THE LEGACY OF COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME IN NANDI COUNTY, KENYA, 1954 - 1992

BY

SAMOEI BASILIANO

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DECLARATION

Declaration by the candidate

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SAMOEI KIRWA BASILIANO

SASS/DPHIL/HIS/01/2012

Declaration by the supervisors

This thesis has been presented with our approval as the university supervisors

Sign:________________________________ Date:____________________________

DR PAUL ABIERO OPONDO

Department of history, political science and public administration,

Moi University

Sign:________________________________ Date: 24-11-2025

AMB DR PAUL KIBIWOT KURGAT

Department of history, political science and public administration,

Moi University

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my dear wife, children, fellow historians, and all lovers of knowledge who will find this document monumental to their search for knowledge.

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ABSTRACT

There is evidence of many ambitious Agricultural projects that were established by the colonial government that begun on a sound footing but ended without attaining the intended objectives. The Ndalat Settlement Scheme is one such project. Much as the colonial government had ambitious objectives of transforming agricultural production among the African farmers at its inception, years of political and economic disconnect between the post-independence government and the farmers led to its under performance and subsequent closure. The genesis of the Scheme can be traced back to the African Land Development (ALDEV) of 1947 which sought to tackle emerging issues on land usage crisis. It was followed by the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 which focused on land consolidation and land use intensification. Furthermore, the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) schemes were later established with the aim of integrating Africans into the capitalist economy. As much as at the beginning the Scheme managed to attain a level of economic and social benefits on the people of Ndalat such as development of Cereals and Produce Board which marketed produce, introduction of exotic breeds of animals, construction of schools and health centres, the long-term attainment of the transformation that was intended was compromised by the colonial legacy of governmentality. As a result, the commercialization of smallholder farming systems failed to achieve the desired objectives as farmers went back to the production at subsistence levels. This was escalated during the period of SAPS as from 1980 through to 1992 where prices were compromised as a result of the introduction of free market economy that led to collapse of major agencies that supported the farming enterprise. Therefore, the study traced the historical trajectory of the scheme right from its establishment in the early years of independence to 1992 when it was wound up. The study was guided by four objectives namely: To trace the origins and roots of the Colonial Settlement policy, 1954-1962, Explore the establishment of the Ndalat Settlement scheme in the early years of independence, 1963-1970; discuss the social, political and economic influence of the Colonial Agricultural policy on Ndalat Settlement Scheme, 1970-1980 and to analyse the influence of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) on the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, 1980-1992. The study was founded on interpretivist philosophy and was underpinned by the commercialization and articulation theories which was based on the interpretation of lived experiences of the people coupled with relating them with how the government attempted to commercialize and transform farming but with time failed to do so as intended. The study adopted a historical descriptive design with a sample size of 38 informants aged between 60 and 97 years who were conveniently sampled from among. Interview schedule was the main instrument complimented by documentary review of journal articles, books, archival and government policy documents. The data was transcribed before being subjected to content analysis and presented in thematic and narrative formats. The study traced the roots of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme to the Swinerton Plan of 1954 which was crafted with the intention of quelling rising tensions among Africans on land issues. The study also established that after independence, the ambitious program of the scheme was gradually a host of challenges which by 1992, after the inception of the SAPS (Structural Adjustment Programs), rendered the scheme defunct. Based on the findings, the study recommends that Agricultural policies crafted by the government should be sustainable and this can only be done through ensuring that the objectives that guide the formation of these programs are followed and the challenges arising are countered. At the same time, the study recommends that there should be a discernible nexus between the plans by the political class and the masses so that they are fully embraced and sustained.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AI	Artificial insemination
ALDEV	African Land Development Board
ALUS	African Land Utilization Scheme
EAC	Eastern Africa Community
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
HD	High Density
ILO	International Labour Organisation
JKL	Jomo Kenyatta Library
KCC	Kenya cooperative creameries
KDP	Kenya Dairy Board
KNLP	Kenya’s National Land Policy
KNLS	Kenya National Library Services
LD	Low Density
LDSB	Land Development and Settlement Board
MCC	Milk collection centres
MCCs	Milk Collection Centres
MTL	Margaret Thatcher Library
NSS	Ndalat Settlement Scheme
RVP	Rift Valley Province
SDP	Smallholder Dairy Project
UEAB	University of Eastern African Baraton
UON	University of Nairobi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Background of the Study

The chapter presents the information that grounds the thesis. It specifically presents the rationale that led to the establishment of the scheme by the colonial government. It also demonstrates the nexus between the governmentality as espoused by Houlcout and the disconnect with the plans for the masses. The chapter also presents the statement of the problem as well as the objectives and the research questions. Besides, it outlines the justifications, methodology, literature review as well as the theoretical framework that guided the study and finishes by exposing the gap in knowledge that this study sought to fill.

Since its inception, the Ndalat Settlement scheme, which was in the then Nandi District (that was changed after the 2010 constitution to Nandi county), is a mirror reflection of the settlement schemes in Kenya initiated in 1962 by the colonial regime and supported by the independence leadership in Kenya. According to Abongo (2015), the objectives of establishing settlement schemes by the Kenyan government were threefold namely: to quell hunger, to promote political stability and to enhance agricultural productivity. However, each scheme was contextually different in terms of geography, political interests and historical dynamics. For example, In Naitiri Settlement Scheme in Western region, Chweya (1990) avers that the aim was to reduce the crowded Luhya population while in Mwea, Muchoki (2012) avers that it was aimed at fostering commercially intensive large scale rice farming. Ndalat Settlement Scheme was located in the current Ndalat location, Mosop sub-county in Nandi County. It was based on a mixed (maize and dairy) farming enterprises though some farmers grew small amount of millet or vegetables for their own consumption.

According to Bedasso (2012), the post-independence history of Kenya is characterized by an unusual mix of stability and fragility. He avers that the robust growth and performance of the first decade after independence was generated by small holder agriculture, while most of the rent was transferred to the elite via patronage. As years went by, political instability came about as a result of the dwindling resources and elite fragmentation. In fact, Bedasso (2012) further argues that land has always been used by the elites as leverage to manipulate the political structures.

The Ndalat Settlement Scheme, just like other schemes that were established by the government at independence mirror Michael Foucault (1982)'s notion of governmentality. According to the idea, governmental structures and practices shape the behaviour of the population over time. As a result, contemporary governance is increasingly characterized by market-driven principles that prioritize individual economic agency while fostering social inequality as a natural outcome. The government coined the idea of Settlement schemes for the sake of controlling the population which was so much anxious about how land issues would be handled as the white men exited and abandoned land. At the time of establishment, Ndalat settlement schemes was made up of three large - scale settler farms covering a total area of 5,900 acres of land which were sub-divided into 306 small scale farms and by June 1966, it covered 11,216 acres comprising 515 small - scale farms and 16 medium- to large-scale farms as Ndalat Complex Scheme. Each settler was expected to earn an annual cash income of £25 to £40 from an average farm size of 19 acres which was considerably smaller than the average farm size on all high-density schemes which had a median farm size of about 26 acres.

As has already been argued, the idea of post-reconstruction of Kenya was coined through the Michael Foucault's lens. Eager to control the masses after the Mau Mau uprising, the government came up with the Swinerton Plan. Officially, the Swynnerton Plan articulated a comprehensive vision for African agricultural advancement. Its core components included: (1) the consolidation of fragmented landholdings into viable family units; (2) the introduction of individual freehold tenure through adjudication and registration; (3) the promotion of high-value cash crops such as coffee, tea, and pyrethrum; and (4) the expansion of credit facilities, extension services, and cooperative societies.

In coming up with this plan, the Colonial officials argued that customary or communal land tenure discouraged investment and productivity. By securing land titles, they believed African farmers would be incentivized to adopt soil conservation measures such as terracing, tree planting, and contour farming and invest in long-term improvements. Moreover, integrating African producers into export markets would stimulate rural accumulation and reduce dependence on wage labour in settler farms, a key objective of postwar colonial economic restructuring.

Empirical evidence suggests partial success. Between 1955 and 1964, African agricultural output reportedly tripled and cooperative societies—particularly in coffee-producing regions enabled smallholders to bypass settler-dominated marketing channels and access credit. These institutions became enduring features of Kenya's rural economy, influencing post-independence agricultural policy and rural finance systems. In this light, the Swynnerton Plan appears as a catalyst for the commercialization of African agriculture and the emergence of a smallholder capitalist class.

However, in line with Foulcault's (1982) postulation, the plan's developmental rhetoric masked its primary function as an instrument of political control. Access to land consolidation, credit, and technical support was not distributed equitably or based on agronomic need, but was explicitly tied to political loyalty. As Anderson observes, "the distribution of land and credit under the Swynnerton Plan became a mechanism for rewarding collaborators and punishing those suspected of Mau Mau sympathies." Suspected insurgents or their families were systematically excluded from resettlement schemes or forcibly relocated to marginal, less fertile regions—effectively dispossessing them under the guise of "development". Conversely, loyalists—often local chiefs, headmen, or those who provided intelligence to colonial forces—were prioritized for land allocation and support, creating a class of African intermediaries whose economic interests aligned with colonial rule. This strategy succeeded in fragmenting Mau Mau's rural base but deepened internal divisions within African communities, sowing seeds of mistrust that outlasted colonialism.

The 1954 Land Registration Act, enacted alongside the plan, institutionalized these divisions by converting communal land into individual titles. Yet implementation was deeply gendered and hierarchical: only male heads of households were recognized as legitimate landowners, while women, youth, and landless labourers were erased from ownership records. Colonial administrators, operating through patriarchal interpretations of "custom," effectively dispossessed women who had long been primary cultivators of food crops. Thus, the plan did not democratize land access; it reconfigured inequality along lines of gender, class, and political allegiance.

The Swynnerton Plan also exhibited pronounced regional bias. Its design was tailored almost exclusively to the densely populated, high-potential regions of Central and Western Kenya, areas already under intense pressure from land fragmentation. By contrast, arid and semi-arid regions inhabited by pastoralist communities such as the Maasai, Samburu, and Somali were largely neglected, despite official claims that over 30% of plan funding was allocated to “semi-arid/pastoral areas”. In practice, these funds were rarely translated into meaningful infrastructure, extension services, or pastoral support programs. For example, Muhia (1977) argued that the black settlers who inherited land in South Kinangop Settlement Scheme suffered the challenge of loan repayments which in many cases, they were unable to repay. This almost rendered them ‘squatters in their own land’. The failure of the government to contextualize the issue of establishing these schemes led to a unexpected negative economic consequences. The disconnect between the political economy and the masses is one characteristic which, as Bedasso (2012) posits, the independence government inherited from the colonial government.

1.1.1 The Pre-independence (LDSB) Period (1961 to 1963)



Figure 1: The pioneering settlement schemes that had been initiated by the LDSB and were operational by 1964

Figure 1 shows highlight the pioneering settlement schemes that had been initiated by the LDSB and were operational by 1964. The size of each smallholding varied according to the scheme (high or low density), and on the ability of the soil fertility and cropping patterns to achieve the target incomes. The schemes were structured along tribal lines and specific economic objective, for instance, the Nandi community were settled in Ndalat designed for mixed farming production while Lessos and Keben designed for tea, maize and dairy production. Other cases include Kibigori

(Luo/Maize), Muhoroni and Tamu (Luo/Sugar, Maize and Milk), Kipkaren (Abaluhya/ Maize), Lugari (Maragoli-Bunyore/Sisal and Maize), West Sotik (Kipsigis-Kisii/Maize and Cream), East Sotik (Kipsigis/Cream, Maize and Coffee), Ol – Kalou (Kikuyu/ Dairy, Wool, Pyrethrum and Wheat), Machakos (Kamba/cream onions, beef cattle and peas) to mention a few

With regards to these settlement plans, Leys (1975)stated that a system of political patronage and stratification was inherited by the government and perpetuated. This system entailed the ruling elites (bourgeoisie) coming up with plans that were not well thought out. These plans later on became failures after heavy investment. Critics argue that the LDSB underestimated the complexity of transitioning from communal or tenancy-based systems to individualized, market-oriented farming without adequate preparation or investment. The lack of processing facilities, storage infrastructure, and reliable transportation further hindered value addition and reduced farmers' bargaining power. Furthermore, the board's reliance on external donor funding, primarily from Britain created structural vulnerabilities. When aid fluctuated, so too did the pace and quality of resettlement, leading to inconsistent implementation and long-term financial instability. Internal inefficiencies, corruption, and overlapping mandates with other agencies further hampered performance.

The LDSB's top-down planning approach also led to significant environmental and cultural disruptions. The rapid conversion of rangelands and forests into farmland contributed to soil erosion, deforestation, and biodiversity loss, particularly in ecologically sensitive zones like the Aberdares and Mau Forest complex (Kariuki 2000). Irrigation projects, while intended to boost yields, sometimes resulted in salinization and groundwater depletion, undermining long-term sustainability. Equally damaging was the disregard for indigenous land tenure systems. In some cases, pastoralist communities such as the Maasai and Samburu were displaced to make way for sedentary agricultural settlements, leading to inter-ethnic conflict and ecological imbalance. The imposition of individual titles and fencing requirements disrupted traditional grazing patterns and collective resource management, eroding centuries-old systems of communal stewardship.

The Ndalat, Settlement Scheme was therefore a product of the wider Political Economy that dominated the post independence Kenya. The plans to establish an intensive settlement scheme was driven by governmentality as encapsulated by Foucault (1982). Because of the independence crave, there was need to control the masses through the establishment of such schemes so as to prevent disorder. However, the challenge was with the hurried establishment and the subsequent bottlenecks that ended up facing the scheme ranging from inability of the farmers to repay their loans, lack of Extension services as well as dwindling market for their produce caused by the Structural Adjustment Programs. The political economy of Kenya, which was characterized by elitism, failed to keep the Ndalat Settlement Scheme productive as intended. Therefore, this study examines the economic policies that were handed over by the colonial government to the independent government on agricultural production and how these policies influenced economic transformation of Ndalat Settlement Scheme and the local, national and international challenges that the scheme experienced that led to its closure.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Settlement Schemes were established during the tail-end of the colonial era in mid 1950's. This continued after independence whereby the plans were inherited and pursued by the newly independent government. The original intentions of the Settlement Schemes were geared towards the resettlement of landless Africans as well as fostering intensive commercial farming in the respective places that they were established. In Kenya, there were about 22 settlement Schemes in six out of seven regions. Each scheme had its own context and background. For example, in Mwea, a study by Muchoki (2012) revealed that the scheme was based on commercialization of rice plantation with the aim of socio-economic transformation of the people. In Njoro, Mwangi (1978) analysed six settlement schemes and arrived at the conclusion that those schemes that were established by the government out performed those that were funded by private individuals. Another study by Ndegwa (1977) which also examined schemes in Nakuru concluded that there were disparities between those schemes that were established in high density areas with those in low density areas. Those in high density areas were given full support by the government while those in low density areas received less support and as a result, failed to attain the objectives of their establishment. Similarly, Wafula (1987) examined the economic impact of the Nzoia Scheme in Kakamega. He observed that the scheme only succeeded in providing land to the people. However, the author avers that the scheme failed to enhance income generation and genuine economic transformation because of dwindling support from the government in terms of Extension services as well as failure to regulate markets coupled with the Structural Adjustment policies in the early 1990's.

As much as most of these studies provide valuable information on the intrigues that faced Settlement schemes, they do not link these events to the concept of governmentality and political economy. As will be argued, it is these two approaches that created a colonial legacy that impacted on the plans on many of these settlement schemes. Being one of the high-density schemes in the rift valley, Ndalat Settlement scheme experienced a period of productivity but later decline and finally closure. This study therefore demonstrated how the ambitious plans by the colonial and post-independence governments in the Ndalat Settlement scheme were products of governmentality and the political economy which failed to sustainably transform agricultural production as a result of the government's failure to constantly and consistently align itself to the objectives that guided its establishment.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General objective

The general objective of the study was to examine the impact of the colonial agricultural policy on the social and economic transformation of Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County from 1954 - 1992.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

This study was guided by the following specific objectives;

1. To trace the origins and foundations of the Colonial Settlement Policy in Kenya from 1954 to 1961
2. To explore the establishment of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in the early years of independence, 1963 to 1970
3. To discuss the social, political and economic influence of the colonial Agricultural policy on the Ndalat Settlement scheme, 1970 to 1985
4. To analyse the influence of the SAPS (Structural Adjustment Policies) on the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, 1985 to 1992

1.4 Research Questions

1. What were the origins and foundations of the Colonial Settlement Policy in Kenya from 1954 to 1961?

2. In which ways was the establishment of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in the early years of independence, 1963 to 1970 done?
3. What were the social, political and economic influence of the colonial Agricultural policy on the Ndalat Settlement scheme, 1970 to 1985?
4. How did the SAPS (Structural Adjustment Policies) on the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, 1985 to 1992 influence the Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

1.5 Justification of the Study

The study helps crystallize and contextualize historical land issues and provide a comprehensive perspective and understanding of colonial settlement and agricultural policies. This should aid the policy and law makers, to appreciate the flaws of the past land tenure laws, and policies and as such, seek to provide remedial measures to address the mistakes made by past policies.

The study benefits several groups of people and sectors. These include: economic historians, policy makers and law makers as well as the county government's department of Agriculture and cooperative development. The economic historians should be able to trace the nexus between colonial policies and post-independence history.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study gives a historical perspective of the social- economic transformation that occurred in the Ndalat settlement scheme in Nandi County by evaluating the agricultural development that took place in the scheme. Maize and dairy farming are major sources of income among the Nandi people, the study therefore helps in analysing how it has impacted people's lives in Nandi County. The study further seeks to propose viable mitigations towards these objectives.

Given that Ndalat Settlement Scheme is one among the many settlement schemes in the country; its success is paramount to the core development of the country in that the land intensification systems can be applied to solve the challenges of land fragmentation. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the study proposes solutions about the colonial legacy and measures to shed light on the historical occurrences in the Nandi County and therefore be added to the academic field for further research and future reference for systematic academic work.

1.7 Scope of the Study

The study was situated in Ndalat Settlement scheme and the settlers in Nandi County since 1954. The study covers the social and economic influence of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in relation to the history of land settlement in the pre – independent Kenya. The study used purposive sampling to draw out data from a representative sample from which inferences were drawn from. Thus, the findings hold to the extent to which the informants provided insightful information to the study.

1.8 Limitation of the Study

Several limitations were encountered in the course of the study. The first limitation was related to access of the relevant records. Some of the most critical records touching on the Ndalat Settlement scheme have been poorly kept by the Agricultural department of Nandi County. This became a limitation because critical information was hard to access. However, this limitation was countered through employing several other approaches in accessing information such as Key Informants as well as archival data. Secondly, there was the limitation of getting the Key Informants who were critical for the study. A majority of them are very old and not in a position to eloquently express themselves. However, this was addressed by research assistants who understand them. At the same time, those who were capable of remembering events assisted in complimenting information given by those who could not vividly express the information. Besides, the questions were guided in order to elicit specific information from the informants, hence minimizing chances of wrong elicitation of information. Lastly, there were time constraints. Some of the informants have since migrated to other areas and as such, the researcher was faced with the challenge of time in accessing the informants. However, this was addressed by employing research assistants who were situated or could easily access the informants from the places they reside. The researcher took a lot of caution to ensure that the limitations do not negatively influence the research outcome.

1.9 Literature Review

As independence was beaconing, it became apparent that the most contentious issue facing the country-land-be addressed by the colonial government. According to Nzomo, (1995) the settlement policy at the pre-independent was a continuation of land reforms that started with the African Land Development Organization (ALDEV) policy (Nzomo, 1995) followed by Swynnerton Plan of 1954 and the LDSB schemes which proceeded with certain structural defects and collapsed in 1962 (Leo, 1978). This land settlement programme projected an externally orientated economy imposed upon the local populace and was founded on the urgent necessity to solve landlessness and was fused with the challenges of financing and administering the transfer of the mixed–farm areas in the scheduled are without damaging the general fabric of the colonial economy. This economic proposition combining land transfer with an initiative for intensifying agricultural activities in smallholder land parcels in the selected parts of the highlands. It is important to note that the highlands were initially a preserve of the whites and this was made so through a series of Colonial Land policies that had been enacted since the onset of colonial administration. As such, it is critical to note that Africans wanted the changeover in administration be accompanied by land reform.

That being the case, the specific hallmarks of the colonial agricultural policy as highlighted by the previous land reforms programmes (ALDEV and Swynnerton Plan) were largely related to the economic instability brought about by the regulatory and administrative policies. For instance, the economic depression of the 1930s forced the colonial government to adopt the dual policy that promoted African peasant production to finance the bureaucracy and subsidize settler agriculture (Throup, 1985). The twin agrarian system during the Second World War in the late 1940s saw the emergence of the peasant production sector as a parallel and important production system (Maxon, 1992) Other significant challenges are the failure of the farmer organizations and their substitution with marketing and regulatory boards which consequently affected the prices of farm produce (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). For instance, the collapse of the world market for dairy products saw the establishment of the Kenya Dairy Board in 1959. Further, in 1965 the substitution of the maize marketing board with the maize control board was as a result of the drought and famine (Leys, 1975).

Therefore, in investigating the social and economic influence of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County from 1954 to 1992, the study interrogates how land transfer at pre-independence era compromised the realization of the intended social and economic benefits of the settlement schemes established as a basis of African empowerment in independent Kenya. The outcome of this land policy was the preservation of the privileged position of settler farming systems, the perpetuation of transitive capitalist elements and the creation of a social class eagerly embraced by the independent Kenyan government but not solving the problems of landless and the accompanying rural poverty.

1.9.1 Dynamics of Colonial Settlement Policy in Independent Kenya

As much as the resettlement of Africans into the former “scheduled areas” of Kenya constituted one of the most transformative agrarian interventions in postcolonial Africa, this was purely an approach that followed Foucaul’s (1982) governmentality approach. The decision was mainly driven by the need of the colonial government to control the population which was eager to experience the changeover not just politically but also economically. Therefore, the government crafted these ideas purely with this in mind. Nevertheless, the policy was crafted in such a manner that it looks like it put people at the centre stage. This explains why during this period, spanning the final phase of British colonial rule and the first five years of independence, was marked by a deliberate, state-driven project to reconfigure land ownership, agricultural production, and social relations. Far from being a neutral technical exercise, this resettlement was a deeply political manoeuvre designed to manage the volatile transition to independence, appease nationalist demands for land restitution, and preserve the economic viability of Kenya’s export-oriented agricultural sector. Drawing on critical scholarship from historians, anthropologists, economists, and policy analysts including (Segal, 1968; ,Harbeson, 1967;;Coldham, 1982 ;Harbeson,1967& Peters, 2007)among others who provided a comprehensive, chronologically structured analysis of the resettlement process, its policy foundations, its implementation challenges, and its lasting socio-economic effects on the African population.

The origins of Kenya’s postcolonial land reform lie not in the euphoria of independence but in the state of emergency declared in 1952 in response to the Mau uprising. The colonial state's initial response was military repression, but it soon recognized that lasting pacification required economic and social re-engineering. This insight gave rise to the Swynnerton Plan of 1954, officially titled "A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya." Ostensibly an agricultural development strategy, the plan was, as Harbeson (1967) argues, a calculated political instrument designed to reward loyalists and create a conservative, propertied rural middle class immune to militant nationalism. By consolidating fragmented customary holdings in Kikuyu reserves and issuing individual freehold titles, the state sought to foster a politically acquiescent peasantry whose interests would lie in private accumulation rather than collective resistance.

Barber (1970) provides a critical economic assessment of this consolidation process. While the Swynnerton Plan envisioned "balanced mixed farming" with livestock and cash crops, Barber demonstrates that over half of the newly consolidated holdings in Nyeri and Kiambu fell below the four-acre threshold deemed necessary for such a system. Consequently, many families were forced into monocropped maize and bean cultivation, undermining the very productivity gains the plan promised. More damningly, Barber noted that planners explicitly anticipated the emergence of a landless class, viewing land markets and tenancy as a "normal step in the evolution of a country". Thus, from its inception, land reform embedded structural inequality within its institutional architecture.

The Swynnerton Plan laid the administrative and ideological groundwork for the larger-scale transfer of land from European to African ownership, but it was the Lancaster House Conference of 1960 that accelerated the process. As Kenya moved toward independence, the colonial state and moderate African nationalists faced a dual crisis: European settlers feared expropriation under African rule, while landless

Africans especially Kikuyu squatters demanded the return of alienated lands. The solution was the creation of the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) in 1961 and the launch of the Million Acre Scheme in 1963. As Segal (1968) observed that this was introduced as a "bold and costly endeavour to change the occupation of farm holdings from one ethnic group to another," reflecting the centrality of land to the postcolonial political process.

The implementation of the scheme was structured around a tripartite model: high-density schemes for the landless and unemployed; low-density peasant schemes for experienced farmers; and Yeoman/Assisted Owner schemes for wealthier African entrepreneurs. This model reflected a dual-track logic. On one hand, high-density schemes served as a political safety valve, resettling potentially restive populations on marginal land like the frost-prone Kinangop plateau. On the other, low-density and Yeoman schemes were designed to integrate an African commercial farming elite into the capitalist economy, thereby preserving the export-oriented structure of the agricultural sector (Kenya National Archives (KNA). Finance for the Land & Agricultural Bank of Kenya. Memorandum to the Secretary of State. Nairobi, n.d.)

A critical insight from Leo (1978) is that this model was not merely biased but systematically disadvantageous to its most vulnerable beneficiaries. High-density settlers were allocated inferior land, faced inflated purchase prices, and received inadequate extension services. Despite these handicaps, Leo's data reveal a counterintuitive outcome:"non-progressive" high-density farmers achieved comparable or even superior returns per acre to their low-density counterparts, driven by an intense personal motivation born of decades of dispossession. This finding directly challenges the "progressive farmer" dogma that underpinned much of the planning and highlights the critical role of human agency in development.

Wasserman (1973) offers a radical reinterpretation of this entire process, framing it not as decolonization but as "continuity and counter-insurgency." He argues that land reform was less about redistributing stolen land and more about stabilizing a fragile regime by co-opting nationalist leaders and preserving colonial economic structures. The early phase of the Million Acre Scheme, particularly the "Jet Schemes" of late 1963, was characterized by political urgency rather than technical planning, with officials rushing to allocate land before independence to "take the lid off the boiling kettle" of land hunger. Technical advice was ignored; previously rejected land was declared suitable on political grounds alone.

This practice did little to foster national integration and much to entrench ethnic territoriality in the new state. Moreover, the LDSB's internal documents reveal a profound tension between political and economic priorities. While the state poured funds into resettlement, it diverted capital from the Land and Agricultural Bank, which was meant to support commercial agriculture in non-settlement areas (Kenya National Archives, n.d.). This misallocation threatened the very economic base the reform was meant to preserve. After independence in 1963, the focus of land policy shifted from crisis management to institutional consolidation. The Kenya Development Plan 1966–70 formalized a development strategy that prioritized economic participation over direct social change, asserting that "economic opportunities are sufficient in themselves to bring about" social progress (Harbeson, 1967). This technocratic vision assumed a linear progression from economic opportunity to social transformation, but on the ground, settlers faced significant structural barriers that undermined this logic.

Economically, settlers encountered bottlenecks in marketing and production. Despite exceeding pyrethrum quotas and milk contracts on schemes like Kinangop, they could not fully benefit due to insufficient drying, canning, or refrigeration facilities. Complex and opaque pricing systems bred distrust, leading many to sell to private traders even at lower prices for immediate payment and transparency (Harbeson, 1967). Production was further hampered by shortages of tractor services and poor road infrastructure, causing delays in planting and harvesting that eroded profits. Administratively, the state prioritized loan repayment over settler welfare. Freehold titles were withheld until debts were cleared, creating a new form of tenure insecurity under African rule (Harbeson, 1967). Funds that could have been reinvested in water reticulation or machinery were instead funnelled into debt servicing, placing a "temporary ceiling on further economic assistance". Socially, there was a "hiatus" between state objectives and settler needs. Cooperatives, the primary vehicle for rural development were poorly understood, leading to embezzlement, weak leadership, and alienation (Harbeson, 1967). Settlers viewed them as no better than middlemen, undermining collective action.

The agrarian change is not a linear process but a dynamic field of power struggles over resources, identity, and legitimacy. In Kenya, this dynamism was evident in the tensions between settlers trying to expand into large-scale commerce, those seeking modest holdings, and marginal peasants being forced to sell land (Harbeson, 1967). By the late 1960s, stark divergences emerged between different types of resettlement. Government-planned Department of Settlement schemes, with their infrastructure, layout plans, and extension support, generally maintained or even increased productivity (Ndegwa, 1977). In contrast, land-buying companies and co-operatives, lacking state oversight, suffered from chaotic subdivision, land tenure insecurity, and the sale of shared machinery, which crippled agricultural viability. A study done by Mwangi, (1987) of Njoro Location illustrates how the unregulated influx of shareholders, 1,135 members sharing 521 acres in one company left no space for schools or service centres, forcing residents to rely on poorly developed “non-designated centres” (Mwangi, 1987).This dichotomy revealed a key failure: the state’s ability to initiate redistribution did not extend to ensuring sustainable post-settlement governance. Moreover, the reform entrenched new hierarchies. Elite capture was evident in the allocation of “Z plots” 100-acre holdings reserved for MPs, senators, and provincial commissioners whose owners often defaulted on repayments with impunity(Mwangi, 1987). Women were systematically excluded; in Githunguri, titles were overwhelmingly granted to men, extinguishing women’s customary access through kinship and rendering them vulnerable upon widowhood (Haugerud, 1989a). The very act of formalization, intended to secure rights, thus institutionalized patriarchy.

Coldham (1982) analysis of the land adjudication process reveals how the reform exacerbated rural inequality. The registration system favoured wealthier, better-educated farmers who could navigate legal procedures, while poorer and less literate settlers often lost out, resulting in a concentration of land ownership among a new elite (Coldham, 1982). The promise of a functional land market and improved access to credit also failed to materialize for most smallholders, as financial institutions favoured those with off-farm incomes. Peters (2007) extends this critique, arguing that externally imposed models of land reform fail to understand the socially embedded nature of African land systems. Her anthropological perspective reveals that rural communities were already engaged in “informal formalization,” using local contracts and ceremonies to secure transactions, suggesting that top-down titling programs were not only inefficient but often disruptive to existing social orders.

The Kenyan experience cannot be understood in isolation. As Segal (1968) and others note, the legacies of colonial land policy reverberated across the Global South. In Zimbabwe, colonial agricultural policies took the form of land alienation and the commoditization of land, culminating in the large-scale commercial farms of the 1930s (Floyd, 1962). In Sudan, the Gezira Scheme appropriated thousands of hectares from peasants and pastoralists, turning them into tenancy-based cotton producers under rigid, command-driven schedules (Bernal, 1997). In South Africa, apartheid-era policies institutionalized a super-exploitation based on simultaneous class, race, and power hierarchies (Bernal, 1997).

These examples demonstrate that the colonial construction of land as a commodity, severable from social relations, was a global project. As Bonneuil and Christophe (2006) argue, settlement schemes were part of an experimental "develop mentalist" strategy where the state sought to transform rural communities through agricultural modernization, education, and market integration. This emergent strategy characterized the developmental state, with pre-packaged schemes serving as major building blocks of a grand experiment in social engineering. The failure of the LDSB program, disbanded in 1962 due to "inherent failures in its configuration," is indicative of the ideological limits of this approach (Leo, 1978).

The resettlement of Africans into the former scheduled areas from 1954 to 1968 was a transformative yet deeply contradictory process. It succeeded as a political instrument, facilitating a relatively stable transition to independence and integrating a new class of African farmers into the commercial sector. However, its developmental legacy was mixed. The program's structural biases favored an emerging elite, while its economic model perpetuated dependency on export markets. The unintended social consequences particularly the erosion of women's rights, the creation of new inequalities, and the fragmentation of communal solidarity underscore that land reform was less about creating a new agrarian order and more about managing a complex transition within the enduring framework of a capitalist economy.

The contrasting arguments across the literature reflect a fundamental tension between state-led developmentalism and the lived realities of rural populations. While policymakers emphasized economic participation and technical solutions, scholars increasingly highlighted the need for context-sensitive, participatory reforms that recognize land as a social institution embedded in power, identity, and history. As Peters (2007) concludes, "tenure does not involve a purely technical, easily quantifiable set of issues... land is embedded within a range of socially constructed meanings, values and relationships." The Kenyan experience stands as a cautionary tale for contemporary land reform efforts across the Global South: without addressing these deeper social and political dimensions, even the most well-intentioned interventions risk reproducing the very inequalities they seek to overcome.

According to Segal (1968), land is at the heart of the political process and the policies adopted reflect the post-independence emergence of distinct national characteristics. In the case of land reform or resettlement in the former schedule areas of Kenya, the land reform and transfers were essentially an economic, political and social exercise introduced in early 1961 as a bold and costly endeavour to change the occupation of farm holdings from one ethnic group to another. The planners of this land reform and settlement programme faced the main challenge of structuring the changeover from large-scale extensive farming to small-scale peasant farming. In many cases the areas selected for resettlement were chosen to satisfy the demands of various tribes whose land units adjoined the former scheduled areas (Shaffer, 1967).

This practice did little to foster national integration and much to entrench ethnic territoriality in the new state. Moreover, the LDSB's internal documents reveal a profound tension between political and economic priorities. While the state poured funds into resettlement, it diverted capital from the Land and Agricultural Bank, which was meant to support commercial agriculture in non-settlement areas. This misallocation threatened the very economic base the reform was meant to preserve.

In a pioneering study on settlement schemes, Bonneuil and Christophe (2006) maintained that the settlement schemes were mere ideologies introduced by a scientist and advocated by the colonial authorities in an attempt to shift the balance of power between agrarian communities and the state. The colonial state sought to transform the social and environmental conditions of rural communities by introducing an experimental 'developmentalist' strategy. This emergent strategy characterizes the emerging developmental state working through agricultural 'modernization', through education, irrigation, transportation and integration of producers into the market. Ultimately, these pre-packaged settlement schemes were major building blocks of the experiment. The experimental paradigm mirrors the LDSB programme which was later disbanded in 1962 because of the inherent failures in its configuration and thus is indicative of the failures of the ideological bases for land redistribution (Leo, 1984).

The central theme in the establishment of the settlement schemes was social and economic empowerment of the landless Africans at pre-independence. Whereas, several reviews of the settlement schemes have commented on the schemes for their positive effects that included the increased intensity of land use, engines of the economic growth, a pivot land policy for agricultural productivity, these settlement schemes impacted significantly on the farmers in the independent Kenya (Due, 1970).

It is through the settlement schemes that African became owners of land holdings and formed an integral part of the capitalist economy (Leo, 1984). Based on this fact, Ndalat settlement scheme was a creation of this land policy and any drastic changes to the settlement schemes could directly linked to this land and agricultural policy. These positive impacts can be directly associated with the establishment of the Ndalat settlement scheme and its inhabitants. On the converse, the negative influences of the settlement schemes include the economic alignment to the metropole, the establishment of social stratification among the farmers which consequently translated to the peasantization and this negatively affected the agricultural production systems including farmers in Ndalat Settlement schemes.

Some 90% of the population of Kenya lives in the rural areas and depends on small-holder agriculture, for their livelihood. Their patterns of land use and land distribution varied enormously throughout the country and, in particular, the effects of the colonial agricultural and land policies continue to be significantly felt (Heyer, 1973). These agricultural systems ranged from family owned smallholdings that are indigenously farmed to highly centralized and mechanized cash crop farming(Chambers, 2013).

In India, for example, Banerjee and Iyer (2005) argues that land and agricultural laws that were enacted by the British during the colonial period continues to significantly impact agricultural productivity. The same is replicated in Pakistan where, as Wily, (2013) posits that the legacies of colonial land laws is land theft that is done through legislation. The same was replicated in the African countries under both the British, French, German and other European powers. For example, in Zimbabwe, the initial colonial agricultural policies took the form of land alienation and commoditization of land. The accumulation of fertile agricultural lands, the land ordinances, and the creation of large -scale commercial farms (Pollak, 1975).

In South Africa, evidence indicate that the apartheid-era super exploitation based upon simultaneous class/race/ power represents an ongoing primitive accumulation of capital with an uneven development (Bond & Desai, 2006). In Sudan, the colonial agricultural policy partnered with multinational capital and turned millions of acres inhabited by farmers and pastoralists into a vast irrigation project called the Gezira scheme dedicated to the production of cotton (Bernal, 1997). The whole irrigation scheme took the form of agricultural project which inscribed the colonial social relations, most particularly relations between rulers and ruled where schedules for agricultural operations were rigid and command driven to control the people of the Gezira.

Maxon (1992) further highlighted the underlying organizational configuration of the settlement schemes presented a significant challenge to the performance of the settlement schemes. The overarching framework for the settlement activities in pre-independent Kenya was that the capitalist penetration which dramatically altered the production systems which were largely filial in nature through land control, cash crop farming and specialization. This integration of settler agricultural systems into peasantry production modes left the smallholder farmers desolate and resulted in the formation of quasi-capitalist formations that effectively destroyed the self-sustaining indigenous production systems. Thus, Leo (1984) observed that the resultant agrarian system derived from the settlement scheme was in a dynamic state and rife with conflict. Some African settlers were trying their way into large–scale agricultural/commerce, others were seeking to expand their holdings into modest scales while other marginal peasants were being forced to sell off some of their lands.

The land settlement programmes were a carry-over of the peasant system of production developed in the reserves and impacted significantly on the post-independence African farmer. The high-density schemes were a compromise between the 'development' agenda and 'social relief' schemes and this peasantry systems transformed into the smallholder farming systems in the post-independence Kenya's agrarian system in concert with capitalism and alongside a flourishing bourgeoisie (Leys, 1975). Retrospectively, Ndalat Settlement scheme transformed the lives of African farmers and thus positively impact on lives of the communities living in the scheme.

1.9.2 Economic Influences of Colonial Agricultural Policy in Independent Kenya

The land settlement programmes implemented in Kenya during the early Second Decade after Independence have been subject to divergent scholarly assessments, reflecting both optimism about their developmental potential and critical scrutiny of their socio-economic outcomes. Proponents such as Odingo (1971) argue that these schemes significantly enhanced land use intensity, contributing to increased agricultural production at a time when population growth was exerting pressure on food systems (Odingo, 1971). By some accounts, the settlement programmes acted as catalysts for national economic growth, transforming approximately 1.5 million acres into productive smallholder farms within nine years while simultaneously serving the needs of the metropolitan capitalist economy (Van Arkadie, 2016). Van Arkadie (2016) mission report affirmed that without these initiatives, Kenya’s nascent economic structure might have collapsed, especially in high-density areas where employment generation was a primary objective.

The settlement schemes were launched under the “Million Acre Scheme,” funded largely through British aid and loans from the World Bank and other international donors. Between 1962 and 1971, over 1.2 million acres of former settler land were purchased by the government and redistributed to more than 35,000 African families through various models, including individual tenure, group ranches, and cooperative farms. The overarching economic objectives were threefold: first, to increase agricultural productivity by placing land in the hands of "progressive" smallholders; second, to generate foreign exchange through the expansion of cash crop production, particularly coffee, tea, and pyrethrum; and third, to create a stable rural middle class that would serve as a bulwark against socialist radicalism and rural unrest (Swainson, 1980).

Critically, the settlement program was framed within a developmentalist ideology that emphasized private property, market-oriented agriculture, and individual entrepreneurship principles that aligned closely with Western donor priorities and the capitalist orientation of Kenya's postcolonial elite. As President Jomo Kenyatta famously declared, "Land is the basis of freedom, justice, and prosperity"(Kenya, 1965). Yet this vision of prosperity was predicated on a specific model of agrarian capitalism that privileged certain social groups and regions while marginalizing others.

Kenya's settlement schemes represent one of the most ambitious and consequential rural development initiatives in postcolonial Africa. Economically, they achieved significant successes in land transfer, smallholder commercialization, and export production during their early years. However, these gains were undermined by elite capture, ecological constraints, inadequate support systems, and, ultimately, the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. Rather than fostering inclusive and sustainable development, the schemes became enmeshed in a political economy of patronage that prioritized loyalty over productivity and stability over equity.

However, this positive assessment is tempered by structural critiques that highlight the embedded inequalities and external dependencies shaping these programmes. As Ochieng and Maxon (1992)observed, the integration of indigenous African production systems into Western capitalist frameworks fundamentally disrupted pre-colonial agrarian practices, embedding colonial-era economic hierarchies into post-independence development strategies. Independent Kenya inherited a peripheral role in the global capitalist system, and the continuity of pro-metropolitan economic policies meant that smallholder agriculture in settlement schemes remained oriented toward export markets and capital flows centred in former colonial metropoles. This alignment constrained local autonomy, influencing everything from farming techniques to crop choices and ultimately limiting the economic returns available to African farmers, particularly in schemes like Ndalat where market integration came at the cost of subsistence resilience (Leo, 1987).

In the initial decade following independence, settlement schemes appeared to deliver on their economic promises. Productivity on resettled farms surged, particularly in Central Province and the Rift Valley, where access to fertile land, reliable rainfall, and proximity to markets enabled rapid adoption of cash cropping. By the late 1960s, smallholders, many of them scheme beneficiaries accounted for over 60% of Kenya's coffee and tea production. This shift not only diversified Kenya's agricultural export base but also generated significant income for rural households, enabling investment in education, housing, and consumer goods.

The economic success of these schemes was facilitated by an extensive support infrastructure. The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) provided subsidized credit, the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) offered input supply and marketing services, and agricultural extension officers disseminated technical knowledge on crop husbandry and soil conservation (Okoth-Ogendo,1991). Moreover, the consolidation of land holdings under individual tenure often replacing customary or communal systems was believed to have enhanced investment incentives by providing clear property rights, a view consistent with neoclassical economic theory.

From this perspective, settlement schemes functioned as effective tools of rural development. They created a class of “emergent” or “progressive” farmers who became engines of agrarian growth. As Bates (2005) argued, Kenya’s postcolonial state successfully harnessed smallholder agriculture to drive export-led growth, avoiding the pitfalls of large-scale state farms that plagued other African countries. The schemes also contributed to poverty reduction in targeted regions: households in settlement areas consistently reported higher incomes and better access to social services compared to those in non-scheme areas (Leo, 1978).

However, even during this ostensibly successful period, significant contradictions and limitations were evident. First, the selection of beneficiaries was highly politicized. Preference was often given to loyalists of the ruling party, civil servants, and urban elites with political connections, rather than the landless poor or Mau Mau veterans who had fought for land rights (Leo, 1978). This elite capture undermined the redistributive ethos of the schemes and entrenched new forms of inequality. Second, the economic benefits were geographically uneven. Schemes located in high-potential areas thrived, but those in marginal or arid zones such as parts of Eastern and Coast provinces struggled due to poor soil quality, erratic rainfall, and limited market access. The state’s focus on export crops also discouraged food production, increasing vulnerability to food price shocks and undermining local food security (Tripp, 1997). Third, the debt burden imposed on settlers was substantial. Beneficiaries were required to repay loans for land purchase, infrastructure, and inputs over 15–20 years, often at interest rates that outstripped agricultural returns. Default rates began to rise by the early 1970s, foreshadowing the financial crises that would plague the schemes in the subsequent decade

Further challenges emerged from the internal design and implementation of the schemes. High-density settlements, while addressing immediate land pressures, were criticized for long-term unsustainability. As (Leys, 1975) notes, increasing population density per acre led to diminishing farm sizes and declining net incomes, pushing many settlers into cycles of debt. In some cases, up to 70% of a settler's income was allocated to loan repayments, leaving insufficient funds for basic household needs such as education, a situation that threatened not only individual welfare but also the stability of the broader agrarian credit system. Moreover, Leo (1978) that these schemes were often misaligned with the capacities of intended beneficiaries: high-density settlements were not designed for "progressive" farmers but rather for landless, unskilled, and capital-poor individuals, thereby undermining productivity goals from the outset Leo (1978). Such policies inadvertently accelerated rural-urban migration, as landless peasants sought wage labour in cities, weakening rural economies and fostering class differentiation, landlessness, and peasantization processes that eroded the very social fabric the schemes purported to strengthen (Leo, 1978).

