POWER SHARING AS A CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TOOL IN SOMALI

BY

ABDIRAHMAN AHMED MOHAMED

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DECLARATION

Declaration by Candidate

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Sign: _____ Date: _____

Abdirahman Ahmed Mohamed

REG No: PGDFP/006/18

Declaration by the Supervisors

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as University supervisors.

Sign:	Date:
Prof. Ken Oluoch	
Department of History, Political Scien	ce and Public Administration
School of Arts and Social Sciences	
Moi University, Eldoret	
Sign:	Date:
Dr. Paul .K. Kurgat	

Department of History, Political Science and Public Administration School of Arts and Social Sciences Moi University, Eldoret

DEDICATION

I, Abdirahman Ahmed Mohamed, dedicate this thesis to my parents and Aunt. I am grateful to you for laying the strong foundations on which most of what I do is built. Thank you for the values of integrity and discipline that you instilled in me.

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ABSTRACT

Somalia comprises of Somalis who are the majority with unique attributes in common including sharing of language, culture and religious faith as Muslims. However, over the past decade, Somalia has not enjoyed peace after being regarded as dysfunctional state with the fall of General Siad Barre's regime in 1991. Several actors including the international community have tried their best to manage conflicts in Somalia though much is yet to be realized. With the current policy debate on power sharing, this study sought to determine if it can help in managing conflicts in Somalia. Specifically, the study sought to: establish the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia, determine the role of clan elders in power sharing on conflict management in Somalia, analyze the effects of political peace talks of power sharing on conflict management in Somalia and assess the effects of constitution review on power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The Classical consociational theory provided anchorage to the study. The study adopted mixed method covering qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative methods entailed the use of interview guide while quantitative methods covered the use of an explanatory and descriptive design. The study targeted 380 political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and country representatives from humanitarian organizations operating in Mogadishu. The sample size was determined using Yamane formula which was equivalent to 194 respondents. The respondents were selected using stratified random sampling method. Primary data was collected using questionnaire that was semi-structured. Prior to data collection, the questionnaire was pilot tested among 10 respondents that were purposively and randomly selected from Esleigh area in Kenya. The collected data was cleaned and edited in excel for consistency before being exported to Statistical Package for Social Sciences for analysis. Descriptive statistics covering frequencies and percentages were used to summarize the data while inferential statistics covering regression analysis was used in drawing deductions about power sharing and conflict management in Somalia. For qualitative data collected from interviews, content analysis was used to analyze the themes. The findings of the study are expected to inform policy formulation in Somalia with regard to power sharing and management of conflicts. From the findings, 90 (73.2%) of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done to establish transitional government in Somalia, 94 (76.4%) agreed that the competency of the clan elders in maintaining peace in Somalia was demonstrated in their oratory skills, 89 (72.4%) of the respondents agreed that they believed some of the political elites were not sincere in their representation in political talks in Somalia and 95 (77.2%) of the respondents agreed that federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal government to the States. The study concludes that the role played by clan elders had the largest effect on conflict management followed by, constitutional review, political peace talks and evolution of power sharing. The study recommended that the international community including UN should support and promote the role of clan elders in conflict management in Somalia. The entire constitutional review process in Somali should be supported by the international community as a mechanism of resolving the conflicts. Political peace talks in Somalia should be inclusive processes that involve all people including female gender. Power sharing should be improved as that can have significant contribution towards conflict management in Somalia

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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

- **Clan Elders in Power Sharing** it covers the competency of the clan elders in Somalia, their knowledge and understanding of the customary laws and Sharia and the moral authority and trust they enjoy in Somalia.
- **Conflict** It results into tension at the national level and may include civil wars.
- **Conflict Management** it involves an analysis of the causes of conflicts, the peacekeeping missions, mediation & arbitration efforts as well as the internal peace interventions especially with regard to the government of Somalia.
- **Constitution Review on Power Sharing** the review of the constitution in Somalia gave rise to federalism at the clan and regional level that increased discrimination especially of the minority clans and this could cause future clan conflicts. It also resulted into decentralization of the power to regionally established States in Somalia
- **Evolution of Power Sharing** it includes the type or form of power that was shared in Somalia, the environment where it was done and the time horizon.
- **Operation "Linda Nchi"** refers to initiative that was taken by Kenya in 2011 to neutralize Alshabab terror group and restore peace within the border of Kenya and Somalia
- **Peacekeeping:** An intervention that seeks to restore order and harmony among worrying parties.

- **Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing** they include the forums and meetings that are organized in Somalia as driven by top down and bottom up approaches with representation from the political elites. Their success depends on sincerity of these political elites. In Somalia
- **Power sharing** it comprises of constitutional review, political peace talks and the role played by the clan elders in maintaining peace at the community level.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework
CCS	Center for Creative Solutions, Hargeysa
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CRD	Center for Research and Dialogue, Muqdisho
CRN	Country Re-engagement Note
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LAS	League of Arab States
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
PDRC	Puntland Development Research Center, Garowe
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SNM	Somali National Movement
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFG	Transitional Federal Government's
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN OCHA	U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WSP	International War-torn Societies Project-International

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Overview

The chapter focuses on the background of conflicts and power sharing from a global, regional and local (Somalia) level. The research problem, objectives and research questions and the scope and limitations of the study are also pointed out in this chapter. The assumptions and significance of the study are also discussed in detail in this chapter.

1.1 Background of the Study

Conflicts have been a major issue among communities around the world for instance in countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, North Korea among other regions around the globe (Mueller & Rohner, 2017). Some of the key factors that could be a motivation to the rise of these conflicts around the world include grievances that arise from unequal treatment and discrimination of some ethnic groups by those having government power (Jarstad & Desiree, 2008). Occurrence of any form of conflict is usually associated result into enormous losses including death of people and destruction of property. Conflicts usually slow down the growth of the economies especially in the war torn States like Iran and Iraq. It is estimated that war in Middle-East countries including Yemen have costed the lives of over 100,000 people (Francois, Rainer & Trebbi, 2015).

According to McGarry and O'Leary (2004), proper management of these conflicts require some form of equality in the ethnic communities which is best realized through some form of power sharing mechanisms. Indeed, power sharing has emerged as an effective tool for managing conflicts among worrying ethnic communities around the world. Consistent with these views, Roeder and Rothchild (2005) argued that power sharing has been viewed as mechanism of managing conflicts while restoring democracy in the most affected economies. In its most basic form, power sharing is the inclusion of political opponents in the jointly established governments and it has emerged as an important platform for managing conflicts in the present times.

As noted by Cheeseman and Tendi, (2010), most scholars around the world are increasingly paying attention on how the power sharing agreements are formulated and operationalized. Power sharing has been utilized as a platform for achieving post conflict reconstruction in most countries around the world that have been characterized by civil unrest. As a tool, power sharing has been used in solving intra-state conflicts while minimizing the possibility that the solved conflicts will resurge (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013). Resurgence of conflicts is always an issue in especially in most African Countries like South Sudan especially due to disputed electoral processes. Power sharing has emerged as an important tool in most peace agreements and negotiations. In fact, power sharing has resulted into significant benefits in those countries where it has been used in solving conflicts (Hartzell & Matthew, 2007).

Power sharing can be seen to revolve around its four basic dimensions: the economic, territorial, political and military aspects. Lijphart (2008) argued that political power sharing aim at ensuring that the rebels have been given an opportunity to work in the government. Although the proponents of political power sharing have argued that it has been a relevant tool for managing conflicts, the critics indicate that it is a tool that merely rewards violence in the country. The need for political power sharing is to ensure that authority of the State is distributed among the groups in a way that is proportional based on parameters like ethnicity or political ideologies. The distribution of power in the political dimension can arise from electoral or administrative

representation. For military dimension of power sharing, the essence is to ensure that authority has been distributed within different security tools of the country (Besley & Persson, 2011)..

With territorial power sharing, there is structuring of the post war countries in line with the federal lines. It can also entail having provisions for the regional autonomy. The essence of territorial power sharing is to formulate groups based on a regional level that have power which is independent with the one that the central government has. The role of economic power distribution is to ensure that income and wealth has been distributed among different groups in such a way that none of the group dominates the resources owned by the State. This can be realized through formulation of policies and rules that require distribution of resources to rebel groups (Hartzell, 2016).

Although power sharing has been utilized in most conflict affected countries around the world, it has created success stories in some areas where it has been unsuccessful in other countries (Lijphart, 2008). In Africa, a good example of the countries where power sharing has been utilized includes Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa as well as in Nigeria. Traniello (2008) opined that while power sharing has resulted into success in some countries, there are some regions where it has led to worse scenarios. For example, the election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa as the first President in 2004 marked the end of apartheid rule that had been in place for quite some time. Contrary to the case of South Africa, the worst scenario transpired in Rwanda where conflicts emerged between the Hutu who were in power and the Tutsis who had no power. In this era, the Tutsis were heavily massacred in large masses by the Hutu over a limited period of time. These cases of South Africa and Rwanda signify circumstances where power sharing has been successful and unsuccessful (Traniello, 2008). Binningsbo

(2013) indicated that power sharing is among the key approaches of resolving conflicts among the affected communities around the world. In fact, power sharing has been viewed as a solution for overcoming the growing conflicts among the communities. In Kenya, Nyamato (2014) shared that most peace building efforts around the world in most conflict affected countries have been characterized by power sharing.

A clear discussion of power sharing can hover around its three related models: consociational model, incentivist model and the tri-polar model. In the consociational model, the groups within the community are viewed as the ingredients of politically established order on the basis of group autonomy and elite consensus (O'Leary, McGarry & Salih, 2005). On the other hand, the incentivist model calls for the need to establish political bodies that can offer incentives to the elites and for moderation of the masses. With the tri-polar model, the key features of consociational and incentivist models are brought together while highlighting the need to ensure that the scope of power sharing has been broadened to other spheres including the political, economic and territorial dimensions that the groups may have a feeling to share (Nyamato, 2014).

There exists two opposing views on power sharing and the role plays in the conflict affected countries: the pragmatists and the critics. The views held by the pragmatists are that power sharing is a relevant tool that strives to convince the parties to sign peace agreements while ensuring that they are committed to jointly establish state institutions and the political processes in common. On the other hand, the critics argue that power sharing hinder how the political processes in a country get to evolve while closing the opportunities for the new individuals wishing to enter the political scenes (Horowitz, 2008). The current debate therefore concerns those who pragmatically provide arguments that power sharing aims at bringing peace agreements against those who

holding opposing views that such effort may have an impact on the ability of the wartorn societies to be transformed over a longer period of time (Mehler, 2009).

Africa has witnessed a significant rise in the number of power sharing peace led agreements especially within the period of 1999 to 2009 (Mehler, 2009). This study will focus on power sharing as tool of resolving conflicts in Somalia that has been characterized by conflicts in the past decades. The democratic era of Somalia was in the period of 1960 to 1969 although the newly established institutions and independence did not meet the expectations of people in Somali. There was growing levels of poverty with nepotism and corruption being the order of the day in most State institutions during this era. It was in October 1969 when the military rule under leadership of Barre that took over government although only worsened the situation in Somalia. During 1980s, there is was heightened resistance to the rule of Barre. Since then, several conflicts have been evident especially with the fall and toppling of Barre in Mid 1990s.

