocate for the destruction of places of worship of non-Muslims, but provides freedom of worship and religious affiliation (see Quran 2: 256, 109:1-6). However, there is no doubt that the churches' attacks had a calculated agenda of expelling the Christians from Zanzibar bringing to forth the issue of the Christian-Muslim relation in the country.

In October 2012, *Sheikh* Farid Hadi Ahmed disappeared for three days under mysterious circumstances, and due to existing mistrust between Uamsho's supporters

³³¹Bergmann, op.cit., p. 4.

³³²Munir Zakaria. 2012. "Zanzibar separatist group leaders charged with inciting violence." *Reuter*, Oct. 22.

and government security agents; the former accused the police of his disappearance. However, on the part, the police maintained that the alleged abduction was stage managed by the organization with the intention to incite the emotions of their supporters thereby instigate them to the path of unrest and turmoil. The resultant violent protests took three days before the police fiercely quelled them.³³³ Following the violence, several officials of the association were arrested and charged with destruction of property, incitement, conspiracy to felony, and the usage of abusive language against government officials.³³⁴ However, due to the difficulties of proving the cases against them, the arrested leaders were ultimately set free,³³⁵ but cautioned to abide by the law of the state, and instead advised to use the influence as leaders promote the unity among the people.³³⁶

Due to the movement's radical stance on a number of issues and the way the government has responded to such overtures, usually with violence, the government declared Uamsho movement to have links with other jihadi Islamist groups such as the al-Shabab of Somalia, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and the Boko Haram of Nigeria. Intelligence reports have indicated that the movement is taping strength from other jihadi Islamist groups scattered across Africa.³³⁷ Officials of the movement have, nevertheless, rejected this view as mere propaganda intended to proscribe the organization.³³⁸

Despite the association presenting itself as the umbrella body of Muslim organizations in the country, this has not stopped other Islamic association from faulting its political

³³³ Bergmann, *op.cit.* p. 4.

³³⁴ Yussuf Issa, "Zanzibar: Uamsho leaders to remain in police custody", *Tanzania Daily News* 3/1/2013.

³³⁵ Interview with Khamis Ramadhan Abdallah, Regional Magistrate, High Court Zanzibar, 13/8/2014.

³³⁶ Interview with the State Attorney Suleiman Massoud Makame, High Court Zanzibar, 13/8/2014.

³³⁷ Bergmann, *op.cit.* p. 5.

³³⁸ Interview with Sheikh Msellem bin Ali Msellem, Chairman Uamsho, Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/03/2014..

approach.³³⁹ There are some Islamic organizations in the country associated with moderate Muslims, which have denounced the insistence of the movement's mixing of religion and politics. In fact, another Islamist group, *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*, has been accusing Uamsho of failing to advance for the global establishment of an Islamic state, and instead focuses on the national agenda. Because of this approach by Uamsho movement, their rival, *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*, insinuate that Uamsho does not have a religious agenda and should, therefore, not be regarded as an Islamic body.³⁴⁰ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Uamsho has presented a religious framed Muslim opposition to the Zanzibar state thereby the appearance of political Islam in the country's political scene. The lukewarm and relatively non-violent approach of Zanzibari Muslims' approach to politics was radically changed with the emergence of Uamsho movement.

4.5 Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the genesis of Uamsho organization, exploring its ideological and social foundations. Before transforming into a political lobby movement, the association was founded with the aim of propagating Islam in the country. The secession agenda of the movement also examined in this chapter highlighted emanating tension clear explained by the conflict theory used in this study. The campaign for secession highlights the conflict between Uamsho sympathizers and the state. The ensuing confrontation as a result of the campaign supports the argument by Bartos and Wehr that conflict is bound to erupt when there are opposing camps with different goals.³⁴¹ It is evident that the goal of the association was to secede from

³³⁹Interviews with Sheikh Issa Haji Hassan, Mwanakwerekwe Zanzibar, 20/2/14; Msellem bin Ali Msellem, Magogoni Zanzibar, 13/3/14.

³⁴⁰ Interview with Massoud Msellem, Deputy Media Representatives of Hizb-ut-tahrir, Zanzibar, 23/2/14.

³⁴¹Bartos and Wehr, op.cit., p13.

mainland to form a full autonomous country of Zanzibar, while that of the state was to maintain the prevailing unification that renders Zanzibar a semi-autonomous country. These differences created tension and conflict between the protagonists as illustrated in this chapter.

Arguably, the emergence of Uamsho movement was attributed partly to lack of a formidable opposition party in Zanzibar due to the existence of the Government of National Unity, which was built up with both parties – CCM and CUF. Apart from being warned, the Uamsho group went on advocating for its agenda based on the strong Islamic faith to the extent that it holds the name ‘extremist fundamentalist group’.

According to Bartos and Wehr, “The colonial policies of colonialism had ensured that civil conflict would occur in these new states. The European powers had carved up their colonial territories with little regard for the African political arrangements in place. Colonial boundaries often split ethnic groups in two, creating vulnerable minorities.”³⁴² Arguably, a section of Muslims in Zanzibar have criticized their unification with the mainland, a project that they believe has its genesis in the colonial era. Since before the 1964 union with Tanganyika, they were an independent state, they aspired to be autonomous with political sovereignty to decide both internal and external affairs for their people.

The secession agenda also reveals the tension and conflict felt by a minority group who feared domination by majority. Norman R. Yetman argues that, “the crucial feature of the minority’s status is the inferior social position in which its interests are

³⁴²Ibid, p5.

not effectively represented.”³⁴³ Arguably, within Tanzania’s political arrangement, the Zanzibar Muslims feel that they are destined to be under non-Muslim majority rule. Because of their inferior numerical strength of about 3% of the population of Tanzania, some Muslims in the country are suspicious that their interests would not be well catered in the unification with mainland Tanzania. This prompted them to seek secession as the best option for their different groups.

However, Uamsho’s demand for the transformation of the political system from secular to an Islamic one is unrealistic in a plural society. Studies have shown that it is only through secular political approach that the interests of the various members of a society are guaranteed and protected.³⁴⁴ There is no doubt that the association has become popular to a section of Zanzibaris because of its articulation of issues dear to them. Gradually, the association is tacitly winning the sympathy of politicians across the divide due to its unequivocal advocacy for Zanzibar’s autonomy.³⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, Uamsho has evolved from a religious charity institution to an Islamic political movement. Though, viewed as a minority group by some analysts, the movement is steady growing in influence, especially among disenfranchised and jobless youths.³⁴⁶

³⁴³Norman R. Yetman. 1971. *Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity in American Life*. Boston: Allyn Bacon Inc, p. 1.

³⁴⁴ Interview with Mkadam Khamis Mkadam, Regional Police Commander (RPC) - Urban West, Madema Zanzibar, 18/08/2014.

³⁴⁵ Bergmann, op.cit.p. 4.

³⁴⁶ Ibid

CHAPTER FIVE

UAMSHO'S ADVOCACY AND VARYING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT OF ZANZIBAR

5.1 Introduction

The Islamic organization of Uamsho presents a section of the country's Muslim efforts of Islamic revival and renewal. Since its formation, Uamsho has been critical of certain government policies such as promotion of tourism, western model of banking based on interest (*riba*) levies and allowing consumption of alcohol, which have all been blamed to have contributed toward the destruction of Islamic values. This confrontation with the state has seen many of the organization's public gatherings being proscribed by the government. The chapter examines the place of the movement within the political developments unfolding in the country, its interaction with the state, and the nature of secular politics that accommodates Islamic institutions of *Mufti*, *Kadhi*, and *Wakf*.

5.2 Uamsho and the Politics of Opposition and Reforms

Zanzibaris have witnessed a period of political discontentment characterised by a single party system in which only the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) party prevailed from 1977 to 1992. However, the political pressure from inside and outside Tanzania compelled the government to introduce the multiparty system that saw the creation of the Civic United Front (CUF) as the official opposition party in Zanzibar. Since the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992, Zanzibaris appear polarized into camps between those supporting the status quo and sympathizers of the opposition, coalescing under the pressure group, *Kamati ya Mageuzi Huru* (KAMAHURU) formed in 1991. Thus, when the law was changed to allow multipartism, CUF was launched without any hindrance. Most CUF leaders were once high-ranking officials

in CCM, including Seif Sharif Hamad whose popularity made the party strong and a threat to CCM.³⁴⁷

Like elsewhere in Tanzania, Zanzibar's multiparty elections of 1995 and 2000 were allegedly marked by irregularities that enabled the ruling party – CCM – to hold to victory and thereby run both the union and the Zanzibar governments.³⁴⁸ The results for both elections were criticized by CUF as being not free and fair.³⁴⁹ The post-election periods have, consequently, been characterized by widespread civil disobedience, demonstrations and sporadic violence. This development saw the President Karume of CCM together with the Secretary General of CUF, Hamad, reaching an agreement in 2009 to end political hostilities, which have been evident since the introduction of multiparty politics in the country.³⁵⁰ The agreement gave room for the creation of a Government of the National Unity (GNU), which established other new posts that were not originally defined in Chapter IV of the Tanzania's constitution. This included the post of the First Vice President and the Second Vice President. To give way to these new posts, the GNU scrapped the post of the Chief Minister.³⁵¹

With these developments, Zanzibar witnessed the 10th amendment of its constitution, which enabled the government to organize a referendum for people to decide on the fate of the GNU. From the result of the referendum, it was clear that the people accepted the GNU by more than 60% votes. Though sceptical of the process, the Tanzania's President, Jakaya Kikwete accepted the agreement, which was the ultimate

³⁴⁷ Harvey Glickman. 2011. *The threat of Islamism in sub-Saharan Africa: The case of Tanzania*. Haverford: Haverford College, p. 2 .

³⁴⁸ Mosaddeq Ahmed. 2002. "Suppressing Dissent the Crackdown on Muslims in Zanzibar." England: Islamic Human Rights Commission, p. 2.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 2.

³⁵⁰ Glickman, op.cit., p. 3.

³⁵¹ Zanzibar Constitution, 1984:29

solution to the political violence in the country.³⁵² Uamsho association became satisfied with that political development to the extent that its leaders went further, and demanded for another referendum for the people to decide whether or not wanted to remain in the unification.³⁵³

During the Constitutional Assembly for political reforms, the structure of the union proved to be the cause of disagreements between members of CCM and the CUF. The supporters of the two dominant parties collided when CCM members advocated for the status quo that defended the incumbent union's structure of the two governments. On the other hand, CUF members initially supported a confederation type of Union, but after the second draft of the constitutional amendment, they joined forces with other opposition parties to champion for the adoption of a Federal State with a three-government structure.³⁵⁴

This standoff between the two parties led to some of the CCM leaders proposing for a referendum to ask citizens if they still support the continuation of GNU form of government. In their view, the GNU government failed to fulfil its original purpose and it was for the people to decide on its fate, as demonstrated in the words of Salmin Awadh Salmin:

For leaders of the other side with whom we have formed GNU to oppose the revolution and union is intolerable. We think there is a need for each side to remain with its political stand instead of building suspicious alliance.³⁵⁵

Thus, despite the formation of GNU government, there seem to be suspicion among the coalition members. There is no doubt the issue of the union's structure has

³⁵² Archie Matheson, 2012. "Maridhiano: Zanzibar's Remarkable Reconciliation and Government of National Unity." *Journal of East African Studies*, Vol. 6, Issue 4, pp. 591-612

³⁵³ Sheikh Abdurrahman Salum, addressing Uamsho rally, Mwanakwerekwe Zanzibar, 10/3/12.

³⁵⁴ Athuman Mtulya. 2014. "Rift in Katiba writing spreads to Zanzibar's GNU", *The Citizen Tanzania*, May 7, 2014. Accessed at: <http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/politicalreforms>.

³⁵⁵ Ibid,

presented a forum for confrontation between the government and members of the opposition, including the Islamist group of Uamsho.³⁵⁶ The movement supported the opposition arguing that the formation of three governments would reduce the power of the mainland to control Zanzibar.³⁵⁷ Despite the scepticism from the opposition, the political leadership believe that the GNU succeeded in uniting the people of Zanzibar since the adoption of multiparty politics in early 1992. While addressing the nation on the 49th anniversary of the Revolution, the country's President, Ali Mohammed Shein, insisted that peace, unity and stability had been attained due to the commitment of the parties and the people's unswerving support for the GNU.³⁵⁸

Despite the opposition coalition, the difference between Uamsho and other political opposition parties is the former's call for an Islamic based political ideology. The movement seems to have attracted supporters among the Muslim population in the country, arguably, because of its current slogan of fighting for the full autonomy of the Zanzibar's Islands (Unguja and Pemba) from the unification. But in the view of their critics, the movement is allegedly working to destabilize the country thereby creating an opportunity for the re-introduction of the Arab dynasty and domination.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the association leaders have insisted that their aim is to make Zanzibar a state ruled by Islamic laws, and not otherwise.³⁶⁰

The rising popularity of the movement has been a major concern to the state, which resorted to outlawing all the public rallies organized by Uamsho. The State security agents cautioned Uamsho's supporters and members of public to stay away from any rallies organized by the movement, declaring:

³⁵⁶ Ibid

³⁵⁷ Ibid

³⁵⁸ Ibid

³⁵⁹ "International Religious Freedom Report for 2012", op.cit.

³⁶⁰ Interview with Msellem bin Ali Msellem, Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/3/2014.

They sent a request to us asking for a permission to hold a public rally. But following the recent incidents we declined to give them permission ...we wrote a letter to inform them of our verdict but instead of responding to us, they went ahead and announced through a press conference yesterday (Friday) that they would continue with their plans despite our rejection.³⁶¹

According to the security agents of the country, it was unlawful to oppose police orders and that any attempt to use force against such instructions would be met with severe police response. In justifying the proscribing of the public rallies called by the movement, President Shein maintained that it was not the place of the movement to discuss union matters, a mandate bestowed upon the Constitutional Review Commission.³⁶² The leader reminded the citizens that it would be unconstitutional for any person to hold meetings to discuss the fate of the union.³⁶³ Clearly, the Zanzibari ruling class has insisted that it is the Constitutional Review Commission, which will decide on the destiny of the union and not any other body. In their condemnation of Uamsho activities, the government claimed that the movement was mandated to address religious matters of Islamic faith, and therefore, unlawfully usurped the affairs of the political domain.³⁶⁴ Consequently, government officials called upon Muslim preachers in the country to desist from dragging the religion of Islam into political matters and instead strive to embrace the separation of Church and State, a view utterly rejected by Islamic religious leaders.³⁶⁵

The approach to ban the movement's public rallies was, however, taken by the Uamsho leadership as an affront of their constitutional rights – the right to freedom of

³⁶¹ Abdulwakil Saiboko. 2012. "Police in Zanzibar ban 'Uamsho' rally." *Daily News*, June 2.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid

³⁶⁴ Interview with Mkadam Khamis, a Regional police commander - Urban West, Madema Zanzibar, 18/08/2014.

