

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AINABKOI SETTLEMENT SCHEME 1963-2008 IN
ELDORET EAST DISTRICT, KENYA**

BY

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DECLARATION

Declaration by the Student

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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to my late Grandmother Tablulei to whom I owe my livelihood.

ABSTRACT

Settlement schemes in Kenya have been faced with various constraints since independence in 1963. The main purpose of the study was to examine the socio-economic factors that affected Ainabkoi settlement scheme from independence to 2008. Methodology employed included oral interviews, secondary data and archival sources. The study also sought to interview 80 original settlers in all four phases or blocks in Ainabkoi settlement scheme. A pilot study was carried out in Lessos settlement scheme. Rural Development approach was used in analyzing data. The analysis of data was done using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The study upheld the ethnicity and socio-cultural organization, such as lineage and clan loyalties persisted in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme adversely affecting settlers socio-economic transformation. One of the findings was that the settlers should be regarded more as pioneers and therefore allowed to put a great deal of work on what will be their land in future. Secondly, the study showed that both social and economic factors are important for the attainment of settlement scheme objectives. Based on the findings, the study recommends that there should be national selection criteria of settlers for all settlement projects, future planning be considered by diversifying the economy of the settlers and by introducing pre-tested crops of high quality and cushion farmers against the fluctuations in market prices and enable them meet the demands of the settlement programme.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADC	Agricultural Development Corporation
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation
ALDVE	African Land and Development Board
ALUS	African Land Utilization and Settlement
C.D.C	Common Development Corporation
CAIS	Central Artificial Insemination Services
CLB	Central Land Board
E.A.P.	East Africa Protectorate
EARC	East Africa Royal Commission
F.C.S.	Farmers Cooperative Society
IBEA	Imperial British East Africa
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KLA	Kenya Land Commission
KNA	Kenya National Archives
LDSB	Land Development and Settlement Board
SFT	Settlement Fund Trustee

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Land has always been and is of great social, economic, cultural and political importance in Kenya. In terms of economy, land is a means of survival, and Kenya being an agricultural country, land is considerably the main source of income and means of subsistence for the majority of the African households. Socially, land is a measure of one's prestige in the society.¹ With regard to culture, land is significant in that it serves as a basis of identity with one's kin. Due to the fact that land is inherited from the family or clan, it links the holder with the fore parents whose graves are on that land. As far as politics is concerned, issues of land have always been very sensitive. The question of land led to the rise of African nationalism which culminated in a bitter armed struggle between forces of colonial dictatorship and the Mau Mau land and freedom army. It should be noted, however, that this has been changing gradually with the entrenchment of capitalism.

In Kenya, settlement schemes had an additional role to ease political and economic anomalies that colonial rule had created. These included the racial and dual economy that developed as a result of the "white highlands" being given more development emphasis at the expense of the African reserves. For this reason, the establishment of European settlement in the white highlands in Kenya and the gazetting of reserves raised problems for the African population. For the African, it meant that there would be no room for population expansion.²

The submission to the Kenya Land Commission of 1933 by African spokesmen identified the land problem affecting African areas and in particular, revealed that some areas in western Kenya which designated present day Kakamega and Teso districts are overcrowded locations though this were not the only areas with the problems. However, little was done by the colonial state to alleviate the land problem thereafter.³

At independence, the Kenya government adopted the resettlement strategy to improve the socio-economic status of her people. The million acre settlement scheme, a massive land transfer programme to settle the landless and solve the problem of unemployment was started.⁴ However, this plan helped to further the land population crisis which existed in certain areas such as Muhoroni, Tongaren among others, where land consolidation was introduced and many people became displaced and landless and others found themselves with very little land. Consequently demand for new land for settlement on a much more massive scale occurred.⁵

There was also an assumption that the schemes would remove the political pressure on the leadership. As Odingo observed in 1966, one of the basic assumptions in inaugurating the settlement scheme in the Kenya highlands was that they would remove political pressure. At the same time, it was hoped that large scale settlement would alleviate the growing population pressure particularly in parts of western and central province.⁶

In 1963, the Kenya government sought financial assistance to buy one million acre of European owned mixed farming land adjacent to densely populated African areas. This was divided into small holdings for African farmers.

The British government not only financed the million acre programme, but undertook to cover the deficit in development aid.⁷ A total of £25.2 million loan and grants was given to the Kenya government by the British government, the Common Wealth Development Corporation (C.D.C) and the World Bank to implement the programme.⁸

The starting of the settlement schemes also acted as a measure of reassurance to white settler assets built up over the years. This resulted in discussions between the British government and the newly independent Kenya government. The outcome of this discussion was the process of transfer of land and the financial assistance directed to the programme.⁹ The programme was meant to facilitate the introduction of better methods of farming into a large segment of the African population through the supervision of production by the settlement staff. It is against this background that this study sought to establish how land was transferred to African settlers and whether the better methods of farming were utilized for increased production hence transforming the socio-economic status of farmers in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme.

1.2. Study Area

Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme is situated in the former white highlands in what was formerly Eldoret East District of Uasin Gishu County. The scheme consists of the East block, West block, North block and South block.

The majority of the occupants of this scheme are from the native Kalenjin and migrant Kikuyu. The most important cash crops grown include maize, pyrethrum, tea, wheat and horticultural products such as vegetables, fruits and potatoes. The settlers also practice dairy farming. The majority of the people resettled were from the Wareng district.

The climate of this region is wet and cool with an altitude of 2500mm above sea level,¹⁰ the amount of land allocated is estimated as 2500 hectares and each individual acquired an average of 40 acres. The size of Ainabkoi is 893 square kilometres. The area has 8 locations and 17 sub-locations.

The population of the African settlers from the onset of allocation was around four hundred people but later the number increased as new people bought land from the initial settlers. The cost of administering the scheme was the responsibility of the members. Majority of the members who occupied the settlement scheme were landless, former workers of the white settlers, retired civil servants and former colonial soldiers.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Settlement schemes had several advantages as potential focal points of social and economic changes. Ainabkoi settlement scheme, like other million-acre schemes in Kenya, was started in 1960-1967, to settle people from all parts of Rift valley. The programme was supposed to implement planned socio-economic changes, and was expected to work according to set out guidelines. One guideline, for instance, required that indigenous agriculture practiced by Africans be discouraged.

Farmers were required to adopt mixed farming, which would enable the small holder to produce food and cash crops for sale.¹¹ In essence, the scheme was supposed to assist its inhabitants to overcome challenges associated with poverty. However, the initial targeted settlers were the landless and former soldiers, but in the end these groups of people were not settled there. Was it therefore possible to attain the objectives of the settlement, given

that the people who ended up settling there were people who had land elsewhere? Given this background, the current study sought to examine the effectiveness of the scheme strategy in socio-economic development of people settled in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme. Additionally, the study also focuses on the socio-economic factors that affected the success of the scheme strategy for rural development. Thus, this study sought to establish the extent to which development agenda have been achieved in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme in terms of income, housing, health facilities and infrastructure. However, Ainabkoi settlement scheme continue to experience a number of challenges in the provision of health, housing, education and other social facilities, suggesting that the principles behind setting up the scheme require to be examined in order to ascertain whether or not they were attained

1.4 Objectives

The study aimed at achieving the following objectives.

- (1) To examine criteria used to allocate land in Ainabkoi settlement scheme.
- (2) To assess the extent to which the objectives for which Ainabkoi settlement scheme was established had been attained.
- (3) To determine the constraints to socio-economic transformation in Ainabkoi Settlement scheme.

1.5 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

- (1) What criteria were used to allocate land in Ainabkoi settlement scheme?

(2) To what extent have the objectives for establishing Ainabkoi settlement scheme been attained?

(3) What constraints to socio-economic transformation were encountered in Ainabkoi Settlement scheme?

1.6 Scope and Limitation

The study aimed at examining the establishment of the million acre scheme as a planned socio-economic change programme in Ainabkoi settlement scheme in the period between 1963 and 2008. The year 1963 marked the beginning of this programme and therefore served as good starting point for analysis. The year 2008 provided good ending since the researcher was able to identify the problems that faced the scheme to date. Furthermore, the period up to 2008 provides a good basis for examining the effects of liberalization on the agricultural sector on the African settlers. The study covered a span of forty seven years. It focused mainly on the African settlers in the Ainabkoi settlement scheme programme. It was the intention of this study to explore socio-economic aspects that affected the implementation of this settlement scheme.

The tool used for data collection was an interview schedule. The interviews were not devoid of problems. Traversing the ecological zones were quite challenging and time consuming, informants were never exact in aspects such as dates of some events. Other challenges were suspicion from the informants; some of them were asking to be 'rewarded'. This problems were overcome by using fast means of communication by using motor bicycle and assuring informants of the confidentiality of the information and benefits of the research in their socio-economic lives.

1.7 Justification of the Study

Several studies have been undertaken on settlement schemes in Africa in general and Kenya in particular. For example, studies carried out by Odingo¹² on the Tongaren and other schemes were based on patterns of land use.

The present study departs from other studies insofar as it focuses on the socio-economic effects of the settlement scheme on the African settlers from a historical perspective. While a similar study was undertaken by Gikenye¹³ in 1992, it examined the history of African settlers in Oljoro-orok by looking at the modalities of settlement into the scheme and the challenges faced by settlers while first settling, as well as the social impact of the scheme. The current study focuses more on the social and economic benefits, if any, that have accrued to the settlers as a result of being part of the scheme.

The study of the Tongaren scheme focused mainly on the performance of mixed small scale farmers growing mainly maize and keeping dairy cows and the peasantry economy that has evolved as a result. The study of Ainabkoi scheme likewise focuses mainly on the performance of mixed small-scale farmers growing tea, wheat, maize, pyrethrum and dairy farming that has evolved in the area. Akwako's¹⁴ studies on Muhoroni settlement scheme attempted to evaluate the socio-economic effects since its inception. However, Akwako's study differs from the present one because it was based on plantation economy with emphasis on the impact of Muhoroni Sugar Company on the African settlers.

As already indicated in the problem statement, Ainabkoi settlement scheme was expected to assist settlers to become economically empowered, notably through agriculture. Given that the settlement programme cost the Kenya government colossal amount of money, which was passed on to the African settlers as loans, it is only fair that an evaluation of the extent to which the investment of public funds has been a success or not, and the present study focuses on this socio-economic change as a historical process does not take place overnight and therefore a period of forty years is a fairly reasonable time frame to undertake an evaluation of the scheme's performance. This study sought to establish whether the objectives of establishing the scheme had been attained or not.

It is hoped that this study will be useful to policy makers, planners and implementers of land settlement programmes which has remained a core sector of Kenyan agricultural policy. Researchers and interested scholars will also find this input useful in their work.

Furthermore, no comprehensive scientific study has been done on Ainabkoi settlement scheme in North Rift region. Thus, this study is intended to fill a gap in African settlement studies, and contributes to the pool of knowledge in social and economic history of Kenya.

1.8 Literature Review

There exist a fairly large volume of secondary sources on settlement schemes. This review begins by examining literature on settlement schemes, which manifest common or general characteristics before dealing with specific literature on settlement schemes in Africa and Kenya. Pickett¹⁵ outlines the factors that should be considered by a settlement

authority in settling African settlers on settlement schemes. They include: common place of origin, farming experience (at least subsistence farming), minimum literacy standards and whether African settlers have a family who worked on the holding. Pickett's recommendations are useful to the present study, which likewise sought to establish the background of the African settlers as well as the criteria used for selecting them.

Moreover, Pickett¹⁶ points out that government sponsored or controlled settlement schemes operate under a framework of "directed change", which implies a transformative approach to rural development. He further argues that this "directed change", affects African settler perception of their role in the scheme, especially where the entire infrastructure, the credit and the supply and marketing services have been provided by a benevolent authority from the outset.

Therefore, Pickett points out that it may become difficult to convince African settlers that they should take over, at some point in time, even partial responsibility for their provision. He also argues that there is need for the proper preparation and motivation of the African settlers before they move into the settlement, training throughout the initial implementation phase.¹⁷ This argument may shed light on why African settlers have failed to enhance agricultural production in Ainabkoi scheme.

Collin Leys¹⁸ writing on underdevelopment and colonialism in Kenya, notes that there was an indigenous group of capitalists who were independent and competing effectively with foreign capital. To him, this group was involved actively in various sectors of the economy including agriculture. Leys argues that the process of differentiation among Africans widened after independence when some African households gained privilege

access to the resources of the state such as land in earmarked settlement schemes. Leys' contribution will help this study as it focuses on the need to examine the background of the African settlers and the levels of differentiation that have come up in the African settler's economic base since the start of the schemes.

Writing specifically on settlement schemes, Leys¹⁹ has observed that Europeans had a monopoly of high potential land in the white highlands. The Africans, on the other hand, were continued in their traditional areas and were not provided with the techniques, the crops, and the capital to produce intensively for market. This, he contends, led to underdevelopment of Africans out of which labour migration to European farms emerged.

Writing on class and economic change in Kenya, Kitching contends that independence made little or no structural difference on African socio-economic life there being considerable continuity of socio-economic trends from the colonial to the post colonial period.²⁰ Kitching argues that the process of differentiation between Africans heightened after independence when some African households gained privileged access to resources of the state for instance land. Kitching contends that the Africanisation of large parts of state apparatus for example land after independence speeded up the process of differentiation. The study sought to find out how the process of land allocation was carried out in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme and whether the farmers felt the socio-economic change.

Rening discusses the Zande scheme in southern Sudan which he argues, "leaned heavily upon the Gezira example."²¹ He argued that, the intent of the early planners in 1943 was to explore the "possibilities for social and economic" development in southern Sudan.

The District Commissioner, however, insisted on including plans to facilitate agricultural supervision for conservation of soil and forest. This scheme was originally intended to produce a variety of cash crops by grouping related Zande families in a compact “villagized” H-pattern of plots which could be cultivated mechanically along the plot contours. He concludes that these early plans were abandoned for being too complicated. More still, the scheme failed because planners and administrators tended to lose sight or ignored the earlier plans. This study provides a criterion for evaluating Ainabkoi scheme in the light of the objectives for establishing them.

Recent works on Kenya’s colonial economy by Cowen,²² Kitching²³ and Swainson²⁴ revealed that there was a class of Africans who accumulated wealth during the colonial period. According to Kennedy, this included a class mainly of kikuyu accumulators in central Kenya even before the onset of colonial rule.²⁵ Other colonial chiefs such as Nabongo, Odera Akang’o and Gakure accumulated wealth by exploiting the state machinery yet there were those who had become differentiated as a result of early access to western education. It was this class of elites which Maxon calls straddle that took up positions of employment in the Africanized civil service and other sectors.

This, point however, is denied by Van Zwanenberg and King²⁶ whose contribution about Kenya’s colonial agriculture, asserts that there was no African class of peasant farmers which had taken shape by independence. These authors contend that as plantation economy took root in Kenya, the colonialists accumulated wealth while Africans provided labour and services. This work provides very important aspects of change from colonial period to independence. With regard to Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme, the same

scenario took place since there have been some gradual socio-economic change in the study area. On the Kenyan settlement schemes, Leo²⁷ gives an important historical analysis of the administration of resettlement schemes in Kenya prior to and after independence. He discusses the early European planned settlement schemes, which were administered between 1959 and 1960, and their subsequent failure to take root. Leo's study sheds light on the economic development and social classes within the settlement schemes and how this contributed to the formulation of the settlement programme.

However, Leo does not consider the question of finance beyond the initial years of the scheme, especially the effect of inflation in reducing the external debt burden. Moreover, he contends that a significant proportion of the settlement plots were diverted into the hands of people who were not landless, just because ethnic rigidities or geography of settlement left some areas of the country overpopulated. On the other hand, others have an access to land, and worse still high population growth is creating landlessness faster than it can be eliminated. Leo's work is important in understanding the background of the African settlers and especially factors such as ethnicity in the distribution of land.

The present study sought to highlight some of the factors hampering the socio-economic transformation of the schemes such as lack of finances, poor infrastructure and lack of machinery in Ainabkoi settlement scheme. Leo notes that the British wrote off loans made to the government to purchase African settler's farms due to high rate of loan defaulting by African settlers. Leo's work is relevant to the present study, which sought to establish the process involved in loan payment considering that African settlers have continued to repay loans despite these having been written off. This will then reveal the

extent to which African settlers might have failed to transform themselves economically as evidenced by the fact that most farmers in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme continue to repay loans to date.

Holding a similar view, Harbeson²⁸ discusses the land issue in Kenyan politics and in particular the land reform issues in relation to decolonization. He points out that the process of Africanizing the white highlands was undertaken on European terms with European interest being given foremost consideration. Moreover, he argues that the post-colonial government did not seek to couple political independence with immediate step to achieve an independent African economy, and so it never renounced the obligation to repay loans given for settlement. Although he has not explicitly dealt with factors affecting the settlement programmes, his reference to loans will help establish the extent to which the African settlers have failed to transform economically

Harbeson, however, fails to delineate the socio-economic imperatives that are deeply rooted in the resettlement programme as mention earlier, especially the administration and economic prospects of the settlement schemes. Therefore, his analysis does not give a cursory evaluation of the success and failure of the schemes within the framework of his time period. That notwithstanding, his work is still relevant for our analysis, for instance evaluating settlement schemes as planned socio-economic centres of change. Ainabkoi settlement scheme lays its emphasis on the issues mentioned beforehand.

Akwako Joseph²⁹ investigated why the new African settlers in Muhoroni scheme are trying to rely on sugar cane in an area in which only 2.5 percent of the cultivated area was under sugarcane in the period between 1960-63 and, if so what combination of social

and economic conflicts prevented them from achieving the same intensity of production as their counterpart, the large scale producers.