Thus, the conflicts that are affecting Somalia have deep roots in its history and they consistently predict the destiny of Somalia as a country. In fact, the conflicts in Somalia are one of the oldest wars in Africa as a continent. After two decades of conflicts that resulted into serious crises, Somalia is now dangerous and very unstable. The key challenge in Somalia has been heightened tension with growing concerns of resurgence of the past conflicts. However, as noted by Levitt (2012), the best way alternative for the communities that had been ravaged by war like Somalia is through power sharing. Through power sharing, it will be possible to prevent future resurgence of conflicts even as the country aim at recovering from the previous conflicts. Power sharing would bring together rival groups in Somalia with the aim of establishing peace while ensuring there is inclusive political representation of the involved groups. As such, the

motivation behind this study is to establish the role played by power sharing as a conflict management tool in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Somalia has been characterized by long periods of civil wars that have destabilized the economy and peaceful coexistence of the communities over the past decades. In fact, the legitimacy of Somalia has been completely lost due to perennial conflicts. The legitimacy of Somalia as a State has been lost because of these conflicts. Although several foreign interventions have been made in Somalia in past two decade, none of these have successfully established peace and created a government that can be regarded as legitimate for Somalis. However, Somalis have turned to traditional conflict management in an attempt to secure peace and security in the country.

A number of studies conducted on power sharing include Nyamato (2014) who focused on opportunities linked with power sharing as an avenue for managing post conflicts in African communities. Power sharing may work well in those democracies that are regarded as stable where the political elites have a high probability of compromising. In Colombia, Mazzuca and. Robinson (2009) looked at politically generated conflicts and their link with power sharing covering the period of 1850-1950. It was noted that the need for adoption of power sharing mechanisms in Colombia during that time was to reduce conflicts and civil wars in the country.

A study by Walden, Javdani and Allen (2014) did focus on how to support power sharing through resolution of conflicts in a constructive manner. It was noted that leveraging on conflict resolution strategies which are constructive can be regarded as an important factor of consideration when one wish to effectively facilitate power sharing among the involved communities. Another study conducted in Burundi by Vandeginste (2009) looked at power sharing and the role it has played in resolution of conflicts. It was noted that through power sharing, Burundi has attained short term objectives including termination of war hence peaceful coexistence. Power sharing has been a successful in Zimbabwe and Kenya and this provides the justification for applying the same in the contemporary Somalia.

From the aforementioned studies, it is clear that some of them create methodological gaps as they adopted desk research methods. Other studies create contextual gaps as they were done in different contexts at country level for instance in Colombia and not in Somalia. Hence, to fill these gaps, the present study sought to establish the role of power sharing as a conflict management tool in Somalia.

1.3 Research Objectives

The study was guided by general and specific objectives.

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to establish the role of power sharing as a conflict management tool in Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The study was guided by the following specific objectives

- i. The establish the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia
- ii. To determine the role of clan elders in power sharing on conflict management in Somalia
- iii. To analyze the effects of political peace talks of power sharing on conflict management in Somalia

iv. To assess the effects of constitution review on power sharing on conflict management in Somalia

1.4 Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

- i. What is the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia?
- ii. What is the role of clan elders in power sharing on conflict management in Somalia?
- iii. How do political peace talks of power sharing affect conflict management in Somalia?
- iv. What are the effects of constitution review on power sharing on conflict management in Somalia?

1.5 Justification of the Study

As a tool of containing conflicts, power sharing has been used in management of postelection related conflicts that most countries like Kenya have experienced especially during the period of 2007/2008. Zimbabwe is another country in Africa that provide a good example where power sharing has been used especially in the year 2009 when there was election related issues between MDC and ZANU political parties. The rationale of this study therefore is to provide guide policy on the need for Somalia to adopt power sharing mechanisms since they have proofed to support resolution of conflicts as in the case of Zimbabwe and Kenya. The study sought to demonstrate why power sharing can be ideal for lowering the possibility of resurgence of conflicts between socially established groups. Given the fact that conflicts usually result into political instabilities and violence, power sharing is a relevant platform of bring political order in the country. In fact, promotion of democracy calls for power sharing.

Not only would this inquiry give an overview of the function that power sharing plays in management of conflicts but also it would consider the ways through which one can initiate power sharing process. The study would also give information on how power sharing can be adopted in the contemporary Somalia so as to resolve the conflicts that have persistently destabilized the economy. Hence, the study would act as a pointer on centrality and importance of power sharing as far as the management of conflicts in Somalia at the national level if concerned.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study focused on power sharing and conflict management. In this regard, power sharing was the independent variable while conflict management was the dependent variable. More specifically, the study focused on evolution of power sharing, clan elders in power sharing, political peace talks of power sharing and constitution review on power sharing and their effect on conflict management. The study was conducted in Somalia that had witnessed a long period of conflicts among the African countries. The study focused on Somalia since the long period of civil wars in the past two decades have resulted into political instability and this can best be managed through adoption of power sharing tools. The study collected primary data through questionnaire that contained both close ended and open ended questions. This ensured that detailed information has been collected from the respondents that addressed the research questions guiding the study. The respondents of the study included political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and country representatives from humanitarian

organizations operating in Mogadishu and it was conducted in the month of September, 2020.

The study anticipated encountering various limitations especially during data collection. By the time data was being collected, Covid-19 pandemic was at peak in most countries including Somalia. This complicates the data collection process especially physical contact with the respondents in administration of the questionnaires. However, the researcher overcame this limitation by administering questionnaires using online method including the use of email accounts and WhatsApp. The use of online method in administering the questionnaire to respondents was hoped to be faster and convenient for the respondents as it minimized physical contact as a precaution for the Covid-19 pandemic. The researcher made several follow ups through the use of the email skype and WhatsApp calls in order to. Provide any clarification on issues that respondents might be facing when filling in the questionnaire. This also went a long way to reinforcing the response rate in the study.

During data collection, some of the respondents had fear to share some of the sensitive information for fear that they might face intimidation. To overcome this limitation, the researcher sought for a letter of introduction from Moi University that categorically stated the purpose of the study as being for academics. Each questionnaire sent to the respondents had this letter of introduction. Furthermore, through phone calls and emails, the researcher provided assurance to the respondents that all information to be shared by them was only to be used for the purpose of academics. Assurance was also provided to the respondents especially with regard to confidentiality of the information they shared.

1.7 Assumption of the Study

In carrying out this study, it was assumed that respondents would give honest and relevant information regarding power sharing and conflict management in Somalia. It was also assumed that respondents had an in-depth understanding and knowledge on the origin and development of conflicts in Somalia with the associated causes. It was further assumed that respondents had knowledge of power sharing.

1.8 Significance of the Study

The policy makers in the government of Somalia including the constitutional experts may benefit from the findings of this study through development of relevant policies that may guide power sharing and thus peaceful coexistence in Somalia. The clan elders and religious leaders may utilize the findings of this study to understand and appreciate the role they have in brokering power sharing deals for managing conflicts between worrying groups in Somalia.

The humanitarian agencies including the affiliates of the United Nations operating in Somalia may have an understanding of the conflicts in the country and how best they can be managed through power sharing. The study may contribute to the existing knowledge on power sharing and conflict management. It may also contribute towards strengthening of the available theories on power sharing and conflict management. Scholars and other researcher carrying out similar studies on power sharing arrangements may find this study as one of the reference points.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is set out to review relevant literature on power sharing and conflict management. The theory that provided anchorage on the study is also reviewed. The review of literature is aligned with the specific objectives of the study.

2.2 Theoretical Review

The study was guided by the Classical consociational theory. The theory is premised on four key principles that form the basis of consociational democracy: grant coalition government, minority veto which is mutual, proportionality when allocating resources and autonomy of the ethnic groups (federalism) (Keating, 2007). Through the consociational framework, conflict in the country is reduced through granting of autonomy, reduction of collaboration between ethnic groups while creating a high level of cooperation among the elites. The theory argues that it possible to reduce conflicts and tension at an ethnic level through minimization of how the ethnic groups interact with exception at the elite point.

As shared by Lijphart (2008), this theory supports power sharing in a democracy. The theory is more relevant in States having significant internal divisions that cut across the linguistic, ethnic or religious dimensions. None of these divisions is big enough for forming a majority grouping. As such, there is stability that comes as a result of consultation with the elite groups. The views of consociationalism aim at enhancing stability of the government strengthen the degree of survival of the power sharing undertakings, the need for democracy to survive and reduction of violence in the State. According to Lederach (1997), establishment of peace require that there is inclusivity across the parts of the society and this should not only emerge when handling with those

individuals in deep State. The various criticisms that have been leveled against this theory stem from its overreliance on cooperation of the elite.

2.3 Conflict Management in Somali

Conflict is a general term that is used to describe numerous situations and unfolding including some form of disagreement, arguments, disputes and quarreling among the parties. Conflict can also be understood to refer to chaos or battles as well as unrest at the State level (Ghebremeskel, 2002). Conflicts kill existance of peace while creating feelings of animosity and hatred among the parties. Although conflicts can be harmful when they set in, they can also act to restore order in the State. Conflicts can arise as a result of various factors including ethnicity, inequality in distribution of the resources of the State, inadequate mechanisms of managing conflicts, abuse of military, language barriers and poor leadership that creates crisis (Obel-Hansen, 2013).

Somalia has witnessed a number of conflicts including civil wars that are deeply rooted in history of the country. During the year 1980s, there was growing resistance to the military rule of General Barre. This resistance culminated into a coup in 1991 when General Barre was overthrown (Bouh & Mammo, 2008). From this period, there was heightened competition as different armed factions were driven by competition for turmoil and power vacuum following toppling of Barre. Persistent conflicts saw collapse of the customary law within the period of 1990 to 1992. This was accompanied by an inflow of peace keeping forces in Somalia. However, there was no central government by then and Somalia was thus regarded as a failed State (Kumssa, Williams, Jones & Des-Marais, 2014).

In 1995, the United Nations opted to withdraw in Somalia having been attacked on several occasions. However, by this time, no functional government had already been

established yet. For the periods of 1991 all through to 1998, various autonomous units of governance were established in northern part of Somalia and these neutralized some fighting and conflicts in the country (Hagmann, 2006). Within the year 2000, there was establishment of the Transitional National Government which was later accompanied by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for the year 2004 (Hagmann, 2007).. It was in October 2011 that Kenya sent its troops to Somalia to fight Alshabaab so as to establish a buffer within Somalia. In August 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia got established. This was regarded as the first permanent central government in the country especially after long period of consistent civil war (Kumss et al., 2014).

Thus, a number of interventions were made in efforts to manage the conflicts in Somalia during the period of civil war. Peace keeping mission was one of the ways through which conflicts were managed in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2007). The peacekeepers were drawn from international dimensions including the US troops in the period of 1990s. However, with the US troops being ambushed and killed in Mogadishu in 1993, there was withdrawal of most international peacekeepers. It was only the Africa Union (AU) that was left with the responsibility of keeping and maintaining peace in Somalia at this time (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009).

Most of the peacekeeping missions did not result into substantial effect on management of conflicts in Somalia largely because of low funds and conflicts that were internally generated. It emerged that majority of the conflicts in Somalia called for home grown solutions. As such, meetings were held and the parties met and charted way of finding permanent solution to the conflicts. This gave rise to the Arta Peace Conference that was conducted in 1991 for restoration of order and peace where TFG was created (Elmi & Barise, 2006). However, the established TFG did not last for long because of the differences among the delegates who took part in the conferences, growing level of tension in Mogadishu and allegation of corruption among the officials in government. By this time, although some other areas and regions like Somaliland and Punt land continued to enjoy peace; other areas like the Central Somalia were still experiencing conflicts (Walls, 2009).