³⁶⁵ Sheikh Msellem bin Ali Msellem, addressing the Uamsho rally at Mfenesini Zanzibar in 15/4/2012.

speech.³⁶⁶ According to the organization, every citizen is constitutionally provided the right of expression, including Zanzibari Muslims as well as Uamsho members. The resultant standoff between the movement and the state, led to the arrest of several Uamsho officials who were subsequently charged for conspiracy to commit felony.³⁶⁷

5.3 Uamsho's Conflicting Positions: From Political Opposition to Election Observers in Secular Politics

Though Uamsho organisation was founded to address the social and religious matters confronting Muslims of Zanzibar, the movement has overtime usurped other roles due to the leadership vacuum evident among the Zanzibaris. Gradually, the association has been assertive in political matters, thereby becoming popular with a section of Muslims whom seem to have faith with the movement. There is no doubt the appearance of Uamsho has undermined the government established Islamic institutions as the voice of Muslims in the country, limiting their influence in the country.³⁶⁸

In their indulgence in national politics, the association has been cautious not to ally itself with any political party in Zanzibar, and Tanzania at large. As an emerging political player, Uamsho claims to have strong liaison with the British and U.S. diplomatic missions as well as with the ones of Swedish and Danish among others.³⁶⁹ Apart from being away from any political party, Uamsho is seen to support the opposition party of the Civic United Front (CUF). Both groups are advocating for the Zanzibar autonomy in order to achieve the freedom of decision for the advantage of Zanzibar. Hence, Uamsho had succeeded to attract a quantity of people from the

³⁶⁶ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p.16.

³⁶⁷ Yussuf, op.cit

³⁶⁸ Department of State. 2004. "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom." International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives, p. 119.

³⁶⁹ Uamsho report on Zanzibar elections of 2005 prepared by Sheikh Azzan.

opposition wing; however, the only difference captured between these two groups is that Uamsho confirmed that their ultimate goal of their advocacy is creation of Islamic state in Zanzibar, contrary to their counterpart, which aimed at creating the democratic constitutional state of Zanzibar.

Due to Uamsho radical posture, the US embassy representatives had regularly met with leaders of the movement to press the importance for religious tolerance. They advised the officials of the movement of the need to condemn attacks against Christians and their property to avert religious based conflicts. Additionally, the embassy officers participated in television and radio events, promoting religious freedom and peaceful coexistence by underscoring the country's history and tradition of religious tolerance.³⁷⁰ However, the movement leadership were unwilling to divulge more information on their relationship with international agents including the Western representatives.

As an NGO that has much influence in the society, Uamsho has been involved in various activities that have political ramification. During the various multiparty elections conducted in the country, the organization has actively participated as a 'neutral' observer. Many of its critics disagreed with Uamsho's participation as election observers, but with the movement insisting that there is no separation of religion and politics in Islam thereby justifying their involvement. In their view, it would be naive to shun from politics.³⁷¹

³⁷⁰ International Religious Freedom Report for 2012 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

³⁷¹ Interview with Sheikh Msellem Ali Msellem, Magogoni Zanzibar, 11/3/2014.

While giving a report for the first Tanzania's multiparty election of 1995, the organization discovered that the elections were characterized with so many irregularities that led to the political unrest. The report posits:

The source of the conflict was the disputed outcome of the presidential election, which gave victory to the CCM candidate, Dr. Salmin Amour, by 50.2 percent. It led to CUF representatives boycotting the sessions of the House of Representatives. However, a consensus was eventually achieved under the auspices of the Commonwealth.³⁷²

These assertion were confirmed by the Tanzania News Online, which reported that the political tug-of-war between the ruling CCM and the CUF opposition has its roots in the disputed October 1995 Zanzibar presidential election in which CUF insisted that the results were manipulated in favour of Amour. As a result CUF representatives vowed not to co-operate with the CCM dominated legislature since they did not recognize the victory of Amour, insisting that the presidential poll was won by the CUF candidate, Seif Sheriff Hamad.³⁷³

Five years later, during the 2000 elections, Uamsho observed that the exercise was again marked with similar irregularities due to the failure to implement the agreed consensus (*mwafaka*) among the concerned political parties. Together with the international observers, they concluded that the elections were not free and fair, and therefore, in their recommendation the entire exercise be repeated.³⁷⁴ The government insisted that repetition would, however, only be done in the 16 constituencies of the Urban-West region, which ultimately saw the CCM candidate Abeid Amani Karume being declared the winner.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Uamsho report on Zanzibar elections of 2005 prepared by Sheikh Azzan.

³⁷³ Ali B. Ali, "Zanzibar Crisis Threatens Stability" *Tanzania News Online* (17) - 4/17/98.

³⁷⁴ Uamsho report on Zanzibar elections of 2005 prepared by Sheikh Azzan.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

According to some analysts since the first multiparty polls, the Zanzibar presidential election had been a two horse race between the ruling CCM and their bitter rival Civic United Front (CUF). Frank Kimboy captures this rivalry by positing:

The situation in Zanzibar politics took a turn for the worse in the 2000 General Election. The 2000 pre and post-election was marred by chaos which claimed tens of people's lives, leaving hundreds more seeking refuge in a neighbouring Kenya. Opposition supporters clashed with police in Zanzibar on October 29 2000, after thousands of people failed to vote because ballot papers either arrived late or did not arrive at all in some polling centres. Police had to use tear gas and live ammunition to disperse hundreds of opposition protestors. Scores of people were reportedly injured in the skirmishes. Despite the condemnation by local and international observers, who called for fresh elections, CCM candidate Mr. Aman Abeid Karume was announced the winner and was sworn in on November 8.³⁷⁶

As one of the observers for the 2005 elections, Uamsho came to the realization that more than 2000 people were registered several times through the assistance of the *shehas* (local administrators) whom majority of them were ardent supporters of the ruling party. In manipulating the outcome of the elections, the *shehas* rejected to register eligible voters without valid reasons, a CCM strategy anticipated to favour the party.³⁷⁷ Despite the *shehas* and their conspirators committing an election offence, no legal proceeding was taken against them. While describing the intense election campaigns and the machination to rig the polls, Uamsho observed:

The whole period of the 2005 elections in Zanzibar was dominated by chaos, brutality, killing, plundering and humiliation perpetrated by groups of hooligans known as Janjaweed from registration to campaign.³⁷⁸

Consequently, numerous people were injured during this election period. According to the association, the blame lies on the leadership of the various political parties, which issued inciting statements that inflamed the political temperature across the political

³⁷⁶ Frank Kimboy. 2015. "Recalling the 2000 Zanzibar elections", *The Citizen, Tanzania*, September 2.

³⁷⁷ Uamsho report on Zanzibar elections of 2005 prepared by Sheikh Azzan.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

divide. In Uamsho's assessment, CCM as the ruling party appeared to have been favoured than other political parties during the election period. This favouritism is captured in the words of *Sheikh Azzan Khalid Hamdan*:

Before the official announcement of the results of the presidential election by ZEC, followers and members of CUF came out to celebrate victory of their candidate after being tipped by their agents that they had won. They were fiercely attacked by the police with numerous tear gas bombs and peppered water canons. Meanwhile CCM supporters celebrated constituency victory at Michenzani area and were given police protection. On the other hand, CUF supporters who came out to celebrate victory at their Mji Mkongwe constituency were brutally attacked by the police.³⁷⁹

The supposed outcome of the election was that CCM won the presidential election as announced by The Zanzibar electoral Commission (ZEC), which the opposition vehemently rejected. Like in the previous elections, Uamsho and other observers declared the process to have been a sham, and should be repeated under the supervision of the United Nations.³⁸⁰ To them, this would end the conflict that had emerged due to the ill-handled election. To avoid re-occurrence of such incidents in future, Uamsho recommended the establishment of an independent election commission acceptable by all parties, provide equal media access to parties participating in the elections, and ensure that the votes are counted in an open and transparent way.³⁸¹

Since the formation of the Government of National Unity in 2010, between CCM and CUF political parties, the popularity of Uamsho seems to be increasing due to the absence of opposition political voice. However, the GNU lived for only five years (2010 – 2015) though, the State constitution recognizes the survival of that government. Moreover, lack of an official opposition created an opportunity for

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid

³⁸¹ Ibid.

Uamsho to step in as a critic of various government policies. These developments saw the organization shifting from a ‘neutral’ observer to a critic of the State. The formation of GNU served the turning point of Uamsho’s history as a political lobby. The constitutional reform debate in 2012 gave Uamsho the much-needed platform in articulating their political agenda.³⁸² During the debate held in Bwawani Zanzibar, *Sheikh* Farid frankly indicated that the people of Zanzibar want their country’s autonomy:

God willing we shall have our independent Zanzibar having a seat in UN along with embassies in foreign countries. Similarly, we shall develop our passports for travelling purposes; moreover, I appeal to our leaders to be firm on this issue without giving up.³⁸³

It is such sentiments that have made the movement popular to the majority of the people in Zanzibar. There is no doubt that mosques were not any longer neutral spaces, but places of political mobilisation.

The evident political scenario is attributed to power struggles and the fear of losing control among the political parties particularly CCM and CUF, which has politically benefited Uamsho to the extent that the group managed to openly advocate for Zanzibar secession from the mainland rather than maintaining the supposed exhausted form of unification. According to some analysts such as Andre LeSage, the emerging political situation has provided the perfect context for religion to be used as a projection screen and venue for confrontation.³⁸⁴ Uamsho’s appearance to the political scene has presented numerous challenges to the government particularly through its advocacy for the Islamic political ideology, believed to be a solution to myriad of problems facing the Zanzibar society.

³⁸² Fouéré, op.cit, p. 3.

³⁸³ Constitutional Debate held at Bwawani Zanzibar on 6/10/2012.

³⁸⁴ LeSage, op. cit, p. 9.

The government together with other critics of the movement, however, consider the Uamsho's demand for the adoption of an Islamic political ideology as a scheme to reintroduce the dominance of Arab rule in the Zanzibar politics.³⁸⁵ Historically, the racially divided Zanzibar society has had a suspicious and acrimonious relationship towards each other.

5.4 Uamsho's Stance to Government Islamic Institutions: Kadhi, Wakf, and Mufti

Historically, Zanzibar was under the Oman sultanate and native authorities like that of the *liwali*, *kadhi* and *mudir* characterized the political culture. While the *liwali* served as a governor of a particular province, the *mudir* and the *kadhi* assisted him as his lieutenant and court judge respectively. During the colonial period, these administrative positions were, internally, formalized within the new Protectorate, remaining nominally part of the sultan's civil service.³⁸⁶ Later, after the Zanzibar revolution of 1964, the government introduced the institution of Mufti and Wakf to cater for Muslims' welfare. In addition, after disregarding the office of the *liwali* and *mudir*, it adopted the Kadhi court institution inherited from the British colonial administration.

According to the country's constitution, the Chief *Kadhi* together with his deputy are supposed to be appointed by the president of the country. As an institution of the state, the *Kadhi* courts are part of the country's judiciary system, and like other judiciary officers, *Kadhis* also draw salaries from the government thereby required to work under the supervision of the Chief Justice of Zanzibar.³⁸⁷ Even though the courts

³⁸⁵ Gatsiounis, op.cit. p. 81.

³⁸⁶ Brennan, R. James. 2008. "Lowering the Sultan's Flag: Sovereignty and Decolonization in Coastal Kenya." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 50, Issue 4, p. 839.

³⁸⁷ Kadhi's Court Act of 2017, p. 4.

are found in almost every district in the country, the jurisdiction of the Kadhi courts in contemporary Zanzibar is limited to social matters of Muslims, which is aptly captured in the Kadhi's Court Act of 2017:³⁸⁸

- 5 (1) The Kadhi's Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings between parties who are Muslims relating to:
- a) marriage, divorce and other related issues;
 - b) personal status;
 - c) maintenances and custody of children;
 - d) wakf or religious charitable trusts, grants, and gifts inter vivo;
 - e) wills and inheritance;
 - f) division of matrimonial assets if there is actual contribution; and
 - g) any other matter in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred to Kadhi's court by any written law.
- (2) Without prejudice to the provision of sub section (1) of this section, any person who is not a Muslim may submit a claim to the Kadhi's Court against Muslim for any matter that the Kadhis' Courts has jurisdiction.
- (3) Every Kadhi shall have jurisdiction to try an offence of contempt of court committed in the course of proceedings and shall have power to sentence any offender as provided for under this Act.

This limited jurisdiction of the *Kadhi* court was criticized by the Uamsho leadership, demanding for the courts to have the power to preside all cases in accordance to the *sharia*. Apparently, what is seen and practiced here is that the *Kadhi* court is only dealing with marriage and divorce cases from among the Muslims not otherwise. That is to say that the *Kadhi's* jurisdiction is basically limited to section 5 (1) a) as highlighted above in the Act. Arguably, such a view has influenced some Muslims to shun the courts, which they consider not to be serving their religion, but rather the interest of the state. As a result, *Sheikh* Hassan Othman Ngwali, the Deputy Chief *Kadhi* of Zanzibar, expressed his dismay of lack of support of the government Islamic institutions, including his office, by certain Islamic NGOs in the country. In his

³⁸⁸ Kadhi's Court Act of 2017, section 5, p. 3.

wisdom, he called upon Muslims to cease banishing the courts and instead have confidence with them.³⁸⁹

Another Islamic institution that operates under the umbrella of the government is the Wakf and Trust Property Commission (WTPC), mandated to oversee the preservation of trust properties and distribution of inheritance to the rightful heirs. The commission's other roles such as the registration of mosques and *madrasas*, organizing pilgrimage to Mecca, receiving and distributing donations to needy Muslims in the country, and the management of endowments are the commonly known functions by the public because they affect many people.³⁹⁰ The Wakf and Trust Commission Act of 2007 while displaying functions of the commission posits:

The commission shall have the following functions:

- (a) To administer:
 - (i) Wakf property;
 - (ii) Trust property; and
 - (iii) Estate of deceased Muslim.
- (b) To coordinate Hajj activities in relation to pilgrims from Zanzibar and to regulate individuals, firms or associations providing travel and other service to pilgrims;
- (c) To coordinate and regulate the provision, collection and distribution of zakkas and other charitable gifts provisions and offerings for religious purposes or cause;
- (d) To coordinate national Idd prayers and Idd Baraza.