He points out that the economic transformation has gradually declined because most of the wealthy African settlers are attached more to urban centers, leaving their plots fallow. The foregoing analysis reveals that little attention has been paid to the evaluation of socio-economic problems that have afflicted Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme since the inception. This study will therefore evaluate the performance of the Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

Settlement schemes have been studied in many different ways, usually from geographic, economic, environmental, sociological and anthropological standpoints.³⁰ As Ogot contends, however, it is very difficult to discern a theory of social change.³¹ In history, as in all other social sciences, an inquiry into the past can be made within the precincts of certain concepts or theories whose application and analysis would help in the construction of past knowledge. Nevertheless, the study of African socio-economic history has been dominated by the great tradition, namely, perspectives inspired by theories of either modernization or underdevelopment.

The basis of the foregoing review of related literature, the socio-economic changes in Ainabkoi settlement scheme were undertaken within the framework of the Rural Development Approach. The development of endogenous development as suggested by

Bassand et al. {1986] has been put forward in opposition to traditional understanding, or Endogenous development is understood as the hypothesis that improvement in the socio-economic well being of disadvantaged areas can best be brought about by recognizing and animating the collective resources of the territory itself. According to Bassad the new meaning of developing, that is, qualitative and quantitative indicators, and not just qualitative and monetary measures are used as criteria and cultural, social, political, and ecological values as well as social costs and long term effects are combined for endogenous development. There are significant gaps in the theory and they can be overcome through systematic analysis of practical experiences. On the other hand, social theory has not been very successful in providing useful models to inform endogenous approaches.

This concept as a development approach was created as an alternative to the practice of central authorities in designing interventions which deal with sector of social and economic life in isolation from each other and / or which assume that socio-economic problem can be solved by standard measure, regardless of location or culture. This approach concentrates on government actions, and considers land settlement schemes as planned change, initiated by the government. Rural development aims at finding the ways to improve the rural lives with participation of the rural people themselves so as to meet the required need of the rural area. The outsider may not understand the setting, culture, language and other things prevalent in the local area. As such, general people themselves have to participate in their sustainable rural development.³²

The need for rural communities to approach development from a wider perspective has created more focus on a broad range of development goals rather than merely creating incentive for agricultural or resource based businesses.

The characteristics of this theory are, first, it sets on development activity within territorial rather than sectional framework, with the scale of the territory being similar than the national state. Second, economic and other development territory by valorizing and exploiting local resources, physical and human. Third, development is contextualized by focusing on the needs, capacities and perspectives of local people, meaning that a local area should acquire the capacity to assume some responsibility for bringing about its own socio-economic development. Education, entrepreneurship, physical infrastructure, and social infrastructure all play an important role in developing rural regions.³³ Rural development is also characterized by its emphasis on locally produced economic development strategies.

While the present study does not object to the development approach, it shifts attention to the settlers who were the participants in the planned change. The study therefore, seeks to understand the role of the settlers in initiating and promoting their new society; land settlement schemes. The study concentrates on the settlers as the most important actors in adapting to their environment and its changing circumstances. This approach is in line with recent historical thinking writings which reject the notion that those rural agricultural peoples' passive forces are simply waiting to be acted upon. Thus, the structure and function of the land settlement schemes are viewed as the result, at least in

part, of the settlers' response to the environment. Thus, the findings of this study were interpreted against this framework of planned change.

1.10 Research Methodology

This section discusses the methodology adopted for this study. It focuses on the research design, provides a description of the study area and target population as well as sample and sampling procedures. It also describes the methods used for data collection as well as the techniques adopted for handling the data, and also provides a description of ethical considerations.

This study was premised on a qualitative research design. Qualitative research approaches are used by researchers who seek to describe and ascribe meaning to life experiences in a subjective manner. According to Merriam,³⁴ a qualitative design is appropriate when a researcher seeks to understand how people interpret their experiences, how they construct their worlds, and the meanings they ascribe to the- experiences. The qualitative design is marked by the use of purposeful sampling, analysis of text, and personal interpretation of findings.³⁵

Thus, a qualitative design was used in this study since the study sought to explore people's perceptions of the historical phenomenon of settlement schemes, as well as the meanings they ascribed to Ainabkoi Settlement scheme in relation to socio-economic development. In order to obtain, analyze, and interpret data, this study made use of the historical approach, which seeks to describe and examine events of the past to understand the present and anticipate potential future effects.³⁶ The data used in this study were

qualitative in nature and were obtained from interviews using open-ended questions and secondary data and archival sources.

The target population for this study comprised of the inhabitants of Ainabkoi Settlement scheme, both men and women, as well as officers holding administrative positions in the scheme – Chiefs, Divisional Officers, Village elders. Age was a considerable factor as it was necessary to identify those who were well-versed with the settlement schemes in order to obtain vital historical information; thus, heads of households were targeted in this study.

As already indicated, the heads of households were targeted in this study. As such, they formed the sampling unit in this study. Sampling was done purposively so as to ensure participation of people with vital information on the study. The heads of the households were thus the primary respondents. Using this sampling technique, a total of 80 settlers were interviewed. An average of twenty African settlers per block was purposively selected based on the following criteria:

- Out of twenty, ten were categorized as progressive farmers in view of how they managed their farms in relation to acreage planted, and good housing facilities.
- The other ten were categorized as stagnated farmers. This category included those whose farms are fallow or leased to other people. Those with thatched grass houses fall into this category.
- In choosing the informants, variables such as age, sex, a good sense of maturity and command of historical knowledge were relied upon as a guide and geographical distribution where the criteria of choosing the informants and this

exercise were made possible by help of chiefs, headmen, present and former leaders.

This study utilized both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary data were collected by interviewing respondents in Ainabkoi settlement scheme. Secondary sources were obtained from various research libraries in Kenya including; Margaret Thatcher library (Moi), Kenyatta University (Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library), Kenya National Library (KNLS) Eldoret, Nairobi University (Jomo Kenyatta) and University of Eastern African Baraton (University College of Eastern Africa Library). Evidence arising from the above documents were analyzed, interpreted and proved useful in enriching those collected by the author from the respondents in the field. Archival research was carried out in KNA, Nairobi. The documents studied included Rift Valley Province and Uasin Gishu district annual reports, archival materials on post-colonial land matters as well as on land settlement were collected. More information was gathered from the Ministry of Lands and Housing offices in Eldoret. Other useful files on land and settlement at Ainabkoi settlement office were consulted. With regard to secondary sources, archival material on post-colonial land matters as well as on land settlement was collected at Kenya National Archives in Nairobi, and the Information was gathered from the Ministry of Lands and Housing offices in Eldoret. Other useful files on land settlement office at Ainabkoi were also examined.

Oral interviews were conducted in the settlement scheme. A total of eighty informants were interviewed. An interview schedule consisting of open-ended questions was used as

much information as possible from the informant obtained. The economic and family background of the informants was investigated, their experience in relation to such historical events as the emergency, land consolidation programme and the attitude in variety of social and economic issues were also elicited.

During the oral interviews, the informants were allowed to talk freely over the given issue with slight interjection to determine and verify the validity of the facts and to avoid domination of the session by particular information in group discussion. Information was also gathered from one of the religious gathering seminar organized for the local community. The question asked gave room for further probing and for the informant to discuss other related issues around the topic being discussed.

The interviews were conducted in Kalenjin and Kiswahili because most informants as well as the researcher speak the two languages. During the interview session, tape recording and note-taking were used simultaneously. Information was recorded in tapes was transcribed and interpreted at the end of the working day and later synthesized with the set themes of the objectives. The interviews centered on socio-economic changes in the pre-settlement and settlement schemes though interview were mostly conducted, there were cases when doubts arose over certain information and group interviews were arranged for verification of facts.

In order to obtain more information about the initial setup of the settlement scheme, leading personalities at the time of inception of the settlement scheme were also taken as informants and were interviewed. This group comprised of former officials of the scheme, chiefs and assistant chiefs, former managers, and headmen, among others.

Further information on the settlement scheme was obtained from archival material on Ainabkoi settlement scheme.

The researcher also used the non-participant observation method in observing socio-economic activities of the settlers. The researcher visited the farmers on their farms and observed their farming activities as well as their social interactions and practices. This method was useful in accessing information that the farmers were reluctant to give verbally. Non-participant observation involves observing community life in the course of data collection. As noted by Foster, et al,³⁷ non-participant observation can yield on understanding of social change. The study participants were asked to respond to a researcher administered questionnaire, which was read to them according to the objective circumstances at the time of the interview. Detailed hand-written notes were taken in the course of the interviews and the observation of community life.

Administering the data collection tools was, however, not devoid of problems. Traversing the ecological zones was quite challenging and time consuming. Informants were never exact in aspects such as dates of some events. Other challenges were suspicion from the informants, and informants asking to be “rewarded”.

To overcome the challenge of suspicion, the researcher took time to explain the objectives of the research to the participants and also assured them that the findings would be used for the purposes of the study only. In some instances the researcher had to give tokens to those who requested to be rewarded.

Adequate procedures were put in place to ensure ethical considerations were adhered to in the conduct of this study. Informants' responses were treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity, and the respondents were made aware of this as suggested by Creswell³⁸ in relation to respecting the informants' needs, rights, values and desires. Prior to interviewing the respondents, the researcher explained the purpose of the study to them and explained to them that participation was voluntary, thus obtaining informed consent. The respondents were invited to participate, with a clear understanding that they were under no obligation to do so and that there would be no negative consequences for them if they declined to participate in the study. No coercion was used, nor was there any deception. Finally, the results of this study will be communicated to the members of the Ainabkoi community.

1.11 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to analyze how settlement schemes had an additional role to ease social and economic anomalies that the colonial role had created. Ainabkoi settlement scheme is situated in the former white highlands in Eldoret East of Rift Valley province. The scheme has majority of occupants being the Kalenjin and a few kikuyu settlement schemes had several advantages as potential focal points of social and economic changes.

The scheme continues to experience a lot of problems. The study aimed at achieving objectives such as examining how land was allocated, whether the scheme attained its objective and prospects for the settlement scheme. This study focused mainly on African settlers in the million acre programme in Ainabkoi. Although several studies have been

undertaken on settlement scheme in Africa in general and Kenya in particular, the uniqueness of the study of Ainabkoi scheme is that it focuses mainly on the performance of mixed small scale farmers.

Ainabkoi settlement scheme was undertaken within the framework of the Rural Development Approach, which concentrates on government actions, and considers land settlement schemes as planned change, initiated by the government. The study utilized both primary and secondary sources of data, and a total of eighty informants were interviewed.

CHAPTER TWO COLONIAL SETTING

2.1 Introduction

In order to discuss the history of settlement schemes in Kenya, one must give a cursory background of the colonial land policies which created landlessness and uproar among the Africans. This chapter will discuss the colonial land policies and implications and highlight the main events of agrarian changes from 1902 to the time of liquidations of colonial rule. An understanding of the colonial setting is fundamental in explaining the continuity of the agrarian problems in Kenya today.

The systems of land administration which evolved during the sixty eight years of British rule in Kenya were inherited without major change by the independent Kenya Government.³⁹ These will underlie many of the current procedures and much of the policy thinking on land tenure and distribution.

2.2 The period 1895 to 1939

The colonial conquest of Kenya after 1895 not only established alien political domination, but it also created conditions conducive to the penetration of capitalism in a more fundamental and thorough going manner than in the nineteenth century. As a colony of Britain, Kenya was expected to provide raw materials for industrial Britain while affording a captive market for the latter's manufactured goods.⁴⁰ Before and during the existence of the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.Co), the possibilities of European settlement in the temperate areas of central and western Kenya had been noted and discussed. The completion of the railway to Kisumu in 1901 offered the British

government the hope that through immigrant settlement on a substantial scale, the railway could be made to pay for itself, so enabling the government to recover the outlay of \$5.2 million spent on construction of the line.⁴¹

John Lonsdale points out that the reasons European settlers were invited were far more complex than producing more exports. Settlement was also justified as providing buffer zones between potentially hostile African communities; they would pin down pastoralism and separate the thorny opposites of export production and African authority.⁴²

With the completion of the railway line in 1901, one of the governments' first preoccupations was to regulate landholding particularly within the coastal area which at the time was virtually the only part of the country affected by immigrant settlement. The Kenya land regulations of 1897 empowered the government to issue new rights over unoccupied land provided they would not be "prejudicial to nature interests,"⁴³ but only by means of certificates of occupancy and only for a period of up to twenty one years, although this period was later extended.

To encourage such settlement, however, it was necessary to offer better security of tenure for settlers. To this end, the government pursued a lenient land policy designating areas to be reserved for European settlement. Ghai and MacAslan⁴⁴ observe that there were three cardinal policy implications to encourage European settlement. First ensuring necessary legal powers were evolved to grant land to the White settlers on sufficiently, attractive terms.

Second, provision would have to be made to regulate where the African inhabitants were allowed to cultivate land and tend their herds. Thirdly, decision had to be made to encourage Africans to work for the incoming Europeans. In order for these policies to be viable, the colonial system of land ownership had to be sustained by law that rigidly separated Europeans, Asians and Africans into strata of different status, rights and privileges. Moreover, the Crown Land's Ordinance of 1902 vested all land in Kenya (other than land to which private title was established) in the British Crown as "public land".⁴⁵ The crown land ordinance made provision for sale or lease of crown land for a term of up to 99 years. The commissioner (later governor) had powers under the ordinance to lease or sell land to settlers.

This allowed for the grant of leases of rural land for a term of up to 999 years.⁴⁶ This was to allow them own land for a longer period of time. According to the 1915 Ordinance, those holding land under the 1897 and 1902 ordinance redefined Crown lands as including all lands occupied by the native tribes of the protectorate and all lands not reserved for the use of any member of any native tribe.⁴⁷ The ordinance provided for a system of registration of deeds in respect of all the leases.

It is however important to point out from the outset that, in setting aside land for European settlements, the colonial government ignored the indigenous land claims and rights. In the eyes of Africans, all land in Kenya had always been occupied subject to the exigencies of the situation thereafter.

By 1926, the reserve demarcation process was completed and Africans were evicted to create room for European agricultural settlement. During these early days, conflict arose as a result of certain African tribal lands being taken over.

These problems, together with overpopulation in certain African districts led to an imbalance in the land situation. The problem was complicated further by the establishment of European settlement on over 3 million hectares of some of the best land in the country. The effect of this was to shut off any possible areas into which excess population could flow from those areas which were settled and occupied by the various African groups at the start of the country. Thus, the establishment of European settlement in the agricultural heartland of the country not only precipitated a land shortage, but also created a problem which became more and more acute as the population in the surrounding African Reserves grew.⁴⁸

The land alienated in the highlands to Europeans was given by the Agriculture Department as 6,040, 360 acres in 1931. This acreage was distributed by the Agriculture Department as shown in the following table:

Table 2. 1: Land use in the white Highlands (1931)

Crop	Acreage
Coffee	98,704
Sisal	124,158
Maize	159, 956
Wheat	43,168
Dairy, cattle raising	
Various and underdeveloped	4,495,281
Unoccupied	1,119,093

Source: Adapted from Great Britain, *Kenya and Commission evidence memoranda*, vol.1.111, London, His Majesty's stationary office 1934 p.2274.

From the table 2.1 above, White settlers had ample land for their future utilization referred to as unoccupied land. It may be fairly assumed that some portion of the acreage shown as “unoccupied” was held as collateral which provided a substantial portion of the fund utilized for development.⁴⁹ The cash crops were allocated 425,986 acres of land which is less than the area occupied by dairy, cattle raising, various and underdeveloped land, 4,495,281aceas. Overall, it is clear that the white settlers were more privileged in terms of farming.

In the early stages, conflicts arose only in specific cases where African population had been moved and their lands taken over for European settlement. But in later periods, the dissatisfaction became so general and widespread that the Kenya land commission (KLC) of 1932/33 was appointed to look into the problem. The work of the commission was to ascertain whether the natives had sufficient land for their purpose and the future.

During the sitting at the Kenya Land Commission, the white settlers argued that Africans should not be encouraged to take up more land outside the reserves unless well controlled and they could take up land that would be in the far future.⁵⁰

2.3 Impact on African Land use

The land policies had great repercussion on African land tenure and settlement pattern and the development and organization of agriculture. Land relations following the displacement of pastoral and agricultural communities were accompanied by many problems of human adaptation. These included famine and livestock diseases and plagues.

In the case of agricultural communities, displacement led to widespread landlessness and discontent among the rural peasantry. The establishment of fixed ethnic boundaries badly disturbed the equilibrium between patterns of land use and availability of land.

The consequences were enormous, a very rapid deterioration of land due to fragmentation, overstocking and soil erosion. Rapid disintegration of those aspects of social and cultural institutions relating to land use control, and, out migration by those who could no longer find enough land to subsist on.

As Maxon contends, the establishment of colonial settlements created the process of proletarianisation in Kenya as an increasing number of men and the households they headed became entirely dependent on wage employment for their subsistence and reproduction. The process of proletarianisation arose first of all, as a result of the decision to encourage European settlement in the Kenya highlands. Moreover, the colonial state

adapted a variety of other means to provide labour for settler ranches, farms and estates. Taxation was a major way in which proletarianisation was fostered.⁵¹ The hut tax first collected in 1902 was not meant merely to raise revenue or even to spur peasant production but it was seen as a means for forcing Africans to seek work away from their homes on European farms. Taxation was insufficient to provide the amount of labour demanded by the European settlers and the state itself, as the settler production was not well developed during the early periods; neither was it able to offer wages and conditions of services attractive enough to retain labour. With the peasant option available to many, Africans did not need to sell their labour in order to survive and as a result, the colonial state fell back on coercion as the most reliable way to obtain labour. Chiefs and headmen on orders from the colonial administration forced men out to work for the European settlers and the state.⁵²

In 1926, when the boundaries of the African Reserves were defined, it became impossible for the Africans to move to the reserves in search of land for cultivation. Despite confinement on limited land, people continued to base their use and tenure practices on the old pattern until it became too small for their needs.⁵³ The other reason that forced Africans out of the reserves was need for employment. In the reserves, jobs were scarce and there was little if any income from the small plots of land for those who still had any.⁵⁴

Another dimension of change which pre-occupied the peasant agriculture was the transformation from purely production for consumption to the production for market. This marked the introduction of a monetary or cash system of production as opposed to

economies of affection or subsistence. In Uasin Gishu district, the African farmer was not allowed to grow crops such as pyrethrum, maize, wheat and dairy rearing. He had inter-alia, to adjust himself to a new medium of change.