Planning deficiencies further undermined effectiveness. In Nakuru District, for example, many schemes lacked essential infrastructure such as roads, water supply, schools, and extension services, severely limiting settlers' access to markets and social services (Mwangi, 1987). Cooperative-based models like the Nyagecho Chisaro Chikonorwe Society and Ndeffo Ltd succeeded primarily in land acquisition but failed to invest in communal development. Ndeffo Ltd, despite managing four farms and representing 5,000 ex-freedom fighters in 1971, bypassed state-led planning mechanisms, resulting in negligible provision of social infrastructure such as schools, clinics, or shopping centres a pattern also evident in the Gichobo Settlement Scheme. These examples illustrate how institutional fragmentation and weak oversight compromised the transformative potential of settlement programmes. This portrays the disconnect between the political economy of the pre- and post-independence Kenya that failed to deliver the ideals of resettlement plans.

In synthesis, while Kenya's post-independence land settlement schemes achieved notable successes in expanding agricultural output and rural infrastructure, their long-term viability was hampered by structural dependency on metropolitan capital, inadequate attention to farmer capacity and equity, poor spatial planning, and an overemphasis on credit-driven resettlement without commensurate investment in human and physical capital. The contrasting perspectives of scholars like (Odingo, 1971; Leys, 1975; Ochieng and Maxon, 1992 & Mwangi, 1987) underscore the complex interplay between state-led development ambitions and the enduring legacies of colonial economic structures, a tension that continues to shape agrarian policy debates in Kenya.

The expansion of rural infrastructure such as roads, schools, health facilities, marketing systems, and access to credit was closely tied to the success of certain schemes, particularly those with integrated planning and institutional support (Odingo, 1971). For instance, the Ndalat Settlement Scheme demonstrated superior economic performance due to its more secure land tenure arrangements compared to cooperative or land-buying company models, which often lacked coherent development frameworks.

Moreover, the schemes fostered social mobility for a segment of the rural population. Access to land enabled investment in education and non-farm enterprises, laying the groundwork for diversified rural livelihoods. In this sense, settlement schemes were not just agrarian projects but engines of broader socio-economic transformation as was observed by Muchoki (2012) on Mwea Settlement Scheme. He stated that the scheme managed to transform the economic lives of the people as intended, even though with some challenges. The same case applied to South Kinangop where, as Muhia (1977) averred, the Africans who took over white farms initially did well but with time, they were unable even to pay the loans owed by them proving that the schemes fell short of their transformative potential. Their economic impact was highly uneven, benefiting politically connected elites and residents of high-potential areas while neglecting the rural poor and ecologically marginal zones. This suited well with the political economy of this period which, as Foulcault (1982) avers, is characterized by market-driven principles that prioritize individual economic agency while fostering social inequality as a national outcome. The debt-driven model of resettlement created long-term financial burdens, and the lack of gender-sensitive design excluded women from land ownership despite their critical role in agricultural production.

Thus, it is not in doubt that the most damning critique is that the schemes were ultimately subordinated to political, not economic, logic. Land distribution became a tool of regime consolidation rather than poverty alleviation. This instrumentalization eroded institutional integrity, fostered corruption, and undermined long-term planning. As Bond and Desai (2006) concluded, “The settlement program was less a developmental strategy and more a mechanism of political control.” Today, as Kenya grapples with landlessness, rural poverty, and climate change, the legacy of the settlement schemes offers both cautionary tales and valuable insights. A renewed commitment to equitable, evidence-based, and participatory rural development anchored in secure land rights and diversified livelihoods remains essential for achieving the economic justice that the postcolonial promise once envisioned.

Furthermore, the schemes failed to catalyse industrial development or structural transformation. Instead of generating surplus capital for reinvestment in manufacturing or services, much of the agricultural income was consumed or diverted into land speculation and real estate. As a result, Kenya remained trapped in a primary commodity export model vulnerable to external shocks.

The 1970s marked a turning point in the trajectory of Kenya's settlement schemes. A confluence of internal and external factors, declining terms of trade for agricultural exports, rising input costs, population pressure, and policy stagnation, eroded the economic viability of many schemes. The global oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 triggered inflationary pressures, increasing the cost of fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery, while world prices for coffee and tea stagnated or declined. Smallholders, already operating on thin margins, found it increasingly difficult to service their debts or reinvest in their farms. At the same time, Kenya's population was growing at over 3% annually, placing immense pressure on land resources. Inheritance practices led to the subdivision of settlement plots, often reducing holdings below the economic threshold required for viable commercial farming. By the late 1970s, many original settlers had divided their land among multiple sons, resulting in fragmented and undercapitalized farms (Bond & Desai, 2006). This process of "land fragmentation" undermined the productivity gains achieved in the 1960s and contributed to rural distress.

The state's response to these challenges was inadequate. Agricultural support services deteriorated due to budget constraints and bureaucratic inefficiency. The KFA became increasingly corrupt, delaying payments to farmers and diverting resources to political allies (Haugerud, 1989). Extension services, once a cornerstone of the scheme's success, were underfunded and failed to adapt to changing ecological and market conditions. Moreover, the government continued to prioritize export crops over food staples, exacerbating rural hunger during periods of drought or price volatility.

Critically, the political economy of the Kenyatta and later Moi regimes further compromised the schemes' economic potential. Settlement programs were increasingly used as instruments of political patronage. New schemes were launched not on the basis of agronomic suitability but to reward ethnic constituencies or co-opt opposition (Studies, 2002). For example, during the 1970s, large tracts of land in the Rift Valley were settled by members of President Moi's Kalenjin community, often displacing previous occupants or bypassing established waiting lists (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). This politicization not only distorted resource allocation but also sowed the seeds of ethnic tension that would erupt violently in the 1990s.

Scholars such as Tripp (1997) argue that by the early 1980s, the settlement schemes had become "developmental dead ends" trapped in cycles of debt, declining productivity, and social conflict. The original vision of a dynamic smallholder sector had given way to a landscape of agrarian stagnation, where survival, not surplus, was the primary objective for many settlers. The early 1980s witnessed a dramatic shift in Kenya's economic policy environment with the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Mandated as conditions for debt relief, SAPs required the Kenyan government to liberalize markets, reduce public expenditure, and dismantle state-led development interventions. The implications for settlement schemes were profound and largely negative.

First, agricultural subsidies were slashed. Input prices for fertilizer and seeds rose sharply, while credit from the AFC became scarce and expensive. Marketing boards, including the KFA, were either privatized or weakened, leaving smallholders exposed to volatile market prices and exploitative middlemen (Haugerud, 1989). The withdrawal of state support effectively abandoned settlers to the vagaries of the market at a time when global commodity prices were in freefall.

Second, land tenure insecurity intensified. Under pressure to promote "efficiency," the government encouraged titling and individualization of land rights, often without adequate safeguards for vulnerable groups such as women and youth. In many settlement areas, land sales previously restricted became commonplace, leading to re-concentration of landownership and the emergence of landless labourers (Haugerud, 1989). This reversal of the redistributive gains of the 1960s contradicted the original purpose of the schemes.

Third, SAPs exacerbated regional inequalities. High-potential areas with access to roads, irrigation, and markets were better able to adapt to liberalization, while marginal areas home to many failed or underperforming schemes fell further behind. Rural-urban migration accelerated as disillusioned youth abandoned unviable farms for informal employment in Nairobi and other cities (Mbithe et al., 2017).

Proponents of market liberalization, such as the World Bank Mbithe et al., (2017) argued that SAPs would ultimately improve efficiency by eliminating distortions and encouraging private investment. However, empirical evidence from Kenya suggests that the abrupt withdrawal of state support without complementary institutions such as rural credit cooperatives, insurance mechanisms, or market information systems left smallholders more vulnerable, not more resilient. As Mbithe et al., (2017) observed, "The removal of the state's developmental role without building alternative support structures condemned many settlement schemes to economic irrelevance."

1.9.3 Social Influences of Colonial Agricultural Policy in Independent Kenya

Moving beyond purely economic assessments, the discussion interrogated how these schemes recalibrated kinship relations, gender roles, ethnic identities, and rural power structures. It the unintended social consequences of state-led resettlement, including the erosion of communal land ethics, the rise of intra-community conflict, and the deepening of social stratification. By drawing on historical, anthropological, and sociological scholarship, the study juxtaposes optimistic narratives of social modernization against critical accounts of social fragmentation, elite co-optation, and cultural dislocation. The central argument is that while settlement schemes contributed to the emergence of a new rural middle class and expanded access to state services, they simultaneously entrenched inequalities, undermined indigenous social institutions, and reconfigured rural society in ways that served state control more than grassroots empowerment.

Upon independence, the new Kenyan government, led by Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African National Union (KANU), committed to healing this rupture through land reform. The Million Acre Scheme (1962–1971), funded by British aid and international loans, resettled over 35,000 African families onto former settler farms (Leo, 1978). But the state's ambitions extended beyond mere land redistribution. Inspired by modernization theory and Western developmental paradigms, policymakers sought to use settlement schemes as tools for social engineering to transform “tribal” peasants into “progressive” citizens integrated into the national economy and polity.

This social vision was articulated in Kenya’s foundational policy document, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965: African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya. The paper rejected “tribalism” and communalism as backward, advocating instead for individual initiative, private property, and national unity. Settlement schemes were thus conceived as microcosms of the new nation: orderly, productive, and governed by rational economic actors rather than kinship elders or ethnic allegiances. Crucially, the schemes were to be equipped with schools, health clinics, roads, and cooperative societies, infrastructure intended to draw rural communities into the fold of modern statehood. However, this ostensibly progressive agenda was embedded within a top-down, technocratic framework that marginalized local knowledge and reinforced patriarchal and elitist norms.

The social impact of Kenya’s post-independence settlement schemes was shaped significantly by the role of cooperative societies and the broader structural transformations that gave rise to class differentiation, peasantization, and the emergence of a rural landed elite. While colonial and early post-colonial policies envisioned cooperative societies as central instruments of social change facilitating collective production, marketing, and access to credit, their actual performance fell short due to institutional weaknesses and misaligned incentives. Although cooperatives were intended to empower settlers economically and socially, most smallholders remained heavily indebted to the Department of Settlement, which disqualified them from accessing commercial credit. This financial exclusion persisted until 1975, when the post-independence government, viewing settlement loans as remnants of colonial control, moved to cancel these obligations in an effort to unlock further investment and stimulate rural development (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992).

One of the most profound social impacts of the settlement schemes was the transformation of kinship structures and communal landholding practices. In many precolonial societies particularly among the Kikuyu and Luo land was held collectively by lineages or clans, with usufruct rights allocated based on need, age, and gender (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). Decision-making about land use, inheritance, and dispute resolution was governed by customary councils of elders, reinforcing intergenerational solidarity and mutual obligation. The settlement schemes dismantled this system by imposing individual, titled landownership. Each beneficiary received a demarcated plot registered in their name, often without consultation with extended family members. While this was intended to enhance investment incentives, it also severed ties of collective responsibility. As Bond and Desai (2006) observed, "The shift from communal to individual tenure not only altered property relations but also redefined personhood from a relational being embedded in kinship networks to an autonomous economic agent."

This transition had mixed social consequences. On one hand, it empowered certain individuals typically male heads of households to make independent decisions about land use, crop selection, and market engagement. For some, this autonomy represented liberation from the constraints of clan authority. On the other hand, it marginalized women, youth, and other non-titleholders who lost customary access to land. Women, despite being primary food producers, were rarely listed as titleholders; their land rights became contingent on marriage, rendering them vulnerable to dispossession in cases of divorce or widowhood (Wamalwa, 2008). Moreover, the emphasis on individual plots eroded mechanisms of mutual aid. In traditional settings, families would pool labour during planting or harvesting; in settlement schemes, such cooperation diminished as each household pursued its own economic agenda. The result was a gradual atomization of rural society, where social bonds were increasingly mediated by market transactions rather than reciprocal obligations.

Despite these reforms, the transformative potential of cooperatives was undermined by poor governance, financial mismanagement, and leadership captured by state-aligned administrators rather than accountable to settler interests. Harbeson (1967) noted that while the economic function of the settlement schemes was expected to catalyse desired social changes through cooperative structures, this assumption oversimplified the dynamics of grassroots participation. In practice, settlers had limited influence over cooperative decision-making, as leadership positions were often held by individuals dependent on government patronage. This disconnect between centralized policy objectives and local socio-economic realities created a rift in priorities, weakening trust in cooperative institutions and subverting their intended role in fostering collective action and representation (Harbeson, 1967). As a result, widespread embezzlement, leadership conflicts, and weak organizational capacity eroded settler confidence, ultimately stalling the promised social transformation.

Parallel to these institutional failures, the settlement schemes contributed to profound shifts in social stratification within rural Kenya. Scholars such as Ochieng and Maxon, (1992)and Leo (1978) argue that the dual structure of smallholder agriculture fostered both a peasantry and a nascent African bourgeoisie operating within the framework of capitalist integration(Ochieng & Maxon,1992). This duality was visibly manifested in spatial disparities: high-density settlement areas were characterized by subsistence-level living in mud houses with thatched roofs and underdeveloped land, while low-density zones exhibited markers of prosperity, including stone or iron-sheet houses, tractors, and cars. Leo's observation that this amounted to "peasant predominance and bourgeois dominance" underscores how settlement policies, despite their egalitarian rhetoric, entrenched socioeconomic inequality (Leo, 1978). The consolidation of land under frameworks like the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 accelerated this process, generating a growing class of landless labourers even as a minority accumulated land and capital, a trend confirmed by Von Pischke's analysis of increasing land pressure by (Von Pischke et al., 1983).

One of the most celebrated social achievements of the settlement schemes was the expansion of access to education and health services. Unlike the "Native Reserves," which were deliberately under-serviced by the colonial state, settlement areas were prioritized for infrastructure development. Schools and dispensaries were built alongside farm plots, enabling children especially girls to attend school regularly for the first time (J. D. Von Pischke et al., 1983). This expansion contributed to rising literacy rates and improved health outcomes in scheme areas. It also fostered a new rural intelligentsia: young people who, through education, gained access to clerical jobs, teaching posts, and even university education. In this sense, the schemes functioned as engines of social mobility, breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty.

However, this modernization came at a cultural cost. The curriculum in settlement schools was standardized and nationalistic, emphasizing loyalty to the state and denigrating "tribal" customs as primitive. Indigenous knowledge systems such as traditional ecological wisdom, oral histories, and healing practices were devalued or erased. As a result, many youth grew estranged from their cultural roots, viewing rural life as backward and urban migration as the only path to success (Tripp, 1997). Moreover, the emphasis on formal education created generational tensions. Elders who had fought for land during Mau Mau found their authority undermined by literate sons who questioned customary norms. Inheritance disputes intensified as educated youth demanded individual land titles rather than accepting lineage-based allocations. The settlement schemes thus became sites of intergenerational conflict, where modernity and tradition clashed without reconciliation.

Settlement schemes not only failed to challenge existing gender hierarchies but in many ways reinforced them. The state's model of the "progressive farmer" was implicitly male, an educated, literate, and conversant with modern agricultural techniques. Consequently, land allocation committees, dominated by male civil servants and local elites, prioritized men as beneficiaries. Even when women applied independently as widows or single mothers, they were often disqualified on the grounds of lacking "technical capacity" or "capital" (Tripp, 1997).

This gendered exclusion had cascading social effects. Women were denied formal access to credit, extension services, and agricultural inputs, which were tied to land titles. Yet they remained responsible for food production, child-rearing, and household maintenance. The dual burden of unpaid domestic labour and marginal participation in commercial farming created what Lipton and Ahmed (1997) termed it as "invisible productivity" essential yet unrecognized labour that sustained rural livelihoods without conferring economic or social status.

Furthermore, the introduction of cash cropping under the schemes intensified gender disparities. Men typically controlled income from high-value export crops like coffee and pyrethrum, while women managed subsistence plots with limited surplus. This division entrenched male control over household finances and decision-making, undermining efforts toward gender equity. As Harrington and Chopra (2010) argues, "The settlement schemes did not liberate women; they incorporated them into a patriarchal capitalist agrarian order on subordinate terms." Only in the late 1980s and 1990s did feminist scholars and activists begin to challenge this exclusion, advocating for joint titling and women's cooperatives. Yet by then, the institutional architecture of the schemes had already solidified gendered inequalities that persist to this day.

Moreover, administrative priorities further exacerbated social dislocation. State officials focused narrowly on production targets and loan repayment, neglecting the broader social requisites necessary for sustainable development, such as education, healthcare, and community infrastructure. This imbalance left settlers ill-equipped to navigate the complexities of cooperative management, market engagement, and intergenerational land planning. Consequently, social transformation lagged behind economic restructuring, leaving communities vulnerable to internal conflict, leadership wrangles, and declining institutional efficacy.

A critical long-term challenge emerged from the progressive subdivision of land. As Mwangi (1987) observes, initial farm units, already modest in size, were repeatedly divided among descendants to meet familial and lineage-based claims to inheritance (Mwangi, 1987). Over time, this fragmentation resulted in uneconomical plot sizes that hindered mechanization, reduced productivity, and deepened cycles of poverty. The inability to scale production on shrinking parcels reinforced patterns of peasantization, trapping future generations in subsistence farming without viable pathways to upward mobility (Leo, 1984).

In synthesis, the settlement schemes failed to deliver comprehensive social transformation due to a confluence of factors: the weakening of cooperative institutions through mismanagement and state interference, the entrenchment of class divisions between a prospering rural bourgeoisie and a marginalized peasantry, and the demographic and structural pressures of land fragmentation. Rather than fostering equitable rural development, the schemes reproduced hierarchical social relations rooted in colonial legacies and amplified by post-colonial policy choices. As such, while they succeeded in redistributing land and integrating African farmers into the national economy, their social outcomes reveal a legacy of uneven development, unfulfilled promises, and enduring vulnerability among Kenya's rural populations.

Contrary to the egalitarian rhetoric of land reform, the settlement schemes generated new forms of social differentiation. While some beneficiaries became prosperous commercial farmers, building brick houses, sending children to secondary school, and acquiring vehicles, others sank into debt and landlessness. This divergence was shaped by multiple factors: initial capital endowment, access to credit, proximity to markets, and, critically, political connections. Beneficiaries with urban ties or civil service jobs often used their off-farm income to invest in agricultural inputs, hire labour, and weather price fluctuations. In contrast, landless peasants with no savings struggled to repay land loans or purchase fertilizer, leading to declining yields and plot subdivision. By the 1980s, a clear class divide had emerged within settlement areas: a rural bourgeoisie of "big men" versus a proletariat of indebted smallholders (Swainson, 1980).

This stratification was exacerbated by the structure of cooperative societies, which were meant to provide collective marketing and credit. In practice, cooperative leadership was often captured by local elites who diverted resources to themselves and excluded poorer members. The Nyagecho Chisaro Chikonorwe Cooperative Society in Nakuru, for instance, had over 11,000 members but was dominated by a few influential figures who controlled access to inputs and profits (Mwangi, 1987).

Such dynamics reproduced colonial patterns of economic exclusion under a nationalist guise. The rise of this rural elite also altered local governance. Traditional councils of elders lost authority to state-appointed administrators and cooperative chairpersons, who derived power not from communal legitimacy but from their ties to the central government. Democracy at the grassroots level was thus hollowed out, replaced by cliente list networks that prioritized loyalty over accountability.

The adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the early 1980s marked a turning point in the social trajectory of settlement schemes. Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, the Kenyan government slashed public expenditure, privatized agricultural services, and liberalized land markets. The social safety net that had once cushioned scheme settlers began to disintegrate. Agricultural extension services, once a conduit for technical knowledge and community mobilization, were drastically reduced. Cooperatives collapsed due to lack of state support, leaving farmers vulnerable to exploitative traders. Most critically, the state withdrew from its role as guarantor of social infrastructure: schools and clinics in settlement areas deteriorated due to underfunding, forcing families to seek services in distant towns or go without.

Perhaps the most consequential and damaging social effect of the settlement schemes was their role in reshaping ethnic identities and fuelling intercommunal tensions. While the initial schemes focused on resettling Kikuyu landless people in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley regions from which they had been dispossessed during colonialism subsequent waves of resettlement were increasingly driven by political considerations. Under President Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002), the state used new settlement schemes to reward loyal ethnic groups, particularly the Kalenjin, and to dilute opposition strongholds. Large tracts of land in the Rift Valley historically contested between Kikuyu settlers and Kalenjin communities were allocated to

Kalenjin families, often through ad hoc or extra-legal means (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). This practice, known as "ethnic engineering," transformed settlement schemes from instruments of national integration into tools of ethno-political mobilization.

The social consequences were devastating. Formerly cooperative multi-ethnic communities became segregated enclaves defined by suspicion and competition. Land disputes, once resolved through local mediation, escalated into violent clashes, especially during election periods. The 1991–1993 "ethnic clashes" in the Rift Valley widely seen as state-sponsored displaced over 300,000 people, many of them original scheme settlers. The settlement schemes thus failed in their foundational promise of national unity. Instead of dissolving tribalism, they institutionalized it within the very fabric of rural settlement. As Branch and Cheeseman (2006) noted, "Land became the currency of political loyalty, and belonging became conditional on ethnic alignment with the ruling regime."

These changes disproportionately affected the poor and marginalized. Wealthier settlers could afford private education and healthcare, but the majority could not. Rural inequality deepened, and social cohesion further eroded. As Mbithe et al., (2017) noted, "SAPs transformed settlement schemes from spaces of state-led development into zones of abandonment, where survival depended on individual resilience rather than collective support." Additionally, land liberalization under SAPs enabled the sale of settlement plots previously restricted to prevent re-concentration. A secondary land market emerged, and many indebted settlers sold their plots to urban investors or wealthier neighbours. This process created a new class of landless rural labourers who, despite living in former settlement areas, had no stake in the land (Kanyinga, 2013). The original social contract of the schemes land for loyalty and productivity was thus broken.

The social legacy of Kenya's settlement schemes is profoundly ambivalent. Proponents highlight their role in expanding state presence in rural areas, promoting education, and creating a class of commercially oriented farmers who contributed to national development. From this perspective, the schemes were necessary interventions in a society scarred by colonial underdevelopment, and their social disruptions were the inevitable costs of modernization. Critics, however, argue that the schemes imposed a foreign model of individualism and capitalism that fractured communal life without offering viable alternatives. They point to the gendered exclusions, ethnic manipulations, and elite capture that subverted the schemes' emancipatory potential. Rather than fostering social justice, the schemes often reproduced colonial patterns of control through new institutions. As Lipton and Ahmed (1997) concluded, "The settlement schemes did not empower rural communities; they integrated them into a hierarchical national order on unequal terms."

1.9.4 Legacy of Colonial Agricultural Policy on Independent Kenya

Leys argued that the post-independence political economy arrangement was a continuation of the colonial legacy. Most of the schemes that had been established by the colonial government were continued without any alteration by the post-independence government. For example, in the aftermath of independence in 1963, Kenya's postcolonial state embarked on a series of ambitious agrarian reforms that had already been crafted by the colonial state, chief among them the implementation of settlement schemes. Designed initially to address the legacy of colonial land dispossession and to promote national cohesion, these schemes were presented not only as instruments of economic redistribution but also as vehicles for profound social transformation. The government envisioned the schemes as laboratories of modernity spaces where traditional rural life would be reshaped through the adoption of individualized land tenure, capitalist farming practices, and state-mediated social services such as schooling, healthcare, and participatory local governance.

Yet while the settlement schemes succeeded in reconfiguring certain dimensions of social life, their broader impact on social equity, community cohesion, and cultural continuity remains deeply contested. For settlers in schemes like Ndalat, this meant enduring systemic disadvantages. Despite being located in former "scheduled areas" historically shaped by colonial land policies, their integration into national markets remained constrained by monopolistic boards whose leadership prioritized the interests of large farms.

More than six decades after Kenya's independence in 1963, the settlement schemes remain among the most consequential and contested interventions in the nation's agrarian history. Conceived in the immediate postcolonial moment as a corrective to colonial land alienation and a catalyst for rural modernization, these state-led resettlement programs transferred over 1.2 million acres of former European-owned land to African smallholders under the "Million Acre Scheme" and its successors (Leo, 1981). Framed as instruments of both social justice and agricultural development, the schemes promised to transform landless peasants into "progressive" commercial farmers, thereby anchoring Kenya's economic growth in a dynamic, export-oriented smallholder sector. For a time, this vision appeared plausible: by the early 1970s, smallholder farms, many of them scheme beneficiaries accounted for the majority of Kenya's coffee, tea, and pyrethrum exports, earning the country accolades as an "African development success story (Bates, 2005).

Yet this optimistic narrative belies a far more complex reality. Over time, the settlement schemes became entangled in the political economy of patronage, ecological constraints, and shifting global markets, leading to divergent trajectories across regions and social groups. While some schemes thrived as hubs of agricultural innovation and rural prosperity, others deteriorated into zones of landlessness, debt, and conflict. The legacy of these schemes, therefore, is not monolithic but layered, reflecting both remarkable achievements in agrarian commercialization and profound failures in sustainability, equity, and institutional coherence. Drawing on historical, economic, and agrarian scholarship, studies argues that while settlement schemes succeeded in creating a commercially oriented smallholder class and expanding agricultural production in high-potential areas, they ultimately failed to deliver inclusive, resilient, and sustainable agricultural development due to elite capture, inadequate support systems, and the subordination of agrarian policy to political expediency.

The trajectory of agricultural development in Kenya, particularly within the context of settlement schemes such as the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, cannot be fully understood without situating it within the broader historical arc of colonial experimentation, state-led developmentalism, and post-colonial policy continuity. As early as 1931, the African Research Survey funded by the Carnegie Corporation framed Africa as an “experimental field” for experts across disciplines, initiating a paradigm in which development was treated not as an organic process but as a series of controlled interventions (Crowley 1931). This gave rise to successive phases: from science for development, through development as experimental science, culminating in the emergence of the developmentalist state, a model characterized by centralized planning, direct economic intervention, and regulatory control over agrarian systems (Cooper & Packard, 1997).

In tropical Africa, this paradigm persisted well into the late 1970s, with post-independence elites largely replicating colonial administrative frameworks rather than radically transforming them. For instance, prior to colonial interference, maize cultivation was embedded in indigenous agro-ecological knowledge systems. As Hashin (1982) observes, pre-colonial communities practiced diversified, family-labour-based agriculture, growing maize alongside other crops for local consumption, integrated with animal husbandry, trade, and craft production. Wealth and livelihood were derived holistically from land use and social exchange networks.

Crucially, the state adopted the colonial model of high-potential, export-oriented agriculture rather than promoting food sovereignty or agro-ecological diversity. Beneficiaries were expected to grow cash crops such as coffee, tea, and pyrethrum under the guidance of agricultural extension officers, using hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers, and mechanized tools. The state provided subsidized credit through the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), marketing services via the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), and technical support through a nationwide extension network. In this vision, the settlement scheme was not merely a plot of land but a node in an integrated system of state-led agricultural modernization.

Central to the institutional architecture of colonial agriculture were marketing boards, designed to consolidate control over production and pricing. The Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), founded in 1922 as a settler-owned enterprise, monopolized milk processing and marketing, laying the groundwork for a vertically integrated system that privileged large-scale producers. By 1929, mixed farming especially dairy and maize had become the backbone of the colonial economy. Over time, numerous sector-specific boards were established: the Maize Control Board (1942), Coffee Marketing Board (1946), Kenya Meat Commission (1950), Tea Development Authority (1951), Wheat Board (1957), Kenya Dairy Board (1959), and others regulating sisal, pyrethrum, passion fruit, and pig farming (Staatz & Eicher, 1998). These institutions entrenched monopolistic practices, price-fixing, and political interference, systematically disadvantaging smallholder producers.

Parallel African-oriented marketing boards were introduced, but they functioned more as instruments of control than empowerment, regulating everything from cultivation to transportation while limiting competition and innovation (Leys, 1975). A review of colonial marketing policies in the 1950s reveals consistent preferential treatment for settler agriculture, with infrastructure, subsidies, and institutional support skewed in their favour. Even when African farmers began producing surplus, they faced structural barriers in accessing fair prices or efficient markets. During the first decade after independence, settlement schemes delivered significant agricultural gains, particularly in Central Province and the Rift Valley. Access to fertile land, reliable rainfall, and state support enabled rapid adoption of cash cropping. By 1970, smallholders many of them scheme beneficiaries produced over 60% of Kenya’s coffee and tea, transforming the agricultural sector from one dominated by large settler estates to one driven by small-scale commercial farming (Studies, 2002b).

This shift had multiple developmental implications. First, it diversified export earnings and reduced dependence on a few large estates. Second, it generated rural income that supported local economies: farmers invested in housing, education, and consumer goods, stimulating demand for non-farm services. Third, it demonstrated the productivity potential of African smallholders, countering colonial stereotypes of African “backwardness”.

The success was facilitated by robust institutional support. Extension officers visited farms regularly, disseminating knowledge on crop husbandry, pest control, and soil conservation. The KFA provided timely inputs and guaranteed marketing, while the AFC offered low-interest loans for land purchase, infrastructure, and inputs. Crucially, the consolidation of land under individual tenure replacing customary or communal systems was believed to have enhanced investment incentives by clarifying property rights, a view consistent with mainstream development economics of the time (Soto, 2013). From this perspective, settlement schemes were effective tools of agricultural development as they harnessed smallholder dynamism to achieve export-led growth without resorting to inefficient state farms. Kenya’s agricultural GDP grew at an average of 4.2% per year between 1964 and 1973, outpacing most of sub-Saharan Africa (Howell, 1985).

However, even during this “golden age,” structural weaknesses emerged. Beneficiary selection was highly politicized: preference was given to KANU loyalists, civil servants, and urban elites with political connections, not the landless poor or Mau Mau veterans. This elite capture skewed the distribution of agricultural benefits. Moreover, the focus on export crops discouraged food production, increasing vulnerability to price shocks and undermining local food security (Tripp, 1997). Finally, the debt burden was substantial: settlers had to repay loans over 15–20 years, often at rates that strained household budgets. By the early 1970s, default rates were rising, signalling future financial distress.

This imbalance carried over into independent Kenya through a process of elite Africanization rather than structural reform. As Chambers (2014) noted, post-independence governments inherited a range of development tools including land consolidation, crop rotation, credit schemes, cooperatives, mechanization programs, and state farms all aimed at boosting productivity and rural infrastructure. However, the leadership of key marketing institutions was transferred not to smallholder representatives but to emerging African elites and large-scale farmers who had either collaborated with or benefited from the colonial system (Nyamongo, 2007). The Africanization of bodies like the KCC and the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) did not democratize access; instead, it preserved the dominance of large-scale producers through co-option strategies and continued price collusion.

As Leys (1975), emphasized, the post-independence government recognized agriculture's fourfold role ensuring food security, generating employment, supplying raw materials, and earning foreign exchange but failed to dismantle the inherited structures that undermined equitable development. Ultimately, the challenges confronting settlement schemes were not merely operational but deeply ideological and systemic. They stemmed from a legacy of colonial experimentation, racialized economic design, and a developmentalist state model that prioritized control over inclusion. Issues such as inadequate planning, fragmented land tenure, unregulated subdivision, lack of infrastructure, and misaligned institutional incentives were not isolated failures but symptoms of a broader pattern: the persistence of colonial-era hierarchies under new political management. As evidenced in the experience of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, these factors collectively eroded farm productivity, deepened inequality, and limited the transformative potential of land redistribution efforts in independent Kenya.

The 1970s marked a turning point in the agricultural trajectory of settlement schemes. A confluence of internal and external pressures eroded their viability. Globally, the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 triggered inflation, raising the cost of imported inputs like fertilizer and pesticides, while world prices for coffee and tea stagnated. Domestically, population growth averaging 3.5% annually intensified land pressure. Inheritance practices led to the subdivision of original plots, often reducing holdings below the economic threshold for commercial farming. By the late 1970s, many 10-acre plots had been divided among three or four sons, resulting in fragmented, undercapitalized farms.

This process of “land fragmentation” had severe agronomic consequences. Smaller plots could not support crop rotation or mechanization, leading to soil exhaustion and declining yields. Farmers increasingly resorted to short-term, high-return crops like maize, further degrading soils. In high-density schemes such as those in Murang’a and Nyeri, land pressure created a class of landless youth who migrated to urban slums or became wage labourers on wealthier neighbours’ farms. Compounding these challenges was the deterioration of state support. Budget constraints and bureaucratic inefficiency weakened extension services, which became understaffed and unresponsive. The KFA, once a reliable marketing channel, grew corrupt: payments to farmers were delayed, and resources were diverted to political allies. Agricultural credit dried up as the AFC tightened lending criteria in response to rising defaults.

The state’s response was not to address these systemic issues but to launch new schemes for political gain. Under President Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002), settlement programs increasingly served as instruments of ethnic patronage. Land in the Rift Valley, historically contested was allocated to Kalenjin loyalists, often bypassing established waiting lists and fuelling intercommunal tensions (Ochieng, 1995). This politicization distorted agricultural planning: new schemes were sited based on loyalty, not agronomic suitability, leading to failed resettlements in arid or marginal zones. As a result, agricultural performance diverged sharply. Schemes in high-potential areas with intact support systems continued to prosper, while those in politically motivated or ecologically fragile zones declined.

By the early 1980s, the settlement program had become a patchwork of success and failure, with little coherence as a national agricultural strategy. The early 1980s ushered in a paradigm shift with the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) under the IMF and World Bank. Mandated as conditions for debt relief, SAPs required Kenya to liberalize agricultural markets, reduce public expenditure, and dismantle state-led interventions. The implications for settlement schemes were catastrophic.

First, subsidies were abolished. Fertilizer and seed prices tripled overnight, while credit from the AFC became scarce and expensive. Many smallholders could no longer afford inputs, leading to a sharp decline in yields. Second, marketing boards were weakened or privatized. The KFA collapsed, and farmers were left to negotiate with private traders who offered exploitative prices. Third, extension services were decimated: by 1988, the ratio of extension officers to farmers had fallen from 1:400 to 1:2,000. The withdrawal of state support effectively abandoned settlers to volatile global markets just as commodity prices plummeted. Between 1980 and 1985, world coffee prices fell by over 60%, devastating smallholder incomes. Without safety nets, many farmers defaulted on loans, lost their land, or shifted to subsistence farming.

SAPs also encouraged land titling and liberalization, enabling the sale of settlement plots for the first time. A secondary land market emerged, and indebted settlers sold to urban investors or wealthier neighbours. This re-concentration of landownership reversed the redistributive gains of the 1960s, creating a new class of rural proletarians, landless labourers living in former settlement areas (Kanyinga, 2013). Proponents of liberalization argued that market forces would improve efficiency by rewarding “productive” farmers. But empirical evidence suggests the opposite: without complementary institutions such as rural credit cooperatives, insurance, or market information systems liberalization increased vulnerability rather than resilience. Smallholders were not liberated; they were exposed.

The legacy of settlement schemes is best understood through competing interpretations. Proponents emphasize their role in creating Kenya’s smallholder export economy. (Bates, 2005) credits the schemes with enabling “peaceful agrarian capitalism” that avoided the inefficiencies of state farms and delivered sustained growth. From this view, the schemes were a pragmatic, market-friendly alternative to socialist land reform. Moreover, they expanded access to agricultural assets for a segment of the rural population. Unlike in Zimbabwe or South Africa, where land reform came decades later amid crisis, Kenya acted swiftly and decisively in the 1960s. The schemes also fostered agrarian innovation: many settlers adopted new crops, technologies, and management practices that increased productivity.

However, critics argue that these successes were partial and exclusionary. The schemes entrenched regional inequalities: high-potential areas thrived, while marginal zones were neglected. Gender disparities were reinforced: women were rarely titleholders and had limited access to credit or extension services. Ethnic politics corrupted the resettlement process, turning land into a tool of patronage rather than development.

Most damningly, the schemes failed to catalysed structural transformation. Instead of generating surplus capital for reinvestment in agro-processing or manufacturing, agricultural income was often consumed or diverted into land speculation. Kenya remained locked in a primary commodity export model, vulnerable to external shocks and price volatility. Furthermore, the focus on individual plots undermined collective resource management. Traditional practices of communal grazing, fallowing, and water sharing were eroded, contributing to environmental degradation. In pastoralist margins, settlement schemes disrupted mobility patterns, exacerbating land conflicts (Haugerud, 1989).

A critical but often overlooked dimension of the schemes' legacy is their ecological impact. The promotion of monocropping especially of coffee, tea, and maize reduced agro-biodiversity and increased vulnerability to pests and diseases. Continuous cultivation without adequate fallow or organic inputs led to soil acidification and nutrient depletion, particularly in high-density schemes. In the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, for example, farmers were encouraged to adopt European-style dairy farming with exotic cattle breeds and zero-grazing systems. While initially profitable, this model proved unsustainable: fodder shortages, high veterinary costs, and declining pasture quality forced many to abandon dairy for low-input maize (Mwangi, 1987). This shift undermined the scheme's original agronomic vision.

Similarly, in the Rift Valley, the conversion of rangelands into maize farms disrupted traditional pastoral systems, leading to overgrazing and land degradation in adjacent areas. The state's top-down agronomic prescriptions often designed by urban-based agronomists with little field experience failed to account for local ecological knowledge or adaptive capacity. Only in the 1990s did policymakers begin to recognize the need for agro-ecological approaches. But by then, the institutional and ecological damage was deep. Today, many former scheme areas suffer from low soil fertility, water scarcity, and declining yields challenges that climate change is poised to exacerbate.

1.10 Overview of colonial Agricultural policy in Nandi County

1.10.1 The Swynnerton Plan and Nandi Economy (1954 - 1961)

It is much easier to visualize that the land enclosures in central province, Nandi, Kericho and Elgeyo – Marakwet districts in the early 1940s were a precursor to the individualized land registration that accelerated rapidly after the war. In Central province, where land fragmentation and enclosures were common, the colonial administration made efforts to consolidate the fragment through the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board (Heyer, 1974a). These informal African land management practices were precursor to the establishment of the African Land Utilization and Settlement Board (ALUS) in 1946 and were tasked with improving land in African areas. However, in 1947, ALUS was renamed the African Land Development Board (ALDEV) (Leys, 1971). As a result of the ALDEV programmes, the net national income of 1947 was £53 million of which half were drawn from agricultural output and three-fifths being the imputed value of African non-marketed production.

Even before the real benefits of ALDEV had been achieved, the colonial administration faced significant challenges in the African reservation then initiated the Swynnerton plan of 1954 for the intensification and development of African agriculture in Kenya as a direct result of the emergency. The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 is first and foremost a colonial agricultural and land policy which resulted in massive forced imposition of land consolidation and individual land title. Consolidated plots became the basis for a revolutionizing smallholder farming practices countrywide (Segal, 1968). The policy arose as an alternative to the failure of the previous policy of maintaining the native reserves as providers of subsistence foodstuff for the low paid wage workers and involved the consolidation of land fragments into single holdings and issuing registered freeholds title to individual. This plan had serious ramifications as it reversed the previous policy and enabled the rich and able Africans to acquire more land while offering or poor farmers thereby creating a landed and landless class (Swynnerton, 1955a).

Swynnerton (1955) Plan represented a new phase of colonial African agricultural development policy, and served as a policy in African areas even today. It expanded cash crop production, introduced new crop and livestock enterprises, and had a strong emphasis on increasing income (Heyer, 1974a). The programme provided extension services, credit and growth of cash crops such as coffee. The plan had a significant impact on the small holders' output with the growth in coffee rising 55% between 1955 and 1964 (Ley, 1971). In the Nandi County, the Swynnerton plan a pilot scheme in Ndalat received a total of £ 12,960 and employed served as a basis for demonstrating land development to the Nandi tribe. Other important developments include the ten livestock improvement centres included Baraton centres, farm institutes at Kipkarren and Kaimosi and smallholding demonstration plots in Kapsabet (Swynnerton, 1955a).

Though this policy, the African marketed production grew by to 13.5% in 1955 to more than 22.5% of the total recorded marketed agricultural production in 1963 and by 1967, the share of marketed output of Africa smallholders had grown to over 50% or one-half of total marketed agricultural production (Van Arkadie, 2016a).

Other significant colonial policy was the native land registration ordinance of 1959 which replaced the customary law governing native land units and introduced land adjudication and consolidation while providing for a system of registration of title in accordance with the English models or land laws (Coldham, 1978). This ordinance was later repealed and replaced by the Registered Land Act of 1963 and formed the legal foundation for which the low – and high-density schemes were created based on tribal lines. Land policy and reforms in agricultural policy were crucial elements in the colonial government framework to manage the transition in Kenya in the decade leading up to independence and in the immediate post-colonial relationship (Van Arkadie, 2016a).

1.10.2 The Establishment of Settlement Scheme (1961 - 1963)

The settlement schemes in Kenya takes two contextual meanings; the first 'settlement' refers to the white settlers alienating land in the African tropics in the early 20th century, while the ‘settlement scheme’ connotes the 'resettlement', or the planned transfer of peasant farmers from densely populated African reserves to completely uncultivated areas. This involved the transfer and settlement of landless, unemployed or under-employed Africans on extensive large scale mixed-farm areas as envisioned by the colonial agricultural policy and embraced as a land reformation process i.e. partition and redistribution of land on socio-political rather than economic grounds (Belshaw, 1964). The British government provided fund for the purchase of land for all settlement schemes on a basis of 33.33 % grant and 66.67 % loan while the development loan funds for the assisted owner (high – density) scheme were provided by the British and West German governments while the International Bank for Reconstructions and Development (IBRD) and the Colonial Development

Corporation (CDC) provided the developments loan fund for the ‘yeoman’ (low – density) scheme at a 6.5% interest (Storrar, 1964).

The settlement schemes emphasized the necessity of a vastly increased number of skilled personnel in research, extension, credit, production and marketing to run efficiently (Frank Jr, 1969).

Owing to the heavy capital demands in relation to the number of families benefitting, the Yeoman Farmer Scheme was discontinued and by 1963, the LDSB program was stopped. The LDSB settlement schemes were only aligned towards food sufficiency and the needs of the metropolitan capital and never at any moment were the supplementary food requirements such as vegetables included in the plan. The ‘yeoman’ holdings bought in the interior, non – contiguous parcels of about 2,000 hectares per unit of the white highland neighbouring African reserves and began as smallholders’ settlements who were dispersed and integrated into the scheduled areas, and become economically and socially part of the white highlands. The logic was that the yeo-men were part of the settler scene who could buy into underdeveloped portion of existing farm and thereby concentrate the farms with investment. Besides, their scattered pattern would enable access to settler informal technical guidance (Leys, 1971).

Both the yeo-man farmer scheme and the assisted – owner schemes were defined in terms of acreage to be bought and allocated to 'low-density plots and 'high-density plots. The land purchase first started on the edges of the white highlands and adjacent to each of the surrounding 'African land unit' tribal reserve. Separately, the colonial government, financed compassionate land purchases from settler farms, where aged or infirm settlers were given priority for purchase outside the designated settlement areas. Over half a million acres of land in this category were acquired by the end of 1963 (Belshaw, 1964).

These land transfer programme met two - fold objectives of stabilizing the land market by preventing economic collapse in the immediate pre-independence period, which could have contributed to a wider panic among the settler communities that was strongly represented in the metropolis(Van Arkadie, 2016a). The colonial land and agricultural policy reform had a stabilizing effect which allowed both the continued international and minority community involvement in large-scale agriculture and urban economic activities and for the remarkably rapid emergence of an African capitalist class.