Like the Chief *Kadhi*, the Executive Secretary responsible for the management of *wakf* institution, is a government appointee. As a result, its critiques, including Uamsho organization, see the institution as an extension of government bureaucratization and control, which has failed to address issues of the people satisfactorily.³⁹¹ There are allegations that the commission is charging high fees with regard to the distribution of inheritance. This has compelled some Muslims to consult

³⁸⁹ Interview with Sheikh Hassan Othman Ngwali, Deputy Chief Kadhi, High Court Zanzibar, 13/8/2012.

³⁹⁰ Yahya, op.cit, p. 438.

³⁹¹ Ibid

unauthorized *ulamaa* to assist them in the distribution of a deceased wealth or in some instances ignore the entire idea of distributing the affected property. Such complaints have been capitalized by the Uamsho leadership to advocate for a new body, which in their view would be people centred.

Similar to the wakf commission and the *Kadhi* court is the Mufti institution whose office bearer is appointed also by the state following its establishment in 2001 upon the passing of the *Mufti* Law. Some of its core functions are to settle Muslim religious disputes, sanction Islamic activities, supervise mosques, and to approve religious lectures, and importation of Islamic literatures.³⁹² This is clearly shown in the Mufti Act section 9 of 2001 amendments:

- (1) The functions of the Mufti shall be:
 - (a) To give *fatwa* on any issue raised to him relating to any Islamic question which need to be decided;
 - (b) To keep record of all fatwa issued by the office;
 - (c) To settle any religious dispute arising among Muslims;
 - (d) To settle any religious dispute arising between Muslims and other religions in consultations with other leaders of that other religions.
 - (e) To organise Islamic research activities in Zanzibar conducted by public or private organisations or any individual and to issue permits thereof in accordance with the regulation made by the Minister;
 - (f) To prepare curriculum of education for *ulamaa* in Zanzibar in collaboration with the Ministry of Education which includes Islamic knowledge in order to upgrade this area;
 - (g) To coordinate and supervise the organisation of lectures, workshop, seminar and other Islamic activities;
 - (h) To coordinate the activities of various Islamic groups within the country;
 - (i) To coordinate and supervise activities of all mosques of Zanzibar and from time to time to give directives when it is necessary;
 - (j) To keep records of all mosques and *ulamaa* of Zanzibar;
 - (k) To coordinate and announce the sighting of a new moon;
 - (l) To approve lectures of Islamic religion from outside Zanzibar after he is satisfied with their ability;

³⁹² International Religious Freedom Report for 2011 United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, p. 3.

- (m) To control and approve the importation, supply and translations of all Islamic books;
- (n) To approve the registration of Islamic Societies in accordance with the provision of Societies Act no 6 of 1995;
- (o) To do all such acts as may be incidental or conducive to the attainment of the objectives of this act; and
- (p) To do any thing given under this Act or any other Act or given by the Minister for the benefit of Muslim community.³⁹³

The above functions have not been welcomed by all sections of the population, particularly its strong critique, and the Uamsho leadership. According to the organization, the creation of the Mufti institution was merely a ploy by the State to control the growing politicization of Islam in the country. One of the informants (Issa Haji) clarifies, “*Taasisi za kidini za serikali hazitambuliki moja kwa moja ila tu ni kwa baadhi ya mashauri*” (Government institutions are not recognized directly unless except when seeking certain advice). There is concern that the *Mufti* office allegedly interpret a form of Islam considered ‘friendly’ to the State government to create the illusion that the government is serious in addressing the interests of Muslims in the country. This strategy was intended to put in check the desire to advocate for Islamic revivalism in Zanzibar.³⁹⁴

Though, it is the *Mufti* who is authorized to announce the beginning and the end of Ramadhan depending on the sighting of the new moon, Uamsho officials along with their sympathizers feel this government arrangement curtails the community the freedom to worship their faith with other Muslims in the world.³⁹⁵ It is common that most countries in the Middle East sight the new moon for Ramadhan and *Iddul-Fitr* seasons earlier before their counterparts in East Africa. Since the Muslims in Zanzibar will have to await the *Mufti*'s office to make the necessary announcement subject to the sighting of the new moon, the Uamsho leadership considers this policy as

³⁹³ Mufti Act, 2001, p. 4.

³⁹⁴ Interview with Sheikh Issa Haji Hassan, Mwanakwerekwe, 20/02/2014.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

restriction against the freedom of worship enshrined in the constitution.³⁹⁶ This scenario places this office in conflict with a section of the Muslim population spearheaded by Uamsho organization.

As a result of the ensuing tension, Uamsho leadership has been in the forefront in demanding for reforms in this institution, which Moshe Terdman aptly presents:

Several Muslim organizations, among them Uamsho, continue to criticize both Zanzibar's Mufti law and the mainland's practice of selecting a mufti, perceiving them as efforts by the union government to institutionalize government oversight of Islamic organizations.³⁹⁷

In Zanzibar, the *Mufti* serves as a public employee of the government, possessing among other things the authority to approve all Islamic activities or gatherings in Zanzibar, as well as religious lectures by foreign speakers or the importation of Islamic literature.³⁹⁸ Ironically in mainland Tanzania, the *Mufti* is not a state employee, but rather elected by the National Muslim Council of Tanzania (Baraza Kuu la Waislamu Tanzania – BAKWATA).³⁹⁹ Similarly, though the Zanzibari Muslims do not advocate for the adoption of the BAKWATA model in its entirety, but they just interested to be allowed to choose their own *Mufti* instead of the State imposing one on them through presidential appointment manifested with personal interests.

Clearly, Uamsho organization presents great challenges to the government Islamic institutions. Due to these institutions' attachment with the State, they have always been perceived as the voice of the government and by extension 'anti-Islam'. Led by Uamsho, the opponents of these institutions regard them as a government strategy of appeasing the Muslims to make them feel that their welfare and interests are always

³⁹⁶ Bergmann, op.cit, p. 4.

³⁹⁷ Religious Report, 2004. "Annual Report on International Religious Freedom", Washington: US Government Printing Office, p. 117.

³⁹⁸ Mufti Act, 2001, p. 4.

³⁹⁹ Religious Report, 2004, op.cit. 116..

catered by a concerned State.⁴⁰⁰ From all indications, the Zanzibar government has encouraged Islamic tendencies to the extent that Muslim programs occupy more airspace in the national radio and television broadcasting. This special treatment is evident with the *adhan* (call for prayers), the Friday prayers, the *Iddul-Fitr* and the *Iddul-Hajj*, which are all transmitted live by the national broadcaster. To further demonstrate their sensitivity to Muslim sensibilities, the government has declared the month of Ramadhan as sacred thereby outlawing bars and hotels to operate in the day, closing of public schools, and reduction of working hours during the fasting period.⁴⁰¹ However, not all these efforts by the state have succeeded to appease the Uamsho fraternity who demands for a complete Islamization of the society, which would eventually result to the establishment of an Islamic state.⁴⁰²

5.5 Conclusion

The discussions in this chapter are appropriately explained through the Political Process Theories, which generally demonstrates the way social mobilisation occurs and its manifestation. According to the deprivation theory, social movements have their foundations among people who feel deprived of resources.⁴⁰³ As demonstrated in this chapter, a section of Muslims in Zanzibar who, arguably, felt deprived of certain rights mobilized around the opposition party, CUF, whose ideas of promoting change in Zanzibar were strongly supported by the Uamsho organization. Though founded as an Islamic NGO focused in spiritual and other social activities, Uamsho organization gradually developed into an articulate political opposition voice and critique of the State.

⁴⁰⁰ Turner, op.cit., p. 13.

⁴⁰¹ US religious report, 2004, op.cit., p. 605.

⁴⁰² Abdisaid M. Ali. 2016. "Islamist Extremism in East Africa." *Africa Security Brief*, No.32.

⁴⁰³ Denton E. Morrison. 1978. "Some Notes toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change." In Louis E. Genevie, ed., *Collective Behavior and Social Movements*. Itasca, Ill.: Peacock. pp. 202-209.

According to the deprivation theory, people who are more likely to organize under a social movement are those who have been deprived certain services important for their existence as a community.⁴⁰⁴ Arguably, due to lack of political reforms and democratic transparency, sections of Muslims in Zanzibar supported the Uamsho's idea of political Islam, which presented to them hope of good governance. Despite Tanzania being a secular state in Zanzibar, the government seems to encourage and promote Islamic tendencies as evident with the transmission of Muslim programs in the national broadcasting.

The chapter further, made analysis on the political reforms and noticed that Mono-party system contributed to the political discontentment in Zanzibar in which only CCM party prevailed. It is revealed that re-introduction of multiparty system was due to inside and outside influences yet it contributed to the creation of CUF. All the conducted elections were won by CCM through allegedly uneven elections in Zanzibar. This development resulted to confrontation between the two rival parties, which ultimately saw the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was supported by more than 60% of Zanzibaris. Since the formation of the GNU in 2010, the popularity of Uamsho, seem to be increasing due to the absence of opposition political voice. Nonetheless, the government and other critics of the association consider the Uamsho's demand for the adoption of Islamic political ideology as a scheme to reintroduce the dominance of Arab rule.

Moreover, it is observed that Uamsho acted as election observers in Zanzibar elections whereby they reported a number of incidents to the extent of concluding that the elections were unfair. As a response, Uamsho recommended the establishment of

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid pp. 202-209.

an independent election commission, providing equal media access, and ensuring that the votes are counted in a transparent way to avoid re-occurrence of such incidents,

It is noted from the chapter that Uamsho organization has been advocating for the Zanzibar autonomy, however, the state appealed the Muslim preachers not to drag religion and politics. Zanzibar has maintained the political culture characterized with offices of *Kadhi*, *Wakf*, and *Muft*, which have been criticized by Uamsho leadership, for not presiding their decisions in accordance to the *sharia*. The functions of these offices are seen by its critique as the government ploy to control the growing politicization of Islam due to their attachment with the state. However, Zanzibar government has encouraged Islamic tendencies by occupying more airspace in the national broadcasting operating Muslim programs, and declaring Ramadhan a sacred month.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PROSPECTS OF ISLAMISM IDEOLOGY IN ZANZIBAR

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Islamism is used as a generic concept with reference to Muslim individuals, movements, and organizations conceiving Islam as an ideology. As demonstrated in the subsequent sections, the Islamist goal is to establish an Islamic state that applies sharia as the basis of law in a Muslim society since the secular idea of human legislation is considered *shirk* (polytheism).⁴⁰⁵ In their assessment, the Islamists in Zanzibar insists that there are doctrinal provisions instructing Muslims to apply the Islamic law in totality. Though the ultimate goal of any Islamist group is to re-enact the lost Islamic Caliphate, there are varying factors that drive its emergence in a particular region. There is no doubt that in Zanzibar, the alternative ideology of Islamism in the country is propelled by secular nationalism, a lame parliamentary democracy, slow and uneven economic growth. Since its appearance in the country, Uamsho has been vocal in condemning the government for not applying the sharia law in its affairs and public policies. In their views, Islam is not solely restricted to spiritual practices, but is integrated also with politics and advocacy.⁴⁰⁶ Though started as a religious association, Uamsho turned into a mobilizing movement of Muslims in Zanzibar. Therefore, the chapter examines the Islamism tendencies in the country, which is followed by an analysis of both the local and external factors that could have contributed to the appearance and appeal to Islamism in Zanzibar's political scene.

⁴⁰⁵Westerlund, op.cit., p. 306.

⁴⁰⁶ Interview with Sheikh Othman Mohamed Saleh, *Muft* office, Mazizini Zanzibar, 18/02/2014.

6.2 Islamism Tendencies: Attack on Symbols of the State and Christianity

Scholars have understood the word Islamism differently, and Harvey Glickman writes:

Islamism is a political ideology, not an offshoot religious cult. Its strategy ranges from violence as a prime tactic to political militancy, to competitive political parties that seek local or national representation in parliaments or local governments. Islamism may spawn violent jihadi groups that dream of recreating a global Islamic community (umma) or groups attempting to restore ultra-traditionalist, Salafist tenets of Islam, similar to what prevails in Wahabbist Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰⁷

From the above expression, we notice that the term Islamism refers to a political ideology that uses different approach to achieve its objectives, which include violent strategy to political militancy as well as competitive political parties with the aim of seeking representation in the government and ultimately influence the recreation of a world of Islamic community.⁴⁰⁸ On the other hand, radical Islam would refer to a totalitarian Islamic supremacy movement that believes it has a monopoly over heaven, truth and justice.⁴⁰⁹ Through their interpretation of Islam, the followers of this movement (radical Islam) are keen to cleanse Islam of the ‘impure’ practices of local *tariqas* (Sufi brotherhoods).

Though it is difficult to differentiate between Islamism and radical Islam, here Islamism would imply a political ideology influenced by Islamic religious principles, whereas radical Islam suggests a tendency of having a strong faith in Islam with a high level of adherence to its principles. In that sense, it is not necessary for a radical Muslim to be an Islamist. Arguably, Muslims who serve in government Islamic institutions in the country are normally viewed as being ‘moderate’ Muslims, while those outside the government influence are seen as supporters of Islamist and radical

⁴⁰⁷ Glickman, op.cit. , p. 1.

⁴⁰⁸ Berman, op.cit. pp 257-272.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid, pp 257-272.

Islam tendency. The Islamist movement of Zanzibar is, arguably, represented by *Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislamu* (JUMIKI), popularly known as Uamsho.

During its rallies, Uamsho, allegedly, not only distributed Afghan *jihad*-training videos and literature, but also advocated for the alienation of secular politicians who refuse to support the implementation of *sharia*.⁴¹⁰ Moshe Terdman's study has revealed that there had been signs of increasing tension between secular and sections of Muslims in Zanzibar with extremist tendencies. As a movement, Uamsho considered all the non-Muslims and other Muslims working for the State as enemies of Islam. Consequently, in their view the government was by extension a Christian institution. This perception was matched with numerous attacks against all the symbols of the State and Christianity. In his report, Moshe Terdman asserted:

Early on March 10, 2003, a Roman Catholic Church in central Zanzibar was set ablaze in an act of arson. One week later, on March 17, a petrol bomb destroyed a school bus belonging to the Catholic Church while it was parked in the school grounds. The following day five senior members of UAMSHO were detained as suspects in the church attacks. On March 19, the home of Zanzibar's Mufti and top Islamic leader, Harith bin Khelef, was attacked with explosives. On March 20, a grenade was lobbed over the fence of the home of Zubeir Ali Maulid, a cabinet minister in the Zanzibar government. Also on March 20, a grenade was thrown into a restaurant filled with foreign guests. It landed on the dinner table of a British diplomat but fortunately, it failed to go off.⁴¹¹

In August 2013, unidentified assailants attacked 18-year-old British teenage girls, Katie Gee and her friend Kirstie Trup, who had been volunteering at a school in Zanzibar with acid. Two men doused them with acid in an unprovoked and infamous attack in which Kirstie suffered burns to her arm, while Katie severely bore the brunt. The right side of her face and body were completely burnt while her right ear was left

⁴¹⁰ Terdman, op.cit., p. 10.