2.4 Change of attitude 1939-1960

There had been two conflicting schools of thought among colonial administrators concerning the retention of commercial African tenure working within the precincts of customary law on the one hand and on the other, the recognition of individual tenure regulated by statutory law and free from traditional community controls. This dilemma was summed by the East Africa Royal Commission (EARC) which noted:

It is undoubtedly true that the majority of East African tribal communities today still believe that their security of land tenure has been in the maintenance of their rights as a community or as individuals protected by a local customary tenure.⁵⁵

However, later the commission in its report reversed its approach to African customary land rights. It noted that the policy of leaving African land tenure to continue unguided for most part under customary influence had not led to the individual security demanded by modern economic conditions. Later in the report, however the commission observed, the policy leaving African land to continue unguarded for the most part under customary influence has not led to the individual security demanded by modern economic conditions.⁵⁶ The concern in the period preceding and after World War II led to a remarkable change in agrarian policy. The emphasis on agriculture during the war, 1939-45 to meet food requirements for the war effort led to the encouragement of Africans production of grains such as maize to feed the soldiers. To boost production to meet war

needs, the Department of Agriculture and veterinary laid down policy guidelines on research and extension services for white settler farms. However, little progress was made or there were no funds to pay for the implementation.⁵⁷

Post-war period saw colonial administration taking into cognizance African production. In 1947 African land utilization and settlement Board (ALUS) was established to help improve land utilization in African areas. ALUS hereafter renamed African land and Development Board (ALDEV) was changed with the responsibility for availing credit facilities to Africans to improve African agriculture. The formation of ALDEV ushered a new phase as pertains to the resettlement of landless people. An African settlement Board was set up in 1945 to execute and coordinate the necessary action. Earlier settlements were started in Taveta and Makueni, Itembe and Molindiki.⁵⁸ But many of these settlement schemes were badly conceived and had to be abandoned fairly early.

Attention shifted towards reconditioning and preservation of land, the so called betterment schemes. There was also need to settle the ex-servicemen. The settler population was boosted by an influx of British ex-soldiers who had served in the Second World War. The European Agricultural Settlement Board was created in 1946 to assist ex-soldiers to settle in Trans-Nzoia and Uasin-Gishu. The board gave loans to assist owners to develop their farms. Tenant farmers were leased land bought by the Board and given loans with which they could develop their land.⁵⁹

However, stiff rules were made under the crown lands ordinance to deal with settlement schemes. These rules stipulated among other things to obey all reasonable orders as may

from time to time be used by a settlement officer for the welfare and good discipline of the inhabitants of the area.⁶⁰

One of the rules stated:

Except with permission of the settlement officer (or in some cases that of the native commissioner), no person was allowed to cultivate and depasture stock other than cattle or sheep (the maximum number not exceeding an equivalent to one head of cattle), to fell any timber, to admit anybody other than his wife or dependent into residence on his plot or to bequeath his interest in the sound plot to any person. Breach of this rule could lead to a fine.⁶¹

Thus, this programme was not a genuine attempt to solve the African land problem as the settlement on a scheme did not entitle one to ownership but as mere squatters. Most of these schemes were ill-conceived and failed to take root. Moreover, it was disappointing that in most of the ALDEV schemes, productivity of the programme was not emphasized as large sums were spent on the soil control measures and digging of boreholes with minimal economic returns.

In addition, schemes planned to eradicate tsetse fly did not achieve their aim and in terms of the total number (C. 11,000), ALDEV schemes hardly came anywhere near solving the population problem.⁶²

2.5 Land reform

In his discussion on the agricultural changes that took place in Kenya between 1945 and 1960, L.H Brown, chief agriculturalist, has classified agricultural changes in the following periods; 1945-1950, the recovery phase during which efforts were directed towards repairing the damage caused by the policy of maximum production for war effort; 1951-1955, the planning phase when plans were made for long term agricultural

development including the well known Swynnerton Plan; 1956-1960 the phases of rapid development in which farm enterprises were greatly accelerated and which witnessed an agricultural revolution in some parts of the country.⁶³

It is also important to note that by 1940, land scarcity in the reserves had become so critical that the demand for the restoration of “stolen lands” had become widespread with the outbreak of Mau Mau revolt in 1952. Accentuated by political agitation, it became clear that the land issue could no longer be ignored. The failure of the early settlement schemes and betterment schemes led to the discovery of a new kind of panacea for bad land use. The colonial experts show that the problematic factor in African land relations was tenure.

So the solution was to reform the tenure system. They argued that African tenure was predominantly communal in nature, and therefore inimical to proper land use. Clayton summarized some of the arguments by saying, *inter alia*;

It is often impossible to tend land properly where a farm is made of scattered strips. It will obviously inhibit sound manuring policy and the proper use of resting land is made impracticable. It increases the difficulties of soil conservation.⁶⁴

The Swynnerton plan of 1954 was launched with an objective of tackling the African land problems. This plan aimed at changing the African land tenure system which it was argued was an obstacle to development in the reserves. Swynnerton was of the view that in order to achieve the objectives, the farmer needed security of tenure through granting of individual title deeds. This was to be done by consolidation of fragmented holdings into the parcel and then registering the parcel of land under individual ownership. These plans also envisaged new marketing boards to provide finance and expertise for

pineapple, coffee, tea and pyrethrum growing in the African reserves. Swynerton reasoned that in the process of individualizing land titles, some landlessness among Africans would undoubtedly be created as able and energetic, or rich, Africans would be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less. This according to Swynerton was a “normal step in the evolution of a country.”⁶⁵

This plan had a marked impact on Kenya’s agrarian policy. First, it was a policy shift from the conventional beliefs by the colonial state that the real problem with the Native Reserves lay in the use of land which caused soil erosion but rather the problem required fundamental reforms in the land tenure system.

The second issue that can be noted from the plan was that it ushered in the peasantization of the indigenous producer, a process which was to end with the creation of settlement schemes.⁶⁶ Many writers on the Kenyan economy have argued that the plan institutionalized a small peasant producer in the reserves and permanently and legally incorporated him into the capitalist state through loans and farm input necessary for the survival of a small scale producer. And yet according to Leys⁶⁷, such a person could not become a full fledged farmer, since the size of his holding could not allow it.

However, the measures taken to promote commercial farming by Africans and the increase of commercial peasant farms were no solution for solving the problem of land shortage. Therefore, the solution was sought in another direction, viz the establishment of settlement schemes in the white Highlands on land bought from European settlers. As Sorrenson contends, reform, comprising changes in land tenure in the African reserves, and the removal of racial barriers in commodity production marked the end of official

limitation of agricultural development dependent upon the country's handful large European estates.⁶⁸ As a result, between 1959 and 1963, the racial barriers to African land ownership in the white Highlands were removed. The question then was, what prospects lay ahead for Africans as they underwent this transformation? Answers to such a question can only be fathomed when we assess the impact of the colonial agrarian policies on Africans.

2.6 African response to the land problem.

Africans were dissatisfied with the colonial government for keeping them in the background in the government policies. They were deeply aggrieved by land alienation that had accelerated landlessness⁶⁹ thus resulting in a sense of insecurity. Although before the First World War, Africans were determined to get adequate compensation for their land, the scarcity of land had not yet been acutely felt by them.

Furthermore, before 1926 when the boundaries of the African Reserves were gazetted, Africans could cultivate or herd their livestock on land needed for public use.⁷⁰ In subsequent years, they were not allowed to cultivate outside their own reserves, thereby hardening their land grievances. Moreover, once the resources were marked for Africans they began to feel the full effect of population pressure.⁷¹

The problem of land shortage among Africans became worse after the Second World War. While the colonial Government opened the Highlands for European servicemen, it was not prepared to do so for African ex-servicemen, who were expected to get employment on European farms or be absorbed into reserves.⁷²

The Second World War had more far-reaching effects than the First World War. For the first time, African leaders united and founded the Kenya African Union to champion their demands.⁷³ African grievances were strongly presented in one united voice rather than many different ethnic groups of the 1920s. By the end of the Second World War, the land problem was unsolved. The causes of the problem were regarded as population growth which had resulted in erosion.⁷⁴

To solve the problem, a ten year plan was drawn up in 1946.⁷⁵ It was intended to prevent erosion and develop but it did not succeed. The men who had participated in the Second World War had an effect on changing attitudes. The war had enlightened them on world affairs, and they wished to see justice done in their own country. From the 1920s the claims assumed more significance as officials like Harry Thuku became important stimulants to political action.

They no longer wanted compensation, but the return of the land itself. The government appointed the Swynerton committee to probe into the African land problem and recommend measures for improving African agriculture.⁷⁶

The Swynerton plan recommended the survey and enclosure of all high quality African land, the change of the traditional form of land tenure, the consolidation and enclosure of fragmented pieces of land and the opening up of cash crop market to Africans. The implementation of the committee's recommendation of consolidation and registration intensified landlessness and poverty; many of the people were displaced.⁷⁷ The programme broke the Kikuyu land ownership system because it emphasized individual

rather than clan ownership. The kikuyu Ahoi⁷⁸ and those who could not prove rightful ownership of land ended up being landless.

In a parallel attempt to solve the Asian land problem, in 1953 the East Africa Royal Commission was appointed.⁷⁹ This commission, unlike the Kenya Land Commission,⁸⁰ recommended the removal of all racial and political barriers which in any way inhibited the free movement of land, labour, and capital⁸¹ in the Kenya colony. The commission recommended changes that would have brought in government policy in the colony.

Earlier, in 1960, the Kenya African Union (KAU) had written to the Secretary of State for the colonies, Ian Mcleod, describing the consequences of land alienation. It argued that the severe overcrowding in the African Reserves and mass exodus of Africans to towns and European farms to serve as cheap labour had increased poverty, malnutrition, crime and moral degradation among the Africans.⁸²

Mbiyu Koinange, an executive member of KAU, Ochieng Oneko, the chairman of the Kisumu branch in their article, 'Land Hunger in Kenya', stressed 'the urgency with which the Africans wanted back their land and constitutional rights. Their argument was that "land in Africa is life and whatever economy people. Their argument was that "land in Africa is life and whatever economy people practiced, land is the basis of society or organization. Progress and development, therefore, starts when security land tenure is granted."⁸³ But as long as the Africans remained tenants of the crown, it was impossible for them to participate in development.⁸⁴ By the end of the 1950s, Africans were determined to have their land back while the European settlers were determined to keep it.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted an evaluation administration and consequences of the colonial agrarian policy on the Africans. It has indicated how the established alien political domination created conditions conducive to the penetration of capitalism in the nineteenth century. Colonial agrarian law and institution articulated the peasant mode of production. It has also land a historical background to the colonial land policies and regulations that were implemented to displace the Africans from their lack. It has also shown processes through which Africans were integrated into a capitalist economy.

The alienation of African land and the subsequent encouragement of white settlers in the Kenya Highlands created what was term the 'white highlands'. Land alienation therefore became a mayor African grievance against colonial government. Using constitutional means, and through various political associations, beginning in the 1920s, they demanded the return of their land. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the colonial government began African land settlement schemes to cater for the increased population and to clear some areas of tsetse fly, but these early settlement schemes did not solve the pressing land problem.

1960 was a significant year in the history of Kenya for two reasons. First, the Land Ordinance in Council that had previously segregated the Kenya Highlands for white settlers was repeal. Secondly, the state of emergency was brought to an end, and colonial rule in Kenya took a new turn as independent majority rule became imminent. The advent of political change in Kenya was not welcomed by the white settlers, who subsequently wished to move out of Kenya. While the settlers were thinking of moving out, Kenyan

ethnic groups were suspicious of each other, particularly regarding the issue of land. The various ethnic groups wanted to proclaim land they thought they had originally occupied prior to colonial rule. In the face of these circumstances, the colonial government sought a way of bringing about an orderly transfer of land from the white settlers to Africans. Therefore, in 1961, the Regional Boundaries Commission was set up to determine what land was to be handed to which ethnic group. Chapter three will take a look into the decolonization of white high lands, procedures and progress, purchase programmes among other issues.

Endnotes

CHAPTER THREE

ORIGIN OF AINABKOI SETTLEMENT SCHEME

3.1 Introduction

The second objective of the study was to assess whether the objective for which the settlement schemes were established were attained. In this chapter the researcher seeks to examine the origin of the settlement scheme programme after independence. A discussion on land acquisition, settlement patterns in both low and high density schemes in Ainabkoi is undertaken. It is important to discuss the planning and implementation of the scheme in order to gauge the socio-economic change over the years.

3.2 The Decolonization of the White Highlands

The early history of the land settlement schemes is a history of rapidly changing thought as events moved rapidly towards independence, and as political influence shifted from the Europeans to the Africans. The land transfer programme after independence was prompted by the political and economic needs to address African farming interest. The initial phase of land redistribution to the Africans was undertaken to parcel out the former white highlands to landless Africans. In the 1950s, the colonial government expected land reform to help quell political dissent and to contribute to the formation of a stable African middle class.⁸⁵

The million-acre scheme in general was part of a national programme for socio-economic development. The scheme itself as defined in 1962, was a high density settlement scheme

providing for the settlement of 200,000 acres per annum of mixed farming land, over a period of five years.⁸⁶ This term has been subsequently used to include schemes that were started during the first phase of the 'Yeoman' and the large scale co-operatives and ranches, which were schemes that consisted of large-scale farming units and constituted one of the two major categories of land settlement schemes.⁸⁷

The opening of the white highlands to Africans took place in 1960 with the amendment of the laws that had excluded African land ownership from the area. These laws included the Registration of Documents Act 1902, Land Titles Act 1908, the Land Ordinance 1915, Government Lands Act 1915, and Registered Titles Act 1920⁸⁸. In order to implement the newly declared agricultural development policy based on a racially integrated farming system in the highlands, the colonial government embarked on the land resettlement schemes. The ground work in connection with the establishment of the settlement scheme was laid in the years 1960-1962 during the two Lancaster House Conferences that were convened to bargain for Kenya's political independence. From the very beginning of the negotiation, the immediate concern of the European community in Kenya was the fate of the white highlands. The key questions to them on this issue were whether the security of those European settlers who preferred to remain in Kenya would be guaranteed and those who opted to leave the country would be compensated.

The first of resettlement schemes were started in 1960. They were financed by the World Bank (IBRD) and the Colonial (later commonwealth) Development Corporation (CDC). The British government had realized from the beginning that it was necessary to secure itself in the event of a radical African Government repudiating any loan commitments

arising out of financing of the resettlement schemes. The British government believed that any African government that came to power would rely heavily on foreign investment in order to continue economic growth. It therefore decided to involve the international capitalist money lending institutions because they believed that no Kenyan government would dare repudiate loans from such institutions.⁸⁹ Any repudiation would entail such a government starving itself of the much needed development aid.

This was the motive behind involving the IBRD and the CDC in the resettlement schemes; that is, to tie the Kenya government to a capitalist path of development. The purpose of land resettlement schemes as Bruce Mackenzie, the then minister for agriculture saw them, were threefold: to maintain and develop the land of the country which was and remained its main source of wealth, to establish confidence in Kenya's economy on the part of farmers of all races, and to relieve certain social problems in the African areas.

One of the most important tasks of the settlement schemes in the white highlands was therefore to exert as early as possible, through settlement, a stabilizing influence on the social and political conditions in Kenya. It was considered desirable and necessary to show not only the land hungry Africans, but also the European farmers suffering from a sense of insecurity that extensive settlement programme were being implemented in a proper manner. In this way, it would also be possible to exert a favourable influence on the economic atmosphere which was overshadowed by considerable uncertainty. Logically, the programme aimed at relieving the land hunger in the reserves by enabling both the farmers departing to resettle and those remaining to buy the land of those leaving. On the other hand, it was intended to create new jobs for Africans and thus attack the problem of

unemployment. Similarly, it aimed at reducing the dualism in the Kenya social structure brought about by the scheduled (areas designed for settlement) and non-scheduled (areas not designed for settlement) areas. Viewed from this perspective the programme aimed at “letting the steam out of the kettle”.