Beginning in 1964, the five-year 'one-million-acre scheme' for the purchase of European-owned mixed farms and the creation of African-owned small-holdings took over and was not scheduled for completion until 1967. In July 1963, settlement officials were instructed that a maximum of 5% of the total high-density plots be specifically larger to accommodate prospective bourgeoisies (Leys, 2014). The officially post-independence government sponsored settlement, the Million – acre schemes settled over 14,873 families on 151,500 hectares by 1974 by 1971 had approximately transferred 526,000 hectares to smallholder settlement schemes. Further, 390,000 hectares were purchased by African and Asian individuals, partnerships or cooperatives, some of whom continued cultivation on a large-scale basis (Van Arkadie, 2016). The state redistributed land to the rural poor, in other words, as a pre-emptive strategy for defusing unrest, not as a means to achieving economic development.

1.10.3 The Kenyatta Government (1963- 1978)

The Kenya Government presumably understood the possibilities of more profitable avenues for agricultural investment, particularly in existing small-scale agriculture away from the colonial land resettlement policies spearhead by the LDSB (Clough, 1965). Thus, upon self rule in June 1963, the government replaced the LDSB with the Central Land Board and its function were taken over by the Department of Settlement and later the Ministry of Land and Settlement in the post-independence government (Ley, 1971). The Central Land Board was established on 7 April 1963 but became operational in October 1963, alongside it was the setting up of the Ministry of Land Settlements and Water Development to protects regional interests and inspire confidence among the white settlers(Angelo, 2016).

Beginning June 1963, the Million Acre scheme was initiated (Angelo, 2016), where multitudes of Africans moved into the former scheduled area after independence as part of the much touted social and economic transformation. This transformation involves the switch from the variety of pre-colonial systems towards peasant production throughout Kenya. New policies and institutions controlled and moulded the peasantry production systems into the wider framework of periphery capitalism. In the end, the million Acre scheme ensured the stability of Kenya's land market and created an attractive investment to foreign and expatriate capital which by 1967 had bought up almost as much land that had been earmarked for smallholder settlement. This led to the passage of the land control Act which gave the district – level boards powers to vet land transactions (Leys, 1971).

The Million Acre schemes were supported by the Registered Land Act of 1963 which replaced the Native Lands Registration Ordinance of 1959. The Registered Land act of 1963 was based on the English land registration system and abolished all form of customary or cooperative forms of land holdings while vesting the proprietor of land with absolute ownership of the land as registered owner free from all other interests and claims, but subject only to registered interests and such other overriding interests in the land (Coldham, 1982). Through this act, the Million Acre schemes succeeded in employing millions of landless Africans and was credited with increasing the agricultural output throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The records from the 1966-1970 development plant reported that the settlement objectives had largely been attained, but landlessness was inevitably growing all the time (Leys, 1971).

Since independence the government of Kenya implemented land adjudication programme with great vigour since it viewed land as a major precondition for increasing land productivity by preventing uneconomic fragmentation, by encouraging long-term investments in the land, and by creating the collateral for farm credit (Coldham, 1982). In the early years after independence many European farms were bought and subdivided for resettling Africans through the Million Acre schemes, but later land purchases become increasingly private transfers as able Africans purchased European farms, either as individuals or forming companies or partnerships for the purpose. In the end, the patterns of land use and land distribution varied enormously throughout the country and, in particular, the effects of the colonial land policies continue to be significant as there are several large-scale farms owned by Africans in concert with landlessness(Heyer, 1974a).

The land resettlement programmes immediately after independence in 1963 faced significant political interferences from the government as indicated by the informal government policy that called for the creation of z-plots for the African elite apparently by the initiative of President Kenyatta himself, which were the 100-acre plots quite substantial former European farms' houses at a cost of £500 (supported by loans) and with an expected annual target incomes of £250 or more. The plots were intended for potential community leaders, a sort of created squirearchy drawn from political leaders, high-level civil servants and military officers (Van Arkadie, 2016)

Based on the configuration of the colonial agricultural and land policies, the GDP had double again in 1964 with the new growth being attributed to the agricultural exports (Leys, 1971). Between 1964 to 1969, agricultural production rose of an average of 4.5 per cent per annum and there was significant stratification in the settlement schemes. At the top were the very large – scale individual owners with linkages professionally, socially and economically to foreign capital with farm managers. At the bottom were the peasant farmers with freehold land titles, with little access to capital, extension services or other inputs (Ley, 1971).

The policy makers in the independent Kenya were sceptical of the economic benefits of small plots of land to the large population of landless Kenyans. They believed in the importance of economies of scale, and that rural Kenyans had little agricultural knowledge and would make unproductive farmers (Moskowitz, 2015). As such in 1966, the land redistribution through the settlement schemes took a political perspective. The resulted in political tension between the KANU (Kenya African National Union) and KPU (Kenya People Union) as a result of failure of the post independence government policies to solve the challenge of landlessness. There was not enough land for all the landless people, while the African ruling elite had its own significant holdings for redistribution and could not consent for redistribution (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006).

Further, administrative policies on the land policy in the independent government of Kenya were under political control. Many at times the government of the day relied on the institutional control of the state apparatus (provincial administration) who were appointed to the land control boards as chairperson and were thus responsible for the land settlement activities. This enabled the African elite to gain from land allocation and influence the agricultural land reform by the lack of the political will for reformation. Further, the African elite replaced the departed colonial regime and this resulted in favourable dividend to the ruling elite with unintended consequence on the process of Africanization (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006).

The settlement schemes also endogenously influenced the new settlers as the main economic institutions did not fully succeed in translating economic opportunities for the African settlers nor did it induce them towards full participation in the modern economy. In particular, the fact that most settlers were new to the colonial economic set-up and therefore they would encounter challenges in integrating them to the demand of the modern economy. Due to this challenges, (Harbeson, 1967) noted that the independent government policies overlooked the already established settlement schemes and focused on the former African areas while expanding the areas for further resettlement. For instance, the development plan 1966 - 1970 emphasized on the former African areas for their greater agricultural potential rather than the new African areas.

The agricultural policy in the 1960s Kenya favoured agriculture as its success was attributable to agricultural research (Gilbert et al., 1994). This is evidence by the formation of the Kenya Seed Company in 1956 as large – scale settler research which accelerated maize production through the development of the modern maize breed from Kitale Synthetic II which was released in 1960, to the Hybrid 611 whose output was much superior and 40 per cent more than the Kitale Synthetic II. This maize breed was released to the smallholder and large – scale farmers revolutionized maize production in the independent Kenya (Oloo, 2020). However, the policy was one – sided and biased against other agronomic zones as there were no agronomic research and the related absence of innovations suitable for smallholder farming systems in the lower, drier arable areas and this constrained development in these zones (Von Pischke, 1977)

Between 1965 and 1969, the total land registered doubled and grew four-fold to 8 million hectares from 1.6 million hectares between 1970-1974, effectively covering most of the agricultural land in Kenya. Land registration in independent Kenya fast tracked the acquisition and access to credit facilities to enable the agricultural development programmes (Leys, 1971). As observed from the 1964 -1970 Development Plan, a further five million acres passed into African hands through a free market policy not small-scale plots but as large-scale farms, with about 180,000 acres going into ADC. By mid-1977, some 4.8 million hectares of former white highland land had been adjudicated and the registered (Coldham, 1982a).

Other significant ways included the guaranteed minimum return and large farm credit programs for commercial farmers (Gilbert et al., 1994). At the end of the 1960s, the two central policies supporting the peasant production system were the individualization of land tenure and the differential provision of credit (Leys, 1971). This policy was supplemented by a wide variety of institutionalized mechanism design to integrate peasant production into the established capitalist economic framework. For instance, the policy called for new institutionalized arrangements to support the peasant production systems and these largely included the Agricultural finance corporation (AFC), agricultural development corporation (ADC), large scale farmers training centres (FTC) and many others. This new agricultural system was purpose-made and exceptionally well backed by external funds and manpower and worked holistically well throughout the 1960s.

The policy of the independent Kenyan governments also emphasized on the marketing boards which included Kenya Cooperative Creameries, maize and produce board, Kenya meat commission which operated as government - controlled boards. The general outcome of the African ownership of the producer and marketing boards was the protection of large-scale farmer positions which had to be reconstructed in 1967 and 1968 due to the market dynamics. An economic appraisal of the settlement schemes indicated that profits per acre from 1964 to 1968 grew considerably faster on high-density scheme than on low – density scheme (Leo, 1971) while a von Hauqwitz's study on 532 plots on five settlement schemes as early as 1967 reported that 60% of the plots were carrying between ten and twenty persons and over 20% were carrying more than twenty (Ley, 1971).

In terms of agricultural productivity, in the late 1960s, marketed coffee dominates crop production followed pyrethrum and tea, but by early 1970s tea had overtaken pyrethrum and close to coffee. Horticultural products represented a substantial proportion of marketed output. However, subsistence and unrecorded marketed output of horticultural crops contributed significantly as well livestock products (Heyer, 1974). Nyeri, Nyandarua (all settlement scheme farms), Kiambu, Kwale, South Nyanza and Nandi Districts were leading suppliers of dairy products and as per the 1968 productions statistics, the Nandi district had 166,689 Zebu cattle, 14,908 modern cow breeds, producing 1,433,000 gallons of milk and 912 gallons of cheese which represented close to 10% of the national output of the dairy products. mixed cropping was far more important in some districts than in others with the areas under crop mixtures, and the number of crops in a mixed cropping were comparatively low in

Kericho and Nandi districts, where maize is grown in pure stands. Elsewhere, mixed cropping is obviously extensive and intricate except in Kakamega and Bungoma and Kisii districts.

By 1970, more than two – thirds of old European mixed farm areas had been occupied by probably 500,000 Africans with the remaining third – roughly million acres still in European hands and would be purchased over the next decade. The land reforms expanded African smallholder cash-crop production, and allowed African smallholders to expanded rapidly into tree crop production such as coffee and tea for export (Van Arkadie, 2016). Tea production expanded gradually until the middle 1960s, before rapidly expanding in other regions. Nyeri was the first to expand tea production and was overtaken by other districts and by early 1970s, Kericho, Kiambu and Meru districts had rapidly expanded while Kirinyaga, Nandi, Embu, Kakamega and Elgeyo-Marakwet districts lagged behind (Heyer, 1974). The veterinary and extension service were heavily subsidised and this contributed substantially to the expansion of the smallholder dairy sub-sector. However, there was a bottleneck in the production of high-quality semen in the Central Artificial Insemination Station, Nairobi (Reynolds et al., 1993).

Earlier estimates in the 1970s point to the presence to two parallel marketing channels. The formal marketing board which was a predecessor to the Maize Board controlled between 40% to 50% of the maize with the remainder being either consumed locally or sold through informal channels. As per varied reports, the share of the maize produce market controlled by the Maize Board fluctuate between 40% in 1974/75 to 80% in 1981/82, while more than four-fifths of the sales went to large millers who supplied the three main urban area of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu (Gilbert et al., 1994).

In some way, policy of the independent government in Kenya can be blamed for the failure in the maize production in the early 1970s. The government inherited the controlled marketing systems at independence and viewed them as the ideal vehicle to implement the objectives of food sufficiency and the promotion of the welfare of the millions of smallholder farmers (Jayne & Smale, 2005). There was an overreliance on maize as the main crop in the settlement schemes in the rift valley with the total income generated making up over three-fourths of the income received. This scenario would be unfavourable to the farmers when the markets for the maize fluctuated as seen in the early 1970s when political machinations determined the both consumer and producer markets (Chune, 1997a).

Throughout 1970s effective breeding and agronomic research program served as the basis for the agricultural productivity in Kenya with other important policy initiatives being; an active field extension service; a commercial seed firm (KSC) providing seeds at reasonable prices; and a well-coordinated effort through all stages of the research and technology transfer (Gilbert et al., 1994). These institutional and scientific cooperation created a success story in maize production throughout the 1960s and 1970s but all the achievements went south after the withdrawal of public financial support for research aid by USAID in 1977 (Oloo, 2020). Estimates showed that 70 per cent of the maize production were attributable to the smallholder farmer who were disadvantaged in terms of production, mechanization, access to credits and markets (Meilink, 2018).

1.10.4 The Moi Government (1978- 1992)

The Moi Government began with significant challenges such as the policy failures (Mukonoweshuro, 1990) food shortages of 1980, the failure of the parastatals, that is public enterprises tasked with the socio-economic transformation, the political upheavals of 1982, and general declining agricultural output (Campbell, 1983). When the Moi regime came to power in 1978, nearly fifteen years after independence, the Kenyan economy was characterized by the twin crises of unemployment and landlessness. In 1979, the Department of Land and Settlement was reorganized with the Department of Settlement falling under the Office of the President (Leys, 1971). Agriculture had witnessed a persistent decline from annual growths of 5.8 % between 1964 and 1972 to 2 per cent between 1972 and 1978 and 1.2 per cent in 1979.

Goldsworthy (1982) observed that maize production declined in the years between 1976 and 1979 due to the effects of the Maize Board of Kenya and the natural limitations of arable land. However, the dawn of liberalization, guaranteed minimum return policy and the credit programs for the large-scale commercial farmers were abolished. The government introduced fertilizer subsidies and entrenchment of the marketing boards through the merging of the Maize Marketing Board with the Wheat Marketing Board to create the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) in 1979 which in effect was a price control method for both producers and consumers alike (Gilbert et al., 1994)

In 1980, gross domestic product and agricultural production grew at rate far below projected rates. The rapid expansion of the population and a shortage of unexploited arable land in the main high potential areas began to expose a potentially dangerous imbalance between the national supply of and demand for food. The food shortages were attributable to the annual population growth rate, diminishing arable land supply of less than 18 percent of the country's total area, poor government strategy, inappropriate public policies, and poorly administered programs and projects (Cohen, 1984).

Many of the then development arrangements were tied to the public enterprises which totalled 63 parastatals (publicly – owned state enterprises) which was roped into the producer cooperatives in Kenya. These enterprises faced external constraints arising from policy guidelines and managerial laxity thus, their boards are more likely to fail in discharging their duties. Parochial or personal interest, nepotism and tribalism is rife with corruption and inefficiencies plaguing their operations (Oyugi, 1980a).

For instance, the shortage of maize in 1980 was attributed to the poor management of the Maize board in that the board was unable to control its stock and gave preferential treatment to some millers. As of 1980, Kenya Cooperative Creameries, Kenya Meat Commission, Wheat Board faced serious financial difficulties. Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) were in dire straits that the minister of Cooperative Development once threatened to have it absorbed into the mainstream of cooperative movement to ensure more efficient management. Top management was also accused by former employees of gross irregularities and general mismanagement (Oyugi, 1980a).

By 1982, the Kenyan economy headed into a depression, characterized by exhausted foreign exchange reserves, substantial deficits in the balance of payments, stagnation in export crops due to low international prices, soaring government borrowing, high inflation and a rising debt service ratio. Due to these conditions, agricultural development largely remained underfunded in the early 1980s (Mukonoweshuro, 1990). The Dairy Board fully exercised its mandate of regulating milk market. Essentially, Self-help groups, not registered as co-operatives were able to exploit the legal loophole in the co-operative to collect and sell milk. This scenario created price differences in the producer and consumer prices (Mukonoweshuro, 1990).

In the 1980s, Kevelenge (1978) observed that the dairy production system was plagued by low production parameters due to the insufficient feeding arrangements and in particular, the energy deficiency in the feeds. Most smallholder farmers in the tropical zones tended towards foraging as the main feeding arrangement and since tropical pastures are capable of meeting only maintenance and moderate level of production at most times of the year, then these animals cannot obtain sufficient nutrients to meet their production requirements.

Dairy farming faced several challenges which include; inadequate tick prevention due to the inadequate acaricides in the plunge dipping technique, animal diseases epidemics such as the Rift Valley Fever, East Coast Fever which usually devastated the animal population and the shortage of pasture and water during dry spells especially between the months of December and March (Chune, 1997a). The seasonal fluctuations in milk production among the smallholding farming systems are associated with erratic nature of nutrition (Kevelenge, 1978)

Reynolds et al., (1993) observed that the decline of the milk production and the problems of milk marketing were as a result of the inefficiencies of the KCC which was in effect a state-owned enterprise and thus was subject to managerial inefficiencies, political interference among other issues. In particular, KCC had the monopoly and had to buy all the surplus milk. These challenges coupled with the operational inefficiencies in the transportation of milk from impassable rural roads in some instances and translated into higher transaction costs for the producers. Severe problems have arisen in milk marketing since the KCC, already accused of managerial inefficiency, paying low producer prices and late payment to farmers suffer from loss of trade and under-capacity utilisation of processing plants. The KDB had become ineffectual as informal sales of raw milk expanded (Reynolds et al., 1993)

The policy designed to force sales of surplus to the NCPB, relied on official restriction of inter-district movements of maize to two bags. These restrictions introduced arbitraging opportunities who in turn created an illegal parallel market into which most smallholder maize was sold. Essentially, NCPB served a conduit for moving maize from the producer to consumer without any value addition (Meilink, 2018). According to Jayne and Smale (2005) the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) in Kenya, incurred losses equivalent to five percent of their countries' GDP during early 1980s. This aspect would later affect the ability of the NCPB to perform their function once the market was liberalized.

Other important significant impediments to the development of dairy farming according to Reynolds et al., (1993) include the non-funding of the animal health and extension services due to the statewide budgetary cuts following structural adjustment in the 1980s which consequently impact on the clinical, disease control and vaccination services. By the mid-1980s, the multilateral donors instituted structural adjustment programmes, which slashed the amount of funding for the provision of veterinary and extension and this led to a reduction in the milk output (Reynolds et al., 1993). As early as 1986, USAID reported that agricultural research programmes were suffering from structural and programming weakness arising from underfunding and neglect by the ministries involved. This inadvertently led to the failure of the plant breeding and ultimately affected the farm productivity (Gilbert et al., 1994).

The 1987 cereal sector reforms initiated by European bilateral donors called for the NCPB tasks to be scaled down to three main functions; a market stabilization mechanism through floor and ceiling market prices; maintenance of national food security stock; and finally, the commercialization operations in the maize market. The liberalization of the sector saw the NCPB only receive about 24 per cent of the total maize production by 1989 and 15 per cent by 1993 (Gilbert et al., 1994).

There was consumption shift which represented changes in diets and/or savings on food purchases. The price fluctuations in maize seasonally and over time sometimes reflected the incidence of drought, restrictions on the movement of maize, and seasonality in local supplies. These output fluctuations impacted the staple food prices. For instance, weather patterns were associated with the 31% decline in the maize prices from March to September 1985, but at the same it was related to the increase in the same period in 1987 (Gilbert et al., 1994).

The cereal sector reform program initiated by the multilateral donors in 1988 entailed the cutback in the state owned depots owned by the NCPB, and close 65 per cent of its buying centres by 1987. By 1998, NCPB operated 60 depots and over 600 buying centres translating to higher operational costs considering that maize producing areas of Rift Valley alone accounted for two-thirds of the total NCPB maize purchases (Meilink, 2018).

By 1989, the Kenya Seed Company (KSC) had developed and released 11 high-altitude maize hybrids that yielded more than 30% more output and maize improvement programmes were expanded into different agroclimatic zones. The fivefold increase in national maize production in Kenya was accompanied by the doubling in population over the same period (Gilbert et al., 1994). Furthermore, without the improvements in agricultural GDP (4.4% to 8%) attributed to maize technologies, the agricultural sector would not have been able to keep up with the almost 4% annual population growth during the past two decades in Kenya (Jayne & Smale, 2005).

In Kenya, the scientific and institutional cooperation that created the maize success story of the 1960s and 1970s collapsed in the 1980s, as a combination of fiscal crises and donor pressure weakened public financial support for research, extension, and credit (Jayne & Smale, 2005). Due to the underfunding of the maize research programmes and withdrawal of the budgetary support for agricultural services, smallholder farmers in the late 1980s and early 1990s were more unlikely to realize their yield potential for reasons not confined to weather. Other important reasons include lack thereof or inferior agronomic practices and efficient support services for smallholders, decline in soil fertility in intensive maize production systems, pest and disease problems which worsened with intensification of agriculture.

The Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) was officially responsible for the control of marketing and pricing of dairy produce. However, the price was strongly influenced by the main marketing organisation, the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC), which held a virtual monopoly of milk processing and distribution until the early 1990s (Reynolds et al., 1993). The Kenyan dairy farmer was tremendous resilience however, the onset of liberalization policies in 1992 made a significant difference as too many farmers broke away from the stranglehold of the monopoly of KCC to process and pack their own milk in many parts of the country.

It is also instructive that these innovations have been sustainable over time. From 1989 to 1993, the Nandi district boasted 89,392 consolidated land units with 57,955 registered land title deeds. And while registered cooperatives in the district numbered 124 by 1988, this figure had jumped to 138 by 1996. Moreover, Nandi produced 1,800 tons of cleaned coffee and boasted coffee processing units by 1996.

All these intrigues of the agricultural policy of pre- and post-independence Kenya point to an inescapable conclusion of the intertwined nexus between governmentality, political economy and the colonial legacy that formed the fulcrum of these programs. Most of the studies reviewed have not exposed this connection and hence this study's intention was to crystallize the nexus between these specific interconnected issues and link them to the Ndalat Settlement Scheme which was a direct product of the colonial legacy.

1.11 Theoretical Framework

The study employs the commercialization and articulation theories in order to interpret the activities of smallholders in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme.

1.11.1 Commercialization Theory

The study embraced Commercialization Theory by Jorgenson (1961) in order to understand the transition of agriculture in the Ndalat settlement scheme in the late colonial period and post-independence era. Scholars such as Livingstone have argues that commercialization as a way of achieving agricultural development has been advocated for by many scholars and development experts over the years. He further avers that the advancement of this theory is as a result of the lack of improvement in the subsistence farmers' welfare and economy of countries where farmers practice subsistence farming. Therefore, the advocates of agricultural transformation draw attention to commercialization as a way of increasing farmers' welfare and spurring economic growth. In his work, 'The development of dual Economy', Jorgenson who developed the theory of dual economy divided into two sectors modern sector (manufacturing) and traditional sector (agriculture). In his analysis, the agricultural sector was assumed to be a function of land and labour without capital accumulation.

In analyzing the contribution of agriculture to economic growth under the context of Jorgenson's dual economy, Jorgenson (1961) pointed out five ways in which agriculture contributes to economic growth. These were: providing food in face of rising demand; increasing incomes and foreign exchange earnings through agricultural exports; providing labour by pushing labour from agriculture to manufacturing; provision of capital since it is the dominant sector in developing countries; and increasing incomes for the rural farm population as a stimulus to industrial growth. However, Johnston and Mellor gave increased agricultural output and productivity as a precondition to agriculture contributing to economic growth. They posed that the increasing output and productivity could be achieved through commercialization, a view supported by (Khan & Bergan, 1966)

Many scholars see agricultural commercialization as a product of a series of stages. The farmer is postulated to move from subsistence farming to a mixed family farming and then to commercialized agriculture. In the subsistence farming system, inputs are mainly generated in the home (e.g. manure) and there is no trading of outputs. Todaro (1977) avers that the goal of this farming model is food sufficiency. In the mixed family farming, though the goal is still food sufficiency, the farmers use home generated and market sourced inputs and part of the produce (mainly the surplus) is sold. In the commercial agriculture, the farmer is fully engaged with the input market (with the aim of increasing productivity and enhance specialization) and output markets (in order to maximize profits). Therefore, in this process, the smallholder farmers undergoes an agricultural transformation process by shifting from subsistence agriculture to specialized production that interacts with both the inputs and outputs markets. Under this premise, it is noteworthy that though commercialization is mostly viewed as a specialization in cash crops, this is not essentially the case with commercialization of staple or traditional food crops being a common phenomenon especially among smallholder farmers (Jaleta et al., 2009). Moreover, market failures and barriers to entry in to the export markets by smallholder farmers in developing countries makes these farmers diversify into non-staples but not to fully specialize depending on their agro-ecological and market circumstances (Muricho, 2015). Agricultural production in commercialized farms is market oriented. Therefore, commercialization at the farm level goes beyond increasing production in order to have surplus production to the market to include the household's choice behaviour on input use and production motivated by profit maximization.

Using this theory, the study argued that the original intention of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme was geared towards commercialization of farming. This is underscored by the intensity of the effort that was invested in the scheme both in terms of land and support to farmers. It was hoped that the farmers would then transition from subsistence and embrace commercial farming. However, due to a series of factors ranging from diminished support, lack of inputs, reduced market of produce as well as fluctuation of prices and poor storage, the goal of commercialization of farming in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme never materialized. This cannot be divorced from the concept of governmentality where the plans of the government for its people are intended to benefit the government operations rather than genuinely transform the lives of the people. This disconnect can be seen as the one responsible for the eventual collapse of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme.

1.11.2 Articulation Theory

To be able to understand how the settlement scheme managed to withstand the challenges that faced other schemes in the 1970's and 80's, the study employed the Articulation theory in arguing that the western agrarian practices that were introduced in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme managed to take off at the onset because of their articulation with the African approaches. This theory, propounded by Hall (1985) and others provides a critical framework for understanding the complex, contingent, and often unstable configurations of power, culture, and economy that characterize post-colonial Africa. Far from depicting social transformation as a linear progression from "traditional" to "modern" or from "pre-capitalist" to "capitalist," articulation allows us to see how multiple modes of production, ideologies, and subjectivities are temporarily linked without necessity, permanence, or full integration into historically specific social formations. In the African context, this theory illuminates how colonial structures were not simply discarded at independence but were rearticulated under new political arrangements that preserved, modified, and sometimes deepened existing inequalities while giving them the appearance of national sovereignty and developmental progress.

At its core, articulation refers to the process by which distinct elements, the economic structures, cultural identities, political discourses are connected in ways that transform their meanings and effects, even as they retain their relative autonomy (Hall, 1985). As Hall famously illustrated through the metaphor of an "articulated lorry," the cab (representing, for instance, state ideology and the trailer (representing peasant agriculture or informal economies) are linked through a specific, historically contingent mechanism that can be undone or reconfigured under different conditions (Grossberg, 1986). This challenges both economistic Marxism, which assumes that economic structures unilaterally determine cultural and political forms, and essentialist culturalism, which views identities and traditions as timeless and internally coherent. Instead, articulation posits a world without guarantees, a post-foundational terrain where meaning, identity, and power are perpetually contested and reassembled (Laclau & Mouffe, 2014).

The articulation concept postulates that there is the need for the differentiation between an object and the idea of that object in that 'things' that are derived from the ideas take a form of conceptual essentialism. From an economical view, economism takes shape as a form in which production systems consist of an economy, a definite combination of relations and forces of production, having definite political, legal and cultural conditions of existence which cannot be secured through the action of the economy itself. The installation and incorporation of classical capitalism into peasantry modes of production needs to be articulated from the structured dominance relationship brought about by the inevitable transformation of pre-capitalist modes and their dissolution by capitalist relations.

Put into context, especially for the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, the concept is especially vital to understanding how the Africans, a social category often dismissed in classical Marxist theory as residual or transitional was not erased by capitalist development but actively reproduced as a functional component of global capital accumulation. Far from being a sign of backwardness or failed modernization, the persistence of smallholder and subsistence farming reflects what Berman (1984) describes as capital's strategic reliance on subordinate, non-capitalist modes of production. These modes supply flexible labour, absorb surplus populations during economic downturns, and buffer metropolitan economies from crisis. Thus, the reproduction of the African peasantry is not an obstacle to capitalism but an intrinsic feature of its global operation, a continuous form of "primitive accumulation" that Marx described as the violent expropriation of land and labour at capitalism's origins, now rendered as an ongoing, structural necessity.

The Kenyan case offers a powerful illustration. The post-independence settlement schemes such as Chune (1997) or even Ndalat were not designed to create an isolated category of Africans small holders. In fact, it was a demonstration of articulation which was mixed with the western goals of agriculture that sought to fuse with the African agricultural practices. The Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) deliberately differentiated between "yeoman" holdings (~20 hectares) for aspiring elites, "owner-assisted" smallholdings (~6 hectares) for a rural middle stratum, and high-density plots for the landless poor (Lonsdale & Berman, 1979a). By July 1963, colonial and early post-colonial authorities further instructed that up to 5% of high-density plots be enlarged specifically for civil servants, soldiers, and salaried professionals, what (Clarke, 2018) terms a calculated insertion of a "prospective bourgeoisie" into the agrarian landscape. This was not accidental stratification but political engineering: a strategy to stabilize the new state by creating loyal rural intermediaries while simultaneously disciplining the broader peasantry through debt, marketing controls, and limited access to extension services.

Here, articulation operates at multiple levels: economic, political, and discursive. Economically, it links capitalist agro-export models with subsistence practices, allowing the state to extract surplus without fully transforming peasant relations. Politically, it constructs class fractions that serve as conduits of state power in rural areas. Discursively, it reconfigures the meaning of "development," "modernity," and "African farmer" in ways that legitimize inequality as national progress. As Laclau and Mouffe (2014) argue, discourse is not merely language but the very fabric of social reality encompassing institutions, practices, and material relations. A maize field, for instance, is not just a site of cultivation; it is a nodal point where discourses of food security, national sovereignty, gendered labour, and market rationality converge. The Maize Marketing Board (MMB), established in 1959, attempted to fix this field within a technocratic discourse of centralized control. Yet, over time, smallholder farmers, cooperatives, and civil society groups rearticulated maize as a symbol of resistance challenging price controls, marketing monopolies, and exclusionary development models.

This rearticulation is not automatic; it requires antagonism, that is a rupture that exposes the limits of a hegemonic discourse and opens space for counter-hegemonic projects. Antagonisms are not natural or essential (e.g., "race" or "gender" as biological facts) but socially constructed through struggle. In post-colonial Kenya, the fragmentation of land through inheritance, the gendered burden of domestic labour, and the volatility of global commodity prices became antagonisms that revealed the contradictions of state-led agrarian capitalism. When women in Naitiri protested discriminatory credit policies or youth demanded land redistribution, they were not merely expressing pre-existing grievances; they were constituting themselves as political subjects through the act of articulation, linking local experiences to broader claims about justice, equity, and citizenship.

Stuart Hall's contribution deepens this analysis by emphasizing that hegemony is not imposed from above but constructed through a delicate, ongoing process of cultural politics. Projects must "articulate" with the fragmented, contradictory field of "common sense" borrowing and bending popular themes about nation, family, work, and morality to secure consent (Hall, 1985). In post-colonial Africa, nationalist elites often rearticulated anti-colonial rhetoric into a developmentalist ideology that equated "progress" with export-oriented agriculture, mechanization, and Western-style modernity. Yet, as Hall warned, this hegemonic project was never fully successful.

Crucially, Hall (1985) viewed articulation not just as a theoretical concept but as an embodied practice a form of political and pedagogical engagement rooted in listening, translation, and dialogue. In the African context, this implies a pedagogy that takes seriously the multiplicity of rural life worlds not as obstacles to development but as resources for alternative futures. When environmental justice activists in Kenya frame soil degradation not as a technical problem but as a violation of intergenerational obligation, they are practicing articulation: connecting ecological crisis to cultural memory, spiritual values, and political mobilization (Lonsdale & Berman, 1979).

Moreover, articulation theory guards against the pitfalls of both universalism and particularism. It rejects the assumption that African societies must follow a predetermined path of capitalist development, while also resisting romanticized notions of cultural purity. As DeLuca (1999) notes, a framework enables us to see identity as a "nodal point" constituted through the intersection of multiple, often conflicting discourses.. A woman farmer in western Kenya, for example, is not simply a "peasant," "mother," or "entrepreneur"; she is a subject position produced through the contingent alignment of kinship obligations, market participation, state policy, and global value chains. Her agency emerges not from a fixed essence but from the tensions between these discourses a space where resistance and reinvention become possible.

In sum, articulation theory offers a powerful lens for analysing post-colonial Africa not as a zone of failure or exception but as a dynamic site of ongoing negotiation between global capital, state power, local knowledge, and popular agency. It reveals how colonial legacies are not erased but reconfigured; how domination is secured not through coercion alone but through the selective incorporation of subaltern practices; and how resistance emerges not from outside the system but from within its cracks and contradictions. By foregrounding contingency, heterogeneity, and struggle, articulation challenges us to move beyond deterministic models of development and instead imagine more just, plural, and democratic forms of social life, ones that do not require homogenization to achieve connection, and that recognize difference not as division but as the very ground of political possibility.

After a century of colonial rule and independent national existence in Africa, the relations of production in which the peasantry are involved are necessarily poised in relation to the development of capital. In analysing the persistence of the peasantry, the passive notion of 'survival' is dropped and the question changes to that of reproduction of the peasantry and its function for imperialism. The reproduction of the peasantry and the pre-capitalist forms of production is thus seen as necessary and functional for capital. Thus, the reproduction rather than the expropriation of the peasantry in Africa represents a continuing process of primitive accumulation that is an intrinsic part of capitalist development (Berman, 1984). Thus, the social relationship in capitalist production systems is based on domination and subordination (Hindess & Hirst, 1977). Berman (1984) argued that the existence of subordinate and dominated pre-capitalist modes is essential for the continued reproduction of capital in metropolitan centres of development.

Therefore, in line with Hall’s Articulation model, this dual model of the economy based on an export-led, import-substitution, foreign investment supported type of economic development brought about contrasting returns to the economic development of the Africans in Ndalat Settlement Scheme. At the same time, it further undermined the economic position of the Africans in the scheme (Hall, 2019). Ndalat settlement can be articulated as a form of peasant production system which was in sync with the envisaged smallholder productions at the establishment of the settlement schemes in independent Kenya. However, due to systemic political and economic factors, the articulation failed to yield the anticipated goals and hence the subsequent diminish of the scheme.

1.12 Research Methodology

1.12.1 Study Area

The study was carried out in the Ndalat settlement scheme which is located in Ndalat Location of Nandi County. Before the Kenyan constitution in 2010, the current Nandi County was designated as Nandi District. It formed part of the then Rift Valley province. Ndalat Settlement Scheme was selected based on the fact that it was among the first schemes to be established at the eve of independence Ndalat location has three sub-locations of Ndalat, Lemook and Kaigat. The area is an undulating valley dissected by Rivers flowing to the Western zone of the county. The main shopping centre is Ndalat which has existed since the colonial era and its GPS is the location (0.536823 and latitude 35.101542). Ndalat location has a population of 402 households as per the original land distribution during the 1961 land transfer.



Figure 2: Map of Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Mosop Sub – County in Nandi County

Source: Moi University Department of Geography and Environment Studies GIS Lab.

1.12.2 Research Philosophy

The study is underpinned by an interpretivism approach because the study enters the social world of the informants and seeks to understand their world view. Interpretivism as a philosophical approach is a function of a particular set of circumstances and individuals coming together at a specific time and therefore is highly appropriate to the circumstance of the study. The epistemology of interpretivism philosophical foundation is drawn from subjective meanings and social phenomena.

The study focused on the details and descriptions of the historical situation in the Ndalat Settlement scheme since its establishment and in doing so sought to unravel the reality behind the historical details and the subjective meanings that motivated the observed action. Typically, the study was inductive and more of in-depth investigations of the historical details in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme from 1954 to 1992. The study used interviews as the main research instrument with small samples of 46 informants and information was analysed qualitatively.

1.12.3 Research Design

The study employed a historical qualitative design as it gives a description of the features of specific phenomena and also produce an accurate profile of factors, events and situations given the economic and social influence of the Ndalat settlement scheme in Nandi County. The study provides a historical description of the events that occurred during the establishment of the settlement scheme in 1961 and interrogate the changes of major economic and social transformations that occurred thereafter.

1.12.4 Study Population

The target population for this study comprised 50 farmers from the 402 registered plots in the Ndalat Settlement scheme and other key persons directly involved in mixed farming systems including agricultural extension officers, co-operative officers, livestock extension officers and national government administrative officers. Purposive sampling was selected because it is ideal for qualitative research. Kasomo (2006) posits that this type of sampling gives the researcher an opportunity to get those informants who are knowledgeable through either interacting with the matter under investigation (Extreme case sampling) or experts on the matter being investigated (Maximum variation sampling)(Kasomo, 2006). Therefore, the researcher targeted those respondents that had the information that was needed for the study, namely those who have interacted with the scheme for a long time as well as experts in Agriculture by virtue of professional undertaking both past and present. Therefore, the study targeted 50 respondents out of which 38 were farmers and the remaining 12 were experts and current and former Agricultural officers. Dworkin (2012) calls for a qualitative study to sample a minimum of 25 individuals and a maximum of 50 individuals because of saturations point. Mason (2010) indicated that saturation point is a significant factor in deciding a sample size for qualitative research. To this end, saturation was determined by the frequency of repeated responses which demonstrated that the relevant data had been collected.

The inclusion criteria entailed selecting those people from the settlement scheme who have an economic and social history of the settlement and thus can answer the objectives of the study. Thus, the study used the purposive sampling technique to sample the farmers while Snowball sampling was used to select the Key Informants. This entailed identifying of those who are considered to have the requisite knowledge about the scheme and allowing them to recommend others with a similar experience.

1.12.5 Data Sources

This study used both primary and secondary sources of information. The primary data comprised data from the Kenya National Archives (KNA), interviews of key informants including smallholder farmers, agricultural and livestock extension officers, national government administrative officers. For the success of this study, secondary sources were obtained from journal, articles and books accessed from libraries in Kenya including; Margaret Thatcher Library (MTL), Moi University, Jomo Kenyatta Library (JKL) University of Nairobi (UoN), Kenya National Library Services (KNLS) Eldoret and University of Eastern African Baraton Library (UEAB).

1.12.6 Data Collection

Primary data was largely collected and the study employed two primary data collection instruments namely; interviews and documentary reviews. Because of the fact that the study relied on the interpretive approach, the interview was seen as the most ideal method of data collection because it allowed the informants to interpret the issues based on their lived experiences. As such, interview schedules were designed with open-ended questions and additional probing questions and were considered suitable for obtaining firsthand information from the informants. These instruments were used to draw out an in-depth understanding of the establishment and the socio-economic transformation in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in 1954 to 1992. The data collection process involved notes taking notes and audio recordings. Documentary reviews involved the historical records and information from books, journal and articles drawn from online repositories and libraries.

1.12.7 Data Analysis Techniques

In actualizing the study, data collected was analysed qualitatively. Qualitative data were evaluated, classified into logical thematic categories based on the objectives and then coded. The analysis of qualitative data collected using interviews and document analysis was an ongoing process where emerging themes were categorized based on the research questions. Since the interviews generates qualitative data, data transcription mechanisms were used to translate the unstructured data into meaningful information. This was backed up by Archival resources that depicted the actual happenings. The interpretive approach ensured that all data that was gathered through interviews, documentary review as well as Archival sources was welded together and presented chronologically to form the historical account of the colonial legacy of the Ndalat Settlement scheme. Accordingly, a permission letter to carry out the study obtained from the respective authorities and verbal consents were obtained from the informants. Any individual who participated in the study was accorded respect and their participation was based on their own volition. The mode of collecting data from informants was evaluated in order to enhance the information collecting environment.

1.12.8 Ethical Considerations

Generally, ethical behaviour conforms to the notion of fairness, justice, and acceptability to the study participants. Ethical behaviour draws from one's standards of morality and is based on the social acceptability of behaviour. The study employed various steps in ensuring adherence to research ethical standards. First, the researcher sought and obtained a research permit from the National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) number NACOSTI/P/24/35688 before commencing the data collection process. Second, the researcher sought and obtained permission from county commissioner's office, Nandi County before commencing the data collection exercise. Lastly, the researcher wrote a letter of transmittal of data collection instruments to individual informants.

During the data collection process, the researcher sought voluntary participation from the participants with the individuals being informed of their right to choose to participate or even decline. In situations where an individual informant chose not to respond, the researcher then sought a substantive replacement. Secondly, the researcher sought informed consent from the targeted study participants. Third, the researcher assured the research participants of the confidentiality of information being provided. Fourth, the researcher gave full disclosure to the research participants.

1.13 Summary of the Chapter

Chapter one was the research preparatory chapter because it not only laid the foundation of the study by outlining the objectives of the study as well as pointing out the gap that existed through related literature review that was buttressed by the theories that were applied. At the same time, the chapter proceeded by defining the study area while at the same time operationalising data collection, analysis and interpretation process. At the same time, the chapter periodized how the study will be laid out in subsequent chapters with chapter two laying the background foundation by reviewing the roots of the colonial land policies that gave rise to the Ndalat Settlement Scheme.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SETTLEMENT POLICY IN KENYA FROM 1954 TO 1962

2.0 Introduction

This section describes the roots and origins of the colonial settlement policies starting with ALUS and ALDEV of 1947 which were enlarged through the Swynnerton plan of 1954 and ended with the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) programmes (Belshaw, 1964) The colonial government promoted land transfer under the settlement programmes (Van Arkadie, 2016) , that included the LDSB schemes of which Ndalat settlement scheme is one of the pioneering high – density scheme (Clough, 1968). These plans were the blue prints that the colonial government used to control the masses at the height of rebellion. It should be noted that land was a very critical factor that birthed rebellion in colonial Kenya. Therefore, in an attempt to respond to the unrests, these policies were crafted and they were aimed at not only resettling landless Africans, but also spearheading commercial agriculture so as to transition them from the subsistence production that they were accustomed to. It will be demonstrated that as much as the plans were very ambitious and well grounded, they were affected by the economic and political environment at the national level.

2.1 The nature of the Colonial Settlement Policy in pre-independent Kenya

Between 1947 and 1964, Kenya witnessed one of the most ambitious and consequential agrarian transformations in colonial Africa a period marked not by spontaneous rural progress, but by the deliberate, state-engineered reorganization of land, labour, and livelihoods under the guise of development. The Agricultural Land Settlement (ALUS) and Agricultural Development (ALDEV) programmes of 1947, the landmark Swynnerton Plan of 1954, and the institutional consolidation embodied by the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) did not merely respond to economic needs; they were meticulously crafted instruments of political stabilization, designed to contain the rising tide of African nationalism while appeasing a white settler community fearful of impending decolonization. Far from being neutral interventions in agriculture, these policies constituted a comprehensive project of social engineering, one that sought to remake African farming in the image of European smallholder ideals, while simultaneously co-opting a loyalist peasantry into a new colonial order. What emerged was not a uniform rise in rural prosperity, but a stratified, contested, and deeply ideological transformation of Kenya's agrarian landscape.

2.2 Mau Mau period and Land reforms (1952-1956)

It is apparent that the reforms that the government enacted at the height of Mau Mau were informed by Faucoult's concept of governmentality as well as Commercialization theories. The government was eager to control the masses and it had realized that using force was not becoming effective as rebellion continued. As a result, having in mind the grievances of the masses, crafted the Swinerton plan. This was a policy document that, in its technical precision and sweeping ambition, became the blueprint for colonial agricultural reform across tropical Africa. Officially framed as a strategy to boost food production and increase African incomes, the plan was, in practice, a counterinsurgency measure born of the trauma of the Mau Mau Emergency. By offering land titles, credit, and technical support primarily to Kikuyu and other "cooperative" communities who had been dispossessed during the rebellion, the colonial state turned land reform into a tool of political pacification. As Holger Hansen has argued, the Swynnerton Plan did not seek justice for the landless, it sought to build a class of African smallholders whose economic dependence on the state would ensure their political loyalty (Amatsimbi, 2024). This logic extended beyond land allocation: the plan mandated land consolidation, enclosure, and individual titling practices that dismantled communal tenure systems long central to African social organization. The result was not greater equity, but the institutionalization of a new hierarchy, in which access to resources was contingent upon conformity to colonial norms of “responsible” farming.