⁴¹¹ Ibid, p. 10.

shrivelled, black and useless.⁴¹² Approximately half a dozen acid attacks attributed to radical Islamists groups have been witnessed in the country. Apart from foreigners, local Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders were also not spared the onslaughts. In February 17, 2013, a Roman Catholic priest Rev. Evaristus Mushi was shot dead by unknown people, and several churches torched following violent protests.⁴¹³

Despite the reported cases of violence, Uamsho leadership maintained that the movement would continue fighting for Zanzibar's sovereignty through acceptable ways avoiding any illegal and unconstitutional means. The association's leadership claimed that there were people both in and out of the government, using the isolated cases of violence attributed to Uamsho to tarnish the image of the group. Realizing how emerging violence could present negative publicity to the movement, one of the leaders opined:

We are not responsible for the unrest; the police should work hard to arrest and charge those who caused the mayhem, including the burning of churches. But we remain clear that as Zanzibaris, we will continue to demand for the sovereignty of Zanzibar, come-what-may.⁴¹⁴

Apart from consistently demanding for Zanzibar's self-autonomy, Uamsho leadership and sympathizer protested against the alleged increasing of western influence on the island through the tourism industry. They argued that foreign tourists are responsible for the destruction of Zanzibar's Islamic culture. In their assessment, they are worried of the increasingly "inappropriate behaviour" posed by the Western tourists whose public behaviour is deemed offensive to the Islamic moral code. This inappropriateness is captured in the words of *Sheikh* Farid Hadi, the leader of the Zanzibar Imams Association (JUMAZA):

⁴¹²Amy Oliver. 2018. "British Teen Left Horribly Injured by a Brutal Acid Attack." *Daily Mail*, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk>.

⁴¹³Bergmann, op.cit., p. 5.

⁴¹⁴Yussuf, op.cit.

Tourists should not indulge in sex acts or kiss openly. This is not something that people can accept...Every society has norms to be respected. We want a law that stipulates a certain standard of public appearance thereby forbidding the wearing of very short dresses in the public. Though Islam allows non-Muslims to lead their own way of life, they ought to do this within the acceptable confines.⁴¹⁵

The above statement should not be misconstrued to suggest that Uamsho organization is opposed to Western tourists, but to the contrary the movement is only concerned that while in public the tourists should conduct themselves with decorum and in line with the general ethos of Islamic public probity. This careful and calculated approach by the Uamsho leadership towards the tourism industry is informed by the realization that it one of the major source of revenue for the country. Confirming the significance of tourism to the country thereby calling for a careful balancing act towards the industry was President Shein who counselled:

Everyone has a role to play in promoting tourism since it is our leading foreign currency earner; 80 per cent of foreign income comes from tourism and that over 70 per cent of the Zanzibaris adults are directly or indirectly employed in the tourism industry. We need constructive views to promote tourism. We can promote tourism while safeguarding our culture, norms, and religious principles. Should Zanzibar need to get out of its economical difficulties at both the individual and the national level, tourism remain crucial to the country.⁴¹⁶

The importance of the tourism sector to the country cannot be overstated as reports indicates that it is also the leading sector in investment projects as it contributes over 27 per cent of GDP annually.⁴¹⁷ However, Umasho leadership feels that the government has not done enough to protect the Islamic public morality. According to the General Secretary of Uamsho, Abdullah Said Ali, the country's courts seems to be

⁴¹⁵ "No kissing, Zanzibar tells tourists", *Kingston Gleaner News Paper Archiver* May 5, 2005, p. 15.

⁴¹⁶ Ali Mohamed Shein, President of Zanzibar. 2012 "Zanzibar Targets 500,000 Tourists." *Daily News*, June 18

⁴¹⁷ Ali Halil Mirza, Director of Zanzibar Tourism Commission. 2012. "Zanzibar Targets 500,000 Tourists." *Daily News*, June 18.

reluctant to impose strict laws for the sale and consumption of alcohol for the fear that it will affect the tourism industry.⁴¹⁸

The reality is, nevertheless, that the tourism business is expected to replace the clove export trade, which was hit with a reduction of the international market price. The report by Economic Research Bureau posits:

The clove industry has dominated Zanzibar's economy for some time now. Recently however, with the pace of economic liberalization gathering momentum, new growth (lead) sectors have emerged. Tourism is one such sector and the construction industry is gaining prominence. What is required is to develop strategies for the sustainability of these sectors.⁴¹⁹

Further, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which was signed into law in December 2002 presented enormous challenge to Muslim groups such as Uamsho who have been vocal in their opposition to the proposed law. There had been a number of violent terrorist activities in Tanzania, including the 1998 bombing of US embassy in Dar-es-salaam, which contributed to the enacting of the Act to provide comprehensive measures of dealing with terrorism threat.⁴²⁰

Though the legislation did not categorically mention any religious or ideological group, individual Muslim clerics, local media, the Legal and Human Rights Centre, and human rights NGOs, were highly critical of the powers the Act gave to the police to conduct searches, arrests, and detentions in determining a terrorist. There was a concern among Muslims that the law would be used to intimidate the opposition voices critical of State's policies.⁴²¹ The law also required religious organizations to

⁴¹⁸ Terdman, op.cit., pp. 1-12,

⁴¹⁹ Economic Research Bureau, 2003, Zanzibar Country Analysis Report, University of Dar-es-salaam, p. 119

⁴²⁰ The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, p. 5.

⁴²¹ US religious report, 2004:117; LeSage, Andre. 2007. "Terrorism Threats and Vulnerabilities in Africa." *African Counterterrorism Co-operation: Assessing Regional and Subregional Initiatives*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press.

provide certain information to the Registrar of Societies at the Home Affairs Ministry before officially recognized by the State. Specifically, a religious organization was compelled to avail at least 10 followers, a constitution, a resume of its leaders, and a letter of recommendation from the district commissioner for registration.⁴²² However, the critiques of the law were wondering why the need to formulate another law when the office of the *Mufti* has the authority to approve or deny the registration of Islamic societies under the 2001 *Mufti* Law.⁴²³

While viewing the war on terror as a war against Islam and Muslims, Uamsho leadership and their supporters, demonstrated against the United States of America (US) embassy in July 12, 2005 demanding for the release of prisoners being held in Iraqi jails, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.⁴²⁴ Thus, the Uamsho leadership hit out at the US authorities on their supposedly skewed policies against Islam, which was manifested through their global influence in the enactment terrorism laws.⁴²⁵

Appearing to be critical and suspicious of every government move, the Uamsho movement asked Muslims in the country to boycott the 2012 national census because of the State's refusal to enumerate the people's religious affiliation in the country.⁴²⁶ To catalogue the religious affiliation of the people in the country, and Tanzania at large, was important to the Umasho leadership because they are convinced Muslim are the majority in Tanzania despite the distorted reports of the State. According to a 2010 Pew Forum survey, it "estimates that approximately 60 percent of the population is Christian, 36 percent Muslim, and 4 percent other religious groups."⁴²⁷ Majority of

⁴²² The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, p. 31.

⁴²³ Mufti Act. P. 5.

⁴²⁴ Terdman, op.cit, p. 7.

⁴²⁵ Ibid, p. 7.

⁴²⁶ Bergmann, op.cit., p. 3.

⁴²⁷ "Tanzania International Religious Freedom Report for 2015 United States", Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, p. 1.

the Muslims in the country has vehemently rejected this estimation. This is because such figures are mere speculations since “there are no domestic polls covering religious affiliation”; even though in the view of local commentator they consistently present a picture of “roughly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims in the country.”⁴²⁸

According to the opinion of the leadership of Uamsho organization, Prophet Muhammad founded an Islamic state, which survived up to the time of Ottoman Empire in Turkey, when it eventually disintegrated. Subsequently, there have been efforts by various Islamic groups and associations advocating for the re-establishment of the nostalgic Islamic state (*Khilafah*).⁴²⁹ Leading the call for the re-establishment of the lost Islamic State in the context of Zanzibar is the group whose leaders insisted that Uamsho’s major aim, though ambiguously, is to turn Zanzibar into a land ruled by *Shari’ah* law. To realize this desire, the movement’s leadership was not even ashamed to suggest that all the non-Muslims residents of the island, who comprise 1% of the population, to convert to Islam.⁴³⁰

6.3 Local Factors and Emergence of Islamist Discourse

Prior to multiparty politics, there was no official opposition critical of the state affairs. Speaking against the state had numerous consequences thereby undermining the appearance of critical voices in the country.⁴³¹ With the ushering of multiparty political system in 1992, there appeared several political parties challenging the ruling party (CCM). The plural political atmosphere presented platform for articulating

⁴²⁸Ibid

⁴²⁹ Hakan Yavuz. 2001. “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey”, *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 7, No.3, pp.1-24.

⁴³⁰Terdman, op.cit, p. 10

⁴³¹Glickman, op.cit., p. 1.

divergent opinion thereby demanding for a spirit of political tolerance.⁴³² Prior to the advent of competitive politics, already Uamsho had officially been recognized by the State as a religious body that was concerned with spiritual and social aspects of the Muslims community in the country.⁴³³ Nevertheless, after sometime the organization began taking clear political positions.

There are other Muslim associations in the country such as the *Jumuiya ya Maimamu Zanzibar* (JUMAZA, - Zanzibar Imam's Association) founded in 2003, and the *Tabligh Markaz*, (Islamic Propagation Unit), which was first established in south Asia in 1927 before opening offices in the country in 1970s. The two Muslim associations appear to have established cordial working relations with the state thereby focusing their attention to religious matters of the country's Muslims.⁴³⁴

Another organization that has assumed openly political stance is the *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* (Islamic Liberation Party), which was first founded in 1953 in Jerusalem before opening a branch in the country. However, *Sheikh* Massoud Msellem noted that his party started its activities in Zanzibar in early 2000 organising in a secrete way, and even though it has immediately become open no buildings specifically used as offices.⁴³⁵ *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* is an international pan-Islamist political organisation whose aim is to ensure the re-establishment of the Islamic *Khilafah* (Caliphate) to guarantee global Muslim live in accordance to their faith. It is expected that with the caliphate, it would unite the global Muslim community, undertake the implementation of the Sharia, and subsequently carry out proselytization of the Islamic faith among the non-Muslim in the world. Nevertheless, the party refused to register for official

⁴³² Mussa, op.cit., p. 19.

⁴³³ Ibid, p. 19.

⁴³⁴ Turner, op.cit., p. 24.

⁴³⁵ Interview with Massoud Msellem, Deputy Media Representative of Hizb-ut-tahrir, Zanzibar, 23/02/2014.

recognition with the State because it considered the Zanzibari government as *Kufr* (infidel). Like the earliest radical Kharijites in the Islamic history, Hizb-ut-Tahrir divides the world into two spheres of *Darul-Islam* (the abode of Islam/peace) and *Darul-kufr* (the abode of non-Muslim/warfare). Comparatively to the Uamsho movement, the only common denominator they seem to share is implementation of Islamic sharia, which differs when it comes to the ways and techniques of achieving it. Paradoxically unlike Uamsho, the *Hizb-ut-Tahrir* organization is not very critical of the State, and this is why despite their seemingly radical stance on political matters the State has not proscribed the organization because its leaders have refused to indulge in secular politics of the country.

From around 2012, Uamsho association has been consistent in articulating political and economic matters confronting the county. There is no doubt that the availability of the freedom of speech along with the introduction of multiparty political system enabled Muslim activists to speak openly on political matters.⁴³⁶ The Tanzania constitution clearly states that the freedom of conscience is the right to every person, as stipulated in section 18 of the constitution:

18. Every person -
- (a) has a freedom of opinion and expression of his ideas;
 - (b) has out right to seek, receive and, or disseminate information regardless of national boundaries;
 - (c) has the freedom to communicate and a freedom with protection from interference from his communication;
 - (d) has a right to be informed at all times of various important events of life and activities of the people and also of issues of importance to the society.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁶ Interview with Juma Nahoda, Haille Selasie High School, Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.

⁴³⁷ Tanzania Constitution, 1977, p. 16.

This constitutional provision has provided Muslim activists, included those with Islamists agenda, with the legal justification to articulate all matters affecting the society and State without fear.

Arguably, Islamist tendencies have been prevalent in Zanzibar during since the liberation struggle in the colonial period. However, following the independence (December 1963) and the bloody revolution of Zanzibar (January 1964), the supposedly Islamist tendencies became inactive as they were suppressed by the high-handedness of the revolutionary government.⁴³⁸ Later, during the time of multiparty democracy that was ushered in 1992, the group of unidentified people holding Islamist tendencies re-appeared under the banner of *Bismillahir-rahmaanir-rahiim* (In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful). Despite its amorphous and ambiguous appearance as neither a political party nor an unregistered NGO, the group demanded for the introduction of Islamic sharia in the country. . Consequently, due to the fear of their separatist agenda formulated on religious basis, the government banned the group in early 1990s.⁴³⁹

Despite Uamsho's recognition as a Muslim welfare organization, it curtailed their aspiration of engaging in political matters. Aware of the challenge that obstructed their desire to advance their political agenda, Uamsho leadership decided to enter into partnership with the Civic United Front (CUF). According to Political Parties Act, no organization shall qualify for provisional registration as a political party if among the things engages in discrimination based on religious affiliation. The ACT stipulates:

⁴³⁸ Interview with Abdullah Talib Abdullah, Executive Secretary of Wakf and Trust Property Commission, Meli tano Zanzibar, 26/02/2014.

⁴³⁹ Interview with Abdullah, Executive Secretary of Wakf and Trust Property Commission, Meli tano Zanzibar, 26/02/2014.