Beyond this, two further economic objectives which immediately concerned the settlement scheme were formulated, the first one being to provide subsistence and loan repayment together with a given net income from consolidated holdings, and the second being to maintain the gross production at its former level in the scheme areas. As Nottidge contends the main aim was to facilitate an orderly transfer of land from European to African ownership with little or no drop in productivity.⁹⁰ In 1962, it was generally accepted that a permanent solution had to be found for the land hunger which had been a major cause of political instability. As part of the political bargain for independence, the ‘million acre scheme’, which aimed at settling about 35,000 African families on former European owned land within five years, was launched.⁹¹

3.3 Procedures and progress

Under the million Acre scheme, there were the high density schemes and low density schemes incorporating the assisted owner schemes hitherto known as the Yeoman scheme. The high density schemes were established for farmers with little agricultural knowledge and little money. Candidates were to be landless, unemployed and able to pay the legal cost of land transfer to the tune of about £10. Priority was to be given to the former resident labourers regardless of their tribal affiliation.⁹²

The farms were designed to produce a net income per annum from £25 to £70 plus subsistence and means to repay loans. The low density scheme was, however, planned for farmers with agricultural knowledge, experience and capital. Settlers were required to pay 10 percent of the purchase price of the land as well as provide some working capital.⁹³

The low density settlement schemes aimed at providing a net income for settlers of over £100 after provision for subsistence and loan obligations.⁹⁴ The million-acre settlement schemes were designed to bring about an orderly transfer of European-owned mixed farming land to African small holder. Thus, in the late 1960s, land ownership in scheduled areas was opened up to all races in order to accommodate African small holders.⁹⁵

Over the period 1972-1978, the gross value of marked agricultural production was projected to increase from k£ 105 million in 1972 to K£ 155 million in 1978.⁹⁶ Government expenditure on agriculture development programme was increased considerably. The major part of the land allocated to the million acre scheme was transferred during the second phase (1963-1965). The transfers were affected by a new independent organization representative of the various regions that was formed under the independence constitution. This was the Central Land Board (CLB), which was responsible for selection of the areas to be transferred with the objective of ensuring that the various tribes concerned had a fair quota of settlement and schemes in relation to their needs for land. Valuation and purchase of settlements became the responsibility of the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) in which the transferred land was vested. Settlement operations were carried out by the Department of Settlement. According to a report of the

Central Land Board (CLB), a total of 592,190 hectares of land were transferred for settlement of various kinds during the first two phases between 1961 and 1965 at a cost of Kshs. 122,589,051 as represented in

Table 3. 1: Land purchase between 1961 and 1965

	Farm number	Area (Hac)	Cost Kshs
Million Acre scheme (including 3.9 compassionate case farms)	780	465,194	10,289,657
Settlement Fund Trustee assisted farms	134	44,140	1,133,628
Nandi salient	20	7,087	179,563
Ol-kalou salient	83	49,503	705,434
Assisted owner schemes	77	26,266	280,769
Total	1,094	592,190	12,589,051

Source: Adapted from the central Land Board Report, 1965.

Analysis of the data in shows that the land purchased under the million Acre scheme had 465,194 hectares worth Kshs 10,289,657. The Settlement Fund Trustees assisted farms with the area of 44,140 hectares worth Kshs 1,133,628. Nandi Salient was allocated the lowest acreage, 7,087 hectares which were worth Kshs 179,563 while Olkalou Salient had the highest acreage of 49,503 hectares costing Kshs 705,434. The Assisted Owner Schemes had 26,266 hectares worth Kshs 280,769. Therefore, the total area (hectares) was 59,190, amounting to Kshs 12,589,051.

From the onset, the resettlement programme was implemented in three ways. The government purchased large scale farms for subdivision into smaller units for settlement by Africans. Second, the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) purchased large

farms for retention as a whole unit either as national farms operated by the corporation, or as transitional farms destined for transfer in whole units to private African ownership, but operated by the corporation meanwhile. Lastly, mortgage facilities were provided by the Land Bank and the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to enable purchases by Africans of farms owned by Europeans.⁹⁷

3.4 The Purchase Programme

The planning of the settlement scheme began with the specification of a target income a plot would be capable of producing after the African settler had met all financial obligations and provided for his or her family subsistence needs. Holders at high density schemes were required only to deposit stamp duty and legal fees depending on the total settlement acreage which normally varied between Kshs 100 and 160. Legal fees were fixed at Kshs. 20 (twenty).⁹⁸

The agricultural officials, at the request of the director of settlement, assessed the potential of each parcel of land to be included in settlement. They decided what acreage would be required to meet the given income target and then drew up budgets for each plot. The budget provided detailed plan for the management of the plot, specifying what crops and animals would be raised, noting the acreage to be devoted to each activity and listing anticipated expenses and income. In return for his or her plot the incoming African settler assumed a debt which included the expenses incurred by Central Land Board (CLB) in purchasing the land.⁹⁹ In Ainabkoi settlement scheme, the incoming settlers were provided with the following in form of loans: dairy cows, iron sheets, farm implements (fencing

wire, *jembes*, wheelbarrow, and milk cans, among others), and this brought change to their lives economically.

The pace at which the African settlers were taking up land in this scheme was slow in both the high and low density schemes. This was due to a number of factors. First, most of the African settlers were recruited from Iten, Kabarnet, and Eldoret and this made most of them afraid to attend the interviews due to the tedious grilling exercise. The second factor was lack of cash for some African settlers who depended on disposing of land in the fore-settlement areas. The issue of interviewing the African settlers was waived thus paving the way for free will to buy. Initially, most people thought the whole deal was fishy because most chiefs did not sensitize their people to taking up land in the schemes.

The third factor was that land was allocated in an order that may not have been suitable for the African settler, therefore discouraging some of them from purchasing. Majority of the soldiers who fought in the Second World War thought that they were to be rewarded in form of land which never materialized. They were therefore forced to seek employment from the white settlers to enable them earn a wage then purchase the farms within the scheme.

According to the chief of Ainabkoi, David Kipkemei, the scheme was sold in the ratio 4:3:1 meaning 4 (Keiyo), 3 (Tugen), and 1 (any other like Nandi). An individual was allowed to buy 30 acres in high potential land and 40 acres where land was not so productive since they were either rocky areas or swamps.

3.5 Provision of funds

Due to the lack of necessary funds for settlement over and above its normal development funds, the Kenya government had to negotiate for extra funds with various bodies. The outcome of these negotiations was successful and the government obtained money from four main sources. The total amount of money gotten by 1986 was Kshs 22,469,000.

These sources are shown below:

Table 3. 2: Sources of Funds for Land Settlement

Commonwealth Development Corporation	£10,977,000
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	£9,000,000
The British government.	£1,274,000
Federal Germany republic.	£1,218,000
Total amount from these sources	£22,469,000

Source: Republic of Kenya dept of settlement, five-year plan 1968, 3.

These bodies and the British government in particular, were quite willing to lend these colossal sums of money for this purpose just after Kenya had acquired its independence owing to two major factors. On the one hand was the prevalent political atmosphere. The Europeans in Kenya at the time felt that their property and even lives were not safe under an African government, and as such they wanted to leave the country. The British government, was therefore willing to lend money to the Kenya government so that these Europeans (majority being British Citizens) could be ‘paid’ in the form of their land being bought at reasonable price – without them causing problems in the United Kingdom (UK) for a conservative party government. On the other hand, land was a critical issue in Kenya immediately after independence, and as such the Kenyan government was looking for ways and means by which it would acquire land and pass it over to the people. The loan therefore provided a means to “kill two birds with one stone”. The settlers did not get loans in cash but were given the money in kind – in the forms of items such as issue notes and ploughing orders, which they used to get contractors to plough for them.

With this money, the government sought to achieve for three main purposes: to purchase the land, to develop it, and pay for the administrative costs. By mid 1967, the plan affected approximately 35,000 families settled on 15 million acres of land. The total spending for this was £25.5 million-£10.75 million spent on the purchase of land, and £9 million on developing it and £5.75 million on costs and administration.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, as the million acre scheme evolved, for that is how it was referred to, it gained support from the British government. However, the international aid agencies were skeptical of the risks implied in the programme. They were warned that the inclusion of lower quality land for poor African settlers who had no experience in farming would jeopardize the standards set by the World Bank.¹⁰¹

3.6 Identification, Selection and Allocation of Land to African Settlers.

The Minister for Lands and Settlement had to give approval to any person taking up land. The list of selected persons was taken to him for final approval (he was responsible for selection of African settler on all schemes). The normal procedure was for the Area Settlement Controller to notify the District Commissioner of the number of plots available, capital (if any) required and the date on which he would be ready to accept the African settlers.¹⁰² The District Commissioner therefore advertised in the district offices and chief's offices before this was approved and one was issued with application forms. A district selection committee was then formed to interview the applicants. In order to be selected, one had to be unemployed, landless and have knowledge in farming. Those given preference were the ex-labourers of the farms to be taken over¹⁰³. These guidelines were applicable to all African settlers in Kenya.

The rich were allocated land due to their economic ability to purchase. When the area, selected for settlement and type of scheme was known, the work of planning and executing the schemes rested upon the Settlement Fund Trustees under which the department of survey and planning works. The department, together with staff of the department of agriculture and survey began to carry out a counter survey of the farms to be bought and the land was classified.

Maps prepared showed the necessary conservation, roads and drainage required and in conjunction with the town planner, schools, villages and health centres were selected. In the meantime, the conservation of soil was carried out by the section of the agricultural development and the plots were sub-divided in line with the category of the scheme and budgets that had been initially drawn by the planning officer, based on sound agricultural practices. According to Yeoman and peasant farm survey, surveys were carried out in order to provide control for mapping and planning purposes. The same process was carried out at Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme (10,000 acres).¹⁰⁴

3.7 Establishment of Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme

History has revealed that before the completion of the Uganda railway in 1901 hardly was there European settlement in the ‘white highlands’.

With the encouragement of British officials, the older established Indians moved inland. Hitherto, travelers passing to and from Uganda had reported seeing potential areas for white settlement.

They were impressed by the emptiness of the land, particularly in the Rift Valley, and beyond. Writing in 1893 Captain Lugard described the possibilities for agricultural settlement and stock rearing farms.¹⁰⁵ According to London, the District Commissioner Uasin Gishu District, the occupants of certain farms in the Ainabkoi area in regard to the electoral area boundaries of the Mau and Uasin Gishu areas should be changed so that they are included in the Uasin- Gishu area, and not, as at present in the Mau.¹⁰⁶

A new administrative sub-station had to be opened at Ainabkoi. The Forest Department was co-operative in this respect, but the position the forest station was increased considerably in importance by reason of the work being carried out there, and large extensions to their nurseries have been planned and are underway. This meant that they required water supply for their own purposes and it was now necessary to give serious and urgent consideration to the installation of a new water supply for the administrative sub-station.¹⁰⁷ Hon Daniel Arap Moi, M.P, Vice- president visited Uasin Gishu on 9th August, 1969, Mr. B.E Wasike the Assistant Commissioner for squatters, western Kenya visited the District on 7th August, 1969, for a meeting held at G.R Woodleys.¹⁰⁸ After the meeting a letter was written on the same to address the squatters' plight. They had an officer in the area for the next six weeks whose sole occupation was to inspect farms for that purpose.

Once the inspection was completed and permit books issued, attestation *safaris* were arranged by Major Antrobus, the Labour Officer. At that moment the resident labour question was receiving greater attention than ever before by all Government Departments in the area, and were therefore fortunate enough to have the staff to cope, once the District council was satisfied regarding the issue of permit books.¹⁰⁹ Loan repayments were

Sluggish and varied widely between settlements. According to the two checks made on 31st October 1963, it showed that on that date the percentage of outstanding loans were fairly met as indicated on the column below (1963). Further checks of the worst areas were made in January 1964 as shown in the right hand column below. Unfortunately, the percentages were not highlighted.

Table 3. 3: Repayments due on 30th June 1963

	Outstanding at 30th October 1963	Outstanding at January 1964 (when next installment was due
Ainabkoi West	45%	Not checked
Ainabkoi North	37%	Not checked

Source; Adapted from the Central Land Board Report, 1965

As indicated Error: Reference source not found above, the outstanding loan repayment in 1963 was slightly lower in Ainabkoi North due to the poor soil conditions but was not checked in both areas in 1964 because of slow pace of repayment in the previous year.

On small holdings, Ainabkoi and Lessos settled large numbers of small holders. The usual teething troubles occurred, but generally speaking these offices overcame the troubles of animal husbandry and livestock improvement which appear to be an invariable problem in the initial stages of any settlement scheme.

Concerning the kikuyu community, some of them sold their farms due to 1992 ethnic clashes during elections. Among them was Nahashon Mwangi who had sixty acres of land who then sold to Harun Tuigong from Tugen community, Baringo. Mwangi later relocated to Nakuru. Nyongi who resided in Ndanai had also sixty acres and sold to Arap

Chemngom from Metkei. Kimundu had sixty acres sold to Arap Morio and Kimundu left for Kitale. Nahashon Mwangi had fully settled in Ainabkoi but the others had property elsewhere. These Kikuyu migrated to Ainabkoi in 1965 when the settlement scheme was being allocated. They were brought by former president Jomo Kenyatta. To date, the scheme is dominated by the Kalenjin.¹¹⁰

3.8 Conclusion

The foregoing analysis has shown that though the original settlement plan was intended for the landless and the squatters as explicit in the final analysis, they could not raise the required money for the programme had to look to other settlers from well-off background that could not raise the needed purchase price of the land. This category of settlers included the young the petty bourgeoisie or employed. Therefore, the settlement programme from the very beginning favoured the rich class.

The core problem encountered in the implementation of the million Acre programme was its inability to accommodate prospective settlers who wanted to take up farming. For the low density schemes, the down payment of Kshs 1,000 was out rightly a huge sum of money that ordinary peasant could not afford to raise. The first of resettlement of resettlement schemes started in 1960 were financed by the World Bank and the Colonial Development Corporation thus subsidizing the African settlers.

As part of the political bargain for independence, it was decided to launch the million acre scheme which aimed at settling about 35,000 African families on former European owned land within five years. The objective to a larger extent was realized. The greatest number

of settlers who benefited from the scheme was the Keiyo, followed by the Tugen and the minorities were the Nandi and Kikuyu. The new African settlers attempted to transform themselves socio-economically in light of the new environment (scheme). This will form the discussion for the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AINABKOI SETTLEMENT SCHEME

4.1 Introduction

New settlements provide African settlers with an opportunity for social economic developments which invite experiments ¹ to arrive at some new equilibrium in adaptation. This has always proved extremely difficult. Objectives were very important in settlements primarily designed for economic production, or for social change. However, differences in most cases were reflected in the size of proposed holdings. Some were big enough for modern commercial input while others were mainly to settle landless people. Ainabkoi settlement scheme had the two categories.

In this chapter an attempt will be made to examine the extent to which the socio-economic changes (objectives) of the settlement scheme have been attained or not attained, and, to what extent the success or failure can be ascribed to analyses how land was allocated. The attitude of the African settlers will be examined in the light of the socio-economic transformation in their new situation.

The African settlers in Ainabkoi settlement scheme were drawn mostly from Kalenjin community and a few Gikuyu. On settling, farmers in Ainabkoi scheme received housing, five dairy cows, farm inputs, farmed implements, barbed wire, loan for structures such as dairy, posts, timber and a minimum of thirty acres of tillable land and seventy to ninety acres of land on poor terrains. The families were provided with educational, health and social facilities.

The Settlements Fund Trustees took an active role by implementing programmes for economic, social and political advancement of the African settlers to solve mutual problems and to plan and execute local development projects.²

Since the establishment of the scheme, forty five years ago several changes in the socio-economic life of the African settlers have taken place. To evaluate the socio-economic performance (change) in Ainabkoi settlement scheme, a number of variables ought to be examined. For one, what is the perception of the African settlers about themselves? To what extent are the African settlers a community or how cohesive are the settlers? Where do the African settlers base their loyalty? Is there any larger unit of loyalty or are settlers still operating at clan level? To what extent is clan co-operation evident amongst the African settlers or to what extent is clanism (if any) hampering or facilitating socio-economic change in the scheme? These are some of the baffling questions this study attempted to evaluate in this chapter.

However, socio-economic changes carry several interpretations and therefore it can be ambiguous if not clarified in advance. In the study the researcher examined only the socio-economic indices discerned in the million acre scheme blue print, and also from the secondary knowledge the author has gathered about Ainabkoi settlement scheme. As the study intended to evaluate planned socio-economic change among the African settlers who took up settlement in Ainabkoi, it became necessary that data pertaining to the socio-economic organization of the settlers in Ainabkoi scheme also must be discussed.

The contrast and comparison of the two sets of data constitute the basis for the evaluation of the socio-economic performance of the settlement scheme.

4.2 Socio-Economic Background of Pre-settlement Inhabitants

This study presumed that some of the inhabitants of Ainabkoi scheme were people who originally had been living in typical, familiar African traditional rural way of life, but whose perspective of life had to change as they resettled in a different area under new conditions of life. Thus, a brief discussion of the Kalenjin socio-economic life is warranted in an attempt to discern the root of Kalenjin socio-economic organization in pre-settlement period in order to contrast aspects inherent in both.

In most Kalenjin communities, it is a traditional rule for the boys to undergo circumcision before being initiated into early adulthood. During this ceremony, there is feasting and drinking of the traditional brew and animals are slaughtered to provide meat for the ceremony as well as for food. Girls too, since time immemorial have been undergoing circumcision ceremonies but due to changes in the society, the ritual has been banned although it is still being practiced to a small extent in some parts of the community. Among the Kalenjin, bride wealth is also bonded to the parents of the girl and the number of cattle paid as bride wealth ranges between four to twelve and same number of sheep depending on the family status.³

Kalenjin groups were traditionally polygamous where one man married two or more wives; some of them have married simply because they believe that having many wives is a sign of being a powerful man in society. Polygamy has reduced due to economic challenges, religious attributes and other related challenges. To some extent, women who

were initially married but failed to have children were allowed to marry for the sake of having their own children.

In regard to religion, a good fraction of the Kalenjin people associate themselves with Christianity and belong to different denominations, including Catholic Church, African Inland Church, Anglican Church. A smaller number belong to Islam, while others practice traditional religion⁴. The Kalenjin ethnic communities also distribute land to their married males in the form of inheritance. The Kalenjin economic way of life has customs that integrate the individual in the family, the clan and the entire ethnic group, and which make the social, economic and political life of the people practicable and effective. As already mentioned elsewhere in this paper, there are certain taboos observed among the Kalenjin people, and some of these practices have had a negative impact on the socio-economic performance of the people who settled in Ainabkoi Division as will be shown later.