The Swynnerton Plan found fertile ground among the Nandi population with deep historical ties to European settler agriculture. By the mid-1950s, Nandi had become a laboratory of colonial modernity. Terraces, grass filter strips, and bench terraces, 7,570 miles of them by 1954 crisscrossed the landscape, not merely as soil conservation measures, but as visible symbols of a new agrarian order (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/30/1957). These physical interventions were accompanied by a parallel transformation in farming knowledge: the adoption of chemical fertilizers, particularly single super phosphate, surged from ten tons in 1954 to widespread use by 1957, with Nandi becoming the only district in Kenya where African producers purchased fertilizers in significant quantities. Maize yields rose dramatically, with deliveries to government depots more than doubling between 1953 and 1955, transforming Nandi into a key node in Kenya’s cash crop economy. Yet these gains were not organic. They were the product of an intensive, state-led system of extension services, demonstration plots, and coercive incentives that linked access to credit, livestock, and machinery to compliance with prescribed farming practices

2.3 Institutional Restructuring and Cooperative Development

The institutional architecture underpinning this transformation was equally deliberate. Cooperative societies, once peripheral to rural life, became central pillars of colonial governance. By 1957, the Department of Agriculture noted that cooperatives had become “a feature of African life,” not simply as marketing agents but as schools of discipline, training farmers in committee work, bookkeeping, and bureaucratic compliance (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/30/1957). Loans for boreholes, water tanks, and corrugated iron roofs were disbursed not as acts of charity, but as conditional investments. To qualify, farmers had to hedge their fields, plant Napier grass for fodder, cultivate trees for fuel, and practice rotational grazing, all requirements that transformed the farm into a site of surveillance and behavioural regulation. (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958).Those who met these standards were rewarded with tractors, improved livestock, and access to markets; those who did not were left behind, reinforcing a stratified peasantry defined less by need than by obedience.

2.4 Agricultural Modernization and Productivity Gains

Commercialization theory guided the colonial agricultural plans. This is because the government established ambitious projects whose aim was to intensify agriculture and transition it from subsistence to commercial. For example, in a bid to upgrade indigenous Zebu herds, promoted crossbreeding with Sahiwal bulls and, later, exotic European breeds like Ayrshire. By 1958, eight Sahiwal bull camps had been established, over 160 inseminations performed, and more than 140 improved cattle distributed to selected farmers (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958). Disease control became another frontier of control: rinderpest inoculations reached tens of thousands annually, and non-compliance was met with prosecution as 50 Nandi farmers fined in 1955 alone for failing to vaccinate their herds (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/28.1955).

The shift from communal dips to individual spray pumps, with sales rising from 800 units in 1954 to nearly 2,000 by 1955, reflected not only technological adoption but a deeper ideological shift: the privatization of animal health and the erosion of collective responsibility. Even apiculture, a traditional practice sustained by bushland, was rendered obsolete by the expansion of paddocks and hedges, illustrating how the logic of modernization often came at the cost of indigenous ecological knowledge.

Farm mechanization further signaled the modernization of Nandi agriculture. In 1955, ten new tractors were acquired, and service rates rose from Shs. 40 to Shs. 55 per acre, indicating growing demand for mechanized plowing (DCNAN/1/28/1955). Yet the sector faced challenges: machinery companies struggled with poor management, employee dishonesty, and low customer satisfaction, revealing the fragility of private enterprise in a state-subsidized environment. Moreover, the benefits of mechanization were unevenly distributed, reinforcing existing inequalities among farmers.

Maize farming flourished in Nandi district and delivered 49,279 tons of maize to the agricultural produce control depot, more than double the amount delivered in 1953. In 1955, overall maize deliveries stood at 77,588 bags constituting 14.36% of the total maize deliveries for Rift Valley Province as a whole. By 1957, the continued prominence of cooperative societies was reflected in the Department of Agriculture's assertion that cooperatives were becoming "a feature of African life as they provide training in committee work and general business affairs (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958).

As early as 1954, the introduction of fertilizers had been progressively accepted by the Nandi community as peasant farmers had bought a total of ten tons of single super phosphate in 25-pound paper bags for the application to their maize fields. The areas were mainly confined to the Ndalat area of Nandi district (DCNAN/1/28/1955). In 1955, the Department of Agriculture annual report indicated the adoption and application of phosphate supplies had increased the maize yield. And in 1957, it was reported that “only in Nandi did African producers buy fertilizers in any quantity (DCNAN/1/30/1957).

The policy led to the increase in agricultural production rising from 6 per cent in 1957 to 14 per cent in 1963 (Leo, 1984) with the average number of cattle per household being six heads with the modal number being on for 16% households and an average of between one and four cattle per household in 57% households (KNA/Nandi Colonial Annual Report, 1955). About three quarters of the farmers sold their cattle because of fixed land sizes and to raise money to meet other family expenses such as school fees and family expenditure (KNA/Nandi Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Report, 1955). Cattle sales accounted for over fifty percent of the total income earned from livestock related activities second after maize production.

Market integration deepened as well. Cattle sales became a major source of income, contributing over 50% of livestock earnings, second only to maize. Before the 1958 trade recession, the district earned approximately £204,382 from livestock, with hides and skins generating £44,590 and £12,451 respectively (KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958).

Poultry keeping, especially among women’s clubs, gained traction, though egg prices fluctuated seasonally, exposing smallholders to market volatility. Nevertheless, demand for quality breeding stock outpaced supply by 1962, indicating strong grassroots engagement with commercial agriculture. Yet beneath these achievements lay profound structural contradictions. The promotion of exotic breeds and intensive farming marginalized traditional practices such as apiculture and reduced opportunities for sheep and goat rearing due to bush clearing and enclosure.

Furthermore, the focus on individual land titling undermined communal land ethics, fostering competition over increasingly scarce resources.

In support of Agricultural funding for supporting dairy farming, a joint board for loans and water supplies was instituted in 1956 with a capital of about £40,000 intended for individuals or groups who wished to install power pumps, rams, boreholes, corrugated iron roofs and water tanks. Despite an increase in interest rates in 1957 the demand for loans was greater than the capital available from all sources. During the year about 11 loans totalling roughly Shs. 18,000/= and 32 loans from the ADC totalling to Shs. 40,000/= were given out. In 1958, ADC gave 71 loans totalling Shs. 95,400/=, ALDEV gave 59 loans totalling to Shs. 79,000/= and the Joint Water Board gave 11 loans totalling to Shs. 19,000/=.

Mechanization, too, was both a symbol and a limitation of colonial ambition. Tractor services rose from Shs. 40 to Shs. 55 per acre by 1955, and ten new Fordson Majors were acquired to meet growing demand. Yet mechanization remained unevenly distributed, accessible only to those who could meet the stringent criteria for credit and land improvement. Private machinery firms struggled with poor management and dishonest employees, exposing the fragility of market-based solutions in a context where the state remained the primary arbiter of opportunity.

Farm mechanisation greatly advanced in the Nandi District and in 1955 the Agricultural Officer reported that:

> *The use of mechanized implements such as the tractors flourished, and rates for service have risen from about Shs. 40/= to Shs. 55/= per acre and 10 more tractors were purchased by the Nandi district during the year. However, farm machinery companies were beset by several problems, such as lack of business ability, dishonest employees, low customer satisfaction and poor work standards.. In terms of agricultural loans few successful farmers met the criteria for loans - (a) farm fully hedged and stock proof (b) 1/2 acre of*

> *Napier grass planted as stock feed, (c) trees planted for fuel and shade, and (d) rotational grazing practised among others.*

The legacy of this period is not merely one of increased maize yields or fenced homesteads. It is the enduring inheritance of a system that equated development with control, progress with conformity, and modernity with the erasure of indigenous ways of knowing. The Nandi District, once a site of fierce resistance to colonial encroachment, became a showcase for colonial reform its terraces and cattle sheds standing as monuments not to liberation, but to managed transition. The colonial state succeeded in transforming African agriculture into a productive, market-integrated sector, but at the cost of deepening social inequality, fracturing communal ties, and embedding a dependency on state patronage that would haunt post-independence policy for decades. As observed by the Agricultural advisor to the secretary of state, G. W. Nye, it was "The African areas were undergoing the early stages of an agricultural revolution difficult to write briefly and in moderation about the developments taking place in African agriculture in Kenya" at that time.

The Swynnerton Plan represented a calculated fusion of reform and domination. While they undeniably spurred agricultural productivity, institutional innovation, and rural modernization particularly in Nandi District they did so within a framework designed to preserve colonial hegemony during the twilight of empire. The Swynnerton Plan and its successors were less about liberation than about managing decolonization on terms favourable to the status quo. They created a stratified peasantry, rewarded loyalty, and displaced communal land ethics with individual proprietorship all under the banner of "development." As Newsham and Bhagwat (2015) argue, the legacy of these schemes was not merely economic but epistemological: they established a paradigm in which African agriculture had to conform to European standards of efficiency, ownership, and market integration, a paradigm that continued to shape post-independence policy long after colonial rule ended

A critical and recurring theme is the colonial imposition of individual freehold tenure through land adjudication, enclosure, and titling, processes that systematically undermined traditional communal landholding systems. The shift from collective to individual ownership, exemplified in the Mutwot settlements, was framed as progress but had profound social consequences: it fragmented community-based resource management, favoured certain ethnic or class groups, and laid the groundwork for future land conflicts. Further, the modernization of livestock production as a core component of rural transformation. Policies promoted crossbreeding (Sahiwal and Ayrshire), disease control (rinderpest inoculation), and zero-grazing through cattle sheds and spray pumps. Livestock became a key source of cash income, second only to maize, and integrated into broader commercial circuits through hides, skins, and milk.

2.5 Development as Experimental Ideology/paradigm

Perhaps the most profound theme is that "development" functioned as an ideology/paradigm, a discourse used to legitimize colonial intervention while masking its coercive dimensions. The language of progress, efficiency, and modernization served to justify the dismantling of indigenous systems and the imposition of European agronomic models. As Newsham and Bhagwat (2015) argued, the settlement schemes established a paradigm where African agriculture had to conform to external templates to be deemed "legitimate" or "productive".

Underlying all these developments was a deeper, more insidious theme: the ideological construction of "development" itself. Colonial administrators spoke of progress, efficiency, and modernization, but these terms masked a project of epistemic domination. African farming was not to be understood on its own terms, but only as it could be measured against European standards of land use, ownership, and productivity. The rejection of collective farming in favor of individual titles as advised by Israeli experts and enshrined in LDSB policy was not a neutral technical choice, but a moral judgment: communal systems were deemed backward, individual ownership progressive (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63, 1963.)

The target income of £10–£200 above subsistence for African smallholders was not an economic benchmark, but a political one: sufficient to create the illusion of self-sufficiency, yet insufficient to challenge the broader structures of colonial capital. As Newsham and Bhagwat (2015) observed, the settlement schemes became the institutional and ideological foundation upon which colonial agricultural policy was constructed across tropical Africa, shaping not just land tenure, but the very way African agriculture was imagined, studied, and governed.

By 1964, the Master Plan projected 2,500 acres under cultivation, yet only 350 acres were planted with maize far below potential, due to delays, inadequate tractors, and unresolved land claims (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63, 1963). The gap between planning and practice revealed the limits of technocratic governance: policies could be meticulously designed, but their implementation was always subject to local resistance, administrative incompetence, and the enduring complexity of rural life. The same tension defined the LDSB's flagship project: the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. Designed as a model of high-density, individualized farming, Ndalat was surveyed, mapped, and fenced under the supervision of Settlement Officer Linnet Cain in 1961, yet plot allocation remained chaotic and contested well into the 1970s.

The land purchases were based on 1958 – 1959s land values but with strict agricultural user value, permanent improvements (such as houses for a maximum of £ 1,300) and permanent crops in consultation with valuers and the Kenya National Farmers' Union. The smallholder farmers provide collateral in the form of capital to insulate against market fluctuations. Thus, the white settler farms were subdivided into small land 'peasant' holdings.

2.6 Origination of the settlement schemes in Kenya

The historical evidence from the Ndalat Settlement Scheme 1964 Master plan indicated that the settlement program was coordinated by the area settlement controller for the purpose of accelerating agricultural activities.

> *The land was registered under three individuals; D. N Tweedie owned 2,003 acres registered as L.R. No. 9367/1; J. R Tweedie owned 2,003 acres registered as L.R. No. 9367/2 while B.C. Tweedie owned 1,000 acres registered as L.R. No 770/1, with an extra 920 Acres registered as L.R.No.5731/2.*
>
> *It is estimated that some 2,500 acres will eventually be under crop production in this scheme and this will necessitate the LDSB to provide somewhere in the region of 8 Fordson major tractors until such time that some plot holders turn to contractors to plough land on a contract basis. Approximately 350 acres are currently under maize which could have been 800 acres had the settlement board commenced cultivations sooner. Currently, maize under cultivation although severally attacked by hail should produce in the region 5-6 bags per acre overall, and whether it is sold to the plot holders or harvested by the board should produce a fair income'.*

The planning and implementation of settlement schemes in early post-independence Kenya were coordinated through a division of responsibilities between the Department of Settlements and the Department of Agriculture. As documented in the Department of Settlements' Annual Report for 1962–63, the initial phase of settlement planning commenced with a comprehensive land use survey, which classified the target areas into distinct categories: high-density, medium-density, low-density, and unsuitable farming land. This spatial stratification was visualized through detailed cartographic representations that informed the physical layout of each settlement scheme, ensuring that land allocation aligned with agro-ecological potential and infrastructure capacity.

Simultaneously, the Department of Agriculture assumed responsibility for formulating the economic and agricultural framework of each scheme. This included determining the recommended crop mixes, livestock quotas, and projected household income targets—key metrics used to evaluate the viability and sustainability of settler households. Financial planning was notably differentiated between funding sources: schemes supported by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) typically aimed for a subsistence base plus an additional £100 in annual cash income per household, whereas those funded by His Majesty's Government (H.M.G.) targeted a more modest subsistence level supplemented by £25 annually. These figures reflect not only differing levels of external investment but also divergent policy objectives, IBRD schemes often carried broader developmental ambitions, while H.M.G.-funded initiatives were more constrained by colonial-era fiscal priorities.

Further granularity in financial planning is evident in the Department of Settlements' internal correspondence, specifically in Addendum 1: DS 15/43, which details the financial projections for the Model Plots A, B, and C within the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. This document provides a structured breakdown of plot classifications (Class A, B, and C), each corresponding to varying land sizes and productivity potentials. For each class, the report outlines estimated loan disbursements, anticipated annual yields, projected household incomes, and corresponding repayment schedules. These figures were not arbitrary but were calibrated to align with both the physical constraints of the land and the socio-economic expectations placed upon settlers. The inclusion of formal repayment structures underscores the state's attempt to institutionalize financial responsibility among settlers, even as it sought to foster agricultural self-sufficiency (KNA/Department of Settlement/15/43).

Together, these documents reveal a deliberate, if fragmented, system of planning: land use was governed by ecological and spatial logic, while economic planning was driven by fiscal availability and policy imperatives. The interplay between these two systems, spatial classification and financial targeting formed the operational backbone of early settlement schemes, setting the stage for both their ambitions and their eventual challenges in implementation.

2.7 The Colonial Transition and the Mechanics of Land Transfer

The Ndalat Settlement Scheme exemplified a key mechanism of agrarian transition during Kenya's move from colonial rule to independence. It functioned as a structured instrument for transferring former European-owned farmland into African hands, enabling a controlled and state-managed redistribution process. Administered by the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB), the scheme converted large-scale settler estates into smallholdings allocated to African farmers under formalized land use, credit, and development frameworks.

This transition was supported by international funding from the British and German governments, as well as multilateral institutions, ensuring financial continuity amid political change. Rather than abrupt land seizure, the process emphasized legal conveyance, planned subdivision, and conditional tenure reflecting an effort to balance rapid Africanization with economic stability and agricultural productivity. As such, the scheme served not only as a vehicle for land reform but also as a bridge between colonial land systems and post-colonial rural development policy.

The historical accounts from the informants share similarities with the official archival records as observed in Appendix II; addendum 9 list a group of five individuals but as detailed by several pioneering farmers; Mr Daniel Chepsiror, Mr Kipkoech Rono and former cooperative officer. The former cooperative officer gave a historical account of scheme.

> *The settlement scheme was initiated as the white settlers sought to exit Kenya. Ndalat settlement scheme originated from the land owned by three white settlers, Mr Bruce Tweedie, Mr John Tweedie and Mr Douglas Tweedie whose farms are considered to be 'compassionate' farms allocated to the veterans of the First World War in 1921. The exit of the British Settler Brothers; Mr Bruce Tweedie, Mr John Tweedie and Mr Douglas Tweedie were funded by the LDSB under the stewardship of the British and German Governments. Mr McDonald farm (KapMakiton) which was 500 acres split into two; 100 acres for squatters and 400 acres for the Ndalat Settlement scheme (Oral interview, farmer (Kapmakiton), March 20th 2021).*

Further information was drawn from Farmer (Kapmakiton area);

> *The land was registered under three individuals; D. N Tweedie owned 2,003 acres registered as L.R. No. 9367/1; J. R Tweedie owned 2,003 acres registered as L.R. No. 9367/2 while B.C. Tweedie owned 1,000 acres registered as L.R. No 770/1, with an extra 920 Acres registered as L.R.No.5731/2. Because of the settlement operations, specific locations in the settlement scheme would later have pseudonyms: KapBruss (Bruce), and Kaptigilis (Douglas). Other pseudo-names included Kapsigiryo (John), KapSmith (Steinkamp and Smith Ltd), KapMakiton (McDonald) and KapNg'ombe (Hendrix) which later became the central yard for dairy cows for sale to the new settlers. Upon the relocation of the white settlers, all the land and equipment owned by the white settlers reverted to the LDSB (Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022).*

A former agricultural inspector, also contributed to the discussion;

> *The initial Her Majesty Government (HMG) settlement scheme in 1962 was funded by the British Government and West German Government and operated under as an LDSB scheme before being handed over to the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) in 1964. The settlement scheme was structured with the settlement office being the overall in charge, and under him was the agricultural extension office, the veterinary office, the health office, the cooperative office and the farm economic survey office. These offices worked synergistically under the settlement office to ensure that the objectives of the settlement were achieved such as the production schedule and arrangement, loan repayments, agricultural development and socio-economic advancement.*
>
> *The settlement fund trustees initially comprised three ministries; Ministry of Finance, the ministry of agriculture and ministry of economic planning and later incorporated the ministry of land and settlement in 1963. The SFT had four directors from the ministries who were tasked with the planning of the transfers of the settler's farms to the new African smallholder* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022)

This was elaborated by the pioneering farmer;

> *The first settlement scheme in Nandi District was the Lessos Settlement Scheme in 1961 where the settler farms were divided into 40–acre farms at a deposit of Kshs 750 for a 30–year loan. The second settlement scheme in Nandi District was the Ndalat Settlement scheme in 1962. The land was allocated on 15–acre smallholding plots however some special plots of 100 acres were allocated to retired soldiers and civil servants who had experience in farming.*
>
> *After land allotment, the settlement office initiated by farm planning by providing barbed wire, poles and fencing apparatus and the farmer fenced the plots; ⅓ of the land for crop production and ⅔ for the livestock production to allow for animal rotation. The farmers were then given 3 pedigree animals, milking equipment (cans, buckets, etc) (Oral interview, Pioneer Farmer, May 9th 2022)*

A retired senior settlement office, elaborated further on the nature and topography in the settlement scheme;

> *The plots differed in size based on the quality and topography of the land. The size of a good arable plot measured 15 acres (approximately six hectares) while plots in the marshy, hilly and lowlands measured 30 acres to even 100 acres depending on the quality of the land. There were also special plots that were allocated*

> *to government employees, civil servants and farmers with specific skills and know-how. These plots served promoted agricultural technological know-how to the new smallholder farmers. The 15-acre smallholding plots were to be involved in subsistence farming to produce food for the family and surplus for generation of income.* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022

Based on former agricultural officer, Mosop Division;

> *The settlement schemes were initiated by the colonial government through the LDSB which acquired the land from the white settlers in a specified manner intending to sustain and maintain agricultural productivity. The first settler farms to be sold were those that were closer to the African reservation and the process took several stages. First, the land was subdivided into economic units for smallholding agriculture. This process took into consideration the topography and the quality of the land. Once, the sub-division had been completed, a white settlement officer by the name, of Mr. Gibson, was placed on the former white settler farm to aid in the transition. The white settlement officer would then be supported by an African settlement officer as the settlement process took shape* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer, Mosop Division, March 29th 2023)

A central theme emerging from the settlement reports is the highly structured and formalized process for applying for and allocating plots. The Regional Government Agent (*here addressed by the applicants was in fact the settlement officer for Nandi District*) emphasized that applications must be made in person before a selection committee, and written requests would not be considered. This underscores an effort by the colonial and soon-to-be-independent state to manage demand, ensure fairness through direct assessment, and prevent corruption or undue influence. The government agent explicitly instructed chiefs to inform their people that they should not write directly to him, stating, "All allocation is done by the Committee and there is no point in writing to me". (Kenya National Archives (KNA). Application for Plots in Ndalat Settlement Scheme. Various dates, 1962–1964. File DC-KAPT-1-8-42. National Archives of Kenya, Nairobi)

There is some suggestion that the initial uncertainty as suggested by the department of settlement reports. For instance, these reports indicated that the applicant pool was diverse, reflecting the broad societal groups seeking land. Applications came from ordinary citizens like Kimaru arap Sitienei, a squatter with Shs. 7,000 in cash and livestock, who expressed urgent need due to his lack of a permanent home (Sitienei); police officers such as Constable Kipsaina A. Tirop and Wilson Kiplang'at, who sought land as a form of retirement security (Tirop; Kiplang'at); prison warders like Kiplang'at Arap Nge'ny, who was currently incarcerated but wished to apply; and even institutional bodies like the Anglican Church, which requested plots for schools and churches. This diversity highlights the widespread desire for land ownership across different strata of society (Kenya National Archives (KNA). Application for Plots in Ndalat Settlement Scheme. Various dates, 1962–1964. File DC-KAPT-1-8-42. National Archives of Kenya, Nairobi)

Several letters highlight the personal and familial motivations behind the applications. For instance, Joseph Bartile, a chief, wrote on behalf of his son-in-law, requesting a plot so he could support his family and build a stable life. Similarly, Richard A. Tarus, a settler himself, provided a strong character reference for Kipkoech arap Chumo, attesting to his work ethic and reliability as a farm hand, thereby attempting to bolster his application. These references suggest that personal reputation and community standing played a role in the informal aspects of the application process, even if formal decisions rested with the committee.

2.8 The Financial Arrangement of Land Ownership and the Burden of Repayment

The availability of international credit was instrumental in enabling the transfer of land from settler estates to African smallholders through state-managed settlement schemes, a process formally initiated in 1961 and sustained throughout the decade via structured land purchase loan programs that extended into the end of 1970. This financial architecture facilitated what amounted to one of the most significant redistributive land reforms in early post-independence Kenya, allowing African settlers to acquire formerly European-held land without immediate full cash payment. Instead, long-term loans underwritten by external donors formed the backbone of this transition, effectively socializing the cost of land acquisition across time and reducing entry barriers for African beneficiaries.

Excerpts from farmer/retired senior settlement office, indicated that;

> *The Ndalat Complex scheme began with the plot numbers originating from 1 to 64 in 1962 with the size for these plots being 15 acres. The next phase had plots numbering 65 to 372 with a plot size of 15 acres. Later on, the next phase had plots numbering 373 to 572 and lastly, there were two large farms in Kaptebe with about two hundred acres each* (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

> *The plots at the settlement schemes were sold for a Kshs. 4,000 cash basis or a loan amount of Kshs. 6,000 with a 10% deposit which was paid immediately. At the initiation stage in 1962 – 1963, the 15-acre plots were acquired at a deposit of Kshs 120, while in 1964, the 20-acre plots were acquired as a deposit of Kshs. 600. In 1964 at the Kapng'ombe (a pseudo name that arose because of the central location from which the farmers were able to acquire the dairy cows) the plots were going for Kshs 6,000 in 1964 and a development loan valued at Kshs. 3,000. The land loan was to be repaid over 30 years while the development loan was to be repaid over 10 years*.

Furthermore, A former cooperative inspector, also elaborated on the settlement activities during the initiation period

> *At the initiation, the new settlers were paid sixty shillings for the first three months to sustain them during their transition period. Originally, the farm financing arrangement was carried out by the LDSB who offered land and development loans which were to be repaid concurrently. Because of the collateralization of the land titles during the establishment of the settlement scheme, many farmers could not access AFC loans. The settlement store had an office which was run by Dalgety Company Limited and each smallholder was to acquire the items on credit and the transaction was recorded by the clerks* (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

Evidence from the department of settlements is in tandem with the oral history with the documents reveal the specific economic model and requirements for settlers on the Ndalaṭ scheme. Each holding was designed with a target annual income of between £225 and £400 (approximately Shs. 5,000–8,000), based primarily on dairy farming and maize cultivation. A settlement charge of £200 (Shs. 4,000) was required, payable either as a lump sum or over 30 years in instalments. To facilitate development, the Department of Settlement offered loans totaling up to Shs. 2,000 for the purchase of cattle, fencing, and cultivations, with an annual repayment of Shs. 275. Upon acceptance, applicants were also required to deposit Shs. 100 to cover legal fees and stamp duty for the freehold title. This indicates a policy aimed at creating economically viable smallholders who could become self-sufficient through productive agriculture (Kenya National Archives (KNA). Application for Plots in Ndalat Settlement Scheme. Various dates, 1962–1964. File DC-KAPT-1-8-42. National Archives of Kenya)

The documents also expose practical challenges and tensions. One applicant, Kipkoech A. Koskei, complained of being told to pay Shs. 180 but then receiving no further communication for three months, indicating potential bureaucratic delays or inefficiencies. Another case involved a prisoner, Sumbain Arap Cherwon, whose plot was not to be taken away simply because he was in prison, but he was instructed to arrange for someone to maintain it and continue payments. This shows an attempt to balance property rights with the realities of incarceration.

Oral historical accounts, corroborated by official documentation, affirm the central role of international financial support in underpinning settlement agriculture during Kenya's early post-colonial period. As Von Pischke (1977) has argued, the viability of these schemes was contingent upon external credit arrangements facilitated by bilateral and multilateral institutions, including the British and German governments, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). These funding mechanisms were instrumental in financing both land acquisition and infrastructural development within the settlement programs.

Financial instruments were differentiated according to their purpose and duration. Land loans intended to cover the purchase price of plots were extended over a 30-year repayment period, reflecting their long-term investment character. In contrast, development loans, which financed on-farm improvements such as housing, fencing, and water infrastructure, carried a shorter 10-year repayment term. Both types of loans accrued interest at an annual rate of 6.5%, a rate that balanced affordability with fiscal discipline. Notably, the level of subsidy varied by settlement density: in high-density schemes, land loans covered 100% of the purchase price, whereas in low-density schemes, they covered 90%, requiring settlers to contribute a 10% down payment (Von Pischke, 1977). This differential reflects a policy calculus aimed at promoting intensive land use in more densely populated areas while introducing a measure of financial commitment in less densely settled zones.

Repayment performance in the early years of implementation was relatively strong. By 1963, IBRD-supported schemes recorded a repayment rate of 90%, indicating a high degree of compliance and financial capacity among beneficiaries in those programs. In comparison, H.M.G.-funded schemes achieved a 70% repayment rate, a lower but still encouraging figure given their typically smaller capital outlays and more limited technical support structures. These divergent repayment trends suggest not only variations in loan management but also differences in monitoring, settler selection, and institutional oversight between donor-funded programs.

Together, these findings underscore how international credit frameworks shaped the economic architecture of Kenya’s settlement schemes. While the availability of long-term financing enabled widespread land redistribution, the sustainability of these programs hinged on disciplined repayment behaviour and effective administrative coordination, factors that would come under increasing strain in subsequent decades, particularly as macroeconomic conditions shifted and structural adjustment pressures emerged in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the documents indicate that land availability was limited and demand was high. The settlement office informed one applicant that all plots had already been allocated and the waiting list closed. In another instance, the settlement advised a prospective applicant interested in a larger farm than those available at Ndalaṭ to consider other options, such as the extension of the Lessos scheme or the planned takeover of farms in the Kipkarren Salient. This suggests that the smallholder model of the Ndalaṭ scheme was just one part of a broader, more complex land redistribution strategy.

Institutionalization of cooperative societies as vehicles of development

Cooperative societies emerged as pivotal institutional vehicles for socio-economic transformation within Kenya’s settlement schemes, serving not merely as economic conduits but as mechanisms for social discipline, collective organization, and state-mediated modernization. Nowhere was this more evident than in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, where the *Ndalat Farmers’ Cooperative Society* was formally established within two years of the scheme’s inception, a deliberate strategy by the Department of Settlements and its allied agricultural agencies to institutionalize production targets, ensure credit repayment, and integrate smallholders into formal market systems.

Except from oral history showed that Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. As per former agricultural inspector.

> The SFT offices advocated for the socio-economic aspects of settlement scheme in the form of Ndalat Farmers' cooperative society which was established within two years of the establishment of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. At first, the fiscal arrangement including marketing of the milk and maize produce from the settlement scheme and the loan repayment was done at the settlement offices in the scheme headed by the white settlement officer called Mr Gibson supported by an assistant African settlement officer with service providers such as Smith and Steinkamp and Dalgety Ltd.
>
> Once established, the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society was operationalized by the settlement offices, all the farmers registered with the cooperative and production quotas were allocated to each farmer. For instance, each smallholder farmer was supposed to deliver at least 50 Litres of Milk daily and a minimum of 50 90-Kg Bags of Maize annually. The cooperative society provided trucking services where each farmer's produce was carefully examined, weighed and recorded before being loaded into the ferrying truck which delivered the raw milk to the nearby Kenya Co-operative Creameries, Eldoret Plant. The sale process was completed with the KCC having thoroughly examined the quality of milk and recorded the cumulative quantity of the milk delivered on a daily basis.

As recalled by the former agricultural inspector involved in the scheme's early operations, the Cooperative Society was not an organic farmer-led initiative but a top-down administrative construct designed to operationalize the state's developmental agenda. The Settlements Field Team (SFT) offices actively promoted its formation, viewing cooperatives as essential tools for translating policy objectives such as increased agricultural output, cash crop production, and financial accountability into daily practice among settler households (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022).

From its inception, the cooperative was administered through the settlement office, which remained under the direct supervision of the white Settlement Officer, Mr. Gibson, supported by an African Assistant Settlement Officer. Key logistical and financial functions including the collection of produce, coordination of marketing, and enforcement of loan repayments were centralized at this office. Service providers such as Smith and Steinkamp (agricultural supplies) and Dalgety Ltd. (marketing and transport) were contracted to facilitate the flow of goods and capital, reinforcing the integration of colonial-era commercial networks into the post-independence settlement framework.

All registered farmers were required to join the cooperative as a condition of tenure and access to development loans. Production quotas were strictly enforced: each smallholder was mandated to deliver a minimum of 50 litres of raw milk per day and 50 bags of 90-kilogram maize annually. These targets were not arbitrary but calibrated to meet the projected output levels needed to sustain the cooperative's financial viability and to fulfil contractual obligations with state-linked processors.

The cooperative operated a centralized collection and transport system: farmers brought their produce to designated collection points, where it was inspected, weighed, and recorded in official ledgers maintained by cooperative clerks under the oversight of settlement officers. Raw milk, in particular, was transported daily in refrigerated trucks to the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) processing plant in Eldoret. Upon arrival, KCC quality control officers conducted rigorous bacteriological and compositional tests before accepting the consignment. Daily delivery volumes were meticulously documented, and payments were credited to individual farmer accounts a system designed to instil financial discipline and reinforce the link between production and income.

This highly regulated system exemplified the state's vision of agrarian modernization: smallholder farmers were to become efficient, accountable, and market-oriented producers not merely landowners. The cooperative, while nominally a collective enterprise, functioned as an extension of the settlement bureaucracy, enforcing compliance through quotas, record-keeping, and the conditional provision of services. As such, it embodied the dual logic of development: empowerment through participation, and control through quantification.

This positive trajectory was corroborated by earlier reports: the 1963 Annual Report had already noted favourable repayment compliance, with 90% of beneficiaries in IBRD-supported schemes meeting their annual repayment obligations, compared to 70% in those funded by His Majesty's Government (H.M.G.). These disparities underscored differences in program design, monitoring capacity, and perhaps settler selection criteria between donor-funded initiatives. The higher repayment rate in IBRD schemes likely benefited from more rigorous technical supervision, better infrastructure planning, and tighter financial oversight, whereas H.M.G.-backed projects, though broader in reach, often operated with fewer administrative resources (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).

As detailed in the department's annual reports, the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) exercised rigorous oversight over the allocation and management of settlement holdings through formal instruments such as the *letter of allotment*, which embedded binding conditions derived from the Agricultural Ordinance and the Chattels Transfer Ordinance. These legal mechanisms functioned not only as administrative tools but also as instruments of discipline: settlers who violated the terms of their allotment, whether by failing to cultivate their plots, neglecting soil conservation requirements, or breaching residency conditions were subject to progressive sanctions. Initial infractions typically resulted in formal warnings;

repeated or serious breaches could culminate in eviction from the plot. Similarly, default on development loan agreements triggered enforcement actions, including, as a final measure, the seizure of movable assets (chattels) under provisions of the Chattels Transfer Ordinance. This system of conditional tenure underscored the state's dual role as both enabler and regulator, emphasizing compliance, productivity, and fiscal responsibility among African settlers ((Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).)

This emphasis on systematic planning resonates with historian Bonneuil (2000) analysis of colonial and early post-colonial development states as "experimentalist" regimes that sought to master environments through expert knowledge and technical intervention. According to Bonneuil (2000) the design and management of settlement schemes catalysed the expansion of a specialized cadre of scientists and technical officers across disciplines including agronomy, soil science, forestry, public health, education, and civil engineering whose expertise became central to state-building projects. Their growing institutional authority marked the ascendance of a developmentalist ethos in which nature, disease, and social organization were seen as malleable through scientific planning. In Kenya, this manifested in the mobilization of agricultural extension officers, hydrologists, and land use planners who were tasked with transforming African smallholder agriculture into a modern, productive sector aligned with national economic goals (Bonneuil, 2000)

Despite this apparent rationality and technical sophistication, the financial burden on settlers remained significant. Circumstantial evidence suggests that although land and development loans covered major capital costs, settlers were often required to bear out-of-pocket expenses for essential agronomic improvements. For instance, soil conservation works such as the construction of cut-off drains along contours and road boundaries were mandated for every holding at a cost of Kshs. 15 per plot, payable by the settler. Such charges, while modest in absolute terms, added to the cumulative financial pressure on households already servicing long-term loans. Water distribution systems, where feasible, were planned and implemented by hydraulic engineers seconded from the Ministry of Works, reflecting an integrated approach to rural infrastructure. Yet access to piped or reliable irrigation water remained uneven, often privileging larger or more strategically located schemes (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).

Collectively, these trends illustrate a period of relative financial stability and institutional efficacy within Kenya's settlement program during the 1960s. The combination of accessible credit, extended repayment terms, and growing accountability mechanisms enabled a significant transfer of land ownership while maintaining a degree of fiscal sustainability. However, as later developments would reveal, particularly in the face of economic downturns and structural adjustment pressures in the 1980s, the resilience of these repayment patterns was contingent upon continued state support, stable agricultural markets, and predictable macroeconomic conditions, all of which would erode in subsequent decades.

Ndalat settlements scheme, often hailed as a model, thus stands not as a triumph of rural upliftment, but as a cautionary emblem of how development discourse can be co-opted to serve the imperatives of control, even under the guise of liberation. However, the official records indicate that land availability was limited and demand was high. For instance, the settlement office informed one applicant that all plots had already been allocated and the waiting list closed. In another instance, the settlement advised a prospective applicant interested in a larger farm than those available at Ndalaṭ to consider other options, such as the extension of the Lessos scheme or the planned takeover of farms in the Kipkarren Salient. This suggests that the smallholder model of the Ndalaṭ scheme was just one part of a broader, more complex land redistribution strategy.

A persistent critique of the settlement program, one echoed in both contemporary accounts and later scholarship, is that its origins and design disproportionately favoured European settlers, particularly during the late colonial period. Although the post-independence phase repurposed many of these schemes for African beneficiaries, the underlying spatial layouts, tenure models, and technical standards had been initially developed to serve British settler agriculture. Critics argue that the transfer of land did not necessarily entail a transformation of the colonial agrarian structure, but rather its adaptation to new political realities. As a result, some scholars have contended that the so-called "developmental" logic of the schemes masked continuities in power, expertise, and resource allocation that privileged former colonial interests even as land ownership formally shifted to African hands.

Thus, while the settlement schemes represented an ambitious attempt at redistributive reform and rural modernization, they operated within a framework shaped by colonial legacies, technocratic imperatives, and asymmetric power relations. The state’s reliance on legal controls, expert knowledge, and conditional financing reflected a vision of development that was both interventionist and disciplinary, one that sought not merely to redistribute land, but to reshape African farming communities according to a standardized model of productivity, order, and accountability.

In conclusion, this collection of correspondence provides a crucial window into the implementation of post-colonial land reform. The main arguments are embedded in the administrative procedures and personal appeals: the state's attempt to create a new class of African smallholder farmers through a structured, equitable, yet highly bureaucratic process; the emphasis on economic viability and responsible borrowing; and the intense societal pressure for land access driven by both economic necessity and the symbolic value of ownership. The documents collectively illustrate the transition from colonial rule to independence as a period defined by hope, aspiration, and the practical difficulties of building a new agrarian order.

2.9 Challenges introduced by the Colonial Settlement Policy in the period leading to independence

The transition from colonial to independent smallholder agriculture was fraught with structural challenges that undermined the effectiveness of settlement schemes. Although these programs were designed to redistribute land and promote African economic empowerment, they inherited and often reproduced the limitations of earlier colonial agrarian policies. As observed, the shift to small-scale African farming occurred within a framework shaped by contradictory government policies, fragmented land tenure systems, and unrealistic development assumptions (Brett, 1973). In particular, the colonial settlement policy faced significant challenges that include the government policy, land itself, the agrarian policy Arrighi et al., (2010) and many others. For instance, the main challenges encountered by the independent small-scale farmers related to land optimization, organizational deficiency, overambitious economic targets, underestimates of development costs and difficulties of cost recovery (Hulme, 1987) and lack of formal credit (Von Pischke, 1977).

2.10 Land Optimization and organizational Deficiencies

A central challenge lay in land optimization in the form of the ability of settlers to productively utilize their allocated plots. Many schemes were established on marginal or ecologically degraded land, limiting agricultural potential despite intensive planning efforts. Even on more fertile sites, settlers frequently lacked the technical guidance, inputs, and infrastructure necessary to achieve projected yields. This was compounded by organizational deficiencies in extension services and cooperative structures, which hindered coordination, marketing, and collective input procurement.

Evidence adduced from the informants indicated that Ndalat Settlement scheme faced several challenges relating to land size, political undertones, misaligned agronomic objective and loan defaults among other issues. Based on the oral history from former cooperative inspector;

> *During its establishment, all community leaders were not to be allotted any plots in the scheme as they were considered to have some land holding by their virtue of leadership but due to their influence and their relations with committee members, they acquired plots in the scheme. The settlement activity was also fraught with underhand dealing as the government officials colluded and gained extra plots through their relatives. Though, the allotment processes were imprecise the allotment of the plots were skewed as there were several instances where the settlement officials gained extra allotment, thus denying genuine and deserving Africans the opportunity to participate in the development process. Collusion by the African settlement officers ensured double allocation for some individuals or certain individuals acquired land through proxies by indirectly using other Africans in the reserves* (Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022).

Former agricultural inspector, also voiced reservation in the resettlement policies where the post – independent government allowed large -scale agriculture to prosper alongside these HMG settlement schemes.

> *Considering that large -scale farming is more economical for the agricultural production, land fragmentation into 15 – acre small-*

> *holding farms as promoted by LDSB was indeed an uneconomical land resource. And thus, in later stages, the post – independence government permitted the transfer of the whole settler large - scale agricultural land in the former scheduled areas on a 10% deposit to able farmers. These farmers wholly acquired the settler farms as it was and pursued large – scale agricultural production on a commercial scale* (Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022).

While settlement schemes represented a bold attempt at agrarian reform, they operated within a policy environment that prioritized symbolic redistribution over sustainable livelihood creation. The legacy of colonial land policy characterized by uneven investment, and centralized control was not fully dismantled but repurposed, leaving new smallholders to navigate inherent institutional gaps and economic vulnerabilities.

As evidenced by Heyer (1974) Nandi District was dominated by animal husbandry way back before 1940s, and this served as the main agricultural activity until the introduction of Swynnerton Plan of 1954. However, as early as 1950, the middle-class peasant households in Nandi district were more spontaneous to the adoption of cash crops and few of them started to grow coffee in suitable areas that were not adjacent to European estates.

The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 served as the ideological and operational blueprint for agrarian transformation in African reserves and, later, post-independence settlement schemes (Swynnerton, 1955a). It sought to “intensify African agriculture” by replacing communal landholding with individualized, titled private property, promoting land consolidation, enclosure, and scientific farming. In Nandi, where animal husbandry had historically dominated, the Plan catalysed a shift toward mixed commercial farming, with the introduction of exotic tree species such as Euphorbia and Eucalyptus, paddocking, soil conservation, and controlled livestock breeding became mandatory. Crucially, the Plan did not aim at equity but at creating a "middle-class peasant" stratum; economically viable, credit-worthy, and aligned with colonial market logic (Kanogo, 1987). This class became the backbone of schemes like Ndalat, while the landless were resettled as secondary beneficiaries.

As described by the pioneer farmer,

> *After realising the important role played by African agriculture during the war and the colonial government sought to consciously plan and intensify African agricultural production through the Swynnerton Plan of 1954. In the realm of land enclosure and titling were greatly stressed. The fencing of the enclosed land with hedge materials was encouraged. Farm layout and paddocking became common features and land consolidation though not common, was advocated together with limiting land sub-divisions to economically unmanageable units.*
>
> *Animal husbandry witnessed drastic changes. Not contented with the Nandi livestock, the colonial authority realized that the livelihoods of Nandi community were tied to the livestock and therefore initiated a policy to encouraged cross - breeding of the indigenous livestock breeds such as Zebu with imported Sahiwal stock. Provision of paddocks, stock-proof hedges, spray pumps, improved grass and homestead water supplies became common features, especially in high potential areas. Nevertheless, all these changes accentuated rural class differentiation, creating a rich landed peasantry on one hand and a poor landless class on the other. The rich peasants steadily ventured into mercantile business and a number of shops dotted the Reserve. The implications of the agrarian reform dimensions of the Swynnerton Plan for the rural population of Nandi were complex. Whereas the relatively large acreages that characterize the district generally mitigated against the rise of landlessness, evidence abounds of the accentuation in rural socio-economic stratification. Middle-class peasant households were most receptive to agrarian innovations and commercialization rose higher in the cycle of rural accumulation.*
>
> *In terms to inequalities in land allocation, Chief and headmen benefited most because they had already been involved since about 1947 in land enclosure. Parcels of land allocated were of not less than 4 hectares and in many areas averaged 8 hectares. Persons who had already been permitted to enclose large tracts of land before the Swynnerton Plan became official policy, were allowed to register these same tracts, which in many cases were larger than average holdings* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, June 12th 2022).

The foregoing demonstrates the zeal within which the colonial government intensified agriculture in Ndalat. It is apparent that this was driven by commercialization intentions as well as Articulation whereby there was a crave by the government to give incentives to African farmers to engage in intensive farming. The introduction of cross-breeds serves to demonstrate this end. As has been demonstrated, the Africans were receptive of the changes and them begun following the approaches that the colonial government wanted them to follow.

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the historical antecedents of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. This scheme was the brainchild of the Swinerton Plan of 1954 as well as the ALUS and ALDEV of 1947 and finally the Land Development and Settlement Board. These blueprints were geared towards the Agrarian transformation of agriculture from subsistence to commercial. There was heavy investment both financially and technically by the colonial government. At the same time, it has demonstrated that Africans were receptive of these plans by the government. The next chapter proceeds to look at how the post-colonial government handled the settlement schemes, with particular focus to the Ndalat Settlement scheme.

CHAPTER THREE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME IN THE EARLY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, 1963 TO 1970

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the history of the establishment of the Ndalat Settlement scheme in the early years of independence. It will be demonstrated that the scheme started on a sound footing. However, as time went by, several gaps begun manifesting. These gaps posed a challenge to the farmers and towards 1970's the scheme was experiencing many challenges. Many of the white farmers and Extension officers had then left, Africans were having challenges repaying loans and there was uncertainty in their productivity. All these came to haunt the much-hyped settlement programs that were ambitiously handed over to the new government. This transition was informed by the Political Economy of the Post-Colonial state which prioritized the political class and neglected the masses. As a result, financing of this project dwindled, marketing as well as storage of produce became a challenge and this proved difficult for the farmers to repay their loans. In other words, the scheme begun to be unsustainable.