- (1) No organization shall qualify for provisional registration as a political party unless—
- (a) the founding members have applied for registration of the party in the prescribed manner;
 - (b) its membership is voluntary and open to all the citizens of the United Republic of Tanzania without discrimination on account of gender, disability, religious belief, race, tribe, ethnic origin, profession or occupation.
 - (c) more than two third of its members are not of the same sex;
 - (d) its constitution and rules promotes gender equality;
- (2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, no political party shall qualify for provisional registration if by its policy, constitution, rules, statements, activities or conducts:-
- (a) aims to advocate or further the interests of –
 - (i) any religious belief or group;
 - (ii) any tribal, ethnic or racial group; or
 - (iii) only a specific area within any part of the United Republic of Tanzania.⁴⁴⁰

From the above quotation, it is obvious that Uamsho could not be registered as a political party because of its clear religious bias. Consequently, religion became a politically instrumentalized projection area in the context of a political arena characterized by power struggles and anxiety.⁴⁴¹ Without doubt, multiparty political system opened the door to the growth of Islamist activities because “the demise of the one party State allowed for alternative forms of association.”⁴⁴² The unfolding scenario created a favourable atmosphere to Islamic activism due to the availability of the right to freedom of speech that allowed every citizen the right to discuss array of issues, including politics hitherto inconceivable under the single –party system.

Economically, the chief cash product of Zanzibar is cloves that earn the country foreign exchange. Cloves account for around 45% of Zanzibar’s gross domestic product (GDP) in contrast to tourism that currently represents about 20% of Zanzibar’s GDP. But according to recent data by the Zanzibar Tourism Commission,

⁴⁴⁰ The political Parties Act 2015, Section 16, pp. 10, 11.

⁴⁴¹ Bergmann, *op.cit.* p. 4.

⁴⁴² Glickman, *op.cit.* p. 3.

tourism is increasingly becoming a leading economic sector in the country.⁴⁴³ From around 2000, the production of cloves has gradually been deteriorating due to different causes including the fall of price in the world market, attributed to the overflow of cloves produced by other countries. A report by Juma Ali Juma indicated that:

Its production has however registered a significant steady decline over the last four decades from an annual average of about 16,000 tonnes in 1970's to a current average of between 1500 to 3500 tonnes in 2000's. Declining production has been attributed to climatic variations, insecurity of the three -acre land tenure system, diseases, poor management limited replacement, ageing of clove trees and State monopoly in clove marketing systems that put off private sector investment and participation in clove industry.⁴⁴⁴

As a result, Zanzibar has tried to diversify its source of income with tourism emerging as a natural replacement even though its Western-focused tourist industry is small and fragile. The fall of cloves trade outlines the real economic situation of Zanzibar that some people especially from Pemba island where cloves is dominant are likely to face life hardship thereby attracted to alternative political model, including Islamism.

A study by Thembi Mutch shows that there is high unemployment and inequity in Zanzibar thereby contributing to growing grievances – often targeted at non-Muslims from mainland Tanzania and immigrants from other East Africa countries.⁴⁴⁵ More so, a report by Al Jazeera media house revealed that there is high level of youth unemployment of up to 85% coupled with drug addiction that estimates around 7% of

⁴⁴³ Report by Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (RGoZ): 2013 Zanzibar-Tanzania <https://www.zanzibar.go.tz/index.php?rgo=tourism>. 25/11/2018.

⁴⁴⁴ Juma Ali Juma, External Consultant Final Clove Advocacy Report by Zanzibar Clove Growers Organisation (ZACPO) July, 2010, p. 2. [Http://Www.Best-Dialogue.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Zapco-2010-07-Zanzibar-Clove-Advocacy-Report-Juma.Pdf](http://www.Best-Dialogue.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/Zapco-2010-07-Zanzibar-Clove-Advocacy-Report-Juma.Pdf)

⁴⁴⁵ Thembi Mutch. 2012. *Zanzibar and the Mainland - the Shaky State of the Union*. London: Think Africa Press.

Zanzibar's population being addicted to heroin.⁴⁴⁶ Mutch aptly describes this scenario:

Locals complain that there is an unequal distribution of wealth. They are still not enjoying the benefits of new, lucrative hotels and they suffer through insufficient sewage systems, water and work, whilst tourists and hoteliers reap the benefits of Zanzibar's natural beauty. For locals, civil society remains weak and unemployment is 85% amongst the youth. A drug problem such as heroin addiction has been rising slowly since the 1980s and is now a visible problem.⁴⁴⁷

In addition, Zanzibar has fared poorly from the economic liberalization of the 1990s, falling behind mainland Tanzania in economic growth.⁴⁴⁸ There are concerns among the locals concerning unequal distribution of wealth. As indicated above they complain of not enjoying the benefits of the lucrative tourism industry, whereas the tourists and hoteliers reap the benefits of the industry. Consequently, the dissatisfied segment of the population is easily attracted to the Islamism call for justice and equity due to their vulnerable condition.

With unemployment, xenophobic sentiments among the local Zanzibaris have been on the rise blaming their unfortunate condition to immigrants. This tension between the locals and immigrants is demonstrated in the quotation below:

It's getting extremely tense, I can say they hate us. We don't get served in cafes. If Masaii try and set up stalls to sell tourist curios in Nungwi they get chased out and the landowners who rent us the shop get fined. It is very difficult now. Zanzibaris are sick of all outsiders – such as Tanzanians from the mainland and Kenyans who get good jobs in the hotels.⁴⁴⁹

There is a popular belief among the locals that the country has not enjoyed the same rate of economic growth and social development comparatively to Tanzania

⁴⁴⁶Abigail Higgins. 2015. "Fighting Heroin Addiction in Conservative Zanzibar," Al Jazeera, May 28

⁴⁴⁷Mutch, op.cit.

⁴⁴⁸ Turner, op.cit., p. 259.

⁴⁴⁹ Mutch, op.cit.

mainland.⁴⁵⁰ Amid economic hardship, the Islamist discourse as formulated by Uamsho remains an attractive outlet for the unemployed and discontented segment of society. Despite Zanzibar being part of the Tanzania state, there are wide disparities in the remuneration of the civil servants. A civil servant employed in Zanzibar is paid a lower salary than the one working in the mainland Tanzania irrespective of both doing the same duties and having similar educational attainment. For instance, the minimum salary for Zanzibari public workers was TZS 150,000 during 2015/2016 financial year,⁴⁵¹ and that of a civil servant in mainland Tanzania was TZS 310,000 in the same year.⁴⁵² These salary variations have been interpreted as a deliberate effort to marginalize the Muslim community in the country hence strengthening the demand to secede from the union and create an Islamic state.⁴⁵³

The ensuing scenario confirms the Deprivation Theory, which compels a section of Zanzibaris to organize under an alternative political model that would guarantee the improvement of their social condition. It is these feelings of discrimination and marginalization that the opposition capitalised, Islamists included, to mobilize the masses on the religio-political platform. Without doubt, the popularity of Uamsho as a representation of Islamist's ideology could be explained, on the one hand, through the people's desire to escape their economic miseries.⁴⁵⁴

The political consciousness of Zanzibari Muslims could be attributed to the growing access to both secular and religious education. The appearance of Islamist organizations has led to the modernization of Islamic education thereby attracting

⁴⁵⁰ Interview with Said Ali, Benbella High school, Zanzibar, 21/02/2014; and Ali Amour Kiponda High School, Zanzibar, 24/02/2014.

⁴⁵¹ Khadija Khamis and Mariyam Kidiko, *habarileo* — Maelezo Zanzibar, 19/08/2016.

⁴⁵² Samuel Kamndaya. 2015. "Minimum salary raised to Sh. 310,000." *The Citizen*, May 19.

⁴⁵³ Interview with Juma Nahoda, Haille Selasie High School, Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.

⁴⁵⁴ Jeffrey Haynes. 2006. "Islam and Democracy in East Africa," *Democratization*, 13, no. 3, pp.490–507.

support from a cross section of the population in the country. The mass access to education has produced a generation that is educated and informed, enabling them to articulate for their rights as citizens.⁴⁵⁵ Aware of the resultant favourable condition, the Uamsho movement have tapped it to their advantage to disseminate their agenda to the masses. As a result of the easily available Islamic literature, satellite television, recorded religio-political sermons in tapes, CDs, and DVDs, one could notice a section of Zanzibar Muslims who have become more vocal, and politicized.

To the supporters of Islamist agenda, the secular political system is blamed for the various maladies facing Muslim society of Zanzibar; hence, demanding for the establishment of an Islamic political model as a solution. In their assessment, a liberal political democracy provides numerous freedoms that go beyond the Islamic ethical boundary. According to them, the prevailing political system is responsible for the disappearing of Islamic moral ethos in the public.⁴⁵⁶ It is against this background that in early 2010, a group of Muslim under the name *Simba wa Mungu* (Lions of God) emerged to police the societal morals. They agitated for public morality that controlled women's code of dressing and prohibits drinking of alcohol both in private and public spheres.⁴⁵⁷ This demonstrates how Muslim religious scholars in the country are striving to become influential in determining and enforcing religious and social behaviour in the society.⁴⁵⁸

As indicated earlier, after the 1964 revolution, Zanzibar signed a pact with Tanganyika, uniting the two countries to form The United Republic of Tanzania. This

⁴⁵⁵ Westerlund, op.cit, p. 323.

⁴⁵⁶ Interviews with Wahida Khalid, Secondary School Teacher, Melinne Zanzibar, 19/02/2018.

⁴⁵⁷ An Interview with Abdullah Talib, Zanzibar Wakf Office, 26/02/2014.

⁴⁵⁸ Glickman, op.cit, p. 3.

decision was, however, criticized by a section of the Zanzibari population.⁴⁵⁹ With the unification, Zanzibar had to surrender numerous responsibilities to the union government, which became the source of grievances. There are concerns among Zanzibaris that the unification was a political plunder since there is nothing good to show from the union. Instead, the unification is blamed to have left Zanzibar behind, which is believed to have been a deliberate systematic agenda designed by Nyerere to ensure that any form of development associated with the Muslims was annihilated.⁴⁶⁰

Several Zanzibaris including some politicians in the ruling party (CCM) support the idea of Zanzibar seceding from the union and forming their own independent state. Mansour Yussuf Himid (a former CCM member), for example, was expelled from the party because of opposing the ruling party position of maintaining the status quo.⁴⁶¹ On their part, Uamsho have been very consistent in articulating this cause despite confronting numerous challenges. Using their rallying call “*tuacheee tupumue*” (let us breathe), the organization insinuate that the union is toxic and they would now want to be allowed to run their affairs independent of the Tanzania mainland.⁴⁶² It is this feeling of deprivation that has compelled a section of Muslims in the country to seek for an alternative political solution, which in their assessment would be found in the Islamic political ideology to bring the necessary change in the country.

6.4 External Factors’ Influence of Islamism Development in Zanzibar

Another situation, which could have contributed to the emergence of Islamism in Zanzibar, is the influence of external factors. There is an increase of wealthy donors

⁴⁵⁹ Bang, *Textual Sources on an Islamic African Past*, p. 350.

⁴⁶⁰Glickman, op.cit, p. 4.

⁴⁶¹ Mutch, op.cit.

⁴⁶² An Interview with Abdullah Rashid Seif, member of Uamsho, Msumbiji – Zanzibar, 22/02/2014; Massoud Msellem, deputy media representative of Hizb-ut-tahrir East Africa, Magogoni Zanzibar, 23/02/2014

from the Gulf States, funding the construction of mosques, secondary schools, and health clinics in Zanzibar.⁴⁶³ Mosques are very important places where Muslims perform their prayers; organize issuance of sermons and trainings, which informs of being 'good' Muslims. On the other hand, the schools help to build the Islamic ethics and confidence of the Zanzibar's young generation. In addition, the Gulf donors support student scholarships to study in local universities and foreign universities such as Khartoum (Sudan) and Medina (Saudi Arabia).⁴⁶⁴ Moreover, the donors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait finance two Islamic universities of Zanzibar, the Zanzibar University (in Tunguu) and University College of Education (in Chukwani).⁴⁶⁵ Clearly, these developments have increased the ability of Muslims awareness through education provided in the mosques, schools and universities.

More so, some Muslims appear inspired by the triumph of the Islamic revolutions in Iran in 1979 and Sudan in 1989, and by the activities of Islamist groups in the Middle East. The Iranian Islamic Revolution was the series of events that culminated to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty under Shah Mohamad Reza who was supported by America. Mass demonstrations against Shah began in October 1977, which developed into a campaign of civil resistance.⁴⁶⁶ The protests intensified in 1978 as an outcome of the burning of Rex Cinema, which was perceived as the main cause of the Revolution. More so, strikes and demonstrations paralyzed the country between August and December that year; hence, Shah Reza left Iran in exile on 16 January 1979 to Europe, the United States, and lastly died in Egypt in 1980.⁴⁶⁷

⁴⁶³Glickman, op.cit., p. 3.

⁴⁶⁴Turner, op.cit., p. 15.

⁴⁶⁵ Glickman, op.cit, p. 3.

⁴⁶⁶ Abrahamian, Ervand. 2009. "Mass Protests in the Islamic Revolution, 1977–79." in *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 162–78.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

Ayatollah Khomeini was invited back to Iran and returned to Tehran greeted by several million Iranians. Yet he became the leader of the new government with an Islamic Republic, which was supported by various Islamist organisations and student movements. Iran became an Islamic Republic on 1 April 1979 whereby Khomeini became supreme leader of the country in December 1979.⁴⁶⁸ The Iranian instance might give hope to any other Islamist groups their movements to achieve the goals including the Uamsho. Either, The Islamic revolution in Iran is an example, which Muslims around the world cherish to emulate because it is a typical example of an Islamist movement that was successful in re-establishing an Islamic state through mobilising the masses in a revolution.⁴⁶⁹ Therefore, Uamsho leadership together with their sympathisers are convinced that it is possible for them to achieve their goal of establishing Islamic state in the similar manner the Iranians succeeded regardless their differences in religious sects.

The extremist Muslims believe that the redemption of the Muslims in the country could be achieved only through physical means, which guarantees the establishment of *Dar al-Islam* (the land its inhabitants are governed under the Islamic laws) at the expense of *Dar al-Harb* (the house or abode of war).⁴⁷⁰ Consequently, ‘moderate’ Muslims and officials with foreign diplomats have expressed concerns about intensifying Islamist extremism in Zanzibar. The support by Islamist groups of violent means to attain their political objective has raised concern among the political elites of Zanzibar.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Westerlund, op.cit, p. 326.

⁴⁷⁰ Terdman, op.cit.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

The activities of the global *jihadi* groups in various parts of the Muslim world such as Lebanon's Hizbollah, which is a Shia Islamist political party and a militant group is concerned. Hizbollah's paramilitary wing is the Jihad Council in the Lebanese parliament headed by its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. The idea of the group arose among Lebanese clerics who adopted the model set out by Ayatollah Khomeini. The organization was established as part of an Iranian effort to resist the Israeli occupation and improve the standing and status of Shiite community in that country.⁴⁷² Moreover, the Nigeria's militant Islamist group *Boko Haram*, which is fighting to overthrow the government of Nigeria and create an Islamic state, stands as an example as well as the Salvation Islamic Front (FIS) in Algeria, which holds nearly the same general goal.