2.4 Power Sharing and Conflict Management

The inclusion of power sharing in the provisions of United Nations (UN) Charter as a mean of resolving conflicts has gained relevance among scholars. Power sharing is particularly relevant to the parties within societies that have been divided by religious or racial differences (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). Power sharing implies that the key segments of the society are offered with a permanent share of power. Power sharing is largely developed to incorporate the principles of democracy while effectively managing conflicting situations especially in the societies that deeply divided (Sisk, 2003). There are various arrays that are involved during power sharing with embodiment in the terms of the constitution. Through power sharing, the states that have been characterized by historical conflicts and violence are likely to find sustainable peace (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008).

Adeney and Swenden (2019) opined that there are four different dimensions of power sharing: political, military, territorial and economic dimensions. The key emphasis of political power sharing is that the authority of the state should be proportional distributed based on some indicators like ethnicity or political ideologies. For military power sharing, the aim is to ensure there is distribution of authority in security apparatus of the country. This is attained through various means as combining the armed forces of the adversaries into a unified force of the State. Territorial power sharing aims to ensure that regional groups have been provided with some power which is independent as the one that the central government has (Weiner, 1983). With economic power sharing, the whole idea is to distribute resources including income and wealth such that no group dominates ownership of the State resources (Hartzell, 2016).

Power sharing is regarded as a mechanism of conflict management through promotion of rule of law. One key attribute of rule of law is judicial independence in the State (Melton & Ginsburg 2014). Power sharing ensuring that there is no group that dominates state powers (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Through provision of the measures of security, power sharing results into an environment where none of the parties in the state will be worried of exploitation of the available power. Hence, power sharing ensures that elites in the post war states are able to observe the rule of law (Weintraub, 2014). Power sharing allows the judges to exercise their judicial independence (Hartzel, 2019) even when they are not among the minority groups that have been protected through inclusion in State apparatus (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007).

Power sharing also promotes the rule of law through provision of check and balance especially in a postwar society (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009; Melton & Ginsburg, 2014). Power sharing ensures that the publically dominant players and actors are restrained from division of the power of the state among various groups. This is particularly evident with regard to the executive as an actor that may have a lot of influence on other actors and branches like the judiciary in the countries that are recovering from past conflicts and all these may have an effect on the rule of law (Helmke & Rosenbluth, 2009).

Mukherjee (2006) covered power sharing that provide concessions to leaders of the rebel groups. Such concessions include giving them posts in the government and

granting them the right to form their own parties. A different approach was undertaken by Roeder (2005) through differentiation of power-dividing and power sharing institutions and argued that the former is relevant for establishment of peace in a state. Empirically, power sharing offer mixed results (Binningsbø 2013), with some studies arguing that power sharing yield peace although other scholars are in disagreement on what constitute an effective form of power sharing and the associated favorable conditions (Hoddie, 2007).

Power sharing can be operationalized by putting in place inclusive power sharing institutions. Such institutions ensure that the diverse ethnic groups including the minorities are able to access the power of the government. In the event that such institutions are not in place, the minority groups will not have an adequate representation and thus may not have a say in some of the policy issues in the economy. For instance, because of exclusions on ethnic grounds, there arose armed conflicts in Syria before 1991 as well as in Guatemala (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013). In most cases, inclusive institutions explicitly demand that some give ethnic groups are represented in the government for instance in Lebanon and Bosnia.

2.4.1 The Evolution of Power Sharing and its Role in Conflict Management

The literature on power sharing can be traced back to the seminal work of Lijphart's (1968, 1975 & 1977). This literature was in response to the earlier held assertions that it was it was inconceivable to realize democracy in those societies that have been characterized by deep divisions. It was the literature of Lijphart that gave rise to the consociational theory hence increased recognition of power sharing. Lijphart (2002) placed emphasis on how power can be shared in central government (either mutual and/

or grant veto) and territorial sharing of power where some units in the nation have an overall say on some of the formulated policies.

As a concept, power sharing has evolved from its original conceptualization to cover various arrangements which occur in different dimensions. These dimensions include the power that competing elites strive to share (either military, economic, territorial or political) (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003), the governmental level established for sharing of power (sub-national or national level), the surrounding where the arrangements for power sharing are implemented (post conflict or consolidated democracy) and the time period when power sharing is conducted (permanent or transitional) (Bell, 2018). The common ground in all the systems of power sharing is that decision making is informed by the consensus as a principle as opposed to the rule of majority (McEvoy, 2015).

Power sharing especially involving clear linguistic or religious groupings has been a common practice for many years in countries like Lebanon, Belgium and Switzerland since 1998. Considerations for power sharing are in place for other countries like Iraq that have diverse ethnic and religion elements (Bell, 2018). However, the critiques of power sharing argue that it is affected by the risk of heightened competition in governments established as grand coalitions with limited accountability. Indeed, power sharing has been shown to prevent conflicts and that there is higher probability for the deeply divided ethnic or religious countries to embrace power sharing mechanisms. Lijphart (1999) noted that majority of the religious and ethnic countries leverage on power sharing to solve conflicts.

Cheeseman (2011) argued that political power sharing gives mandate to different decision makers to take part in operations of the government. Such the actors could include armed forces, parties used for elections and groups operating at an ethnic level.

These individuals are perceived to have opposing interest compared to the government. The essence of power sharing is to ensure that no group and thus citizen get to suffer the detrimentally serious policies at their interest. The foundation of power sharing was in the research by Lijphart (1975) covering democracy in the societies that are characterized by deep divisions. Initially, power sharing was conceptualized into four constructs: grand coalitions, veto that is mutual, autonomy which is segmented and representation which can be viewed as being proportional (Lijphart (1977). However, it is not always a fact that the four constructs of power sharing will coexist in the society.

There was further development in the concept of consensus democracy by Lijphart's (1999, 2012) with the need to incorporate the dimension of executive parties as well as the dimension of federal constitutional. Barbara (2002) went further to provide the distinction between the sets of power sharing (military, territorial and political power sharing). Presently, there has been growing recognition of power sharing with international players like UN promoting it in post conflict settings as well as after the general elections that will have been disputed (Jarstad & Sisk 2008). These findings are supported by various peaceful agreements conducted in Nepal, Kosovo, Bosnia and Sierra Leone and as shared by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), from the 38 civil wars that were covered within the period of 1945 all through to 1998 with negotiated arrangements of settlement, most of them had some element of power sharing.

In America, a wide range of power sharing tools including separation of powers and federalism were adopted in the newly established republic. The other countries where power sharing was evident include the Zimbabwe's grand coalition government. However, there exist some variations in the degree of power sharing covering two extremes: low and high. The low extreme is one where it is the elected presidents that have a lot of powers where judiciary and other arms have limited influence (O'Donnell,

1994). On the other hand, a high extreme is characterized by decentralization with inclusivity in the central government.

Literature provides that some politically and ethically divided States embraced power sharing which enhanced the level of peace and prosperity (Hennessey, 2015). The implication of this assertion is that adoption of power sharing enhances peaceful coexistence. Good example of this literature include Cederman et al. (2013) who shared that involving rebel groups into the government results into a decrease in engagement into insurgence. A study was conducted in Ireland by Mueller and Rohner (2017) with the aim of power sharing at a local level and its link with the risk of conflicts. While collecting information from 26 local councils at the district level covering the time horizon from 1973 all through to 2001, regression was used for analysis. The study noted a significant link between sharing of power and curbing of deaths. However, the study creates conceptual gap as it was done in Ireland and not in Somalia.

The study conducted by Hartzell and Hoddie (2019) focused on power sharing and the role it plays in promotion of the rule of law in post ware State. It was contended that power sharing support the rise of the rule of law in two various means. In the first means, it was noted that power sharing create institutional constraint which enhance the autonomy and independence of the judiciary. The second manner stemmed from the fact that power sharing provided a sense of security for the judges in courts to be more committed to the rule of law. It was noted that settlement of civil war through power sharing supports and enhance the rule of law. However, the study failed to link power sharing and management of conflict but rather, it focused on the rule of law.

In Nigeria, Rustad (2008) did a study the role of power sharing in promotion of peace. It emerged from literature that three forms of power sharing has been evident in Nigeria: political, economic and territorial. Although separated formulated, it was shown that these three constructs of power sharing strongly interact with each other with regard to the ethnic groups at the country level as well as across the various reservoirs of oil especially at Niger Delta. Although power sharing was developed so as to solve violence at a political and communal level, the same power sharing has brought about more conflicts especially in light of marginalization. The key issue noted was the growing level of corruption that was seen to undermine the actual value and meaning of sharing of power resulting into legitimacy and trust issues in view of the central power. However, the study was conducted in Nigeria and not in Somalia and thus creating contextual gap.

In a study conducted by Agarin and McCulloch (2020), the focus was on power sharing and its link with inclusion and exclusion of communities that are non-dominant. It was revealed that most power sharing arrangements result into the challenges of inclusion and exclusion. The study noted that for the dominant group to have stability, power sharing should aim at marginalizing the groups that are not dominant. The nondominant groups include the individuals that had not been covered in the initial institutions of sharing power. This study failed to link power sharing and management of conflicts but merely focused on inclusivity and non-inclusivity.

2.4.2 The Role of Clan Elders in Power Sharing on Conflict Management

Sewanyana (1997) did a study in Uganda to bring out the link between traditionally established communication and management of the conflicts. The review of literature indicated that a number of traditional means of resolving conflicts were evident in the old days in Africa. These included the use of chiefs and clan elders. However, this study was conducted in Uganda and not in Somalia. The council of elders has a major responsibility of maintaining peace abd they have played a role in resolution of conflicts

in a way as to avoid military interventions. In Somalia, the culture gives a provision that the elders should represent clans. As such, these elders speak and decide on behalf of the clan. These elders have been given power which they are able influence more than one conflicting parties.

Ogwari (2014) looked at traditional leaders and the role they played in management of conflicts in African context. The specific focus of the study was on Somalia National Reconciliation Conference SNRC that extended within the period from 2000 all through to 2010. Literature showed that traditional leaders are widely used in resolution of indigenous conflicts in Somalia. A good example of such traditional platforms was the sharia court. By adopting desk research methodology, it was shown those clans elders have continually been engaged in mediating conflicts at a communal level as majority of the conflicts were seen to arise from inequalities in distribution of resources, growing levels of corruption and ethnicity. It was shared that the international community has failed to give due consideration to the role played by clan elders in resolution of conflicts. However, this study covered was limited to the traditional leaders that are too broad unlike the present study that will focus on clan elders.

Somalia is among the countries in Africa that have retained the traditional clan elders in management of the conflicts. These clan elders are also referred to as traditional leaders. These clan elders have been praised for their ability to enhance communication while mediating for peace in Somalia at clan or national level. One can become a clan elder in Somalia by being voted for by members in the clan, by inheriting or when appointed by some authorities like Digil community. The clan elders are expected to ensure there is strict adherence to customary and sharia laws enhance and maintain peace, highly respected, not biased, with ability to communicate and being honest and good in making decisions. It is argued that these clan elders are well experienced with authority to mobilize the resource for the security of the community. The foundation of sharia courts is the use of traditional means in resolving conflicts. Sometimes, traditional and religious leaders are used in managing intractable regarding security in Somalia.