A girl could be exchanged for grain. A household without grain would decide to give their daughter to be married in a family with grain. This was common during famine. However, the family who had daughters was still expecting bride wealth and this practice was more common in semi arid regions due to food insecurity but this practice has declined with time.

As resources and specialized skills are not equally distributed regionally, and within particular societies, man has always been forced to utilize exchange to get what he is unable to produce in sufficient quantities to meet his requirement.⁵

In as far as the art of manufacturing is concerned, man learnt to sharpen tools by cutting. Industries and craft played a vital role among the Kalenjin economy as they supplemented and complemented agricultural and pastoral activities. Some craft activities that the community indulged in were pottery, weaving, and iron smelting. The art of iron working was also practiced, and iron smelting skills were passed from generation to generation, notably from father to son. The iron smiths did not just specialize in smelting; they also cultivated land.

Among the Kalenjin, stock is greatly valued and changed hands through loans and bride wealth. In this way, each family herd came to be widely dispersed among many friends and relatives living often in rural parts of the country, and the benefit rebounded both to the individual and to society as a whole. Through this kind of broad dispersal of herd, each farmer reduced the danger of catastrophe the destruction of his herds through disease, an enemy raid, or drought. By freely loaning his stock, one widened the number of his friends, relatives or more acquaintances on whose assistance he could rely in future moments of need.⁶

Kalenjin traditional agriculture entails large tracts of land, which are held communally by members of a clan and cultivated by individual families in the clan. Subsistence agriculture is practiced in Ainabkoi scheme and this formed the main part of the Kalenjin diet. The agricultural and land-holding systems appeared to have influenced the Kalenjin clans and lineages in three ways. First, as clans were the main land-holding units, a man had a permanent and inheritable right to land only within the area held by his clan and

more so by the close family members (*karaita*) unless there was land available that was unclaimed and safe, therefore, he was likely to leave his kinsmen without reason.

Second, the use of adjacent pieces of land by kinsmen promoted enough intra-group cooperation and assistance that an individual was economically most secured when living with his close relatives. Thirdly, since clan elders had some control over the agricultural cycle, the agricultural systems supported their authority within the clan. Nevertheless, each family in the Kalenjin tradition has not always consolidated its land as the land is usually scattered in such a way that each family has different places within the clan land.⁷ According to Abdul Sheriff, hunting and gathering as a system of appropriation of subsistence from nature was universally practiced by the societies in present Kenya as late as the nineteenth century.⁸

With regard to social set ups the society was conservative in that they never took possession of any person's property. This view was given by Baliat through oral interview.⁹ Class differentiation in pre-colonial Kalenjin was as a result of the difference in accumulation of wealth. Other people managed to accumulate wealth faster than others. Wealth was determined by the size of one's livestock. The Kalenjin were dependent on cattle for most of their socio-economic and cultural necessities, many of which cattle still fulfill. Other ways of accumulating wealth was through agricultural production, trade, special skills and political positions. However, from mid-nineteenth century, class differentiation became pronounced in Uasin-Gishu.

The findings of this study suggest that though the economy of Ainabkoi is growing, one of the challenges arises due to migration of the youth to urban centers in the recent years for

employment, thus abandoning the old men and women to carry out all the activities. In spite of government adoption after independence of the new land tenure and settlement programme for Uasin-Gishu, the larger farms covered mainly Ainabkoi. It also comprised of small scale farms of settlement scheme plots and sub-divided this sub-division had an influence on economic prosperity.¹⁰ The Kalenjin agriculturists in Ainabkoi settlement scheme mainly grew subsistence crops. Cash crops were unknown in the traditional society. Cultivation was basically the work of men. They were also expected to clear the fields for tilling and maintain a homestead plots. Women engaged themselves in household chores. With regard to trade the Kalenjin within Ainabkoi and its environs exchange commodities with its neighbours like Marakwet, Tugen, Nandi, Keiyo and other minority communities like Kisii, Kikuyu, Luhya among others. They have been having trading contacts with her neighbours for a long time.

Trade enabled people to acquire properties such as grain, agricultural implements and livestock. This was the means by which people supplemented their daily food provision. Importantly, it was through trade and exchange that individuals accumulated wealth as well power.

4.3 Dynamism in the Settlement Community

In the new settlement, there has been a clash of ideology in African settler's socio-economic life, which has made them vulnerable to social and economic changes. It was hypothesized that various aspects of African settlers' socio-economic organizations have

been carried over into the new settlement which in-turn has had adverse effects on the African settlers' socio-economic transformation. On taking to settlement, it was envisaged that the new African settlers were to integrate or embrace the normative ideals of a new society to evolve a more cohesive society.

Normative ideals in this case refer to a desirable standard of living such as social integration (behaviour standard), health standard and valued actions. This has not been the case in the Ainabkoi scheme. Moreover, the study sought to test the pattern of social institutions and interaction that have evolved in the settlements to show whether the settlers have evolved cohesive social institutions showing any change in the social structures. The respondents who were interviewed in regard to this hypothesis in the scheme harbored different opinions. During the time of planning the settlement, the expectation was that the scheme functions as a cohesive unit socially, economically as well as politically.

The findings of this study reveal that some African settlers were more attached to their ancestral homes than in the new environment. One reason advanced by the respondents was the lack of economic opportunities for advancement in the scheme. They pointed out in particular the kind of cash crops to grow as they had been used to growing indigenous crops like millet. The other was poor quality produce due lack of skills and as well ready market for the produce among others.

In their pre-settlement environment, most of the Kalenjin practiced a circumcision ceremony called '*tumdo*' and the same is still on. As pointed out by David Kipkemei, most

of the Kalenjins subscribe to their traditional rituals such as circumcisions, naming of children, among others and the practice is still on especially circumcision.¹¹

These traditional practices have been transferred to the settlement areas and have tended to impact to some extent on socio-economic change especially with weddings which are exaggerated by spending enormous amount of more than Ksh.50,000. Differences have also been expressed in the voting patterns during elections where former Member of Parliament the late Charles Murgor, a Keiyo, enjoyed the backup from the majority of his Keiyo strongholds.¹²

After the subdivision of the boundaries from the larger Uasin – Gishu and Elgeyo Marakwet, now Eldoret East, the current Member of Parliament Professor Margaret Kamar was voted in due to the massive support from the Keiyo community being the majority. The sub-division took place during the boundary review process.

The findings of this study revealed that mutual cohesiveness has not been fully attained. Most of the settlers still see themselves as belonging to their lineage loyalties. There is hardly an overall loyalty. Viewed from another perspective such segmentations are detrimental to evolving a cohesive society. Social relationships in the settlement are thus defined largely on the basis of kinship, family lineage and those provide the locus within which the African settlers' activities are coordinated. On the other hand, to some extent, social relations are largely determined through the economic value based on individual achievement. For example the study revealed that some of the rich and progressive farmers originated from the well to do background in the pre-settlement area and this brought enormous changes economically.

According to the research, the realignment in the schemes has come as a result of the failure of cultural integration when there is lack of both cultural and normative integration and this can be clear since the Kalenjin were suspicious of the Kikuyu and non Kalenjin as they felt that their land was been taken away from them.

Though some Kikuyu young men and women can talk both Kalenjin and Kikuyu languages this was just for convenience sake. With regard to intermarriages, some Kikuyu and Kalenjin did the same but with onset of elections there was separation of the couples. It can be deduced that there is a defect in communication and integration hence lack of dialogue between Africa settlers and flow of ideas which are resistant to change.¹³ In the theoretical framework the dialogical model of Nyerere as supplemented by Friere's¹⁴ concept of dialogue were adopted emphasizing the need for two way open communication so that people can learn from each other. This was lacking among the African settlers. With various clan and lineage based organizations, the settlers owe their allegiance to their respective clans and lineage group.

This breakdown in communication had been caused partly by the cultural as well as political differences. According to William and Znaniecki's¹⁵ definition of the situation approach which was also adopted in the study, there was need for the African settlers to develop schemes of adoption to the new environment. These schemes would have involved shedding some of the practices and assuming universal schemes, or norms that could lead to a cohesive society. This approach provides that settlers failed to understand the new situation (environment in the scheme) and redefine strategies of coping with the new situation.

This study tested the pattern of social institutions and interaction that have evolved cohesive social institutions. The table shows clan based organizations that have been formed by the inhabitants.

Table 4. 1: Welfare Institutions in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme

Social institution	Aim
Kimuruk Women Group	Welfare
Korongoi kimuruk	Welfare
Drys Women Group	Welfare
Kalyet Women Group	Welfare
SoIiat Kibuimet women Group	Welfare
Kibuimet Youth Group	Welfare
Kimuruk Kosyin Youth Group	Welfare
Manerechi Youth Group	Welfare
Drys Youth Group	Welfare

Source: Ainabkoi Location Chiefs Report (Annual 2008)

Majority of those interviewed said that this clan based organization were a sure way of solving economic problems as well as customary ceremonies. According to the informants, most of these groups were formed at village-level so as to address their economic issues. Most of the settlers interviewed belonged to tribal or clan based organizations. The rationale behind formation of such groups was to increase their chances of accessing loans and donations from bodies like Agricultural Finance Corporations (AFC) and Ainabkoi co-operative society and through this initiative, most of the settlers have improved their socio-economic base. The groups cut across all generations and gender.

Some of the members of these organizations were found in ancestral areas as well as in the scheme. Some of the respondents interviewed were leaders who were members of the households.

The study revealed that most African settlers had more attachment to their ancestral homes than the desire to develop a new cohesive society in their new environment on settling in the new environment and it has compromise so much with the economic development of

the scheme. The settlement programme had expected that the African settlers redefine their position and relations in order to meet the requirements of the settlement programme. As Akwako points out; the realignment in the schemes has come as a result of the failure of cultural integration. When there is lack of both cultural and normative integrations, it can be deduced that there is a defect in communication and integration hence lack of dialogue between the settlers and flow of ideas which are resistant to change.¹⁵ One of the findings of this research was to explain the fact that the slow pace in socio-economic development has been due to the failure of the African settlers to redefine their roles in the light of the new environment which this research has found to be true.

Findings from this fieldwork also revealed that there were no competitive secondary schools in Ainabkoi scheme. The main secondary schools are Drys Girls, Ainabkoi secondary, Kapng'etuny has not performed well as it sends few students to public Universities. A good number have enrolled for parallel programme, majority in Moi University and other tertiary institutions.

This average low performance can be ascribed to reasons such as lack of equipment, overcrowding in living halls, large farms tempting most students to turn to farming.¹⁶ These problems are still experienced to date. The average performance of secondary schools could also be ascribed to political influence whereby politicians appointed their own loyal supporters as chairmen or Board of Governors or heads of schools.

Moreover, in terms of planning for future schools, the settlement planning programme put into consideration the possibility of population increase and set aside enough land for building or for future expansion of schools. The report also pointed out that heads of some

of these schools and teachers were not committed with their responsibilities due to farming and business activities they engage in. Absenteeism of pupils was common during dipping, planting and circumcision seasons.¹⁷ These challenges have affected most schools in Ainabkoi scheme. Considering that the settlement occurred over thirty five years ago, the settler's ties with their place of origin (ancestral homes) was still remarkably strong which was equally true of young farmers born in the settlements, so much that at first glance, the prospects that local loyalties will eventually displace loyalties to a distant traditional past seems rather remote.

The findings also revealed that the groups though they live within close physical proximity; their vested interests often function as barriers against economic and social integration and against the merging of the new communities into the regional and national framework. The findings of this study showed that the fusion of classes in the settlement has not been possible.

The study established that both the small scale and large scale farmers from various parts of the country settled in Ainabkoi scheme. considering that the settlement occurred over forty five years ago, these settler ties with their place of origin (ancestral homes) was still remarkably strong which was equally true of young farmers born in the settlement, so much so that at first glance, the prospect that local loyalties to a distant traditional past seems rather slight.

The findings of this study on Ainabkoi settlement scheme revealed that some of the settlers during the initial start of the scheme were polygamous. This means that they were to start a new home in the settlement scheme with the younger wives. The implication of

all this is that, the families of such a settler do not belong to one home. Regarding this, one of the administrators interviewed had this to say: “The influences which tend to perpetuate ancestral home loyalties at the expense of local assimilation is the tribal or clan bond coupled with some settlers traditional polygamous families.” Thus, because of their straddling relationship, some settlers do not see the settlement scheme as just a second home but also as commercial venture to generate income and therefore are not concerned with the general development of the region.¹⁸

Therefore, the reason for some settlers leaving behind the first wife in the ancestral home was an indication that when the settler died he had to be buried in the ancestral home where the first wife lived. There was general fear on the part of many settlers that the whites would at one time come back.

This fear meant that there was little attachment to the settlement schemes and more time was spent on ancestral matters than making decisions in the new environment.¹⁹

The findings of this study also confirm that education too, rather surprisingly works as a separatist force since most of the young children born in the settlement are in most cases sent to their ancestral schools to be educated. The children are first sent to a nearby primary school in Ainabkoi scheme and sent away to the well established schools in the ancestral areas.²⁰ Most of the students are sent to Baringo High school, Kapsabet Boys High School, Singore Girls, Tambach Boys High School or Kapropita Girls Secondary School among others, all in ancestral areas where settlers were born. Such practices have contributed to underdevelopment of educational infrastructure in the settlement.

The scheme is faced with inadequate facilities in primary and secondary schools, inspectorate, high rate of drop out in upper primary school by both boys and girls because of retrogressive cultural practices and the scarcity of trained Early Childhood Development teachers just but to mention a few. To address some of these challenges and improve education in Ainabkoi scheme, there is need to increase enrolment in all primary schools through sensitization and provision of text books in all schools and promote increase of enrolment of children with special needs, through chief's barazas among others.²¹ There is also need to construct science laboratories, provide compulsory education in all primary schools, construction of enough classrooms to cope with increasing population and provide proper vehicles and fuel for inspections and monitoring of schools.

4.4 Aspects of Social Change

In as much as the settlers in Ainabkoi are saddled with socio-cultural constraints to change, there are still certain aspects of change that the settlers have undergone. It can also be pointed out that Ainabkoi Settlers who originally came from different ecological zones are tied to traditional agriculture. They were relatively unfamiliar with the settlement requirements. They had to adapt to new productive regime and develop new social fabric. The ecological differences from one zone to another demanded a transformation in styles of agricultural production. In the pre-settlement period, the staple food was Ugali and Milk. However, settlers in Ainabkoi settlement scheme had to adapt to new type of agriculture based on hybrid maize, wheat, pyrethrum, dairy production among others

especially those who migrated from Tugen (Baringo) and parts of Keiyo, lower parts (valley).

Non-participant observation and interviews were employed by this study to determine the type of cattle kept by the Ainabkoi farmers with a view to determining whether they are predominantly traditional breeds, exotic breeds, or mixed breeds. The findings showed that most farmers reared exotic breeds of cattle. According to one informant who had worked in the scheme as a chief, these breeds had been loaned to the farmers by the settlement organization. In the view of most respondents, the practice of keeping exotic breed of cattle has had significant impact on farmers' incomes due to increased milk yields. As a result of this increased milk yields, farmers' social lives have also changed as seen through varied transformations in areas like the education of their children. In addition, the economic lots of these farmers have also been improved as a result.

Some of them indicated that they have invested some of their agricultural and livestock earnings in real estate development, for instance the Acacia Hostels housing Moi University, Annex Campus.²²

The influence of the scheme made many farmers to realize the importance of exotic breeds, and the consequence of this was that they disposed of their traditional zebu cattle to buy the exotic breeds. The number of grade cattle is now increasing whereas that of the traditional breeds is decreasing. These findings in effect support the research findings that African settlers who moved to Ainabkoi settlement benefited both economically and socially.

In the context of socio-economic change in the new settlements, the settlers were bound to assess their new situation and act accordingly, and their settlement was not without challenges. Settlers were faced with challenges prompting them to redefine their situation according to the requirements of the settlement. One key challenge was finding labour to work on the farms. As already noted the prospective clients of Ainabkoi scheme were a product of a rural society accustomed to agriculture as a way of life and were eager for an opportunity to continue that life. The motivation was there, all they lacked was the skill to deliberate on agriculture. With regard to labour force, the settlers have been utilizing labour from the Luhya community, the Turkana and a few Kalenjin. This has changed recently due to economic challenges, as more Kalenjin now willing to take up any farm labour available.

Nevertheless, the settlement scheme has enabled the farmers to become independent and more self reliant, socially and economically. They no longer have to rely on social networks such as '*kibagenge*' work group to cultivate their shamba. They have to invest to get enough income to pay for their farm labour.²³ So taking up the settlement scheme seems to portend a great change in the new working value of the Kalenjin settlers. It may be generally valid to argue that under the impact of large scale economic structure the settlements offered, traditional rural systems experience change in the scale of their social relationship resulting into more differentiated institutions, thereby involvement of new types of social groupings, but seldom does this occur in a uniform and deterministic manner.

The discussion about what is to be planted in a particular field and how it shall be cultivated rests with the individual farmer. There is a strong role of competition in the settlement. A man takes pride in his efficiency as a farmer, and there is a race to see who can get farthest along with his work. Thus, the settler farmer is not dependent on the co-operation of the members of his lineage for the success, of his individual economic endeavours.

Economically, the settlers were bound to abandon their traditional agricultural practices which predominated in the pre-settlement areas and change to commercialized production of cash crops as well as subsistence crops. The settlers took production of food crops such as maize, wheat and horticultural produce as well as dairy production.

Due to low returns in milk production, most farmers have redefined their animal husbandry and now have taken to production by growing cash crops like beans, pyrethrum and other cereals like millet to supplement their earnings from milk production.