Similarly, motivating the Islamist cause in the country are the activities of al-Shabaab of Somalia. The al-Shabaab group is militarily advancing its cause of annihilating the existing Somalia government in order to replace it with one described as 'Islamic state'.⁴⁷³ The group is possible to stimulate a section of Zanzibari Islamists in embracing violence as a means to attain their goal. *Al Shabaab*, (The Youth) is the largest militant organization, and is not only fighting to oust the Somali government but also to move away the foreign military presence supporting the government. Although based in Somalia, the group also conducts attacks in neighbouring countries, conspicuously Kenya.⁴⁷⁴

To the Zanzibari Islamists, this is something to be emulated. However, at the same time Uamsho also seem to want to influence changes in the country by participating in

⁴⁷² Mariam Farida, *Religion and Hezbollah: Political Ideology and Legitimacy*, Routledge, 2019 ISBN 978-1-000-45857-2 pp.1-3.

⁴⁷³ Glickman, op.cit. ; LeSage, *The Rising Terrorist Threat in Tanzania*, p. 5

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

the political process through supporting the candidatures of certain politicians during elections. Though this strategy resonates very well with the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, it has not successfully worked with the Uamsho organization.

Furthermore, the activities of the separatist group Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) on the Kenyan coast present parallels to the situation in Zanzibar. MRC is a separatist organisation based in the coastal city of Mombasa Kenya formed in 1999 to address perceived political and economic discrimination against the people of the coast province. The group traces its secession claims to the 1895 and 1963 agreements transferring the ten-mile strip of land along the coast to the Government of Kenya from Zanzibar. MRC was dormant until 2008, when it first raised claims that Mombasa should secede from Kenya to liberate the people of the coast from marginalization of the Kenya government. Their slogan “*Pwani si Kenya*” (The Coast is not Kenya) is deliberate to demonstrate that the coast of Kenya has never been part of the nation-state known as Kenya.⁴⁷⁵ Both Mombasa and Zanzibar were historically part of the Sultanate of Oman with a lot in common linguistically, religiously, and affinity.⁴⁷⁶ Yet, the specific parallels that Uamsho seem to have borrowed or influenced by MRC are its intention to secede from Tanzania mainland and its feeling of being politically and economically discriminated and marginalized.

6.5 Conclusion

The discussions in this chapter could be articulated very well by the political process theory. According to this theory, one of the vital components for movement formation is the insurgent consciousness, which involves feelings of certain members of the

⁴⁷⁵ Paul Goldsmith. 2011. “MRC Conflict Assessment Report.” Research Commissioned by Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Programme, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), p. 25. www.kecosce.org/.../MRC_Conflict_Assessment_Threats_and_Op...

⁴⁷⁶ Brennan, op.cit.p. 831

society of being mistreated or that somehow the system is unjust.⁴⁷⁷ The chapter showed that Islamism consciousness in Zanzibar, on one hand, has increased due to the supposed uneven economic growth, and marginalization of the Muslim community in comparison to the status of non-Muslims in Tanzania. However, with the provision of both modern Islamic and secular education, the ‘mistreated’ people become conscious and aware of the situation thereby deciding to search for a solution from an alternative political ideology as presented by political Islam.

The theory seems to confirm Ted Robert Gurr argument that a sense of deprivation or inequality propels people into joining movements, particularly in relation to others, or in relation to their expectations. While exploring why people engage in political violence, Gurr posits that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism in which when frustration is prolonged and sharply felt, often does result in anger and eventually violence.⁴⁷⁸ As illustrated in the chapter, numerous factors both local and external have unified a section of Muslims against the state.

Furthermore, the chapter highlighted on the conceptual meaning of Islamism as a political ideology that uses different approach including violent strategy to political militancy as well as competitive political parties with the aim of recreation of a world of Islamic community. Uamsho was shown as a sample of the group pertaining that ideology thus a number of evil activities were attributed to the group including churches and bars destructions, acid attacks, and murdering of Christian clerics. Moreover, the group not only claimed the government for not protecting the Islamic

⁴⁷⁷Kornhauser, op.cit.p. 256.

⁴⁷⁸ Ted Robert Gurr. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 416-420.

public morality but also scorned at the Prevention of Terrorism Act quarrelling that it was aimed at suppressing Muslim activities in Zanzibar.

The chapter explored the factors that contributed to Islamism in Zanzibar thereby revealed various internal and external factors. Internally, the factors found were the extraneous economic situations such as unemployment, political consciousness, and the rotten social environment including tourism, bars, and immodest dressing among the ladies. In addition, the study found other factors from outside Zanzibar, which are likely to cause Islamism including the triumph of the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Sudan, activities of the global jihadi groups such as Hezbollah, Al-shabbab, Boko Haram, Islamic State (ISI), and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).

Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) – the active group working in Kenya was seen to have also influenced the Islamist group of Uamsho towards its intention to secede from Tanzania mainland. Uamsho members kept insisting on secession of Zanzibar from the fact that they were actually disappointed from what were going on in the society. More so, they noticed that without a comprehensive authority and autonomy there will be no success. To them success is the ability of possessing freedom of decision in all matters concerning the country for instance the introduction and implementation of Islamic rule.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

7.1 Summary

The discussions in this dissertation were spread across the six chapters, which explored the themes of religion and politics, secularism, Islamism and marginalization. Specifically, the study examined Muslims' political activism in Zanzibar and argued on the prospects of Islamism in the country taking Uamsho organization as a case. In explaining the various themes, the study relied the theoretical foundation presented by the Social Conflict theory, which posits that individuals and groups within society have differing amounts of material and non-material resources thereby subjecting a society in a state of perpetual conflict and competition as demonstrated with the situation in Zanzibar. Presently, Zanzibar is a predominantly a Muslim country with a Sunni majority. It began in 1832 when Sultan Said bin Sultan identified Zanzibar as the headquarters of his East African dominion.⁴⁷⁹ With the introduction of the Oman Sultanate, Islam gained much impetus developing to an official religion of the state. Though the Islamic culture forms part of the daily scene, there is a small number of a Christian population, mostly from mainland Tanzania.

The theme on secularism was addressed in Chapter two, showing the genesis, and the divergent views held by both the secularists and Islamists on the concept. As a secular state, Tanzania adopted a form of 'socialism and self-reliance' in her socio-economic development, which did not declare any specific religion a state religion in its constitution. This approach was informed by the desire to restrict the interaction of religion and politics. Despite government restrictions, Zanzibar has always identified itself with certain Islamic institutions such as the *Wakf*, *Mufti* and *Kadhi* court. Thus,

⁴⁷⁹ Hettiger, op.cit, p. 6.

though a secular state, the Zanzibar government has been known to be sensitive to Muslim sensibilities. All Muslim's religious holidays are recognized as national holidays. The government's seemingly bias towards Islam is due to the fact that Muslims are more than 99% of the population of the Zanzibar archipelago.

To have a clear contextualization of Islam in Zanzibar, Chapter Three demonstrated that Islam arrived in this country earlier before the intrusion of the European colonialism. The history of Islam in Zanzibar and the whole area of East African coast can be traced to around 960-1000 AD. Clearly, there is evidence of Islam's long tenure in Zanzibar as illustrated with the presence of the oldest mosque situated in Kizimkazi, southern district of Zanzibar. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese invaded the East African coast, and successfully controlled almost all the ports in the East African coast upon their arrival. As Christians, they exercised a high level of brutality and violence to the local people whom majority were Muslims. Consequently, the local rulers invited Omani Arabs to come and assist them in expelling the Portuguese thereby taking over the region as their new area of influence.

During the British protectorate era, the colonial administration exercised a divide-and-rule policy, which reinforced racial identities among the Zanzibaris as demonstrated in the formation of the various political parties, including ASP, ZNP, ZPPP, and Umma party. Ultimately, a coalition of ZNP and ZPPP formed the independence government of Zanzibar in December 1963. However, ASP led by Abeid A. Karume overthrew the coalition government in January 1964 under the allegations that the independence government continued exploiting Africans. Furthermore, the chapter examined the issue of Tanzania's unification that was influenced by both local and international factors. Despite the beneficial associated with the unification, the

strongest critics of the union have alleged that there is substantial lack of people's participation on union matters. Of major concern to the Zanzibaris is the supposed absence of legal document in the country's statutes ratifying the unification, together with the growing number of union matters from eleven to twenty-three, which in their views threatens the Zanzibar's autonomy.

Discussions on Uamsho as an organization begin in Chapter Four to Chapter Six, which indicates that the organization was formed by a group of Muslims as a platform for religious proselytization. Gradually, the developed from a religious association into a movement leaning towards Islamist tendencies as demonstrated in its agenda advanced by its leadership. The resultant movement is vocal in advocating for the establishment of an Islamic state in Zanzibar, which it believes could only be realized by Zanzibar attaining its full autonomy. As a result, secession marks rallying point of the movement. Consequently, during the constitutional review period, the movement capitalised on the opportunity to question the legitimacy of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. There is no doubt that through their voice, Uamsho seem to have awakened the political consciousness of most Zanzibaris who support the idea of revoking the unification, thereby guaranteeing the country's independence.

As a country, the people in Zanzibar went a period of political discontentment during the single-party system era, which started in 1977 after the coalition of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Tanganyika National Union (TANU) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as the only legal political party. Nevertheless, with political pressure, Tanzania re-introduced a multi-party democracy in 1992, which saw the Civic United Front (CUF) appearance as the main opposition party in Zanzibar. It is under this atmosphere of liberal democracy that the country witnesses the growing of

political Islam thereby posing a threat to the state. CUF major rallying call was to unify the Zanzibaris in demanding for the country's autonomy, an idea that resonated with the political views of the Uamsho Islamist movement.

Since there is no single explanation for the seemingly attraction of a section of Zanzibaris to the Uamsho movement, both internal and external factors are attributed to have contributed to the emergence of political Islam (Islamism) in Zanzibar. These views are explored in Chapter Six. The feeling of supposed discrimination and marginalization by the Muslims in the country captures the internal factor dimension. It is this feeling that has heaved Muslims' emotions to demand for autonomy from the unification. As demonstrated in the chapter, Zanzibar is a part of the United Republic of Tanzania, but many Zanzibaris are discontented with the existing union structure of the two governments arguing that mainland Tanzania seem to have monopoly power over union matters. It is against this background, and as indicated in the Warioba's commission, many Zanzibaris support the idea of Zanzibar attaining full autonomy to allow the country to run its affairs.

Apart from local conditions, the study identified numerous external factors behind the development of Islamism consciousness in the country. The Uamsho movement seems to be borrowing cue from other Islamist groups in other parts of the Muslim world. As a forbearer of political Islam, the Islamic revolution of Iran has largely inspired global Muslims towards the construction of an Islamic state, Zanzibar Muslim included. Moreover, the forces of globalization have amplified knowledge and Muslims' political consciousness through the appropriation new media tools, including radios, telephones, televisions, books, and internet services.

7.2 Conclusion

The study has made investigation on miscellaneous themes on Islamism as prevailing in Zanzibar islands showing its implications. This topic was very crucial to be studied in the contemporary life of Tanzanians particularly Zanzibar. It gave a level of awareness to the readers of this study to the extent that they were provided with information and facts on the clear meaning of general concept of Islamism and its major approaches.

It was very necessary to go back highlighting some issues on secularism in order to better exploring themes on Islamism. Hence, secularism as was defined and analysed in the study, has actually caused big inferences to the Islamic viewpoint, this is mainly due to its major principle of separating religion from the state. Many countries in the world adopted the secular policy hoping that it would be the only way of maintaining peace and security, especially those countries consisted of peoples with different religious ideology. However, for the Muslims guided by their ideology that defines religion as a complete way of human life is a great challenge. That is why implementation of secularism in Zanzibar is somehow different from that of other countries. Though the country was declared secular, it is seen to institutionalize offices based on Islamic religion. Overall, the percentage of secularism found in Zanzibar built hatred condition to Muslims the Islamists among the Uamsho members included.

Zanzibar has passed through different periods such as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods where the study made a detail analysis on the political and Islamic religion activities. When the first foreigners came to East African coast, they found Islamic culture had already cemented with a number of prominent scholars including

Ahmad Abibakr Al-Sumeit and Abdalla Swaleh Al-Farsy. With the coming of colonialism, the people witnessed the introduction of dual system of jurisdiction – Islamic and British. Related to that, was the emergence of political parties, which were mainly associated with social classes, racial identity, and geographical origin. However, in the long run, Zanzibar got independence from the British in 1963 though was not recognized by ASP members who made the revolution in 1964 and ultimately, united the country with Tanganyika to form Tanzania in the same year. Moreover, the frequent cries from the unfair elections organised in Zanzibar made the country to be governed under the government of national unity (GNU). Anyway, unification is the best thing for human being because it strengthens the social, economic, and political ties among the united nations, however, it should be governed by the unbiased and strong consents of both sides.

Checking for the genesis of the Uamsho association played a very important role in the study of Islamism in Zanzibar. It is noted that the association was typically formed with the purpose of performing the prophetic work. However, the association seemed to plunge itself into a state politics to the extent of making analysis on the state constitution publicly, which led to some people to argue the legality of the association to play in that ground. Obviously, it was revealed that the association has embedded a political agenda including secession of Zanzibar from mainland Tanzania. Due to this stance of the association, the government became very negative to it to the extent of banning its activities, arresting its leaders, and opening cases to them. This development has put the country into a terrible and tense situation. Actually, the society needs to live in harmony and conducive environment; however, this level will not be reached without patience and tolerance among people of different faiths, as well as people and the state.

Furthermore, the Uamsho association is seen to be negative towards government machineries. The study showed us that the association was not contented with the government Islamic institutions of Wakf, Mufti, and Kadhi courts. On other hand, the Uamsho's act of participating in Zanzibar political elections of the president and members of parliament as observers was very shame according to other analysts including members of *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*. To them, Uamsho were supposed to find and apply the acceptable ways of achieving the goal of creating the Islamic state.

Islamist activities are big challenge to Tanzania and Zanzibar in particular. Hence, a core subject of the study was to explore Islamism its features and the situations that contributed to its emergence in Zanzibar. It is necessary for the society to be aware of the internal factors including unemployment, social, and political discontentment among others; however, it also ought to be aware of the external factors such as the Islamic activities of Al-Shabaab and Muslim brotherhood among others.