Hudda (2018) undertook a study on the traditional models of maintaining peace in Somali. It was shown that clan elders are more effective in resolution and mitigation of conflicts. Compared to the external third parties who emanate from out of the context of the conflict, the clan elders are part of the community. Being rooted in the society, the clan elders have clear understanding of the cause of conflicts and they can handle them more clearly. Furthermore, the clan elders enjoy numerous trust and cooperation among the community coupled with high level of respect because of the moral authority bestowed on them. It was noted that clan elders are key in resolving all forms of conflicts in Somali. When there is arbitration at the clan level, these elders play a role of judges where they handle criminal issues and cases. When there is dysfunctional central state, these clan elders help in restoring peace while creating trust and relationship between conflicting clans. The success of the clan elders in management of conflicts is informed by such factors as the respect and trust bestowed to them, the traditional and moral authority, their relationship with the society and the fact that they are within the setting where the conflict arise.

Muse (2019) looked at the politically generated crisis in Somalia and its link with the clan system. Information was gathered from reports and publications from global media houses including BBC and CNN. In total, 50 reports were included in the study. Content analysis and historical methods were used during the inquiry. The period of the inquiry was from 1991 all through to 2019. The sociological theory provided anchorage to the

inquiry. It was noted that the rise in civil war in Somalia has been as a result of people ignoring their own culture. It was also shared that there exists the link between clan system and crisis that are politically created. However, the study focused on clan system that is too general, the present study will specifically focus on clan elders.

2.4.3 Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing and Conflict Management

Whenever some communities were facing conflicts, political talks played an important role in managing them. For achieving peace talks, the need evaluate how sincere the representatives were, their legitimacy and compatibility emerged. These factors inform the level of effectiveness of the political peace talks in the country in the effort to manage conflicts. Sincerity requires that the representatives (elites) to be honest and have the interests of the community at heart as they deliberate on power sharing systems. Sincerity is an important component of accountability for those individuals (elites) representing the interests of the community.

The international community has been instrumental in organizing for political peace talks where there is political participation and representation (Hohne, 2010). According to Hohne (2010), most of the representatives were not genuine and since in their interests. There was growing level of disputes largely arising from the issues of representation. This made it for officials to fish out the genuine and legit representatives who can represent the interests of the community well (Menkhaus, 2010). At the same time, youths women were excluded since they did not have representatives in the process of peace. Political peace talks were also characterized by top down approaches in Somalia (Netabay, 2007). Lack of sincere representatives and top down approaches acted as stumbling blocks towards reconciliation efforts in Somalia. To enhance the effectiveness and success of the political peace talks, all resolutions should have been

obtained from people on ground. This calls for adoption of bottom-up approach (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

The study conducted by Farah and Toure (2017) focused on how best to engineer peace in Somalia. The emphasis of the study was carrying out a re-examination of the process of peace in Somalia. Literature showed that the entire process of peace in Somalia had been driven by external parties with little attention on internal parties including the warlords and the political elites. According to the finding, this has resulted into an elusive process of peace in Somalia. However, although the study focused on peace in Somalia and how it can be re-engineered, it failed to cover the aspect of political talks and their role in engineering peace.

Menkhaus (2018) did an inquiry into the bargain by the elites and political deals with a focus on Somalia. Literature showed that because of various battles in Somalia, the level of peace has been adversely affected. Although there has been reduction in violence in the country, the level of insecurity and possibility of clashes in Somalia are high, in late 2004, there was an accord for sharing of power although little has been realized. It was noted that beneficiaries of the state resources in Somalia are limited to few elites due to existance of the politics of patronage. Presently, it was shown that most political agreements and structures in Somalia do recognize the role of elite bargain. It was shown that the cartels that are politically established in Somalia have taken state building and peace building efforts as viable project.

Hersi (2018) conducted a study on fragility of Somalia and Somaliland. Once Somaliland had gained independence from Britain in 1960s, it was united with Somalia resulting into Somali Republic. However, Somaliland underwent marginalization from this venture and this culminated into civil war with the fall of Barre in 1991 followed by separation of the two. Since then, although Somaliland has remained peaceful for some time, it is yet to be recognized as an independent state. On the other hand, Somalia still remains a failed state with its lawless being used to strengthen terror activities. However, the key focus of this study was on fragility of the state thus failing to cover issues like peace talks.

De-Coning (2013) focused on Mogadishu and extensively dwelled on the concept of peace building. It was shown that there is growing tension between the interest of the international agencies and the local ownership of Somalia. For instance, the head of State in Somalia do strive to exercise the sovereign authority and maintain peace. On the other hand, the international players in Somalia also with all the resources strive to maintain peace. Critically, as much as it can be noted that some of the international players are in to support the Federal Government of Somalia to maintain peace, there are those players that are merely staying in Somalia to pursue their own interests that are strategic, economic and for security purpose.

Kidist (2009) focused on regionally established institutions and their role in management of Somalia conflicts. The specific point of reference of the inquiry was on IGAD. It was shown the key obstacles for peace are in Somalia itself. Due to conflicts, it was noted that the issues of power sharing has largely been complicated with the other effect on allocation of resources including property and land. Political elites were seen to support the growing tension in Somalia. The external players including neighboring Countries were seen to supply firearms to the rebel groups to actualize terror activities. However, through IGAD, troops for peace missions had been deployed in Somalia. However, the study failed to bring out the role that political peace talks play as far as management of conflicts is concerned.

It was in 2011 when a new constitution was drafted by the Transition Federal Government. This was aimed at establishing a functional and stable government in Somalia since several decades of civil war and political instability with dysfunctional government. Such the government and the constitution were seen to enhance peace. The efforts to draft a new constitution in Somalia were supported by the Somalia's themselves and the international community. The need to have an evaluation of the laws of Somali so that they were in line with the issues in the country supported the review of the constitution (Le-Sage, 2005).

The new constitution supported the concept of federalism so that integrity and unity is restored. The concept of federalism in the Constitution of Somalia can be traced to 2004 although the same federalism had been in place since the colonial time (Kouroutakis, 2014). Regional border was among the issues that emerged during the review of the constitution and in operationalization of federalism in Somalia. Ideally, these issues linked with regional borders resulted into conflicts with the each of the disputes regions being in line with the constitutional provisions. There also exists federalism at the clan level in Somalia and this encourages a high level of loyalty to the clan by the members.

Ahmed (2014) did a study to bring out the process of creation of the constitution in Somalia. This was a critical inquiry that covered a time horizon from 1960 all through to 2013. The study noted that the development of the constitution in Somalia was not informed by negotiations of the people. It was noted that although Constitutional Commission made efforts to raise some awareness on people, this was not sufficient. Furthermore, once the draft copy of the constitution had come out, little efforts were made to share with the public so as to obtain their views. Furthermore, there was no well-established independent entity for monitoring the entire process. The other issue that emerged was marginalization of women in representation, given that every subclan should only give one representative. The study focused on constitutional review in isolation without linking this with management of the conflicts in Somalia and thus creating the gap for the present study.

Kouroutakis (2014) conducted a study on perspectives and process of the provision constitution in Somalia. It was shared that Somalia adopted the new constitution so as to ease the period of tension by strengthening the governance systems and politically established institutions. However, the key focus of this study was on review of the constitution of Somalia without linking this with management of conflicts. The study creates a methodological gap as it entirely focused on secondary information with the use of desk research methodology.

Mosley (2015) did a study whose aim was to bring out the future of Somalia federal. It was noted that there is high pressure in Somalia for electoral transition in the year 2016. The transition government according to the findings was largely dependent on external forces and securities. The study raised various issues that need consideration for stability of Somalia which include the need to have respect to the minority and the relatively smaller groups of the clans in Somalia during the formation of the state. The results demonstrated that power sharing in Somalia should be aimed at ensuring that none of the clans have a dominating influence on the politically established processes in the country. At the same time, no community should have a major control of the resources including land as this should be shared in some proportion. However, the study failed to cover constitutional reviews and its role in management of the conflicts in Somalia, it merely focused on Somalia and its associated challenges. Fuerthermore,

the study create methodological gap given that it only focused on review of secondary data unlike the present study that will incorporate the primary data.

2.5 Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.1 is the conceptual framework showing the variables of the study and how they were operationalized:




Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework Source: Author (2020) Figure 2.1 is the conceptual framework showing the variables of the study. It can be seen that four independent variables are covered by the study including the evolution of power sharing, the clan elders in power sharing, political peace talks of power sharing and constitution review on power sharing. On the other hand, the dependent variable of the study will be conflict management. Thus, the study examined how evolution of power sharing, the clan elders in power sharing, political peace talks of power sharing and constitution review on power sharing do affect conflict management in Somalia.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The methodologies that supported provision of answers to the research questions are highlighted in this chapter. These include the design of the inquiry, the targeted respondents and how their selection was done. The means of gathering the view of the respondents and the how it was done are also discussed in detail in this chapter.

3.2 Research Design

Research design can be viewed as a framework covering the techniques that are used by the researcher in collection and analysis of data in regard to a given topic (Tetnowski, 2015). The study adopted mixed research methods covering qualitative and quantitative data. An explanatory and descriptive design was adopted so as to address the formulated questions. Such descriptive designs aim at providing an accurate description of the situations in a way that is accurate. On the other hand, an explanatory design helped in analysing the effect of power sharing on conflict resolution that can best be achieved through use of regression analysis. According to Mukerje (2000), a descriptive design provides answers to the questions while describing things the way they exist in their original state. A descriptive design helped the researcher to provide detailed information on power sharing and the conflicts in Somalia.

3.3 Target Population

Target population includes the items or individuals where it is possible to generalize the findings of the inquiry (Mugenda & Mugenda, 1999). The study targeted 380 political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and country representatives from humanitarian organizations operating in Mogadishu as illustrated in Table 3.1.

Category	Target Population
Political leaders	80
Clan elders	100
Religious leaders	90
Country representatives of humanita organizations	rian 110
Total	380

Table 3.1: Target Population

3.4 The Study Area

The study was undertaken in Mogadishu, which is the capital city of Somalia. The rationale for selecting on Mogadishu was because of its central location which made it easier to collect data from the targeted respondents. Mogadishu is the current capital city of Somalia with an estimated population of over 2 million inhabitants. It is a cosmopolitan town in Somalia but with Muslims as most of its inhabitants. Mogadishu is centrally located on the Coastal Banadir in Somalia.

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Method

This section details how the sample size was determined and how sampling was conducted.

3.5.1 Sample Size

Sample size is a representative elements or individuals from the target population that are to be included in the study. Sampling is usually conducted so as to reduce the costs of getting data from a relatively larger target population that can be costly and time consuming. In this study, the sample size was scientifically established using the formulae given by Yamane (1967) as under:

$$n = \frac{N}{(1 + Ne^2)}$$

n = is the desired sample size

N = is the target population

e = is the acceptable margin of error estimated at 0.05 (at 95% confidence interval) Therefore, sample size (n) = $380 \div (1+480 \ (0.0025))$

Therefore, the sample size of the study was 194 respondents

3.5.2 Sampling Method

It is through a sampling that the representative items from the targeted respondents are picked for inclusion in the study. The two key methods of sampling are probability and non-probability sampling methods. Unlike non-probability sampling methods, probability methods of sampling seeks to ensure that all the items in the target population have an equal chance of being picked. Hence, this study adopted probability method of sampling, which are be believed to more ideal with limited biasness.

Specifically, stratified random sampling method was adopted in this study. In this regard, the respondents were stratified into four different strata including political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and country representatives from humanitarian organizations. Thereafter, a representative proportion of respondents was selected from each of the strata forming a sample size of 194 respondents as shown in Table 3.2.