According to one respondent, there were great improvements in the living standards and development in general so the settlers' regular incomes enabled them to pay for education of their children and to do other development agendas. But with the crisis posed by the problem of drought, there was a drop in milk production due to diseases hence forcing farmers to shift to crop production like wheat and maize. Farmers had to reassess and redefine animal husbandry and change to production of food crops.²⁴

Due to the disincentives in milk production and decline in pyrethrum, coupled with lack of market and poor management, farmers were demoralized. For example, low returns and

high production costs, most farmers have redefined their production by growing horticultural crops (potatoes, beans, peas). The trend took some reasonable amount of time still facing the decline. Gradually there was relatively a gradual increase in the returns. Owing to the incentives in milk production as well as maize and wheat production, farmers have made an increase in their production.

According to the Ministry of Planning and National Development²⁵ the dairy industry experienced hard times nationally during the 1997-2001 plan period. This was as a result of market liberalization. Only an average of 3.5 kg of milk per cow per day was realized against the potential 7kg per animal per day. This was attributed to poor breeds, poor management and disorganization of the milk market.

Thirty percent of the milk is sold locally through hawkers, while twenty eight percent is absorbed by the private processing plants such as Spinknit, Donyo Lessos, Brookside and Tuzo, which process various products such as *mala*, cheese, ghee, yoghurt and fresh milk.²⁵ The following table indicates the project and programme priorities in Ainabkoi Division.

Table 4. 2: Ongoing projects/programmes; crop and livestock development

Project name	Objectives	Targets	Description of activities
Tigoni Irish potato seed multiplication	Multiply potato seed for use in the district to increase production and productivity	Meet potato seed demand in the district.	Bulk potato seed – 90%
Milk processing	Reduce over-reliance on	Have operational	Construction of milk

	traditional milk processors	processing plant with capacity of 1800 tonnes	processing plant Justification Due to collapse of Kenya co-operative creameries (KCC), demand for milk processor in the division is high
Trout development	Promote sport fishing	Stocking of Kaptagat River and Ellergrin dam with 10,000 trout	Survey Inventory a fish stock; stocking procurement of fishing gears Justification Available water resource conducive for trout fish. The communities will earn income while the government will earn revenue.

Source: Ainabkoi Divisional Office

From the above table, Tigoni Irish potato seed was to be multiplied for use to increase production and productivity due to market demand. For milk processing, there was a need to reduce over-reliance on traditional milk processors and the target was to have operational processing plant with capacity of 1800 tones. Finally, for the case of trout development, there was need to stock Kaptagat River and Ellergrin dam with 10,000 trout and as well securing procurement of fishing gears. This initiative will benefit communities who will earn income while the government will earn revenue.

In terms of education and extension services, in 1970, Ainabkoi complex staged a successful show at Eldoret showground. Progress has shown by Ainabkoi ability to buy their Lorries for transport and installed milk cooler at Ainabkoi. They had successful cattle sales both to reduce their stock and to pay their loans successfully. With regard to finance

and credit, its financial position had deteriorated and the cooperative officer stopped the extension of credit facilities and recommended that the situation could have been made better by recovering debts from the society through deduction from members produce. Ainabkoi Division planted six seventy two acres of seedlings. From the Nabkoi forest, they five thousand and twenty six cubic meters of timber trees; charcoal was one thousand seven hundred and twenty eight bags and nineteen thousand one hundred and twenty two cubic metres of bamboo was sold.²⁶

Concerning livestock, the Uasin-Gishu Annual Report of 1970²⁷ revealed that in 1969 Ainabkoi in self-help projects witnessed a high morale and chiefs and their assistants offered a lot of guidance to these groups.²⁸ As such, there was a gradual increase in the number of livestock animals between 1965 to 1971. The report also attributes this to sound management, good climatic conditions and market availability.

In terms of education, there were school buildings in Ainabkoi settlement scheme in 1964 with three classrooms, three teachers, one-seven pit latrines, two teacher's latrine and 75 double desks.²⁸ In 1966/69 Self-Help National Fund donated four hundred shillings to Dry's Farm Primary School, five hundred shillings to Ainabkoi Nursery school and eighty three thousand shillings were donated by Reformed Church of East Africa (RCEA) towards Sergoit and Ainabkoi Schools. Kipkabus Harambee Secondary School for both boys and girls was opened up in 1968 with an enrolment of 51 students, one stream and those who sat for certificate were nil.²⁹ Ainabkoi complex staged a successful show and other schemes played the significant part on Eldoret Show especially the complex in 1970.³⁰

The on-going projects in Ainabkoi division with regard to primary and secondary education are; completion of dormitories, laboratories, classrooms, teacher's quarters and zonal office in the following schools; Drys, Rurigi, Ainabkoi, Chemngoror, Cengalo and Tarakwa.³¹ The enrolment pupils in eleven centres in 1979 were as follows; boys-209, girls-184, total enrolment-393. The county council sponsored day care centres were ten with enrolment of boys being 256, girls 217 and the total was 413.³² From the analysis given above, slightly more boys enrolled than girls due to gender bias. In 1976, there was one aided secondary school, Kapng'etuny with a total of 32 students enrolling for East Africa Certificate Examination.

With regard to tertiary institutions there is one village polytechnic initiated in 1975 and aided by Kenya government. By 1976 it had enrolled 36 students in carpentry, agriculture and home economics. This by itself is a good pointer of development.³³

Below indicates utilization levels in primary schools.

Table 4. 3: Number of Primary Schools and their Enrolment Rates in Uasin Gishu per Division in 1983

Division	Schools	Boys	Girls	Totals	Average No. per school
Soy	61	9,477	9,897	19,374	318
Ainabkoi	64	9082	8849	17931	200
Moiben	86	1526 0	1530 7	30567	255
Kessess	49	7943	7890	15833	323
Municipality	34	-	-	21204	624
Total	294	4176 2	4194 3	104909	1720

Source: Uasin Gishu District Education Office, 1983

The table above indicates that the level of enrolment in primary schools in the district, Kesses and soy division have an average of 300 pupils per school while Ainabkoi division has the least of about 200 pupils per school. This was the case because more families sent their children to boarding private schools outside the division. The situation therefore, compromises the quality of education in the scheme.

According to the following table 4.4, there was a high enrolment of pupils at Ainabkoi Scheme.

Table 4. 4: School Enrolment for CPE in Ainabkoi Scheme

School	Total pupils	Total Pupils who Sat CPE	Percentage Pass
Arap Moi primary	302	46	52.1
Dry's Farm	325	56	46.4
Nabkoi	311	38	71.1
Kipkurere	323	10	40

Source: Uasin Gishu District Plan, 1989-1993

According to the findings in Table 4.4, the percentage pass among pupils who sat CPE (Certificate of Primary Examination) stood at over 40% in the lowest school. Education progressed gradually. At the time of this study, Ainabkoi division had 64 schools with total of 17,931 pupils in primary school and 19 secondary schools with 2,742 students.^{34, 35}

The table below shows the number of schools and their distribution in various institutions in Uasin Gishu District.

Table 4. 5: Number of Schools Per Division in Uasin Gishu District between 1989-1992

	Soy		Moiben		Kesses		Ainabkoi		Central (EMC)	
	1989	1992	1989	1992	1989	1992	1989	1992	1989	1992
Pre- primary	63	70	95	106	71	72	74	82	83	69
Primary	61	58	54	52	63	82	55	64	23	34
Secondary	24	17	15	12	14	13	17	12	16	14
Youth Polytechnic	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	-
Total	149	146	164	170	148	167	149	161	103	108

Source: Ministry of Education, Uasin Gishu District, 1993.

Shows that the pre- primary and primary facilities saw some increased in 1992 compared to 1989. However, the secondary schools showed a decline in all division in 1989 to 1992. This was attributed to lack of facilities, and lack of commitment by teachers. Apparently, newly opened schools could not cope with the needs and had to close from 1990. The Youth Polytechnic saw no increases or drop over during the whole period.

Adult education in Ainabkoi had adult students as indicated in the table below. The trend of adult students indicated a gradual increase, suggesting that the rate of literacy was progressing. Women had the highest enrolment rate of 871 while men had 403 the trend was encouraging. The table below shows the enrolment trends of adult education by gender.

Table 4. 6: Gender Dynamics for Adult Education between 1989 and 1993

Gender	Men		Women		
	Year	1989	1993	1989	1993
No		153	250	371	500

Source: Department of Adult Education, Eldoret, 1993, 72.

From Table 4.6 above, there was a higher enrolment of women as compared to men. This was attributed to positive response by women to enroll in adult education. One of the respondents of this study pointed out that the reason for this was that men did not appreciate being beaten by women in class, arguing that many men enrolled in adult classes, but dropped out if the women did better than them in the examinations.

4.5 Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that on arriving in the scheme, the settlers failed to find institutions upon which they could always depend on for security. They found instead a natural environment governed by forces they did not comprehend. They were socially isolated from their kinsmen.

The settlers were prone to adopt modern methods of food and milk production. However, the adaptation to the conditions of the new geographical setting in which the settlers found themselves has been relatively rapid. It is evident from this chapter that the African settlers have continued with their pre-settlement agricultural practices due to failure to have dialogue with settlement authority and inability to redefine their situation in the new environment.

This has revealed that the settlers were required to adopt the requirements of a modern agricultural economy based on maize, wheat and dairy farming once they were settled in the new environment. Nevertheless, the adaptation to new ecological or geographical setting has been relatively rapid.

Given the nature of economic inter-relationships between the organization of economic activity and the social institutions of the settlers' culture, the adjustment of the settlers has implications which go beyond mere socio-economic adaptation. The settlers must In fact, adjust to a totally changed socio-economic setting.

Endnotes

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Ibid., 36. CHAPTER FIVE
CONSTRAINTS TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION

5.1 Introduction

35. Reports focusing on the socio-economic development of Rift Valley province have indicated regional disparity that has characterized Kenya's national income distribution patterns in the post-independence era¹. In examining the proposal submitted to the Kenya government for acceleration of the programme of land consolidation and registration, the Stamp Commission (the commission appointed to advice on the proposals for further transfer of European farms in October, 1965) commented that the mission was horrified by the financial position of the settlement schemes and firmly recommended that there should be no more schemes established until the Kenya government had undertaken economic surveys to reassess the economics of settlement and to initiate measures to avoid any possible catastrophe.² It said "The idea of consolidation and registration seems on the face of it, so plausible and so obviously a good thing that the temptation to pursue the project without proper critical analysis is very great".³ At the political level, the feeling has been that the settlement schemes are far better off since the African settlers are assured of an income annually.⁴

36. An attempt is made in this chapter to assess the validity of these claims in the light of past experience and present trends in Ainabkoi scheme. What is intended here is to examine the effect of resettlement on socio-economic transformation in the larger – holder sector. One of the objectives of this study was to assess the constraints faced in

implementing change in Ainabkoi settlement scheme. In order to account for the socio-economic change and outline the challenges faced in establishing and running the scheme, it is important to provide some background to the planned change as envisaged by the settlement authorities.

37. An understanding of the pattern of transformation and change should of necessity involve some understanding of the type of approach used by government and its agencies for initiating socio-economic transformation. In cases where the objectives of land settlement policy are to increase agricultural production, generate new employment and reduce income disparities, the performance of settlement schemes can be assessed in terms of the achievements of these objectives.

38. Individual settlers are considered basically successful if their household cash or subsistence needs are met by their working in the settlement area. Other indicators of success include the settlers' own estimation that life is better since settlement, a net settler income that exceeds that attainable at the place of origin.⁵

5.2 Planning For the Settlement Programme

39. The basis of the Settlement Fund Trustees programme was land transfer through purchase.⁶ The land and immovable assets in the farms to be taken over were bought from previous owners by the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) and had to be sold to the incoming African settlers. This was the basic precept of the settlement programme, and most other special features have arisen as a consequence of this fundamental fact. The new settlers were provided with loan for the purchase and

development of their land and this loan had to be serviced. Prices of plots varied from area to area due to the nature and condition of the places. Minimum land offered was thirty acres where it was tillable and seventy to ninety acres in other areas. The price per Acre was Kshs. 600 in areas which could not be cultivated.

40. In 1966, Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme Complex was low density because process of land allocation was ongoing. It was good for pyrethrum, oats and potatoes and unsuitable for maize.⁸ Ainabkoi and Burnt Forest had 23,816 acres, in all and settled 482 families. Economy was mainly dairy cattle, pyrethrum and sheep.⁹ In 1967-1968; the degree of estimated acreage and settlement was as indicated in the table below:

41. The table below indicates that the IBRD funded the schemes differently depending on the conditions of the land.

42. **Table 5. 1: Estimated Acreage and Settlement**

43. Scheme	44. Type	45. Acre age	46. Estim ated	47. Actua l	48. Settl ed
49. Ainabkoi East	50. I.B.R. D	51. 5846	52. 142	53. 141	54. 141
55. Ainabkoi West	56. I.B.R. D	57. 6291	58. 144	59. 143	60. 143
61. Ainabkoi North	62. I.B.R. D	63. 4017	64. 89	65. 88	66. 88

67. **Source: Uasin-Gishu Annual Report 1966/68**

68. The table shows for instance, that the people occupying well drained areas were allocated less acreage and those occupying the marshy areas were allocated more acres. It fairly achieved its objectives and the farmers' economic base was increased.

69. The table below indicates Credit at Ainabkoi East Settlement Scheme.

70. **Table 5. 2: Peasant Economy Survey**

71. Duration of the loan	72. Average amount advanced, Kshs	73. Year 1-3 Kshs	74. Year 4-5 Kshs	75. Year 6-15 Kshs	76. Year 16-30 Kshs
77. 30 year loan for land	78. 5,211	79. 311	80. 412	81. 412	82. 412
83. 15 year loan for livestock fencing etc	84. 4,482 85.	86. 291	87. 543	88. 543	89. 0
90. 5 year loan for seed, fertilizers etc	91. 1,476	92. 96	93. 799	94. 0	95. 0
96. Total	97. 11,169	98. 726	99. 1,754	100. 9 55	101. 412

102. **Source: R. H. Clough, 1965.**¹⁰

103. From the table 5.2 above, most African settlers did not the repay the loan due to financial hardships according to R.H. Clough. Therefore, most settlers are still repaying loans to date. As Nottidge and Sack observe, “the objective of all the settlement schemes was to provide subsistence and loan repayment together with a given net income figure from a consolidated holding. It is a basic objective of all schemes that gross production in the scheme areas should be at least maintained at its former level”.¹¹ These statements of objectives are interesting in themselves both for what they contain and for what they omit. One of the characteristic features of the planning of the settlement programme has been its individual schemes and its failure to take account of the aggregate effects of the programme.¹²

104. The loan advanced for the period of 30 years for the purchase of land was kshs 5,211 but farmers managed to raise kshs 1,542 with a deficit of kshs 3,664. For the 15 years loan for livestock fencing, they were given a loan worth kshs 4,482 but paid kshs 1,377 and the shortfall amounted to kshs 3,105. Finally, the 5 year loan for seeds fertilizers was kshs 1,476 and farmers paid kshs 895 with a deficit of kshs 581.¹³

5.3 Cost of administering settlement

105. The aggregate expenditure by the Department of Settlement (Table 5.3) shows that by 1970, the department outlay total expenditure K£ 31.1 million of which 48% had been used for land purchase, 22% for development expenses and 30% for administration.¹⁴ The data for the main parts of the programme shows that the development expenses per settler and per unit of land were more than 2.5 times as much in low density settlement as in the high density programme.¹⁵ The administrative costs include all the operating costs for the department of settlement and its personnel including those seconded to it from other technical ministries, as well as expenditure made against funds for the preparation of cost of farm valuation and acquisition, the cost of settlement development including mapping, surveying and the installation of the layout on the ground before the settlers were admitted, and the cost of daily allowance made to high density settlers during the first six months after settlement before their first crops were ready for harvest, and other expenses of this type.¹⁶

106.

107. It is therefore necessary to separate the cost of settlement development from the normal administrative costs of the department. However, by relating the combined annual costs for both these items in each year with the annual number of both new and established settlers, it is possible to arrive at some estimates of unit costs.¹⁷

108. The table below indicates Settlement Expenditure for 1970 and the total of Expenditure up to 31st December 1971.

109.

110. **Table 5. 3: Financing Settlement Scheme. Settlement Expenditure for 1970 and the total of Expenditure to 31st December 1971**

111.	112. Type of scheme	113. To 31-12-69 118. million Kshs	114. 1-1-70 to 31-12-70 119. million Kshs	115. To 31-12-70 120. million Kshs
121. Land purchase and development 122.	123. Million Acre Scheme	124. 15,163	125. 365	126. 15529
	128. IBRD /CDC Scheme	129. 3119	130. 0	131. 3119
	133. Hara mbee Scheme	134. 127	135. 51	136. 168
	138. Olkarli settlement	139. 2089	140. 147	141. 2,236
142.	Administration expenses	143. 8109	144. 1076	145. 9270
146.	Total	147. 29,502	148. 1640	149. 31,142

150.

151. Source: Department of Settlement Annual Report 1970. 9.

152. In the early years of the programme, by far the greater part of expenditure under this lending was for pre-settlement, while in the latter years, when very few settlers were being established on the ground, the greater part of expenses would have been for the normal administrative costs of the settlement operations.

153. The total administrative cost per farm for year 1965 was KShs 174 from which it is fair to estimate that the average cost of pre-settlement development in the high density and low density programme together was around KShs 150.¹⁸

154. Table 5. 4: Average cost per settler

155. Type of activity	156. High density Kshs	157. Low density Kshs
158. Land purchase	159. 349.5	160. 381.9
161. Development	162. 155.3	163. 407.0
164. Pre-settlement	165. 150.0	166. 150.0
167. Total	168. 654.8	169. 938.9

170. Source: Department of settlement Annual Report 1970

171. From the above table, there was over estimation in the averages cost per settler in the high density schemes and an under estimation in the case of low density schemes. Considering both had the same levels of pre-settlement development, the low density schemes were therefore advantaged because they could assume debt for lower costs incurred for pre-settlement development and the opposite was true for the high density schemes. Since these figures also incorporate the low – cost land which have

been incorporated in the co-operative farms and ranches, the estimated cost per settler in the low density schemes of around KShs 940 may be an underestimation.