Generally, Islamism is a very sensitive topic to be studied. The study relied on the Social Conflict Theory when analysing and presenting its themes. As described in other sections of this study, the theory was relevant and workable in highlighting various incidents taking place within the context of Zanzibar. It is the researcher's hope that the Tanzania society, Zanzibar in particular would have highly benefited by reviewing the report and findings produced by this study.

7.3 Contribution of the Study

The main contribution of this research lies in its analysis of Muslims political activism in Zanzibar from a wide historical outlook. More significantly, it has been able to trace the recent political discourses involving Muslims in the country. The findings presented in this work would serve as a background for those interested in

studying the development of political Islam in the country. Clearly, the study has grappled with the question of political Islam also popularly known as Islamism, with specific focus on Zanzibar. As a religious ideology founded on Islamic principles to guide social, political, and personal life, there are two different approaches used by Islamist to attain their goal. Thus, some Islamist groups confine their activities in a single country to address local affairs, while others concern themselves with the global affairs of the Muslims.

Further, there are different shades of Islamist groups in which one would find those with militancy tendencies and uses violence to achieve their objectives. On the other hand, there also non-militant Islamist groups that always opt for diplomatic approach to achieve their agenda. Arguably, Uamsho organization presents itself as a non-militant Islamist group, due to its reliance on legal and constitutional means to champion its agenda. The ultimate goal of the movement is to secede from the unification, which would ensure the establishment of an Islamic state. This should not be misconstrued to suggest that the movement do not at all resort to the application of violence whenever it feels that the rights of Muslims are being violated.

7.4 Recommendations

Conspicuously emerging out of this study is the Muslims' perceived discrimination and marginalization in a political system dominated non-Muslims from the mainland Tanzania. This has resulted to a section of Muslims developing hatred against any representation of Christian symbolism in the country. If this situation is not checked early, it could erupt into religious based violence pitting Muslims against non-Muslims. There is need to develop an institution of inter-religious dialogue to bring

members of the various religions together in a conversation aimed at taming tension and instead create understanding and tolerance.

Also of considerable impotence is to revisit the union's Articles and the Tanzania constitution to address the concerns raised by the Uamsho movement. If need be, the government should consider the referendum request to allow Tanzanians to decide on the future of the unification or the form of the union that would best address sentiments of all citizens. It would also be crucial for the Tanzanian political elites to facilitate for the establishment of a 'Constitutional Court' to arbitrate any possible conflict between the two states.

It is evident that there exist mistrust and suspicions in the working relations between the government and the Uamsho movement leadership thereby creating unnecessary tension. Through its security agencies, the government has resorted into using violence to clamp down supporters of the movement in their demand for political reforms in the country. It is necessary for the government to accept criticism from the various segments of the society as it is their right enshrined in the constitution. As a democratic society, the state should not be seen to curtail people's freedom of expression instead to sit down and to discuss with the people to the extent that they would get the relevant solution.

7.5 Areas for Further Study

Due to restriction in accessing vital information, there are reports that I was unable to access. The task of correcting any misrepresentation lies with the future researchers who would build on this study to make new analysis. The role of Islamism in developing Islamic solidarity among different Muslim sects in Zanzibar has remained unstudied as well as the effects of Islamism. There is also a need for research to

examine Islamist tendency in other areas apart from the Urban West region where like this study has not been initiated.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Introduction Letter

Moi University,
School of Art and Social Sciences,
Department of Phil. Rel. and Theology,
P.O. Box 3900,
Eldoret, Kenya.

Dear Brother / Sister in Islam,

I am Makame Soud Mohamed, pursuing a PhD degree in Religious Studies at Moi University, Kenya. I am conducting a research on *Uamsho Islamist Movement: The Politics of Islamism, Unification and Secession in Zanzibar* in partial fulfilment of the award of the Doctoral degree in Religious Studies. I kindly request your assistance in participating in this interview. Your information will be treated confidential, and will be used only for the purpose of this study. Please give your honest opinion so that I will be able to come up with answers to the research questions for purpose of academic pursuit.

Thank you very much.

Yours Faithfully,

Makame Soud Mohammed

Appendix B: Identity Letter from Moi University



MOI UNIVERSITY
(ISO 9001:2008 CERTIFIED INSTITUTION)

SCHOOL OF ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES

Tel: (053) 43093
(053) 43620 Ext 2515
Fax: (053) 43047
E-mail: deanarts@mu.ac.ke

P.O Box 3900
ELDORET
KENYA

6th May, 2015

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN,

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: MOHAMED Makame Soud – SASS/DPHIL/REL/01/12

This is to certify that the above named is a bonafide student at Moi University, School of Arts and Social Sciences. He is a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) student in Religious Studies.

He has completed his coursework component and proposal and has now embarked on Thesis writing.

His Thesis is entitled: "Political Reforms and the Prospect of Islamism in Zanzibar".

Any assistance accorded to him will be appreciated.

DEAN
SCHOOL OF ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES
MOI UNIVERSITY

PROF. P.T. SIMATEI
DEAN, SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

Appendix C: Interview Guide for Key Informants - I

(Uamsho Officials & Activists)

Name (optional).....

Date.....Place.....

Age.....Sex.....

Status in the Organization.....

Educational Background.....

1. What is the major reason that led to the formation of Uamsho?
2. What are the objectives of Uamsho organization, and to what extent have they been achieved?
3. What are the main activities of Uamsho?
4. What are the main sources of funding?
5. What is the leadership and membership structure of Uamsho?
6. What is the relationship of the association with the government?
7. What are the major political interactions with the government?
8. Explain the assertion that Uamsho is no longer a religious movement but rather a political group.
9. To what extent has Uamsho become a source of the recent riots and violence witnessed in Zanzibar?
10. How is it justified for people to attack bars and churches?
11. What is the justification of extending the violence to other Muslim leaders?
12. Elaborate the notion that the solution to Zanzibar's socio-economic problems is for the country to secede from the unification.

13. Describe the nature of the relationship between Uamsho and other Islamic associations in and outside Zanzibar.
14. Give details on the relationship between Uamsho organization and the government Islamic institutions such as the *Wakf*, the *Mufti*, and the *Kadhi* Court.
15. To what extent *jihadi* groups like the *Al-qaida*, *Boko Haram*, and *Al-Shabab* have influences on the movement?
16. Why does the organization think that *sharia* law is the solution to the entire problem facing Zanzibar?
17. What is a blue print that would guide the organization to realize its goals?
18. Analyse the specific changes the organization would like to initiate in the country.
19. What forms the ideological of Uamsho organization?

Appendix D: Interview Guide for Key Informants - II

(Muslim leaders)

Name (optional).....

Date.....Place.....

Age.....Sex.....

Status/Position.....

Educational Background.....

1. What is your view with regard to the emergence of the Uamsho organization in the country?
2. Explain the possibility for Uamsho to turn Zanzibar into an Islamic state applying sharia.
3. Account for the suitability of the approach used by Uamsho in advocating for their agenda in Zanzibar and in accordance with the country's law.
4. Give opinion on the said argument that Uamsho is no longer a religious movement but rather a political entity.
5. To what extent could be the recent cases of violence attributed to the rise of Uamsho movement in the country?
6. Show the possibility for the various Muslim organizations in the country to unite in order to have a strong single voice.
7. Mention the raising cases of Islamic radicalisation in Zanzibar.
8. Account for the causes of radical Islamism in Zanzibar.
9. Why Uamsho advocates for the autonomy of Zanzibar?

Appendix E: List of Key Informants

1. Abdalla Rashid Seif, member of Uamsho, Msumbiji – Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.
2. Abdullah Talib Abdulla, Executive Secretary of Wakf office - Zanzibar, 26/02/2014.
3. Ali Amour Ali, Civics teacher, Kiponda High School, Zanzibar, 24/02/2014.
4. Amina Salum Khalfan, *Amira* Propagation Centre (IPC), Zanzibar, 25/02/2014.
5. Hassan Othman Ngwali, Deputy Chief Kadhi, High Court Zanzibar, 13/08/2014.
6. Issa Haji Hassan, Salami mosque, Mwanakwerekwe – Zanzibar, 20/02/2014.
7. Issa Haji Ziddy, Lecturer, The State University of Zanzibar (SUZA), 05/03/2014.
8. Juma Nahoda, Haille Selasie High School, Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.
9. Khamis Juma, Benbella High School, Zanzibar, 21/02/2014.
10. Khamis Ramadhan Abdallah, Regional Magistrate, High Court Zanzibar, 13/08/2014.
11. Kidawa Hassan Ame, political activist, Msumbiji Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.
12. Mahmoud Wadi, Deputy Mufti of Zanzibar, Zanzibar, 18/02/2014.
13. Masoud Msellem, Deputy Media Representative of Hizb-ut-tahrir, Zanzibar, 23/02/2014.
14. Mkadam Khamis Mkadam, Regional Police Commander (RPC) - Urban West, Madema Zanzibar, 18/08/2014.
15. Msellem Ali Msellem, Amir (Chairman) Uamsho, Zanzibar, 11/03/2014.
16. Mwanakheir Gharib Haji, member of UKUEM, Zanzibar, 24/02/2014.
17. Othman Issa Bora, member Uamsho, Msumbiji Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.

18. Othman Mohamed Saleh, Muft office, Zanzibar, 18/02/2014.
19. Said Abubakr Ali, Kiponda High School, Zanzibar, 24/02/2014.
20. Said Ali, assistant head master, Benbella High school, Zanzibar, 21/02/2014.
21. Salum Sharif Ali, Uamsho activist, Madrasatut-tarbiatul-Islamiyyat, Mwanakwerekwe – Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.
22. Suleiman Massoud Makame, State Attorney, Vuga Zanzibar, 13/08/2014.
23. Suleiman Mohamed Saleh, Uamsho activist, Msumbiji Zanzibar, 22/02/2014.
24. Wahida Khalid Iddi, Mwanakwerekwe Secondary School, Zanzibar, 19/02/2014.

Appendix F: Map of Zanzibar Islands – Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba



(Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/zanzibar_77.jpg)

Appendix G: A Copy of Uamsho Constitution

KATIBA YA JUMUIYA YA UAMSHO NA MIHADHARA YA KIISLAM

UTANGULIZI

Pale ambapo hapana umoja miongoni mwa Waislam;

Na pale ambapo hapana kusaidiana miongoni mwa Waislam;

Na pale ambapo maasi yameenea katika jamii;

Na pale ambapo maadili mema yamepote;

IPO HAJA ya kuunda Jumuiya itakayowakumbusha waislam kufanya mema na kuacha maovu;

Jumuiya ambayo itawaunganisha Waislam na kurejesha heshima ya Uislam;

Jumuiya ambayo itawakutanisha waislam katika juhudi zao za pamoja kurudisha utukufu wa Uislam.

SEHEMU YA KWANZA

1. JINA

Jumuiya hii inayoanzishwa kwa mujibu wa Katiba hii itaitwa JUMUIYA YA UAMSHO NA MIHADHARA YA KIISLAM au kwa Lugha ya Kiingereza "THE ASSOCIATION FOR ISLAMIC MOBILISATION AND PROPAGATION" kwa ufupi AIMP.

2. HADHI

Jumuiya itakuwa ni chombo huru kinachojitegemea na kwa jina Lake wenyewe kuweza kumiliki mali pamoja na kuwa na uwezo Wa kushtaki ama kushatakiwa.

3. LUGHA

Katika utendaji wa shughuli zake. Jumuiya itatumia lugha ya Kiswahili na Kiingereza au lugha yoyote nyengine itakayihitajika.

4. MAKAO MAKUU

Makao makuu ya Jumuiya yatakuwa katika Mji wa Zanzibar.
Jumuiya inaweza pia kufungua watawi katika sehemu kadhaa za Unguja na Pemba kufuatana na mahitajio.

SEHEMU YA PILI

5. MADHUMUNI

AIMP inaanza ikiwa na madhumuni yafuatayo:-

- (a) Kuleta mapenzi, umoja na maendeleo miongoni mwa waumini wa Kiislam;
- (b) Kuendeleza heshima, urithi na historia ya kiislam;
- (c) Kuwahamasisha waislam katika masuala ya dini yao Ikiwa ni pamoja na elimu, utamaduni na utukufu wa dini Ya kiislam;
- (d) Kufanya jambo jengine lolote lenye kheri au linalolenga Katika kuinua na kuieneza dini ya kiislam;
- (e) Kulinda na kutetea haki za Binaadamu zinazokubalika katika Uislamu ikiwa pamoja na kumhifadhi muislamu anapokuwa na shida;
- (f) Kulinda na kutetea silka na utamaduni wa kiislamu (usivunjwe, usipotoshwe, usifutwe,).
- (g.) kusaidia kutatua matatizo yanayotokezea katika jamii ikiwa ni pamoja na migogoro, maafa ,na kupambana na majanga mbali mbali ya . maradhi kama ukimwi, matumizi ya madawa ya kulevya nk.

6. NJIA ZA UFANIKISHAJI

Katika kufikia madhumuni yaliyoolezwa katika ibara Iliyotangulia, AIMP inakusudia kufanya yafuatayo:-

- (a) Kuwakutanisha waislam katika mihadhara, ibada za pamoja na shughuli nyengine za dini;
- (b) Kuratibu masuala ua elimu ya uamsho kupitia:-
 - (i) Mihadhara , madarasa.
 - (ii) Kuandika vitabu na makala majarida na magazeti kuhusiana na mada mbali mbali.
 - (iii) Kufanya ziara, semina, warsha na mijadala.
- (c) AIMP itatafuta mawasiliano ya karibu na waislam au vikundi vya kiislam vya ndani na nje ya nchi kwa jili ya kuimarisha mapenzi, umoja na mshikamano miongoni mwa waislam.
- (d) Kuhamasisha kuishi katika utamaduni wa kiislam kwa maneno na vitendo.
- (g) Jumuiya itahusisha na kujenga hisani na mazingira Bora;
- (h) AIMP itafanya au kusaidia kufanywa shughuli yoyote yenye lengo la kuendeleza uislam na waislam.pamoja na kuunda kamati za utendaji katika kufanisha malengo na madhumuni hayo.

SEHEMU YA TATU

7. UANACHAMA

- (a) Kila muislam mwenye umri usiopungua miaka 18 na Ambae anakubali kuitii katiba hii, anaweza kuwa Mwanachama wa AIMP.
- (b) Maombi ya uanachama yatafanywa kwa kujaza fomu Maalum itakayowekwa kwa ajili hiyo.
- (c) Kila mwanachama atakuwa na haki zifuatazo:-
 - (i) Kulingana na masharti yaliyowekwa na katiba hii, Kushuriki na kutoa maamuzi katika shughuli zote Za Jumuiya.