Category	Target	Sample Proportion	Sample Size
	Population		
Political leaders	80	(80÷380)*100%=21.05%	21.05%*194=41
Clan elders	100	(100÷380)*100%=26.32%	26.32%*194=51
Religious leaders	90	(90÷380)*100%=23.68%	23.68%*194=46
Country	110	(110÷380)*100%=28.95%	28.95%*194=56
representatives of			
humanitarian			
organizations			
Total	380		194

3.6 Data Collection Instrument

The study collected primary data using questionnaire and interview guide. The rationale of using primary data is that it is the first hand source of information that was free from biasness. The questionnaire was divided into sections based on the research questions of the study. Some of the items on the questionnaire were rated on a five point Likert scale where 1=strongly disagree and 5=strongly agree. The questionnaire comprised of items with open ended and close ended questions so as to complement each other. The questionnaire was administered to respondents electronically through the email. The interview guide helped in gathering information from the 4 Key Informants (KIs) covering political leader (1), clan elder (1), religious leader (1) and Country representative of humanitarian organization (1).

3.7 Piloting of Data Collection Instrument

Pilot testing is usually conducted so as to bring out the key issues that are likely to be encountered in the field while gathering the views from the respondents (Mugenda & Mugenda 2003). Additionally, Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) argue that a pilot study can comprise of 1-10% of the respondents from the sample size. The researcher carried out a pilot study in Kenya among 10 respondents who were purposively and randomly selected from Esleigh area. The reason why Esleigh was selected for carrying out pilot study was that it was among the highly populated areas with Somali population in Kenya. The respondents who were involved in the pilot study were completely excluded from the final study so as to avoid biasness. The results from a pilot study were helpful in determining reliability and reliability of the study tools.

3.7.1 Validity of the Research Instruments

Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) consider validity as the degree which results from an analysis is a true reflection of what the study seeks to cover. It is only when an

instrument measures what it is designed to measure that it is rendered to be valid. The study adopted construct and content validity where the supervisor reviewed the items on the questionnaire to ensure that they are in line with the objectives of the study.

3.7.2 Reliability of the Research Instruments

Reliability is the consistency with which a measure evaluates a given idea; validity alludes to the level of relationship, or the cover, between an instrument and concept it is proposed to quantify (Crano & Brewer, 2002). Reliability alludes to the consistency or stability of measurements is done during the analysis and interpretation of responses. A reliable measure does not vary starting with one perusing then onto the next (Cozby & Bates, 2012). The researcher computed the values of Cronbach Alpha Coefficient when determining and making a decision on reliability of the instrument with the threshold taken as 0.7.

3.8 Data Collection Procedure

Pilot study was conducted among 10 respondents away from the targeted population before carrying out the actual study. Pilot study was aimed at testing whether the research instruments are valid and reliable. Thereafter, the researcher sought for an introductory letter from Moi University once the research instruments had been found to be valid. The introductory letter stated the study's purpose as being for academic reason only. The researcher also sought for an authorization letter from relevant authority in Somalia for purposes of collecting data from the respondents. The questionnaire was administered to the respondents through the email address to minimize physical contact owing to the Corvid-19 pandemic. Follow up was done through WhatsApp calls, emails and skype to clarify any issues that respondents were facing. The dully filled in questionnaire from the respondents was shared back either by email or through screen shorts and sending via whatsApp.

3.9 Data Screening, Coding and Analysis

The raw qualitative and quantitative view of the respondents from the field underwent screening to edit for consistencies in excel software. Once this was done, the completely cleaned quantitative data was coded into SPSS version 24. The quantitative data was summarized by descriptive statistics covering frequencies and percentages. In order to make relevant inferences and deductions on power sharing and conflicts management in Somalia, the researcher adopted regression analysis. The following was the model adopted by the study:

 $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \varepsilon$

- Where Y= Conflict Management
- $B_0 = Constant$
- β_1 , β_2 , β_3 and β_4 are Coefficients
- e= error term
- X_1 = Evolution of Power Sharing
- X₂= Clan Elders in Power Sharing
- X₃= Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing
- X₄= Constitution Review on Power Sharing

For qualitative data collected from interviews, the study relied on content analysis for processing. The findings were presented through tables and figures. Kothari (2004) argued that presentation of data in form of pie-charts and bar-graphs provide successful interpretation of the findings.

3.10 Measurement of Variables

Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of how the variables of the study were operationalized:

Type of Variable	Measurement	Scale	Data Analysis
Independent evolution of power sharing	 Type./form of shared power Power sharing environment Power sharing time horizon 	OrdinalNominal	 Frequencies & percentages Regression analysis
Independent clan elders in power sharing	 Competency of clan elders Knowledge of customary laws & Sharia Moral authority & trust 	OrdinalNominal	 Frequencies & percentages Regression analysis
Independent political peace talks of power sharing	 Bottom up & top down approach Gender representation Sincerity 	OrdinalNominal	 Frequencies & percentages Regression analysis
Independent constitution review on power sharing	 Clan federalism & regional federalism Discrimination & clan conflicts Centralization & decentralization 	OrdinalNominal	 Frequencies & percentages Regression analysis
Dependent conflict management	 Causes of conflicts Peacekeeping missions, mediation & arbitration Internal peace intervention 	OrdinalNominal	 Frequencies & percentages

 Table 3.3: Operationalization of Variables

Source; Author (2020)

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Ethics applies to the code of ethics which are intended to ensure that no one gets harmed during the undertaking of the study (Adams et al., 2017). First, the researcher sought for a letter of introduction from the University stating the study's aim and that the information was treated with a lot of confidentiality. The researcher maintained voluntary participation in the study and respondents were not forced to participate in the study. The respondents were also assured that the information they provided was only to be used for academic purposes. Lastly, the researcher adhered to all ethical standards regarding the undertaking of a research study.

CHAPTER FOUR


DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is set out to provide the results of the analysis based on the specific and the general objectives of the study. Once the collected data had been cleaned through excel, it was exported to SPSS tool where a summary of the descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages) were generated to describe the variables. The study conducted regression analysis to establish the influence of power sharing on conflicts management which was the general objective. Both figures and tables helped in presentation of the findings.

4.2 Response Rate

The researcher administered 190 questionnaires to the political leaders, clan elders, religious leaders and country representatives from humanitarian organizations operating in Mogadishu. From these questionnaires, 123 of them were dully filled and returned representing a response rate of 64.7%. For qualitative data, all the 4 interview guides were dully filled and returned which meant a response of 100%. The information on the response rate of the questionnaire and the interview guide is as shown in Figure 4.1.





This response rate was good enough and consistent with Mugenda and Mugenda (2003)

who shared that a response rate of above 60% is good for analysis and presentation of

the findings.

4.3 Reliability and Validity Results

The questionnaire was pilot tested prior to the actual data collection so as to establish its reliability. The results of the pilot test are as indicated in Table 4.1.

Variable	Cronbach Alpha coefficient	No. of Items		
Dependent conflict management in	.764	10		
Somalia				
Evolution of power sharing	.857	5		
Clan elders in power sharing	.733	5		
Political peace talks of power sharing	.792	5		
Constitution review on power sharing	.771	5		

Table 4.1: Reliability and Validity Results

Source: Field Data (2020)

From Table 4.1, all the variables had Cronbach Alpha coefficient values above 0.7. The

implication of this finding is that the questionnaire used in the study was reliable.

4.4 General Information

The study sought to understand the general information of the respondents covering

their gender, residence, period of residence, level of education and the position held.

4.4.1 Gender Distribution of Respondents

The findings on gender distribution of the respondents are as indicated in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4.2: Gender Distribution of Respondents Source: Field Data (2020)

The findings in Figure 4.2 indicate that 80% of the respondents were male while 20% were female. This means that the role of women in power sharing in Somalia has not been significantly recognized. This could be attributed to cultural beliefs and traditions in Somalia that ignore the role of women in leadership and such roles as power sharing. These views are consistent with (Menkhaus, 2010) who shared that , youths women were excluded in political peace talks in Somalia since they did not have representatives in the process of peace.

4.4.2 Residence and Citizenship Status in Somalia

The study sought to establish whether respondents were residents and citizens of Somalia with the findings as shown in Table 4.2.

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	77	62.6
No	25	20.3
Not Sure	21	17.1
Total	123	100.0

Table 4.2: Residence and Citizenship Status in Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.2 indicate that 62.3% of the respondents were citizens and residents of Somalia, 20.3% were non-residents and 17.1% were not sure. This means that the power sharing efforts in Somalia were led by residents and non-residents. It also implies that diverse findings were sought from the respondents given their status of residence.

4.4.3 Period of Residence and Citizenship in Somalia

Table 4.3 gives the findings on the number of years the respondents had resided in Somalia.

8	
0	6.5
25	20.3
42	34.1
44	35.8
4	3.3
123	100.0
	42 44 4

Table 4.3: Period of Residence and Citizenship in Somalia

Table 4.3 indicates that 35.8% of the respondents had been residents and citizens of Somalia for 10-12 years, 34.1% for 7-9 years, 20.3% for 4-6 years, 6.5% for less than 3 years and 3.3% for over 13 years. These findings paint a picture of the recovery of Somalia after two decades of civil wars and conflicts that adversely affected the economy. It means that a significant proportion of the people In Somalia are residents from other countries since most of the local labor force had probably fled in other countries after the long period of political instability.

4.4.4 Level of Education

The level of education of the respondents were established and summarized as shown in Table 4.4.

	Frequency	Percent
No formal education	10	8.1
Primary education	10	8.1
Secondary education	19	15.4
College education	28	22.8
University education	56	45.5
Total	123	100.0

Table 4.4: Level of Education	Table	4.4:]	Level	of Ed	ucation
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Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.4 indicate that 45.5% had degrees, 22.8% had some college diploma education, and 15.4% had secondary education with a tie between those that had no formal education and those with primary level education at 8.1% respectively. This means that the respondents of the study had education that probably enabled them to read and understand the research questions as sought by the study.

4.4.5 Position Held in Somalia

The various positions held by the respondents were established and summarized as indicated in Table 4.5.

	Frequency	Percent
Political leaders	18	14.6
Clan elders	36	29.3
Religious leaders	30	24.4
Country representatives of humanitarian organizations	39	31.7
Total	123	100.0

Table 4.5: Position Held in Somalia

The results in Table 4.5 indicate that 31.7% of the respondents were country representatives of humanitarian organizations, 29.3% were clan elders, 24.4% were religious leaders and 14.6% were political leaders. This means that diverse views were expressed by the respondents on power sharing and conflict management as sought by the study.

4.5 Dependent Conflict Management in Somalia

The study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of the various conflicts management interventions in Somalia covering the various peacekeeping missions including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), mediation and arbitration efforts have been in place. Table 4.6 is a summary of the findings.

Statements on Effectiveness of Conflict	strongly disagree		disa	isagree neither agree Strong agree nor agree disagree		disagree		agree		0.
Management	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Interventions										
African Union Mission in Somalia for peace keeping missions	0	0.0	4	3.3	27	22.0	66	53.7	26	21.1
UN-forces for peace keeping missions	0	0.0	24	19.5	37	30.1	37	30.1	25	20.3
Kenya armed forces under 'Operation <i>Linda Nchi</i> '	0	0.0	2	1.6	37	30.1	64	52.0	20	16.3
Mediation efforts in place	0	0.0	35	28.5	7	5.7	71	57.7	10	8.1
Arbitration mechanisms in place	0	0.0	0	0.0	35	28.5	68	55.3	20	16.3

 Table 4.6: Effectiveness of Conflict Management Interventions

Source: Field Data (2020)

The findings in Table 4.6 indicate that 92 (74.8%) of the respondents agreed that African Union Mission in Somalia for peace keeping missions was effective in resolving the conflicts while 4 (3.3%) disagreed. The study noted that 62 (50.4%) of the respondents agreed on UN-forces for peace keeping missions in Somalia as conflict management strategies as 24 (19.5%) disagreed. It was noted that 84 (68.3%) of the respondents agreed on the role played by Kenya armed forces under 'Operation *Linda Nchi*' in resolving conflicts in Somalia. At the same time, 81 (65.9%) of the respondents agreed that the mediation efforts helped in managing conflicts in Somalia. Furthermore, 88 (71.5%) agreed on arbitration mechanisms that were in place in Somalia in response to the conflicts.