3.1 From displacement to Controlled Resettlement

Post-1960, settlement schemes like Ndalat were established on former white settler farms purchased by the state using loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), and British and German governments (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963). Administered by the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) and later the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT), these schemes were not acts of land restitution but managed transitions designed to maintain settler-level productivity under African labour. Resettlement was highly selective: vetting committees screened applicants based on prior employment with settlers, squatter status, or landlessness, effectively co-opting loyalist segments of the rural population. Women were formally included but often excluded in practice due to lack of identification, reinforcing patriarchal land access norms.

Based on the historical account from one of the pioneer farmer, Ndalat Complex Scheme was launched under the following procedures and structures.

> *The resettlement process took several stages and were preceded by a vetting process that took several stages. In the first stage, a special committee made up of 20 individuals headed by Amai (Pseudo name for Headman) and Kiptaiyat (pseudo name for Chief) and African government officers drawn from the various location in the Nandi District was established. This vetting committee vetted all the Africans from local African reservation and validated that they were indeed landless. The committee sat and established a criterion for vetting the individuals to be settled in the settlement scheme and this include the following: all former employees white settlers including cooks, foreman, herdsmen and housekeepers, all former squatters who were native to the district and those living outside the district and individuals from other tribes such as Luhyas residing in the district. Women were also allocated land as long as they proved that they were landless at that time. Since, most women lacked the identification card, they were not allotted the plots but some were able to access the plots through either friends or relatives.*
>
> *In the second stage, individuals (squatters or landless) made application to the district commissioner through the chief. Once, the District commissioner received the applications, he collated all the applications and send them to vetting committee to vet the veracity of the applications. Once, the process was complete, the district commissioner established the settlement office in the scheme. In 1962, the settlement office in the whole Ndalat Complex Settlement scheme was Mr. Gibson. Once the settlement office was established, the district commissioner sets a date for a formal gathering (Baraza) through which the land allocation was initiated.*
>
> *The settlement officer demarcated and numbered the plots and prepared ballots for the same for baraza. On the day, the DC presided a baraza, the individual applicants drew ballots representing the plot number for the scheme after which the*

individuals were taken to their plots. Once vetted, the individual was allocated land and was supposed to pay for the 10% of the land immediately to receive the letter of allotment that allowed them to settle on the land.

Once allotted the land, the smallholder was given 24 months to fence the land, build a house, construct a dairy shed and sanitation facilities and acquire the dairy cows from the settlement office. These activities were mandatory and a failure to undertake these activities meant that the allotment letter was recalled and the plot given out in the next allotment. Immediately, upon settlement, the African smallholder was supposed to build a house, a dairy shed and sanitation facilities (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020).

Further evidence is drawn from Case examples of rejections of applications by the vetting committee is adduced from the settlement reports as indicated by Appendix 2: an Addendum 6: List of Rejected applicants which shows the list of rejected applicants and the reasons for rejections.

More evidence is drawn from settlement reports as indicated in the excepts below..

Similarly, in 1966, transfers of land from the original owners begun as indicated in Appendix II; Addendum 8: MacDonald Plot. For example, plot number 306, which belonged to Mr Macdonald, was transferred to 5 of his labourers who took it after his death (LO/43/306/20). Similarly, plot numbers 443, and 043 were transferred to Thomas Ngaira, and Tarakwa and A Lagat (L0/43/306/20). By May 1967, maps for the Ndalat Settlement Scheme had already been amended. In the same year, some owners were evicted by the selection committee and other settlers recommended to replace them. There also begun to emerge an interest in plot acquisition for business purposes. For example, successful farmers such as Paul Kiptanui and Paulina expressed their interest in purchasing business plots in Ndalat (KNA/DS/15/43)

However, by the time, the process of application was not well understood and they were turned down by the then director of settlement on account of not following protocol. At the same time, in 1967, plots number 77,88 and 93 were declared vacant because the original settlers, Cheptobok, Kiplagat Sambu and Kipserem Beigo deserted their respective plots. These farmers had also defaulted loans accumulating to Sh. 7,421. As a result of this, the plots were later transferred to Mr. Kibet, Chepkemoi and Kiplangat who took over the process of loan repayment and made the plots viable. In 1968, the minister of Lands and Settlement approved the settlement of Philip Barslai on plot number 507(KNA/NDL/43)

A central theme emerging from the minutes is the LDSB's active role in managing the transfer of land from colonial-era ownership structures to African settlers, a process that was part of a broader national effort to address historical inequities and promote economic self-sufficiency. This is evident in several key areas of discussion. First, the board reviewed the progress of settlement schemes, noting that 536 families had been settled in April 1963, bringing the total number of settler families close to 5,000). This reflects the scale and urgency of the resettlement program, which was likely driven by political and social imperatives following independence.

Second, the minutes highlight significant concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the new settlers. The Director of Settlement reported that while loan repayments from settlers on International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) schemes were satisfactory, the Island Farms Scheme was causing concern due to poor repayment rates (LDSB 1963, Minute 46a). To address this, letters of warning were sent to defaulting settlers, and a dedicated Settlement Officer was to be assigned to supervise repayments. Furthermore, there was a recognition that Her Majesty's Government (H.M.G.) smallholding scheme were not always using their loans effectively for preparatory cultivation. The board suggested that settlers should contribute some personal capital alongside their loans to ensure better investment and accountability, indicating an awareness of the need for both financial discipline and capacity building among the new landowners.

The minutes also reveal the complex negotiations involved in land acquisition. For instance, in the case of Lari Farms Ltd., the withdrawal of the Pig Industry Board from negotiations left the scheme "very expensive," forcing the LDSB to consider offering a reduced price or terminating the deal altogether. Similarly, an offer from a Mr. Dalton at Cherangani to fund a tea factory in exchange for a higher valuation of his land was rejected on the grounds that it contradicted the board's established valuation principles. These instances illustrate the tension between pragmatic development goals and the need for transparent and equitable procedures.

Finally, the case of Ephraim Gichiriri stands out as a poignant example of the human dimension of these policies. Gichiriri appealed against his eviction from Luckhurst Farm, plot No. 7. After hearing his case, the board resolved to evict him but simultaneously decided that "every effort should be made to find him a suitable smallholding in the Rift Valley Region". This resolution, passed with five votes in favour, two against, and four abstentions, underscores the balancing act the board faced upholding rules and financial obligations while also exercising a degree of compassion and social responsibility.

These LDSB minutes provide a crucial window into the operational realities of post-colonial land reform in Kenya. They depict an institution grappling with the immense logistical, financial, and ethical challenges of redistributing land and establishing a new class of African farmers. The main arguments are not theoretical but are embedded in the board's decisions: the paramount importance of productive land use, the necessity of financial accountability, the complexity of fair land valuation, and the need for humane administration in the face of individual hardship.

Bonneuil (2006) critique of the colonial and postcolonial state as “experimentalist” offers a compelling lens through which to understand the failure of settlement schemes to achieve genuine rural transformation. The colonial authorities, influenced by high-modernist ideologies, viewed development as a technical, apolitical process that could be engineered through standardized interventions. The Swynnerton Plan of 1954 epitomized this approach: it bundled land consolidation, tenure formalization, agricultural intensification, and social engineering into a single, prepackaged blueprint. While it succeeded in transforming some African farmers into “progressive” commercial producers, it did so at the cost of local autonomy and ecological knowledge.

This experimentalist logic did not disappear after independence. Instead, it was internalized by the new Kenyan elite, who continued to implement development programs through centralized, technocratic channels (Leys, 1971). Settlement scheme farmers were isolated from their surrounding communities, dependent on state-provided inputs, credit, and extension services. Their farming practices were prescribed rather than negotiated, and their risk-management strategies such as crop diversification, intercropping, or seasonal migration were discouraged or rendered obsolete. As Bonneuil (2006) argued, this was not simply a matter of ignorance or cultural bias; it was a deliberate strategy to subordinate rural populations to state control and to affirm the authority of bureaucratic and scientific elites.

The deskilling of African farmers had profound long-term consequences. By severing the links between farmers and their indigenous knowledge systems, the state not only reduced their adaptive capacity but also stifled local innovation. Agricultural development became a top-down affair, with knowledge flowing unidirectional from research stations to fields, rather than emerging from the dynamic interaction between local practice and scientific inquiry. This division of labour between those who design and those who execute reinforced hierarchical power relations and undermined the very resilience that smallholder agriculture requires in the face of climatic and economic uncertainty.

3.2 Mixed Farming as the Prescribed Economic Structure

The mixed farming model maize and dairy was not a response to local agro-ecology alone but a neo-colonial ideal transplanted from European estates (Belshaw, 1964). It was chosen for its capacity to produce both food and cash, aligning with national food security goals and export revenue targets. Ndalat's design targeted an annual net income of $40 per household, with a daily milk quota of 248 gallons and maize yields of 12–13 bags per acre . This system required high external inputs: DAP fertilizer, acaricides for tick control, artificial insemination (AI), and mechanized land preparation—all dependent on state or cooperative supply chains. The prohibition of bulls, sheep, and goats underscored the rigid techno-bureaucratic control over production choices.

Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division elaborated on the contradictions introduced by the colonial settlement policy.

> *Though, Coffee as a crop was available and suited to the agroecological zone in the Ndalat Settlement scheme, the colonial administration uprooted the 500 acres of coffee plantations during the establishment of the settlement scheme. Thus, coffee as a crop was not embraced despite the presence of coffee plantation in 'Kapmakiton'. The scheme only promoted monocropping culture without recourse to other economic activities. This lack of alternative economic activities had a consequent effect on enterprise diversification which would have provided an alternative income source for the farmers. The post – independence Kenya appeared to have focused on the agricultural colonial policies and structures and thus there was no alternative economic paradigm in all the settlement schemes* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023).

Further circumstantial evidence from Appendix II; Addendum 7: Coffee Plantation in Elgon Estate indicate the presence of 234 acres which were uprooted before the land was reallocated by the resettlement. In appendix II; Addendum 8; MacDonald plots include Elgon Estate LR 11027 as plot 551 proofing that coffee plantation was a viable agricultural activity (KNA/NKU/BND/42).

3.3 Regulatory and Marketing Boards: Monopsony as Control

From inception, Ndalat farmers were locked into state-monopolized marketing structures. Milk was sold exclusively to the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC); maize to the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) successors to colonial-era boards like the Maize Control Board (1942) and Kenya Dairy Board (1959) (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).

These statutory marketing boards set fixed prices, controlled supply quotas, and insulated urban consumers from price volatility but at the cost of suppressing farmer incomes and discouraging diversification. The cooperative society (e.g., Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative) acted as the conduit, pooling produce, deducting loans, and distributing inputs effectively functioning as an arm of the state rather than a farmer-owned enterprise.

Ndalat Farmers' cooperative society served other important function of supporting the farmers in the agricultural endeavours as elucidated by former cooperative inspector.

> *The cooperative society also accessed extra animal health and nutrition requirements that was formerly provided by a white veterinary officer who was based in Eldoret. The veterinary officer provided the required advisory service on animal health and productivity during the regular drenching days. For instance, the veterinary officer visited the different cattle dips on different days in order to examine the state of the animal health and nutrition. During these days, each farmer was to bring all his/her herd to be examined and recorded and the officer would dispense advice on the state of the herd in terms of nutrition requirements for each cow among other things.*

> *The cooperative also acted as the clearing house for the settlement financial arrangements where the farmers' records for all the settlement and developments loans were kept. The accounting clerk at the cooperative society was supposed to maintain ledger accounts for every farmer in the scheme, their outstanding settlement and development loans, their farm produce and total sales. In this manner, the settlement loans would be deducted every six months and transferred to the settlement authorities and later the ministry of lands (*Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022)

Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division also acknowledged

> *In seeking to provide these services, the Cooperative society built its own offices and stores in Ndalat settlement scheme and expanded its activities and acquired transportation trucks. The cooperative society was managed and run democratically through the election of the nine-man management committee (Chairman, treasurer, and secretary). These elections were overseen by the ministry of cooperative development. Essentially, the cooperative societies were autonomous bodies which was overseen by the ministry officials. The cooperative society had in some time hired clerks and typist to assist and recording and bookkeeping. These individuals were trained by the cooperative society to support the activities and operations of the cooperative society.*

As indicated by the pioneer farmer, the settlement offices initiated the establishment of the Ndalat Farmer's Cooperative society.

> *Within two years, the SFT programme at the national level advocated for the creation of social entities called cooperative societies in each settlement scheme in Kenya. Under the SFT programme, the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society became a conduit through which farmers were able to access farm inputs and implements from Dalgetty Ltd and KFA.*
>
> *Once, the Ndalat Farmer's Cooperative society was operationalized by the settlement offices, all the farmers were to register with the cooperative and production quotas were allocated to each farmer. For instance, each smallholder farmer was supposed to deliver at least 50 Litres of Milk daily.*

Ndalat Farmer's Cooperative Society served as conduit to underpin the economic development of the farmers in several ways that included acting as a marketing agent for the smallholder farmers. The cooperative was expected to pool farmers produce such as milk and maize and then transporting them to the main buyers that is the

Kenya Cooperative Creameries for Milk and National Cereal and Produce Board for Maize. The cooperative society had with time, hired clerks and typist to assist in recording and bookkeeping. These individuals were trained by the cooperative society to support the activities and operations of the cooperative society (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023).

3.4 Formalization of individual land tenure system for Africans

Individualized land tenure became an essential feature in agricultural development throughout the world but also which practices are relevant for development (Hebinck, 1998). As indicated by former agricultural inspector two.

> *The LDSB - settlement scheme introduced private land tenure system where the land was allocated to individuals in an era where land was held communally in the African reservation. This land tenure system aided the processing of financial capital for the development of the farms. For instance, the smallholder farmers in the settlement scheme were able to access 10 – year development loans from the LDSB based on their land allotment letters through the settlement offices. To that effect, virtually all the development loans were repaid within the specified period as any defaulting smallholder was replaced by the settlement officials.*
>
> *The smallholder farmers benefited from the agricultural development brought by the settlement schemes. The varied benefits ranged from the individual ownership of the land allowed them to commercialize the smallholding and generate substantial economic return from the production of maize and milk. In comparison, peasantry and subsistence farming was rife in the Cheptil reservation which bordered the scheme.*

3.5 Hierarchical Agricultural Supervisory Structures: From Nairobi to the Plot

Only in the 1930s, did the colonial government become receptive to African agricultural development, though African agriculture faced other constraints that included shortages in financial and human resources for instance, there was only one Agricultural Officer for each of the African agricultural districts in the late 1930s (Heyer, 1973). This number increased to 228 by 1938 from 26 in 1924 (Heyer, 1973).

Though the number of officers was significant, one agricultural officer served between 100,000 and 200,000 people over a widely scattered area, and coverage was selective. For instance, the districts in the central province had agricultural officers in the 1930s except for the Meru district, while the Rift Valley districts of Baringo, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Nandi, and West Suk (West Pokot) had veterinary officers only. The impact of agricultural policy was very uneven at this period.

Roped with the settlement policy was the establishment of agricultural structures to overseer and govern the agricultural development taking root in the county. These hierarchical structures had the ministry official at the top, cascading to agricultural officer at the provincial level, district levels and divisional levels and lastly extension officers in the ground. A vertically integrated bureaucracy ensured compliance. At the apex sat the SFT, comprising directors from Finance, Agriculture, and Lands ministries. Below were senior settlement officers (e.g., based in Eldoret), overseeing multiple schemes, and settlement officers like Mr. Gibson, who managed Ndalat directly. At the scheme level, a triad of agricultural instructors, veterinary scouts, and cooperative inspectors monitored daily operations. By 1961, Kenya had recruited 12,000 agricultural instructors, reducing the farmer-to-officer ratio from 1:83,000 to 1:50,000 demonstrating the state's commitment to micro-level agronomic control (Thurston, 1987).

The historical accounts by former cooperative officer,

> The colonial agricultural policy designed the organizational structures that supported the agricultural development throughout the country from the local levels to national *levels. For instance, the settlement activities were led by a director of settlement at national level, a senior settlement officer based in Eldoret and who was in charge of various settlement schemes such as Lessos Complex (Nandi), Ainabkoi complex, Elgeyo Border, Kaptagat, Ndalat Complex (Ndalat, Kaigat and Sosiani), Kibolos Complex*

(Chepsaita), Tapsagoi, Ng'enyilel settlement schemes among others. Other senior settlement officer was based in Turbo and was in charge of Sergoit, Soy, Chemoset West (Likuyani), Lumakanda, Lugari, Chekalini, Mautuma settlement schemes. Below the senior settlement officer was the settlement officer for each settlement scheme and in the case of Ndalat complex was Mr Gibson.

At the national level, the SFT had the four directors from the ministries (Finance, Economic planning, agriculture and later on, the Lands and settlement) and executive officer. The SFT had officers spearheading settlement activities at the province level (in the rift valley, the offices were located in Nakuru), who oversaw the settlement offices in the district level in Eldoret town. The settlement officer, Mr. Gibson who was the overall person responsible for the settlement scheme and the agricultural development activities, ensure the adherence of the LDSB regulations such as the farm scheduling and arrangements, adoption of pedigree dairy cows (Freisian, Ayrshire, Guernsey and Redpoll), livestock prohibition of sheep and goats, prosecute the loan defaulters among other responsibilities.

At the local level, the settlement offices comprised the district commissioner in charge of that district (Uasin Gishu) as the chairperson, the local chiefs representing the resident community and councillors representing the African District Council in the district. The local committee for the SFT included the district commission (or District Officer One), eight chiefs and eight councillors.

In terms of agriculture, cooperative and veterinary functions, the colonial policies established a national office headed by a director (Director of Agriculture, Director of veterinary, Director for cooperatives), a provincial agricultural, veterinary and cooperative officer at provincial levels, a district agricultural, veterinary and cooperative officers at district levels and agricultural, veterinary and cooperative assistants/inspectors at each settlement schemes (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022).

3.6 Institutionalization of Commodity-Based Economic Structure

The state's emphasis on cash-crop monocultures reflected a broader developmentalist vision inherited from the colonial era and reconfigured under the banner of postcolonial modernization. In schemes such as Ndalat, settlers were allocated uniform plots, supplied with standardized inputs, and directed to cultivate specific commodities aligned with national economic plans rather than household food security or local agro-ecological conditions. The state's emphasis on cash-crop monocultures reflected a broader developmentalist vision inherited from the colonial era and reconfigured under the banner of postcolonial modernization (Van Zwanenberg & King, 1975).

Ultimately, the settlement schemes institutionalized an agro-export model centred on standardized agricultural commodities. Ultimately, the settlement schemes institutionalized an agro-export model centred on standardized agricultural commodities. This structure prioritized volume, uniformity, and predictability qualities compatible with monopsony boards and export contracts but stifled innovation, risk-taking, and ecological adaptation (Ruthenberg, 2012). Maize, milk, and later pyrethrum or wheat was produced not for local consumption patterns but for state-coordinated markets tied to national planning targets and foreign exchange earnings (Swainson, 1980). This structure prioritized volume, uniformity, and predictability qualities compatible with monopsony marketing boards and export contracts but actively discouraged innovation, risk-taking, and ecological adaptation (Johnston, 1989).

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This rigid commodification of agriculture was reinforced through statutory marketing boards such as the Maize Marketing Board, Kenya Co-operative Creameries, and the

Pyrethrum Board which exercised near-total control over pricing, distribution, and input supply. These institutions created a captive producer base, effectively suppressing market alternatives and disincentivizing diversification. Farmers who deviated from prescribed cropping patterns risked losing access to credit, extension services, or guaranteed markets (Muendo, 2004). As a result, the agricultural landscape in settlement areas became increasingly homogenized, undermining traditional risk-mitigation strategies such as intercropping, fallowing, and seasonal flexibility.

When fiscal crisis hit in the 1970s, exacerbated by global oil shocks, declining export prices, and rising debt servicing costs, the fragility of this commodity-dependent system was dramatically exposed (Cowen, 1986). The Kenyan state, facing mounting balance-of-payments pressures, began to scale back subsidies, delay payments to farmers, and dismantle the operational capacity of marketing boards. Without guaranteed prices or reliable input supply, yields collapsed across key commodity sectors. Cooperative societies once the backbone of collective production and marketing in settlement schemes rapidly decayed as members defaulted on loans and withdrew participation(Swainson, 1980). In Ndalat and comparable sites, many settlers abandoned cash-crop production altogether, reverting to subsistence farming or engaging in informal petty trade to survive.

This retreat from the state-sponsored agro-export model was not merely an economic adjustment but a profound social reorientation. It revealed the hollowness of the developmental promise embedded in the settlement schemes: rather than fostering self-reliant rural entrepreneurs, the state had produced a class of dependent producers vulnerable to macroeconomic volatility and institutional failure. The collapse of the commodity-based structure in the early 1980s thus marked not only an agricultural crisis but a crisis of the postcolonial social contract itself.

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3.7 Gradual Development of Smallholder Farming Systems

In terms of nature of the agricultural systems, the colonial agricultural policy called for the mixed farming systems of maize and milk as the main economic mainstay through experimentation (Ochieng & Maxon, 1992). At independence, the pre-dominance of the colonial agricultural policy meant that maize and milk production would dominate mixed farming systems for both export and local consumption (Heyer, 1974).The mixed farming systems then took root during the 1960s. Belshaw (1964) and continued until the diminish of the scheme with little changes to it. This European mixed farming represented a neo-colonial ideal and way of life for the educated Africans. In the defence of the economy and national interior linchpin, the independence leadership justified the transfer of the mixed farms as they were, along with the apparatus of monopsony structures (Ley, 1971).

A pioneer Farmer described the processes that took place in the settlement scheme from the original initiation of the settlement scheme to the standard procedures and the details of operations.

> *The 15 acre plot was split into 3 sections; 0.5 Acre for homestead, 3.5 and 11.5 acres for grazing; the African smallholder was to cultivate three and half acres and plant hybrid maize which were sourced directly from the Kenya Seed Company in Kitale, keep livestock was allocated 11.5 acres for grazing and the farmer was to construct an homestead in the remaining half an acre. Besides the smallholding farms, the settlement plans also ensured that within the settlement scheme, several capital and social welfare infrastructure were incorporated and provided.*

In Ndalat Settlement Scheme, the land preparation was carried out by a contractor called 'Steinkamp" and input provided by the settlement offices. Other important initiatives were the application of modern agronomical practices such as land preparation using tractors, ploughs and planters from the Contractor (Steinkamp). Each farmer was given 3 pedigree animals and milking equipment and if the animals reproduced, the farmer was to either sell the calf or the cow. Bulls, bullocks, sheep and goats were not allowed in the farms. In Ndalat settlement scheme, farmers were provided with technical expertise in form of agronomy practices for crop production and livestock extension services for livestock production. On the settlement offices were the animal health assistant who were to provide AI services and disease control through preventive and curative management of diseases. Tick control was achieved through weekly dipping arrangements in the cattle dips that had been constructed and operationalized by the settlement offices (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, June 12th 2022).

Smallholder farming in Ndalat was not spontaneous but scripted. Each 15-acre plot was subdivided into 0.5 acre homestead, 3.5 acres for hybrid maize (H614), and 11.5 acres for pasture supporting three grade dairy cows (Friesian, Ayrshire, Guernsey, or Redpoll). Indigenous crops (sorghum, finger millet) and Zebu cattle were prohibited, reflecting a deliberate erasure of indigenous agro-ecological knowledge.^10 Input access was mediated through state-linked contractors: Steinkamp and Smith provided tractors and tools; Dalgety Ltd supplied pedigree livestock; Kenya Seed Company distributed hybrid seeds (Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022). Farmers operated under 10-year development loans, secured against land titles, with repayment enforced through a cooperative check-off system default meant eviction.

Essentially, the establishment of the mixed farming systems in Kenya was largely the result of the colonial policies on agriculture driven by the need to integrate the African settlers into an economic activity and at the same time sustain the demands of the protectorate The colonial policy called for the enlargement of the market opportunities for the peasantry agriculture to produce food and cash crops not only for the subsistence, local consumption and also for export (Maxon, 1992) At independence, Kenya turned into an agricultural economy, with maize production remained a crucial part of food security in two ways; as a commodity for food requirements of a more diversified economy, and as a cash crop in areas where it is agro-ecologically suited to provide high returns (Oloo, 2020). The growth and expansion of the smallholder maize production followed the policies of the post-independence government of tackling food security and development and its success hinged on innovative breeding coupled with complementary investments in agronomic research, extension, seed distribution systems, and rural infrastructure; and institutionalized infrastructural support mechanism to coordinate grain marketing with seed, fertilizer and credit delivery. This support mechanism was implemented through controlled pricing and marketing systems that incurred large subsidies and treasury costs, and which eventually contributed to fiscal crisis and agricultural policy failure.

Based on the historical account by farmer/former chair, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society,

> *The policy emphasized monocropping of maize as the only crop that was planted in the smallholder plots. Monocropping systems as an agricultural technique destroyed the strains of the indigenous cultivars of maize sorghum and finger millet. At the initial stage only vegetables on a small portion of land were allowed. The scheme also introduced farm mechanization where a firm named Stenkamp and Smith where the agents of the AFC provided the tractor for ploughing to the farmers at reasonable fee. Through this arrangement, the farmers were able to plough their farms on time. However, the mechanical ploughing destroyed the indigenous land ecosystem which was regenerative in nature.*
>
> *In terms of the livestock to be kept, the settlement scheme only allowed that the smallholder farmers kept only dairy cows (a maximum of three cows and calves). Within the scheme, no animal was grazed outside the farm in order to prevent the spread of diseases. In terms of the breeds of the dairy cows, the settlement scheme offered several grade dairy cow breeds including Freisian and Ayrshire, Guernsey and Redpoll. Initially, the settlement scheme provided AI straws at Kshs. 2/straw and the animals were to be served for not more than three straws consecutively without an examination by the veterinary doctor. Later, the AI straws were acquired at a cost of Kshs. 10/straw. The animal serving was aided by African veterinary scouts trained on inseminations techniques and disease surveillance. The veterinary scouts were always moving from one location to another checking on the status of any sick cow or a cow requiring insemination. There were designated places from which the farmer would take the cow for insemination but in the case of a sick cow, the scouts were to inform Dr. Hansen who was to attend to any sick cow on call any time* (Oral interview, farmer/former chair, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative, November 4th 2020)

A resident farmer (Kapbruss village) commented on the nature of operations at the scheme

> *The veterinary officer was tasked with animal health management and disease surveillance (Quarantine, culling and curative services). It was illegal for a farmer in Ndalat Settlement scheme to rear a bull and throughout the farm, the farmers used artificial insemination methods on their cows. The veterinary function led by a white veterinary doctor was in charge of animal health (management and control of incidences of animal pandemics) and reproductive performance (the selection of cow breeds to be kept, the use of AI services, the maximum number of dairy cows to be kept by each*

> *smallholder among other issues). The veterinary doctor was supported by several African veterinary scouts who were tasked with the monitoring of the animal diseases and pandemics, supervision of the smallholder farmer activities (adherence to the objectives of the settlement scheme) and sustained provision of AI services as desired* (Oral interview, resident farmer (Kapbruss village), 10th March, 2021).

> *The agricultural extension services were led by a senior agricultural extension officer who was either Whiteman or African (depending on the availability) but in this case, Mr Shitaka was seconded from the ministry headquarter in Nairobi to oversee the agricultural development of the settlement activities. These extension officers provided extension services such as the farming technologies, management of soil erosion, monitoring the agricultural techniques and productivity among other issues. The agricultural staff in charge of crop production were tasked with soil conservation efforts and laid terraces before planning as well as environmental management activities such as the forest conservation and protection of river banks. Ndalat settlement scheme had a health inspector by the name Mr Jakub Kurei who was responsible for the infrastructural facilities such as the building of sanitation facilities (toilets and pit latrines).* (Oral interview, resident farmer (Kapbruss village), 10th March, 2021).

In a reply, a farmer/retired Soldier contributed to the discussion;

> *There were subsidiary functions such as the AFC agents (Steinkamp and Smith Company Limited), Dalgety Limited and Meyer Limited all of which provided varied support functions. The Steinkamp and Smith Company limited provided loan and leasing facilities such as tractors and ploughs, farm tools and implements among other things, while Dalgety Limited provided hybrid cows where the smallholder farmers were to access the dairy cow breeds, and the Meyer Limited providing hybrid seeds and fertilizer to the farmers. The firms either operated under the settlement offices such as the Steinkamp and Smith Co. Limited (provision of farm tools and implements) and Meyer Limited (hybrid seed and fertilizer) or operated under AFC such as the Steinkamp and Smith Company offered mechanization implements such as tractors, ploughs, planters for hire for the initial period before the cooperative society was grounded. The settlement officer seconded an agricultural instructor who oversaw the establishment of the settlement activity by ensuring the smallholder had fenced the farm, and undertake agricultural development as required. The whole Ndalat complex had several agricultural instructors; Paul Tarus, Simon Kurgat, Stephen Kemei and Kiprop araap Kebeney, Ngatia, Edward Mburu, David Kapkiyai, Thomas Birgen and Saina* (Oral interview, farmer/retired soldier, October 3rd 2020)

> *The settlement had several veterinary assistants (instructors) that included; Mr Christopher Araap Samoei, Mr Matayo Araap Biy, Saulo Olayo and Kiboit. The veterinary officers firstly recommended the acquisition of dairy cows from the where the dairy cows which had been acquired by the settlement office from the white settlers' stock (Mr Bruce Tweedie) were collated before distribution. It was only, the veterinary officer who would recommend the acquisition of the dairy cows. Under the veterinary instructors were AI scouts who were tasked with insemination of cows.*
>
> *The veterinary scouts traversed the settlement scheme daily and if a farmer had a cow on oestrus, then farmer would put in a white scarf on his farm entrance to indicate that a cow was on oestrus and the AI scout would serve the cow for Kshs 2 per straw and invoice the farmer. The farmer paid for the AI services through a check-off system arrangement with the cooperative society. The cooperative inspector also monitored the production arrangement of all the farmers and in case of drastic fall in a farm, the cooperative inspector was to report to the veterinary and agricultural officers to visit the farm and investigate the reasons for the fall in the production. He also ensured that all the farmers' production was 'sold' to the cooperative society.*
>
> *In the earlier days, the farmers could not access AFC loans for agricultural production because of the outstanding land and developments loans offered by the SFT to support smallholding agricultural development in the country. Later on in 1970s, some farmers were able to access AFC loans based on stricter supervision mechanisms from the SFT programme. In addition, KFA provided loans to the farmers through the provision of input, farm implements to the farmers through the Cooperative Society.*

The Ndalat settlement scheme 1964 Master plan indicated that the initial pioneering farms had approximately 800 heads of grade Friesian cows producing milk to fulfil a 240 gallon per day milk contract. The main concerned as raised by the settlement officials including Mr. Gibson was to maintain the contract until such time as the plot holder took over their plots and were able to maintain the quota themselves.

> 'There has been some difficult in maintaining this quota due to the fact that the previous owner removed the bulls from the herd as soon as negotiation with the SFT commenced. Consequently, when the board took over there were very few cows and calf. This led to many of the cows being in milk for over a year and therefore producing very little. There has also been one or two outbreaks of foot and mouth which has also reduced the yield from the cows (Kenya National Archives/Ndalat Master Plan, 1963/64 TR/8/T572, 1964).

Within the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, the settlement officers observed that were concerted efforts to increase Livestock and Dairy product farming;

> *'The existing herd of grade Friesian cattle on the scheme were sold off piecemeal to the plot holders. There is a danger some farms of tick-borne disease as the stock have not been grazing in this part of the scheme for the past five months. When plot holders on this part of the scheme are issued with stock, they will have to dip twice a week for the first two to three months. On such small plots as this, it will be uneconomic for each plot holder to breed his own replacements. There are two alternatives; one, either the three large stock and in calf heifers for sale to the rest of the settlers or the settlers have to go outside the scheme and buy replacements as and when they need them.'*
>
> *'Artificial Insemination is being practiced there at the moment under a private practitioner and I suggest that this arrangement is continued as there will be no room for individual plot holders to run bulls. I have asked the local veterinary officer to inspect the scheme with regard to cleanliness etc and to report direct to the SFT.*

According to the former agricultural inspector, the underlying arrangement for the farmers in the settlement scheme was as follows;

> *The dairy cows were kept on an extensive system where one cow consumed not less than three (3) acres per acre based on the restrictions of the number of animals kept and the minimum land preserved for pasture. The milking of animals was done by family labour and the morning produce transported to the creameries at Eldoret (KCC) by a contactor called "Morow/Mowlem' transporters which later on changed to Great Rift Transporters after the acquisition by Africans. Milk was collected as early as 3:00 AM in the morning and transported to the KCC, Eldoret plant because of the bad roads and the distance to the creameries in Eldoret. Later on, the settlement scheme through the cooperative society bought several tractors and took over the transportation of the milk. The afternoon milk was commonly used for subsistence purpose and the surplus transported to the cooperative society for skimming into butter at 'Kaspigirio'* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural office two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023).

However, based on the 1965/66 Annual reports from the Department of Settlement (Kenya National Archives/Ndalat Master Plan, 1963/64 TR/8/T572, 1964), the cooperatives faced significant challenges arising from financial mismanagement and malpractices by the committee and insufficient staff. Other important challenges in the cooperative societies in the settlement schemes included; lack of financial management and control, planning and coordination, fraud, embezzlement and fund misappropriation were experienced in some cases.

3.8 Heavy Financial Burden on smallholders

Other important challenges introduced into the scheme was the land repossession which was something new to the African settlers and in general Africans. This is indicated by one of the pioneer farmer;

> *Throughout 1960s to 1970s, close to 10 per cent of the smallholder farms were repossessed for the defaulting of development loans. For instance, in mid-1960s, two smallholder farmers who defaulted on land loans were quietly dispossessed of the land by the settlement office and the land was allotted to a new farmer. In another case, one smallholder farmer defaulted on the balance of Kshs. 2,000 development loan and the settlement office came and drove all his dairy herd as a deterrence but then the Ndalat Farmers' Co-operative society came to his rescue and paid up the outstanding amounts. Some smallholder farmers had their land repossessed because they breached the settlements rules such as selling the dairy cows, and using the cows for brideprice and unable to fulfil their settlement objectives. For instance, three original owners that included Cheptobok A. Lagat (Plot 77) Kiplagat A Sambu (Plot 93) and Kipserem A Beigo (plot 88) deserted their land and left after defaulting the settlement loans worth Sh. 7,421 by 1967. The farmer, Kipchumba A Choge who had settled on the three plots was dispossessed of the land holding and sent away from the settlement scheme as indicated in Appendix II; Addendum 11: Plot repossession by SFT* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020)

There were specific instances where the new settlers illegally sold their plots and this was observed by the department of the Settlement reports as indicated in appendix II: Addendum 4: Plot Sales during initiation period. Other documentary evidence is adduced from the farmer/retired settlement officer;

Some pioneering settlers were not able to service their land and development loans. One smallholder farmer sold his dairy cows and the settlement officer, Mr Gibson oversaw the prosecution and the farmer was jailed for six months for the misdemeanour. Few and countable settlers defaulted on their loan with the number being less than 10 and were disposed their land by the settlement office, and went back to the African reserves. Out of the 64 initial plot allotments, 22 pioneering settlers sold their plots while three plots were repossessed by the white settlement officers. Though, most smallholder had repaid their loans by 1990s, some farmers had not fully settled their loans to the SFT. (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

The evidence adduced from the informants is supported by the Department of Settlement annual report 1965/66 which indicated that 875 settlers had breached their loan agreements (Letters of Allotment) but only 10 smallholding farms had been repossessed in 1965 and a further 26 in 1966. Von Pischke (1977) corroborated the evidence that settlers were heavily indebted, because of the several reasons; first, the settlement charge value of the land under European ownership and management, second, the use of settlement activity as a means of solving landless and lastly, the willing buyer - willing seller arrangements.

Further evidence is drawn from the Department of Settlements' Annual Report for 1965–66 indicated measurable progress in both loan disbursement management and repayment behaviour. On average, settlers carried outstanding land settlement loans amounting to Shs. 3,700 per plot, alongside development loans totalling Shs. 2,600. While these figures may appear substantial, they represented a gradual decline in cumulative indebtedness compared to earlier years, signalling steady repayment performance and improved financial stewardship among settler households. This downward trend in outstanding balances reflected not only consistent remittances but also the maturation of the loan cycle as initial cohorts of settlers moved further into their repayment periods.

The Institutional Architecture of Social Re-engineering

From their inception, Kenya's settlement schemes were not merely about land redistribution; they were instruments of nation-building and cultural modernization. The state, under Jomo Kenyatta's leadership, envisioned the schemes as laboratories for a new kind of Kenyan citizen, one who was economically self-reliant, politically loyal to the central government, and culturally aligned with the values of "modernity"(Boone, 2014).

Plots of 5–10 acres were allocated to individual nuclear families, a stark departure from the communal or lineage-based landholding systems that had historically governed access to land among the Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, and other communities (Muriuki, 1975). Settlements were laid out in grid-like patterns with standardized infrastructure: access roads, primary schools, health dispensaries, and churches often built through harambee (community self-help) initiatives but sanctioned and supervised by district officials (Kanogo, 1987). This spatial and administrative design intentionally weakened kinship-based authority and fostered dependence on state-mediated institutions, thereby reconfiguring the very fabric of rural social organization.

Former agricultural inspector two focused on the socio – economic transformation taking place in the scheme.

> *Ndalat settlement scheme introduced the social and economic stratification among the Africans in the settlement schemes and those still living in the reservations or the planned African land holding under the Swynnerton plan. The White settlement officers built two model houses for the settlers for Asha and Malakwen Kosobo from*

> *which individuals were supposed to draw and built the houses. This enabled the smallholder to build house with corrugated iron sheets (initially, there were only three smallholder farmers with house having corrugated iron sheets) while the African in the Cheptil reservation still lived in small thatched houses* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022)

3.9 The Legal Construction of the Male-Headed Nuclear Household

The foundational social intervention of Kenya's settlement schemes was the legal redefinition of land ownership through individual, male-centred title deeds. Unlike customary systems in many parts of precolonial Kenya where land was held by lineages, clans, or communities with usufruct rights allocated to households or individuals, settlement schemes mandated that land be registered in the name of a single male applicant (Ake, 1976).' This design was not incidental but ideologically driven. As Christophe Bonneuil study's observed, the schemes in postcolonial Africa were explicitly intended to "create a class of African petty bourgeois farmers who would owe their economic position and social identity to the state, not to traditional authorities."

Empirical evidence confirms that this legal architecture had far-reaching social consequences. In a study of 120 settler households across Central and Rift Valley provinces, Ruthenberg (1966) found that 98% of titles were held exclusively by men, and in 87% of cases, wives had no formal claim to the land, even after decades of co-residence and labour contribution. This legal exclusion translated into practical disempowerment: women were routinely bypassed in decisions regarding crop choice, livestock sales, and credit applications. Agricultural extension officers overwhelmingly male and trained in Western agronomic models, reinforced this dynamic by addressing only the titled male as the "farmer," thereby naturalizing gendered hierarchies within the household (Chune, 1997).

Oral histories from Ndalat Settlement corroborate these findings. Female respondents consistently reported that while they performed the majority of daily farm tasks; planting, weeding, milking, and manure collection, their husbands controlled all cash transactions and strategic decisions. As one female informant stated, "The land is in his name. Even if I work harder, I cannot sell a cow without his permission." This institutionalized subordination contrasted sharply with practices in adjacent "reserve" areas, where women often retained independent control over kitchen gardens or small livestock, serving as a buffer during household crises.

Moreover, the nuclear household model disrupted extended kinship networks that had historically provided social insurance. In pre-settlement communities, landlessness was mitigated through kin-based access, and labour was pooled during peak seasons through reciprocal arrangements '*kesumet*'. The settlement plots, however, were spatially isolated and legally bounded, discouraging collective labour and weakening inter-household obligations. For instance, in a comparative study of livestock systems, Reynolds et al., (Ley, 1975) noted that "the dispersal of homesteads in settlement schemes reduced opportunities for communal grazing supervision and mutual calf care, increasing the workload for individual women."

3.10 Erosion of Indigenous Customary Traditions

One of the most significant consequences of resettlement was the weakening of indigenous customary institutions, particularly those tied to land tenure, elder authority, and communal ritual. In pre-colonial societies, land was rarely an individual commodity; among the Kikuyu, for instance, lineage elders (*athamaki*) regulated its use and inheritance, while rituals marked the transfer of stewardship across generations (Muriuki, 1974)). The imposition of titled, individually held plots in the schemes severed this link between land and lineage, rendering elders' traditional roles obsolete. Moreover, because settlers were often drawn from multiple ethnic groups and resettled far from ancestral homesteads, the communal consensus necessary for conducting rites of passage such as Kikuyu male and female initiation (*irua* and *ngwiko*) became increasingly difficult to achieve (Kanogo, 1987). Younger settlers, many of whom had served in the military or worked in urban centres, increasingly dismissed such practices as "backward," associating them with colonial subjugation rather than cultural continuity. State propaganda, disseminated through agricultural extension officers and local administrators, reinforced this view by equating modern farming techniques, nuclear family structures, and individual entrepreneurship with national progress.

Among Nilotic communities such as the Kalenjin and Maasai, the decline of age-set systems further illustrates this trend. These systems had historically regulated social behaviour, military organization, and political representation across generations. In the individualized, cash-crop-oriented environment of the schemes, however, such collectivist structures lost their functional relevance, as personal economic success superseded communal obligation (Spear, 2003).

As indicated by one of the pioneer farmer, the indigenous and cultural traditions were slowly eroded and lost in the settlement schemes.

> *The community in the Cheptil reservation maintained their indigenous social and cultural structures such as indigenous knowledge flows and transfers, customary traditions such as labour reciprocity(kesumet), circumcision for both girls and boys and other important social – cultural events such as child upbringing. The settlers in the scheme were prohibited from practicing these indigenous and cultural traditions and thus the indigenous socio – economic interlinkages between different individuals were disrupted by the land tenure systems and the individualization of the land and the prohibitions and this reduced the knowledge flows between the community members in the cheptil reservation and Ndalat Settlement scheme*

> *Ndalat settlement scheme introduced labour commoditization to the Africans as the indigenous Africans had a form of labour reciprocity (kesumet), a form of in – kind labour where the community congregated at individual's farm to harvest the crop and given items in return or reciprocate in return. The settlement scheme created a labour market for individuals from the Cheptil reservation provided labour to the settlers in the settlement and in return they were paid in monetary terms or in kind items such as cereal or milk in return. This scenario promoted valuable technology transfers between the two communities as it enabled the individuals in Cheptil reservation access hybrid maize stock and exotic bulls and calves that were sold by the settlers* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, May 15th 2021)

3.11 Christianization and the Marginalization of Indigenous Spirituality

Christian missions, which had been present in Kenya since the late nineteenth century, found fertile ground in the settlement schemes. The state actively partnered with major denominations, the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), the Reformed Church of East Africa (PCEA), and the Roman Catholic Church to deliver essential social services. Churches built schools and clinics within scheme boundaries, effectively becoming co-administrators of rural life (Anderson, 2005a). In many cases, access to these services was informally contingent upon church attendance or nominal Christian affiliation, creating strong incentives for conversion.

Missionaries actively discouraged indigenous religious practices, often labeling them as "heathen" or superstitious. Among the Kikuyu, veneration of Ngai (the supreme deity) and rituals led by traditional healers (*mũndũ mũgo*) were increasingly stigmatized and driven underground (Mbiti, 1990). In their place, Christian practices; Sunday worship, baptism, and church-sanctioned monogamous marriage became markers of respectability and social mobility. This shift was not merely theological; it was deeply sociological. Christianity promoted nuclear family ideals and patriarchal household structures that often conflicted with pre-existing arrangements. Polygyny, once a sign of wealth and status, declined sharply not only because small plots could not economically support multiple wives but also because churches refused to recognize such unions (White, 1990). Conversion thus became a prerequisite for full participation in the new social order of the schemes.