172. The table below indicates the grants and loans meant for the Resettlement Programme up to the year 1970.

173.

174. **Table 5. 5: Grant's and loan for Resettlement Programme Up to 1970.**

175. Source	176. Grant 177. million Kshs	178. Loan 179. millio n Kshs	180. Total 181. million Kshs
182. British Govt	183. 10,541	184. 11,284	185. 21,73.5
186. West German Govt	187. 0	188. 1,218	189. 1,218
190. IBRD	191. 0	192. 1,080	193. 1,080
194. CDC	195. 0	196. 676	197. 676
198. Land Band and AFC	199. 0	200. 1,355	201. 1,355
202. Kenya Govt.	203. 2,810	204. 2,356	205. 51,116
206. Total	207. 13,261	208. 17,969	209. 31,230

210. **Source: Adapted from the Department of settlement annual Report 1970 – p.12.**

211. The table above shows that most of these institutions preferred provisions of loans rather than giving the grants. Since the loans awarded attracted interest, it became a burden to the settlers. It was observed during the study period that most of the settlers are still servicing the loans granted, hence having an impact on the overall economic development of the farmers. Loans but no grants

212. The table below indicates the cost of land purchase and development in the high and low density schemes.

213. **Table 5.6: Department of settlement costs – 1961 – 1970, and purchase and Development costs**

214.	215.	216. 217.	218. Per Hectare 219. millio n Kshs	220. Per settler 221. millio n Kshs
222. Land purchase	223. High density	224. 10,75 7	225. 24.4	226. 349.5
	228. Low density	229. 1,902	230. 26.3	231. 381.5
232. Develop ment	233. High density	234. 4,778	235. 10.81	236. 155.3
	238. Low density	239. 2,027	240. 28.1	241. 407.0

242. **Source: Figures published in Department of settlement Annual Report, 1970.**

243. The table above indicates that the cost of land purchase and development in the high density schemes was higher than that of the low density scheme. There was an over estimation of cost per settler both in low and high density while in terms of development, there was an over estimation in the average cost per settler in the high density scheme and under estimation in the case of low density scheme. Therefore, the settlers at Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme had to repay a lot of loans which later affected them in their general development.

244. Ley argues that the settlement programme was very expensive and aimed at benefiting only a few settlers, about 135,000 people at the end of Million Acre Transfer Programme. It absorbed a large proportion of the total investment in agriculture over the last decades²⁰ from 1963 – 1967. Such a programme would seem difficult to justify in normal circumstances but is defensible in terms of the exceptional situations existing in Kenya in 1960.

245. Even then, its huge expenditure would have been impossible to justify if funds had not been made available on generous terms by the British Government, and may have helped raise costs as was reflected in the land valuation purchase programmed by LDSB.

246. In addition, the actual costs were increased by the time lag between departure of the previous owners and the establishment of the new settlers, causing a loss of production and a decline in the utility of assets through depreciation and a decline in field operations which meant an extra cost in land preparation necessary before small holder production could begin. The haste with which the major part of the scheme was implemented also raised costs. Despite the high cost involved, the settlement programme has been successful in several ways, even if not in a financial sense. Cost benefit studies show that, once allowance is made for the British grant element, the economic returns are positive.²¹ Certainly the settlement schemes have notable achievement, that they resolved the political issues relating to the African take-over in the scheduled areas and avoided an uncontrollable situation, increased output in

settled areas above pre-settlement levels and settled a large number of families who were otherwise landless.²²

247. The 1965 Stamp Commission²³ was sent to Kenya from Britain to advise on the settlement programme. This Commission advised on behalf of the settlement programme because of the poor state of the schemes. This led to the Van Ankadie commission of 1966²⁴ which observed that the failure by settlers to repay loans was caused mainly by the fact that high-density schemes were a dangerous compromise between what the mission called 'development' schemes and 'social relief' schemes.

248. The plots had to be subdivided in order to accommodate new settlers. If all went exactly as planned, the settlers who paid his debts on time would be left with a net cash income that was simply too small to meet his most essential family expenditures.²⁵ In many cases, the commission found that most even the optimistic target budgets expected the poorest settlers to pay over 70 percent of their net farming income in debt repayments and be left with a sum of £25, implying they could not even afford primary school fees for their children, let alone secondary school fees.²⁶

249. The settlers also faced challenges in dairy farming. Major constraints faced were associated with inadequate resources to procure quality feeds and pastures, ramifications of post-election chaos, poor breeding methods, and inadequate disease control, and surveillance facilities among others. These impacted negatively on the management of the scheme. As indicated in the table below, milk supply fluctuated.

250.

251. **Table 5. 7: Ainabkoi Scheme Milk Deliveries to K.C.C and Brookside in 2008**

252. Month	253. New K.C.C	254. Brooksi de	255. Total (litres)
256. Jan	257. 21,119	258. 37,790	259. 58,909
260. Feb	261. 21,729	262. 57,908	263. 79,637
264. Mar	265. 13,266	266. 43,714	267. 56,980
268. Apr	269. 16,336	270. 53,337	271. 69,673
272. May	273. 23,013	274. 90,511	275. 113,524
276. Jun	277. 10,562	278. 88,803	279. 99,365
280. Jul	281. 13,993	282. 78,651	283. 92,429
284. Aug	285. 21,778	286. 77,651	287. 99,429
288. Sept.	289. 25,923	290. 96,036	291. 121,959
292. Oct	293. 29,300	294. 109,400	295. 138,700
296. Nov.	297. 31,634	298. 111,000	299. 142,634
300. Total	301. 260,605	302. 947,818	303. 1,148,423

304. **Source: ANBK DIV/ANN.REPT/VOL I/2008**

305. There was more milk delivered through Brookside than through New K.C.C throughout the accounting period. This arose due to good prices offered by Brookside. More milk was produced in the second half of the year because the pastures and fodder were in plenty which is attributed to the steady rains in this period. The rains set in the months of March/April. Drought spell may have caused the low level of milk production during the January /April period.

306.

307. **Table 5.8: Years milk delivery through Ainabkoi Farmers Co-operative society (FCS) to dealers**

308. Year	309. Quantity (litres)		310. Total (litres)
	312. New KCC	313. Brook side	
315. 2006	316. 435,655	317. 964,121	318. 1,399,776
319. 2007	320. 660,910.8	321. 904,073.1	322. 1,564,983
323. 2008	324. 260,605.2	325. 947,817.5	326. 1,148,422.7

327. **Source: ANBK DIV/ANN.REPT/VOL I/2008**

328. The general trend is that milk delivery to New K.C.C went down as the delivery data for year 2006, 2007 and 2008 indicates. The major reason behind this is that other market players entered the arena. Competition was very stiff and some companies offered attractive prices hence edging out new K.C.C. Milk production declined from 4,232,314 kg in 2007 to 3,227,818.8 kg in 2008. This is a drop of 19%. In the year 2007, there was a drop in milk prices which led to a drop in milk production of 3%.

329. Dairy industry was affected by change in climate and variation in market prices as milk production dropped by 19% in the year 2008. Milk supply treat line also indicates a down ward growth rate.

330. The table below shows the trends in input and output of dairy.

331.

332.

333. **Table 5.9: Input and Output of Ainabkoi Dairy Farmers Co-operative Society**

334. Description of item	335. Output (KShs)	336. Input (KShs)
337. Sales of milk	352.	367. 62,422
338. D.W premises	353.	,830.80
339. payment to producer	354. 574,908.60	368. 213,545.0
340. K.C.C Charges	355. 46,755.30	0
341. External transport	356. 73,940.10	369.
342. Salaries to staff	357. 22,741.00	370.
343. Casual labour	358. 1,030.00	371.
344. NSSF	359. 1,120.00	372.
345. Transport & subs All	360. 710.00	373.
346. Depreciator	361. 3,877.00	374.
347. Repairs and maintenance	362. 955.00 363. 363,059.50	375. 376.
348. Internal transport	364. 20.00	377.
349. Sundry expenses	365.	378.
350.	366. 6,225,117.0	379.
351. Total	0	380.
		381. 6,456,028.
		80

382. **Source: Ainabkoi Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd, 1994**

383. The table above indicates the breakdown of input and output of dairy. There was more output than input, an indication of progress.

384. In terms of the milk sector in the year 2002 – 2008, there was a reduction on over-reliance on traditional milk processors. Ainabkoi Division had a processing plant which was able to process 180 tonnes of milk per year. Due to collapse of Kenya Co-

operative Creameries (KCC), demand for milk in the processing plant went up. Due to that, the milk production which was 5.5 kilograms per cow per day increased to 7.5 kilograms per cow per day.²⁷

5.4 Impact of Liberalization on Dairy Farming

385. The liberalization of the milk sector affected the dairy sector adversely because farmers in Ainabkoi had not evolved mechanisms of surviving in a liberalized milk sector. Importation of cheap milk from Ukraine flooded the local market thereby discouraging the milk farmer.²⁸

386. Use of Artificial Insemination (AI) was recorded at Ainabkoi co-operative Society in September, 2008. The charges for insemination were Kshs. 800. Ainabkoi co-operative Society management stepped up the campaign for more farmers to embrace this breeding technique in order to improve their stock, a farmer in Chepng'oror location was trained as an inseminator. He was from Chepng'oror farmers group. The initiative was financed to the tune of fifty percent by a collaborator – SEDCO Company. Total cost of training was Kshs. 32,000. The farmer was trained at Kitale Agricultural Development Corporation.

387. The main collaborations in AI services in the year were Central Artificial Insemination Services (CAIS).The programme was progressing as the first A.I. realized 1495 animals and its repeat was 692 animals all adding to 2387 animals bred.²⁹

388.

Plate 1: Agrovet store in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme



389. The store gathers for farmer's services and the products are sold on credit and repayment offset through produce delivered to Ainabkoi Farmers Cooperative Society.

5.5 Cooperatives Societies in Uasin Gishu District

390. Despite making some success, the co-operative movement is faced with various problems in Kenya. These problems range from inefficient management, dishonesty or fraud, lack of education as well as lack of funds. Co-operative enterprise succeeds almost invariably when well managed. The limiting factor in most cases in Kenya has been lack of quality and vigour on the part of managers, including management

committee or directors.³⁰ the same scenario is experienced in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme as indicated in the table below.

391. **Table 5. 10: The achievements of Agricultural Enterprises in the 1989-1993 plan periods in Ainabkoi in comparison with other divisions**

392. Type	393. Ainabkoi	394. Kesses	395. Moin	396. Ziwa	397. Soy	398. Central
399. Pyrethrum	400. 4	401. 0	402. 0	403. 0	404. 0	405. 0
406. Cereals	407. 0	408. 1	409. 6	410. 8	411. 1	412. 2
413. Multi-purpose	414. 0	415. 2	416. 2	417. 1	418. 0	419. 0
420. Rural Sacco	421. 1	422. 0	423. 0	424. 0	425. 0	426. 0
427. Saving & Credit	428. 1	429. 0	430. 0	431. 0	432. 0	433. 14
434. Livestock marketing	435. 0	436. 0	437. 0	438. 0	439. 1	440. 0

441. **Source: Uasin Gishu, District Development Plan 1989-1993**

442. The above table indicates the development indices in the 1989-1993 plan periods in Ainabkoi settlement scheme in comparison to other divisions. The changes were due to climatic variations in different divisions. As for the savings and credit, most divisions are not aggressive in investment due to attitudinal factors, lack of awareness in terms of marketing and lack of government support.

443. In the same period, no co-operative was liquidated. With regard to horticultural development, there was improved marketing and production of horticulture products.

- These was done through provision of coolers and good transportation systems to the markets and also advise to producers on better ways of improving output.
444. Due to lack of vehicles, the co-operative officer could not closely supervise the societies. There was also need for the ministry to post some personnel in the Division for the purpose of effective supervision. From the report, the activities of co-operatives had started dwindling but the major cause of the problem was the lack of supervision of co-operative societies in the scheme. This was due to the fact that when the settlement schemes were started, there was only one co-operative officer based in Eldoret who supervised co-operatives in the entire Uasin-Gishu, Trans-zoia, Elgeyo Marakwet and Nandi districts.
445. The researcher interviewed several respondents who were co-operative officials during the early phase of the settlements and some who have lived on up to present in order to compliment the written sources. According to Moses Yatich, manager and Haron Chemjor³¹ who were the first officials of Ainabkoi scheme that greatly assisted farmers to repay loans and develop their farms. Co-operatives declined financially due to government's failure to control infiltration of politics into co-operative affairs. The co-operative lacked capital to sustain their operation and some co-operative officials were fraudulent thus leading to misappropriation of funds.
446. Therefore, the major problem that faced the Ainabkoi co-operative movement was that of poor management and lack of close supervision from the parent ministry. Why co-operative societies were dwindling lay in the fact that farmers started avoiding channeling their produce through them, because co-operatives deducted loans from

their proceeds on behalf of SFT in circumstances which left members with no income. According to Josephine Wanjia,³² the co-operatives were initially undercapitalized. The co-operative was affected by the practice of deducting AFC outstanding loans from the proceeds of maize and milk marketed through the co-operatives. AFC claimed that the loans had been made to the co-operative and not to the farmers individually and although co-operatives failed to re-enter the field of milk marketing, their members were unwilling to market the milk through their society because of deduction of outstanding loans by AFC.³³ According to Stephen Kibos, an original member, when milk prices dwindle, farmers underfed their dairy cows to reduce milk production.³⁴ The weakness of the co-operative societies affected other services the societies were required to give to the settler. Because of lack of funds, the co-operative societies were unable to maintain and operate cattle and sheep dips and provide artificial insemination services.

447. **Table 5.11: Milk production in litres**

448. Year	449. 2003	450. 2004	451. 2005	452. 2006
453. Jan	454. 73,5 79	455. 53,1 12	456. 97,1 00	457. 87,4 86
458. Feb	459. 84,8 86	460. 56,1 3	461. 77,6 43	462. 71,0 08
463. March	464. 68,6 60	465. 29,3 91	466. 65,5 31	467. 70,6 55
468. April	469. 55,5 20	470. 58,5 30	471. 77,8 03	472. 90,7 10
473. May	474. 78,2 61	475. 105, 434	476. 114, 248	477. 142, 966
478. June	479. 103, 572	480. 97,4 46	481. 123, 792	482. 150, 750
483. July	484. 115,	485. 31,6	486. 143,	487. 148,

	531	04	368	376
488. Aug ust	489. 105, 491	490. 114, 899	491. 120, 162	492. 140, 492
493. Sept ember	494. 105, 273	495. 121, 989	496. 121, 260	497. 90,4 15
498. Octo ber	499. 75,2 11	500. 113, 183	501. 112, 455	502. 127, 469
503. Nov ember	504. 57,7 22	505. 120, 650	506. 110, 145	507. 117, 395
508. Dece mber	509. 54,4 84	510. 115, 240	511. 120, 112	512. 120, 466
513. Tota l	514. 1,03 8 354	515. 1,13 6,563	516. 1,43 3,681	517. 1,09 2,758

518.

519. The above table indicates milk deliveries which had slight variation mostly attributed to low payment by the various buying companies such as Kenya Co-operative Creameries the (K.C.C), Brookside, Spin-Knit among others. There has been a steady increase in the consecutive three years but a drop was realized in the year 2006 due to low payment to farmers. The price of milk rose from KShs.16 of the beginning year to KShs.20 towards the close of the year under review. The survey also revealed that the primary co-operative society in the settlement own tractors for transporting the produce to the co-operative and likewise they have a lorry for serving the same purpose. Most informants revealed that the society has enhanced the farmers' economic growth.

520. Citing a plethora of reasons like management efficiency and lack of sufficient facilities for example farm implements, the researcher tried to counter check these allegations but was not able to get the necessary records which are deemed to be available in the society offices. In certain cases it was also established that the society

grants loans to farmers for example the society as scheme of granting loans for school fees and other personal needs. The management of the co-operative society was faced with some problems like misappropriation of funds by some untrustworthy committee members, marketing of the produce and lack of funds at times to pay farmers among others.³⁵

521. The common problem the researcher identified with the primary co-operative society is that the society is unable to attract adequate financial resources to service the needs of their members efficiently. They neither have competent nor adequate staff to provide the needed services not to mention necessary equipment.

522. Even though the settlement geography and organization offered ideal units for the formation of co-operative unions, the idea of forming such unions was discussed, at least in the planning of settlement, but it was not analyzed.³⁶ Over the years, the co-operative as purchasing agent for the farmers split up into microcosmic scheme-level societies instead of being organized into larger co-operative unions. According to the annual report of 1966, Ainabkoi East, West and North settlement scheme had a whole milk production of 240,000gallons 48,000lbs of butter production.³⁷ It can be concluded that the settlement scheme programme therefore did not constitute a planned, coherent approach to the promotion of co-operative.

Plate 2: Anaibkoi farmers co-operative Society Limited, Ainabkoi

523.



524. The structure above is the administration block for Ainabkoi Farmers Co-operative Society (FCS). It is here where all the farmers' records are contained.

5.6 Conclusion

525. From the foregoing, it can be fairly concluded that the co-operative movement in Ainabkoi Division has been dwindling due to a number of factors, chief of which was the inability of the co-operative to become self-supporting. This arose because these co-operatives were undercapitalized and could not survive on their own.