4.6 Evolution of Power Sharing and Its Role in Conflict Management in Somalia

The study sought to establish the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia. A summary of the descriptive statistics on evolution of power sharing is as presented in Table 4.7.

Statements on evolution of evolution of power sharing		ongly agree	disagree		neither agree nor disagree		agree		Strongly agree.	
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Federal power sharing has promoted equality in distribution of resources in Somalia	0	0.0	7	5.7	47	38.2	37	30.1	32	26.0
RegionalpowerdistributionhasbeenimplementedinSomalia	0	0.0	25	20.3	17	13.8	61	49.6	20	16.3
Clan power sharing has been in place in Somalia	0	0.0	34	27.6	18	14.6	49	39.8	22	17.9
Power sharing was done in the post conflict environment in Somalia	0	0.0	5	4.1	29	23.6	70	56.9	19	15.4
Power sharing was done to establish transitional government in Somalia	0	0.0	20	16.3	13	10.6	66	53.7	24	19.5

 Table 4.7: Evolution of Power Sharing and Its Role in Conflict Management in

 Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.7 indicate that 69 (56.1%) of the respondents agreed that federal power sharing had promoted equality in distribution of resources in Somalia while 7 (5.7%) disagreed. Obel-Hansen (2013) conflicts can arise as a result of various factors including ethnicity, inequality in distribution of the resources of the State, inadequate mechanisms of managing conflicts, abuse of military, language barriers and poor leadership that creates crisis. The study noted that 81 (65.9%) of the respondents agreed that regional power distribution has been implemented in Somalia while 25 (20.3%) disagreed. The study established that 71 (57.7%) of the respondents agreed that clan power sharing has been in place in Somalia and 34 (27.6%) disagreed. The study established that 89 (72.4%) of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done in the post conflict environment in Somalia while 5 (4.1%) disagreed. As shared by Weintraub (2014), power sharing ensures that elites in the post war states are able to

observe the rule of law. Power sharing allows the judges to exercise their judicial independence (Hartzel, 2019) even when they are not among the minority groups that have been protected through inclusion in State apparatus (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007).

The findings of the study showed that 90 (73.2%) of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done to establish transitional government in Somalia while 20 (16.3%) disagreed. As a concept, power sharing has evolved from its original conceptualization to cover various arrangements which occur in different dimensions. These dimensions include the power that competing elites strive to share (either military, economic, territorial or political) (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003), the governmental level established for sharing of power (sub-national or national level), the surrounding where the arrangements for power sharing are implemented (post conflict or consolidated democracy) and the time period when power sharing is conducted (permanent or transitional) (Bell, 2018). The common ground in all the systems of power sharing is that decision making is informed by the consensus as a principle as opposed to the rule of majority (McEvoy, 2015).

4.7 Role of Clan Elders in Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia

The role of clan elders in power sharing in Somalia was examined with a summary of the descriptive statistics as shown in Table 4.8.

Statements on clan		ongly	dis	agree		ither	agree		Strongly	
elders	ais	disagre			agree nor disagree				agree.	
	f	<u>e</u> %	f	%	f	<u>agree</u> %	f	%	f	%
Clan elders in Somalia	-	/0	-	/0	•	/0	-	/0	•	70
are competent in										
solving conflicts	0	0.0	16	13.0	30	24.4	50	40.7	27	22.0
among the clan										
members										
The competency of the										
clan elders in										
maintaining peace in	0	0.0	4	3.3	25	20.3	70	56.9	24	19.5
Somalia is										
demonstrated in their										
oratory skills Clan elders in Somalia										
are well versed with										
customary laws with	0	0.0	24	19.5	35	28.5	41	33.3	23	18.7
adherence to Sharia										
Clan elders in Somalia										
have moral authority										
to discipline errant	0	0.0	14	11.4	23	18.7	58	47.2	28	22.8
members of the clan										
The trust that clan										
elders enjoy in										
Somalia has										
successfully helped in	0	0.0	14	11.4	30	24.4	54	43.9	25	20.3
solving conflicts to										
maintain peace in the										
country										

 Table 4.8: Role of Clan Elders in Power Sharing and Conflict Management in

 Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.8 show that 77 (62.7%) of the respondents agreed that clan elders in Somalia are competent in solving conflicts among the clan members while 16 (13.0%) disagreed. The findings of the study showed that 94 (76.4%) of the respondents agreed that the competency of the clan elders in maintaining peace in Somalia was demonstrated in their oratory skills as 4 (3.3%) of the other respondents disagreed. Sewanyana (1997) the council of elders has a major responsibility of maintaining peace and they have played a role in resolution of conflicts in a way as to avoid military interventions. In Somalia, the culture gives a provision that the elders should represent clans. As such, these elders speak and decide on behalf of the clan. These elders have been given power which they are able influence more than one conflicting parties.

The study established that 64 (52.0%) of the respondents agreed that clan elders in Somalia are well versed with customary laws with adherence to Sharia as 24(19.5%) disagreed. The study revealed that 86 (69.9%) of the respondents agreed that the clan elders in Somalia had moral authority to discipline errant members of the clan while 14 (11.4%) disagreed. Hudda (2018) undertook a study on the traditional models of maintaining peace in Somali where it was shown that clan elders when there is dysfunctional central state, these clan elders' help in restoring peace while creating trust and relationship between conflicting clans. The success of the clan elders in management of conflicts is informed by such factors as the respect and trust bestowed to them, the traditional and moral authority, their relationship with the society and the fact that they are within the setting where the conflict arise. It was shown that 79 (64.2%) of the respondents agreed that the trust that clan elders enjoyed in Somalia has successfully helped in solving conflicts to maintain peace in the country as 14 (11.4%) disagreed.

4.8 Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia The study sought to establish the role of political peace talks on conflicts management in Somalia with the findings as summarized in Table 4.9.

Somalia										
Statements on political peace talks of power		ongly Igree	dis	agree	agr	ither ee nor agree	a	gree		ongly ree.
sharing	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
I believe that political peace talks in Somalia have been driven from the top by the few political elites	11	8.9	30	24.4	20	16.3	54	43.9	8	6.5
I know that most of the political peace talks in Somalia have been externally driven	2	1.6	25	20.3	22	17.9	62	50.4	12	9.8
Adopting bottom up approach in political peace talks would greatly promote conflict management in Somalia	2	1.6	44	35.8	15	12.2	47	38.2	15	12.2
I believe female gender has been neglected when it comes to representation in political talks in Somalia	2	1.6	15	12.2	38	30.9	55	44.7	13	10.6
I believe some of the political elites were not sincere in their representation in political talks in Somalia	2	1.6	22	17.9	10	8.1	61	49.6	28	22.8

 Table 4.9: Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing and Conflict Management in

 Somalia

Source: Field Data (2020)

From the results in Table 4.9, it can be shown that 62 (50.4%) of the respondents agreed that they believed that political peace talks in Somalia had been driven from the top by the few political elites while 41 (33.3%) disagreed. The study established that 74 (60.2%) of the respondents agreed that they knew that most of the political peace talks in Somalia had been externally driven while 27 (22.0%) disagreed. The finding is consistent with Hohne (2010) who noted that the international community has been

instrumental in organizing for political peace talks where there is political participation and representation. According to Hohne (2010), most of the representatives were not genuine and since in their interests. There was growing level of disputes largely arising from the issues of representation. This made it for officials to fish out the genuine and legit representatives who can represent the interests of the community well (Menkhaus, 2010). At the same time, youths women were excluded since they did not have representatives in the process of peace. Political peace talks were also characterized by top down approaches in Somalia (Netabay, 2007). Lack of sincere representatives and top down approaches acted as stumbling blocks towards reconciliation efforts in Somalia.

The findings of the study showed that 62 (50.4%) of the respondents agreed that adopting bottom up approach in political peace talks would greatly promote conflict management in Somalia as 46 (37.4%) disagreed. To enhance the effectiveness and success of the political peace talks, all resolutions should have been obtained from people on ground. This calls for adoption of bottom-up approach (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). The results showed that 68 (55.3%) of the respondents agreed that they believed female gender had been neglected when it came to representation in political talks in Somalia as 17 (13.8%) disagreed. The study noted that 89 (72.4%) of the respondents agreed that they believed some of the political elites were not sincere in their representation in political talks in Somalia while 24 (19.5%) disagreed. This finding is consistent with (Netabay, 2007) who indicated that lack of sincere representatives and top down approaches acted as stumbling blocks towards reconciliation efforts in Somalia.

4.9 Constitution Review on Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia

An assessment of constitutional review on power sharing and its role in conflicts management in Somalia was conducted with a summary of the findings as shown in Table 4.10.

Statements on Constitutional Review		ongly agree	dis	agree		either ree nor	a	gree		ongly ree.
on power sharing		0			dis	disagree				
	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%	f	%
Thereviewedconstitution of Somaliarecognizesclanfederalism in sharing ofState resources	0	0.0	14	11.4	28	22.8	47	38.2	34	27.6
The reviewed constitution gave rise to six regions recognized as States in Somalia for equal resource distribution	0	0.0	34	27.6	16	13.0	55	44.7	18	14.6
Regional federalism has resultedintodiscriminationofminorityclansdistribution of resources	0	0.0	12	9.8	34	27.6	47	38.2	30	24.4
Federalism that was brought as a result of constitutional review has resulted into tribalization that could spur clan conflicts in future	0	0.0	10	8.1	27	22.0	71	57.7	15	12.2
Federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal government to the States	0	0.0	17	13.8	11	8.9	58	47.2	37	30.1

Table 4.10: Constitution Review on Power Sharing and Conflict Man	agement in
Somalia	

Source: Field Data (2020)

The study established that 81 (65.9% of the respondents agreed that the reviewed constitution of Somalia recognized clan federalism in sharing of State resources while 14 (11.4%) disagreed. The study noted that 73 (59.3%) of the respondents agreed that the reviewed constitution gave rise to six regions recognized as States in Somalia for equal resource distribution while 34 (27.6%) disagreed. The findings of the study showed that 77 (62.7%) of the respondents agreed that regional federalism had resulted

into discrimination of minority clans in distribution of resources while 12 (9.8%) disagreed. The new constitution supported the concept of federalism so that integrity and unity is restored. The concept of federalism in the Constitution of Somalia can be traced to 2004 although the same federalism had been in place since the colonial time (Kouroutakis, 2014). Regional border was among the issues that emerged during the review of the constitution and in operationalization of federalism in Somalia. Ideally, these issues linked with regional borders resulted into conflicts with the each of the disputes regions being in line with the constitutional provisions. There also exists federalism at the clan level in Somalia and this encourages a high level of loyalty to the clan by the members.

The findings of the study showed that 86 (69.9%) of the respondents agreed that federalism that was brought as a result of constitutional review had resulted into tribalization that could spur clan conflicts in future as 10 (8.1) disagreed. The study established that 95 (77.2%) of the respondents agreed that federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal government to the States and 17 (13.8%) disagreed. there exist some variations in the degree of power sharing covering two extremes: low and high. The low extreme is one where it is the elected presidents that have a lot of powers where judiciary and other arms have limited influence (O'Donnell, 1994). On the other hand, a high extreme is characterized by decentralization with inclusivity in the central government.