As observed by former agricultural inspector, the scheme drastically impacted on the settlers in many ways;

> *Under the LDSB settlement offices, a two-acre plot in Ndalat Township was allocated to the Reformed Church of Eastern Africa for the development of health facility to provide healthcare services to the smallholder farmers in the scheme. At the onset, the Africans in the Cheptil reservation could not access healthcare services as the government – owned facilities in Eldoret were far and congested. Later on, after independence, the human health services were extended to the inhabitants of the African reserves from Cheptil, Kaigat. Further, the smallholder farmers in the scheme accessed good nutrition in terms of nutritious meal three times a day while their counterparts in the reservation struggled to access two meals a day. All the smallholder farmers in the scheme were supposed to build sanitation facilities such as the pit latrines before settling in their allocated plots.*
>
> *At the onset, most new settlers in the scheme practised indigenous religion with only 10 settlers out of the 600 settlers practising Christianity or Islam religion. Most of the settlers began adapting Christianity with the first Christian denomination being Reformed church of East Africa. Later on, the Catholic Church began establishing itself and later on became dominant. The RCEA then became the first church to establish an hospital in Kaigat in addition to the one established in Ndalat (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022).*
>
> *During the establishment of Ndalat settlement scheme, there was no difference between followers of different Christian denominations. Most new settlers shared common ancestry and therefore held common indigenous beliefs. However, the two dominant Christian denominations were the Catholic Church at Kapsigirio, African Inland Church at Kaigat and Anglican Church at KapBruss. The descendants of the followers of Catholic - sponsored school at' Tweedies' Kamulat primary schools while those of protestant denomination went to Simat and Kaigat Primary Schools (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022).*

Former agricultural inspector two focused on the differences between the different Christian religions with regards to the socio – economic transformation taking place in the scheme.

> *The protestant denominations spearheaded agricultural development by embracing and adopting virtually all innovations. For instance, they adopted imported chicken breeds such as White Leghorn Breed, and the growing of the grafted fruits(oranges). These individuals adopted the cultural ways of the white settlers from dressing to suturing the 'pierced' ear lobes. However, their fellow Catholics were a bit conservative and lagged behind in embracing the development changes brought about by the Ndalat settlement schemes.*
>
> *In terms of economic development, the followers of protestant denomination embrace cultural change by being the first persons to build house with iron roofs, semi- permanent housing that included verandas and many other facets of change. Further, all the followers of the AIC denomination were the first to join the National Health Insurance Fund (Formerly National Hospital Insurance Fund) in the 1970s at a cost of Kshs 20 and sought medical advice and treatment at a hospital in Miwani Hospital currently known as Eldoret Hospital. The Catholics tended to remain in tandem with their cultural ways such as traditional circumcision rites for both girls and boys* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022)

3.12 Conclusion

The period between 1963 and 1970 was mixed with both successes and challenges to the farmers in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. The success came about as a result of the Africans getting land and initial support to engage in commercial agriculture. This gave them the opportunity to repay their loans that they were serving on the plots they were residing on. At the same time, this period led to notable social developments in terms of construction of schools and churches. However, it has been demonstrated that as the years went by, the farmers begun experiencing challenges to the extent that their farming activities as well as repayment of loans became a challenge.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE OF THE COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME, 1970 TO 1980

4.0 Introduction

This chapter delves into the period between 1970 to 1980 with the specific intention to elaborate the social, economic and political influence of the Ndalat settlement scheme on the lives of the people. Specifically, the chapter first examines the legacy that was carried over by the colonial land policies and how that legacy came to haunt the activities of the scheme. This was the time when Africanization was taking place as the remaining white farmers were leaving. This had ramifications that were twofold: on one hand it gave the Africans full control of the scheme devoid of any interference but on the other hand, the white settlers left with a lot of resourceful programs and expertise that denied Africans a chance to continue as they started. Despite this, the scheme managed to attain social, political and economic influence on the people of Ndalat. The influence came in many ways ranging from improved livelihoods, construction of roads, expansion of educational opportunities and many more. However, it turns out that the full influence of the scheme on the people was also captured by the political economy where the political class took advantage to prioritize their gains. This denied the farmers the full chance of enjoying the benefits of the scheme. The end result was further weakening of the agricultural enterprise.

4.1 The Collapse of the Developmentalist Paradigm

The Ndalat Settlement Scheme exemplified both the ambitions and the contradictions of Kenya's post-independence "developmentalist" project Bonneuil (2000), a state-driven vision of agrarian modernization rooted in colonial planning logics. Initially, the scheme functioned as a tightly regulated socio-economic laboratory, where white settlement officers, technical experts, and state-backed cooperatives enforced a rigid regime of production quotas, land use schedules, and financial discipline. Yet this experimental model began to unravel in the late 1970s, not due to settler resistance alone, but because of a critical institutional withdrawal: the systematic dismantling of supervisory structures that had underpinned the scheme's operational coherence.

4.2 Institutional failures in the settlement Scheme

This institutional collapse reflected a broader flaw in the developmentalist paradigm itself. As historian Bonneuil (2000) had argued, the colonial and early post-colonial settlement schemes emerged from a culture of scientific planning that treated society as a machine requiring expert calibration. Farmers were not partners but subjects: told what to plant, when to plant, and how to manage livestock within uniform field plots and nuclear-family households. Deviation whether through off-farm employment, small-scale enterprise, or communal labour practices was deemed subversive and punished through loan cancellations, lease forfeitures, or suspension of subsistence allowances (Hulme, 1987).

As per former agricultural inspector:

> *The settlement scheme configurations and arrangement worked efficiently in the 1960s through 1970s until the late 1970s when the settlement offices withdrew its staff from the scheme. The cooperative society was a member of the Kenya Farmers Association and accessed animal feeds on credit and thus enabled the farmers to benefit from the competitive pricing, accessibility and available feeds for their dairy cows. This credit arrangement also ensured the timely and reliable access to feeds and thus increased the milk productivity from each smallholder farmer in the scheme* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022).

The downturn to the experimental 'developmentalist' paradigm in the settlement schemes was the delegation of the settlement supervision mechanisms to the Ndalat

Farmers' Cooperative Society by the settlement offices and as observed by the former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division:

> *The settlement offices were wounded up in 1968/69 and by 1970, they were not there. Due to its closure of the offices, there was a significant drop in the strict farm supervisory mechanisms as the government didn't replace the departing settlement officers with any overarching structures such as farm supervision. Instead, the farm economic unit, the veterinary office, the agricultural extension services among other settlement structures were delink from the settlement scheme and transferred to divisional agricultural offices.*
>
> *Whereas, the Ndalat Settlement scheme had four agricultural extension officers, five veterinary officers, one health inspector and a farm economic unit, the immediate closure of the settlement offices saw the relocation of these officers to Mosop Divisional headquarters to cater for the new settlement activities including the agricultural development activities in the former African reserves. This realignment of the agricultural offices to the Divisional officers starved of the supervisory mechanisms to the settlement scheme which negatively impacted on the development of smallholder production systems while the farmers seemed glad to be 'liberated' from the supervision and thus regressed to their original peasantry* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023).

These delinking had serious repercussion to the experimental 'developmentalist' strategy as former agricultural inspector two, who stated the following:

> *When the settlement offices were closed down, the white settlement officers left settlement scheme and immediately the smallholder farmers were reluctant to pursue the objectives of the settlement scheme. This led the decline in the smallholding farming systems in the scheme starting with the commencement of the drop in animal productivity. The lack of supervision led to overstocking and bull breeding which consequently led to the drop in milk productivity.*
>
> *Earlier, in 1960s, the white settlement officers ensured that all the farmers received substantial support and supervision and the cooperative society run as an autonomous body corporate to the settlement offices. Usually, the cooperative society had one executive person who reported to the management committee, acted as a secretary to the management committee and was oversighted by the local cooperative officer. In the 1970s, once, the white settlement officer left, the farmers wholly relied on the cooperative society for the operations and activities of the individual farm.*

The management of cooperative society was 'overwhelmed' by the demands of the smallholder farmers. The cooperative society relied on the individual whims of the executing manager for future directions and a few literate committee members. On the one hand, the running of the cooperative society depended on the goodwill of the manager and by extension the management committee. On the other hand, the staffers were largely illiterate and untrained except the veterinary scouts and thus the productivity was marginal. Thus, the manager tasked with all the responsibilities of the cooperative society and this sometimes may overwhelm one person. The tasks ranged from employee supervision, membership relations, agency relationship with different marketing bodies and supplier organizations and banks among other responsibilities. All this had a consequent effect on the optimal efficiency and effectiveness of the manager and by extension, the returns to the cooperative society and to all membership at large (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022).

One of the pioneer farmers observed that there was insufficient supervisory support to the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society, once it was delinked from settlement offices:

Due to the inadequate farm supervision, the farmers introduced the outlawed livestock such as the sheep and goats which effectively competed for the same grazing pastures with the cows. The introduction of goats and sheep in the scheme impinged the land production schedule of three acres per dairy cow and consequently reduced the milk productivity per cow as the dairy cow could not get sufficient feeds for reproductive performance and productivity. Overtime, this had a cyclical effect in the productivity and thus as time passed, the overall milk productivity from scheme reduced (Oral interview, Pioneer Farmer, August 20th 2021).

Further, the delinking of the Cooperative society from settlement offices had a direct and adverse effect on the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society as indicated by its former chair:

The land mechanization efforts and processes stalled immediately after the departure of the white settlement officers. In essence, the cooperative societies were not proactive enough in acquiring sufficient number of tractors, ploughs, planters, shellers etc and during planting season, the demand for ploughing, planting services and even breakdowns delayed land preparation and planting seasons. Any delayed in land preparation and planting seasons had

> *a consequent impact on the farm productivity levels* (Oral interview, resident farmer (Kapsigirio village) March 20th 2021).

By the beginning of 1970, the settlement offices in Ndalat were formally wound up. As former Agricultural Officer, Mosop Divisional observed, this closure was not accompanied by any replacement mechanism for farm supervision. Instead, the entire administrative edifice comprising four agricultural extension officers, five veterinary officers, one health inspector, and a dedicated farm economic unit was delinked from the scheme and relocated to Mosop Divisional headquarters. This realignment was ostensibly designed to extend agricultural services to former African reserves, but in practice, it starved the settlement of expert oversight, leaving smallholders without technical support or accountability frameworks.

Crucially, the state delegated responsibility for managing this vacuum to the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society, an institution ill-equipped for the task. In the 1960s, the cooperative had functioned as an autonomous but closely supervised body, with a single executive secretary reporting to a management committee under the oversight of a local cooperative officer. But after 1969, it became the sole institutional anchor for the entire scheme. The manager, an often-overburdened individual with minimal training was expected to handle employee supervision, membership relations, banking, supplier coordination, and marketing linkages with entities like Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC). Staff literacy and technical capacity were generally low, with only veterinary scouts possessing formal training. As a result, operational efficiency declined, and the cooperative's capacity to support members eroded.

4.3 Regression to peasant modes of production

The consequences of the withdrawal of the settlement apparatus were immediate and severe. According to former agricultural inspector two, the departure of the white settlement officers triggered a rapid decline in adherence to scheme objectives. Farmers, once subject to daily scrutiny, became “reluctant to pursue” the prescribed development agenda. Animal husbandry standards collapsed: overstocking and unregulated bull breeding led to a measurable drop in milk productivity. The absence of veterinary supervision encouraged the introduction of livestock explicitly prohibited under the original plan, namely sheep and goats which competed with dairy cattle for limited pasture. As one of the pioneer farmers noted, this violated the carefully calibrated three-acre-per-cow land allocation, undermining fodder availability and reproductive performance, and initiating a downward spiral in overall dairy output (Oral interview, Pioneer Farmer, August 20th 2021).

The withdrawal of supervision ironically granted settlers a form of “liberation,” but one that exposed the fragility of imposed modernity. Many reverted to peasant modes of production, prioritizing household food security over cash-crop targets. This was not backwardness, but a rational adaptation to the loss of state support and the persistence of structural constraints. Mechanization efforts stalled as tractors, ploughs, and planters were not replaced, causing chronic delays in land preparation and planting—directly reducing yields. By 1970, 44% of land and development loan repayments across LDSB schemes were in arrears, signalling deepening fiscal stress (Ley, 1971).

Compounding these issues was the commodification of land and labour inherent in the settlement model. Land purchase arrangements required LDSB and later the Settlements Field Team (SFT) to hold a legal charge over each plot, using it as collateral for loans. Since African settlers lacked alternative assets, this created a closed credit loop: formal financing was inaccessible outside the scheme, and seasonal credit depended entirely on cooperative arrangements. Only after significant loan repayment often by the mid-1970s could settlers access broader financial markets.

A critical constraint was the limited availability of formal credit beyond the initial settlement loans. While land and development loans provided through the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) enabled entry into the schemes, they were typically non-revolving and did not cover recurrent operational needs such as seeds, fertilizers, or equipment maintenance. Once disbursed, there were few mechanisms for accessing follow-up financing, leaving farmers vulnerable to shocks and unable to scale production. This absence of a broader rural credit system severely constrained the long-term viability of smallholding agriculture outside the structured settlement framework. However, most settlers in LDSB schemes had by 1975 paid significant land loans and this allowed them to access formal credit arrangements with various financial institutions (Von Pischke, 1977).

Suppression of indigenous social institutions

Moreover, the scheme actively suppressed indigenous social institutions such as labour reciprocity, extended kinship networks, and communal land management that might have buffered against state withdrawal. As Hulme (1987) noted, settlement schemes frequently underperformed because they ignored the social embeddedness of peasant households. In Ndalat, the hierarchical, bureaucratic administration blending colonial control with neo-colonial resource extraction treated settlers as isolated economic units rather than members of interdependent communities.

The settlement scheme had hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative system that blended colonial, neo-colonial and imperialistic tendencies coupled with national – international contest on behalf of the neo-colonial state which expropriates energy, materials and information from agrarian satellite areas to metropolitan centres(Hume, 1987). The social institutions such as labour reciprocity, extended family and filial clans suited to settlers' needs was discouraged and therefore the settlers were dependent on government agencies and the planned withdrawal of specialised project management units would indefinitely cause paralysis in the Ndalat settlement scheme. The result, as Bonneuil (2000) observed, was a new form of domination: the household head became the sole legal interlocutor with the state, bound by individual tenancy and held solely responsible for productivity, thereby fracturing collective resilience.

Thus, rather than replacing the colonial agrarian order, the settlement scheme reconfigured it fusing peasant production with capitalist imperatives in a dynamic, conflict-ridden system. Agricultural credit remained essential for productivity, but access was filtered through class, literacy, and proximity to state networks. In the end, as the developmentalist machinery faltered, what emerged was not failure, but a hybrid agrarian formation: one in which peasant and capitalist modes coexisted, competed, and mutually reinforced the inequalities the scheme was meant to resolve.

Ultimately, the Ndalat experience reveals a paradox of post-colonial agrarian policy. While the state promoted settlement as a path to equity, the outcomes were deeply stratified. Prosperous peasants and emerging bourgeois farmers often those with off-farm income used the scheme to accumulate capital, expand holdings, and access credit. Meanwhile, marginal settlers, lacking liquidity or technical support, were forced to sell portions of their plots, reproducing landlessness within the very program meant to abolish it. IBRD/CDC-financed schemes became sites of status and prosperity, whereas high-density H.M.G. schemes remained dominated by subsistence-oriented peasantry, living in thatched homes on underutilized land.

To validate the juxtapositions in the LDSB settlements schemes, Bonneuil (2000) observed that the settlement schemes were designed with the physical and social space in accordance with "plans" produced by the scientific bureaucracy. The settlement scheme introduced a new system of domination by the individual household head rather than the indigenous ways of living in a community. The scheme favoured the nuclear family and granted tenancy after gaining access to land through the scheme offices. The household head also had the legal responsibility for conducting the agricultural operations on his plot according to the experts and inspectors' prescription. This scenario established the personal relationship between the individual household head and the state.

In the end, more prosperous Africans from the ambitious peasants to the emerging bourgeoisie benefited from the variety of lucrative opportunities in agriculture and enterprises. The expansion of the peasantry comes from landlessness and the members of the bourgeoisie who saw the ownership of peasant holdings as integral to their careers in the capitalist economy. However, in many agricultural pursuits, the peasants were matched or outstripped the productivity of the large-scale farmers (Leo, 1984). New policies and institutions were created to control and mould the peasant production systems and fit them into the wider framework of periphery capitalism (Leo, 1984). The articulation of capitalist agriculture to the traditional peasant mode inevitably expanded commodity production in the settlement schemes (Lonsdale & Berman, 1979) but then the agrarian system in the LDSB settlement scheme was in a dynamic state and rife with conflict. Some African settlers were trying their way into large scale agricultural /commerce, others sought to expand their holdings into modest scales while other marginal peasants were forced to sell off some part of their lands (Leo, 1984).

The expansion of the agricultural extension services to African areas.

One of the most significant economic legacies was the development of institutional supervisory frameworks intended to regulate and modernize African agriculture. Beginning in the 1930s and intensifying after World War II, the colonial state implemented a system of agricultural extension services, soil conservation units, and production quotas aimed at increasing output and preventing environmental degradation. These structures were later repurposed during the settlement scheme era (1960s–1970s) as instruments of developmental control, particularly in high-density African schemes where compliance with cultivation schedules and livestock standards was enforced through loan conditions and tenure security.

The expansion of inspection services further reinforced this control. Inspectors monitored farm hygiene, livestock health, and soil conservation, effectively standardizing African agriculture to meet colonial quality benchmarks. This professionalization of oversight helped integrate African produce into formal markets, reducing reliance on informal trade and increasing tax revenue for the colonial state. As Cooper (2019) observes, "the extension agent became the vanguard of modernity, bringing scientific rationality to what had been dismissed as backward peasant farming"

4.4 The expansion of the cash crop production into African areas.

Closely linked to this administrative apparatus was the expansion of African cash cropping, which emerged as a cornerstone of colonial rural policy through the Swynnerton (1955) Plan. In response to global demand for coffee, maize, and dairy products, the colonial state actively incentivized African participation in commercial agriculture not through genuine empowerment, but via a controlled system of price regulation, marketing monopolies, and restricted access to export channels (Van

Arkadie, 2016). Farmers were permitted to grow cash crops only under license and within designated areas, ensuring that production remained subordinate to settler-dominated sectors. Nevertheless, this limited opening enabled a segment of African peasants to accumulate capital, reinvest in land improvement, and lay the foundation for post-independence agrarian entrepreneurship.

4.5 Agricultural Development and Socio-Economic Transformation

By 1971, the cumulative impact of these interventions became visible in rising living standards. Many Ndalat settlers upgraded their homes from grass-thatched huts to structures roofed with corrugated iron sheets. Children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools at younger ages, some attending prestigious institutions like Kapsabet Boys' High School. A growing number of farmers acquired mechanized implements; tractors, ploughs, planters enabling timely land preparation and reducing reliance on manual labour. This economic empowerment was closely monitored by settlement offices, which tracked household income, expenditure patterns, and loan repayment performance as indicators of successful integration into the cash economy.

Agricultural output also improved significantly. Maize production tripled in successive years following the adoption of hybrid seeds and inorganic fertilizers—a shift directly linked to extension advice and input availability. Similarly, dairy productivity increased markedly. According to the Department of Settlement Annual Report 1965/66, the Ndalat Scheme exceeded its livestock targets, recording 1,975 heads of cattle against a budgeted 1,658, with an average yield of 51 gallons of milk per cow annually. However, challenges emerged: older sections of the scheme (e.g., pioneering Ndalat blocks) became overstocked, while newer areas like Leseru remained underpopulated. Officials called for redesigns in farm layouts and crop rotation plans to prevent land degradation and optimize productivity (Kenya National

Archives/Department of Lands and Settlement. Annual Report 1965/66. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966).

Infrastructure development further reinforced this progress. As former agricultural inspector two observed, feeder roads throughout the Ndalat Scheme were murram-surfaced, well-maintained, and provided access to every holding—a stark contrast to the poor connectivity in neighbouring African reserves. Water supply, however, remained uneven. A borehole at "Kaptigilis" fed an elevated tank at "Kapsigirio/KapBruce," with water pumped via hydra-pump to communal troughs. Yet not all farmers had access, forcing many to drive their herds to distant rivers like Sosiani or Lemook, a logistical burden that undermined efficiency.

Beyond agriculture, the scheme catalysed social development. The Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) facilitated the construction of schools: Kamulat Primary (1962), Kaigat Primary (1965), and Leseru Primary (1968), followed by Ndalat Secondary School (1977), now St. Teresa of Avilla Secondary School. Churches and basic health facilities were also established, embedding social services within the agrarian landscape. Former chair of the cooperative society emphasized that such infrastructure gave settlers advantages unavailable to those in nearby reservations, reinforcing spatial inequalities even as redistribution occurred.

Crucially, the scheme became a conduit for technology transfer to surrounding African reserves. One of the pioneer farmer noted that labour was drawn heavily from Cheptil reservation, where workers gained firsthand experience in hybrid seed planting, fertilizer use, exotic dairy breeds, and AI services, knowledge they carried back to their own subsistence plots. Surplus heifers, bullocks, and calves (limited to four per buyer) were sold to residents of Simat, Kaigat, Kabyemit, and Cheptil, enabling cross-boundary diffusion of improved livestock. Hybrid seeds and fertilizers also spread into reserve areas, along with AI services offered at centres like "KapBruss." As a result, milk yields in the settlement (20–30 litres per cow) far exceeded those of indigenous herds in the reserves (1–2 litres), demonstrating the transformative potential of state-supported innovation.

Underpinning all of this was a reorganized labour regime. Family labour formed the backbone of daily operations especially in animal care while hired labour, primarily recruited from surplus populations in the African reserves, was mobilized during peak seasons for weeding, harvesting, and stalk cutting. This dual system allowed smallholders to intensify production without permanent wage commitments, reflecting a strategy deeply embedded in kinship networks and cultural repertoires of reciprocity. Yet it also reproduced dependencies, as settler prosperity relied on the availability of low-cost labour from marginalized communities excluded from land ownership.

The outcomes of the agricultural development were evidenced in the 1970s as the economic transformation occurred in the settlement scheme.

> *In late 1960s, a significant number of the farmers were able to uplift their living standards by building house with corrugated iron sheets, educated their children at younger age to high school level, while some bought farm implements such as tractors, ploughs, planters among others. The economic empowerment initiatives were partly driven by the developmental demands of the settlement offices who monitored the economic progress of all settlers.*
>
> *In the 1960s and 1970s, the agricultural development and the economic transformation in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme run smoothly as supported by the settlement offices. The maize production increased three-fold in the successive years after the adoption of hybrid maize and the application of fertilizer. Overall, the living standard of the smallholder farmers improved greatly as the farmers increased their consumption patterns by buying new products. Income earned at household level, went to the land owner*

or the head of the household and was used for several uses such as investments in land, paying school fees and savings (Oral interview, farmer (Kapmakiton), March 20th 2021).

The settlement scheme also promoted the development of economic infrastructural facilities such as roads as observed by former agricultural inspector two;

The road infrastructure within the Ndalat Settlement scheme was management by the settlement offices and all farms accessed feeder road which were murramed and well maintained. There was a borehole at the 'Kaptigilis' and an elevated storage tank at 'Kapsigirio/KapBruce' and a hydra – pump pumped water to a common trough but this was not accessible to all the farmers in the scheme and therefore some farmers had to take their herd to either Sosiani or Lemook rivers.

4.6 Symbolic Politics and the Performance of Agricultural Excellence

Beyond economic and technical functions, the LDSB schemes served a powerful symbolic purpose: to demonstrate the viability of African smallholder capitalism and to legitimize the post-colonial state's developmental agenda. This was most vividly expressed through the national smallholder farming competitions initiated after independence. These contests, sponsored by the Ministry of Land and Settlement, awarded trophies such as the *Angaine Cup* to the most productive farmers, transforming agriculture into a public spectacle of national pride.

A pioneering settler, Mr Lamai exemplifies this phenomenon. By adopting paddocking, growing Rhodes grass and oats, maintaining farm records, and achieving high milk yields, he became a model farmer. His victories in the regional (1972, 1977) and national (1972, 1977) competitions earned him recognition from President Jomo Kenyatta himself[1]. Such accolades were not merely personal achievements; they were state-sanctioned endorsements of the settlement model.

These competitions reinforced the idea that agricultural success was a moral and civic duty. They encouraged emulation, fostered competition, and elevated certain individuals as exemplars of the "new African farmer." Yet, they also obscured structural inequalities: only those with access to capital, education, and extension support could compete effectively. The celebration of individual champions masked the struggles of the majority who laboured under debt, input costs, and market uncertainties.

The scheme also trained to the farmers as indicated by former Mosop Agricultural officer;

> *The agricultural development in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme took a notch higher when the post – independence government introduced smallholder farm competition to motivate the smallholder farmers to improve their farming practices as well as productivity. The initiative was a creation of the ministry of land and settlement under the department of agriculture to encourage farmers to improve its productivity. Ndalat Settlement scheme was recognized nationally for its contribution to agricultural development category* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer, Mosop Division, March 29th 2023).
>
> *One exemplary farmer, Mr. Lamai started paddocking method in 1969, grew Rhodes grass, oats and maize as per required and kept farm records. He was producing high quantities of milk such that in 1972, the settlement officials visited him and trained him on farming techniques. He entered the regional farming competition under the 'Angaine' cup which was held in Eldoret for the North Rift Region. He won the trophy in 1972 and went to national competition and became national champion in 1972 and was rewarded by the then President Jomo Kenyatta. In 1974, Araap Sang later participated in the competition and won in North Rift region but lost the national competition. In 1977, Mr. Lamai participated again and won in North Rift Region and become the national champion the same year. In general, Mr. Lamai was recognized and awarded by President Kenyatta for being the national champion in the smallholder farming category* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer, Mosop Division, March 29th 2023)

In Ndalat, this translated into a standardized farm design: settlers received 15-acre plots, with one-third allocated to crop production (primarily maize) and two-thirds to livestock (mainly dairy cows). This spatial and economic division reflected a calculated attempt to replicate, at a smaller scale, the productivity of former white settler farms while adapting it to African smallholder conditions. As one of the pioneer farmer recalled, “Since the weather patterns in Ndalat Settlement scheme were more favourable all over the scheme with minimum variation in rainfall,” the agro-ecological conditions were deemed ideal for such a system (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020). The result was an intensive, input-driven model that prioritized yield per acre over extensive pastoralism or subsistence cropping. This shift marked a decisive break from pre-colonial and reserve-period agricultural practices, where land use was more flexible and less monetized. The imposition of a fixed, state-prescribed farming model illustrates the colonial state’s belief in its own technical superiority and its desire to discipline African labour and land use according to capitalist norm.

The technological infrastructure introduced in the Ndalat scheme represented a radical departure from traditional farming methods. Mechanization, hybrid seeds, exotic livestock breeds, artificial insemination, chemical fertilizers, and acaricides became central to the new agrarian order. As former cooperative inspector noted, “Farm ploughing, tilling and planting were mechanized and thus required the use of imported tractors,” while “cow breeds were inseminated and required periodic dipping using acaricide to prevent tick infestation”.

One of the most transformative aspects of the LDSB schemes was the institutional ecosystem established to support smallholders. As former agricultural inspector two, recalled, “The settlement scheme deployed six extension officers headed by a white officer, Mr. Boader,” who conducted regular farm visits, organized field days (barazas), and delivered training on modern techniques. These extension services were critical in transferring knowledge and ensuring adherence to state-prescribed farming standards.

The Ndalat Settlement Scheme thus represented a complex nexus of state planning, technical expertise, institutional support, and social transformation. During the 1960s and 1970s, it achieved notable successes in raising productivity, improving infrastructure, and expanding access to education and markets. However, these gains were contingent upon continued state supervision, centralized control, and unequal access to resources—conditions that would unravel after the closure of settlement offices in 1968–69. What emerged was not collapse, but a recalibration: the developmentalist project, once tightly managed, gave way to localized adaptations, informal economies, and uneven outcomes that revealed both the promise and limitations of planned agrarian reform.

4.7 Social Influence in the Settlement Schemes

Kenya's settlement schemes, launched after independence in 1963 under the umbrella of the Million Acre Scheme and its successors, are often celebrated in official discourse as successful land redistribution initiatives that averted widespread rural unrest (Ley, 1975). However, a growing body of empirical social science literature reveals that their most enduring legacy lies not in acreage transferred but in the profound reconfiguration of rural social life (Heyer et al., 1976). Designed with technical precision around credit-financed land purchase, standardized farm layouts, and state-supervised agricultural practices, these schemes embedded a specific vision of modernity, one that privileged the literate, male, wage-connected smallholder over communal or subsistence-oriented producers. The social influence of settlement schemes was both deliberate and deeply consequential, operating through legal, institutional, and spatial mechanisms that reshaped the very fabric of rural society.

Crucially, this transformation unfolded in two distinct phases. From 1960 to 1972, state optimism, robust extension services, and relatively stable commodity prices enabled many settlers to achieve modest prosperity, reinforcing state legitimacy and the ideology of “progressive farming (Myers et al., 2021). However, from 1973 onward amid global economic shocks, fiscal retrenchment, and the early effects of structural adjustment precursors, social stresses intensified, exposing the fragility of the settlement model and accelerating patterns of differentiation, exclusion, and community decay.

4.7.1 The Expansion of Formal Education System

Perhaps the most transformative institution within the schemes was formal schooling. The government prioritized the construction of primary schools in every settlement, often co-located with churches. By 1970, primary enrolment rates in scheme areas significantly outpaced those in non-scheme rural regions (Republic of Kenya. Ministry of Education Annual Report, 1970. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971). However, the curriculum was uniformly national and Western-oriented, emphasizing English literacy, arithmetic, and science while marginalizing indigenous knowledge, local languages, and oral traditions (Bhola, 1987).

The most pervasive social impact of settlement schemes emerged from the intersection of agrarian policy and rising educational expectations. In the 1960s, the state promoted education as a pathway to national integration, and settler households eagerly enrolled children in primary schools, viewing education as both a social good and a long-term investment (Heyer et al., 1976). However, as public education became less subsidized in the 1970s, families bore increasing costs for uniforms, books, and examination fees.

For the first generation of settler children, school represented a pathway out of agrarian labour and into salaried employment. Parents many of whom had been denied formal education under colonial rule invested heavily in their children's schooling, viewing it as the ultimate vehicle for upward mobility (Kelsall, 2002). This created a generational divide: while elders clung to customary ways, the youth, educated in state schools and influenced by urban media, embraced modern identities. Girls' education, though still lagging behind boys', saw notable gains, particularly in mission-run schools that emphasized female literacy and domestic science as essential to national development (Kanogo, 2005). This contributed to a slow but steady reconfiguration of gender roles, with educated daughters increasingly delaying marriage, participating in church youth groups, and even challenging patriarchal authority within the household.

Empirical data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics shows that between 1970 and 1982, average per-child educational expenditures in rural households rose by 220%, far outpacing farm income growth. Oral testimonies from Ndalat and Kinangop confirm that this burden fell heavily on farm earnings. A pioneer farmer, a maize and dairy farmer, recalled: "In the 1970s, I had six children in school. When milk prices dropped in 1981, I sold two cows to pay fees. The next season, I couldn't afford fertilizer (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, June 12th 2022.)"

The former chairperson of the cooperative society also highlighted the significant economic benefits attributable to the establishment of the Ndalat settlement scheme.

> *The settlers embraced socio – economic transformation through education as the LDSB promoted the establishment of three schools within the scheme; Kamulat Primary school (1962), Kaigat Primary school (1965) and Leseru Primary school (1968) where the descendants of the pioneering settlers got basic education. Other schools in the scheme included the Ndalat Secondary school which*

> *was established in 1977 and is currently known as St. Teresa of Avilla Secondary School. The adoption of formal learning also saw the children from protestant - denominated households received secondary level of education at Kapsabet Boys' High School. Further, the scheme also developed social- infrastructural facilities such as school, churches and hospitals* (Oral interview, farmer/former chair, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative, November 4th 2020)

4.7.2 Land Fragmentation and the Crisis of Customary Inheritance

Rapid population growth and the practice of dividing plots among sons led to severe land fragmentation. By the late 1980s, many holdings had shrunk to less than two acres, economically unviable for cash-crop farming. As a result, many youths abandoned farming for casual labour or urban migration, further weakening rural social cohesion. This demographic reality accelerated the decline of customary land inheritance practices. Traditionally, land allocation was governed by lineage seniority and communal need; in the schemes, inheritance increasingly became a legal matter governed by statutory law and written wills often influenced by Christian notions of individual rights and "fairness (Smith, 2010)." Elders lost not only control over land but also influence over their descendants' life choices, which were now shaped more by education and wage labour than by kinship obligation.

The issue of population explosion in the settlement scheme was informed by the former agricultural inspector,

> *Throughout the post – colonial period, spanning 1970 onwards, the scheme encountered population explosion as the sons and daughters of the smallholder farmers came of age. Household growth due to the rapid population growth in the 1970s and 1980s saw the descendants of the pioneering settlers being bestowed with land as form of inheritance translating to the subdivision of smallholding land. And following their hereditary cultural tradition, the farmers started subdividing their plots to their sons and daughters and this diminished the available land for agricultural activities. The land subdivision in the schemes was not planned and therefore it impinged on the envisaged production arrangements and quotas. Depending on the number of children, a farmer had, the land was*

> *subdivided into smaller plots which were at times economically unviable that could not support the new families* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022)

One of the pioneer farmers pointed out that;

> *The population expansion had a drastic effect on the agricultural intensification processes. Once the land had been subdivided, either the farmer kept the same number of animals in the now small holding and continually cultivated the same land for maize or reduced the number of dairy cows and continued with the same crop rotation arrangement. In most cases, most farmers kept cultivating the same piece of land repeatedly with consequently in dropping yield and a drop in the earnings. This further reduced the yield to the bare minimum of subsistence. This cycle of subsistence continued with the descendants of the African smallholder* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020).

Population explosion is an important issue in the agricultural development as observed by Chune (1997) study as customary traditions of land inheritance impinge on the agricultural development. For instance, Naitiri settlement scheme had nearly doubled its population from 3,993 in 1969 to 6,561 in 1989, thus increasing the average household to six heads per household and increasing the population density per kilometre square from 99 in 1969, 142 in 1979, to 154 in 1989. These increases tended to intensify the pressure on land, escalate the high dependency ratio and expand the food requirements.

4.8 Institutional Continuities: From Swynnerton to Settlement Schemes

The blueprint for Kenya's post-independence settlement schemes was unmistakably rooted in the colonial Swynnerton Plan of 1954, which sought to transform African agriculture through land consolidation, individual tenure, cash-crop specialization, and state-supervised "modern" farming practices (Swynnerton, 1955). Although formulated during the emergency period to co-opt loyalists and stabilize rural society, the Plan's technocratic logic was enthusiastically adopted by the postcolonial state as a model for agricultural development (Anderson, 2005). The Land Development and

Settlement Board (LDSB), later succeeded by the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT), institutionalized this approach by allocating former European-owned land to selected African settlers under strict contractual conditions that mandated adherence to prescribed agronomic standards (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963) .

Each plot typically 15 acres in high-potential zones like the Rift Valley was rigidly zoned: 0.5 acre for a homestead, 3.5 acres for hybrid maize (usually H614), and the remainder for pasture to support up to three grade dairy cows. Indigenous crops like finger millet and sorghum, along with Zebu cattle, were explicitly prohibited as "unscientific" and incompatible with the vision of a disciplined commercial peasantry *(*Oral interview, farmer/former treasurer, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society, September 28th 2022). Access to pedigree livestock, hybrid seeds, and DAP fertilizer was conditional upon signing a sales agreement requiring a 10% down payment and repayment of development loans over ten years, with default triggering eviction and reallocation (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963). This system ensured high initial compliance: by 1963, all 301 plots in the first phase of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme were occupied, and settlers had constructed dairy sheds, fenced fields, and sanitation facilities within the mandated 24-month period (Kenya National Archives/Department of Settlement. Annual Report 1962/63. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1963).

The LDSB schemes supported the transfer of technologies to the African areas as observed by one of the pioneer farmer:

> *Within the scheme, there were two forms labour; the family labour and the hired labour. In most cases, family labour was used throughout the year in animal husbandry while the smallholder farming was ably supported by the large population in the African reservation in terms of hired labourers. The crops husbandry and*

> *production activities such as weeding, stalking and harvesting were mainly done by the hired labour from the Cheptil reservation. During this activity, the Africans were able to gained valuable expertise in terms of the technical knowhow and hybrid seeds that they would plant on their small subsistence plots.* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020)

> *The technology transfer in the settlement scheme enabled the smallholder farmer to access extension services, keep exotic dairy breeds, plant hybrid seeds and use inorganic fertilizer which resulted in high returns. Smallholder farmers in the settlement scheme produced over 20 to 30 litres from one dairy which was superior to the productive potential of indigenous cattle in the neighbouring African reservation in Cheptil area. Most Africans in the reservation kept large number of herds of cattle with the highest milk production of the indigenous cattle being one or two litres* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022).

> *The Ndalat settlement scheme also promoted the development of the African reserves through attitudinal change in crop husbandry. The African reservations in Simat, Kaigat, Kabyemit, and Cheptil benefited from the technological transfer in terms of acquisition of modern breed cattle in terms of bulls and heifer brought from the settlement schemes. Most Africans in the reserves accessed hybrid seeds and bought calves and surplus cows (only four cows were allowed) from the smallholder farmers in the settlement schemes. Surplus herd(heifers and bullocks) within the settlement scheme were disposed to the neighbouring African reserves. The reservation also benefited from the adoption of input facilities such as hybrid seeds and fertilizers, the adoption of AI services which spilt into the reservations. Individuals from environs took their cows for AI serving based at 'KapBruss'* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023)

In support, agrarian development requires economic factors of production such as labour and this human labour is based on the intensification of basically family labour or hired labour. This strategy was oriented towards protecting the means of production and consumption and shaped by, and embedded in, the domain of the family and cultural repertoires. The labour process was made up of various farm tasks (such as weeding, seed selection and planting, land preparation, production and reproduction of soil fertility, harvesting) and involves the co-ordination of both the productive and reproductive aspects of agricultural production (Brand, 1965).

More information was drawn from farmer/ elder, Kapsigirio village) on the activities of the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative scheme.

> *The co-operative society also supported in technology infusion by providing subsidized AI straws for inseminating cows. The settlement offices initially provided AI straws for inseminating cows at Kshs. 2 per straw for all cows in the settlement scheme. The artificial insemination service was arranged by the veterinary scouts who were trained on insemination technique and moved around the scheme daily as they provided other services like animal disease surveillance. Later on, the cooperative society took over the AI services and inseminated the cows at Kshs. 10 per straw.*
>
> *The Ndalat Farmer's cooperative Society acquired three tractors for land preparation and planting and this enabled farm mechanization within the settlement, a fact that enabled efficiency in ploughing, and planting of the main crop, maize. The cooperative ran the mechanization programme for as long as the farmer collectively 'sold' their produce through the cooperative society* (Oral interview, farmer (elder, Kapsigirio village) September 15th 2020)

A pioneering farmer (Kapbruss Village), further, the changes that occurred with time as the agricultural development taking place in the Scheme. She noted that as time changed, the farmers accrued benefits from their farming activities.

> *Later in mid -1960s, the farmers were allowed to register with the Kenya Farmers' Association and thus accessed farm inputs at competitive process. In the same instance, the farmers accessed loans from Agricultural Finance Corporation but at a specific condition; three farmers were required to collectively sign for the loan and collectively plant 15 acres of maize (*Oral interview, farmer (Kapbruss village), March 20th 2021)

The legacy of Colonial initiated programmes

The foundational flaw in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme's design lay in its structural continuity with colonial agricultural policy. Despite the formal transfer of political power in 1963, the economic architecture of the scheme remained anchored in the colonial imperative: the production of primary commodities for export, underpinned by a centralized, state-managed marketing system that privileged control over efficiency. As Bonneuil (2006) critically observed, colonial settlement schemes across tropical Africa were less about rural upliftment than about creating a compliant, extractive peasantry that would sustain metropolitan demand without challenging the existing global division of labour.

The post-independence government, constrained by limited human capital, fiscal scarcity, and an overstretched bureaucracy, lacked the institutional capacity to reimagine this system. Instead, it preserved its core mechanisms. As former agricultural inspector, noted, "The government overlooked their economic contribution." This neglect was not accidental but structural: the state's developmental priorities were redirected toward urban industrialization and the maintenance of a centralized, import-substituting economy, leaving rural areas like Ndalat to wither under the weight of inherited inefficiencies. The absence of a coherent postcolonial agricultural vision meant that Ndalat became a site not of transformation, but of stagnation, a colonial relic administered by an under-resourced African bureaucracy ill-equipped to modernize it.

A former agricultural inspector, observed that Ndalat Settlement scheme was overlooked and underfunded as the government reduced investments in terms of human, capital and technology.

> *In the late 1960s, when most farmers had repaid the development loans, the white settlement officers and staff where withdraw from the settlement scheme. The European – controlled settlement structures and staff held significant say in the farming arrangement and schedules and ensured that compliance through sanctions. When the SFT settlement structures took over the LDSB settlement structures, they focused on the land issues and overlook productivity and the farmers increased the arable land for maize production and kept more than 3 animals. This increased the grazing pressure by animals thereby negatively affecting animal nutrition and production.*

The Failure of the Agricultural Credit Access

Even when the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) began offering short- and medium-term loans in the mid-1970s, access remained circumscribed. The AFC's lending policies were explicitly tiered: long-term credit flowed to large-scale commercial farms, while smallholders received only conditional, group-based loans such as the limited facility extended to six farmers in the early 1970s, requiring them to pool 15 acres for maize production. This was not an innovation but a restriction disguised as support.

As Von Pischke (1977) that there was preferential lending patterns institutionalized inequality, favouring politically connected large-scale producers while marginalizing the very smallholders the state claimed to uplift. In Ndalat settlement scheme, this meant that while large-scale wheat and hybrid maize producers received subsidized inputs through the Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation (C&SFC), and tea growers accessed credit via the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), maize and dairy farmers at Ndalat were left with fragmented, unreliable, and often delayed AFC support, whenever possible.

A former settlement officer, observed that the settlers in the scheme were curtailed by the initial land loan repayable in 30 years and development loan repayable in 10 years.

The development loan repayments took a minimum of 10 years and thus most of the settlers could not access any other capital outlay for production. It was only in the mid-1970s, when most farmers had repaid their development loans and a huge part of land loans, that the smallholder farmers were allowed to access the AFC loans for development. The AFC loans were uniquely structured such that farmers could acquire AFC loans could procure farm inputs through their cooperative society. The AFC loan repayments were handled by the cooperative through the banks and marketing bodies (KCC and KFA) (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

Initially, the settlement officers after having seen the production output offered a conditional loan facility through Stenkamp and Smith Company acting on behalf of Agricultural Finance Corporation. The AFC loan was conditional a group loan to three farmers to pool – up 15 acres for maize production considering that farmers could only grow maize on 4.5 acres. However, this facility was possible in until the early 1970s when only six farmers access this facility (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

A former cooperative inspector also elaborated on the settlement activities during the initiation period

> *Whereas the settlement activity began in the early 1960s, the land was largely held by the LDSB and later SFT as the creditors to the settlers. The land registration of the settlement land began in earnest in the early 1970s with the confirmation of the settler's title against the original letters of allotment but land titles were not issued until the settler had fully settled all the land loans accrued to the settlement fund trustees.* (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, February 12th 2021)

A critical constraint was the limited availability of formal credit beyond the initial settlement loans. While land and development loans provided through the Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB) enabled entry into the schemes, they were typically non-revolving and did not cover recurrent operational needs such as seeds, fertilizers, or equipment maintenance. Once disbursed, there were few mechanisms for accessing follow-up financing, leaving farmers vulnerable to shocks and unable to scale production. This absence of a broader rural credit system severely constrained the long-term viability of smallholding agriculture outside the structured settlement framework. However, most settlers in LDSB schemes had by 1975 paid significant land loans and this allowed them to access formal credit arrangements with various financial institutions (Von Pischke, 1977)

The persistence of these patterns can be traced directly to colonial institutional frameworks. Von Pischke (1977) emphasized that the agricultural infrastructure developed during the colonial period; marketing boards, price controls, crop regulations, and research priorities was designed to serve large-scale settler agriculture. Post-independence governments retained these institutions, often without significant reform. Consequently, agricultural research in the 1960s and 1970s remained skewed toward large-scale commercial farming, neglecting the needs of smallholders in arid and semi-arid lands. The absence of context-appropriate innovations further marginalized these farmers, limiting their capacity to increase yields or diversify production.