526. The initial functions of co-operative societies as debt collectors on behalf of Settlement Fund Trustee (SFT) and Agricultural Finance Corporation left most settlers with no income to subsist on. This restricted in the farmers diversion of their produce to other marketing outlets in which they were assured of getting their income. Thus the co-operative was denied the commission which is one of the vital sources for co-operative finances. The dwindling of co-operatives affected both the marketing and production of maize and milk as farmers dealt directly with exploitative traders without a middleman to cushion them against exploitation by unscrupulous traders.

527. The planners of the settlement scheme had intended the settlers to grow certain crops and keep dairy cattle in the hope of raising a targeted income but in practice, the settlers were influenced by unpredictable external and internal factors, and the settlers were not able to meet their targeted incomes all the time.

528. Moreover, the failure of the co-operative society to carry out their roles effectively caused the scheme as originally conceived to fail. The factors that contributed to the weakening of the society were diverse. Of initial importance was its method of formation. The early co-operative societies were government initiated. By requiring the settlers to join a co-operative society immediately after acquiring a farm plot, the government was making this a law without consulting the settlers. The study concludes therefore that, since the government initiated the co-operative movement in Ainabkoi settlement scheme, it had the responsibility of safeguarding it under all costs. By failing to act, the government indirectly weakened the co-operative movement. If the government had dealt prudently and immediately with this situation, the co-operative movement in Ainabkoi Settlement Scheme could not have experienced adverse problems as is the situation now.

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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

529. The main objective of this study was the evaluation of the performance of Ainabkoi division settlement scheme, which was set up under the million acre programme. The study sought to identify the socio-economic changes that settlers have undergone since taking land in the settlement; to investigate the factors that influenced the transformation of settlers; and to establish the extent to which the objectives of the scheme were attained in relation to the way they were initially conceptualized.

530. The first objective aimed at investigating the historical background of the settlers in Ainabkoi settlement schemes. This study has historically traced the origins and administration of Ainabkoi scheme. These findings indicates that most settlers were not necessarily landless and unemployed as was stipulated in the settlement blue print, but were composed of the middle and upper echelons of former workers of the white settlers, retired civil servants, former colonial soldiers. This was so because there was no means of knowing who were landless and who owned land. This study found out that the original landless and squatters targeted could not raise the purchase price so the settlement authorities opened the doors to the richer classes who would pay and get the programme running considering the expediency with which the programme was being implemented at independence.

531.

532. The study also revealed that the administration of the scheme was onerous in that, the evaluation of farms was excessively generous and that in consequence, the total

sum paid for the purchase of land was unnecessarily inflated. This placed excessive burden on the settlers in paying back the loans.

533. From the experience adduced in this study, the researcher recommends that in future planning of new settlement schemes, the settlers should be regarded to have more say, and therefore be allowed to put a great deal of work on what will be their land in future. Thus, they should be left to start with minimum necessary capital and gradually improve their land and income as they get production going. Above all the perfectionism which so often besets donor aided schemes as was the case with the million Acre scheme should be avoided. As has been shown, in the case of Ainabkoi schemes, the farmers targeted income spelt out in the settlement blue print has not been realized. Therefore, the researcher recommends that in planning a settlement scheme, emphasis should be placed on precise social and economic objectives, precise decision on division of capital and recurrent cost between government and settlers, thus avoiding very long and onerous repayments.

534. In noting the dynamics of the land settlement process, the findings revealed that kinship relations, clans' allegiance and family lineage among the resettled farmers have been carried over to the new settlement scheme which in turn has had an adverse effect on the settlers' socio-economic change. It has been shown that even although the settlement scheme brought together people of different origins, Small groups of settlers still continue to look to their distant homes as the focal points in their social life. The study found out that most youths who are expected to assist run the scheme

have moved to urban centres in search for jobs, leaving the old men and women who lack the skills of modern techniques to manage the settlement.

535. An attempt should also be made to show that settlement schemes can be viable programmes for social and economic development. The constraints that befell the million Acre scheme was the planning and implementation. Contrary to the stipulated objectives of resettling the landless and unemployed people, the scheme settled a substantial number of persons who were not landless.

536. This study also revealed that planning and administration of the scheme was onerous in that the valuation of the farms and the assets therein was grossly inflated and in consequence the total sum paid for purchase of land was unnecessarily inflated. This placed excessive burden on the settlers in paying back the loans. From the findings, the government tended to have exaggerated spending on administration and valuations of farms. These exaggerations were inevitable as the whole network of the land settlement programme was lined with Europeans who had an interest in manipulating the programme in favour of fellow Europeans. African for that matter, were not represented on the initial land processing organizations.

537. The study also aimed at evaluating the socio-economic effects of resettlement in Ainabkoi schemes. As noted in the findings, Ainabkoi settlers have benefited from the whole process of resettlement. They now own bigger land than they used to in the pre-settlement area. They have utilized that land to grow cash crops, and rear dairy cows, which is beneficial to them because it earns them substantial income and make them self-reliant.

538. The study also set out to analyze the constraints of Ainabkoi settlement scheme as avenues of planned socio-economic change. As previously mentioned, important policy guidelines towards settlers' organization were not spelt out in the settlement blue print. Recognizing that the new settlers were bound to the local primary co-operative societies on taking plots in the scheme, the research findings showed that these co-operative societies have not been able to serve farmers adequately prompting the local farmers' co-operative society (Ainabkoi) to look for alternative markets for farmer's products. Therefore, the New Kenya co-operative creameries (K.C.C) has not been serving the farmers adequately in as far as prices are concerned.

539. The study has further revealed that there was inadequate planning for economic activities in the schemes. The government expected the settlers to meet their loan commitment and subsistence by practicing modern commercial agriculture, but the farmers did not. The problem of transport for farmers' produce became the main factor in escalating costs that reduced farmers' incomes. Moreover, any future plans for a scheme intending to engage in dairy and wheat growing should take into account the fluctuation of prices due to supply and demand, whereby very low prices are paid at harvest due to the high supply and greatly increased off season's prices. It is suggested that in future, planning should consider diversifying the economy of the settlers. This is necessary to cushion farmers against the fluctuations in market prices of agricultural produce and enable them to meet the demands of the settlements programme.

540. In the study analysis, it was found that credit facilities are insufficient and improperly targeted in the schemes. This is one of the main constraints associated with

the inability of land resettlement schemes to realize their development potential. The problem of credit for which there is no easy solution, definitely threatens the dairy scheme. Credit is primarily provided by three organizations, AFC, co-operative banks and the F.C.S, which have a monopoly in regard to seasonal loans. There are a number of fundamental problems that need to be addressed. These include the facts that only small minorities of settlers make use of institutional credit, and second, the inability of most settlers who default for reasons beyond their control. In order to solve these problems, there should be greater commitment to small holder credit policies on the part of the commercial banks.

541. The study has also observed that political interference in settler's socio-economic activities has been quite detrimental to them. It also attributed the poor performance of schools in the division as the appointment of Board members was politically influenced. In the economic history of Ainabkoi, politics has been responsible for the running down of institutions, for instance the poor performance of Kenya co-operative creameries (K.C.C). This in turn has affected the overall economy Ainabkoi and hence the scheme has to produce enough food to maintain their social relations.

542.

543. The study also recommends that to avoid any ethnic bias in future, the settlement process should aim at heterogeneous pattern of settling settlers rather than settling settlers from the same ethnic group in one area. Heterogeneous pattern will make it difficult for easy regular contacts with ones ethnic members and hence the settlers in a neighbourhood are bound to develop close contacts with each regardless of ethnic

belonging as they will be bound to come up with common problems which will create a cohesive society.

544. However, ethnic feelings are gradually fading away as reflected in the combination in the farmers' co-operation society where all those communities within the scheme co-exist. Moreover, economic hardships of the settlers have acted as a unifying force for all the settlers of Ainabkoi division as well as the people of Ainabkoi. This unity was reflected in the voting pattern of 1992 in the party elections in which all politicians who had undermined the economic prospects of the district were voted out. The researcher recommends that in future, the government should avoid interfering with farmer's institutions and be restrained from appointing representatives to such organizations. This is necessary since most parastatal bodies have collapsed due to politicization of the management.

545. The political dynamics in the constituency has influenced socio-economic changes in the settlers' lives. This is attributed to the fact that most of the settler's parliamentary representatives have been the western educated elite who do not have established homes in the settlement areas. Therefore, they operated from high class homes like Eldoret, Elgon View estate, Nakuru Nairobi and other palatial homes drawn from different parts of the country. Due to this, it is only the proxy clique in the constituency that reports the incidents in the constituency. As observed during the research, this has greatly contributed to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the settlers to initiate and participate in development projects.. It is suggested that in

- future, settlers consider electing a person who has a rural attachment so that he or she can be an instrument in initiating rural development projects.
546. The rapid sub-division of land has also been due to the polygamous family system and the African inheritance system, which calls for sub-division of land among married sons. This as observed during the findings leads to a rapid land fragmentation. The researcher established that land division can only pose a problem where there is lack of know-how on the application of modern farming methods. And in a situation where the family is bound by the customary system of land inheritance, it would be advisable to sub-divide land among sons to ease quarrels but this should only occur where loans have been cleared.
547. However, the study has shown that due to common hardships in the scheme, settlers were evolving strategies of adapting to life. These strategies for adaptation include the formation of village or location based organizations in the place of ethnic based ones to cater for the needs of the larger society. It has been indicated that settlers are diversifying their crop production to include other crops such as millet, sorghum and potatoes. The purpose of this diversification is to move away from their concentration on maize growing, dairy farming and to horticultural agriculture.
548. However, as pointed out, the poor settlement policy, political interference and lack of supporting structures also hampered this redefinition. The researcher recommends that the government should enact laws to regulate the standards acceptable in terms of maize seeds, fertilizers, farm chemicals and pesticides. This is necessary because the unscrupulous traders have infiltrated the agri-business sector with low quality products

and thereby exploiting the farmers. The researcher also recommends that crucial services such as veterinary (AI and Dipping) be carried out by government and only liberalized gradually when all arrangements are properly in place to run them. This also is applicable to agricultural extension services, which if liberalized will greatly deny the poor peasants a chance to improve their agriculture as they will not afford to pay for the services. Liberalization may widen the level of differentiation between the rich and the poor peasants unless controlled. The state should ensure that these services are only liberalized when peasants are in a position to stand on their own.

549. It is also recommended that the government should ensure that a number of public utilities such as land for schools, markets, cattle dip among others taken illegally by some settlers are repossessed and handed over to public. Therefore, in sum, the theories identified to guide the research were also quite relevant to the process of socio-economic change in Ainabkoi division. It can be argued that even if the settlers had been wishing to re-define their situation, conditions in the scheme were out of their control and attempts to keep contacts with natal homes of origin were an important adaptive strategy that may have prevented mass desertions and as such, it was an aspect of re-definition of the situation they had found prevailing.

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APPENDICES

LIST OF RESPONDENTS

667.	MEMBERS	EAST BLOCK	DATE
668.	Kibet Tireito	”	
	10/08/09		
669.	Jeremia Kitony	”	
	10/08/09		
670.	Joshua Kiptui	”	
	10/08/09		
671.	Joel Chelashaw	”	
	10/08/09		
672.	Benjamin Kiptoo	”	
	10/08/09		
673.	Ziporah Chemweno	”	
	12/08/09		
674.	Isaac Cheruiyot	”	
	12/08/09		
675.	Micah Kurui	”	
	12/08/09		
676.	Kiplimo Bwalei	”	
	12/08/09		
677.	Miriam Bett	”	
	12/08/09		

678. Catherine Chesire ”
12/08/09
679. Stepen Mulwo ”
12/08/09
680. Bathaniel Chepkeres ”
16/08/09
681. Benjamin Amkei ”
16/08/09
682. Eunice Too ”
16/08/09
683. Elin Kale ”
16/08/09
684. Constantine Chesire ”
16/08/09
685. Sowl Chirchir ”
16/08/09
686. Francis Sitim ”
16/08/09
687. Peter Kosilbet ”
16/08/09
688. Job Chepkieny ”
16/08/09

689. Joshua Kiptui ”
18/08/09
690. Lina Tebenewa ”
18/08/09
691. Lucy Kosgey ”
18/08/09
692. Susan Rono ”
18/08/09
693. Saline Tigogo ”
18/08/09
694. Luka Chemutai ”
18/08/09
695. Joseph Bett ”
18/08/09
696. Hilar Koech ”
18/08/09
697. Valentine Bomer ”
18/08/09
698. Teresa Rotich ”
18/08/09
- 699.
700. **WEST BLOCK**

- | | | |
|------|------------------|---|
| 701. | Kimutai Kiming | ” |
| | 22/08/09 | |
| 702. | Stephen Chepyego | ” |
| | 22/08/09 | |
| 703. | Joseph Yatich | ” |
| | 22/08/09 | |
| 704. | Barkeben Tanui | ” |
| | 22/08/09 | |
| 705. | Kabilo Kimurgei | ” |
| | 22/08/09 | |
| 706. | Julius Kigen | ” |
| | 25/08/09 | |
| 707. | Elizabeth Ruto | ” |
| | 25/08/09 | |
| 708. | Talai Kipkoech | ” |
| | 25/08/09 | |
| 709. | Stephen Tanui | ” |
| | 25/08/09 | |
| 710. | David Chemelil | ” |
| | 30/08/09 | |
| 711. | Philip Serem | ” |
| | 30/08/09 | |

712.	Solomon Koimur	”	
	30/08/09		
713.	Barnaba Bachot	”	
	30/08/09		
714.	Antiny Chepkoya	”	
	30/08/09		
715.	Joyce Cherubet	”	
	30/08/09		
716.	Kabon Serem	”	2/09/09
717.	Willy Rono	”	2/09/09
718.	Peter Buinet	”	2/09/09
719.			
720. NORTH TIMBOROA BLOCK			
721.	Jane Musik	”	8/09/09
722.	Samwel Ndirangu	”	8/09/09
723.	Kimiso Kiplagat	”	8/09/09
724.	Clement Bett	”	
	12/09/09		
725.	Daudi Kiprotich	”	
	12/09/09		
726.	Joel Leitich	”	
	12/09/09		

727.	Abraham Kiprotich	”
	12/09/09	
728.	Nancy Chebon	”
	20/09/09	
729.	Lucy Kiritu	”
	20/09/09	
730.	Musa Kiplagat	”
	20/09/09	
731.	Leah Biwott	”
	25/09/09	
732.	Kadija Ramji	”
	25/09/09	
733.	Lina Kegen	”
	25/09/09	
734.	Kennedy Bungei	”
	28/09/09	
735.	Pius Kigen	”
	28/09/09	
736.	William Rop	”
	28/09/09	
737.	Samsa Sagat	”
	28/09/09	

738. Wambui Njenga ”

02/10/09

739. Waitatu Ndirangu ”

02/10/09

740. Aligisia Makaya ”

02/10/09

741. NORTH BLOCK

742. Rael Barmoiben ” 15/10/09

743. Kimutai Kurui ” 26/10/09

744. Kiprono Kiplagat ” 03/11/09

745. Kipruto Maina ” 10/11/09

746.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR AINABKOI SCHEME SETTLERS

747. 1. (a) Informant's Name.....
748. (b) Informant's Age.....
749. (b) Informant's Sex.....
750. 2. (a) Who owns this plot?.....
751. (b) Who manages this plot?.....
752. (c) When did you acquire this plot?
.....
753. (d) Where was your original/ancestral home?.....
754. 3. (a) Did you own any piece of land there?.....
755. (b) What do you produce on this farm?.....
756. (c) How many acres of each?.....
757. (d) Which produce do you find most profitable?.....
758. 4. (a) Are you a member of any social organization?.....

759. If yes then which one?.....

760. (b) What Services are rendered by this organization?.....

761.
.....

762.
.....

763. (c) Has this organization been useful to you?.....

764.
.....

765.
.....

766. (d) Are these organizations clan/lineage based?

767. If yes, explain

768.
.....

769.
.....

770. (e) If not, which form do they take?.....

771.
.....

772.
.....

773. 5. (a) In your pre-settlement area did you plant your crops using fertilizers?

774.
.....

775. (b) If your answer in 5a (above) is yes which fertilizers did you use?
(Tick one)

776. (i) Organic manure

777. (ii) Inorganic fertilizers

778. (c). Do you use fertilizers in this settlement?

779. Yes [] No []

780. 6. Have you realized any changes since you came to the scheme or you were better off before settling here?.....

781. 7. Since you came to this scheme where have you been acquiring money to develop the farm?

782. (a) The company

783. (b) The Co-operative

784. (c) Government

785. (d) Bank

786. (e) Others

specify.....

787.

788. 8. From any of the above under what conditions do you obtain the loan?

789.

.

790.

..

791. 9. Briefly, explain how you have been spending the money.....

792.

.....

793.

.....

794.

.....

795. 11. How do you repay the loan?.....

796.

.....

797.

....

798.

....

799. 10. What problems do you experience while repaying the loan?

.....

800.

.....

801.

.....

802. If any, explain

.....

803.

.....

804.

.....

805. 12. What has been the role of company (Co-operative Society) in facilitating
loaning system in the scheme?

.....

806.

.

807. 13. Can you explain or narrate the transformation you have undergone since you settled in this scheme.....

808.
.....

809. (Probe further whether such transformation has had an impact on the farmer or not).

810. 14. How has the elected leaders been instrumental in helping to initiate development projects in this scheme?

811.
.....

812. 15. Which projects in particular have they initiated?

813. (a) Schools

814. (b) Health centres

815. (c) Community development projects (specify).

816. 16. What role does the community play in ensuring that such projects become operative?

817.
.....

818. 17. Which type of cattle did you keep in the pre-settlement area?

819.
.....

820.
.....

821. 18. What type of cows do you keep in this settlement?

822.
.....

823.
.....

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