4.10 Qualitative Analysis

An interview guide was used to collect data from the 4 KIs. The analysis of the general information of these KIs indicated that all were male with different levels of education including college diplomas and undergraduate degrees. Majority of the KIs had resided

in Somalia for a period of over 5 years and thus probably had relevant information to share as far as power sharing and conflicts were concerned.

The KIs were asked to indicate the contribution of the international community in solving conflicts in Somalia. One KI noted that the international community has played a pivotal role in strengthening the level of democracy within Somalia. Another KI gave the role played by the United Nations and the African Union as a great step towards establishing a permanent solution to conflicts in Somalia. Another KI shared mixed reactions by arguing that the international community had led to mixed concerns as far as conflict resolution in Somalia was concerned.

The study sought to establish some of the measures that the Federal government of Somalia had taken to bring peace and reconciliation and to eradicate marginalization. The KIs jointly shared that the Federal government of Somalia has not been active in strengthening peace and reconciliation in the country. This infers that were it not for the combined role played by the international community, Somalia could not have attained peaceful coexistence. This therefore points out to the critical role that the international community including the AU has played in resolving conflicts and restoring order in the present Somalia.

The study sought to establish the evolution of power sharing in Somalia and the role it had played as far as management of conflicts was concerned. One KI said that power sharing emerged some way back even before formation of the federal government in Somalia when the country had been divided into different administrative regions. Another KI shared that power sharing evolved from the tradition clan system that had been in place since time immemorial. Based on this views shared by the KIs, the study infer that power sharing is a multi-dimensional concept whose evolution dates back in the old days of the present Somalia.

The KIs were asked to indicate the role that clan elders played in Somalia. One of the KI noted that the clan elders helped to restore peace at the community level. The other KI noted that clan elders were highly respected individuals who had all support of the community and they could discipline the errant members of the community. The other KIs noted that the clan elders helped in negotiating and solving conflicts in the community in Somalia and they are viewed as the present day judges in the court system.

The study sought to establish the role that political talks on power sharing played as far as in conflict management in Somalia was concerned. The KIs unanimously agreed that political peace talks helped to restore order and peace in Somalia. However, one of the KI noted that the only issue with political peace talks was that they were largely driven by external players. By being external driven, they lacked major support from the grass root and people at the community level. The other issue that emerged was the fact that most of the political peace talks did not consider gender, especially the female as they were completely left out in most of these talks.

The KIs were asked to indicate the roles of constitutional review on power sharing in conflict management. From the findings, the study noted that constitutional review has resulted into the modern devolved systems in the present day Somalia. It was shared that constitutional review is one of the components of power sharing that had contributed towards stability of the present day Somalia.

4.11 Regression Results on the Role of Power Sharing as a Conflict Management

Tool in Somalia

The general objective of the study was to establish the role of power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. To achieve this objective and test the formulated hypotheses, regression analysis was conducted. The findings are as presented in subsequent sections.

4.11.1 Model Summary

The results of the regression model summary are as indicated in Table 4.11.

Table 4.1	1: Model	Summary
-----------	----------	---------

				Std. Error of the					
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Estimate					
1	.858 ^a	.736	.727	2.61020					
a. Predictors: (Constant), Constitutional Review, Political Peace Talks, Evolution of Power Sharing, Clan Elders									
Common E	Sources Field Date (2020)								

a. Predictors: (Constant), Constitutional Review, Political Peace Talks, Evolution of Power Sharing, Clan Elders Source: Field Data (2020)

Table 4.11 indicates the value of coefficient of correlation R as 0.859, this means that there exist strong and positive relationships between power sharing and conflict management in Somalia. The value of R square is 0.736; which is interpreted to mean that 73.6% change in conflicts management in Somalis is explained by power sharing. A number of studies conducted on power sharing include Nyamato (2014) who focused on opportunities linked with power sharing as an avenue for managing post conflicts in African communities. Power sharing may work well in those democracies that are regarded as stable where the political elites have a high probability of compromising. In Colombia, Mazzuca and Robinson (2009) looked at politically generated conflicts and their link with power sharing covering the period of 1850-1950. It was noted that the need for adoption of power sharing mechanisms in Colombia during that time was to reduce conflicts and civil wars in the country. This means that apart from power

sharing, there are other factors that influence conflict management that future studies should focus on.

4.11.2 Analysis of Variance

The results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of the model are as shown in Table

4.12.

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	2244.551	4	561.138	82.361	.000 ^b
Residual	803.953	118	6.813		
Total	3048.504	122			

Table 4.12: Analysis of Variance

a. Dependent Variable: Conflict Management

b. Predictors: (Constant), Constitutional Review, Political Peace Talks, Evolution of Power Sharing, Clan Elders Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.12 indicate the value of F calculated as 82.361, which is large enough to infer that the overall model of the study was significant. The p-value was 0.000 which is less than 0.05. This means that power sharing has significant effect on conflicts management in Somalia. A study by Walden, Javdani and Allen (2014) did focus on how to support power sharing through resolution of conflicts in a constructive manner. It was noted that leveraging on conflict resolution strategies which are constructive can be regarded as an important factor of consideration when one wish to effectively facilitate power sharing among the involved communities. Another study conducted in Burundi by Vandeginste (2009) looked at power sharing and the role it has played in resolution of conflicts. It was noted that through power sharing, Burundi has attained short term objectives including termination of war hence peaceful coexistence.

4.11.3 Regression Beta Coefficients

The regression beta coefficients and p-values were established to indicate the significance of the variables of the study as shown in Table 4.13.

		lardized cients	Standardized Coefficients		
	В	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	3.638	1.300		2.799	.006
Evolution of Power Sharing	.006	.031	.011	.192	.848
Clan Elders	.416	.037	.645	11.134	.000
Political Peace Talks	.020	.038	.027	.523	.602
Constitutional Review	.264	.045	.339	5.896	.000

 Table 4.13: Regression Beta Coefficients

a. Dependent Variable: Conflict Management

Source: Field Data (2020)

The results in Table 4.13 lead to the following predicted model between power sharing and conflict management.

Y=3.638+.006X1+.416X2+.020X3+.264X4

The finding of the study indicated that when other factors are held constant, conflict management in Somalia would be at 3.638. The first objective of the study sought to establish the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia. The findings indicated that when the variables are held constant, a unit change in evolution of power sharing would lead to 0.006 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value was 0.848, which was less than 0.05. This means that evolution of power sharing had no significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. A study was conducted in Ireland by Mueller and Rohner (2017) with the aim of power sharing at a local level and its link with the risk of conflicts. The study noted a significant link between sharing of power and curbing of deaths. The study conducted by Hartzell and Hoddie (2019) contended that power sharing support the rise of the rule of law in two various means. In a study conducted by Agarin and McCulloch (2020), it was revealed that most power sharing arrangements result into the challenges of inclusion and exclusion.

The second objective of the study sought to determine the role of clan elders in power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The study established that when all the variables are held constant, a unit change in the role of clan elders in power sharing would lead to 0.416 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. At 5%, the study established that the role of clan elders in power sharing had a p-value of 0.000 which was less than 0.05. This means that the role played by the clan elders in power sharing had significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Sewanyana (1997) did a study in Uganda to bring out the link between traditionally established communication and management of the conflicts. And established that the council of elders has a major responsibility of maintaining peace and they have played a role in resolution of conflicts in a way as to avoid military interventions. In Somalia, the culture gives a provision that the elders should represent clans. Ogwari (2014) looked at traditional leaders and the role they played in management of conflicts in African context. By adopting desk research methodology, it was shown those clans elders have continually been engaged in mediating conflicts at a communal level as majority of the conflicts were seen to arise from inequalities in distribution of resources, growing levels of corruption and ethnicity. Hudda (2018) undertook a study on the traditional models of maintaining peace in Somali. It was noted that clan elders are key in resolving all forms of conflicts in Somali. The success of the clan elders in management of conflicts is informed by such factors as the respect and trust bestowed to them, the traditional and moral authority, their relationship with the society and the fact that they are within the setting where the conflict arise. Muse (2019) looked at the politically generated crisis in Somalia and its link with the clan system and shared that there exists the link between clan system and crisis that are politically created.

The third objective of the study sought to analyze the effects of political peace talks of power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The findings of the study indicated that when all other variables are held constant, a unit change in political peace talks of power sharing would lead to 0.020 unit change in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value of political peace talk was 0.602, which was less than 0.05 and thus it was not significant. Menkhaus (2018) showed that most political agreements and structures in Somalia do recognize the role of elite bargain and that the cartels that are politically established in Somalia have taken state building and peace building efforts as viable project. De-Coning (2013) focused on Mogadishu and extensively dwelled on the concept of peace building where it was shown that there is growing tension between the interest of the international agencies and the local ownership of Somalia. For instance, the head of State in Somalia do strive to exercise the sovereign authority and maintain peace. On the other hand, the international players in Somalia also with all the resources strive to maintain peace. Kidist (2009) focused on regionally established institutions and their role in management of Somalia conflicts. The specific point of reference of the inquiry was on IGAD where it was shown the key obstacles for peace are in Somalia itself. Due to conflicts, it was noted that the issues of power sharing has largely been complicated with the other effect on allocation of resources including property and land.

The last objective of the study was to assess the effects of constitution review on power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The study established that when all other variables are held constant, a unit change in constitution review on power sharing would result into 0.264 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value was 0.000 which was less than 0.05 and thus it was significant. Ahmed (2014) did a study to bring out the process of creation of the constitution in Somalia and noted that

although Constitutional Commission made efforts to raise some awareness on people, this was not sufficient. Kouroutakis (2014) conducted a study on perspectives and process of the provision constitution in Somalia and shared that Somalia adopted the new constitution so as to ease the period of tension by strengthening the governance systems and politically established institutions. Mosley (2015) did a study whose aim was to bring out the future of Somalia federal. It was noted that there is high pressure in Somalia for electoral transition in the year 2016. The results demonstrated that power sharing in Somalia should be aimed at ensuring that none of the clans have a dominating influence on the politically established processes in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The chapter is set out to provide a summary of the findings based on the objectives of the study. The conclusions and recommendations of the study are also provided as informed by the key findings and objectives of the study. The suggestions for further studies are also indicated.

5.2 Summary of the Findings

This section provides a summary of the findings from the analysis.

5.2.1 Evolution of Power Sharing and Its Role in Conflict Management in Somalia

The study established that 90 (73.2%) of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done to establish transitional government in Somalia. It was shown that 89 (72.4%) of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done in the post conflict environment in Somalia. The study noted that 71 (57.7%) of the respondents agreed that clan power sharing has been in place in Somalia. The study noted that 81 (65.9%) of the respondents agreed that regional power distribution has been implemented in Somalia. The results indicate that 69 (56.1%) of the respondents agreed that federal power sharing had promoted equality in distribution of resources in Somalia. The findings of regression analysis indicated that when the variables are held constant, a unit change in evolution of power sharing would lead to 0.006 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value was 0.848, which was less than 0.05. This means that evolution of power sharing had no significant effect on conflict management in Somalia.