To understand the implications of colonial agricultural policies, it is crucial to begin with the theoretical framework of uneven development, a concept central to Marxist analyses of capitalist economies. Karl Marx as cited Bond and Desai (2006) argued that capitalism inherently generates unevenness not only between classes but also across regions, sectors, and modes of production. In colonial Kenya, this unevenness manifested as a bifurcated agricultural system: one dominated by European settlers practicing capital-intensive, export-oriented farming, and the other comprising African smallholders engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence agriculture. This duality was not accidental but structurally engineered to serve the needs of imperial capital accumulation.

As Leys (1971) observed, Kenya's colonial economy was backed by the colonial state, appropriated the most fertile lands particularly in the "White Highlands" marginalizing African communities to less productive reserves. This spatial segregation was accompanied by institutional mechanisms that ensured African labour would remain cheap and readily available for settler farms, effectively transforming African landowners into wage labourers or subsistence cultivators. The dual economy thus produced a symbiotic yet exploitative relationship: capitalist agriculture depended on the pre-capitalist subsistence sector to subsidize the reproduction of labour power, thereby lowering wage costs and enhancing surplus extraction.

Upon independence, the Kenyan state inherited this bifurcated agrarian structure. Rather than dismantling it, successive governments particularly under Jomo Kenyatta chose to adapt and repurpose it. The settlement schemes launched in the 1960s, ostensibly aimed at redistributing land to landless Africans, often replicated colonial patterns of inequality and dependency. These schemes were not merely land redistribution programs; they were deeply embedded in the colonial legacy of top-down planning, technological determinism, and the marginalization of indigenous knowledge (Von Pischke, 1971)

4.9 The Dual Economy Reconfigured: Creating a Rural Petty Bourgeoisie

While settlement schemes succeeded in transferring land ownership from white settlers to Africans, they did not dismantle the dualistic structure of the colonial agrarian economy. Instead, they reconfigured it by creating a new class of African commercial farmers often former squatters, teachers, or clerks—who benefited from state support, while marginalizing the majority who lacked capital, social connections, or bureaucratic literacy (Kanogo, 1987). As von Pischke (1972) observed, the agricultural research and extension system remained skewed toward large-scale, high-potential farming, offering little to settlers in marginal areas or those without access to credit (Anderson, 2005). This bias ensured that only a narrow segment of beneficiaries could sustain the prescribed mixed-farming model, while others fell into debt, leased out land, or reverted to subsistence practices (Chune, 1997).

4.10 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that Kenya's settlement schemes from 1970's onward achieved short-term productivity not through the inherent dynamism of African smallholders, but through coercive discipline, input subsidies, price guarantees, and institutional oversight all inherited from the colonial developmentalist apparatus. When these supports were withdrawn, the system unraveled, exposing its lack of endogenous resilience. The schemes were less instruments of liberation than vehicles of managed transition: they transferred land but preserved the logic of control, created a rural petty bourgeoisie but deepened inequality, and promoted "modern" agriculture while delegitimizing local knowledge. Ultimately, the legacy of these schemes lies in their demonstration that agrarian transformation cannot be imposed from above without embedding institutions that foster autonomy, adaptability, and equity. The colonial agricultural policies, repackaged under nationalist rhetoric, succeeded in stabilizing the postcolonial state but failed to create a sustainable or just rural economy, a contradiction that continues to shape Kenya's agrarian landscape today.

CHAPTER FIVE

INFLUENCE OF SAPS (STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS) ON THE NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME 1980 TO 1992

5.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the influence of Structural Adjustment Programs that dominated the 1980s and 90's. These programs were initiated by the IMF/ World Bank institutions. The aim was to encourage free market and less government control of the economy. As will be argued, these programs led to the reduction of prices of agricultural produce. This was caused by the deliberate lack of control and regulatory framework. Major agricultural agencies such as the KGGC, KFA, KCC begun underperforming and by the end of the era, were on their knees.

5.1 The Structural Adjustment Programme Era (1982 to 1992)

At the national level, colonial and early post-independence governments established coordinated programs to scale up agricultural development. Former Agricultural Officer two, Mosop Division recalled that initiatives such as the National Dairy Development Programme (NDDP) were introduced to promote milk production among smallholders (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023). This was later succeeded by the National Agricultural Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP) in 1982, though its foundations were laid much earlier through extension networks supported by foreign expertise particularly consultants from India and Israel who advised on irrigation, cooperative management, and high-yield farming systems. These programs exemplified the developmentalist logic of the era: that progress could be engineered through scientific intervention, centralized planning, and external technical assistance.

In addition, the policy also established national programmes for promoting agricultural development in the settlement schemes. This is evidenced by information drawn from Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division:

> *The Colonial government had also established programmes such as the National Dairy Development Programme (NDDP) for promoting dairy farming among the small holder farmers. Other significant programmes including the establishment of the National Extension Programme which was purely focused on dissemination of agricultural information to the farmers. This programme later translated to the national Agricultural Livestock Extension Programme (NALEP) in 1982 till 1986 which encompassed both crop and livestock. The colonial government later provided consultants from India and Israel* (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023).

5.2 The Collapse of Institutionalized state -run monopsonies

The cooperative structure, intended as a vehicle for collective empowerment, became another site of systemic failure. The Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA) operated as monopolistic intermediaries, extracting rents rather than facilitating value creation. The KCC's monopsony power allowed it to dictate milk prices with impunity, while the KFA's control over input supply chains ensured farmers had no alternatives. The conditional nature of AFC loans requiring repayment through cooperatives like KCC and KFA further entrenched this dependency. Farmers could not escape the system; they were trapped in a cycle where their creditworthiness was determined by the very institutions that exploited them.

Importantly, the collapse of the statutory marketing boards such as the near collapse of the KCC in 1982(Oyugi, 1980) which distressed the farmers because of marketing monopsony.

> *The marketing monopsony of the KCC largely contributed to the fluctuations in the milk prices throughout the 1980 and early 1990s.*

> *Further, the collapse of the KCC meant that farmers could not access steady markets for their produce as milk vendors bought raw milk at low prices for sale in Eldoret. The collapse of the KCC also exacerbated the operations of the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society as the organization could pay its employees, nor fulfil its obligations to the farmers. This had a roll-on effect on every other objective of the society such as bulking of the farm produce, bulk purchasing of farm inputs, settling farmer obligations among other operations. This consequently led to the massive underperformance of the Ndalat Cooperative society which nearly collapse with outstanding debts largely held by KCC* (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector two, May 28th 2022)

The dismantling of the Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA) in 1984 and its replacement by the Kenya Grain Growers' Cooperative Union (KGCCU) marked a turning point in Ndalat's decline. This was not a reform but a rupture a politically motivated reorganization that severed the functional linkages between farmers and the input-output systems that had, however imperfectly, sustained them. As former agricultural officer two, Mosop Division emphasized, the KFA, despite its colonial origins, had developed a sophisticated network for distributing seeds, fertilizers, gunny bags, and feed supplements. It operated as a de facto agricultural supply chain, leveraging economies of scale and farmer trust.

The KGCCU, however, was a bureaucratic imposition. Created by executive fiat and staffed by politically appointed officials with no agricultural expertise, it lacked the operational capacity, logistical infrastructure, or farmer engagement mechanisms of its predecessor. Its mandate was expanded to include cereal farmers, diluting its focus and stretching its resources thin. As former cooperative officer, recalled, "The new body could not run smoothly like the KFA." The result was catastrophic: farmers could no longer reliably access quality seeds, DAP fertilizer, or animal feed. The vacuum was filled by unregulated private traders peddling adulterated inputs, a phenomenon corroborated by the Kenya Seed Company's documented failure to maintain seed purity in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Kenya Ministry of Agriculture

1978, 34). The use of outdated H614 maize hybrids, favoured not for yield but for taste, persisted into the 1980s because better alternatives like H629 and H6218 were simply unavailable. This was not farmer ignorance, it was institutional failure

The KGCCU's withdrawal from cereal marketing in 1984 further exacerbated the crisis. With the creation of the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB), farmers lost their direct link to a known, albeit flawed, marketing agent. The NCPB, burdened by inefficiency and political interference, failed to provide stable price signals or timely payments. By 1996, the price of a 90kg bag of maize had collapsed to Kshs. 600 due to import glut and market liberalization, rendering production unviable for smallholders who had no savings buffer. The transition from KFA to KGCCU thus represented not progress, but the dismantling of the last functional institution that had mediated the farmer's access to markets and inputs.

5.3 Agricultural Decline and Institutional Erosion

While Kenya's post-independence settlement schemes were initially heralded as engines of agrarian modernization, their long-term sustainability was uneven. Nowhere was this divergence between promise and performance more evident than in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme, a high-altitude agricultural zone whose early productivity gave way to systemic decline by the early 1980s. According to a former agricultural inspector who served in the Rift Valley region, Ndalat was increasingly "overlooked and underfunded" as the Kenyan government scaled back investments in human capacity, capital infrastructure, and agricultural technology from the mid-1970s onward. This retrenchment had cascading effects on both crop and livestock production, revealing how macro-level policy shifts intersected with micro-level farming decisions to undermine decades of initial progress (Bates, 1987).

In the 1960s and early 1970s, Ndalat benefited from the state's robust extension services and scientific oversight. The Ministry of Agriculture conducted regular soil surveys to assess fertility, with particular attention to potassium levels a critical nutrient for maize, the scheme's staple crop (Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI). Annual Report on Seed Certification and Distribution, 1979–1981. Nairobi: KARI, 1982.). At the time, maize yields averaged an impressive 30 bags per acre, a testament to the synergy between state support and smallholder adoption of recommended practices. Agricultural extension officers promoted the use of Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) fertilizer, which farmers widely adopted to replenish soil nutrients and sustain yields (Muindi et al., 2016). For over a decade, this system functioned effectively, enabling settler households to generate surplus income and invest in improved housing, education, and livestock.

However, the mono-cropping of maize, coupled with the prolonged reliance on DAP, initiated a slow ecological deterioration. By the late 1970s, potassium depletion had become severe, and the continuous application of DAP, rich in phosphorus but lacking in potassium and lime began to increase soil acidity. (Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Agriculture. Soil Fertility Surveys: Rift Valley Province, 1965–1972. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1973). This chemical imbalance compromised root development and nutrient uptake, ultimately depressing per-acre productivity just as state support was waning. Critically, no corrective measures such as liming, crop rotation, or potassium supplementation were introduced, as the government had already begun withdrawing technical personnel from schemes like Ndalat.

This institutional retreat was mirrored in livestock management. In the early years, Ndalat farmers, maintained grade dairy cows through artificial insemination (AI) services and pasture management. But by the late 1970s, AI services were discontinued, and breeding regressed to the use of local bulls, leading to inbreeding and a decline in milk yield and genetic quality (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022)

Compounding this, overstocking became rampant, especially after land titles were issued and farmers gained full control over their plots. As former agricultural officer observed, the introduction of sheep and goats which required less labour and capital than dairy cattle led to intensified competition for pasture, further straining already degraded grazing lands. Many farmers abandoned feed supplementation, zero-grazing, and other improved husbandry techniques, reverting to extensive, low-input systems that prioritized short-term survival over long-term productivity.

The indifference of smallholders to agronomic advancements also contributed to stagnation. A former agricultural officer two stationed in the region, noted that farmers clung to the H614 maize hybrid throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, despite the release of higher-yielding, altitude-appropriate varieties such as H629, H6213, and H6218. Their preference for H614 was based not on agronomic suitability but on culinary taste, a cultural choice that came at the cost of reduced yields. Moreover, farmers increasingly neglected timely land preparation and proper fertilizer application, signalling a broader disengagement from the extension-led “modernization” project that had once defined the scheme’s ethos (Oral interview, former agricultural inspector, May 5th 2022)

This disengagement was not merely a matter of farmer apathy; it was a rational response to national policy failures. As former cooperative officer, emphasized, the statutory marketing boards particularly the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) and the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC) imposed volatile and often depressed producer prices throughout the 1980s. Whereas the 1960s and 1970s had seen gradual price increases that enabled surplus accumulation, the 1980s were marked by unpredictable year-to-year fluctuations in maize and milk prices. This volatility, intensified by fiscal austerity measures and the early effects of structural adjustment conditionalities, left farmers unable to afford certified seeds, fertilizers, or veterinary services (Former cooperative officer. Oral communication November 2025).

Compounding these market failures was the collapse of input quality control. Due to chronic underfunding of agricultural research and seed certification bodies in the late 1970s, the Kenya Seed Company could no longer guarantee the integrity of its hybrid maize supplies (Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI), Annual Report on Seed Certification and Distribution, 1982).

By the early 1980s, adulterated or substandard seeds flooded local markets, leading to poor germination rates and further yield declines. For farmers already reeling from price instability and ecological degradation, this final blow eroded confidence in the entire agricultural system.

5.4 The Structural Adjustment Shocks

The 1980's and 1990's brought not merely institutional decay but a full-scale assault on the public agricultural support system through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These policies, framed as "efficiency-enhancing," delivered devastating consequences for Ndalat. Budgetary cuts led to the mass layoff of agricultural extension officers and veterinary staff. In the 1960s, Ndalat Location had three extension officers; by the 1980's, it had one. This reduction was not merely a statistical decline, it was the severing of the lifeline of technical knowledge. Farmers no longer received guidance on soil fertility management, crop rotation, or improved animal husbandry. The once-regular soil surveys that monitored potassium levels in the late 1960's and 1970's ceased, allowing the mono-cropping of maize to deplete the soil without intervention.

The liberalization of markets, while theoretically increasing competition, in practice destroyed the safety nets that had protected smallholders. Subsidized artificial insemination (AI) services, which had helped maintain dairy herd quality in the 1970s, were discontinued. Farmers, unable to afford AI straws or acaricides, reverted to natural breeding using local bulls, a practice that led to inbreeding, reduced milk yields, and increased susceptibility to diseases like Foot and Mouth. As former agricultural officer lamented, "Dairy productivity hit a new low in the 1990s." The quality of cattle deteriorated not because farmers were careless, but because the state withdrew the very tools that had enabled improvement.

Moreover, the shift from collective to individual marketing, mandated by KCC policy undermined the cooperative model. Farmers who once delivered milk in bulk through the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society were now required to register individually with KCC, with a minimum daily delivery of 250 litres, a threshold few could meet. This policy, designed to "increase efficiency," instead fragmented the cooperative's bargaining power, drove up its per-unit operational costs, and alienated the majority of smallholders. As per the former chair of the cooperative, confirmed, "The farmers' cooperative societies faced imminent collapse in the early 1990s because of the loss of marketing channels and misappropriation of funds." The cooperative, once the engine of collective investment and risk-sharing, became a hollow shell, unable to pay its staff or settle debts to KCC.

Agricultural funding shortfalls also contributed to the changing fortunes of the smallholding farmers in the Ndalat settlement scheme as informed by one of the pioneer farmers.

> *During the late 1980s, the farmers faced with significant funding shortalls as marketing channels underperformed because of monopsonies. In the early 1980s, farmers could not access the AFC loans because of the challenges in accessing markets for their input and output for the agricultural produce as the farmers could not purchase farm inputs and dairy cows. In many other cases, the AFC loans were subjected to more scrutiny to almost all farmers including pioneer farmers where their descendants were not allowed to access any loan facility based on the initial pioneering settler arrangements* (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, May 15th 2021).

5.5 Socio-Demographic shifts

Beyond the economic and institutional dimensions, Ndalat's decline was deeply social. The expansion of nuclear households, driven by rising educational costs and the erosion of extended family support systems, placed new financial burdens on farmers. As per former pioneering farmer observed, farm income was increasingly diverted to tuition fees and household needs, leaving little for reinvestment in agriculture. This created a vicious cycle: as farmers spent more on consumption and less on inputs, productivity fell, incomes declined, and debt increased forcing many to abandon AFC and KFA loans altogether.

Livestock management deteriorated in tandem. The introduction of sheep and goats in the late 1970s, while initially a strategy for diversification, quickly became a symptom of economic desperation. These animals required less capital and labour than dairy cattle, making them an attractive alternative as milk prices became volatile and AI services vanished. Yet their proliferation intensified pasture competition, degraded soil through overgrazing, and further reduced the carrying capacity of the land. The decline in animal nutrition directly translated into declining milk yields, compounding the crisis.

Infrastructure decay completed the picture. The roads, once maintained by colonial officers to ensure the efficient movement of produce, fell into disrepair after African administrators assumed control. As noted by pioneer farmer (Oral interview, pioneer farmer, May 15th 2021), access to water sources was deliberately blocked by some farmers, turning communal streams into contested zones. The absence of piped water meant farmers relied on distant, often polluted, sources further undermining livestock health. The physical decay of the settlement mirrored its institutional decay.

5.6 The Persistence of Colonial Land Logic

The broader narrative of Kenya's post-independence land policy, often celebrated as the creation of a "black capitalist class" must be critically interrogated in the context of Ndalat. Van Arkadie (1983) and Chune (1998) remind us that the colonial land transfer framework was designed not to empower the masses but to create a compliant, propertied peasantry that would serve as a buffer between the colonial state and the landless majority. In Ndalat, this legacy persisted: land titles were granted, but without complementary investments in infrastructure, credit, or extension services. The result was a class of landowners who were economically isolated, technologically backward, and politically voiceless.

Reynolds et al., (1994) correctly identify the structural barriers to smallholder intensification: high input costs, poor market access, disease, and managerial deficits. But they overlook the political economy that produced these barriers. The state did not fail because it lacked resources, it failed because it chose to preserve the colonial economic order, even as it discarded its administrative apparatus. The beneficiaries of the land reform were not the broad mass of smallholders but a narrow stratum of politically connected individuals who leveraged their titles for personal gain, not communal development. As Ruthenberg (1972) foresaw, the assumption that African agricultural officers would prefer administrative roles over fieldwork was not a cultural bias but a structural design: the state needed technicians to manage, not to transform (Ruthenberg, 1972).

The story of Ndalat Settlement Scheme is not one of farmer incompetence or cultural resistance to modernity. It is a story of institutional betrayal. The colonial system bequeathed a model of agricultural production that was extractive, centralized, and exclusionary. The post-independence state, instead of dismantling it, inherited its architecture and then abandoned its maintenance. The result was a perfect storm: credit systems that punished investment, marketing boards that suppressed prices, extension services that vanished, cooperatives that collapsed, and infrastructure that crumbled—all under the banner of "development."

The macroeconomic environment of the 1980's and 1990's characterized by SAPs, market liberalization, and fiscal austerity did not cause Ndalat's decline; it accelerated its inevitable collapse. The real failure was the state's refusal to recognize that agricultural development in a postcolonial context requires more than land redistribution, it requires sustained investment in public goods, institutional capacity, and equitable market access. Ndalat's farmers were not passive victims; they adapted, innovated, and persevered under conditions designed to ensure their failure. Their decline is not a footnote in Kenya's economic history; it is a central to the unfinished project of rural emancipation.

According to Ruthenberg (1972), African agricultural officers preferably liked to be assigned administrative duties as opposed to fieldwork. The author noted that '*It is therefore open to some doubt whether agricultural extension of the kind introduced by the British would stay after Independence. It was assumed that the newly promoted African Agricultural Officer will prefer to be assigned clearcut administrative duties which he can execute than to have the task of selecting local priorities, developing innovations on his own and persuading farmers to follow them.'*

Education, Urbanization, and Disassociation

The expansion of secondary and tertiary education in the 1980s deepened the cultural rift between generations. Scheme youth who attended secondary schools or technical colleges returned with aspirations for clerical, teaching, or civil service jobs not farming (Lonsdale, 1992). This created intergenerational tension, as elders expected sons to work the land while sons viewed farming as a last resort. Moreover, the national curriculum remained disconnected from local agrarian realities: students learned about photosynthesis but not intercropping; they studied British literature but not African proverbs. This epistemic dislocation contributed to a widespread devaluation of indigenous knowledge, now seen as irrelevant to modern life (Brinkman, 2024). Literacy and formal certification became key markers of social status, and illiterate elders once revered for their wisdom were increasingly perceived as obsolete.

Based on the former cooperative officer;

> *Ndalat Settlement scheme faced an important significant challenges affecting the agricultural development was the generational change in settlement scheme where the pioneering settlers had the knowhow and abilities had died and their descendants couldn't keep up with the agricultural development and productivity. Further, as the children of the original African settlers became adults, the*

> *hereditary demands of succession saw the sub-division of the land in the 1970s and 1980s into uneconomic land size. The descendants of the settlers preferred the white – collar jobs as opposed to farming. Because of this aspect, the smallholding could not operate to the desired levels required and underproductivity plagued the settlement scheme. Most of the dependents preferred to be teachers, police services and civil service and this reduced the productivity of the small holding farms as there were no farms hand to help the older generation. Later in the early 1980s, the younger descendants of the pioneering settlers lacked agricultural knowledge to undertake farming. This was attributed to the lack of induction into practical farming practices and techniques at lower age and thus disliked agricultural in general* (Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022)

Changing cultural habits in the scheme also influence the performance outcomes in the scheme. In the origination of the scheme, alcohol uptake was largely insignificant among the pioneering settlers but then the changing demographic patterns during the 1970s and 1980s saw an increase in the number of settlers and descendants consumed alcohol. Alcohol consumption is associated with economic regression through preferential avoidance of work for leisure. By 1980s more and more descendants were involved in alcohol uptake when compared to their pioneering settlers (Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023)

Other important challenges to the commercialization in the scheme was the conservatism displayed by the community with regard to progressive development initiatives by the former senior settlement office.

The settler community held a risk – averse culture where the settlers would not partake in economic opportunities that were considered to be risky. This was illustrated by the farmers fearing to take other loans other than the land and development loans for agricultural development such as intensive farming techniques. This then had a consequent effect on the further economic progression in the settlement scheme and this has seen the scheme remained as it was since its establishment (Oral interview, farmer/retired senior settlement office, Mr. John Kosgei, February 12th 2021)

5.7 Implications of the Structural Adjustment Programme Era (1982 to 1991)

Nyangito conducted a study on the Kenya's agricultural policy and sector performance from 1964 to 1996. The authors argue that during the era of controls, the Kenyan government dominated the production and marketing activities. This domination stifled the development of the private sector. However, government inability to continuously support the activities financially and technically, led to a decline in agricultural growth and development. In addition, government started initiative to offload the activities to the private sector and let the free markets guide production and marketing activities were also not successful. This is because there was a lack of harmony and co-ordination of the implementation for the privatization process. This resulted in stagnation of agricultural growth primarily because of the vacuum that existed as a result of a poorly developed private sector which also had poor capacity in production and marketing.

Nyangito conducted a study on the impact of recent changes in Kenyan agricultural sector and public agricultural research in Kenya. The author argues that the policy reforms had a negative effect on the capacity of KARI to provide research and extension services. For instance, adjustment in the government fiscal policy has meant that KARI has fewer funds to do its research. The findings imply that SAPs which advocated for the reduction in research activities had a negative effect on the productivity of the agricultural sector.

Mbithi (2004) indicated that agricultural prices and productivity have generally declined in the post reform period. Specifically, the authors noted that the performance of the agricultural sector in the 1990s was dismal, with annual growth in agricultural GDP averaging 2% compared with 4% in the 1980s. Agricultural export growth after the reforms had shown mixed trends due to market access limitations for Kenyan exports. Market access for imports into the Kenyan market had improved since the reforms, occasioning a tremendous import growth. However, the report argued that the capacity to import food had declined, which made Kenya more food insecure. Reforms had also negatively affected the balance of trade between Kenya and the rest of the world. After the reforms, the country moved from broad self-sufficiency in production of most food staples to a net importer, a situation that begged for a re-thinking of the policy framework on agriculture.

Rono examined the effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) on Kenyan society. The authors noted that the economic and political reforms initiated by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Kenya since 1988 and especially after 1991 had transformed many aspects of the daily life of Kenyan people. The SAPs had been linked to the high rate of income inequality, inflation, unemployment and retrenchment. This had led to the unintended consequences of lowered living standards, especially, those relating to the material resources in the family. Furthermore, Rono (2002) argues that the SAPs in Kenya have been linked to the increasing social problems such as deviant and crime rates, ethnic hatred and discrimination and welfare problems, especially in the areas of education and health.

The trickle-down effect of the SAPs on the Ndalat Settlement Scheme was economically disastrous. Because of the falling prices, farmers could no longer be guaranteed on their investment in farming. The lack of a common marketer like the KGGCU also denied farmers the benefit of selling their produce centrally at determined prices. At the same time, associations like the Kenya Farmers

Associations were disbanded as people pursued the capitalistic approach towards selling their produce. All these underpinnings dealt a big blow to the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in 1992 when it was wound up.

5.8 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated that in the 1980's to 1990's, international economic reforms that were imposed by the Bretton Wood institutions had a far reaching effect on the Ndalat Settlement Scheme. The reforms paved way for an economic restructuring at the national level that was cascaded at the local level. This re-structuring saw the collapse of government-owned farmers agencies such as the KGGCU (Kenya Grain Growers and Cooperative Union), the KCC (Kenya Cooperative Creameries) and the Marketing and Produce Board. As a result, the farmers were forced into a capitalistic free market economy that proved to be difficult to operate in. As a result, the very ambitious ideas that conceived the Ndalat Settlement Scheme came to a conclusion in 1992.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Summary

The section presents the summary of the study findings as drawn from the discussion and draws the conclusion based on the discussion. Based on the summary and conclusions, this chapter proceeds to make recommendations, both methodological, scholarly as well as policy that will be used by stakeholders in historical studies.

From the findings, it is apparent that the colonial agricultural policy in Kenya evolved through a series of interconnected interventions designed to reshape African rural economies in the final decades of British rule. This trajectory began with the African Land Development (ALDEV) policy of 1947, which sought to enhance productivity in Native Reserves through technical input and limited credit. It was significantly expanded by the Swynnerton Plan of 1954, an ambitious blueprint that prioritized land consolidation, registration, and the commercialization of African smallholder agriculture as a means of both economic modernization and political stabilization. However, the research has aptly demonstrated using the Faocault's (1982) theoretical paradigm that all these efforts were coined in the concept of governmentality. The colonial government used land as a control mechanism so as to prevent the escalation of disenfranchisement by the Africans that was in place as expressed through the Mau Mau resistance. By the early 1960s, these principles were institutionalized through Land Development and Settlement Board (LDSB)-funded schemes, among which the Ndalat Settlement Scheme emerged as a flagship high-density project.

These developments directly affected the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in the then Nandi District. Located in the former White Highlands, Ndalat was carved from the consolidated holdings of three British ex-servicemen—D. N. Tweedie, J. R. Tweedie, and B. C. Tweedie who had been allocated land in the 1920s. The scheme, launched in 1962 with joint funding from the British and West German governments, was explicitly designed for landless Africans with limited capital and agronomic experience. Using the commercialization theoretical paradigm, it was demonstrated that the intention of the designers of the scheme was to accelerate intensive commercialization of farming. As such, the scheme operated initially under the LDSB before being transferred to the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT). At its core, Ndalat was conceived not merely as a land redistribution program but as a model settlement meant to showcase a new mode of African agrarian life, one rooted in market-oriented production, individual land ownership, and disciplined labour. At the onset, Articulation approach seemed to have worked well whereby the Africans were integrated into the western agricultural practices hence abandoning their subsistence approaches. The African Settlers were allocated standardized 15-acre plots, calculated as the “minimum economic unit” capable of supporting a household while generating a modest cash surplus. Access to land was contingent upon a multi-tiered financial commitment: an initial payment of 120 Kenyan shillings, followed by either a lump sum of Kshs 4,000 or a 30-year loan of Kshs 6,000, plus a separate 10-year development loan of Kshs 3,000 to finance infrastructure and inputs. Upon the initial payment, settlers received a Letter of Allotment, basic farming tools, and mandatory training in prescribed agricultural techniques. They were also granted a resettlement allowance of 60 shillings per month for the first three months to ease the transition. Crucially, they were expected to achieve self-sustaining production within two years a demanding timeline that imposed significant pressure on households unaccustomed to commercial farming rhythms.

However, as years went by, it became apparent that the objectives of the scheme were not in tandem with what was taking place. In the 1070's, the White settlers begun leaving and this had a tremendous effect on the African settlers. This was a reflection of the political economy paradigm where there was a huge disconnect between the policies of the independent government and the beneficiaries of the scheme. The government failed to support the scheme through the replacement of the white leaving Extension officers with Africans as well as supporting the farmers access markets that would give them their fair share of profits. In the 1980's through to the 1990's, the scheme was directly affected by the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPS) which opened up for free market economy. The prices of farm produce drastically fell and the scheme no longer was profitable hence failing to achieve the Agrarian Revolution that had been anticipated at the onset. This study brings the understanding of the intersection between the political economy and the objectives of the ambitious plans that never materialized. It mirrors what happened in many other Settlement Schemes where as a result of disconnect between government objectives and their implementations, well-thought-out agricultural plans ended up being white elephant projects. The findings are crucial in informing not just Historians, but also policy makers on the essence of sustainable maintenance of projects of such kind.

6.2 Conclusion

The study makes the following conclusions:

The colonial-initiated settlement policy promoted mixed farming agricultural model in Ndalat Settlement scheme centred on hybrid white maize and dairy production. This system was deliberately chosen to align with colonial visions of a modern, monetized countryside. It required the adoption of imported hybrid seeds, inorganic fertilizers, and exotic cattle breeds such as Friesian, Guernsey, Red Poll, and Ayrshire which were presented as superior to indigenous varieties. In practice, this shift displaced diverse, low-input indigenous systems based on finger millet, sorghum, variegated maize, and hardy local livestock. These traditional practices, though resilient and ecologically adapted, were dismissed as backward and inefficient, paving the way for an input-dependent agronomy that tied farmers to external markets and state-controlled supply chains.

To manage this transformation, the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society was established as the central institutional mechanism. The cooperative was not a grassroots initiative but a state-mediated structure designed to enforce production quotas, distribute inputs, provide extension services, and channel output to statutory marketing boards. These boards—including the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC), Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA), Dairy Board, and later the National Cereal and Produce Board operated as monopsonies, effectively controlling prices and suppressing competition. While framed as instruments of market stability and quality control, they systematically limited farmers' income potential and discouraged diversification or value addition.

Parallel to agronomic change was a profound reorganization of land tenure. Through concerted efforts at land consolidation and registration, the scheme advanced a capitalist model of individualized, alienable property rights. This represented a radical departure from communal or lineage-based systems that had historically governed land access in many African communities. In Ndalat, each plot was registered in the name of a single (typically male) household head, formalizing private ownership and enabling credit enforcement, tax collection, and state oversight. This legal shift was not merely administrative; it was a social and ideological project that redefined relationships to land, labour, and community.

The social impact of the scheme extended far beyond the farm. Ndalat became a site of cultural transformation, where settlers were introduced to Western medicine, formal education, and Christian religious practices often through mission-linked institutions. Traditional social institutions and practices were either eroded or actively suppressed. Reciprocal labour systems such as 'kesumet', which had underpinned communal farming and social cohesion, faded as individualized production took hold. Similarly, cultural rites like female genital mutilation were discouraged in line with colonial moral agendas. The nuclear family emerged as the dominant domestic model, reinforced by housing layouts, inheritance norms, and state recognition. Coupled with initial improvements in food security, this contributed to rapid population growth. Over time, however, customary inheritance practices led to the subdivision of the original 15-acre plots among male heirs, fragmenting holdings into units too small to support commercial viability a process that undermined the scheme's original economic logic.

The legacy of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme is complex and enduring. On one hand, it successfully integrated a segment of the landless African population into the postcolonial economy, provided a template for subsequent settlement programs like the Million-Acre Scheme, and institutionalized key rural development structures—including cooperatives, extension services, and mixed farming. It created a new class of market-oriented smallholders who contributed to national food production and export earnings in the early independence period.

On the other hand, the scheme entrenched structural vulnerabilities. It dismantled ecologically resilient indigenous agricultural systems in favour of fragile, input-dependent models. It reinforced economic dependency through monopsonistic marketing structures that extracted surplus and stifled innovation. The individualization of land tenure, while enabling credit access for some, also accelerated social differentiation, contributing to landlessness, tenancy, and rural inequality. Moreover, the cultural dislocations it provoked while framed as "modernization" often severed communities from sustainable social and ecological practices.

In sum, the Ndalat Settlement Scheme was far more than a land redistribution initiative. It was a comprehensive social engineering project that sought to produce not only crops, but compliant, individualized, and economically integrated subjects ready to sustain Kenya's transition to independence within a capitalist framework. Its successes in political stabilization and agrarian incorporation were real, but so too were its costs: the erosion of indigenous knowledge, the creation of new forms of dependency, and the long-term fragmentation of rural livelihoods. The echoes of Ndalat continue to shape Kenya's agrarian landscape, serving as a powerful reminder of how development interventions, even when well-intentioned, can carry deep and lasting contradictions.

6.3 Recommendations

Given the enduring legacy of colonial agricultural policy, characterized by individualized land tenure, monopsonistic marketing structures, and fragmented smallholdings any effort to rejuvenate agricultural productivity in Ndalat must move beyond mere restoration of past models. Instead, a forward-looking, integrated strategy is required to address contemporary constraints while building on existing assets. The following interlinked policy interventions are proposed to enhance farm productivity, income resilience, and rural livelihoods in the scheme.

6.3.1 Creation of Alternative and Efficient Market Structures

The historical dominance of state-controlled marketing boards such as the Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB) has entrenched monopsonistic pricing that consistently disadvantages smallholder farmers. To redress this structural imbalance, the government should facilitate the development of alternative, competitive market platforms enabled by information and communication technologies (ICTs). Digital commodity exchanges, mobile-based market linkages, and transparent price-discovery mechanisms can empower farmers to bypass intermediaries and access real-time market information. By connecting producers directly with processors, retailers, and export markets, such platforms would foster competitive pricing, reduce post-harvest losses, and ensure farmers receive a fairer share of end-consumer value. This shift is essential to transform agriculture from a subsistence activity into a profitable enterprise.

6.3.2 Intensification of Smallholding Agricultural Systems

The initial success of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in the 1960s and 1970s was rooted in a supervised model of agricultural intensification, supported by strong institutional oversight from bodies like the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT). With the decline of such structures, many farms regressed to low-input, subsistence-level practices, leading to the erosion of productive capital. Despite the drastic reduction in average plot sizes due to subdivision, intensification remains viable—provided it is reoriented toward specialization and efficiency.

Given Ndalat's agro-ecological suitability, a strategic focus on dairy production particularly zero-grazing systems combined with complementary crop enterprises offers a promising pathway. However, zero-grazing is capital-intensive and requires reliable access to feed, water, veterinary services, and housing infrastructure.

Therefore, government support through targeted policies, extension services, and input subsidies is critical. Agricultural extension should go beyond generic advice to offer tailored guidance on optimal planting schedules, seed varieties, fertilizer regimes, and livestock breeds, alongside clear risk assessments for each enterprise.

6.3.3 Crop Diversification Aligned with Agro-Ecological Potential

With limited land availability, crop diversification must be guided by ecological suitability and market demand rather than tradition alone. Historically, the area supported coffee cultivation under white settler farming, a crop that could be reintroduced given favorable conditions. Beyond cash crops, there is significant potential to expand production of high-value horticultural crops such as vegetables, which enjoy strong demand in nearby urban centers. Additionally, drought-tolerant staples like bananas, cassava, and potatoes can enhance household food security during dry spells.

The presence of reliable water sources further opens opportunities for irrigated horticulture and integrated dairy-horticulture systems. A deliberate effort should be made to map the agro-ecological zones within Ndalat and promote a portfolio of crops that balance nutritional needs, income generation, and climate resilience. Such an approach would reduce overreliance on maize, a crop increasingly vulnerable to climate shocks and price volatility.

6.3.4 Enhanced Credit Accessibility for Rural Producers

Access to finance remains a critical bottleneck. To enable intensification and diversification, innovative credit mechanisms must be introduced. These should combine cash loans and in-kind inputs (e.g., certified seeds, fertilizers, animal feed, and veterinary supplies). Cash credit schemes could be developed in partnership with local banks and SACCOs, using land leasehold titles or group guarantees as collateral. Farmers would submit simple business proposals outlining expected yields, market channels, and profit margins. Loan repayment could be structured through direct deductions from produce sales, minimizing default risk while ensuring liquidity for reinvestment.

6.3.5 Provision of Agricultural Insurance and Risk Mitigation Mechanisms

Agriculture in Ndalat, as elsewhere, is exposed to multiple risks, climatic, biological, and market-related. To build resilience, the government should promote affordable, accessible agricultural insurance products tailored to smallholders. These could include weather-indexed insurance, pest outbreak coverage, and price-hedging instruments. Additionally, the state should reintroduce a Guaranteed Minimum Return (GMR) mechanism for key commodities like milk and maize, providing a safety net during periods of collapse in output or prices due to drought, disease, or market failure. Long-term risk-pooling arrangements—possibly integrated with artificial insemination (AI) and extension services would further stabilize farmer incomes and encourage investment.

6.3.6 Promotion of Food Sufficiency and Access to Appropriate Technology

National food security depends on empowering smallholders to produce efficiently. The government should prioritize a strategic policy of food self-sufficiency, with emphasis on appropriate mechanization. Rather than large-scale machinery, small, affordable farm tools and implements such as motorized pumps, mini-tractors, shellers, and milk cooler should be made available through subsidies or hire-purchase schemes. Timely access to subsidized inputs, including quality seeds and fertilizers, must be guaranteed to stimulate consistent production. Such measures would not only boost yields but also reduce labour drudgery, particularly for women and youth.

6.3.7 Agricultural Value Addition through the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society

As farm sizes shrink and per-unit incomes decline, value addition becomes essential to sustain rural livelihoods. The Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society must be revitalized not merely as a marketing channel, but as a processing and enterprise hub. The society could invest in milk pasteurization, yogurt production, maize milling, or fortified flour processing, capturing higher margins from raw commodities. Profits from these activities could be reinvested into member services or distributed as dividends, creating a virtuous cycle of collective economic advancement.

6.3.8 Promotion of Alternative Non-Farm Income-Generating Activities

Finally, rural poverty in Ndalat cannot be addressed through agriculture alone. An integrated rural development strategy must include non-farm economic activities. Drawing from earlier national plans such as the 1997–2002 blueprint, Rural Small-Scale Enterprises (RSSEs) should be promoted particularly agro-based industries located in rural centers that use local farm produce as raw materials. However, the historical model that treated rural communities solely as suppliers of raw materials must be replaced with inclusive value chains that allow farmers to participate in processing, packaging, and retail.

Support should also extend to traditional rural crafts and trades—including brick-making, carpentry, masonry, tailoring, and leatherwork—which provide critical off-farm income, especially during agricultural off-seasons. When combined with agricultural intensification and market access, such enterprises can form a diversified rural economy capable of absorbing demographic pressure and reducing vulnerability.

6.4 Suggestion for Further Studies

The study makes the following suggestion for further studies;

a) Evaluate the economic potential of the peasantry agricultural systems that are resultant from settlement schemes.

b) Examine the informal land tenure systems (generational transfers, inheritance and other cultural practises relating to women) that are currently prevailing in the settlement schemes.

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Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer two, Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023

Oral interview, Former Agricultural officer Mosop Division, March 22nd 2023

Oral interview, farmer/former chair, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative, November 4th 2020

Oral interview, resident farmer (Kapbruss village), 10th March, 2021

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Oral interview, former cooperative inspector, February 15th 2022

Oral interview, pioneer farmer, April 1st 2020

Oral interview, Pioneer Farmer, May 9th 2022

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Primary Sources

a. List of informants

No	Name(year of birth)	Designation	Dates
1	Key Informant One, Mr Tarus (1938)	Former Agricultural Inspector one	May 5th 2022
2	Key Informant Two, Mr Tarkwen (1940)	Former Cooperative Inspector	February 15th 2022
3	Key Informant Three, Mr Kebenei (1930)	Former Agricultural Inspector two	May 28th 2022
4	Key Informant Four, Mr John Kosgei (1939)	Farmer/Retired Senior Settlement Officer	February 12th 2021
5	Key Informant Five, Mr Malakwen Kosobo (1936)	Pioneer Farmer	June 12th 2022
6	Key Informant Six, Mr Kipkosgei Butuk (1932)	Pioneer Farmer	May 9th 2022
7	Key Informant Seven, Mr Peter Keino (1942)	Farmer/Pioneer Headteacher, Nyigon Primary School	May 6th 2021
8	Key Informant Eight, Mr Nathan Koisir(1929)	Pioneer Farmer	April 1st 2020
9	Key Informant Nine, Mr Lamai (1960)	Former Agricultural Officer, Mosop Division	March 29th 2023
10	Key Informant Ten, Mr Kipkoech Rono (1943)	Farmer (Kapmakiton),	March 20th 2021
11	Key Informant Eleven, Mrs Cecilia Korir (1929)	Farmer (Kapbruss Village)	March 20th 2021
12	Key Informant Twelve, Mr Job Maiyo (1924)	Farmer (Kapbruss village)	June 6th 2021
13	Key Informant Thirteen, Mrs Jane Kiptergech (1928)	Farmer (Kapsigirio Village)	March 20th 2021
14	Key Informant Fourteen Mr Morton Lelei (1958)	Former Agricultural Officer two, Mosop Division	March 22nd 2023
15	Key Informant Fifteen, Mr Nathaniel Mengich(1938)	Farmer/Former Chair, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society	November 4th 2020
16	Key Informant Sixteen, Mr Naftali Nyango (1940)	Farmer/Former Treasurer, Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative society	September 28th 2022
17	Key Informant Seventeen, Mr Benjamin Ng'etich (1948)	Farmer/Former Clerk to Ndalat Cooperative Society	February 24th 2021
18	Key Informant Eighteen, Araap Boit,	Farmer/Retired Soldier	October 3rd 2020
19	Key Informant Nineteen, Mr Anthony Sitienei (1952)	Farmer (Elder, Kapsigirio Village)	September 15th 2020
20	Key Informant Twenty, Mr Chepkesir Rono (1940)	Resident Farmer	April 7th 2022
21	Key Informant Twenty One, Mr David Simbolei	Pioneer Farmer	May 15th 2021

	(1942)		
22	Key Informant Twenty Two, Mrs Tecla Rugut (1952)	Farmer/Copy typist, to Ndalat Cooperative Society	May 15th 2021
23	Key Informant Twenty Three, Mr Kiptalam Seurei (1940)	Pioneer Farmer	August 20th 2021
24	Key Informant Twenty Four, Mr Chobotony Barno (1940)	Pioneer Farmer	March 14th 2021

b. Archival Sources

KNA/AN/32/54, Native Agriculture, Nandi 1945-1948.

KNA/KPT/DC/1/2/4, KNA, Labour 1942

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/28/1955

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KNA/Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Report, 1954.

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KNA/AN/42/29, 1954-1955

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/29/1956, p.18

KNA/Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Report, 1955

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/29/1956, p.18

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/29/1957, p. 14

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958, p.19

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KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/28/1955, p.18

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/30/1957, p.1

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958, p.25

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/33/1960

Kenya National Archives/Ndalat Master Plan, 1963/64 TR/8/T572. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1964.