- (ii) Kuchagua ama kuchaguliwa kushika nafasi yoyote
Ya uongonzi.
- (iii) Wakati wowote atakapoona muafaka, kutoka Katika Jumuiya kwa amani na usalam
- (d) Kila mwanachama atakuwa na wajibu kama ifuatavyo:-
 - (iv) Kulipa ada maalum ya kiingilio katika Jumuiya.
Ada hii haitorudishwa kwa mwanchama endapo
Ataacha kuwa mwanachama au katika hali
Nyengine yoyote.
 - (v) Kulipa ada ya kila mwaka kama itakavyowekwa na
Kamati kuu.
 - (vi) Kushiriki kikamilifu katika shughuli zote za
Jumuiya ambazo zina muhusu.
 - (vii) Kutekeleza majukumu yoyote mengine kama
atakavyopangiwa na uongozi wa Jumuiya.
- (e) Mwanachama atapoteza sifa za uanachama endapo
Moja au zaidi ya haya yafuatayo litatokea:-
 - (i) Iwapo atafariki
 - (ii) Kwa hiari yake, atakapoacha uanachama;
 - (iii). Endapo utafukuzwa uanachama na kamati kuu;

SEHEMU YA NNE

8. UTAMADUNI WA AIMP

- (a) AIMP itakuwa na utamaduni wa kiislam uliyojengeka
Kutokana na Quran na Sunna za Mtume (SAW);
- (b) Jumuiya haitokuwa na dhahebu maalum bali mwanachama
Wanaweza kuwa ni waislam wa madhehebu tofauti;

- (c) Jumuiya itakuwa na utamaduni wa kutatua migogoro ya waislam kwa hekma na ustarabu mkubwa.
- (d) Jumuiya haitakuwa na uhusiano wowote na chama chochote cha siasa.

SEHEMU YA TANO

9. VYOMBO VYA KIUTAWALA

Jumuiya itakuwa na vyombo vya utawala vifuatavyo:-

- (a) Mkutano Mkuu.
- (b) Bodi ya Wadhamini.
- (c) Kamati Kuu.

A. MKUTANO MKUU

- (a) Mkutano Mkuu utajumuisha wanachama wote wa AIMP na Utaitishwa angalau mara kwa mwaka au kukiwa na dharura ya kuitisha mkutano mkuu. Mkutano Mkuu utakuwa ndio chombo cha juu kabisa katika Jumuiya.
- (b) Mkutano Mkuu utaongozwa na Amir ambae pia atakuwa Ndie mlezi wa Jumuiya.
- (c) Mkutano Mkuu utakuwa na majukumu yafuatayo:-
 - (i) Kuchagua Amir na naibu Amiri, Mshika Fedha na Wajumbe wote wa bodi ya Wadhamini na Kamati Kuu.
 - (ii) Kupokea na kupitisha au kujadili ripoti za utekelezaji kama Zitavyowasilishwa na Kamati Kuu;
 - (iii) Kupitia na kupitisha au kuacha kupitisha bajeti ya Ya Jumuiya kwa mwaka ujao wa fedha.
 - (iv) Kupokea na kujadili ripoti ya mapato na matumizi kwa Mwaka wa fedha uliopita;

(v) Kurekebisha Katiba endapo wazo la kufanya hivyo Litawasilishwa na Kamati Kuu na kukubaliwa na Wanachama wasiopungua theluthi mbili ya Wanachama wote;

(vi) Kufanya jambo jengine lolote linalohitajika kwa Mujibu wa sheria ya Jumuiya ya 1995, Katiba hii Au sheria nyengine ya nchi kuhusiana na Jumuiya.

B. BODI YA WADHAMINI

(a) Bodi ya Wadhamini itakuwa ni chombo cha pili katika Uongozi wa Jumuiya.

(b) Bodi itakuwa na wajumbe wasiopungua watano na Wasiozidi kumi watakaoteuliwa ma Kutano Mkuu kutoka Miongoni mwa waislam;

(c) Mwenyekiti wa Bodi atachaguliwa na mkutano mkuu na ni yeye atakaongoza mikutano yote ya Bodi. Endapo Mwenyekiti atakuwa hayupo basi Bodi itamteua mmoja miongoni mwao ili kuchukua nafasi ya mwenyekiti kwa madhumuni ya kikao au vikao hivyo.

(d) Bodi itakutana angalau mara nne kwa mwaka.

(d) Bodi ndiyo itashirikiana na Kamati kuu itakuwa ndiyo mlinzi na msimamizi mkuu wa Jumuiya na mali zake zote. Na kwa nafasi hiyo Bodi ndiyo itakayokuwa na uwezo, kwa niaba ya Jumuiya, kushtaki ama kushtakiwa, kumiliki, kuuza na kununua Mali ilimradi tu iwe kwa maslahi ya waislam.

(f) Bodi ndiyo itakayokuwa na mamlaka ya kutoa ufafanuzi kuhusiana na vifungu vya Katiba hii.

(i) Endapo kutatokea matatizo yoyote ndani ya Jumuiya Basi Bodi ndiyo itakayofanya kazi ya usuluhishi.

(i) Bodi inaweza kuanzisha kamati ndogo ndogo kwa madhumuni ya kushughulikia suala lolote la Jumuiya . Uongozi na utaratibu wa kazi wa kamati hizo pia utapangwa na Bodi.

C. KAMATI KUU

- (a) Kutakuwa na Kamati Kuu ya Jumuiya ambayo itakuwa Ndiyo dhamana wa shughuli za kila siku za Jumuiya, Wajumbe wote wa Kamati Kuu watakuwa wanaishi Zanzibar.
- (b) Kamati Kuu itakuwa na Amiri, Katibu Mkuu, Mshika fedha Na wajumbe wengine kumi;
- (c) Kamati Kuu itakutana chini ya Amiri angalau mara moja kwa mwezi.
- (d) Masuala yote ya uajiri, uachishaji au ufukuzaji kazi yatakuwa chini ya Kamati Kuu.
- (e) Ili kuweka ufanisi kazini, Kamati Kuu inaweza kuunda vitengo au idara mbali mbali na kuwateua viongozi wa vitengo au idara hizo.
- (f) Kamati Kuu inaweza kuweka kanuni na taratibu ambazo itabidi zifuatwe na wanchama na viongozi wote wa Jumuiya. Isipokuwa kwamba kanuni na taratibu hizo Lazima zisithibitishwe na Bodi ya Wadhamini kabla ya kuanza kutumika kwa mujibu wa katiba.
- (g) Kamati Kuu itakuwa na jukumu la kutayarisha programu ya utekelezaji wa shughuli za Jumuiya kwa mwaka mzima.
- (h) kamati kuu itahakikisha kwamba malengo ya Jumuiya yalioelezwa katika katiba hii yanafikiwa.

SEHEMU YA SITA

10. VIONGOZI WA JUMUIYA

AIMP itakuwa na viongozi wafuatao:-

- (a) Amir;
- (b) Naibu Amir;

- (c) Katibu Mkuu;
- (d) Naibu katibu mkuu;

(e) Mshika Fedha;

(f) Wajumbe.

A. AMIRI

- (a) Amiri atakuwa kiongozi mkuu wa Jumuiya na Atachaguliwa kwa wingi wa kura katika Mkutano Mkuu wa Jumuiya. Isipokuwa kwamba Amiri wa mwanzo wa Jumuiya atateuliwa na wanachama waanzilishi na atashika nafasi hiyo hadi hapo Mkutano Mkuu Utakapoamua kuchagua Amiri mwengine.
- (b) Amiri alichaguliwa hushiuka awadhifa huo atabaki kwa Kipindi cha miaka 3 na wanaweza kuchaguliwa tena kwa kipindi chengune cha miaka 3.
- (c) Amiri ataitisha na kusimamia vikao vyote vya Mkutano Mkuu, na Kamati Kuu.
- (d) Amir anaweza kuondoshwa madarakani kwa azimio Litakapopitishwa katika Kamati Kuu na kuungwa mkono Na theluthi mbili ya wajumbe wote wa Kamati Kuu.

B. KATIBU MKUU

- (a) Kutakuwa na Katibu Mkuu wa Jumuiya ambaye pia Atakuwa ndiye katibu wa Bodi na Kamati Kuu. Jumuiya Inaweza pia kuweka nafasi ya Naibu Katibu Mkuu pindipo Itaona ipo haja ya kufanya hivyo.
- (b) Katibu Mkuu na Naibu Katibu Mkuu, kadri itakavyokuwa, watachanguliwa na Bodi ya Wadhamini katika kikao maalum kilichoitishwa kwa ajili hiyo na wataendelea kushika wadhifa huo kwa kipindi cha miaka 3 na wanaweza kuchaguliwa tena kwa kipindi chengine cha miaka 3 na si zaidi.
- (c) Katika kupitisha maamuzi yoyote yanayohitajika kupigiwa kura, Katibu Mkuu hatoruhusiwa kupiga kura.

- (d) Katibu Mkuu na Naibu wake (kama yupo) watakuwa na majukumu yafuatayo:-
- a Kwa mashirikiano na Amiri, kuuitisha vikao vyote vya Mkutano Mkuu, Bodi na Kamati Kuu.
 - b Kupanga ajenda zitakazozungumza katika vikao hivyo.
 - c Kuweka kumbukumbu zote za Jumuiya.
 - d. Kuweka vyema daftari la wanachama wote wa jumuiya . pamoja na kuwaingiza wale wapya wanaojiunga na kuwafuta wale ambao, kwa sababu yoyote, wamesita kuwa wanachama.
 - e. Kufanya shughuli za kila siku za Jumuiya.
 - f. Kufanya jambo jengine lolote kama atakavyoamriwa na Amir au Bodi au Kamati Kuu.
 - g. Iwapo Katibu mkuu au Naibu itathibitishwa kwamba wamefanya Jambo lolote ambalo ni kinyume cha maadili ya Jumuiya au cha aibu au kuvunja Katiba hii basi Bodi itakuwa na mamlaka ya Kusimamisha uongozi uamuzi wa ama kumfukuza au kumrudisha Kazini utapitishwa na Mkutano Mkuu wa Jumuiya.

C. MSHIKA FEDHA

- (a) Kutakuwa na Mshika Fedha wa AIMP ambae Atachaguliwa na Mkutano Mkuu wa Jumuiya.
- (b) Mshika Fedha atashika wadhifa huo kwa kipindi cha Miaka mitatu lakini anaweza kuchaguliwa kushika tena Nafasi hiyo kwa kipindi cha pili cha miaka mitatu.
- (c) Mshika Fedha atakuwa ndio dhamana na msimamizi wa fedha zote za Jumuiya.
- (d) Mshika fedha atafungua akauti moja au zaid katika Benki ya Watu wa Zanzibar au benki nyengine ziliopo Nchini kama ambavyo Kamati Kuu itaelekeza.

- (e) Mshika Fedha ataweka kumbukumbu zote za mapato na matumizi ya Jumuiya na atakuwa na wajibu kila ifikapo mwisho wa mwaka wa fedha wa Jumuiya, kufunga hesabu za Jumuiya.
- (f) Kamati Kuu inaweza endapo itaona muafaka, kuajiri au Kuomba, kwa makubaliano maalum, huduma za mkaguzi wa hesabu ili kuchungua hesabu za Jumuiya.
- (g) Kamati Kuu inaweza kuweka nafasi na kumteua Msaidizi Mshika Fedha ili kumsaidia Mshika Fedha pale Atakapokuwa na haja ya kufanya hivyo.
- (h) Endapo Mshika Fedha au msaidizi wake (kama yupo) atakwenda kinyume na maadili, au atavunja masharti ya Katiba hii au kufanya kitendo chochote chenye kuleta aibu kwa Jumuiya, basi Bodi ya Wadhamini inaweza Kumsimamisha kazi na endapo haitoridhika na utetezi Wake, basi itamfukuza kabisa.

Isipokuwa kwamba Mshika Fedha aliyefukuzwa kazi kama hakuridhika na uamuzi wa Bodi basi anaweza kupeleka rufaa yake katika kikao cha Mkutano Mkuu ambao baada ya kusikiliza pande zote itatoa uamuzi kufuatana na wingi wa kura.

D. WAJUMBE

- (a) Wajumbe wote wa bodi ya Wadhamini na kamati Kuu Waliochaguliwa kwa mujibu wa Katiba hii nao watakuwa ni Viongozi wa Jumuiya hii ya AIMP
- (b) Wajumbe watashika nafasi zao kwa kipindi cha miaka mitatu na wanaweza kuendelea kutumikia Jumuiya pindipo watachaguliwa tena .Hakutokuwa na kikomo cha utumishi wa Mjumbe katika Bodi au kamati Kuu.

(c) Mjumbe yoyote anaweza kuondolewa madarakani kwa azimio lililopitishwa na kuungwa mkono na theluthi mbili au zaidi ya wajumbe wa bodi ya wadhamini ikiwa mjumbe huyo amefanya kitendo au jambo lolote ambalo ni kinyume na maadili ya Jumuiya au cha aibu au kuvunja katiba hii, Isipokuwa ieleweke wazi kwamba hakuna mtu atakachukumua bila ya Kwanza kupewa nafasi ya kujitetea.

(c) Iwapo mjumbe aliyeondoshwa madarakani hakuridhika na Uamuzi wa Bodi, basi anaweza kupeleka rufaa yake katika kikao cha mkutano Mkuu ambapo uamuzi wake utakuwa ni wa Mwisho.

12. MIKUTANO

(a) Katika mkutano au kikao chochote cha Jumuiya, basi nusu ya Wajumbe wa mkutano au kikao hicho itatosha kuendelea na mkutano au kikao hicho, katika Mkutano Mkuu wa Jumuiya, Iwapo nusu ya wajumbe haikupatikana basi theluthi moja ya Wajumbe wote itatosha kuendelea na Mkutano siku nyengine ambapo mkutano huo utaitishwa.

(b) Uamuzi wowote katika Mkutano Mkuu au vikao vyengine vya AIMP utafikiwa kutokana na wingi wa kura isipokuwa labla Wajumbe wawe wamewafikiana wote kwa jumla. Katika upigaji kura za ndio na siyo basi Amir atakuwa na kura ya ziada baada Ya ile kura yake ya kawaida.

(c) Katibu Mkuu au kama itakavyokuwa, Msaidizi wake ataweka kumbukumbu zote za viako. Kumbukumbu hizo zitathibitishwa au vyenginevyo katika kiao kitakachofuata cha kamati husika au Mkutano Mkuu.

12. UWAJIBIKAJI

(a) Mamlaka yote ya AIMP yatakuwa mikononi mwa wanachama na hivyo basi viongozi wa Jumuiya watawajibika moja kwa moja kwa wanachama waliowaweka madarakani.