5.2.2 Role of Clan Elders in Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia The findings of the study showed that 94 (76.4%) of the respondents agreed that the competency of the clan elders in maintaining peace in Somalia was demonstrated in their oratory skills. The study revealed that 86 (69.9%) of the respondents agreed that the clan elders in Somalia had moral authority to discipline errant members of the clan. It was shown that 79 (64.2%) of the respondents agreed that the trust that clan elders enjoyed in Somalia has successfully helped in solving conflicts to maintain peace in the country. The results show that 77 (62.7%) of the respondents agreed that clan elders in Somalia are competent in solving conflicts among the clan members. The study established that 64 (52.0%) of the respondents agreed that clan elders in Somalia are well versed with customary laws with adherence to Sharia. The study established that when all the variables are held constant, a unit change in the role of clan elders in power sharing would lead to 0.416 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. At 5%, the study established that the role of clan elders in power sharing had a p-value of 0.000

which was less than 0.05. This means that the role played by the clan elders in power sharing had significant effect on conflict management in Somalia.

5.2.3 Political Peace Talks of Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia

From the results, 89 (72.4%) of the respondents agreed that they believed some of the political elites were not sincere in their representation in political talks in Somalia. The study established that 74 (60.2%) of the respondents agreed that they knew that most of the political peace talks in Somalia had been externally driven. The results showed that 68 (55.3%) of the respondents agreed that they believed female gender had been neglected when it came to representation in political talks in Somalia. The study showed that 62 (50.4%) of the respondents agreed that they believed that political peace talks in Somalia had been driven from the top by the few political elites. The findings

of the study showed that 62 (50.4%) of the respondents agreed that adopting bottom up approach in political peace talks would greatly promote conflict management in Somalia. The findings of regression analysis indicated that when all other variables are held constant, a unit change in political peace talks of power sharing would lead to 0.020 unit change in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value of political peace talk was 0.602, which was less than 0.05 and thus it was not significant.

5.2.4 Constitution Review on Power Sharing and Conflict Management in Somalia

The study established that 95 (77.2%) of the respondents agreed that federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal government to the States. The findings of the study showed that 86 (69.9%) of the respondents agreed that federalism that was brought as a result of constitutional review had resulted into tribalization that could spur clan conflicts in future. The study established that 81 (65.9% of the respondents agreed that the reviewed constitution of Somalia recognized clan federalism in sharing of State resources. The findings of the study showed that 77 (62.7%) of the respondents agreed that regional federalism had resulted into discrimination of minority clans in distribution of resources. The study noted that 73 (59.3%) of the respondents agreed that the reviewed constitution gave rise to six regions recognized as States in Somalia for equal resource distribution. From regression analysis, the study established that when all other variables are held constant, a unit change in constitution review on power sharing would result into 0.264 unit increase in conflict management in Somalia. The p-value was 0.000 which was less than 0.05 and thus it was significant.

5.3 Conclusion

The study sought to establish the evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia. The study established that the evolution of power sharing had

no significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Most of the respondents agreed that power sharing was done to establish transitional government in Somalia and that power sharing was done in the post conflict environment in Somalia. The study noted that clan power sharing has been in place in Somalia. The study noted that regional power distribution has been implemented in Somalia. The results indicate that federal power sharing had promoted equality in distribution of resources in Somalia.

The study sought to determine the role of clan elders in power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. It was noted that the role played by the clan elders in power sharing had significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Most of the respondents agreed that the competency of the clan elders in maintaining peace in Somalia was demonstrated in their oratory skills. The study revealed that the clan elders in Somalia had moral authority to discipline errant members of the clan. The trust that clan elders enjoyed in Somalia has successfully helped in solving conflicts to maintain peace in the country. The clan elders in Somalia are competent in solving conflicts among the clan members. The clan elders in Somalia are well versed with customary laws with adherence to Sharia.

The study sought to analyze the effects of political peace talks of power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The study established that political peace talks had no significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Majority of the respondents agreed that they believed some of the political elites were not sincere in their representation in political talks in Somalia. The study established that most of the political peace talks in Somalia had been externally driven. The results showed female gender had been neglected when it came to representation in political talks in Somalia. The study showed that political peace talks in Somalia had been driven from the top by the few political elites. The findings of the study showed that adopting bottom up approach in political peace talks would greatly promote conflict management in Somalia.

The study sought to assess the effects of constitution review on power sharing on conflict management in Somalia. The findings of the study indicated that constitution review on power sharing had significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Majority of the respondents agreed that federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal government to the States. The findings of the study showed that federalism that was brought as a result of constitutional review had resulted into tribalization that could spur clan conflicts in future. The study established that the reviewed constitution of Somalia recognized clan federalism in sharing of State resources. The findings of the study showed that regional federalism had resulted into discrimination of minority clans in distribution of resources. The study noted that the reviewed constitution gave rise to six regions recognized as States in Somalia for equal resource distribution.

5.4 Recommendations for Policy and Practice

From the results of regression beta coefficients, the role played by clan elders had the largest significant role towards conflict management in Somalia. In view of this finding, the study recommends that traditional conflict management techniques should be supported in Somalia including the use of clan elders. The international community including UN should support and promote the role of clan elders in conflict management in Somalia.

Constitutional review had the second largest and significant effect on conflicts management in Somalia. In view of this finding, the study recommends that the entire

constitutional review process in Somali should be supported by the international community as a mechanism of resolving the conflicts.

Political peace talks had the third largest although non-significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. This study recommends that political peace talks in Somalia should be inclusive processes that involve all people including female gender. The process of political peace talks should be supported by the international community but it should be majorly driven by the local community and not external players.

Evolution of power sharing had the least and non-significant effect on conflict management in Somalia. Thus, the study recommends that power sharing should be improved as that can have significant contribution towards conflict management in Somalia.

5.5 Areas for Further Research

The present study was conducted in Somalia focusing on power sharing and conflict management. The study recommends further studies to be done in other fragile countries like South Sudan, Liberia and Kenya. Conflict management was the dependent variable in the present study, future studies should focus on other constructs like electoral disputes like what was witnessed in Kenya after the 2007 post-election conflicts.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Questionnaire

I am Abdirahman Ahmed Mohamed, a student at Moi University currently undertaking a study on *POWER SHARING AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TOOL IN SOMALI.* You are therefore requested to fill in this questionnaire with appropriate responses so that I am able to provide answers to the aforementioned study. Note that all information you share will only be used for academic purpose. Any information you share will be treated with utmost confidence. Thank you.

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Kindly indicate your gender

Male	[]
Female	[]
Other	(Kindly specify)

2. Kindly indicate whether you are a resident and citizen of Somalia

Yes	[]
No	[]
Not Sure	[]

3. Kindly indicate the number of years you have been a resident and citizen of Somalia

Less than 3 years	[]
4-6 years	[]
7-9 years	[]
10-12	[]
Over 13 years	[]

4. Kindly indicate your highest level of education

No formal education	[]
Primary education	[]
Secondary education	[]
College education	[]
University education	[]
Other	(Kindly specify)

5. Kindly indicate your current position in Somalia as a resident/citizen.

Political leaders	[]
Clan elders	[]
Religious leaders	[]
Country representatives of humanitarian organizations	[]
Other	(Kindly specify)

SECTION B: DEPENDENT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

6. Given below are various causes of conflicts in Somalia over the past two decades. Kindly rate these causes on a scale of 1-5, where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5=very great extent.

Statements on Causes of Conflicts	1	2	3	4	5
Unequal distribution of national resources					
Marginalization of minority clans by the government					
Proliferation of fire arms from neighboring countries in pursuit					
of their own personal interests in Somalia					
Misuse of State resources including power by those in					
government					
Competition on the natural resources in the country					
Other					

7. In response to the persistent conflicts in Somalia, various peacekeeping missions including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), mediation and arbitration efforts have been in place. Kindly rate the effectiveness of these interventions as far as conflict management in Somalia is concerned. Use a 5-point Likert scale where 1=not effective, 2=ineffective, 3=moderately effective, 4=effective and 5=very effective.

Statements on Effectiveness of Conflict Management	1	2	3	4	5
Interventions					
African Union Mission in Somalia for peace keeping missions					
UN-forces for peace keeping missions					
Kenya armed forces under 'Operation Linda Nchi'					
Mediation efforts in place					
Arbitration mechanisms in place					

SECTION C: EVOLUTION OF POWER SHARING AND ITS ROLE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

7. Below are several statements on evolution of power sharing and its role in conflict management in Somalia. Kindly indicate the extent of your agreement with each of these statements on a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree.

Statements on evolution of evolution of power sharing	1	2	3	4	5
Federal power sharing has promoted equality in distribution of					
resources in Somalia					
Regional power distribution has been implemented in Somalia					
Clan power sharing has been in place in Somalia					
Power sharing was done in the post conflict environment in Somalia					
Power sharing was done to establish transitional government in					
Somalia					

SECTION D: ROLE OF CLAN ELDERS IN POWER SHARING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

9. Given below are some of the statements on the role of clan elders in power sharing and how this affects conflict management in Somalia. Kindly indicate the extent of your agreement with each of these statements. Use a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree.

Statements on clan elders	1	2	3	4	5
Clan elders in Somalia are competent in solving conflicts among the					
clan members					
The competency of the clan elders in maintaining peace in Somalia is					
demonstrated in their oratory skills					
Clan elders in Somalia are well versed with customary laws with					
adherence to Sharia					
Clan elders in Somalia have moral authority to discipline errant					
members of the clan					
The trust that clan elders enjoy in Somalia has successfully helped in					
solving conflicts to maintain peace in the country					

SECTION E: POLITICAL PEACE TALKS OF POWER SHARING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

10. Below are statements on political peace talks on power sharing and the role in conflict management in Somalia. Kindly indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the statement. Use a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree.

Statements on political peace talks of power sharing	1	2	3	4	5
I believe that political peace talks in Somalia have been driven from the					
top by the few political elites					
I know that most of the political peace talks in Somalia have been					
externally driven					
Adopting bottom up approach in political peace talks would greatly					
promote conflict management in Somalia					
I believe female gender has been neglected when it comes to					
representation in political talks in Somalia					
I believe some of the political elites were not sincere in their					
representation in political talks in Somalia					

SECTION F: CONSTITUTION REVIEW ON POWER SHARING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

11. Below are statements on constitutional review on power sharing and the role in conflict management in Somalia. Kindly indicate the extent of your agreement with each of the statement. Use a scale of 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree.

Statements on Constitutional Review on power sharing	1	2	3	4	5
The reviewed constitution of Somalia recognizes clan federalism in					
sharing of State resources					
The reviewed constitution gave rise to six regions recognized as States					
in Somalia for equal resource distribution					
Regional federalism has resulted into discrimination of minority clans					
in distribution of resources					
Federalism that was brought as a result of constitutional review has					
resulted into tribalization that could spur clan conflicts in future					
Federalism has resulted into decentralization of power from the federal					
government to the States					

END

Appendix II: Interview Guide for Political Leaders

1. Kindly indicate your gender

2. Kindly indicate your highest level of education
3. Kindly indicate the number of years you have resided in Somalia

4. Kindly indicate the contributions of the international community in solving the Somali problem? (Answer on the space below)

5. Kindly indicate some of the measures that the Federal government of Somalia has taken in this area to bring peace and reconciliation and to eradicate marginalization? (Answer on the space below)

6. Kindly indicate ways of evolution of power sharing in Somalia and the role it as played in management of conflicts in the country

7. Kindly indicate the other roles of clan elders in Somali conflict management

8. Kindly indicate the roles of political talks of power sharing in conflict management

9. Kindly indicate the other roles of constitutional review on power sharing in conflict management

THANK YOU