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/31/1958

KNA/Department of Settlement/15/43

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/29/1956

KNA/DC/ICER/1/28/1955, p.22

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/32/1959

KNA/Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Report, 1956

KNA/KPT/DCNAN/1/29/1956

KNA/NES/ADM/16 report by the soil conservation service in Ndalat 1967

KNA/Ndalat Master Plan, 1964, TR/8/T572

Government of Kenya (2008); Sessional Paper of the National Livestock Policy

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Interview Schedule

Specific Response Information:

Analysing to examine the economic and social impact of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County, from 1954 - 1992.

1. What have been the economic activities at Ndalat Settlement Scheme since its inception?

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2. How were the farms allocated to the eventual beneficiaries of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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3. Who was involved in the allocation of farms at the Ndalat Settlement Scheme during that period?

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4. What has been the economic impact of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme on Nandi County?

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5. What has been the social impact of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme on Nandi County?

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Examining the legacy of colonial agricultural policy and infrastructure on influencing pre-independence Kenyan settlement schemes with specific reference to Ndalat.

6. Do you know any colonial agricultural policy that guided the activities at Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

If Yes, can you mention it below;

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7. Do you know any independent government agricultural policy that guided the activities at Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

If Yes, can you mention it below;

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8. How do you evaluate the two policies in regard to Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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Comparing historical perspectives of dairy and maize farming as economic and social activities in Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County.

9. Between dairy and maize farming at Ndalat Settlement Scheme, which came first?

………………………………………….. Which year? ……………………………..

10. How did dairy and maize farming as an economic activity change the population around Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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11. How did dairy and maize farming as an economic activity change the population around Nandi County?

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12. How did dairy and maize farming as a Social activity change the population around Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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13. How did dairy and maize farming as a social activity change the population around Nandi County?

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14. How did the government get involved in Ndalat Settlement Scheme to intervene?

i. Economically

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ii. Socially

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Analysing the economic and social influence of Ndalat Settlement.

15. How do you evaluate the economic and social influence of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme to date in Nandi County?

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Assessing the challenges presented by the development of the Ndalat Scheme.

What challenges can you list in association with the development of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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What challenges were brought by the government in association with the development of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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What challenges were posed by the people of Ndalat in association with the development of the Ndalat Settlement Scheme?

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Appendix II: Archival Evidence

Addendum 1: DS 15/43; Financial Budgets for the Model plots A, B & C

Registry
Please file PR

58

DS. 15/43/

25th September, 5.

The Area Settlement Controller (N),
P.O. Box 408,
ELDORET.

NDALAT NO. 43

BUDGET

Herewith as requested extra copies of budgets for Category A & B plots. The Category C plot will have the same Settlement Charge and Development loan and based on a cattle economy, the details of the budget I'll discuss with S.C.P.O. when he is next in.

2. The Documents have been ordered by the Loan Officer and should be ready in about 10 days.

PR

(P.H. GATLEY)
for DIRECTOR OF SETTLEMENT.

c.c.
S.C.P.O.

May we have your suggestion for Category C. ?.

see also 7

Scheme Ndalat No. 43. Date:- August, 1965.

BUDGET

Plot category	- A	Average size 17.6 acres.
Target income	-£40 plus subsistence.	
Settlement charge	-4,000/-	
Land loan	-4,000/-(30 years @ 6½%), annual repayment	306/-
Development loan	-3,000/-(10 years @ 6½%), annual repayment	412/-

Loan schedule.	Shs.	Qualifying capital.	Shs.
Livestock	1,650	Stamp duty	80
Housing & fencing	600	Legal fees	40
Establishment of crops	750		120
	3,000		

Farm plan at maturity (4th year)		Livestock Inventory.	
0.6 acre	homestead	3 cows	3 L.U's.
2.0 "	subsistence	1 heifer	1 L.U's.
4.0 "	maize	1 yearling)	
2.0 "	fodder-crops.	1 calf)	½
9.0 "	grazing.	)	4.5 L.U's
17.6 "		= 3.9acres per L.U.	

Income.	Shs.
4 acres maize, 10 bags per acre @ 30/- per bag.	1,200
3 cows @ 300 gals:- 600 gals @ 1/50 per gal contract	900
300 gals @ 1/- per gal. butterfat.	300
Sale of 1 surplus calf @ 30/-.	30
Sale of 1 cull cow @ 300/-.	300
	2,730.

Expenses.	Shs.
4 acres maize @ 150/- per acre.	600
2 acres fodder-crops @ 90/- per acre.	180
4.5 L.U's @ 70/- per L.U.	315
	1,095

Loan repayments, Land and Development loans.	718.

BUDGET

Average size 28 acres.

Plot category	- B
Target income	-£40 plus subsistence.
Settlement charge	-4,000/-
Land loan	-4,000/-(30 years @ 6½%), annual repayment 306/-
Development loan	-3,000/-(10 years @ 6½%), annual repayment 412/-

Loan schedule.	Shs.
Housing & fencing	200
Livestock	2,800
	3,000

Qualifying capital.	Shs.
Stamp duty	80
Legal fees	40
	120

Farm plan at maturity (4th year)

0.5 acre	homestead
2.0 "	subsistence
3.0 "	fodder-crops.
23.5 "	grazing
28.0	

Livestock Inventory.

6 cows	6 L.U's.
2 heifer/steers	2
2 yearling 2 calves	1
	9 L.U's.

= 2.9 acres per L.U.

Income.	Shs.
6 cows @ 300 gals:- 900 gals. @ 1/50 per gal. contract.	1,350
900 gals. @ 1/- per gal. butterfat.	900
2 culls or steers surplus @ 300/-.	600
2 surplus calves @ 30/-.	60
	2,910.

Expenses.	Shs.
9 L.U's @ 70/- per L.U.	630
3 acres fodder-crops @ 90/- per acre.	270
	900.

Loan repayments, Land and Development loans. 713.

Gross margin: Plus subsistence Shs.1292

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Addendum 2: Plot Allocation to the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society

DS. 15/43

16

DS/31/30/CS.944.Vol.11/86:WDM.

27th November, 5.

Commissioner for Cooperative Development,
P.O.Box 811,
NAIROBI.

APPLICATION FOR TRADING PLOT.
NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME NO.43.
REF. YR. REMINDER CS/944/33 ON YOUR
CS.944/32.

I have no objection on the Society being allocated with a plot in the Ndalat Settlement Scheme Trading Centre for hardware as indicated in the D.C.'s (Uasin Gishu) letter Ref. No. LND.16/4/3/1/19 of 19th June, 1965, provided that first the financial aspect of the society is sound enough to meet capital and running expenses; secondly, if the D.O., S.O. and A.C.O. are satisfied with the running of this society, particularly on loan repayment etc; thirdly, if the By-Laws of this Society are amended accordingly to enable the Society run business other than that specified in the By-Laws of the Society under the heading "Objects" or, if the society is to use this plot for a store for 'Stores for Resale to Members' e.g. farming requisites, then there would be no need for amendment of the BY-Laws. The only question would then be whether they have sufficient capital in hand to put up the building.

W. D. MWASI
(W.D. MWASI)
AG. ASST. COMMISSIONER FOR COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT(S)

WDM/UMR.

c.c. Commissioner of Lands, NAIROBI.
D.C., Uasin Gishu District.
P.C. Nairobi.
A.S.C.(N) Eldoret.
S.S.O. (N) Hoey's Bridge.
C.O. (N) Hoey's Bridge.
Chairman, Ndalat F.C.S., Box 182, ELDORET.

Addendum 3: Tractor Acquisition by the Ndalat Farmers' Cooperative Society

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT

Telegrams: "SETTLEMENT", Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 27831/7
When replying please quote
Ref. No. [illegible]/31/30/C[illegible].944/Vol.11/135:[illegible]
and date

SETTLEMENT FUND TRUSTEES
P.O. Box 30450
NAIROBI

17th June, 1966.

Commissioner for Cooperative Development,
NAIROBI.

Director of Settlement,
NAIROBI.

not copied to
S.

NDALAT FARMERS COOP. SOCIETY LTD.
RE: INVESTIGATION ON THE PURCHASE
OF 4 TRACTORS.

Further to my loose minute to D.S. copied to C.C.D., Ref. [illegible]/31/30/C[illegible].944/Vol.11/128:[illegible] of 10th June, 1966, I wish to report as follows:-

1. The 4 tractors were bought during December, 1964, when Mr. Patt, a [illegible].C.V., was stationed in the Scheme when Mr. John [illegible]dungu[illegible] was the C.O. (S) Eldoret.

2. It was said by the Management Committee that they were advised by Mr. Patt, P.C.V., that they would do very well if they had these tractors and that he would approach S.F.T. to give a loan of about Sh.100,000/= towards the purchase of these tractors. When he approached S.F.T. during Mr. Finlayson's time as A.[illegible].C.(N) he objected to this idea. During this time, the Society went ahead in preparing for this loan and in a Committee Meeting held on 4/12/64 they resolved under their Mint. No. 90/64 that their Borrowing Powers be raised to Sh.180,000/= to enable them to purchase the 4 tractors. In the Scheme there was a member, Mr. Kiprop Arap [illegible]bonei, who owned 2 new tractors. Under Mint. No. 91/64 the Management Committee resolved to purchase Mr. Kiprop's 2 tractors at Sh.19,096/= including Insurance and registration. Under Mint. No. 1[illegible]1/64 of a meeting held on 28/12/64 the Committee resolved to trade in their tractor No. [illegible].65 and purchase 2 new tractors on hire purchase terms having failed to obtain a loan from S.F.T..

3. Unfortunately, these resolutions to purchase the 4 tractors were never put to General Meeting to resolve on them with an exception of increasing the Borrowing Powers. Nor were the Hire-Purchase terms refered to C.C.D. for his approval as provided in the Cooperative Act, Section No. 34, Cooperative Rules Nos. 23,24 and By-Laws No. 22(1).

4. The Maximum Borrowing Powers for Ndalat F.C.S. Ltd. passed and approved by C.C.D. was Sh.80,000/= during May 1963. This was raised by Resolution No. 10[illegible]/64 of 7th December, 1964 to Sh.120,000/= and approved by the C.C.D. on 27/4/65. The Management Committee, therefore, had gone astray to incurring debts well over their liabilities approved by both the General Meeting and C.C.D.

5. The Society could not run these tractors economically due to mismanagement and drought. They failed to keep their Hire Purchase terms and the 4 tractors were repossessed by Bailey and Roberts in May 1965, leaving the Society with a debt of Sh.6,000/50 on repairs to settle.

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....2....

6. Though the Management Committee members and the Society were ill-advised by Mr. Patt and probably not advised by the then Cooperative Officer, the responsibility to have purchased these 4 tractors still lies on the then Management Committee members who are as follows:-

1)	Chairman	: Mr. Christopher Sumoe.
2)	Treasurer	: Mr. Yakub Kuroi.
3)	Hon-Secretary	: Mr. Kiprop Kibenei.
4)	Committee,	: Mr. Moses Kenya.
5)	"	: " John Arap Ingal.
6)	"	: " Stanley Mospei.
7)	"	: " Kipter Rono.
8)	"	: " Edward Kori.
9)	"	: " John Lelei.

7. It may be necessary to consult the General Meeting on this before any decision is made on having the liability incurred on those tractors is placed on the Management Committee.

8. As a matter of interest, while I was at this meeting I looked at the Ledger Book and Monthly Trial Balances since May 1965 to 31st April 1966 and noticed that Machinery Services (Gailey & Roberts) was still shown as Creditor to the Society to the extent of Sh.62,881/93 while in fact was Sh.6,002/50. I instructed the C.O. (S), Mr. L. Ruto and his Coop.Asst. to adjust the accounts immediately. By copy of this letter the Examiners of Accounts (Settlement) ~~may~~ shall note this and adjust the Trial Balances accordingly.

(N.D. MWASI)
AG.ASST.COMMISSIONER FOR COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT(S)

NDM/BHR.

c.c. A.S.C.(N).
S.S.O. Eldoret.
C.O. (S) "
E.A.S. (Settlement).

DS 182

/COPY/

(22)

MACHINERY SERVICES

GAILEY & ROBERTS LTD,
P.O. BOX 86,
ELDORET

Your DS./31/30/CS.944/Vol.II/107:MDM

May I see Koech's file please.

Ref. 66/687/ELD/MISC/C.3

30th March, 1966

The Acting Assistant Commissioner for Co-operative Development (S)
The Settlement Fund Trustees,
P.O. Box 30450,
NAIROBI.

RECEIVED
- 5 APR 1966
REGISTRY
SETTLEMENT FUND
TRUSTEES
4258

For the attention of: Mr. W.D. MBASI

Dear Sir,

Re: KOALAT FARMERS' CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY

With reference to you letter, as above, of the 7th instant, addressed to Mr. Hudson, we would reply as follows.

It is quite impossible for us to consider returning any of the equipment as for a start the repossessed tractors have long since been resold at a loss to this Company. We would advise you that these were repossessed on the instructions of the Credit Finance Corporation Ltd., Nairobi, who held the hire purchase agreements, and we were, therefore, acting as their agents.

In any case your facts are not quite correct. Originally, two of the tractors involved were bought by a person called Kiprop Kebenei who, like the Society, failed in making repayments and which ultimately, of course, lead to the repossession of the equipment concerned.

Secondly, you may not be aware of the fact that the above Society, apart from the hire purchase agreements, still owes this Company Shs. 6,002/50 on current account and this matter has been in the hands of our Solicitors for some time.

We trust that this explains the position and regret our inability to be of any further assistance to you in this instance.

Yours faithfully,
MACHINERY SERVICES

(Signed) H.A.C. JENKINSON
MANAGER - ELDORET / KITALE

HACJ/SAT

c.c.
V.G. Hudson, Esq.,
Machinery Services,
P.O. Box 30342,
NAIROBI.

DS

D.S. 15/47

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT

Telegrams: "Settlement", Nairobi
Telephone: Nairobi 27831/7
When replying please quote
Ref. No. DS/31/30/CS.944/Vol.II/107/WDM
and date

RECEIVED
-7 MAR 1966
MAIN OFFICE
MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT

SETTLEMENT FUND TRUSTEES
P.O. Box 30450
NAIROBI

7th March, 196.

Mr. Hudson,
c/o Gailey & Roberts Branch, Eldoret,
P.O. Box 88,
ELDORET.

Dear Sir,

NDALAT FARMERS COOPERATIVE SOCIETY LTD.

It has been reported to me that this Society bought 4 tractors from you and during last year when the Society failed to carry on payments you repossessed the machines thereby making the society lose about Sh.49,000/=. This deterred the progress of this society extremely and as you know these are Kenya Government Organizations to run these schemes successfully for the benefit of both the landless and the Government. This enterprise has cost the Kenya Government a lot of money (borrowed money) from World Bank etc. which has got to be paid back with high interest.

2. This Society had bad management by the time it purchased these tractors and since great efforts have been made during last year the society is now running efficiently. It is one of the good societies we are having in Kenya, repaying loans to S.F.T. satisfactorily.

3. In view of this, bearing in mind that this is a Government sponsored organization, it would be greatly appreciated by Director of Settlement, Commission r for Cooperative Development and myself if you could arrange to have these tractors returned to this society which is now in sound management control to ensure paying you the remaining amount and save the scheme failing, which the S.F.T. and Kenya Government cannot afford.

Yours faithfully,

W. D. MWASI

(W.D. MWASI)
AG. ASST. COMMISSIONER FOR COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT(S).

Copy to:-
C.C.D.
D.S.
A.S.C.(N).
S.S.O.(N).
C.O.(S) (N). - Nakuru Eldoret

WDM/G.

Addendum 4: Plot Sales during initiation period

MINUTES OF PLOT ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (SETTLEMENT)
MEETING HELD IN DISTRICT COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
ELDORET ON 24TH MAY, 1966 AT 2.15 P.M.

Present – R.A. Riyamy – District Commissioner Chairman
Dist. Agriculture Officer – Eldoret.
Senior Settlement Officer, Turbo
Settlement Officer, Ndalat.
Settlement Officer Elgeyo Border.
Area Investigation Officer, North.
Co-operative Officer Settlement Scheme.
Mr. L.K. Sigilai – M. Provincial Council.
Mr. A.Kandie – Unofficial member.
N.K. Dabhi – Secretary.

MINUTE 1 : ILLEGAL SALES OF PLOTS IN NDALAT.

The subject was discussed and it was made known that 6 plots were affected of this illegal practice. The Area Investigations Officer presented his report and recommendations on the situation.

MINUTE 2 : PLOTS IN AINABKOI EASE SETTLEMENT SCHEME.

The committee was informed that pending the outcome of negotiotions with the Special Commissioner for Squatters re; the future of evicted squatters, who are now in the Chief's Centre, it was not thought worth to consider the applications for the vacant plots in Ainabkoi East Settlement scheme.

MINUTE 3 : CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS.

Applicants were interviewed by the Committee and decisions taken as shown in the attached schedule.

MINUTE 4.

All other 15 applications were unsuccessful as no other plot available in Elgeyo Border was vacant. The applicants were so informed by committee.

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
ELDORET.

NKD/TKM.

(25)

DS 15/43/Vol.II/23/PDA:

21st April, 6

Area Settlement Controller (N),
P.O.Box 408,
ELDORET.

Re: Ndalat Extention Settlement Scheme
Uasin Gishu District
Ref: District Commissioner, Eldoret's
Letter LND.5/33 dated 15th April,
1966, addressed to you copied to this
Office

The only action that can be taken by the Settlement Fund Trustees in respect of those settlers settled on plots 465, 485, 488, 495 and 501 who have secretly sold these plots to other people is that they, the original allottees, forfeit the plots in accordance with condition B of their Letter of Allotment and that these plots are allocated to new applicants selected by the Uasin Gishu District Selection Committee, of which the District Commissioner is the Chairman, and that you or the District Commissioner, Eldoret prosecute the self chosen new occupiers for trespassing under section 3 (1) of the Trespass Act (CAP)294.

Please arrange with the District Commissioner, Eldoret accordingly.

(P.D. ABRAMS).
for DIRECTOR OF SETTLEMENT.

c.c.

District Commissioner,
Uasin Gishu District,
P.O.ELDORET.

PDA/JKR.

(24)

DS.15/43

LND.5/33.

15th April, 66

RECEIVED
20 APR 1966
5050
SETTLEMENT FUND TRUSTEES

The Area Settlement Controller (N)
ELDORET.

RE: NDALAT EXTENTION SETTLEMENT SCHEME
UASIN GISHU DISTRICT

It has been brought to my notice that the undermentioned plots, and some more others, of the above scheme changed hands. The original official settlers secretly sold their plots to other persons who come from neighbouring reserves of Nandi District:-

Plots so far disclosed:- 465, 485, 488, 495 and 501.

These plots were allocated in January this year to the registered displaced labour in the area who were seeking Government's assistance to get them settled as they were claiming to be destitute and landless. The way they acted appeared to show that they were no worth of the sympathy they received and would request for a firm action against them.

In order to stamp out this secret selling of settlement plots I would strongly recommend for a court action on the original settlers and have the hidden buyers evicted. I trust that a thorough investigation will be taken and please let me know the line of action you have taken on the matter.

R. A. RIYAMY

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
ELDORET.

RAR/TKM.

Copy to:- The Director of Settlement,
P.O. Box 30028,
NAIROBI.

" " The Provincial Commissioner,
Rift Valley Province,
P.O. Box 28,
NAKURU.

Senior Settlement Officer,
P.O. Box 3,
TURBO.

Addendum 6: List of Rejected applicants

APPLICANT	SCHEME	PLOT NO.	REMARKS
1. Chepketer w/o Kimenjo	Ndalat Ext.	-	Not recommended applicant not a of the area.
2. Mufogo s/o Ngusare	---"---	-	--------"---------"--------"-
3. Kitur arap Chepsirer	---"---	519	Recommended.
4. Trubena Cheboo	---"---	--	Not recommended applicant not of the area.
5. Joseph Sitienei	---"---	--	------"--------"--------"
6. Kipkurgat Arap Serem	---"---	--	------"--------"--------"------
7. Elijah Some Kiptanui	---"---	--	------"--------"--------"------
8. Mrs Leah Tindaret	---"---	--	Being considered for a special p
9. Chuma Arap Kesio	---"---	--	Not recommended applicant not a s of the area.
10. Charles Akaba	---"---	--	Not recommended. His father has ven plot No.51 514.
11. Tarakwa Lagat	---"----	482	Confirmed squatter, agreed plot No.48 be transferred on the consent of own
12. Mbimwa Ngaira	---"----	501	Confirmed squatter, agreed plot No.50 be transferred on the consent of own
13. Mugazi Bushereka	---"----	443	Confirmed squatter, agreed plot No.44 be transferred on the consent of own
14. Albert Kiarie	---"----	--	Not squatter. Himself not in.
15. Elia Jepkemei	---"---	488	A widow with seven children recommend plot No.488.
16. Chebii Kibetkwan	Elgeyo Border	252	Recommended.

Addendum 7: Coffee Plantation in Elgon Estate

NKU/BND/3842

29th. June, 66.

Soil Conservation Planning Officer,
P.O. Box 30450,
NAIROBI.

ELGON ESTATES (L.R. 11027 pt).

816 acres: 234.7 acres of coffee.

The coffee on their farm is in fair condition, but requires fertilizer and spraying. There is also some evidence of over bearing and some of the crop should be prunned off. The cleaning program should be stepped up - at the moment only ~~[illegible]~~ present but there is effidence of couch grass creeping in.

~~This~~ No enterprise is coffee. The area is suitabel for maize and also for cattle on a semi-~~enterpive grazier~~ gasis.

BUDGET.

Settlement Charge	557,000	
Less 10% deposit	55 700	
Land Loan	501,300	(£ 25,065)
Annual repayment	Sh. 38,200	(£ 1910)

Qualifing Capital.

Stamp Duty	11.140
Legal Fees	40
	11180

Working Capital

Sh. 10,000.

Development Loan.

30 dairy cows @ £ 35 ~~1050~~	1050
30 i/c dairy heifers @ £ 30	900
20 bulling heifers @ £ 20	400
1 S/H small ~~t~~ractor	500
Implements (plow, harrow,&trailer)	300
Sprayer	150
Fencing	750
Repair to coffee factory	100
Seeds and Fertilizer	750
	£ 4900

Annual repayment £ 674.
Total annual repayments £ 2584.

Income (at Maturity).

235 acres coffee @ 6 cwt = 70.5 Ton @ £ 300	21,150
80 cows @ 300 gallons @ 1/-	1200
75 acres maize @ 15 bags @ 30/-	1687
Sale of 20 cull cows @ £15	500
	24,537

-2-

Expenses.

70.5 Tons coffee @ £ 200 per ton	14,100
100 dairy L.a. @ 70/-	350
75 acres maize @ 300/-	1,125
25 acres fodder @ 100/-	125
	15700
Less loan repayments	2584
Margin £	5253

Livestock Inventary

80 dairy cows =	80 L.a.
20 heifers =	13.3
20 yearling heifer =	6.7

100 L.a. on 500 acres=
5 acres per L.a.

Maturity budget will not be attained till full stocking is reached. This will depend on what stock is available in the first instant. However the effect of stock availability is marginal in this case and full loan repayments should be ~~out~~ met from the coffee crop, from year 1.

P.W. GERRARD.

PWG/JBA.

File No. DS,15/43/II/32:FT

L.O.

NDALAT SCHEME - 43

Please prepare development loan documents for Plot 551 of the above scheme based on the following, and forward to Area Settlement Controller (North) for signing.

	£
Development Loan	4,900
Annual repayments over 10 years	674
Loan Schedule:	
Cattle	2,350
Tractor & implements	1,000
Fencing	700
Repair to Coffee Factory	100
Sprays, seeds and fertilizer	750
	4,900

(F.T.)
Ag. S.C.P.O.

7th July 1966

c.c. L.O. file
c.c. Area Settlement Controller (North)
ELDORET

32/1

SCPO

What are the initials of Mr. Wanguhu? I have no other records to trace this. Is this one of Assisted Owners?

8/7.

WANGUHU

Addendum 8: MacDonald Plot

(41)

LO/43/306/20:FT

8th Sept

Planning Officer
Soil Conservation Service
Dept of Agriculture
P. O. Box 95
ELDORET

NDALAT SCHEME 43

Plot 306 on the above Scheme was originally a special plot for Mr. MacDonald, since deceased. He bequeathed the plot to five of his old labourers. In order to settle them properly I would be grateful if you could divide the plot into 5 parts of equal potential.

This is necessary as we are legally unable to issue a letter of allotment to five signatories.

(F. Thornley)
Ag. SOIL CONSERVATION PLANNING OFFICER

E.M. to see

c.c.
DS.15/43

NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME NO. 43

EX-MCDONALD - DECEASED.

EX-SETTLEMENT. PLOT 306.

Plot No.	Total Acres	Arable	Non. Arable	Arable Equivalent.
522	53.6	8.2	45.6	24.5. Rocky&, SteepHill
523	15.2	15.2	-	15.2
524	14.5	14.5	-	14.5
525	15.2	15.2	-	15.2
526	15.2	15.2	=	15.2
TOTAL:	113.7	68.3	45.6	84.6

plus 550 | 252·4 Ex Macdonald '2' plot.

551 | 87.5 (Ex Porter LR 11027) '2' plot.

Total 12 ~~54.8~~ 41.1.]

Addendum 9: Original list of white settler farms

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT (48)

Telegrams: "SETTLEMENT",
Telephone: 21, TURBO.
When replying please quote
Ref. No. NDL.043/7/10
and date

THE SETTLEMENT OFFICER
NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME
P.O. Box 182,
ELDORET,

RECEIVED 9 DEC 1966 20490

....29th.November,.........1966

To · The Director of Settlement,
P.O.Box 30450,
NAIROBI. FOR ATTENTION OF (MR.L.P.MBUTHIA)

Thro' Area Settlement Controller(N),
P.O.Box 408,
ELDORET.

" Senior Settlement Officer,
Box 3,
TURBO.

Forwarded 1/12/1966

(47)

Re: Your letter, Ref: No.DS.15/43/Vol.II/LPM: 47
Regarding P.I. Schedule.

I here append a list of the P.I's on this location, L/R number and other particulars.

PLOT NO	NAME OF OWNER	L/R NO.	ACRES AND DESCRIPTION
309	D.Tweedie	9467/1	1 acre - House
352	Van Der Meden	766/2	Properly excised 35 acres, 10 acres is being considered for a school.
429	Bruce Tweedie	770/	Excised 1 acre, the house can be purchased by anyone.
102	J.Tweedie	5731/3	22 acres, township centre, the house being used as scheme office.
489/490	Van Royan	755/2/2	9 acres not excised, house not used.

The proformas are attached in the back of this letter.

N.J. NDIKA,
SETTLEMENT OFFICER,
NDALAT/SOSIANI.

NJI/KKA

Encl.

DEPARTMENT OF SETTLEMENT
A.S.C. (N) ELDORET
- 7 DEC 1966
RECEIVED

Proformas removed and filed in Ops Room Files
15/2.

Addendum 10: Settlement Officer's Report

15/43 original on Safari Report file

62

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT
Area Settlement Controller (North)
P.O. Box 408, Eldoret.

ASCN/11/10

RECEIVED
7 APR 1967

4th April, 1967.

The Director of Settlement,
Ministry of Lands and Settlement,
P.O. Box 30450,
Nairobi.

In pursuance of my programme for the month of March 1967 I hereby submit my Safari Report:

SENIOR SETTLEMENT OFFICER, NZOIA

HOEY'S BRIDGE SCHEME NO.11

Plots Of all demarcated plots in this Scheme, only three plots are not settled, i.e. No. 21, No.54 with P.I.s and No. 65; these are to be settled as soon as possible.

Action S.S.O.

Out of four Z plots settled, one ex-Danehurst has been sold to Mr. Mulama; the P.I.s were burned down and a report has been submitted accordingly. The rent of these P.I.s by S.F.T. is to cease.

Action S.S.O.

Dips There are two dips in this Scheme which are under repair, ready for the cattle when they become available; so far no cattle have been issued to this Scheme. These two dips will be adequate.

Spray Races There are two Spray Races on the Scheme which are incomplete. They should be disposed of as they will not be required even when cattle have been issued.

Action S.S.O.

P.I.S A P.I. Register must be kept wherein all P.I.s as per Valuations will be entered and their disposal recorded. The S.S.O. is to supply the S.O. with copies of all Valuations.

Action S.S.O. and S.O.

Ploughing It was noted that ploughing and the supply of fertilizer and seed was almost complete.

Cattle Issues As no cattle are available at the moment, cattle loans must be frozen.

Action S.S.O.

Budget The budget for the Scheme was not available. The S.S.O. is to supply it.

Action S.S.O.

Co-operative Society Application for registration has been submitted. All settled settlers except 100-acre plotholders have joined the Society.

I was impressed by the Settlement Officer who appeared to know his Scheme well.

NZOIA SCHEME NO. 10

Plots There are ten vacant plots to be settled in the normal way and three Z plots comprising 10 plots still unallocated; these are ex-Vorster, ex-Thurley 'B' and ex-Boshoff.

! Mr. Wafula

SENIOR SETTLEMENT OFFICER, TURBO

NDALAT SCHEME NO. 43

Plots Although the monthly return shows there are seven vacant plots, these should be deleted from the return as they are made up of :-

3 township plots 2 plots amalgamated with others

1 plot No.310 which does not exist on the ground

1 plot No.306 ex-McDonald divided into 5 plots, 522-526

P.I.s Proper records are to be maintained as explained to the S.O.; those P.I.s that have be n bought should be issued to the owners.

Dips Five dips, all in working order, are to be issued to the Co-operative on their approved loan.

Co-operative Society This Society has improved tremendously recently.

Ploughing, fertilizer and seed These are well in hand.

Plot Schedules These are to be supplied by the S.S.O.

SOSIANI SCHEME NO. 44

Plots All plots are settled.

Dips There are three dips all in working order.

Co-operative Society One Society covers both Ndalat and Sosiani, therefore there are no separate Co-operative problems in Sosiani.

Addendum 11: Sample application for a business plot



GAZETTE NOTICE NO........

96/A

THE REGISTERED LAND ACT 1963
(No. 25 of 1963)

...KAIGAT.....TOWNSHIP : SETTLEMENT SCHEME NO...43.....

The Commissioner of Lands on behalf of the Settlement Fund Trustees, gives notice that the plots in ...Kaigat Township.......................... ....as described in the Schedule appended hereto are available for alienation and application are invited for the direct grants thereof.

2. A plan of the plots may be seen at the offices of the District Commissioner and the Local Settlement Officer.

3. Applications should be submitted to the Commissioner of Lands through the District Commissioner and not direct so as to reach the District Commissioner not later than .15th October.....1968..

4. Applicants must enclose with their applications the sum of Shs.200 as a deposit, which will be dealt with as follows:-

(a) If the applicant is offered and takes up and pays for a plot within a period of 30 days as required in paragraph 5 below the deposit will be credited to him.

(b) If the application is unsuccessful the applicant's deposit will be refunded to him.

(c) If the application is successful and the applicant fails to take up and pay for the plot offered to him within a period of 30 days as required in paragraph 5, the Commissioner of Lands may declare the deposit forfeited and the applicant shall have no further claim thereto.

5. Each allottee of a plot shall pay to the Commissioner of Lands within 30 days of the notification that his application has been approved, the assessed stand premium and proportion of annual rent together with survey fees also the fees payable in respect of preparation and registration of the grant and stamp duty assessed at 2 per cent of the stand premium and annual rent, in default of payment of which within the specified time, the Commissioner of Lands may cancel the allocation and the applicant shall have no further claim to the grant of the plot offered.

General Conditions

The ordinary conditions applicable to township grants of this nature as varied hereby shall apply to the grants:-

(a) The grants shall be made initially for a term of 33 years convertible to 99 years in due course in cases where development has taken place to the required standard as shown in (b) below.

(b) The grantee will be required to erect within six months of the commencement of the lease buildings in traditional style in accordance with plans previously approved in writing by the Local District Council and the Commissioner of Lands. Should the buildings be of permanent materials and of an approved design and erected within two years of the commencement of the lease to the satisfaction of the authority concerned, the term of the lease, may, on application made prior to the expiry of the 33-year lease be extended to 99 years at such rental and condition as may then be prescribed.

............/2

15/
DS 4/3/
15/43.

PAUL KIPTANUI BOR

IMPALA FARM,
P. O. Box 536, ELDORET.
29/7/1967

(68)

The Director,
Ministry of Land & Settlement,
P.O. Box 30450,
NAIROBI:

RECEIVED
2 AUG 1967
104/68
REGISTRY
SETTLEMENT FUND
TRUSTEES

APPLICATION FOR A PLOT (BUSINESS) PLOT NO. 20.
REF NDALAT SETTLEMENT (KAIGAT 04852).

I humbly beg to apply for the above mentioned plot at KAIGAT CENTRE which is situated at Ndalat Settlement Scheme in plot Reference No 04852.

I have got sufficient money to build the permanent Business shop and to run it well.

Sir, if my application is approved I can assure you that I will do my best to show the others what to do.

I shall send the Legal Fees as soon as you approve my application.

Sir, I remain.

Yours faithfully

[signature]

P. K. Bor

~~LO.~~ DS.15/43 MRS. PAULINA & Mr. Paul Bot IMPALA FARM,
P.O. BOX 536, ELDORET
29/7/1967
69

The Director
Ministry of Land & Settlement
P.O. Box 30 450,
NAIROBI.

RECEIVED
2 AUG 1967
10466
REGISTRY
SETTLEMENT FUND TRUSTEES

Sir,

REF: APPLICATION FOR A BEER HALL (KAIGAT PLOT NO.27)
(REFERANCE PLOT NO. 04352 NDALAT)

We humbly beg to apply for the Beer Hall at KAIGAT CENTRE PLOT NO. 27. We have got some money to manage the Hall and bring it to a permanent building.

None of us has been charged for any offence in drunkness; neither Criminal ones.

Sir, if you approve our application we shall cover you with the payment of Fees and Start building the Hall with no further delay.

Sir, We remain

Yours faithful

Mrs Paulina Jepokeiyo (Partner) (P.K. Bot

[illegible]

Addendum 11: Plot repossession by SFT

(71)

MINISTRY OF LANDS AND SETTLEMENT

Telegrams: "SETTLEMENT",
Telephone:
When replying please quote
Ref. No. NDL.043/2/Vol.II/64
and date

THE SETTLEMENT OFFICER
NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME
P. O. Box 182, ELDORET,

20th July, 1967.

RECEIVED
10 AUG 1967
10750.

To The Director of Settlement,
P.O.Box 30450,
NAIROBI.

Thro' Area Settlement Controller(N), Forwarded 5/8/67
P.O.Box 408,
ELDORET.

" Senior Settlement Officer, Forwarded 4-8-67
P.O.Box 3,
TURBO.

DECLARING PLOTS VACANT.
NDALAT SCHEME 043.
PLOTS 77, 88 AND 93.

With regard to the above subject I wish to inform you that the above quoted plots have been vacated by Original settlers.

Plot 77 Total acreage 16 this plot was settled on 7th January, 1963 by Cheptobok A.Lagat who deserted the plot and left vacant.

Plot 88 Total acreage 17 this plot originally allocated to Mr. Kipseram A.Biego who settled on 1st March 1963 and after which derserted the plot during 1964 left vacant.

Plot 93 Total acreage 15. This plot was settled on 23-January, 1963 by Kiplagat A.Sambu who deserted the plot during March,1963. Funy enough these plots have illegally occupied by one illegal settler known as Kipchumba A.Choge. This illegal settler is unable to run the above plots as a whole. During 1965 21st May, plot 88 was served with notice to remedy breach of condition.

For information inrespect of loan dues as present billing concern is as below stated:-

Plot No. 77	--------	Shs. 2552.00
Plot No. 88	--------	Shs. 2553.00
Plot No. 93	--------	Shs. 2316.00
Totals	-------	Shs. 7421.00

71/1
S.I.O.
Pse deal.

And as such should be declared vacant. May I have authority to reposses 9 cattle are on the plots respectively Plot 77 - 2 cows Plot 88 - 2 cows Plot 93 2 cows 2 heifers 1 steer, and issue them to other settlers, Ndalat Ext. (Kaptabei).

71/2 Mr. Blakha
Please ... and deal.
S.I.O.

NJI/KKA

N.J. INDIKA,
SETTLEMENT OFFICER,
NDALAT/SOSIANI COMPLEX.

DEPARTMENT OF ...
AUG 1967

DS/15/43/75.

8th September, 7.

The Settlement Officer,
Ndalat Scheme,
P.O. Box 182,
ELDORET.

RE: PLOTS – 77,88 and 93
on Ndalat Scheme

I acknowledge your letter NDL/043/2/VOL.11/64, of the 20th July 1967. On the strength of this letter these plots were investigated on by an Officer from Head Office in your absence accompanied by S.F.T. Clerk from your office and the position is as follows:-

1. PLOT NO. 77 which is legally registered under the name of Mr. Cheptobok A. Langat has been sold to Mr. Kibet A. Koske for sometime past. Mr. Kibet was not present to be interviewed and I was informed that Mr. Cheptobok A. Langat's whereabouts is unknown.

2. PLOT NO. 88 legally belongs to Mr. Kipserem A. Biego, was sold to Chepkemei w/o Ngeny for Shs. 1,400/- about two years ago together with two cows and a small grass thached hut. Theplot has temporary fencing and a bigger hut is being erected. It is claimed that since then a total of about Shs.900/- has been paid towards loan repayments and that the new settler is a member of the Co-operative. Mrs. Chepkemei w/o Ngeny is a widow and has approximately 7 acres maize crop on the plot. Mr. Kipchumba A. Choge only happened to be this woman's son otherwise he (Kipchumba) has nothing to do with this plot although, he helps her on the management of the plot. The original settler's whereabouts is not known and has hot been anywhere near the plot for the last 2 years, he is believed to be somewhere in Kitale town.

3. PLOT NO. 93. This farm was bought from Mr. Kiplangat A. Sambu, who is thelegal owner ab ut two years ago by Kipchumba A. Choge together with the two cows issued to him, plus a small hut and the fencing for Shs. 1,000/-. Kipchumba has since paid Shs.600/- in cash, plus proceeds totalling Shs.300/- from two steers born on the plot and sold by the Settlement Officer to meet loan repayments, he has about 10 acres maize crop in the ground which will be harvested towards the end of the year, half the proceeds which will go towards loan repayments, he is also a member of the Co-operative. The legal settler Mr. Kiplangat A Sambu has not been seen anywhere near the plot since handing over to Kipchumba and he is believed to be somewhere in Uganda.

In view of the circumstances under which these people have acquired these plots, I sympathise with their ignorancy and owing to the time they have been on these plots, I think we should help them to be legalised by getting the respective plots transferred to them. I have explained to S.F.T. Clerk and the settlers how to go about it, please do give them every assistance towards this goal.

c.c. to:-
A.S.O. (North).
S.S.O., (TURBO).

(P.M. SHITAKHA)
For: DIRECTOR OF SETTLEMENT

Telegrams: "DISTRICTER", Kapsabet
Telephone: Kapsabet 3
When replying please quote

Ref. No. ....LND.16/26/402.
and date

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE
NANDI DISTRICT
P.O. Box 30, KAPSABET

.29th November,..... 1967.

RECEIVED
2 DEC 1967

The Director of Settlement,
Settlement Fund Trustee,
P.O. Box 30450,
NAIROBI.

SAO

REPOSSESSED PLOTS

Your Office letter Ref. DS 16/7/A/Vol.II/95
dated 24th November, 1967 refers.

Upon request from the Senior Settlement Officer, Turbo, that plots No. 24 and 255 at Ndalat were planted with maize and needed reallocation immediately the District Selection Committee met on 27th May, 1967 and approved reallocation of the two plots to the following:

1. Mr. Kipkatam arap Sambu - Plot No. 24.
2. Mrs. Chepkirong w/o Cheronyei - Plot No. 253.

Minutes of this meeting are enclosed for your perusal and approval.

DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
NANDI.

PJK/AFKT.

c.c. The Area Controller,
P.O. Box 408,
ELDORET.

85/A

P. 2 of minutes missing - not enclosed. Spoke to DO1 in absence of D.C. He will post today. 7/12

85/B

R

3. Mr. Chepkwany Ruto - Rejected.

Appendix III: University Research Approval

MOI UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES

ELDORET
KENYA

8th May, 2024

NACOSTI (National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation),
P.O. Box 30623,
Utalii Hse.
NAIROBI.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: SAMOEI BASILIANO - SASS/DPHIL/HIS/01/2012

This is to certify that the above named is a bonafide student at Moi University, School of Arts and Social Sciences. He is pursuing a Degree in Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in History.

He has completed his coursework component and proposal and has now embarked on Thesis writing.

His Thesis is entitled: **"Colonial Agricultural Policy and Socio-Economic Transformation of Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County, Kenya, 1954 – 1992".**

Any assistance accorded to him will be appreciated.

DEAN
SCHOOL OF ARTS
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
MOI UNIVERSITY

PROF. MARY WAHOME
DEAN, SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

(ISO 9001:2015 Certified Institution)

Appendix IV: NACOSTI Research Permit

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **360499**

Date of Issue: **23/May/2024**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. BASILIANO KIRWA SAMOEI of Moi University, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Nandi on the topic: COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND SOCIO- ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME IN NANDI COUNTY, KENYA, 1954 - 1992 for the period ending : 23/May/2025.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/24/35688**

360499

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document, Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

See overleaf for conditions

Appendix V: County Commissioner's Office

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Tel: 053 5252621, 5252003, Kapsabet
Fax No. 053 – 5252503
E-mail:
nandicountycommissioner@gmail.com
When replying, please quote

Ref: No. NC.EDU. 4/3 VOL.II/(118)

HARAMBEE

County Commissioner's Office,
Nandi County
P.O. Box 30,
KAPSABET.

Date: 30th May, 2024

Basiliano Kirwa Samoei
Moi University
P.O. Box 3900.
ELDORET.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

This is in reference to letter No. NACOSTI/P/24/35688 dated 23rd May, 2024 from the Director General, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation on the above subject matter.

You are hereby authorized to conduct research on **"Colonial agricultural policy and socio-economic transformation of Ndalat Settlement Scheme of Nandi County "** for the period ending **23rd May, 2025.**

Wishing you all the best.

COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NANDI
04 NOV 2024
P.O.BOX 30-30300, KAPSABET

pp CAROLINE M. NZWILI,
COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
NANDI.

Appendix VI: County Education Office

REPUBLIC OF KENYA
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR BASIC EDUCATION

Email: cdenandicounty@yahoo.com
Telephone: 0773044624
When replying please quote

County Director of Education
NANDI COUNTY,
P. O. Box 36-30300,
KAPSABET.

Ref: NDI/CDE/RESEARCH/1/VOL.III/154

Date: 30th May, 2024

Mr. Basiliano Kirwa Samoei
Moi University
P.O Box 3900
ELDORET.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Reference is made to the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation's letter Ref: No. NACOSTI/P/24/35688 dated 23rd May, 2024.

The above named person has been granted permission by the County Director of Education to carry out research on **"*Colonial Agricultural Policy and Socio-Economic Transformation of Ndalat Settlement Scheme in Nandi County, Kenya, 1954-1992*"** for the period ending **23rd May, 2025.**

Kindly provide him all necessary support he requires.

For: County Director
of Education
NANDI COUNTY

Mathew C. Sum,
For: County Director of Education,
NANDI COUNTY.

Appendix VII: Plagiarism Report

SR741

ISO 9001:2019 Certified Institution

THESIS WRITING COURSE

PLAGIARISM AWARENESS CERTIFICATE

This certificate is awarded to

SAMOEI BASILIANO

SASS/DPHIL/HIS/01/2012

In recognition for passing the University's plagiarism

Awareness test for Thesis **entitled: COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF NDALAT SETTLEMENT SCHEME IN NANDI COUNTY, KENYA, 1954 – 1992** with a similarity index of 1% and striving to maintain academic integrity.

Word count: 57135

Awarded by

Prof. Anne Syomwene Kisilu

CERM-ESA Project Leader Date: 17/12/2024